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NOTE.
In

the first volume,

are considered

the

and in the first two titles of the second volume,

doctrines

relating to the birth, life, powers, acts,

obligations, and death of a corporation, effort being made to get a
view of the general principles as a whole.
This second volume, with the exception of the first two titles, deals

with the Corporation as a Subject and Source of Peculiar Rights and
Obligations in its twofold aspect of Corporate Relations and Individual Relations.
The Corporate Relations comprise the relation of the Corporation
to the State, including the Creating State, other States, and the National Government ; to the promoters ; to the officers ; to the shareholders; to the creditors, and to others.
The Individual Relations comprise the relations of the various
the promoters, the officers, the shareholders, and
groups of persons
the creditors, and each member of each group to the other groups or
members thereof, as well as the members of each group among themselves.

In most

several relations are developed by considering
the rights of each as against the others ; as, for example, in the Relathe
tion of the Corporation to its Shareholders are considered
cases

these

(i)

of the corporation as against the shareholders, and (2) the
rights of the shareholders as against the corporation; and likewise
with the rest, so far as possible ; in the Relation of the' Corporation
rights

to the State, however, it seemed better not to make such a separation.

TITLE

JII.

THE DOCTRINE

CHAPTER

OF

ULTRA VIRES. l

14.

GENERAL THEORY OF ULTRA VIRES TRANSACTIONS.
ARTICLE I.

MEANING

OF THE

TERM.

ATLANTIC R. R.

CO. v.

357.

Sec.

DEPUE, J.,
1886.

IN

CAMDEN

IN THE COURT
48 N.

AND

ING,
OF

ETC., R. R. CO.

ERROR AND APPEALS

J. L. Rep.

OF

530, on 574~575-

MAY'S LANDNEW JERSEY.

it

it,

The expression ultra vires is used in different senses
to express
either that the act of the directors or officers is in excess of their authority as agents of the corporation, or that the act of the majority of
the stockholders is in violation of the rights of the minority, or that
the act has not been done in conformity with requirements of the
charter, or that the act is one that the corporation itself has not the
capacity to do, as being in excess of its corporate powers.
The indiscriminate use of this expression, with respect to cases different in their nature and principles, has led to considerable confusion,
if not misapprehension.
Where the act done by directors or officers
is simply beyond the powers of the executive department of the corporation as the agency by which the corporation exercises its functions,
and not of the corporation itself, it may be made valid and binding
by the action of the board of directors, or by the approval of the
Where the act done by stockholders is not in excess
stockholders.
of the powers of the corporation itself, but is simply an infringement
upon the rights of other stockholders, it may be made binding upon
the latter by ratification or by consent implied from acquiescence.
Where the infirmity of the act does not consist in a want of corporate
but in the disregard of formalities prescribed,
power to do
may

5

;

;

;
1

;
7

4

;

2

;

2

2

;

;

;

3,

2

&

&

1

See on the general subject of ultra vires: Abbott's Digest, p. 870; 27
Ames,
Eng. Ency. 351; Angell
256;
Beach,
421-439; Boone,
Clark,
98-104; 12 Century Digest,
62-68; Cook,
6671545-1547;
Elliott,
683
200-230
12 Ency. Laws of England, p. 360
Green's Brice's
Ultra Vires
Morawetz,
540-561
575-724
Potter,
Reese Ultra Vires
758-769; Taylor,
264-338;
5638-5652;
Spelling,
Thompson,
5967-6042
8308-8331
Waterman,
Thompson,
Thompson,
160-161.

Note.

Am.

ULTRA VIRES.
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1 1 77

or may not be valid

as to third persons dealing bona fide with the
corporation, according to the nature of the formality not observed, or
the consequences the legislature has imposed upon non-observance.
These are all cases depending upon legal principles, not peculiarly
applicable to corporations, and the use of the phrase ultra -vires tends,
to confusion and misapprehension.
In its legitimate use, the expres
sion ultra vires should be applied only to such acts as are beyond the
In this sense it is to be applied in
powers of the corporation itself.
this case.
In the discussion of this subject a distinction is sometimes taken
between the acts of a corporation, which it is not expressly, or by
necessary implication, empowered to do, and acts expressly forbidden
it to do, treating the latter as incapable of being endowed with any
validity, and the former as susceptible of ratification, and capable of
obtaining validity from equitable estoppel.
See, also, 1869, Miner's Ditch Co. y. Zellerbach. 37 Cal. 543, 99 Am. Dec.
infra, p. 1200; 1899, National, etc., Loan Ass'n v. Home Sav. Bank, 181
111. 35, 72 Am. St. Rep. 245.
Also, note, 70 Am. St. Rep. 156.

300,

ARTICLE II.
Sec. 358.

THEORIES

( i ) Ultra vires
to make them.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER
1891.

IN

AS TO UNDERLYING

PRINCIPLES.

acts void because of legal incapacity

CHICAGO, R. I.
PAC. RY. CO.

& P.

RY. CO.

IN THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT.

v.

UNION

47 Fed.

Rep.

15, on 20, 21.

The doctrine of ultra vires has been thoroughly sifted within the
Thomas
its extent and limitations clearly defined.
last thirty years
v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 71 ; Branch v. Jesup, 106 U. S. 468, i
Sup. Ct. Rep. 495; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. St. Louis, A. & T. H.
R. Co., 118 U. S. 290, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1094; Oregon Ry. & Nav.
Co. v. Oregonian Ry. Co., 130 U. S. 1,9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 409; Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24, n Sup.
Ct. Rep. 478. Two propositions are settled. One is that a contract
by which a corporation disables itself from performing the functions
and duties undertaken and imposed by its charter is, unless the state
which created it consents, ultra vires. A charter not only grants
An acceptance of those rights is an
it also imposes duties.
rights
As it is a contract which binds the state
assumption of those duties.
not to interfere with those rights, so, likewise, it is one which binds
It is
the corporation not to abandon the discharge of those duties.
not
or
in
the
like
a
deed
or
vests
grantee
patentee,
not
patent, which
a
conis
it
is
more
it
but
full
of
alienation
title,
but
;
power
only

1

178

TRANSP. co. v. PULLMAN'S

PALACE CAR co.

359

tract whose obligations neither party, state or corporation, can, withThe other is that the powers
out the consent of the other, abandon.
of a corporation are such, and such only, as its charter confers; and
an act beyond the measure of those powers, as either expressly stated
A corporation has no natural or inor fairly implied, is ultra vires.
Created by the state, it has such powers
herent rights or capacities.
"only this, and nothing more."
as the state has seen fit to give it
And so, when it assumes to do that which it has not been empowered
by the state to do, its assumption of power is vain ; the act is a nullity ; the contract is ultra vires. These two propositions embrace
They are its alpha and omega.
the whole doctrine of ultra vires.

Sec. 359.

Same.

CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION
1891.

CO. v.

PULLMAN'S PALACE CAR CO. 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
S. 24, 66,

ii

Sup. Ct. 478.

139

U.

In error to the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Pennsylvania.
This was an action of covenant, brought September 21, 1886, by
the Central Transportation Company, a corporation of Pennsylvania, against Pullman's Palace Car Company, a corporation of Illinois, to recover the sum of $198,000, due for the last three-quarters
of the year ending July i, 1886, according to the terms -of an indenture of lease from the plaintiff of all its personal property to the
defendant, dated February 17, 1870, and set forth in full in the declaration.
Plaintiff was nonsuited in the court below, and then sued out this
writ of error.
The principal defense in this case, duly made
MR. JUSTICE GRAY.
by the defendant, by formal plea, as well as by objection to the plaintiff's evidence, and sustained by the circuit court, was that the indenture
of lease sued on was void in law, because beyond the powers of each
of the corporations by and between whom it was made.
[After disposing of a preliminary question of practice and reviewing the following cases: Railroad Co. v. Winans, 17 How. 30, 39;
Pearce v. Railroad Co., 21 How. 441-443 ; Zabriskie v. Railroad
Co., 23 How. 381, 398; Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 71, 80, 81,
82, 85, Branch v. Jesup, 106 U. S. 468, 478, 479, i Sup. Ct.
Rep. 495; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 118 U. S.
290, 309, 312, 630, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1094, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 68, 24;
Salt Lake City v. Hollister, 118 U. S. 256, 263, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep.
1055 ; Willamette Woolen Manuf'g Co. v. Bank of British Columbia, 119 U. S. 191, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 187; Green Bay & M. R.
1 Statement

abridged, and quotations

from cases omitted.

359
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VIRES.

Co. v. Union Steam-Boat Co., 107 U. S. 98, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep.
221 ; Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. Co. v. Keokuk & H. Bridge Co., 131 U.
S. 371, 384, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770; Oregon Ry., etc., Co. v. Oregonian Ry. Co., 130 U. S. i, 30, 32, 34, 35, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 409,
supra, p. 429.
The clear result of these decisions may be summed up thus: The
charter of a corporation, read in the light of any general laws which
are applicable, is the measure of its powers, and the enumeration of
those powers implies the exclusion of all others not fairly incidental.
All contracts made by a corporation beyond the scope of those powers are unlawful and void, and no action can be maintained
upon
The oblithem in the courts, and this upon three distinct grounds:
gation of every one contracting with a corporation to take notice of
the legal limits of its powers ; the interest of the stockholders, not to
be subjected to risks which they have never undertaken ; and, above
all, the interest of the public, that the corporation shall not transcend
the powers conferred upon it by law. A corporation can not, without
the assent of the legislature, transfer its franchise to another corporation, and abnegate the performance of the duties to the public, imposed upon it by its charter as the consideration for the grant of its
Neither the grant of a franchise to transport passengers,
franchise.
nor a general authority to sell and dispose of property, empowers the
grantee, while it continues to exist as a corporation, to sell or to lease
These prinits entire property and franchise to another corporation.
ciples apply equally to companies incorporated by special charter
from the legislature, and to those formed by articles of association
under general laws.

By a familiar rule, every public grant of property, or of privileges
or franchises, if ambiguous, is to be construed against the grantee,
and in favor of the public ; because an intention, on the part of the
government, to grant to private persons, or to a particular corporation,
property or rights in which the whole public is interested, can not be
presumed, unless unequivocally expressed or necessarily to be implied
in the terms of the grant ; and because the grant is supposed to be
made at the solicitation of the grantee, and to be drawn up by him or
by his agents, and therefore the words used are to be treated as those
of the grantee ; and this rule of construction is a wholesome safeguard
of the interests of the public against any attempt of the grantee, by
the insertion of ambiguous language, to take what could not be obtained in clear and express terms.
Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge, 1 1 Pet. 420, 544-548 ; Railroad Co. v. Litchfield, 23 How.
66, 88, 89 ; Slidell v. Grandjean, 1 1 1 U. S. 412, 437, 438, 4 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 475. This rule applies with peculiar force to articles of association which are framed under general laws, and which are a substitute for a legislative charter, and assume and define the powers of the
corporation by the mere act of the associates, without any supervision
of the legislature or of any public authority.
Oregon Ry., etc., Co.
v. Oregonian Ry. Co., 130 U. S. 26, 27, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 413. 414.
* * * The plaintiff not
[After reviewing the terms of the lease.]

u8o
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only parts with all its means of carrying on the business, and of performing the duty for which it had been chartered, of transporting passengers
and making and letting cars to transport them in ; but it undertakes to
transfer, for 99 years, nearly co-extensive with the duration of its own
corporate existence, the whole conduct of its business, and the performance of all its public duties, to another corporation ; and to continue in existence during that period for no other purpose than that of
receiving, from time to time, from the other corporation the stipulated rent or compensation, and of making dividends out of the monConsidering the long term of the indenture, the pereys so received.
of
the property transferred, the large sums to be paid
ishable nature
the
defendant
by way of compensation, its assumption of the
quarterly by
avowal, in the indenture itself, of the infrank
and
debts,
the
plaintiff's
tention of the two corporations to prevent competition and to create a
monopoly, there can be no doubt that the chief consideration for the sums
to be paid by the defendant was the plaintiff's covenant not to engage in
the business of manufacturing, using, or hiring sleeping-cars ; and
that the real purpose of the transaction was, under the guise of a lease
of personal property, to transfer to the defendant nearly the whole
corporate franchise of the plaintiff, and to continue the plaintiff's existence for the single purpose of receiving compensation for not perThe necessary conclusion from these premises is
forming its duties.
that the contract sued on was unlawful and void, because it was beyond the powers conferred upon the plaintiff by the legislature, and
because it involved an abandonment by the plaintiff of its duty to the
*
*
*
public.

It was argued in behalf of the plaintiff that, even if the contract
sued on was void, because ultra vires and against public policy, yet
that, having been fully performed on the part of the plaintiff, and the
benefits of it received by the defendant, for the period covered by the
declaration, the defendant was estopped to set up the invalidity of the
contract as a defense to this action to recover the compensation agreed
But this argument, though sustained by decisions
on for that period.
in some of the states, finds no support in the judgments of this court.
[Citing and quoting from, to this effect : Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101
U. S. 86 ; Ashbury Ry., etc., Co. v. Riche, L. R. 7 H. L. 653 ; Union
Trust Co. v. Illinois Midland Ry. Co. , 1 17 U. S. 434 ; Pennsylvania R.
Co. v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 118 U. S. 316-318; Salt Lake City
v. Hollister, 118 U. S. 263; Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341,
350; Louisiana v. Wood, 102 U. S. 294; Parkersburg v. Brown,
106 U. S. 487, 503, i Sup. Ct. Rep.. 442 ; Chapman v. Douglas Co.,
107 U. S. 348, 355, 2. Sup. Ct. Rep. 62; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v.
Keokuk & H. Bridge Co., 131 U. S. 371, 389, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 776.]
The view which this court has taken of the question presented by this
branch of the case, and the only view which appears to us consistent
with legal principles, is as follows: A contract of a corporation,
which is ultra vires, in the proper sense, that is to say, outside the
object of its creation as defined in the law of its organization, and,
therefore, beyond the powers conferred upon it by the legislature, is

ULTRA
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not voidable only, but wholly void, and of no legal effect.
The objection to the contract is not merely that the corporation ought not to

a

6

it

if

a

it,

is

a

a

is

it

;

is

it,

is

is

it

is

is

a

is

it

it,

it,

it

is

it

it,

it

a

is

it

it

it,

have made
but that
could not make it.
The contract can not be
ratified by either party, because
could not have been authorized by
either. No performance on either side can give the unlawful contract
any validity, or be the foundation of any right of action upon it.
When
corporation
acting within the general scope of the powers
conferred upon
by the legislature, the corporation, as well as persons contracting with
has complied
may be estopped to deny that
with the legal formalities, which are prerequisites to its existence or to
its action, because such requisites might in fact have been complied
with. But when the contract
beyond the powers conferred upon
by
existing laws, neither the corporation, nor the other party to the contract,
can be estopped, by assenting to
or by acting upon
to show that
was prohibited by those laws.
The doctrine of the common law,
tenant of real estate
by which
estopped to deny his landlord's
title, has never been considered by this court as applicable to leases
It certainly
by railroad corporations of their roads and franchises.
has no bearing upon the question whether this defendant may set up
that the lease sued on, which
not of real estate, but of personal
property, and which includes, as inseparable from the other property
transferred, the inalienable franchise of the plaintiff,
unlawful and
void, for want of legal capacity in the plaintiff to make it. A contract ultra vires being unlawful and void, not because
in itself
immoral, but because the corporation, by the law of its creation,
the courts, while refusing to maintain any
incapable of making
action upon the unlawful contract, have always striven to do justice
between the parties, so far as could be done consistently with adherence to law, by permitting property or money, parted with on the
faith of the unlawful contract, to be recovered back, or compensation
to be made for it.
In such case, however, the action
not maintained upon the unlawful contract, nor according to its terms
but on
an implied contract of the defendant to return, or failing to do that,
has no right to
to make compensation for, property or money which
retain. To maintain such an action
not to affirm, but to disaffirm, the
unlawful contract. The ground and the limits of the rule concerning the
remedy, in the case of contract ultra vires, which has been partly performed, and under which property has passed, can hardly be summed
up better than they were by Mr. Justice Miller in
passage already
quoted, where he said that the rule "stands upon the broad ground
void, and that nothing which has been done
that the contract itself
nor the action of the court, can infuse any vitality into it;"
under
contract
and that, "where the parties have so far acted under such
that they can not be restored to their original condition, the court
relief can be given independently of the contract, or whether
inquires
will refuse to interfere as the matter stands." Pennsylvania R. Co.
v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 118 U. S. 317,
Sup. Ct. Rep. 1106,
maintain
Whether this plaintiff could
any action against this
1107.
meruit,
or otherwise, indein
defendant,
the nature of
quantum

Il82

P.,
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pendently of the contract, need not be considered, because it is not
This action, acpresented by this record, and has not been argued.
and prosewas
evidence,
brought
and
the
declaration
the
to
cording
cuted for the single purpose of recovering sums which the defendant
had agreed to pay by the unlawful contract, and which for the reasons and upon the authorities above stated, the defendant is not liable for.
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Brown, not having been a member of the court when
this case was argued, took no part in its decision.
See sequel to this case, 1897, Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Central
Note.
Transportation Company, 171 U. S. 138, holding: (1) That the Central Company is entitled to recover from the Pullman Company the value of property
transferred by it to that company when the lease took effect, with interest, as
that property has substantially disappeared, and can not now be returned ;
(2) That the value of that property is not to be ascertained from the market
value of the shares of the Central Company's stock at that time, but by the
value of the property transferred;
(3) That the value of the contracts with
railroad companies transferred by the Central Company form no part of the
sum which it is entitled to recover ; (4) That the same principle applies to the
patents transferred which had all expired; (5) That it is not entitled to recover anything for the breaking up of its business by reason of the contracts
being adjudged illegal.
The United States rule as to leases and the long list of cases supporting it
are given in the case given above.
See, contra, 1886, Camden & Atlantic E. Co. v. May's Landing, etc., E. Co.,
48 N. J. Law 530; 1889, Manchester & L. R. Co. v. Concord E., 66 N. H. 100,
49 Am. St. Eep. 582 ; 1896, Bath Gas Light Co. v. Claffy, 151 N. Y. 24.
Also note, 70 Am. St. Eep. 156, on 163.
As to the general doctrine of ultra vires acts being void, because of legal incapacity of the corporation, see note to section 360.

Sec.

360.

Same.

ME. JUSTICE GEAY
1889.

IN

PITTSBUEG,

C. & ST.

BEIDGE CO.

L. EY. CO.

v.

KEOKUK

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
S. 371, on 384-385.

131

U.

The outlines of the doctrine of ultra vires, and the reasons on
which it rests, have been clearly stated in previous judgments of this
court.
The reasons why a corporation is not liable upon a contract ultra
vires, that is to say, beyond the powers conferred upon it by the legislature, and varying from the objects of its creation as declared in
the law of its organization, are:
ist. The interest of the public, that
the corporation shall not transcend the powers granted.
2d. The interest of the stockholders, that the capital shall not be subjected to the
risk of enterprises not contemplated by the charter, and therefore not
authorized by the stockholders in subscribing for the stock.
3d. The
obligation of every one, entering in a contract with a corporation, to
take notice of the legal limits of its powers.

ULTRA

361

VIRES.

1183

it,

These three reasons are clearly brought out in the unanimous judgment of this court, delivered by Mr. Justice Campbell, in the leading
case of Pearce v. Madison and Indianapolis Railroad, 21 How. 441,
in which it was held that a railroad corporation was not liable to be
sued upon promissory notes which it had given in payment for a
and running in connection with
steamboat received and used by
its railroad.

&

1

3

8

2

2

As to the general doctrine of ultra vires acts being void because of
Note:
legal incapacity, see, in addition to the cases cited in Central Trans. Co. v.
Pullman's Pal. Car Co., 139 U. S. 24, supra, p. 1178; 1804, Head v. Providence Ins. Co.,
Cranch 127; 1818, People v.TTtica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. 358,
Am. Dec. 243, supra, p. 113; 1824, New York Firemen Ins. Co. v. Sturges,
Cow. 664; 1827, Bank of U. S. v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64; 1829, Beach v.
Wend. 574; 1839, Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519; 1844,
Fulton Bank,
Sandf. Ch. 280; 1851, East Anglian R. Co.
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THE MICHIGAN SOUTHERN AND NORTHERN INDIANA
RAILROAD COMPANIES.
1

BISSELL

IN THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS.

22

N. Y. 259-309.

1

a

J.

COMSTOCK, C.
A general statement of the plaintiff's case is,
that the two corporations defendant were jointly engaged in the business of carrying passengers and freight between Chicago and Lake
Erie, through
part of the state of Illinois, and through the states of
Indiana and Michigan, by three connected railroads which they owned
Arguments and part of opinions omitted.
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or controlled, and the business of which was managed under a consolidated arrangement, which had been in force between the defendants, for some time previous to the injury complained of ; that, being
so engaged, they undertook and assumed to carry him, the plaintiff,
as a passenger, from Chicago, or a point near that place, eastward
over the consolidated line of road ; that he took his seat in their cars accordingly, and that, during the transit, he was injured by an accident
which happened through their carelessness and neglect.
Assuming
the truth of this statement, there is no doubt of the plaintiff's right to

recover.
But the defendants deny the legal truth of these facts, because one
of the companies was chartered by the legislature of Michigan, with
power to build a road in that state, and the other by the legislature of
Indiana, with power to build one in that state. They both insist, that
they had no right or power, under their respective charters, to consolidate their business in the manner stated, and especially, that they
could not legally, either separately or jointly, acquire the possession
and use of a connecting road in the state of Illinois, and undertake
to carry passengers or freight over the same.
They do not deny that
their boards of directors and agents, duly authorized to wield all the
powers which the corporations themselves possessed, entered into the
arrangements which have been mentioned, nor that, in the execution
of those arrangements, they made the contract with the plaintiff to
carry him as a passenger ; nor do they deny that they received the
Their
benefit of that contract, in the customary fare which he paid.
defense is, simply and purely, that they transcended their own powers,
and violated their own organic laws.
On this ground, they insist that
their business was not, in judgment of law, consolidated ; that they
did not use and operate a road in Illinois ; that they did not undertake
to carry the plaintiff over it; and did not, by their negligence, cause
the injury of which he complains ; but that all these acts and proceedings were, in legal contemplation, the acts and proceedings of the
natural persons who were actually engaged in promoting the same.
Can, then, two railroad corporations, having connecting lines, thus
unite their business, for the purpose of promoting their common interest; charter another connecting road, in furtherance of the same
policy ; hold themselves out to the public as carriers over the whole
route ; enter into contracts accordingly ; receive the benefit of those
contracts ; and then, when liabilities arise, interpose the violation of
their own charters to shield them from responsibility? Such a defense
is shocking to the moral sense, and although it appears to have some
support in judicial opinions, I think it has no foundation in the

law.
[Theory of incapacity.]

The doctrine has certainly been asserted
on some occasions, that in all cases where the contracts and dealings
of a corporation are claimed to be invalid for want of power to enter
into the same, a comparison must be instituted between those contracts and dealings and the charter, and, if the charter does not appear
to embrace them, then that they must be adjudged void to all intents
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and purposes, and in all conceivable circumstances.
The reasoning
on which this doctrine has been usually claimed to rest, denies, in
effect, that corporations can, or ever do, exceed their powers.
They
are said to be artificial beings, having certain faculties given to them
by law, which faculties are limited to the precise purposes and objects
of their creation, and can no more be exerted outside of those purposes and objects than the faculties of a natural person can be exerted in the performance of acts which are not within human power.
In this view, these artificial existences are cast in so perfect a mold
The acts and dealthat transgression and wrong become impossible.
ings of a corporation, done and transacted in its name and behalf, by
its board of directors, vested with all its powers, are, unless justified
by its charter, according to this reasoning, the acts and dealings of the
individuals engaged in them, and for which they alone are responsible. But such, I apprehend, is not the nature of these bodies; like
natural persons, they can overleap the legal and moral restraints imposed upon them : in other words, they are capable of doing ivrong.
To say that a corporation has no right to do unauthorized acts, is only
to put forth a very plain truism ; but to say that such bodies have no
power or capacity to err, is to impute to them an excellence which
does not belong to any created existences with which we are acThe distinction between power and right is no more to be
quainted.
lost sight of in respect to artificial, than in respect to natural per*
*
*
sons.
In the case of The Life and Fire Insurance Company v. Mechanics' Fire Insurance Company, 7 Wend. 31, it was contended that a
certain corporate transaction, if unlawful, was to be regarded as the
act of the agents or officers of the company, and not of the company,
and, therefore, that the company should be allowed to recover back
the money or property improperly disposed of.
That doctrine was
refuted by Mr. Justice Sutherland, in this language: "This would be
a most convenient distinction for corporations to establish
that every
violation of their charter, or assumption of unauthorized power on the
part of their officers, although with the full approbation of their
directors, is to be considered the act of the officers, and is not to
prejudice the corporation itself. There would be no possibility of
ever convicting a corporation of exceeding its powers, and thereby
forfeiting its charter, or incurring any other penalty, if this principle
could be established." These remarks suggest an unanswerable argument against the doctrine.
Why, it may be asked, does the law provide the remedy by quo warranto against corporations, for usurpation and abuse of power?
Is it not the very foundation of that
that
can
and do perform acts and usurp franproceeding,
corporations
chises beyond the rightful authority conferred by their charters ? Most
The sovereign power of the state interposes, alassuredly this is so.
the
or
and on that ground demands from the courts
abuse,
excess
leges
*
*
*
a sentence of forfeiture.

Corporations are said to be clothed with certain powers enumerated
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in their charters, or incidental to those which are enumerated, and it
is also said they can not exceed those powers ; therefore, it has been
The premises
urged, that all attempts to do so are simply nugatory.
are correct, when properly understood ; but the conclusion is false,
When we speak of the
because the premises are misinterpreted.
powers of a corporation, the term only expresses the privileges and
franchises which are bestowed in the charter; and when we say it can
not exercise other powers, the just meaning of the language is, that as
the attempt to do so is without authority of law, the performance of
unauthorized acts is a usurpation, which may be a wrong to the state,
But the usurpation is possible. The
or, perhaps to the shareholders.
privileges and franchises granted are not the whole of a corporation.
Every trading corporation aggregate includes an association of persons
having a collective will, and a board of directors or other agency in which
that will is embodied, and through which it may be exerted in modes
of action not expressed in the organic law. Thus, like moral and
sentient beings, they may and do act in opposition to the intention of
their creator, and they ought to be accountable for such acts. * * *
But the doctrine, that corporations can never
[Theory of illegality.]
be bound by engagements not justified by the grant of power from the
state, is next defended on a different ground.
Although it be conceded that they are present and acting as legal persons, or entities,
when such engagements are entered into, it is said that all contracts
in excess of the rightful power possessed by corporations are illegal,
and therefore void.
This is an argument totally different from the
one which has been so far examined, because it necessarily imputes the
making of the contract to the corporate person or being; whereas
the doctrine which I have endeavored to refute denies that proposition.
The very point of the supposed illegality consists, or, at least, it may
consist, in the performance of acts perfectly lawful in themselves, but
which being done by a corporation and not by individuals, are pronounced illegal, because they are so done without authority contained
in the charter.
But is it true that all contracts of corporations for purposes not
embraced in their charters are illegal, in the appropriate sense of that
term? This proposition I must deny.
Undoubtedly, such engagements may have the vices which sometimes infect the contracts of individuals. They may involve a malum in se or a malum prohibitum,
and may be void for any cause which would avoid the contract of a
natural person.
But where no such vices exist, and the only defect is
one of power, the contract can not be void, because it is illegal or immoral. Such a doctrine may have some slight foundation in the ear-

lier English railway cases, East Anglian Railway Co. v. Eastern
Counties Railway Co., u C. B. 775, 7 Eng. Law. & Eq. 509; McGregor v. Deal and Dover Railway Co., 18 Q.'B. 618; but it was
never established, and is not now received in the English courts.
Mayor of Norwich v. Norfolk Railway Co., 4 El. & Bl. 397; Eastern Counties Railway Co. v. Hawkes, 5 H. L. C. 347.
The books are full of cases upon the powers of corporations, and
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the effect of dealing in a manner and for objects not intended in their
charters; but with the slight exception named, there is an entire absence, not only of adjudged cases, but of even judicial opinion or
dicta, for the proposition that mere want of authority renders a conSuch a proposition seems to me absurd; the words
tract illegal.
ultra -vires and illegality represent totally different and distinct ideas.
It is true, that a contract may have both these defects, but it may also
For example, a bank has no authority
have one without the other.
to engage, and usually does not engage, in benevolent enterprises. A
subscription, made by authority of the board of directors and under
the corporate seal, for the building of a church or college, or an almshouse, would be clearly ultra vires, but it would not be illegal ; if
every corporator should expressly assent to such an application of the
funds, it would still be ultra vires, but no wrong would be committed,
and no public interest violated.
So a manufacturing corporation may
purchase ground for a school-house, or a place of worship for the intellectual, religious, and moral improvement of its operatives; it may
buy tracts and books of instruction for distribution amongst them.
Such dealings are outside of the charter ; but, so far from being illegal or wrong they are in themselves benevolent and praiseworthy. So
a church corporation may deal in exchange ; this, although ultra vires,
is not illegal, because dealing in exchange is, in itself, a lawful business, and there is no state policy in restraint of that business.
To illustrate the subject in another manner: An agent may make
a contract in the name and behalf of his principal, but not within the
If the consideration and purpose of such a conscope of his agency.
tract be lawful, it may be void as against the principal, but not on the
A corporation is not an agent of the state, nor,
ground of illegality.
in any strict sense, of the shareholders.
But it derives its powers from
the state, and it may transcend those powers for purposes which, in
themselves considered, involve no public wrong.
Contracts so made
may be defective in point of authority, and may contemplate a private wrong to the shareholders ; but they are not illegal, because they
violate no public interest or policy.
My meaning, in short, is that the
illegality of an act is determined in its quality, and does not depend
on the person or being which performs it.
There
[Underlying reasons and policy Nature of a corporation.]
has been, I think, some want of reflection, even in judicial minds,
upon the reasons and policy which mainly govern in the granting of
charters to corporations, with certain specified powers and no others.
A private or trading corporation is essentially a chartered partnership,
with or without immunity from personal liability beyond the capital
invested, and with certain other convenient attributes which ordinary
It is also something more than a partnerpartnerships do not enjoy.
ship, because the legal or artificial person becomes vested with the
title to all the estate and capital contributed, to be held and used, howNow, in a well-regulated uninever, in trust for the shareholders.
corporated partnership, the articles entered into by the associates specBut, suppose the same associates
ify the objects of their association.
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desire a charter of incorporation for the more convenient prosecution
of the same business, and obtain one. We shall find it to contain the
like specification, which becomes the grant of power from the soverI am speaking of powers and privileges
eign authority of the state.
granted which are not, in their essential nature, corporate or public
from the private enterprises which any
franchises, as distinguished
class of citizens may embark in ; and, with the exception of municipal
or governmental charters, the class of powers here referred to will be
found to cover nearly the whole field of corporate rights.
It is not
difficult, then, to see the reason and policy which underlie such grants.
The associates ask for a charter, in order to carry on their business
with greater advantages ; and the same reason exists for a specification
of the purposes of their organization, as in the case of an association
The charter takes the place of the articles of
without a charter.
and
becomes
the appropriate rule of action.
No public
agreement,
interest or policy is involved, because the objects of the grant are not
of a public nature ; the powers and rights specified are identical with
those which any private person or association of persons may exercise.
If those who manage the concerns of a simple partnership deal with
the funds in a manner or for purposes not specified, their acts are
ultra vires; and if the directors of such corporation as I am here
speaking of do the same thing, their acts are also ultra vires in the
same sense and no other.
To apply the word "illegality" to such
transactions, is to confound things of a totally different nature.
It is
and
which
are
affected
them
there
is
no
interests
;
private
only
by
statute or rule of the common law by which they become public
offenses.
In every treatise upon the law of contracts and there are many of
them
we shall find an enumeration of such as are immoral or illegal ;
but amongst them can not be found a specification of the promise or
agreement of a corporation, founded on a lawful consideration, and
to do that which in itself is lawful to be done, although not within the
It has always been supposed, and to that effect are
powers granted.
all the authorities, that contracts are illegal either in respect to the
consideration or the promise.
Where both of these are lawful and
right, the maxim, ''ex turpi contractu non oritur actto," can have no
application. The incapacity of the contracting party, whether it be a
corporation, an infant, a feme covert, or a lunatic, has nothing to do
with the legality of the contract, in that sense of the word which is
now under discussion.
So, in the treatises upon corporations, we
shall find their rights and privileges to be very extensively considered,
but nowhere an intimation that their dealings outside of their charters
*
*
*
are deemed illegal for that cause.
[Estoppel.]
Let us now concede that the unauthorized contracts of a
corporation are illegal in the sense contended for ; it by no means follows that they are never to be enforced.
An agreement declared by
statute to be void can not be enforced, because such is the legislative
will; but when, without any such declaration, it is simply illegal, it
is capable of enforcement, where justice plainly requires it. Circum-
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stances may, and often do, exist, which estop the offender from taking
The contract may be entered into on
advantage of his own wrong.
the other side, without any participation in the guilt, and without any
knowledge even of the vice which contaminates it. An innocent person may part with value, or otherwise change his situation, upon the
A railroad corporation, for example, may purfaith of the contract.
and
chase iron rails,
give its obligation to pay for them, with a design
on
to sell them again
speculation, instead of using them for continuing its track; such a transaction is clearly unauthorized, and is,
therefore, said to be illegal.
But if the corporation is deemed to
in other words,
as
have above shown,
make the contract
legal possibility for corporations to make contracts outside of their
just powers, how can its illegality be set up against the other party,
So, an incorporated
who knows nothing of the unlawful purpose
bank may purchase land, having power to do so for
banking-house,
but actually intending to speculate in the transaction.
This
also
ultra vires but can the want of authority be interposed, in repudiation of
just obligation to pay for the same land, the vendor not being
doctrine
not only shocking to the reason
in part delicto? Such
and conscience of mankind, but
goes far beyond the law in regard
to the illegal contracts of private individuals.
As am not contending that the unauthorized dealings of corporation are never to be questioned, the object of this discussion has
been to ascertain the true ground on which they can be impeached,
where they are not attended by the vices which are fatal to private
have shown,
i. That such dealings are
contracts also.
trust
possible in law, as they often take place in fact; in other words, that
in the nature of these bodies to overleap the restraints imposed
2. That
upon them.
transgression of this nature
simple excess
of power (using that word to express the rules of action prescribed in
their charters, and by which they ought to regulate their conduct),
but
not tainted with illegality, so as to avoid the contract or dealseems hardly necessary to
ing, on that ground. This proposition,
applied only to transactions which involve or contemplate
repeat,
no violation of the code of public or criminal law, but on the conEven illegal contrary, are innocent and lawful in themselves.
tracts, in the proper sense, are not, universally and indiscriminately,
to be adjudged void and especially this
not so where the offender
alleges his own wrong to avoid just responsibility, the other party
being innocent of the offense.
If these negative conclusions can not be denied, follows, that contracts and dealings such as
have been speaking of, are to be condemned by the courts only on the ground that they are
breach of the
duty which private corporations owe to the stockholders to whom the
It
the undoubted right of stockholdcapital beneficially belongs.
ers to complain of any diversion of the corporate funds to purposes
This, as general principle, can not be
unauthorized in the charter.
too strongly asserted and by this principle, justly applied to particular
to be resolved.
instances, the question in such cases
The original
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subscribers contribute the capital invested, and they and those who
succeed to their shares are always, in equity, the owners of that
capital. But, legally, the ownership is vested in the corporate body,
impressed with the trusts and duties prescribed in the charter ; in
these relations we have the only true foundation of the plea of ultra
vires. * * *
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It is also said, in order to render this doctrine less offensive to the
reason and conscience, that the innocent dealer may, upon the voidrecover back the value
ness of the contract and a disaffirmance of
or consideration with which he has parted.
This position necessarily
concedes that the corporation, as
legal person, made the unauthorized contract, and received the money, or value, under and according
to
thus overthrowing the main objection to its liability to respond
It also concedes the innocence of the
directly upon the contract.
other contracting party thus, according to all the analogies of the
law, refuting the only other objection (illegality) on which the absoclaimed to rest: for, surely, after
lute invalidity of such dealings
will not
conceding that the corporation actually made the contract,
be contended that
can set up that
ought not to have made
against an innocent person, who has given up his money or property
on the faith of the same contract.
But
answer, further, that while
in many cases the remedy of
suit in disaffirmance of the agreement,
and to recover back the consideration, will be sufficient to prevent
All collateral
will be entirely worthless.
wrong, in many others
securities must fall to the ground with the principal contract, and all
its consequences and results.
The present case will afford the best
illustration. The defendants, in consideration of
trifling sum received from the plaintiff for fare, agreed to perform the service of
By the
carrying him in their cars, perhaps some two hundred miles.
negligent performance of that agreement, they inflicted on him injuries for which
jury has said the proper compensation was $2,500.
This being the measure of damages for the breach of the contract,
the absurdity, not less than the injustice, of confining him to the
remedy of disaffirmance, because the agreement was ultra v^res^ must
*
*
be quite apparent.
But little more need be said in reference to the particular case now
before us.
If the defendants did not become liable for the breach of
their undertaking to carry the plaintiff, or of their duty resulting from
that undertaking,
can see no ground for holding them accountable
as simple wrong-doers.
If their contract was ultra vires, and that
defense to an action upon
must be received as absolute and perempno principle of estoppel or rule of justice can be urged
tory,
against that defense,
then
more clear, that the simple wrong to
the plaintiff's person was also ultra vires.
was with considera-bJe
difficulty that the liability of
corporation in any case for pure tort
was ever established:
and they are never so liable, except when engaged in the performance of some duty or undertaking in respect to
which accountability arises. If the defendants' express undertaking
was absolutely void, so that no duty could arise thereupon, the implied
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undertaking, resulting from the actual attempt to carry the plaintiff
as a passenger, is encountered by the same objection ; and there is
nothing left of the transaction except a pure and simple tort, committed
by the defendants' servants, while not engaged in any business which
could bring responsibilities upon the defendants themselves.
I think
it plain that this theory of liability will not sustain the plaintiff's
case.

But I have no hesitation in affirming the judgment of the court below, upon the principles of contract, and of duty resulting therefrom. * * *
SELDEN, J. * * * When a corporation, sued for a breach of
contract, sets up as a defense its own want of power to enter into the
contract, two questions are involved: First, whether the contract was,
in truth, beyond the corporate powers; and, second, if so, whether
this is available as a defense.
It is only in reference to the first of
these questions, and to prove that the contract was really ultra vires,
that the argument has been resorted to, that a corporation has no
natural powers.
The excess of power being established, the question,
whether this constitutes a valid defense, depends upon entirely differ-

ent considerations.
The assumption, therefore, that the doctrine, which declares the unauthorized contract of a corporation to be void, rests in any degree
upon the theory that a corporation can never be said to have done
anything but what it had a legitimate right to do, is wholly unwarranted ; and, hence, the irresistible logic with which it is shown that
corporations must necessarily partake of the imperfection which attaches to all created things, is wholly without force in its application
to the present case.
Corporations, as well as natural persons, may,
no doubt, err.
They may exceed their powers and violate their charters, and may be held responsible for so doing.
Were it otherwise,
could
for
never
be
made
liable
nor
a
tort
could they be pro;
they
ceeded against by quo warranto.
The statute which authorizes the
attorney-general to file an information in the nature of a quo warranto
against an offending corporation (2 R. S. 583,
39), assumes that
the
limits
corporations
may transgress
prescribed by their charters.
Subdivision 5 of the section referred to provides that the proceeding
may be instituted "whenever it (the corporation) shall exercise any
franchise or privilege not conferred upon it by law."
[True theory of ultra vires is illegality, as violating- public policy.]
The real ground upon which the defense of ultra vires rests; and
the only one upon which it has ever, to any extent, been judicially
based, is, that the contracts of corporations which are unauthorized
by their charters are to be regarded as illegal, and, therefore, void.
There are three classes of illegal contracts, viz. : ist, those which are
mala in se, i. e., which embrace something which the law deems in
and of itself criminal or immoral ; 2d, those which violate the provisions of some statute, and are hence called mala prohibita; and,
3d, those which contravene some principle of public policy. Corporations may make contracts falling within either of the two first of these
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classes, and such contracts are no doubt subject to the same rules as if
made by individuals. Of course, where the only objection to the contract
of a corporation is that it exceeds the corporate powers, it can not be
considered as malum in se; and although, in this state, where we
have a statute (i R S. 600,
3), expressly enacting that no corporation shall exercise any corporate powers except such as their charters
confer, the contrary might, with much plausibility, be contended.
shall, nevertheless, concede, for the purposes of this case, that such
contracts do not belong to the class styled mala prohibita.
But the contracts of corporations which are not authorized by their
charters are illegal, because they are made in contravention of public
policy. That contracts which do in reality contravene any principle
of public policy are illegal and void, is not and can not be denied.
The doctrine is universal.
There is no exception. Although the unauthorized contract may be neither malum in se nor malum prohibitum, but, on the contrary, may be for some benevolent or worthy
object, as to build an alms-house or a college, or to purchase and distribute tracts or books of instruction, yet, if it is a violation of public
policy for corporations to exercise powers which have never been
granted to them, such contracts, notwithstanding their praiseworthy
Those, therefore, who hold that corponature, are illegal and void.
rations are liable upon their contracts, notwithstanding they were made
without authority, are forced to contend that no principle of public
This is the ground which they
policy is violated by such contracts.
do take, and which, it is obvious, they must necessarily take, in order
to sustain their position.
Here, then, we have an issue made up,
which, if I am right, is decisive of the question under consideration.
[Public policy involved.] What, then, is the argument, by which it
is sought to be shown that there is no principle of public policy involved in this question of the liability of corporations for their unauthorized acts? It is said that a private corporation is simply a chartered partnership, possessing certain attributes conferred by its charter
for the purpose of enabling it the more conveniently to transact its
business ; that, even in unincorporated partnerships, the articles of copartnership always specify the objects of the association ; and that,
when such associations choose to become incorporated, those objects
are, for the same reason, specified in the charter; that the charter
simply takes the place in this respect of the articles of agreement, in
the case of an unincorporated partnership ; that, as the objects of such
associations, although incorporated, are of a private nature, there is
no question of public policy involved, and that no public interest requires that the transactions of the corporation should be kept within
its chartered limits.
If we admit the soundness of this argument, and assume that the
directors of a corporation are not under any public obligation to keep
within their chartered powers, but are to be regarded simply as the
agents of the corporators, so that any excess of power on their part
amounts simply to a breach of trust towards their principals, it would
not follow that the corporation is liable upon its unauthorized con-
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tracts.
But I apprehend there are serious objections to this view of
the nature of corporations, and of the effect of their charters. In the
first place, if there is no public interest involved, how is it possible to
justify the creation of private corporations at all? Such corporations
are endowed with valuable franchises and privileges, which give them
great advantages over mere private citizens, whether individual or associated. The grant of such pi'ivileges, upon the principles for which
some of my associates contend, would be a pure piece of legislative
favoritism, which should be indignantly condemned.
In this country,
if in no other, it is held to be the duty of government to protect the
people in the enjoyment of equal rights and privileges, and not to use
its power for the special benefit of its favorites.
Every privilege or
advantage given to one man or set of men is necessarily at the expense of others ; and it is against the fundamental principles of our
government that this should be done, unless required by interests of a
No doubt these principles are frequently violated, and
public nature.
corporate powers and privileges are conferred which no public interest
demands; but, nevertheless, such interest is the ostensible reason for
the grant in every case.
Take, for instance, the very class of corporations in question here,
viz., railroad corporations, which are mere privale associations, organized by their members with a view to their personal profit and
emolument; and yet their creation is considered so much a matter of
public interest as to invoke the power of eminent do-main, by which
the property necessary for their purposes is forcibly taken from its
owners as for a public use. The same is true of telegraph and plankroad incorporations. But, although the interest of the public in the creation of corporations of this class is made a little more obvious by the
necessity which exists of taking from others property which is specific
and tangible, for the purposes of the corporation, yet the same principle applies to all corporations ; for in all some value, corporeal or incorporeal, is taken from a portion of the community and given, to the
corporators.
Will it be said that, although the public have an interest in the creation of corporations, it has none in the precise extent of the powers
conferred, and that no public policy is concerned in their being
strictly confined to the exercise of such powers? It is, obviously, imThe franchises and privileges
possible to support such a position.
given to corporations belong to the public, and it would be just as
reasonable, and just as logical, to contend that, under a patent for one
hundred acres of land, the patentee might take possession of two hundred without infringing any public interest.
Every additional power
given to or usurped by, a corporation, extends its .advantages over
persons unincorporated.
If a bank is permitted to trade in merchandise it comes in competition with others so employed.
If a railroad
is
in
allowed
it
comes
to
build
and
sail
company
ships,
competition
with those engaged in commerce, and so of every other branch of
business.
The importance of limiting corporate bodies to the' exercise of those

I 194

BISSELL

V. THE M.

S.

&

N.

I. RY. CO.

361

powers, and the enjoyment of those privileges and franchises, which
have been specifically conferred upon them, must, I think, be obvious.
Their privileges give them decided
They are rapidly multiplying.
mere
over
They
private,
unincorporated
advantages
partnerships.
have large capitals and numerous agents, and are capable of entering
into combinations with each other.
They are not only formidable to
individuals, but might even, under some circumstances, become formidable to the state.
They are, or should be, created, as we have
seen, for public reasons alone; and the legislature is presumed, in
every instance, to have carefully considered the public interest, and
to have granted just so much power, and so many peculiar privileges
as those interests are supposed to require.
This reasoning is confirmed by the action of the legislature, in expressly prohibiting corporations from exercising any powers not granted to them,
(i R. S.
common
law the
this
of
600,
the
making
principle
By
3, supra.}
enactment,
of
and
the
has
an
legislature
express
positive
subject
shown that it considered this restriction upon corporations to be a
matter of public interest and importance.
The fact that a mere excess of power on the part of a corporation,
by the assumption of privileges not conferred, affords ground for a
quo -warranter, is in itself proof that the public has an interest in keep*
* *
ing such bodies within the limits of their charters.
If we consider the directors merely as the agents of the shareholders, and the charter as nothing more than their power of attorney from
the corporators, the latter, as the principals, would have a right to repudiate and prevent the execution of a contract, made in their behalf
by their agents, without authority ; inasmuch as every person dealing
with such agents must, as is well settled, be presumed to know the
extent of the powers which the charter confers.
The position then occupied by some of my associates is this : They
admit that the shareholders in a corporation have a right to restrain
its directors or managers, as their trustees or agents, from entering
into any contract not authorized by the charter, or from carrying such
contract into effect if made; and yet they hold that the directors are
liable, not in their individual, but their 'corporate character, to the
party with whom the contract is made for not carrying it into effect.
It is difficult to see how these two propositions can stand together.
The
The directors are the mere representatives of the corporators.
Hence, by the two propositions just
latter constitute the corporation.
stated, it is maintained, that the corporators have a legal right to enjoin their representatives against the performance of a contract, which
they themselves are legally bound to perform ; in other words, they
are liable for damages, because their representatives have not performed a contract, which they had a right to restrain those representatives from performing.
This can hardly be. It would seem to be a
legal impossibility.
One or the other of these propositions must, I
think, be false.
Either it must be denied that the shareholders can
invoke the aid of a court of equity to prevent the performance of a
contract entered into by the directors, which the charter does not au-
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a principle established by numerous
authorities
thorize
or it must
be admitted that they are not liable for the refusal or neglect of
the directors to perform it. It might be otherwise if it could be shown
are not presumed to
either that persons dealing with corporations
know the extent of the powers conferred by the charter, or that the
corporators can be presumed to have authorized the directors to transBut the contrary is the rule in respect to both.
cend those powers.
It would seem to follow that if we look upon the unauthorized contracts of corporate officers as mere breaches of trust, and nothing
This, however, is not
more, the corporation is not bound by them.
the ground upon which I have been endeavoring to maintain that corporations are exempt from liability upon their contracts which are
ultra vires ; nor is it the ground upon which such defenses have in
general been sustained in suits brought by third persons against corI shall, therefore, proceed further to
porations upon such contracts.
show from the authorities that such contracts are illegal and void for
public reasons, entirely irrespective of the fact that they constitute
breaches of trust towards the shareholders.
[Reviewing cases.] * * *
The strength of the opposing views consists in the alleged injustice
of permitting a corporation to avoid obligations by pleading its own
But it should be remembered that
want of power to incur them.
this argument is just as applicable to the case of an individual who
sets up the illegality of his own contract, and thus shields himself
as to that of
from the responsibility upon
If
be
corporation.
said, that in the case of illegal contracts between individuals, each
participator in the guilt, and hence the law will not interparty
equally true in respect to the unauthorpose to protect either, this
Their powers are prescribed by
ized contracts of corporations.
statute, and every one who deals with them
presumed to know the
*
extent of these powers.
My conclusion, therefore, is, that the contract of the defendants to
transport the plaintiffs from Chicago to Toledo was illegal and void,
they having, as we have seen, no power under their charters to enter
into the engagement for running their cars on joint account between
It does not follow, however, that they are not liathose two places.
ble to the plaintiff in this action.
The complaint
founded upon the
rested
of the relation in
defendants,
the
out
which
growing
upon
duty
which they stood to the plaintiff, to take care that he should not be
If this duty could only arise out of some
injured by their negligence.
contract between the parties, then the conclusion arrived at would be
fatal to the recovery.
The contract actually made by the defendants
to transport the plaintiff can form no part of the plaintiff's case, and
he must recover,
at all, irrespective of that contract.
It said that
the contract was ultra vires and the corporation
must
protected from all responsibility for its violation on that ground,
be equally free from responsibility for an injury inflicted while atapprehend, by no means follows,
tempting to perform it. But this,
far
as
the
so
true
duty to observe due care grew
though
probably
out of the contract.
The plaintiff's claim, however, rests not upon
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his contract, but upon the right which every man has to be protected
from injury through the carelessness of others.
It has the same legal
foundation as that of one who has been injured by the negligent driving of some person upon the public highway, or who has been run
over by a train of cars, when crossing the railroad track.
The duty
to observe care in these cases arises, not upon any contract, but from
the obligation which rests upon all persons, whether natural or artificial, so to conduct as not, through their negligence, to inflict injury

if

a

;

it,

is

it

a

a

*

*

I

if,

* *
*
upon others.
To test the liability of the defendants, therefore, in this case, it is
necessary to inquire what would be the responsibility of railroad companies in general towards persons sitting in their cars, but whom they
have made no contract to transport.
This must depend upon the circumstances under which the individuals had entered the cars.
If
they were there as mere trespassers, without shadow of right, the
company would not, perhaps, be responsible for any injury they might
But
on the other
sustain through the negligence of its servants.
hand, the entry into and remaining in the cars was with the assent,
express or implied, of the company, and injury should result from the
think, be
negligence of the latter or its agents, the company would,
*
responsible.
Was the plaintiff, then, in the defendants' cars as mere trespasser,
or was he there lawfully, as between him and the defendants?
To
The defendants can never
this question there can be but one answer.
trespasser, when he was
allege that the plaintiff was in their cars as
there by their express assent.
The contract between him and the
The
true, for reasons of policy could not be enforced.
company,
and required the dedefendants might at any time have repudiated
fendant to leave the cars
arid
he refused might thereafter have
But neither his entry into the cars, nor
treated him as
trespasser.
his remaining there until required to leave, could ever be regarded by
* * *
the defendants as an infringement upon their legal rights.

Affirmed.

J.

;

J.;

Denis, J., for reversal
all
Cler-ke, J., concurred with Selden,
other judges for affirmance, without passing upon questions discussed
by Comstock, C. J., and Selden,
See note, 70 Am. St. Rep. 156.
That ultra vires acts are not illegal and void, see, 1821, Utica Ins. Co.
v. Scott, 19 Johns.
1860, Parish v. Wheeler, 22 N. Y. 494; 1870, Bradley
Am. Rep. 656; 1875, Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow,
v. Ballard, 55 111. 413,
etc., 63 N. Y. 62, 20 Am. Rep. 504; 1880, Pratt v. Short, 79 N. Y. 437;
1886, Garrett v. Burlington Plow Co., 70 Iowa 697, 59 Am. Rep. 461; 1889,
Wright v. Hughes, 119 Ind. 324, 40 Am. St. Rep. 69; 1889, Manchester, etc.,
R. Co. v. Concord, etc., R. Corp., 66 N. H. 100,49 Am. St. Rep. 582;
Center Town Co. v. Morris, 43 Kan. 282, 19 Am. St.
1890, Sherman
Wash. 435, 26 Am. St.
Ron. 134; 1891, Horton
Co. v. Long,
Rep. 867; 1891, Holmes, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Holmes Co., 127 N. Y. 252,
24 Am. St. Rep. 448; 1892, Carson City Sav. Bk. v. Carson City El.
Co., 90 Mich. 550, 30 Am. St. Rep. 454; 1893, Linkauf v. Lombard, 137 N. Y.
417, 33 Am. St. Rep. 743; 1894, Kennedy v. California Bank, 101 Cal. 495, 40
Am. St. Rep. 69; 1894, Williams v. Bank, 71 Miss. 858, 42 Am. St. Rep. 503;
2
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1894, Kadieh v. Garden City, etc., Bldg. Ass'n, 151 111. 531, 42 Am. St. Rep.
256; 1896, Bath Gas L. Co. v. Claffy, 151 N. Y. 24; 1897, Bedford Belt Co. v.
McDonald, 17 Ind. App. 492, 60 Am. St. Rep. 172; 1897, Boyd v. Am. Carbon,
etc., Co., 182 Pa. St. 206; 1899, Zinc Carbonate Co.v. First Nat'l Bk., 103 Wis.
125, 74 Am. St. Rep. 845.

Sec. 362.

Ultra vires acts are valid if all the shareholders
consent, and creditors are not injured.

(4)

See Murphy

v. Arkansas

&

L. L.,

etc.,

supra, p. 950.

Co., 97 Fed. Rep. 723,

Note.
See, 1886, Swift v. Smith, 65 "Md. 428 ; 1889, Arkansas R. L. T., etc.,
Co. v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 13 Colo. 587; 1890, Martin v. Niagara Falls, etc.,
Co., 122 N. Y. 165; 1893, Millsaps v. Merchants' & P. Bank, 71 Miss. 361;
1894, People v. Barker, 141 N. Y. 251 ; 1895, Osborn v. Montelac Park, 153 N.
Y. 672, and many other cases given in 1 Cook Corp., 3.
Contra, 1851, East Anglian R. Co. v. Eastern Counties R. Co., 11 C. B. 775;
1875, Ashbury R. Co. v. Riche, L. R. 7 H. L. 'Rep. 653; 1895, Charlebois v.
Delap, 26 Can. S. C. 221, 238; 1896, McCutcheon v. Merz Capsule Co., 37 U.
S. App. 586; 1896, Germania Safety Vault & T. Co. v. Boyntori, 71 Fed. Rep.
797.

Sec. 363.

(5) Ultra vires

acts are valid, except as against the

state.

FARWELL COMPANY
1897.

v.

WOLF.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN.
10-22, 65 Am. St. Rep. 22.

96

Wis. Rep.

In 1893
[Action to recover damages for a conspiracy to defraud.
defendants entered into a conspiracy to defraud wholesale dealers in
goods, wares and merchandise by purchasing goods on credit, without
intending to pay for them, and by having them delivered at the store
of one Josephson, who was to sell them and divide the proceeds among
the co-conspirators.
This scheme was carried out, and large amounts
of goods were purchased on credit from the plaintiff and numerous
other dealers, who were not paid for their goods.
Before the commencement of this action, such dealers, for a valuable consideration,
sold and assigned to plaintiff their respective claims for the goods sold,
together with their respective causes of action for damages against the
defendants on account of such conspiracy.
Judgment for plaintiff on
all of the claims.
Defendants appealed.]
MARSHALL, J. The record shows that plaintiff is a corporation
organized for the purpose of carrying on a general dry goods business.
The point was raised on the trial, and preserved for review, that it did
not possess power to acquire by assignment claims for damages in no
way connected with its own affairs, growing out of the alleged con1

Statement

as

in

65

Am. St. Rep., p. 22; part of opinion omitted.
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spiracy to defraud. It does not appear that such claims were in any
way necessary to the preservation or enforcement of plaintiff's original
claim, or that such purchase was to affect in any way the purposes of
its organization, so as to bring its action in that regard within the rules
that a corporation may, to preserve its own property and protect its
legitimate interests, acquire and enforce liens which would otherwise
be outside of the purposes of its organization. A corporation has only
such powers as its organic act, charter, or articles of organization confer. This is elementary, but it includes such powers as are reasonably
necessary to effect all the general purposes of the corporate creation,
though not particularly specified in its charter, unless prohibited
From the foregoing, without
thereby, or by some law of the state.
further discussion, we must hold that plaintiff had no authority to acquire by purchase the various claims for damages on which a recovery
was had.
But it by no means follows that its want of power can be
taken advantage of by the defendants in this action.
Formerly, want
effective
for
defense and atof corporate power was an
weapon, both
but,
in
the hands of private parties,
without any change whattack,
ever respecting the general doctrine of ultra vires as applied to the
acts of corporations acting outside the purposes of their creation, there
has been a gradual development in the direction of holding that none
but a person directly interested in the corporation or the state can
Such development from the rigorous rule
question such authority.
which anciently obtained was manifested earliest in the adoption of
the rule that, where a corporation has violated its charter in the purchase and acquirement of real estate, its title thereto and right to enjoy the same can not be inquired into collaterally in actions between
that
private parties, or between the corporation and private parties
Natoma, etc., Co. v. Clarkin,
it can be questioned only by the state:
Alexander v. Tolleston Club, no 111. 65; Fritts v.
14 Cal. 544;
Palmer, 132 U.S. 282: Runyan v. Coster, 14 Pet. 122; National
Bank v. Whitney, 103 U. S. 99; Shewalter v. Pirner, 55 Mo. 218;
Ragan v. McElroy, 98 Mo. 349 ; National Bank v. Matthews, 98 U.
S. 621. In the latter case the supreme court of the United States, reversing the supreme court of the state of Missouri, laid down the rule
that, "where a corporation is incompetent by its charter to take a title
to real estate, a conveyance to it is not void, but only voidable, and
the sovereign alone can object;" that "it is valid until assailed by a
direct proceeding instituted for that purpose" by the government ; and,
further, in effect, that the danger of a judgment of ouster and dissolution is the only check to prevent and punish violations of corporate
charters.
If the question were respecting the right of a private person to challenge corporate action concerning the acquirement or enjoyment of lands, without authority in the charter so to do, it would be
deemed so well settled that no such right exists as not to be open to
serious discussion ; but whether the same rule governs generally is not
so clear.
An extended discussion of the subject, showing the process of development in the application of such a rule, would be interesting and
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instructive, but not necessary for the purposes of this opinion. Therefore, we content ourselves with referring to a few well-considered
cases, showing the present state of the law respecting the subject,
which Thompson, in his work on Corporations, very properly refers
In Prescott Nat. Bank v. Butto as a "new and growing doctrine."
ler, 157 Mass. 548, an action between the bank and a private person,
the question was raised of whether the action of the former in purchasing notes in the open market as a commodity was ultra vires;
and in respect thereto the court said, in effect, that if such a purchase
be ultra vires, it is not made penal or expressly prohibited : therefore
the violation of law could be remedied only in proceedings against
the bank, in the name of the state, to deprive it of its charter.
In
Grant v. Henry Clay, 'etc., Co., 80 Pa. St. 208, where the question
was whether the corporation could purchase or hold leases of mining
lands, the court, in deciding such question, said, in effect, that if the
commonwealth is interested in such an inquiry, it must be made by
the proper officer; that the question was of a public nature, concerning solely the sovereignty of the state, and not one that in any way
concerned private parties. In Martindale v. Kansas City, etc., R. R.
Co., 60 Mo. 508, the question was whether the defendant had violated
statutory requirements, and the court laid down the broad doctrine
that collateral inquiry by a private citizen into the supposed illegal
acts of a corporation is not permitted in any case, unless expressly so
To the same effect are Kinealy v. St. Louis,
provided by statute.
etc., R. R. Co., 69 Mo. 658, and Hovelman v. Kansas City, etc..
Co., 79 Mo. 632. In Baker v. North Western, etc., Loan Co., 36
Minn. 185, the question was, whether the purchase and enforcement
of certain mortgage liens was in excess of the corporate authority.
Held, that none but the state or a stockholder could raise the question.
If the position that the principle under discussion is now, in most
jurisdictions, recognized as one of general application, except in respect to contracts wholly executory, required further support, resort
might be had to many other adjudications of the highest respectability,
though authorities there are which still adhere to the old rule that a
corporate act in excess of its power, either because outside of the
purposes of the corporation or because prohibited by statute, is ultra
vires, and can not be enforced in any action in any court of justice,
without regard to whether such act be challenged by the public or by
a private person.
Such authorities are exceptional.
Judge Thompson, in his valuable treatise on the Law of Corporations, volume 5,
sections 6033-6038, commenting on the subject, appears to deprecate
the prevalence of the "new doctrine," and to argue against its further extension, upon the ground that it practically destroys the effect
of the doctrine of ultra vires, as applied to the unauthorized exercise
of corporate power ; but the learned author is manifestly in error in
that respect.
Such doctrine, notwithstanding the limitation which
modern development has placed on the means by which it may be
called into use, still exists, and may and will continue to exist, adapted
as fully as ever to restrain the abuse of corporate franchises and au-
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thority, and to punish such abuse whenever the state, in its sovereign
That such doctrine can not be recapacity, sees fit to exercise it.
sorted to as a weapon for attack and defense in the hands of mere
private persons, and used as a ready means of embarrassing business
operations by and with corporate bodies, which directly or indirectly
touch and administer to human desires at every turn of the individual
in modern life, while its effectiveness for all essential purposes of
restraint and punishment is fully preserved, furnishes no cause for
regret, but rather cause for gratification at the evidence of how certainly principles, by natural growth and development, adapt the law
and its administration to the ever-changing needs of advancing civiliWhen
zation so as best to promote justice and the common welfare.
a corporation offends against the law of its creation, such offense is
against the sovereignty of the state ; hence it is most proper that the
state should apply the remedy and be charged with the sole responsibility in that regard, and such is the law by the trend of modern auThis does not hold but that a person
thorities, which we approve.
directly interested as a stockholder may, in a proper case, interfere,
or but that the court may refuse, on its own motion or the objection of
a private person, to aid a corporation to enforce, or protect it from the
effect of, a contract wholly executory, when outside the purposes of
the corporate organization.
In accordance with the foregoing, we hold that if a corporation purchases, pays for and takes an assignment of a cause of action respecting matters outside the purposes of its creation and not authorized by
its charter, in any action to enforce such cause of action, want of corporate power to engage in such business can not be interposed as a
defense.

(After holding the claims were not assignable, the decision was reversed on this ground.)
See, Accord: 1848, Barrow v. Turnp. Co., 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 304;
Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 5 Fla. 110, 58 Am. Dec. 448; 1870, Pacific R.
Co. v. Seeley, 45 Mo. 212, 100 Am. Dec. 369; 1878, National Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621 ; 1882, Wright v. Pipe Line Co., 101 Pa. St. 204, 47 Am.
Rep. 701 ; 1883, St. Louis Drug Co. v. Robinson, 81 Mo. 18 ; 1889, State v.
Thresher Co., 40 Minn. 213; 1890, Commonwealth v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., 132
Pa. St. 591, supra, p. 1014; 1895, Nashua, etc., Corp. v. Boston, etc., R. Corp.,
164 Mass. 222,49 Am. St. Rep. 454; 1897, Farrington v. Putnam, 90 Maine 405,
supra, p. 1029.
Note.

1853, South

ARTICLE III.
Sec. 364.

VARIOUS INTERESTS

AFFECTED.

The state, the parties, the shareholders, the creditors.

SAWYER,

C.

J.,

IN

MINERS' DITCH CO.

v.

ZELLERBACH.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA.
37 Cal. Rep.
543, on 577-8, 586-8; 99 Am. Dec. 300, on 306-7, 314-16.

1869.

s

In considering the cases in which the law applicable to corporations
discussed, it must, also, always be borne in mind that there are sev-

364

ULTRA

VIRES.

I2OI

eral classes of rights to which they apply, and that upon the same general state of facts, the legal consequences might be different with
Thus there are corporate
reference to the different classes of rights.
that is to say, rights which pertain to the corporation as
rights
such
the artificial legal, entity created by the act of incorporation, considered as a single, distinct person ; individual rights of the
stockholders as such, and rights of the creditors of the corporation.
The rights of strangers dealing with the corporation may vary according as they are considered with reference to the corporation itself, the
So, also, there are
stockholders, or the creditors of the corporation.
several classes of corporations, such as public municipal corporations,
the leading object of which is to promote the public interest ; corporations technically private, but yet of a quasi-public character, having
in view some great public enterprise, in which the public interests are
directly involved to such an extent as to justify conferring upon them
important governmental powers, such as an exercise of the right of
eminent domain.
Of this class are railroad, turnpike and canal
companies, and corporations strictly private, the direct object of which
is to promote private interests, and in which the public has no concern, except the indirect benefits resulting from the promotion of trade,
and the development of the general resources of the country.
They
derive nothing from the government, except the right to be a corporation and to exercise the powers granted.
In all other respects, to
the extent of their powers, they stand upon the footing of natural persons, having such property as they may legally acquire, and holding
and using it ultimately for the exclusive benefit of the stockholders.
In this last class, the stockholders and those dealing with the corporation are the only parties directly and immediately interested in their
acts, so long as the corporation confines itself within the general scope
of its powers.
The rights of the corporation, the corporators and of
strangers dealing with the corporation, may, in some respects, vary
according to the circumstances surrounding a given transaction.
The term ultra vires, whether with strict propriety or not, is also
used in different senses.
An act is said to be ultra vires when it is
not within the scope of the powers of the corporation to perform it
under any circumstances or for any purpose.
An act is also sometimes said to be ultra vires with reference to the rights of certain parties, when the corporation is not authorized to perform it without their
consent, or with reference to some specific purpose, when it is not
authorized to perform it for that purpose, although fully within the
scope of the general powers of the corporation, with the consent of
the parties interested, or for some other purpose.
And the rights of
strangers dealing with corporations may vary, according as the act is
ultra vires in one or the other of these senses. All these distinctions
must be constantly borne in mind in considering a question arising
out of dealings with a corporation.
When an act is ultra vires in the
first sense mentioned, it is generally if not always void in toto, and
the corporation may avail itself of the plea. But when it is ultra vires
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in the second sense, the right of the corporation to avail itself of the
* *
*
plea will depend upon the circumstances of the case.
The question, as between stockholders and the corporation, is a
very different one from that which arises between the corporation itself and strangers dealing with it; and the principle established, where
the contest arises between strangers and the corporation, is, whether the
act in question is one which the corporation is not authorized to perform under any circumstances, or one that may be performed by the
corporation for some purposes, but may not for others. In the former
case the defense of ultra vires is available to the corporation as against
all persons, because they are bound to know, from the law of its existence, that it has no power to perform the act.
But in the latter
case the defense may or may not be available, depending upon the
question whether the party dealing with the corporation is aware of
the intention to perform the act for an unauthorized purpose, or under
circumstances not justifying its performance.
And the test, as between
strangers having no knowledge of an unlawful purpose and the corporation, is to compare the terms of the contract with the provisions
of the law from which the corporation derives its powers ; and if the
court can see that the act to be performed is necessarily beyond the
powers of the corporation for any purpose, the contract can not be
enforced; otherwise it can. Or, in the language of Mr. Justice Selden, in the case before cited: "Where the want of power is apparent,
upon comparing the act done with the terms of the charter, the party
dealing with the corporation is presumed to have knowledge of the
defect, and the defense of ultra vires is available against him.
But
such a defense would not be permitted to prevail against a party who
can not be presumed to have had any knowledge of the want of authority to make the contract. Hence, if the question of power depends
not merely upon the law under which the corporation acts, but upon the
existence of certain extrinsic facts resting peculiarly within the knowledge of the corporate officers, then the corporation would, I apprehend,
be estopped from denying that which, by assuming to make the contract,
it had virtually affirmed." (22 N. Y. 290.) Strangers are presumed to
know the law of the land, and they are bound, when dealing with the
corporations, to know the powers conferred by their charter. These are
open to their inspection, and it is easy to determine whether the act is
within the scope of the general powers conferred for that purpose. But
they have no access to the private papers of the corporation, or to the
motives which govern directors and stockholders, and no means of
knowing the purposes for which an act, that may be lawful for some
The very fact that the appointed officers of the
purposes, is done.
corporation assume to do an act in the apparent performance of their
duties which they are authorized to perform for the lawful purposes
of the corporation, is a representation to those dealing with them that
the act performed is for a proper purpose.
And such is the presumption of the law, and upon this presumption, strangers having no notice
in fact of the unlawful purpose, are entitled to rely. To this effect is
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the principle of the following, among other cases, as well as those
Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21
already cited:
How. (U. S.) 545, is a strong case applying this doctrine to public
Gelpecke v. City of Dubuque, i Wallace (U. S.)
corporations.
cited; Bank of United States v. Dandridge, 12
and
cases
203,

Wheat. 64.
Upon any other principle there would be no safety in dealing with
corporations, and the business operations of these institutions would
be greatly crippled, while the interests of the stockholders and the
public, and their general usefulness, would be seriously impaired.
The officers are appointed by the corporation, and if any loss results
to strangers dealing with the corporation from their misrepresentation
in matters within the general scope of their duties, it should fall upon
the corporation, which is responsible for their appointment, rather
than upon parties who have no other means of ascertaining the facts,
and must rely upon their assurances or not deal with the corporation
at all.
V,

See cases below under Art.

ARTICLE IV.
Sec. 365.

i

.

p. 1233.

APPLICATIONS

OF THE DOCTRINE.

Contracts

(a) Wholly executed by both parties.
See Leazure v. Hillegas,

Sec. 366.

Serg. &

R.

313, supra,

p. 1008.

Same.

LONG
1891.

7

v.

GEORGIA PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
523, 24

OF ALABAMA.
Am. St. Rep. 931.

91

Ala. Rep.

519

McCLELLAN, J. The case made by the amended bill is this: On
April 23, 1883, the complainant, B. M. Long, and his wife, Amanda

C. Long, executed to the Georgia Pacific Railway Co. a deed, upon
valuable consideration presently paid, to and of the iron, coal and
oil interests and properties in and pertaining to certain tracts of land,
aggregating about four thousand acres ; the said Long retaining the
fee to said lands, except in respect to said mineral interests, and continuing in possession thereof.
The grantee is a corporation, and was
and is without power to purchase and hold said land, or the mineral
interests in the same.
The bill seeks to have the deed declared void,
1

Arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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because of this incapacity of the corporation, and to have the same
canceled as a cloud upon complainant's title.
The bill was demurred to on several grounds, and the demurrer was sustained generally, the decree to that end being now assigned as error.
Only those grounds of error which present the question, whether a
vendor who has sold, received payment for, and conveyed land to a
corporation which had no power to hold the same, can have any relief in respect to the transaction, are discussed in argument, and to
these our consideration will be confined, since it is manifest that the
determination of this question, in line with the decree below, as we
think it must be determined, will be fatal, not only to the present appeal, but to complainant's cause of action.
It is thoroughly well-settled law that a party to an ultra vires executory contract made with a corporation is not estopped to set up the
want of corporate capacity in the premises, either by the fact of contracting, whereby the power to contract is, in a sense, admitted or
recognized, or by the fact that the fruits or issues of the contract have
been received and enjoyed, and this, though the assault upon the transMarion Savings Bank v.
action comes from the corporation itself.
Dunkin, 54 Ala. 471; Chambers v. Falkner, 65 Ala. 448; Sherwood v. Alvis, 83 Ala. 115; Chewacla Lime Works v. Dismukes, 87
Ala. 344. But where the contract is fully executed where whatever
a different
was contracted to be done on either hand has been done
In such case the law will not interfere, at the instance
rule prevails.
of either party, to undo that which it was originally unlawful to do,
and to the doing of which, so long as the contract to that end remained executory, neither party could have coerced the other.
As
declared by Mr. Bishop, "the parties voluntarily doing of what they
have unlawfully agreed, places them, in effect, in the same position
as if the contract had been originally good ; neither can recover of the
other what was parted with. The reason for which is, that, since they
are equally in fault, the law will help neither."
Bishop on Contracts,
627.

The former decisions of this court are in line with this doctrine,
and fully recognize the distinction between executory and executed
void contracts, to the effect that, while suits to enforce the former
may always be defended on the ground of their invalidity, no relief
prayed upon such ground can be granted with respect to the latter.
Morris v. Hall, 41 Ala. 510; Ingersoll v. Campbell, 46 Ala. 282;
Sherwood v. Alvis, 83 Ala. 115; Dudley v. Collier, 87 Ala. 431;
Craddock v. Mortgage Co., 88 Ala. 281. And this is the doctrine
Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U.
generally declared by other courts.
S. 71; Day v. S. S. B. Co., 57 Mich. 146, 58 Amer. Rep. 352;
Parish v. Wheeler, 22 N. Y. 494 ; Miners' Ditch Co. v. Zellerbach,
37 Cal. 543, 606; Terry v. Eagle Lock Co., 47 Conn. 141.
There is no question but that the case presented by the bill involved
a contract on the part of the railway company to buy, and on the part of
It is
the complainant to sell, certain interests in the land described.
equally clear that the payment of the agreed pi'ice on the one hand,
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and the execution of the conveyance on the other, fully executed this
contract on both sides, left nothing to be done by either party in the
premises, and bring the transaction within the principle we have been
considering, which denies to the complainant any relief in respect
to it.
The same conclusion is reached by another well-established principle. It is, that when a party sells and conveys property to a corporation, which is without power to purchase and hold the same, and receives compensation therefor, there being no fraud in the transaction,
he is in no sense injured or prejudiced by the incapacity of the corporation, nor can he be heard to complain of it ; but the question becomes
one between the corporation and the state, the sovereign alone having
the right to impeach the transaction ; and until it supervenes for this
purpose, the corporation is vested with perfect title against all the
world, defeasible only on office found. R. & B. Railroad Co. v.
Proctor, 29 Vt. 93; Leazure v. Hillegas, 7 Serg. & Rawle 313;
Goundie v. Northampton Water Co., 7 Pa. St. 233; Baird v. Bank
of Washington,
Serg. & Rawle 411; Lathrop v. Bank, 8 Dana
114, 129; Hough v. Cook County Land Co., 73 111. 23, 24 Amer.
Rep. 230; Cowell v. Springs Co., 100 U. S. 55; Reynolds v. Craw-

n

fordsville Bank,

112

U. S. 405, 413;

2

Mor. Corp.,

710.

Affirmed.

See Am. Un. Tel. Co. v. U. P. R. Co., 1 McCrary 188, infra, p. 1225;
Note.
St. Louis, V. & T. H. E. Co. v. T. H. & I. R. Co., 145 U. S. 393, infra, p. 1228.
Also, note 70 Am. St. Rep. 156, etseq.; 1897, Home v. Pollak, 118 Ala. 617,
72 Am. St. Rep. 189, note 194.

Sec. 367.

(b) Wholly executory.
( i )

Corporation complainant.

THE NASSAU BANK

v.

JONES.

1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.

1884.

Rep. 115-124.

95

N.

Y

J.

RUGER, C.
The question involved in this case, as we regard it,
is the right of a banking corporation chartered under the laws of this
state to subscribe for the stock of a railroad corporation.

In the spring of

1879, the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad Company, being a corporation organized to construct railroads in Colorado
and adjoining territories, with the view of raising money to extend its
lines, published a circular, whereby it proposed, in substance, to issue
$5,000,000 of its bonds, in sums of $1,000 each, payable thirty years
after date, with annual interest at 7 per cent, in gold, secured by
mortgage upon its property ; and to deliver one of such bonds, together
with five shares of its capital stock, of the par value of $ 100 per
1

Arguments and part of opinion omitted.
2
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CAS.

3

1206

THE NASSAU

BANK V. JONES.

367

share, to each and every person who should advance thereon the sum
of $900, reserving, however, the privilege to the railroad company of
withdrawing the proposition when it should have received subscripThis proposal was
tions to said loan to the amount of $3,000,000.
favorably received, and the loan was subscribed for by citizens and
corporations in various states of the union, to an amount greatly exAmong others
ceeding the sum required by the railroad company.
one
David Jones, subscribed for, and was
the defendants' testator,
It is claimed by the
awarded $90,000 of such contemplated loan.
court, that Jones unthe
trial
and
as
a
fact
was found
appellant,
by
for
of
the
and
the
benefit
the plaintiff, to condertook, by
authority
tract with this railroad company for a loan, under its proposal, in the
name of the plaintiff, to the extent of one-half of the amount which
should be allotted to him ; and by this action the appellant seeks to
recover from Jones' executors, among other things, the profits claimed
The
to have been made by him upon its share of the transaction.
the
of
maintain
the
seems
to
the
to
action
right
depend upon
power
bank to enter into the proposed contract, for if it had no lawful
authority to make such a contract it could not become liable to Jones
upon its obligation to take and pay for the property contracted for ;
and consequently there would be no consideration for Jones' undertaking to subscribe for the benefit of the bank. Not only this, but
the bank could not, by suit, enforce against any one an executory contract which it was unauthorized by its charter to make.
(After holding that the bank was not authorized to purchase the
stock.)
The contract between the plaintiff and Jones was wholly executory, and nothing has occurred thereunder preventing the bank from
setting up its own want of authority to make such a contract as a defense to any action brought thereon by Jones.
While executed contracts, made by corporations in excess of their
legal powers, have, in some cases, been upheld by the courts, and
parties have been precluded from setting up, as a defense to actions
brought by corporations, their want of power to enter into such contracts (Bissell v. M. S. & N. I. R. R. Co., 22 N. Y. 258; Whitney
Arms Co. v. Barlow, 63 N. Y. 62; Woodruff v. E. R. Co., 93 N.
Y. 618), this doctrine has never been applied to a mere executory
contract which is sought to be made the foundation of an action,
either by or against such corporations.
It was said by Judge Selden,
in Tracy v. Talmage (14 N. Y. 179), "That a contract by a corporation, which it has no legal capacity to make, is void and can not be
In White v. Buss (3
enforced, it would seem difficult to deny."
Gushing 448) , Chief Justice Shaw lays down the rule as follows : "It is
well settled by the authorities that any promise, contract or undertaking, the performance of which would tend to promote, advance or
carry into effect an object or purpose which is unlawful, is in itself
void and will not maintain an action."
Lord Mansfield, in Smith v. Bromley (2 Douglas, 696), says:
"If
the act is in itself immoral, or a violation of the general laws of pub-
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lie policy, then the party paying shall not have this action." In Tracy
v. Talmage (supra, 217) Judge Comstock says: "It is admitted that
the contract of a corporation, which it has no legal capacity to make,
can not in its terms be enforced."
There is nothing in this case to exempt the plaintiff from the operation of the general principle determined in the cases referred to.
Jones owed no duty to the plaintiff, except that which sprang out
of his engagement to purchase the stock and bonds in question ; and
that having failed on account of its illegality, left no enforcible obligation resting upon him. (Levy v. Brush, 45 N. Y. 589.) There
is no pretext for the claim that the contract was in any respect an
executed one, for Jones never even entered upon its performance.
His subscription for the loan in his own name was in direct violation
of the obligation which it is claimed that he had assumed; and it is
that obligation alone which is sought to be enforced in this action.
The bank, by the transaction in question, secured Jones' promise to
do certain things, and has relied solely upon that promise.
It has done
nothing in performance of the contract, and, so far as it is concerned,
the contract remains wholly executory.
Neither can Jones be treated as a trustee for the benefit of the
plaintiff; a trust whereby it is attempted to accomplish an illegal purpose is quite as objectionable as a direct contract to effect the same
object.
The law does not raise an implied obligation to effectuate a purpose which is forbidden, and which can not be effected by the parties
through the agency of an express contract. (Perry on Trusts,
214.)
The claim here is that a trust should be implied to enable the
plaintiff to reap the profits from a transaction in which it was not authorized by law to engage.
We have found no authority which supports such a claim and are unable to discover any ground upon which
this action can be maintained.
It follows that the judgment should be affirmed.
All concur except Rapallo and Earl,
, dissenting.
Judgment affirmed.

JJ.

Note.
To same effect, see N. W. U. Packet Co. v. Shaw, 37 Wis. 655, supra,
p. 1040.
See, also, note, 70 Am. St. Rep. 156, et seq.

Sec. 368.

(2) Other party complainant.
LUCAS

1886.

v.

WHITE LINE TRANSFER COMPANY.

IN THE SUPREME

COURT OP IOWA.

Am. Rep. 449-456.

70

1

Iowa Rep. 541, 59

[Action by co-surety for contribution. The Valley National Bank
(by Lucas, its cashier) and the White Line Transfer Company be1

Statement abridged, part of opinion omitted.
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came sureties for L. & M., beer merchants, to the Best Brewing ComUpon L. & M. failing in business they executed their note to
pany.
the bank and transfer company, payable on demand, in consideration
of the payees assuming to pay the debt to the brewing company.
When the brewing company demanded payment, the bank asked the
transfer company to pay its share, and it refused ; whereupon the
bank paid the sum due, and then brought an attachment suit in its
name and that of the defendant, against L. & M., obtained judgment, and realized thereon a small sum, leaving over $1,300 yet unThe transfer company filed an
paid ; the bank sues for half of this.
answer setting up that it had no power, nor were its officers authorized
The bank demurred to this answer; the
to make such a contract.
court below sustained the demurrer, and gave judgment for plaintiff.

Defendant appealed.]
ROTHRJCK, J. The principal question involved in the appeal is the
ruling on the demurrer interposed by plaintiff against defendant's

answer.
It is true, the demurrer seems to be based on the idea solely
that by the conduct of the defendant subsequent to signing the original bond it has estopped itself from setting up the plea of want of
power or authority to sign the bond. The two following propositions
i . Had the officers of the defendant
are proper to be considered :
power to bind the corporation by placing its name on the bond in
2. If they had no such power, has the corporation, or its
question?
officers, so acted in relation thereto subsequently as to prevent or estop
the corporation from now setting up the plea of want of power?
The corporation defendant is acting under the general incorporation
laws of the state, and from the provisions of its articles and the statute
A corporation exists and exercises its franchise
it derives its power.
of
a grant from the legislative power.
The granting
only by virtue
of
a charter in the case of private corporations for
and acceptance
pecuniary profit are based on the theory that the prosecution of the
business proposed will be a benefit to the public, and that the investment of capital therein will result in pecuniary profit to the stockholders, and that it is an undertaking, on the part of the corporation and
all of its stockholders, that in consideration of the grant of power the
capital shall be used for the prosecution of the purpose named in the
There is also an undertaking on the part of
charter, and no other.
the corporation with each stockholder that the capital he invests shall
be put to no other use and subject to no other hazard than that contemplated by the powers expressed in the charter, and that those things
which are within the scope or object of the corporation shall be done
in the manner pointed out in the charter and the laws governing its
action.
But corporations and their officers do not always keep within
their powers, and the application of the doctrine of ultra vires is often
attended with very perplexing questions. By the application of a few
plain rules, however, we may readily reach the proper answer to the
question involved in the case.
I. Every person dealing with a corporation is charged with
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knowledge of its powers as set out in its recorded articles of incorporation.
2.
Where a corporation exercises powers not given by its charter,
it violates the law of its organization, and may be proceeded against
by the state, through its attorney-general, as provided by the statute,
and the unanimous consent of all the stockholders can not make illegal acts valid. The state has the right to interfere in such case.
3. Where a third party makes with the officers of a corporation an
illegal contract beyond the powers of the corporation, as shown by its
charter, such third party can not recover, because he acts with knowledge that the officers have exceeded their power, and between him and
the corporation or its stockholders no amount of ratification by those
authorized to make the contract will make it valid.
4. Where the officers of a corporation make a contract with third
parties in regard to matters apparently within their corporate powers,
but which upon the proof of extrinsic facts (of which such parties had
no notice) lie beyond their powers, the corporation must be held, unless
it may avoid liability by taking timely steps to prevent loss or damage
to such third parties; for in such cases the third party is innocent, and
the corporation or stockholders less innocent for having selected officers not worthy of the trust reposed in them.
5. This class of cases may be illustrated by that where the officer
of a corporation, empowered to build and operate a certain line of
railroad, purchase iron to be used for another line, without the knowlSo in case of Humphrey v. Patrons' Mercantile
edge of the vendee.
Association, 50 Iowa 607, the debts of the corporation were, by its
articles, limited to a certain amount, but the officers of the association,
in dealing with Humphreys, exceeded that amount without his knowledge, or means of knowledge, and the corporation was held. Thompson v. Lambert, 44 Iowa 239, belongs to the same class of cases, with
the addition that in the last case the stockholders, who objected to
what they termed an ultra vires contract, were charged with knowledge of and participation in the act they claimed to be illegal, and
were in no situation to complain.
A corporation can not retain benefits derived from an ultra vires contract, and at the same time treat
the contract as entirely void, unless perhaps in cases where the other
party has assisted willfully in putting it beyond the power of the corporation to return what is received on such contract.
6. Where the corporation has permitted its officers to engage in
ultra vires transactions, and in the prosecution of such transactions
the officers commit a wrong or tortious act without the fault of the
injured party, the corporation is estopped from taking advantage of
the ultra vires character of the original undertaking.
These rules do not cover all cases, but are sufficient tc guide us in
the determination of the question of this case.
the power of defendant to make the contract,
^ After considering
proceeds : )
It seems to us clear that the corporation defendant had no power to
make the contract of suretyship in question, and for the same reasons,
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as clear that the officers of the corporation had no power to
sign the letter of May 27, purporting to assume the payment of the
Both instruments, so far as the deamount stipulated in the bond.
fendant was concerned, were illegal and void, and no attempted ratification by parties having no power to make the original contract could
It is
make it valid, no matter how often such attempts were made.
questionable on the authorities whether even the consent of all the
stockholders could make the contract valid, when it was so plainly
beyond the powers granted by their corporation, which was in duty to
the legislative authority held to apply its capital to the prosecution of
the business for which it was organized, and for which it received the
It is very clear,
But this we need not determine.
grant of power.
however, on authority and on principle, that there could not be a ratification without the consent of all the stockholders.
It appears from the record 'that the note sued on in attachment proceedings, and the proceedings themselves, were taken and carried
through without the knowledge or assent of the stockholders or directors, and that the corporation defendant received no benefit therefrom,
for whatever was realized therein was applied on the contract of suretyship, which was void as against the defendant, and was so applied
by plaintiff or other unauthorized parties.
Tracy v. Guthrie Co.

it is just

Agr'l Soc., 47 Iowa 27.
It is further claimed that

the corporation defendant, by its signature
to the bond and letter, induced the plaintiff to become liable on the
bond and letter also, and induced plaintiff also to pay the amount of
the bond.
It is stated, however, in the petition, that the defendant
refused to pay its half, and it must be borne in mind, in view of what
has preceded, that the brewing company and plaintiff were all the
while, at and after the time of signing the bond, charged with notice
that the officers of the defendant were not authorized to bind the defendant, and that attempts to do so on their part were illegal and
void ; and in this respect defendant's stockholders are innocent parties,
while the plaintiff is not.
We are therefore of the opinion that the circuit court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the answer of the transfer company, and its
ruling thereon is reversed and the cause remanded.
Judgment re-versed.
Note.
p. 1048.

To same effect,

see

Coppin v.Greenlees Co.,

38

Ohio St.

275, supra,
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(c) Partly executed.
(

I

)

Fully

performed
by it.

THE TERRELL

by the corporation,

COTTON AND WOOLEN

BOND

v.

1891.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS.

ING CO. 1

82

enforcible

MANUFACTUR-

Texas Rep. 309-314.

TARLTON,.J. This suit was brought November 9, 1889, by appellee against J. R. Bond and others, in the district court of Kaufman county, to recover a balance due of $875 on a promissory note
executed January 23, 1888, by appellants (J. R. Bond as principal
and the others as sureties) in favor of appellee, and due twelve months
from date.
Defendants answered that the note was executed in consideration of
money loaned by plaintiff to the principal, Bond; that plaintiff at the
time it made the loan was a private corporation under the laws of
Texas, and was by its charter authorized and empowered to manufacture and vend cotton and woolen goods, and do other acts incident
and necessary thereto ; that under its charter plaintiff had no authority
to loan money ; that for more than seven years before the institution
of the suit plaintiff had not engaged in the manufacture and sale of
cotton and woolen goods, but had confined its operations to loaning
money; that the note was void.
(Plaintiff put in a reply, and trial was had, resulting in judgment
*
*
*
for plaintiff, the court finding the law to be as follows:)
1 . The plaintiff, under its charter, had no power or right to loan
defendants its funds or capital.
2. Defendants, having received the money for which the note was
executed bv them, are estopped from denying the power of plaintiff
to loan the money.
The last finding of the court is assigned as error, and presents the
only question to be considered by us, viz. : Are the appellants, who
have received the money in consideration of which they executed the
note sued on, in a position to question the appellee's right of recovery ?
In considering the question, it will be conceded that the court was
correct in finding that the act of the plaintiff corporation in loaning
the money was ultra -vires.
It seems now to be settled by the great weight of authority, that
where there is a question of a contract between a corporation and another party, and the contract has been performed by the other party,
and the corporation has received the benefit of the contract, it will
not be permitted to plead that on entering into the contract it exceeded
its chartered powers.
Railway v. Gentry, 69 Texas 632, and the
If
numerous authorities there cited.
This rule operates conversely.
J Statement

abridged; arguments and part of the opinion omitted.

GRAND LODGE OF ALABAMA V. WADDILL.

12 12

370

it

a

*

a

it

is

if

it

is

78

;

i

63

83

it,

the other party has received from a corporation the benefit of a conhe will not be heard to resist
tract fully performed in good faith by
enforcement of the contract as to him by pleading the mere want of
Arms Co. v.
power in the corporation to enter into the contract.
111. 136; Bradley v. Ballard,
N. Y. 70; Darst v. Gale,
Barlow,
55 111. 417; Cozart v. Railway, 54 Ga. 379; Tel. Co. v. Railway,
Fed. Rep. 745; Dimpfel v. Ohio, etc., Co., noU. S. 209; HitchNatchez v. Mallory, 54 Miss. 497;
cock v. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341
Thompson v. Lambert, 44 Iowa 239; Railway v. Alleghany Co., 79
Pa. St. 370, 392; De Groff v.
Pa. St. 210, 215; Watts' Appeal,
Am., etc., Co., 21 N. Y. 124; Gallion v. Hays, 29 Ohio St. 330,
340; Railway v. McCarthy, 96 U. S. 258, 267; Bliss v. Loan Co.,
This rule
supported by the more modern de30 N. W. Rep. 465.
cisions, and seems to us to be founded in the suggestions of fair dealing and honesty. It does not appear, though the loaning of the money
by the corporation to the appellant Bond was ultra vires, that his
Why, then,
rights were in any way infringed by the transaction.
If he should return the money
should he be heard to complain?
which he received, he would be doing but an act of justice in restorto the stockholders of the corporation to whom
ing
legitimately
Meanwhile,
on account of the public welfare he feel sobelongs.
licitous that the corporation should be prevented from engaging in
future loaning operations in excess of the power conferred by the
statute under which
organized, the remedy against such
usurpabe
invoked
He could easily become the
tion can at any time
by him.
relator in
quo tvarranto proceeding to be instituted under article
*
*
of the Revised Statutes.

4089^

Affirmed.
See note, 70 Am. St. Rep. 156,

Same.

and cases cited in note to

Contra.

GRAND LODGE OF ALABAMA
1860.

361, supra.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF

v.

WADDILL.

ALABAMA.

1

Sec. 370.

et seq.,

Ala. Rep.

36

[Action by the Grand Lodge of Freemasons of Alabama

to recover

a

a

it

to the defendants, evidenced by
note signed
$2,753.75, loaned by
made
them
and
The
by
payable to the plaintiff one year after date.
on
the
and
note,
count
the
common
contained
count
for
complaint
money loaned.]

1

Statement abridged,

J.

J.

WALKER, C.
The defendants and George P. Blevins, as
A.
to whom the suit abated in consequence of his death, executed their
promissory note for the consideration of money loaned by the plaintiff.
arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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The recovery of the money was resisted, upon the ground that the

plaintiff had no authority to make a loan of money; and the court beWe are constrained by
low, by its charge, sustained the defense.
our convictions of the law to approve the charge.
The authority of corporations is limited by their chartered powers,
and the necessary and proper means of executing those powers. City
Council of Montgomery v. M. & W. P. R. Co., 31 Ala. 76; Ex
parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461 ; M. & A. v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400; Smith
v. Ala. L. I. & T. Co., 4 Ala. 558; State v. M. & A. of Mobile, 5
P. 279, 309; State v. Stebbins, i St 299; Straus v. E. Ins. Co., 5
Ohio St. 59; A. & A. on Cor. 270,
256.
(After considering the provisions of the charter, proceeds : )
There is no specified power granted to this corporation, in the exercise of which the loaning of money becomes an appropriate or necessary means. Nor is there any purpose to be accomplished by the corporation, as indicated in the charter, which requires a resort to the
There is some evidence afforded by the third secloaning of money.
tion that the purpose of the society is charity; but the loaning of
money is by no means a necessary means of accomplishing charitable
purposes.

3

a

if

&

a

it

a

a

is

It

a 5

7

it,

Contracts of corporations, which they have no power to make, are
void, and courts of justice will not enforce them.
So, also, promissory notes and other instruments, given to secure the performance of
the contract, are void.
No action to enforce the contract, whatever
form the pleader's skill may give
can be maintained.
Wend. 582;
Barb. 20.
Wend. 34; 25 Wend. 648;
true that money
loaned may be recovered under
common money count.
But then
common count in this case would be an enforcerecovery under
ment of
void contract, as effectually as
had been under
special count, setting forth the contract.
The decision in Waddill v. Ala.
Tenn. Rivers R. Co. (35 Ala.
is

In that case the money was
323) has no pertinency to this case.
loaned without the authority of the corporation.
not
Here such
shown to have been the case. The corporation, transcending its powers, made the loan.
Judgment affirmed.
See, to same effect, 1880, Chambers v. Falkner, 65 Ala. 448; 1893,
92 Tenn. 115, 36 Am. St. Eep. 71, and, generally, note
360, supra.
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[Appeal from judgment of the circuit court in favor of the defendThe action was to recover upon an accident policy issued by
ant.
the company, for loss of arm due to the accidental discharge of a
The insurance company
gun which the plaintiff undertook to clean.
was organized in 1887, under the law of 1875, and authorized to inThe law of 1875 reserved to the
sure against accidents in traveling.
state the right to repeal, alter or amend the same, and in case of any
material amendment made, the same was to be submitted to the shareholders, and if a majority of these accepted
should become
binding upon the company, and the stock of dissenting members
If the amendment was rejected,
should be paid for by the company.
then the company was to wind up its affairs and go out of business.
In 1889 an amendment was offered by the state, authorizing all companies organized under the law of 1875 to insure against "disabilities
This amendby sickness, or disease, or other bodily infirmities."
ment was neither accepted nor rejected by any regular corporate action.
The company, however, continued to do business, and in 1890 insured
the plaintiff "against external bodily injury effected through external
violent and accidental means." It was admitted that plaintiff had
want of power of the company under the
no actual knowledge of
act of 1875 to issue such
policy, or that the company had not acThe company claimed the policy
cepted the amendment of 1889.
under the law of 1875, and
was void for want of authority to issue
had not accepted the amendment of 1889, and the court below
that
so held.
The plaintiff claimed: i. That since the contract was fully
executed upon his part, the company could not rely upon the doctrine
of ultra vires; and, 2. That because
insured him against
loss not
assumed to exercise power under the amendsustained in traveling,
ment, and thereby so represented to him its acceptance, and was thereby
had not in fact accepted the amendment.]
estopped to show
*
* We recognize
LURTON, C.
diversity of opinion in
the courts of America as to the right of either party to rely upon the
defense of ultra vires, when the contract
not expressly prohibited,
and
not immoral, and has been fully executed upon one side.
The
not
theory upon which the cases rest, which hold that the defense
one merely in excess of express
to be entertained when the act
authority, seems to be that such a contract should be regarded as a
mere breach of duty by the agents of the corporation, and that the
state has ample remedy for such abuse, or for
usurpation of power,
in
defense
proceeding to annul the charter; that to permit such
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of no service to the state in preventing corporate usurpation, or in
promoting the public interest, and only operates to encourage dishonResting upon one or more of these arguesty and promote injustice.
There- are, then, a class of cases
be
cited.
ments, many cases might
acts
which take a distinction between
merely in excess of authority
which,
in
addition,
are
and those
affirmatively forbidden or immoral,
of
some
or in contravention
principle of public policy.
It seems to us that the true foundation of the doctrine of ultra vires
lies in the proposition that every act of a corporation in excess of its
power is an act in contravention of public policy, and for that reason
The ground upon which corporate privito be held null and void.
leges are conferred is, that the public interests may be thereby subIf this is not so, then all such concessions are mere acts of
served.
legislative favoritism, and contravene the foundation upon which free
government is supposed to rest that all are to be protected in the enjoyment of equal rights and privileges. Charters must be supposed,
therefore, to be granted upon the supposition that some public interest is thereby advanced.
"The legislature is, therefore, presumed,"
says Judge Selden, in Bissell v. R. R., 22 N. Y. 285, "to have
granted just so much power and so many peculiar privileges as these
interests are supposed to require."
It must be, therefore, that any act in excess of these granted powers is an act contrary to public policy, and, upon that ground, illegal
and void.
Any other view by which such acts are to be supported
because executed would operate as an enormous practical extension
of the power of corporations.
The view this court has taken has,
therefore, been that "all acts outside the object of its creation, as defined in the law of its organization, and, therefore, beyond the powers conferred upon it," are acts not voidable only, but wholly void.
Buckeye Marble Co. v. Harvey, 92 Tenn. 115 ; Elevator Co. v. M. &
C. R. R. Co., 85 Tenn. 705; Mallory v. Oil Works, 86 Tenn. 598.
The rule, and the foundation upon which it rests, as held by the
English courts, is identical with our own. The English doctrine is
summarized by Mr. Beach in these words: "Corporations are created
for fixed purposes, with certain specified powers.
It is deemed to be
public policy to keep them strictly within the bounds so defined.
There is an implied prohibition to go beyond such limits, and all persons dealing with a corporation are charged with notice of the limitations upon its authority.
Therefore, every contract of a corporation
or its agents which exceeds the powers of the corporation violates this
implied prohibition, and contravenes such public policy, and is illegal
and void.
Consequently, as to such contracts, there can be no ratification or estoppel."
2 Beach on Private Corporations, section 421.
The Tennessee rule is in accord with the holding of many of the
American courts.
Pittsburg Ry. Co. v. Keokuk Bridge Co., 131 U.
S. 389; Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman Co., 139 U. S. 60;
Davis v. Old Colony R. R. Co., 131 Mass. 258; Chambers v. Falkner, 65 Ala. 448; Marion Savings Bank v. Dunkin. 54 Ala. 471.
The remedy, in case one of the parties has received a benefit under
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such a contract, which, ex aequo et bono, it ought not to retain, is a
suit in disaffirmance and for an accounting.
Buckeye Marble Co. v.

is

if

it,

Harvey, 92 Tenn. 115.
The plaintiff's suit is upon the contract, and in affirmance of
and,
there be nothing else in the case, could not be maintained.
But
the defendant company, for any reason, estopped to show

It

is

*

#

that this amendment had not been adopted?
(Quoting the provisions of the act of 1875 as to amendments.)
*
to be observed that the state does not by this act undertake

to

it,

it

is

is

a

it

it

it

if

a

if

a

it,

it

I

it

a

fundamental alteration, and require the corporaarbitrarily impose
tion to continue in business under the amendment. It does, however,
demand that the corporation shall accept the amendment, however
radical
may be, or continue its existence only for the purpose of
In other words, the state says to every corwinding up its business.
poration to be organized under this law, "I reserve the right to repeal
or amend this charter at any time. If the amendment
shall propose
shall be submitted to the action of the
is. vital and fundamental,
If majority assent to and adopt
stockholders.
then the corporation may continue in business. If there be any who are incapable of
consenting, or any unwilling to accept, then all such shareholders shall
cease to be shareholders, and the corporation shall be liable for the
the amendment be unacceptmarket value of all such shares. But
able to
majority, then you shall exist only for the purpose of winding up your business, and shall have no power to enter upon any new
contracts."
the alteration be fundamental, the corporation
Under this act,
must do one of two things
accept the offered amendment or wind up.
The defendant says that
did neither.
The law conclusively presumes that every officer, agent and stockholder of this company knows
the general law of the state affecting its powers and its business.
The
corporation, regarded as an entity, must be taken to have known of
This right was
the right reserved by the state to amend its charter.
written in its very face.
It must be taken to have known that the
It must be
state, by the act of 1889, had proposed an amendment.
taken to have known that
must
must accept this added power or
cease to do business.
It knew that every such corporation which
should thereafter be found engaged in the doing of new business
as having all. the powers
would be regarded by all who dealt with
An act
conferred by the act of 1875, and the amendment of 1889.
or contract within the scope of either of these general laws of the
state was an act or contract within the apparent scope of the powers
of any such company.
All who deal with corporation are bound
to take notice of the limitations contained within the law of its creaBut when an
tion. Mor. on Corp.,
592; Beach on Corp.,
383.
act or contract
within the apparent scope of its charter, and the
defect in power depends upon some extrinsic fact peculiarly within
the knowledge of the officers and agfents of the corporation, and
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unknown to the person so dealing, then there is no presumption of a
participation in doing the illegal act, and a different rule of responsibility applies from that enforced when the defect is apparent upon a
*
*
*
comparison of the contract with the charter.
Let us apply this principle to the case in hand. One dealing with

a

a

it,

this corporation is bound to take notice of the statute and its amendHe was not bound to go
ments under which it was doing business.
When he found this company engaging in new business
any further.
after the amendment of its charter, under the act of 1889, he was
bound to look to the limitations upon its powers contained in this
amendment ; for, finding it using the powers therein conferred, he
had a right to presume that its stockholders had adopted this amendThe question as to whether a stockholders' meeting had been
ment.
held, and whether a majority of the stock had been voted for the
amendment, were questions of internal management peculiarly within
the knowledge of its officers and agents, and as to which it is conThe making of the contract involved
ceded he had no knowledge.
was a representation, as was the fact of its continuance in business by
these officers and agents, that such a meeting had been held, and that
a majority of the stock had accepted the offered power necessary to
* *
*
justify the making of the contract.
Certainly the contract in question was within the apparent scope of
the power of this company, and a stranger in good faith dealing with
had
right to assume that the necessary steps had been taken to
accept the power its officers were assuming to have, and the company
must be held estopped to show that
majority of its shareholders had
*
*
*
not accepted it.

Reversed.

Accord: In re Assignment Mut. G. F. Ins. Co.,
Note.
Am. St. Rep. 149 (forbidden contract), and note, p. 156.

143, 70

Contra.

DENVER FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY
1885.

Iowa

v.

McCLELLAND.

IN THE SUPREME

COURT OF COLORADO.
11-29, 59 Am. Rep. 134.

1

Same.

9

Sec. 372,

107

Colo. Rep.

[Action by McClelland to recover for loss of property insured

d

1

Statement

omitted.

abridged.

Concurring opinion of Beck, C.

J.,

J.,

a

and Helm,

^

g

against damage by hail, under policy issued by the insurance comThe declaration stated that on June 12, 1882, the insurance
pany.
company insured his growing crops of wheat, oats and strawberries
ree
against loss or injury by hail to the extent of $1,935, or an
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premium of $61.03, $3 ^ which were paid down, and a note for
$58.03 due and payable November i, 1882, to the company, was executed by the plaintiff, delivered to and accepted by the defendant,
and the latter issued a policy to the same effect on the same date, providing for a valuation by appraisers selected by the parties in case of
partial loss, and if the sum could not be agreed upon by the parties
themselves; that a loss occurred on June 19, 1882; that proofs were
immediately put in showing the loss to be $1,500; that the parties
disagreed as to this, whereupon appraisers were chosen, who fixed
the loss at $1,500, and reported the same to the company, which refused to pay according to the terms of the policy.
Suit was then
brought ; the company answering, denied any liability upon the ground
that its articles of association (which had been duly filed with the secretary of state, and also in the clerk's office of the county where the
property insured was located, as required by law), authorized it to insure "against loss or casualty by fire or lightning," only, and tendered
back the $3 paid and the note given by the plaintiff, who refused them.
The plaintiff demurred to this answer; the demurrer was sustained,
and the company electing to stand upon its answer, the damages were
assessed by a jury at $1,265.50, and judgment for that sum was given.
The appellee brought error for sustaining the demurrer and giving
The sole question is whether the company
judgment for plaintiff.
can avail itself of the plea of ultra vires as a defense.]
STONE, J. * * * The authorities cited on both sides of the
case are very numerous.
Questions touching the ultra vires of corporations have been before the courts of probably every state in some
shape, and various phases of the question have been many times considered by the federal courts, while standard text-books are full of
research and discussion upon the entire subject.
We have examined
these authorities with care, but a review of them here would be unnecessary labor, since both the English and American authorities have
been collated and discussed fully in many of the leading cases cited
In respect to the precise
by counsel in their briefs filed in the case.
before
there
is
us,
question
apparently much conflict of opinion in
the decisions of the courts, such conflict being in many cases apparent
It is. quite well settled as a
only, but in others squarely antagonistic.
rule
that
a
corporation possesses only such lawful powers as
general
are expressly conferred by its charter, and such as are clearly incidental or impliedly requisite for carrying out the declared objects and
purposes of its creation.
On the one hand, it is held by some authorities that acts of a corporation in excess of the powers limited by the foregoing rule are
illegal, that any contract made in such excess of lawful authority is
void and not enforceable, and that neither party to an action founded
thereon is estopped to plead the ultra vires of the contract in bar of
such action.
On the other hand, it has come to be the settled doctrine of several
states that a corporation may be estopped to deny its authority to enter
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into a contract which has been executed, and from which it has derived the benefit which it thereby sought. There seems to be a growing tendency to this doctrine in modern decisions in this country, and
it is also supported by the authority of English cases.
As is said in Parish v. Wheeler, 22 N. Y. 494, a leading case upon
"The executed dealings of corpothis subject in the United States:
rations must be allowed to stand for and against both parties where
the plainest rules of good faith require."
Mr. Waterman, in his late excellent treatise upon the specific performance of contracts, says that it is now settled that a corporation
can not avail itself of the defense of ultra -vires, when the contract has
been in good faith fully performed by the other party, and the corporation has had the full benefit of the performance and of the contract.
Section 226. So if the other party has had the benefit of a contract
fully performed by the corporation, he will not be heard to object that
the contract and performance were not within the legitimate powers
of the corporation.
In the case before us the contract, as made by the parties, appears
to have been fully executed on the part of the appellee, so far as his
right of action when brought was affected by it. He had paid a small
portion of money on the amount of the premium agreed to be paid,
and had given a promissory note for the balance.
This was all he
had agreed to do ; all that had been exacted of him by the insurance
company, and this he had performed. It matters not that the note
had not been paid, for it was not due when his right of action accrued
and when he brought his suit.
It is not contended that the payment of the note was a condition
precedent to his right of action against the company, since, at the
time of bringing the action the note lacked two months of maturity,
and there was nothing to be done or performed by him under the contract.
The performance already made by the appellee had been accepted by the appellant company, and, so far as it was concerned, the
execution of the note was the same as a cash payment in full of the
amount

;

the company

had the benefit

thereof.

It is argued on be-

half of the appellant that the courts ought in all such cases to sustain
the defense of ultra vires, here interposed, on the ground of public
policy ; that the public which confers the corporate powers upon such
companies has an interest in the protection of innocent stockholders
and creditors of such companies by confining the exercise of corporate
powers strictly within their authorized limits, and this is given in the
books as the chief reason for the rule of decision in the cases which
sustain the defense of ultra vires.
That the public has such an interest is quite true, but whether to
afford such protection the defense of ultra vires is alway necessary in
such cases is another thing.
Stockholders are but one portion of the
another
with
equal rights of protection, is that with
public ;
portion,
whom these multiform corporations deal in the daily exercise of their
assumed powers.
And it seems illogical to assume that the interests
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of the public would be best subserved by a public policy which will
allow a corporation, any more than an individual, to violate the principles of common honesty and claim exemption from the obligation
of its contracts by pleading its own wrong-doing.
Such policy would
rather seem to offer a premium for dishonest dealing.
Besides, both the state which grants these corporate powers, and
the stockholders for whose benefit such powers are exercised, have
their remedies, the former by interfering to revoke the charter, and
the latter by an action to restrain the unauthorized
undertakings.
While courts are inclined to maintain with vigor the limitations of
corporate actions, whenever it is a question of restraining the corporation in advance from passing beyond the boundaries of their charters, they are equally inclined, on the other hand, to enforce against
them contracts, though ultra vires, of which they have received the
If the other party proceeds to the performance of the conbenefit.
tract, expending his money and labor in the production of values
which the corporation appropriates, such corporation will not. be excused on the plea that the contract was beyond its powers.
Bradley
v. Ballard, 55 111. 413, 8 Am. Rep. 656.
Corporations have the capacity to do wrong, and may overstep the
limits placed by the law to their powers, and when they violate their
charters in this respect their acts are illegal, but not necessarily void.
Bissell v. Mich., etc., R. R. Co., 22 N. Y. 258.
The plea of ^lltra vires is not to be understood as an absolute and
peremptory defense in all cases of excess of power without regard to
The plea is not to be enterother circumstances and considerations.
tained where its allowance will do great wrong to innocent third persons.
Bissell v. Mich., etc., R. R. Co., 22 N. Y. 258. Where a
certain act is prohibited by statute, its performance is to be held void
because such is the legislative will.
So where the consideration of a
contract is by law illegal, as where the cause of action arises ex turpe.
But where the act is not wrong per*se, where the contract is for a lawful purpose in itself, has been entered into with good faith, and fairly
we must assent to the
executed by the party who seeks to enforce
doctrine of those authorities which hold that the excess of the corporate powers of the contracting party which has received the benefit
an unconscionable defense, which may not be set up
of the contract
to exempt from liability the party so pleading it. And such, we think,

it

is

it

a
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the case before us.
The answer of the insurance company does not deny the averment
in the complaint that the company "was doing business in Larimer
general fire and hail insurance
county, in the state of Colorado, as
entered into the contract of inIt does not deny that
company."
surance with the appellee in manner and form as alleged in said comThe sole
plaint, nor that the contract was executed as averred.
defense upon which the appellant company relies here
its want of
By offering to insure the property
authority to insure against hail.
of appellee against damage by hail, and by entering into the contract
of insurance therefor,
claimed to possess the power so to do.
It

ULTRA VIRES.

3?2

122

I

took the appellee's money and assumed the risk and obligation of
paying the damage, much or little, that might occur, or of having
nothing at all to pay, if the contingency of damage should not happen
within the time covered by the policy.
A loss having occurred, the company seeks exemption from the
obligation it entered into by denying that it had any authority to do
what it asserted the right to do when it voluntarily assumed the un-

dertaking.

We are aware that the courts have been very slow to concede that a
defendant setting up as a defense the ultra vires of a contract, where
said contract was clearly not authorized, should be held liable on the
contract, since this would appear to sustain the enforcement of an unauthorized contract, and therefore the cases show that whenever the
courts could avoid this seeming inconsistency by resting the recovery
This has often led to
upon some other ground, they have done so.
in
other
The
true
directions.
equal inconsistency
ground would seem
to be that of equitable estoppel, whereby the defendant is not permitted to rely upon or show the invalidity of the contract.
In such
case, the contract is assumed by the court to be valid, the party seeking to avoid it not being permitted to attack its character in this
respect.
The point was strongly insisted upon by counsel for appellant in
argument, that one dealing with a corporation is bound to know the
extent of its powers to contract, that the corporate name itself indicates the scope of its business, and the record of its charter or articles
of incorporation furnishes notice of the extent and limitation of its
corporate powers and authority to contract.
While as a general proposition this is true, yet it must be conceded
that this constructive notice is of a very vague and shadowy character.
Every one may have access to the statutes of the states affecting companies incorporated thereunder, and to their articles of incorporation,
but to impute a knowledge of the probable construction the courts
would put upon these statutes and articles of incorporation to determine questions raised upon a given contract proposed, is carrying the
doctrine of notice to an extent which can only be denominated preIt was in answer to the same point that Chief Justice
posterous.
Comstock observed, in his opinion in a leading case upon this question, that "a traveler from New York to Mississippi can hardly be
required to furnish himself with the charters of all the railroads on
his route, or to study a treatise on the law of corporations."
Bissell
v. M. S. & N. I. R. R. Co., 22 N. Y. 258. It was urged in argument on behalf of appellant that the state, which created these corporations for public good, has such an interest in their existence and
perpetuity that public policy should be interposed to keep them within
the legitimate exercise of their powers.
This may be true to a certain extent, and the state may interpose to revoke their charters for
an abuse thereof; but we take it that it is no more the public policy
of the state to protect the business of private corporations than that
of its individual citizens; and to invoke public policy in a case like
2
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the one at bar, in order to prevent a corporation from doing wrong,
by punishing the other party, would differ little from asking a court,
on the ground of public policy, to prevent the obtaining money or
goods through false pretenses by holding that the party defrauded
should be punished by the loss of his money or goods.
While such wrong may be prevented by interference on the part of
the state, or stockholders of the company, it can not well be said that
to cure the evil it is necessary in every case to exempt the company
from the liability of its unauthorized engagements.
The principle of estoppel by conduct is the same principle which
is applied by courts in holding that the statute of frauds by which,
under the general rule, a contract would be void, is never to be used
for the protection of a fraud.
The essential elements of an estoppel by conduct are laid down by
this court, in Griffith v. Wright, 6 Colo. 248, to be that:
i. There
must have been a representation or concealment of material facts.
2.
The representations must have been made with knowledge of the
facts, unless the party representing was bound to know them, or that
ignorance thereof was the result of gross negligence.
3. The party
to whom it was made must have been ignorant of the truth of the
matter.
4. It must have been made with the intention that the other
should
act upon
but gross and culpable negligence on the
party
of
the
be estopped, the effect of which
to make
to
part
party sought
fraud on the party setting up the estoppel, supplies the place of
intent.
The other party must have been induced to act upon it.
The case before us seems to be fairly brought within the foregoing
rules and definitions.
The insurance company, through its agent, not
concealed
the
want
of authority to insure against hail, which
only
now sets up, but its open notorious acts in soliciting policies of this
character throughout the country, impliedly held out and represented
its authority for such business.
Such agent was certainly bound to know the extent of the authorhis acts in the premises
ity of the company he represented, and
were not done with full knowledge of the facts, his ignorance in this
respect was gross and culpable negligence.
That the appellee was ignorant of the truth of the matter of want
of authority in the company
not denied by the appellant company,
inference
which,
an
to be drawn, that the arexcept by
argued,
ticles of incorporation, and the record thereof furnished constructive
notice of the extent of authority of said company.
But
seems to us
that such inference
rebutted by the presumption fairly arising from
the nature of the transaction, that the appellee would not have paid
his money for the performance of
promise which he knew was void
that its performance could not be enforced, and that his money would
be utterly thrown away.
That the offer of the appellent to insure, and the representations
made to induce the appellee to enter into the contract of insurance,
were made with the intent that the appellee should act thereon,
self-evident from the nature of the transaction, and the acceptance by
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the appellee of the offer so made by the appellant; and that the appellee was induced to act upon the offer and representations so made
is equally apparent, for the act was an obvious sequence of the
inducement.
It was strenuously contended by counsel for appellant in the oral
argument of this case, that whether the contract in a case of this kind
is executed or not is immaterial ; that the true grounds of liability depend upon, and should be placed upon, the fact of whether the elements of estoppel exist; whether the conduct of one party has been
such as that the other party would be defrauded or injured thereby
unless the contract should be enforced.
However this may be in respect to the other cases, or as a general
rule, we are quite willing to assent to this view in the particular case
before us, and to rest our decision upon the ground of estoppel by the
conduct of the appellant company.
We do not say that the directors or acting officers of such company
may act in excess of their legitimate powers against the interests and
contrary to the will of the stockholders of such company, but while
'
admitting the excess of proper authority, we think, on principle and
the weight of modern decisions, that if the stockholders, whose business it is to see that their own managing officers act within the proper
scope of their powers, either expressly, or by silence impliedly, assent
to acts done on their behalf in excess of authority, they should be held
estopped to deny that such acts were authorized.
The appellant company here offered to pay back the money and return or cancel the note given for the policy, and counsel urgently contended that this is all that legally can or rightfully ought to be exacted.
This would not place the appellee in statu quo. Every insurance company would be ready and willing to do that much after the loss had
occurred, on condition of exemption from payment of the loss.
The
damage to appellee is the loss of his crops, against which the appellant
undertook to secure him. After the loss it was far too late for appellee to insure in another company having unquestioned authority to
insure against such loss.
We, therefore, conclude that since the contract of insurance, though
it may have been beyond the scope of the proper object and purposes
of the company as expressed and conferred by their articles of incorporation, was neither by statute nor by their charter expressly forbidden, nor in its nature illegal or improper, and since the conduct of
the company in soliciting the insurance and entering into the contract
therefor under the circumstances disclosed by this case was such that
to exempt it from its engagements thereunder would result in injuring
and defrauding the appellee, who in good faith dealt with the company under the belief of its rightful authority in the premises, the defense of the appellant company interposed against its liability on the
contract is inequitable, unconscionable, and should not be allowed.
It is admitted that a contract is not enforceable when prohibited by
statute; when not so prohibited, however, and when not illegal or immoral in its nature, nor contrary to sound public policy, a contract,
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even ultra vires, may be enforced, when, under the circumstances of
of justice requires it. This is the
its execution, every consideration
most
of
in
the
cases relied upon by the appellee
of
decision
ground
in the case.
As is said by the supreme court of the United States in the case of

Zabriskie v. Cl., Col. & Cin. R. R. Co. et al., 23 How. 400: "A
corporation, quite as much as an individual, is held to a careful adherence to truth in their dealings with mankind, and can not, by their
representations or silence, involve others in onerous engagements,
and then defeat the calculations and claim their own conduct has superinduced."
Among the many authorities examined in support of our views in
Parish v. Wheeler, 22 N. Y. 503;
this case, we cite the following:
Bissell v. M. S., etc., R. R. Co., 22 N. Y. 258; Bradley v. Ballard,
55 111. 413; Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow, 63 N. Y. 69; Darst v.
Gale, 83 111. 141 ; State B'd of Agr. v. Citizens' Street R'y Co., 47
Ind. 407; Oil Cr., etc., R. R. Co. v. Pa. Trans. Co., 83 Pa. St.
166; Argenti v. City of San Francisco, 16 Cal. 255; State of Ind.
v. Woram, 6 Hill 37 ; Convei'se v. Norwich & N. Y. Trans. Co., 33
Conn. 180, modifying the doctrine in the case of Hood v. N. Y. &
N. H. R. R. Co., 22 Conn. 502; Chicago Build. Soc. v. Crowell,
65 111. 453; Ward v. Johnson et al., 95 111. 215-240; Zabriskie v.
Cl., Col. & Cin. R. R. Co. et al., 23 How. 398-401; Hitchcock v.
Galveston, 96 U. S. 341-351 ; Nat'l Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621 ;
Manville v. Belden M. Co. (McCrary, J., U. S. Cir. Ct.), 3 Colo.
Law 558; Green's Brice's Ultra Vires, 371, and cases cited; Sedgwick's Stat. and Const. L., 90; Waterman's Specific Perf. Cont.,
cited supra.
Affirmed.

(d) Specific performance.

Sec. 873.

See Case v.

Sec. 374.

Kelly,

i

)

R. R. Co.,

See article by

Sec. 375.

101

U. S. 71, supra, p. 915.

E. A. Harriman, in

14

Harv. Law Rev. (Jan'y, 1901),

Same.

(2) Recovery

of unpaid rentals under the contract.

Palace Car Co., 139 U. S.
Oregon Ry. Co. v. Oregonian Ry., 130 U. S. i,

See Central Trans. Co. v. Pullman's

supra, p. 1178.
supra, p. 429.
24,

1012.

Recovery of damages for breach.

See Thomas v.
Note.
p. 332.

U. S. 21, supra, p.

Leases.

(e)
(

133
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Sec. 376.

122$

Same.
( 3

)

Recovery for use of property.

See Brunswick
supra, p. 1071.

Sec. 377.

Gas

L. Co.

v.

N. G. F.,etc., Co.,

85

Maine 532,

Same*

(4) Re-entry.
AMERICAN UNION
1880.

TELEGRAPH

CO. v. UNION

ROAD CO. 1

PACIFIC RAIL-

IN THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT, DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA,
i McCrary Rep. 188-208.

[Suit by the telegraph company to enjoin the railroad company from

a certain contract of lease under which the plaintiff had
been in the possession and operation of the telegraph line in question ;
the line was built by the railroad company under its authority from
congress "to construct, maintain and enjoy a continuous line of railroad and telegraph."
In 1866 the railroad company, in consideration of the transfer to it of 17,800 shares of the stock of the telegraph
company, leased its telegraph line to the telegraph company for the
whole period of the railroad charter, or any renewals thereof, upon
condition that the telegraph company would perform all the public
and private duties imposed upon the railroad company, in respect to
the telegraph line, by its charter or the laws of the United States. In
1880 the railroad company, of its own motion, undertook to rescind
the lease, and take possession of the line and operate it to the exclusion of the telegraph company, and to do this cut the wires running to plaintiff's office.]
McCRARY, Circuit Judge. * * * (After holding that the lease
by the railroad company was ultra vires proceeds:)
This brings me to the question whether the railroad company can
be permitted to rescind the contract, and on its own motion to take
possession of the lines, offices and property, without first returning
As already
the consideration received therefor from the plaintiff.
stated, the railroad company received from the plaintiff, in payment
for the property and rights agreed to be transferred by said contracts,
There
17,800 shares of the capital stock of the corporation plaintiff.
is a dispute as to the value of the stock, but I believe it is not placed
by any one of the deponents at less than $150,000, while some of
them place it at a much higher sum.

disregarding

1
Statement much abridged, and only that part of the opinion relating to retaking possession of the leased premises is given.
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No case has been cited in argument, nor have I been able to find
one which holds that a court of equity, having jurisdiction of the parties
to "and the subject-matter of" an illegal contract, should require one
of such parties to give up what he has received under
without requiring the other to do the same. Many cases hold that
corporation which has made
contract ultra vires, which has not been fully
not estopped from pleading its own want of power when
performed,
sued upon such contract
but that doctrine does not apply to
case
where a party comes into
court of equity, and, while retaining all
that he has received upon such a contract, asks to be permitted to retake what he has parted with under it.
take
there
nothing in
the law, as there
certainly nothing in the principles of equity, to
estop the court from saying that the obligation to return the property
transferred under these contracts
mutual, and shall not be enforced
against one of the parties without being at the same time enforced
As the parties and the subject-matter are now beagainst the other.
fore the court,
the duty of the court, as far as possible, to place
It has been held that even in cases at common
them in statu quo.
law,
contract ultra vires, made between
corporation and another
person, and under which the corporation has received value, which
retains, will be so far enforced as to estop the corporation from refusing payment on the ground of its own want of power. Bradley v.
Bullard,

55

111.

417.

of Thomas v. West Jersey R. Co., 101 U. S.
from
at length, Mr. Justice Miller, upon this point,
quoted
already
can
be
no question that, in many instances, where an
"There
says:
invalid contract, which the party to
might have avoided or refused
to perform, has been fully performed on both sides, whereby money
has been paid or property changed hands, the courts have refused to
sustain an action for the recovery of the property or the money so
And in regard to corporations, the rule has been well
transferred.
laid down by Chief Justice Comstock, in Parish v. Wheeler, 22 N. Y.
404, that the executed dealings of corporations must be allowed to
stand for and against both parties when the plainest rules of good
the enBut what
faith require it.
sought in the case before us,
has
So far as
forcement of the unexecuted part of this agreement.
the
been executed, namely, the four or five years of action under
accounts have been adjusted and each party has received what he was
entitled to by its terms."
The present case, like the New Jersey case in which these remarks
one on which the contract has been executed in part,
were made,
In the New
but
differs from that case in one important particular.
in
contract
question)
Jersey case the court say that, "so far as
(the
has been executed, namely, the four or five years of action under it,
the accounts have been adjusted, and each -party has received what he
was entitled to
its terms.
If that case had been in equity, and had appeared that the railroad company had received in advance the full consideration for the
whole term of the lease, which
retained, while asking to be relieved
7

1
?

case

it

it

'
'

by

it

it

is

it, it

is

is

it
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I have no doubt the court would have said: "You
must come into this tribunal with clean hands; you must do equity
before you can seek the aid of a court of conscience."
The contention of the railroad company is that it should be permitted to take possession of the property in controversy without process
While I am clear that the contracts under
or legal proceedings.
which the property is held by plaintiff are ultra vires, there is a dispute upon that subject, and such a dispute as in my judgment can not
be determined by the railroad company of its own motion.
The right of rescission does not justify the railroad company in takThe plaintiff has a right to
ing possession except by lawful means.
be heard upon issue joined in a pi'oper proceeding before being
The present question is not whether the contracts should be
ejected.
rescinded and the property restored to the railroad company, but
whether this should be done by the railroad company upon its own
motion, and in a way to deprive the plaintiff not only of a hearing in
the regular course of this court, but also deprive it of the right of
appeal.
It is one thing for me to hold that the contracts are, in my judgment, ultra vires, and quite another to say to the railroad company,
"You may turn the plaintiff out and take possession without giving it
a day in court."
An injunction will often be granted to restrain a party from deciding for himself a question involving controverted rights, and to compel him to resort to the courts, and this without regard to the absolute merits of the controversy.
It is enough that there is a controin
a
of
to
court
directing that it be settled by legal
versy
equity
justify
Schrader,
v.
Eckelkamp
proceedings.
45 Mo. 505 ; Varick v. New
from the contract,

York, 4 Johns. Ch. 53; Dudley v. Trustees,
ers v. Reno, 53 Pa. St. 224;

12

B. Mon. 610; FarmCo., 7 Johns.

Lansing v. Steamboat

Ch. 162.
The principle settled by these and many other cases is that a
party who is in actual possession of property, claiming under color
of title, is not to be ousted, except by the means provided by law, and
such a possession the court will protect by injunction from disturbance by any other means.
For this reason, therefore, as well as upon
the grounds above stated, I am clearly of the opinion that the railway
company can not be permitted to oust the plaintiff from possession
without process.
The injunction, heretofore granted, will be so far modified as to
make it clear that the railroad company is at liberty to institute legal
proceedings, either by cross-bill in this case or otherwise, to cancel
and set aside the said contracts upon a return of the consideration,
and to settle and adjust, upon principles of equity, the accounts between the parties.
Compare,

Crary

1880,

551 ; 1888,

Central Branch U. P. R. R. v. West. Union Tel. Co., 1 McMallory v. Hanaur Oil Works, 86 Tenn. 598, svpra, p. 957.
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Same.

Sec. 378.

(5) Recovery of possession in equity.
TERRE HAUTE

ST. LOUIS, V. & T. H. E. CO. v.
1892.

IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
12

&

COURT.

I. R. CO. 1

145

Sup. Ct. 953.

U. S. 393,

*

a

a

is

it,

a

a

it,

Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the southern
district of Illinois.
[Bill in equity, filed in 1887 by the St. Louis Company, a corporation of Illinois, against the Terre Haute Company, a corporation of
Indiana, to set aside and cancel a conveyance of the plaintiff's railroad.
February 10, 1868, the plaintiff and the defendant executed a
pretended lease of the plaintiff's railroad, property and franchises to
the defendant for 999 years, the defendant retaining sixty-five per
cent, of the gross receipts, and the rest to be applied to the payment
of interest on the mortgage bonds, and any surplus paid to the plaintiff.
On the completion of the plaintiff's road, the defendant took possesand had received, in tolls and
sion of and had ever since operated
The bill prayed for
otherwise, more than $21,600,000.
cancellareturn of the railroad and other
tion and surrender of the lease, for
for an injunction against disturbing the plaintiff
property held under
in the possession and control thereof, and for an account of the sums
which the defendant had received, or with due diligence might have
received, from the use and operation of the railroad and property.
The defendant demurred, the court sustained the demurrer, dismissed
the bill, and the plaintiff appealed to this court.]
MR. JUSTICE GRAY. The object of this suit between two railroad
to have
contract, by which the
corporations, as stated in the bill,
transferred
its
railroad
and
equipment, as well as its franplaintiff
chise to maintain and operate the road, to the defendant for
term of
and
as
the
canceled,
set
aside
corporate powers of
beyond
999 years,
* *
one or both of the parties.

Statement

abridged

;

1

arguments and part of opinion omitted.

if

a

;

it,

a

a

a

a

a

By this contract one railroad corporation undertook to transfer its
whole railroad and equipment, and its privilege and franchise to
maintain and operate the road, to another railroad corporation for
term of 999 years, in consideration of the payment from time to time
certain portion of the gross receipts.
by the latter to the former of
lease of the railroad and franThis was, in substance and effect,
chise for
term of almost
thousand years, and was
contract which
neither corporation had the lawful power to enter into, unless exand which,
pressly authorized by the state which created
beyond
the scope of the lawful powers of either corporation, was unlawful
and wholly void, could not be ratified or validated by either or both,
and would support no action or suit by either against the other.
Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 71
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. St.
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Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co.,

1 18 U. S. 290, 630, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1094,
Sup. Ct. Rep. 24; Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co. v. Oregonian Ry.
Co., 130 U. S. i, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 409; Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24, n Sup. Ct. Rep. 478.
Upon the question whether this contract was ultra vires of either
corporation, this case can not be distinguished in principle from
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co., above cited.
* *
[After discussing the capacity of the plaintiff to lease its road.]
It is unnecessary, however, to express a definitive opinion upon the

and

7

is

it

I

7

3

i

;

&

i

&

;

a

it

it,

question whether the contract between these parties was beyond the
corporate powers of the plaintiff, because, as is established by the decisions of this court, already cited, a contract beyond the corporate
powers of either party is as invalid as if beyond the corporate powers
of both, and the contract now in question was clearly beyond the corporate powers of the defendant.
The case in this respect is governed by the direct adjudication of
this court in the case of Pennsylvania R. Co. v. St. Louis, A. & T.
H. R. Co., above cited. * * *
It may therefore be assumed, as contended by the plaintiff, that the
contract in question was ultra vires of the defendant, and therefore
did not bind either party, and neither party could have maintained a
suit upon
at law or in equity, against the other.
It does not, however, follow that this suit to set aside and cancel
the contract can be maintained. If
somewhat remarkacan,
ble that, in the repeated and full discussions which the doctrine of
ultra vires has undergone in the English courts within the last fifty
The only
suit like this.
years, no attempt has been made to bring
cases cited in the elaborate briefs for the plaintiff, or which have come
to our notice, approaching this in their circumstances, are in American courts not of last resort, and present no sufficient reasons for
maintaining this suit. Auburn Academy v. Strong, Hopk. Ch. 278
Atlantic
P. Tel. Co. v. Union Pac. Ry. Co.,
McCrary 541,
Fed. Rep. 745 Western Union Tel. Co. v. St. Joseph
W. Ry.
Co.,
Fed. Rep. 430; Union Bridge Co. v. Troy
McCrary 565,
& L. R. Co., Lans. 240; Railway Co. v. Simpson, 21 Fed. Rep.
533-

J.

i

2

a

I

2

i

The English cases relied on by the plaintiff were either suits to set
Vern. 412,
aside marriage brokage bonds, as in Drury v. Hooke,
and Smith v. Bruning,
Vern. 392, nom. Goldsmith v. Burning,
Eq. Cas. Abr. 89; or to recover back money paid for the purchase,
without leave of the crown, of commission in the military or naval
Those
Eden 190.
service, as in Morris v. McCullock, Amb. 433,
cases have sometimes been justified upon the ground that, the agreement being against the policy of the law, the relief was given to the
Ves. Sr. 276; St.
Debenham v. Ox,
public through the party.
Russell,
v.
v.
Eq.
St.
Cone
n
Ves.
John,
536;
526,
48 N.
John
208, 21 Atl. Rep. 847.
But Sir William Grant explained them as
proceeding upon the ground that the plaintiff was less guilty than the
defendant.
Osborne v. Williams, 18 Ves. 379, 382. And Morris
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v. McCullock can hardly be reconciled with his decision in Thomson
v. Thomson, 7 Ves. 470, or with the current of later authorities.
The general rule, in equity, as at law, is In part delicto potior est
conditio defendentis ; and, therefore, neither party to an illegal contract
will be aided by the court, whether to enforce it or to set it aside. If
the contract is illegal, affirmative relief against it will not be granted,
at law or in equity, unless the contract remains executory, or unless
the parties are considered not in equal fault, as where the law violated
is intended for the coercion of the one party and the protection of the
other, or where there has been fraud or oppression on the part of the
Thomas v. Richmond, 12 Wall. 349, 355 5 Springs Co.
defendant.

v. Knowlton, 103 U. S. 49; Story Eq. Jur., 298.
While an unlawful contract, the parties to which are in pari delicto ,
remains executory, its invalidity is a defense in a court of law ; and a
court of equity will order its cancellation only as an equitable mode
of making that defense effectual, and when necessary for that purAdams Eq., 175.
pose.
Consequently, it is well settled, at the
present day, that a court of equity will not entertain jurisdiction to
order an instrument to be delivered up and canceled, upon the ground
of illegality appearing on its face, and when, therefore, there is no
danger that the lapse of time may deprive the party to be charged
Story Eq. Jur.,
upon it of his means of defense.
7ooa, and cases
cited. Simpson v. Howden, 3 Mylne & C. 97; Ayerst v. Jenkins, L.

R.

16

Eq. 275, 282.

When the parties are in pari delicto, and the contract has been
fully executed on the part of the plaintiff, by the conveyance of property, or by the payment of money, and has not been repudiated by
the defendant, it is now equally well settled that neither a court of
law nor a court of equity will assist the plaintiff to recover back the
Thomas v.
property conveyed or money paid under the contract.
R.
16
Richmond, above cited; Ayerst v. Jenkins, L.
Eq. 275, 284.
For instance, property conveyed pursuant to a contract made in consideration of the compounding of a crime, and the stifling of a criminal prosecution, and therefore clearly illegal, can not be recovered
back at law, nor the conveyance set aside in equity, unless obtained
by such fraud or oppression on the part of the grantee that the conveyance can not be considered the voluntary act of the grantor. Worcester v. Eaton,
Mass. 368, and 13 Mass. 371; Atwood v. Fisk,
101 Mass. 363; Bryant v. Peck & Whipple Co., 154 Mass. 460, 28
N. E. Rep. 678; Williams v. Bayley, L. R. i H. L. 200; Jones v.
Society [1892], I Ch. 173, 182, 185, 187.
In the case at bar, the contract by which the plaintiff conveyed its
railroad and franchise to the defendant for a term of 999 years was
beyond the defendant's corporate powers, and therefore unlawful and
The plaintiff
void, of which the plaintiff was bound to take notice.
stood in the position of alienating the powers which it had received
from the state, and the duties which it owed to the public, to another
corporation, which it knew had no lawful capacity to exercise those
If, as the plaintiff contends, the
powers or to perform those duties.

ii
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contract was also beyond its own corporate powers, it is certainly in
no better position.
In either aspect of the case, the plaintiff was in
The invalidity of the contract, in
pari dclicto with the defendant.
of
of
view
the laws
which both parties were bound to take notice,
on
was apparent
its face.
The contract has been fully executed on
the part of the plaintiff by the actual transfer of its railroad and franchise to the defendant ; and the defendant has held the property, and
paid the stipulated consideration from time to time, for seventeen
years, and has taken no steps to rescind or repudiate the contract.
Upon this state of facts, for the reasons above stated, the plaintiff,
considered as a party to the unlawful contract, has no right to invoke
the assistance of a court of equity to set it aside.
And so far as the
plaintiff corporation can be considered as representing the stockholders, and seeking to protect their interests, it and they are barred by
laches.
Harwood v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 78; Graham v. Railway Co., 2 Hall & T. 450, 2 Macn. & G. 146; Ffooks v. Railway
Co., i Smale & G. 142, 164; Gregory v. Patchett, n Law T. (N.

S-) 357This case is not like those in which the defendant, having abandoned

or refused to perform the unlawful contract, has been held liable to
the plaintiff, as upon an implied contract, for the value of what it had
received from him, and had no right to retain.
Springs Co. v. Knowlton, 103 U. S, 49; Bank v. Townsend, 139 U. S. 67,' n Sup. Ct.
Rep. 496, and cases there cited.
But the case is one in which, in the words of Mr. Justice Miller, in
a case often cited in this opinion, the court will not disturb the possession
of the property that has passed under the contract, but will refuse to
interfere as the matter stands.
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. St. Louis, A.
& T. H. R. Co., 118 U. S. 290, 316, 317, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1094.
See, also, Union Trust Co. v. Illinois M. Ry. Co., 117 U. S. 434,
468. 469, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 809; Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman's
Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24, 56, 57, 61, n Sup. Ct. Rep. 478.
Decree affirmed.
Compare, 1879, Thomas v. R. Co., 101 U. S. 71, supra, p. 915; 1884, New
Castle N. R. v. Simpson, 21 Fed. Rep. 533; 188(5, Pennsylvania Co. v. St. L.,
etc., R. Co., 118 U. S. 290, 317; 1888, Mallory v. Hanaur Oil Works, 86 Tenn.
598, supra, p. 957; 1890, Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Grayson, 88 Ala. 572; 1890,
Manchester, etc., R. Co. v. Concord Co., 66 N. H. 100, 49 Am. St. Rep. 582.

Sec. 379.

Same.

(6) Recovery

of

property

in an

action

for unlawful

detention.

See
Note.

Mallory v. Hanaur Oil Works, 86 Tenn. 598, supra, p. 957.
See cases cited to

378, supra.
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2. Bequests in excess of amount authorized by charter;
Sec. 380.
theories :

(a) Valid

as to everybody except the state, which
alone can complain in quo warranto, for viola-

tion of charter.
See Farrington v. Putnam, 90 Maine 405, supra, p. 1029.
Also,

see note, supra, p. 1033.

Sec. 381.

Same.

(b) Void
See,
Also,

In

re

as to excess,

McGraw,

111

N.

Y

and heirs may have set aside.
66, supra, p. 1034.

see note, supra, p. 1039.

Sec. 382. 3- Torts.
See Nims v. Mt. Hermon School, 160 Mass. 177,
467, 22 L. R. A. 364, infra, p. 1268; Bissell v.
Y. 259, per Selden, J., supra, p. 1191.

39

Am. St. Rep.
22 N.

R. R. Co.,

By the weight of authority, a corporation is liable fora tort comNote.
mitted by its officers or agents, in an ultra vires transaction authorized by the
corporate management:
1858, P. W. & B. R. v. Quigley, 21 How. (U. S.)
202; 1859, Taylor v. Water Power Co., 12 Gray 415; 1865, N. Y. & N. H. R.
Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30; 1867,Maynard v. F. F. Ins. Co., 34 Cal. 48; 1869,
Buffet v. T. & B. R., 40 N. Y. 168;' 1871, Hutchinson v. West, etc., R., 6
Heisk. 634; 1878, Railroad Co. v. Chappell, 61 Ala. 527; 1879, First Nat'l
Bk. v. Graham, 100 U. S.699; 1881, Alexander v. Relfe, 74 Mo. 495; 1884,
Cent. R. & B. Co. v. Smith, 76 Ala. 572. 52 Am. Rep. 353; 1885, L E. & W.
R. v. Haring, 47 N. J. L. 137; 1885, Gruber v. Wash. & J. R. Co., 92 N. C.
1 ; 1885, Salt Lake City v. Hollister,
118 U. S. 256; 1886, Denver & R. G. R.
Co. v. Harris, 122 U. S. 597; 1887, Hussey v. N. S. R. Co., 98 N. C. 34; 1888,
Sherman v. Printing Co., 29 Mo. App. 31; 1889, Fogg v. B. & L. R. Co., 148
Mass. 513; 1896, Johnson Fife Hat Co. v. Nat'l Bk., 4 Okla. 17, 44 Pac.
Rep. 192; 1898, Minn. Trust Co. v. Menage, 73 Minn. 441; 1899, Zinc Carbonate Co. v. Bank, 103 Wis. 125, 74 Am. St. Rep. 845.
Contra. See Orr v. Bank of U. S., 1 Ham. (Ohio) 28; 1852, Childs v.
Bank of Mo., 17 Mo. 213 ; 1853, Hood v. N. Y. & N. H. R., 22 Conn. 501 ; 1874,
Gillett v. Mo. Valley R. Co., 55 Mo. 315, 17 Am. Rep. 653 ; 1875, Weckler v. First
Nat'l Bk., 42 Md. 581 ; 1878, Haag v. Commrs., 60 Ind. 511, 28 Am. Rep. 654;
1885, Gunn v. Cent. R., etc., Co., 74 Ga. 509; 1887, Bathe v. Decatur Co. Ag.
Soc., 73 Iowa 11.
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?

i. The state:

Pal. Car Co., 175 111. 125, supra, p. 926;
Ref. Co., 121 N. Y. 582, supra, p. 100;
People
People v. Chicago Gas T. Co., 130 111. 303, supra, p. 1054;
Commw.
p.
1113;
8,
supra,
v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 35
i, supra, p. 1014; also,
v N Y., etc., R. R. Co., 132 Pa. St. $ 9
State, p. 1294 et se$.\
infra, Relations of the Corporation to the
See People v. Pullman's
People v. N. River Sugar

380, supra.

and

Sec. 384.

2.

See, supra,

Sec. 385.

3-

The parties.
Art. iv,

365-382.

Shareholders.

See Dodge v. Woolsey,

18

How. 331, supra, p. 88; Tompkinson

v. S. E. Ry. Co., L. R. 35 Ch. D. 675, infra, p. 1715; Smith v.
Hurd, 12 Mete. 371, infra, p. 1706; Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S.
450, infra, p. 1716; Russell v. Wakefield W. W. Co., L. R. 20 Eq.
Cas. 474, infra, p. 1709 ; Bronson v. La Crosse & M. R. R. Co., 2
Wall. 283, infra, p. 1713.
Sec. 386.

4.

Creditors.

See Dexter Sav. Bk. v. Friend, 90 Fed. Rep. 703, infra, p. 1790;
Pond v. Framingham & L. R. Co., 130 Mass. 194, infra, p. 1808;
Graham v. R. R. Co., 102 U. S. 148, infra, p. 1809; Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason 308, infra, p. 1847; Kearns v. Leaf, i H. & M. 681,
infra, p. 1862 ; Foster v. Borax Co., 80 L. T. R.'46i, infra, p. 1863 ;
Lothrop v. Stedmen, 42 Conn. 583, infra, p. 1865 ; Cole v. Millerton Iron Co., 133 N. Y. 164, infra, p. 1866.
Sec. 387.
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Third parties.

THE STOCKPORT DISTRICT WATER-WORKS COMPANY
MAYOR, ETC., OP MANCHESTER, ET AL. 1
1863.

IN THE ENGLISH COURT OF CHANCERY.

9

v.

THE

Jurist N. S.

266-7.

[Bill by the Stockport District Water- Works Company to enjoin the
city of Manchester and the S. W. Co. from carrying out a certain con1
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tract entered into and alleged to be ultra vires both corporations.
The
S. W. Co. were authorized to supply the town of Stockport with
water taken from the river Mersey at a certain place, the city of Manchester was authorized to supply itself with water from another source,
and the plaintiff was authorized also to supply the town of Stockport
with water within certain limits. The bill alleged that the city of
Manchester and the S. W. Co had entered into agreement for the
purpose and were about to make a junction of their pipes in such a
way that the S. W. Co. could obtain part of its supply from the city's
pipes; this was alleged to be beyond the legal powers of either party;
that the S. W. Co. had no right to obtain water from that source, and
the city no authority to furnish water to Stockport; that the same, if
carried out, would prejudice the rights of the plaintiff, and it asked
to have the contract annulled and the parties enjoined.
The lower
court sustained a demurrer to the bill.]
* *
*
LORD CHANCELLOR (WESTBURY).
(After holding that
the contract probably was ultra vires both parties.)
I can not see any private right which this incorporated Stockport
I do not see how the overleaping of
Company has in this matter.
their limits by the Manchester corporation inflicts any amount of private injury upon the plaintiffs, so as to entitle them to seek redress in
a court of justice.
The legislature has in a variety of cases pointed
out that which the principles of this court had already established
namely, that where an act of parliament is perverted to purposes not
warranted by any person deriving rights under
this court would
restrain all excesses or transgressions of the legislative enactment.
no difficulty, therefore, in defining the course of action for
There
the purpose of restraining the conduct complained of, so far as that
conduct
an injury to the public, or so far as the conduct affects individuals, to whom the Manchester corporation properly responsible.
But to the plaintiffs they are certainly not responsible.
The plaintiffs
have no interest in their action, so as to maintain
complaint against
them.
The plaintiffs are not qualified to represent the rights and interests of the public and in one of these two capacities the bill of the
In neither
can be maintained, must be supported.
plaintiffs,
think that the plaintiffs are entitled to call upon the court
capacity do
for relief. The plaintiffs, in point of fact, would,
they succeeded,
have this consequence secured to them, that their own trade might
The peopossibly be benefited at the expense of their competitors.
ple of Stockport might incur
very serious loss, because there would
be a monopoly established in one company, which would have the
power then of exacting the highest rates allowed by their acts of parliament; whereas,
the existing state of things
permitted to continue, that would not be the result.
Now, supposing the plaintiffs
applied to the attorney-general for the purpose of inducing him to file
an information, probably that circumstance would be
very proper
and those are
few of the
consideration for the attorney-general
not to
reasons which might be assigned, showing how desirable
allow any private individual to usurp the right of representing the

387

ULTRA

VIRES.

1235

The only arguments which I am disposed to accept
public interest.
from those which I have heard to-day are arguments founded upon
the public interest, and the general advantage of restraining an incorBut, in the
porated company within its proper sphere of action.
present case, the transgression of those limits inflicts no private wrong
upon these plaintiffs ; and although the plaintiffs, in common with the
rest of the public, might be interested in the larger view of the question, yet the constitution of the country has wisely intrusted the privilege with a public officer, and has not allowed it to be usurped by a
I must, therefore, allow the demurrer, confirm
private individual.
the order and dismiss the petition for rehearing, with costs.
Note.
Accord: 1893, Southern Pacific Co. v. United States, 28 Ct. of Cl.
Rep. 77; 1896, The Illinois, etc., Bank v. Pacific R. Co., 115 Cal. 287, 49
Idaho
Pac. Rep. 196; 1900, Burke L. & L. S. Co. v. Wells, F. Co.,
, 60
Pac. Rep. 87.

TITLE IV.

GENERAL

DUTIES AND LIABILITIES.

CHAPTER

15.

LIABILITIES OTHER THAN UPON CONTRACTS.
ARTICLE I.
Sec. 388.

(i)

YARBOROUGH
1812.

TORTS.

Conversion.
ET AL. v.

THE GOVERNOR
OF ENGLAND. 1

IN THE KING'S BENCH.

16

&

CO. OF

THE BANK

East's Reports 6-12.

[The plaintiffs declared in trover against the corporation of the governor and company of the Bank of England, for three promissory
notes of the Bank of England, payable on demand, each for ^100,
describing them by their dates and numbers ; to which the defendants
Verdict for plaintiff, and motion to arrest
pleaded the general issue.
judgment.]

In this case, which was argued on
ELLENBOROUGH, C. J.
an action of trover is mainthe
was
whether
Saturday,
only question
tainable against a body corporate ; in other words, whether a corporation can be guilty of a trespass or a tort.
As a corporation they
can do no act, not even affix their corporate seal to a deed, but
through the instrumentality and agency of others ; they can not, as a
corporation, be subject to a capias or exigent (the process in trespass), because the remedies which attach upon living persons can not
be applied to bodies merely politic and of an impersonal nature. But
wherever they can competently do or order any act to be done on
their behalf, which, as by their common seal they may do, they are
liable to the consequences of such act, if it be of a tortious nature,
and to the prejudice of others.
A corporation having the return of writs, or to which any writ, or
a mandamus, for instance, is directed, is liable eventually to an action
for a false return.
The case of Argent v. The Dean and Chapter of
St. Paul's, in this court, about the year 1781, was an action for a false
return to a mandamus respecting an election to a verger's place in
that cathedral, and no objection was made that the action would not
lie. Vidian's Entries, p. i, is an action for a false return against the
mayor and commonalty of the city of Canterbury, for a false return
to a writ of mandamus to restore an alderman to his precedency of
place, etc. It states the mayor and corporation as attached to answer,
The instances of
and the return as falsely and maliciously made.
actions against corporations for false returns to writs of mandamus,
LORD

1
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which are so often directed to them, must be numberless, though I
Bro. Corporahave not found many of them in the books of entries.
tions, pi. 48.
A corporation can not be aiding to a trespass, nor give
a warrant to do a trespass -without writing, and cites 4 Hen. 7,9; and
certainly it appears by that case, and by the sequel of it in 4 Hen. 7,
16, that a corporation can not give a command to enter into land, without a deed, nor do a thing which vests or divests a freehold, nor acBut many little
cept a disseizin made to their use, tuithout deed.
things, it is said, require no command, by which must be meant no
special commanding, as a command to servants to chase cattle out of
their lands, or to make hay ; being things which it is incident to B
servant to do, and which he is bound to do without command : and if
he do
not material, for he may do
good, and the command
without command.
their writing under their
A corporation can not do a tort but
common seal:
per Fitzjames, Justice; Bro. Corporations, pi. 34,
cites 14 Hen.
their writing they
2, 29, which imports that
may. A corporation may be defendants in an action of quaere impedit,
Butler v. The Bishop of Hereand the hindrance
an act of tort.
ford and the University of Cambridge, Barnes C. P., 350; to which
multitude of other instances may be added: Rast., 497? Ast. 378;
Mod. Enc., 291; Winch. 625, 700, 721,. 733;
Lut. noo;
Lev. 332. The statute,
recites the practice, in assizes
H. 4, c.
of novel "disseizin in other pleas of land, of naming the mayor and
franchise, as disseizors, in order to oust
bailiffs and commonalty of
them of holding plea thereof
and directs the inquiry before the judges
of assize, whether they be disseizors or tenants, or be named by
fraud;" which plainly proves that they may he considered as disseizors
and there are instances of trespass against corporations.
In
Ass.,
Ed.
in
22
the
which
was
after
cited
2,
pi.
argupi.
67,
44
ment.
Trespass was brought against the mayor and commonalty of
Hull and another person
and the objection made was not that tresnatural person
pass would not lie against the corporation, but that as
was joined with them, there must be different processes;
distress
But the objection
against the former and a capias against the latter.
does not appear to have prevailed.
In H.
i-, 14, trespass was brought against the mayor, bailiff and
and the objection was not
commonalty, and one of the commonalty
could
that trespass would not lie against the corporation, but that
not be supported against them and an individual of their body, and
Bro. Corporations, pi. 24, says the better opinion was that the writ
was good, and 14 Hen.
was so awarded, and that in that
2, says
case all the justices agreed to it.
Brook also puts the case, "if
release to twenty or 200 of
mayor and commonalty disseize me, and
the commonalty; this will not serve the mayor and commonalty;"

if

is

is

5

2

is is

and the reason
in their corporate character,
because the disseizen
and the release
And the case
to the individuals.
put "that
mayor and commonalty disseize one of their own body, he shall have
assize against them," which clearly imports that the corporation, as
WIL. CAS.
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such, might be disseizors. Also, in 4 Hen. 7, 13, trespass was brought
against the mayor and commonalty of York; they justified under a
right in the inhabitants to have common : but this was adjudged no
plea, because the right in natural persons gave no right to the corporation, and the trespass was alleged in the corporation. They then
pleaded as bailiff's in aydant: but it was adjudged they could not be
bailiffs aiding to a trespass, "nor could they give warrant "without
writing to commit a trespass;" which implies that by proper writing,
In the presnamely, by deed under their common seal, they might.
ent case, which is after verdict, it must be presumed that a competent
conversion was proved, and if it be essential to such conversion that
there should have been an authority from the company under seal to
detain the notes on their behalf, that such authority was proved. The
fact, by reference to my notes, is that it was admitted that the bank
detained the notes in question under an indemnity, and as no objection was taken to the terms of the admission, a competent detention,
i. e., through the means of servants properly authorized to detain on
their behalf, was thereby admitted ; and, therefore, the presumption
of due proof, after verdict, is in effect warranted by the facts of the
case, if it had been material, which it by no means is, to resort to them.
In the case of The King v. John Bigg, 3 P. Will. 419, it was
made a question upon a special verdict in a case of capital felony, for
erasing an indorsement upon a bank note, whether a person intrusted
and employed by the governor and company of the Bank of England
to sign notes on their behalf, was competently authorized for that purpose, not having been, as the special verdict expressly found, so
intrusted and employed under their common seal.
There is a long
and learned argument of the reporter, Mr. Peere Williams, in which
the authorities as to what acts a corporation may do by their servant
without an authority under their common seal, are drawn together.
The majority of the judges who sustained the conviction, must have
been of opinion that an authority under their common seal was not
essentially necessary for such a purpose ; indeed, according to the
report in i Stra. 18, of the same case, the doubt of the judges must
have turned upon another point, namely, upon the import of the word
indorsement (i e., the writing alleged to be erased); and whether it
could be satisfied by an erasure of what was written on the face of the
note.
As to which Sir John Strange in his report says: "That it
was held by all the judges that the defendant was guilty ; for the
writing on the face of the note was of the same effect as an indorsement, and being introduced by the company instead of writing on the
back, and always accepted and taken to be an indorsement, was
The objection of the want of
within the words of the indictment."
authority under the common seal is not even noticed in the report of
However, if there would have been
this case by Sir John Strange.
anything in the objection in this case, if made at the trial, there is
nothing in it after verdict, when it must be presumed, as I have
already stated, that all the competent proof which could be made in
support of the action was made, and of course that an authority under
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seal for the detention of the notes was proved,
all necessary.
Rule discharged.
Note.
1.

Exch.

if such proof were

Liability for torts in general.

to the old doctrine, see note to Eastern Counties
314, infra, p. 1246, and note, supra, pp. 75-6.

As

at

R. Co. v. Broom,

6

2. Modern doctrine -Corporations are liable for torts, substantially as a master is liable for the torts of his servants, while engaged in the master's business, and in this connection the managers of the corporation are practically
the corporation, the whole of the corporate duties being vested in them :
1827, Lyman v. White River Bridge Co., 2 Aikens (Vt.) 255,16 Am. Dec. 705;
1840. Rhodes v. City of Cleveland, 10 Ohio 159, 36 Am. Dec. 82; 1848, Meares
v. Commissioners, 9 Ired. Law (N. C.) 73, 49 Am. Dec. 412; 1849, Vanderbilt
v. R. T. Co., 2 N. Y. 479, 51 Am. Dec. 315; 1852, Lesher v. Wabash Nav. Co.,
14 111. 85, 56 Am. Dec. 494; 1853, Goodspeed v. East Haddam Bank, 22 Conn.
530, 58 Am. Dec. 439, infra, p. 1256; 1855, Jones v. West Vt. R. Co., 27 Vt. 399,
65 Am. Dec. 206; 1856, Henderson v. San Antonio, etc., Co., 17 Texas 560,67
Am. Dec. 675; 1857, Hopkins v. A. & St. L. Co., 36 N. H. 9, 72 Am. Dec. 287;
1858, Phil., W. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. (162 U. S.) 202; 1867, Maynard v. Fireman's F. I. Co., 34 Cal. 48, 91 Am. Dec. 672; 1877, Peebles v.
Patapsco Guano Co., 77 N. C. 233, 24 Am. Rep. 447; 1884, Child v. Boston,
etc., Iron Works, 137 Mass. 516, 50 Am. Rep. 328; 1887, Wheeler & Wilson
Mfg. Co. v. Boyce, 36 Kan. 350, 59 Am. Rep. 571, infra, p. 1250; 1888, Miller v.
Coal Co., 31 W. Va. 836, 13 Am. St. Rep. 903; 1891, Columbus, etc., Coal Co.
v. Tucker, 48 Ohio St. 41, 29 Am. St. Rep. 528 ; 1893, Nims v. Mt. Hermon
School, 160 Mass. 177,' 39 Am. St. Rep. 476, infra, p. 1268; 1894, Dorsey Machine Co. v. McCaffrey, 139 Ind. 545, 47 Am. St. Rep. 290; 1895, Pittsburgh,
C., C. & St. L. R. v. Sullivan, 141 Ind. 83, 50 Am. St. Rep. 313.
See, also, notes to cases following.

Sec. 389.

(2) Nuisance, obstructing

THE CHESTNUT HILL
1818.

& S.

stream.

H. TURNPIKE CO. v. RUTTER.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
(Pa.) Rep. *6-i8, 8 Am. Dec. 675.

1

4 Serg. &

R.

TILGHMAN, C. J. This is an action on the case, brought by James
Rutter against The Chestnut Hill & Spring House Turnpike Company, for an injury done to the plaintiff's land and tanyard, in consequence of certain piers erected by the defendants, on each side of a
stream of water, by which the stream was obstructed and thrown
back, and overflowed the plaintiff's land.
The defendants below, who are plaintiffs in error, rely on two ob1

Arguments, except

a

small part of Judge Ingersoll's, omitted.
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1
jections: I. That a corporation is not suable in this kind of action ;
2. That the declaration does not state a good cause of action, even if
the defendants were liable to an action in this form.
i. Corporations have lately been so multiplied in the United States
that they stand a very prominent part in the business of the country.
It has, therefore, been necessary to consider with great attention their
nature and their rights, both as to suing and being sued.
And as it
would be extremely inconvenient that they should do wrong without
being amenable to justice, the inclination of the court has been to
hold them responsible.
There was a time when it seems to have
been supposed that they could make no contract but by writing under
The reason assigned was, that being incorpotheir common seal.
real, and consequently incapable of speaking, it was impossible that
But, upon reflection, this
they should enter into a parol contract.
reason has been thought insufficient, for if pursued to its full extent
it would prove that a corporation could not act at all. It has no hand
to affix a seal, and must therefore employ an agent for the purpose.
But this agent must receive his authority previous to affixing the seal.
It is necessary, therefore, that the corporation should have the power
to act without seal, so far as respects the appointment of a person to
affix the seal.
Now if it can appoint an agent without seal for one
Accordpurpose, there is no reason why it may not for another.
ingly, in the case of The King v. Bigg, 3 P. Wms. 419, on a
special verdict in a case of capital felony, it was held that the Bank
of England might, "without seal, authorize a person to sign notes in
And it was decided by the supreme court of the United
its behalf.
States, in the case of The Bank of Columbia v. Patterson's Administrators, 7 Cranch 299, that a corporation may, without seal, enter
In the words of Judge
into a contract, express, or even implied.
Story, by whom the opinion of the court was delivered, "when a corporation is acting within the scope of the legitimate purpose of its
institution, all parol contracts made by its authorized agents, are
1
Ingersoll, for plaintiff in error, argued : Corporations are the creatures
of the law, of a highly refined and intangible nature, whose properties and
attributes lawyers alone can understand. Deriving their existence from the
law, they must be governed by the terms of the law which creates them.
They must proceed and be pursued in the path prescribed by the law. If the
corporators do an act beyond their corporate powers, they, as individuals, and
not the corporation of which they are members, must answer it. If the corporation itself enter into a contract not authorized by its charter, no action
founded on the contract can be sustained, though the individual members
may be sued.
Suppose an insurance company should undertake to make a
turnpike road, or to build a church, could those who were employed by them
recover against the corporation as such?
Every principle of the law of corporations forbids it. Now, a corporation never was and never can be authorized by law to commit a tort; they can invest no one with power for that
If, therefore, an agent constituted for a legal purpose inflict an inpurpose.
jury, the corporation is no more answerable than it would be for an act of
that agent, done without any authority whatever derived from it, because
being unauthorized to commit a wrong, it is out of the scope of its corporate
powers. The act of the law, like the act of God, can work a wrong to no one,
and if a man sustain damage by it, it is damnum absque injuria.

3^9
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express promises of the corporation, and all duties imposed on them
by law, and all benefits conferred at their request, raise implied
By this decision I consider the
promises, for which an action lies."
law as settled.
It does, indeed, seem to have been the opinion of
this court, in the case of Breckbill v. The Lancaster Turnpike Company, 3 Dall. 496, that an action of assumpsit would not lie against
a corporation.
But the law had not been at that time fully considered, and I may say that our late brother Yeates, who was on the
bench when Breckbill v. The Lancaster Turnpike Company was
decided, was satisfied as to the propriety of acquiescing in the authority of The Bank of Columbia v. Patterson's Administrators.
But it is objected that the present action is not on contract but on
tort, and a very refined argument is brought forward to prove that a
A corporation, say the decorporation can not be guilty of a tort.
fendant's counsel, is a mere creature of law, and can act only as
authorized by its charter.
But the charter does not authorize it to do
The argument is falwrong, and, therefore, it can do no wrong.
lacious in its principles and mischievous in its consequences, as it
tends to introduce actual wrongs and ideal remedies; for a turnpike
company may do great injury by means of laborers who have no
It is much
property to answer the damages recovered against them.
more reasonable to say that when a corporation is authorized by law
to make a road, if any injury is done in the course of making that
road by the persons employed under its authority, it shall be responsible in the same manner that an individual is responsible for the
The act of the agent is
actions of his servants touching his business.
the act of the principal.
There is no solid ground for a distinction
between contracts and torts. Indeed, with respect to torts, the opinion
of the courts seems to have been more uniform than with respect to
contracts.
For it may be shown that from the earliest times to the
present corporations have been held liable for torts. Many cases have
been cited from the year books.
Upon examination they do not all
answer the citations, but enough appears to show that the law was so
In 4 Hen. 7, p. 13, pi. n, we find an action of trespass
understood.
Plea, that all the inagainst the mayor and commonalty of York.
of
common in the land where the trespass is suphabitants had a right
posed to have been committed ; held, not good, because the action is
against the corporation, and the plea is a justification as to individuals. In a subsequent part of this case it is said that a corporation
This,
can not give a warrant to commit a trespass -without -writing.
if it be law, proves that a warrant may be given by writing, which is
sufficient for the plaintiff's purpose, the point being whether a corporation can commit a trespass.
In 8 Hen. 6, p. i, pi. n, and p. 14,
pi. 34, trespass was brought against the mayor and bailiffs and comIt was objected that a cormonalty of Ipswich, and one J. Jabez.
poration and an individual can not be joined in one action, but it was
not objected that trespass does not lie against a corporation, and the
objection is said to have been overruled in 14 Hen. 8, 2.
In the book of assizes (31 Ass. pi. 19), it appears that an assiae
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of novel disseizin was maintained against the mayor and commonalty
of Winton.
Brook lays it down that if the mayor and commonalty
disseize one who releases to several individuals of the corporation,

this will not serve the mayor and commonalty, because the disseizin
In the old books of entries are numeris in their corporate capacity.
ous precedents of writs of quaere impedit against corporations, and
in Vidian's Ent. I, is a declaration in an action on the case, ( 16 Car. 2)
against the mayor and commonalty of the city of Canterbury, for a false
To come to more modern times, it was held
return to a mandamus.
in the Mayor of Lynn, etc., (in error) v. Turner (Cowp. 86) that an
action on the case lies against a corporation for not cleansing and
keeping in repair a stream of navigable water, which it was bound to
do by prescription, in consequence of which the plaintiff was injured.
This was in the year 1774, a little before our revolution. The laws
of the commonwealth forbid my tracing this point through the English
courts since the revolution, but we shall find abundant authority in
In Gray v. The Portland Bank, 6
the courts of our own country.
Mass. Rep. 364, it is laid down that the bank was responsible for
wrongs done by itself or its agents. In Riddle v. The Proprietors of
the Locks, etc., on Merrimack River, 7 Mass. Rep. 169, an action
was maintained against the company for damage suffered by the
plaintiff in consequence of the locks not being kept in repair. And
in Townsend v. The Susquehannah Turnpike Company, 6 Johns. 91,
an action was supported for the loss of a horse, killed by the falling
of a bridge, which the company had built of bad materials.
These
authorities put it beyond doubt that the form of action in the present
case is good.
The objection to the declaration remains to be considered.
It is
said that the act of assembly by which this company is chartered
gives them power to erect bridges over all the streams which cross the
road, and, therefore, they are not responsible for any damages which
But this is too
may be suffered in consequence of these bridges.
broad a proposition : for, granting that they would not be responsible
for damages unavoidably resulting from a bridge built in the best
manner, and obstructing the passage of the water no more than was
necessary for its proper construction, it would not follow that they
should not be answerable for damages arising from a bridge so carelessly or inartificially built as to occasion an unnecessary and wanton
Now, the declaration alleges that the defendants, conobstruction.
and
triving
wrongfully and injuriously intending to injure the plaintiff,
So that
etc., did 'wrongfully and unjustly set up certain piers, etc.
we are bound, after verdict, to suppose that it was proved the defendTo say now
ants were in fault in the manner of erecting the piers.
that they were guilty of no wrong would be to declare that it is impossible for them to be made answerable for any injury which may
arise from any kind of bridge or piers.
This is going farther than
I can permit myself to do, being satisfied that the law never intended
to authorize damage without necessity. Whether the company would
be answerable for damages occasioned by a bridge or piers of proper
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is a point of great importance, on which I give no
opinion, as it does not arise in this case. I am of opinion, on the
whole, that the judgment should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
construction

Note.

Compare Riddle v. Proprietors, etc.,

Sec. 390.

(3) Trespass
MAUND

1842.

v.

7

Mass.

169, supra, p. 47.

to property.

THE MONMOUTHSHIRE CANAL CO.

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. 4 Manning & Granger
( 43 Engl. C. L.)* 45 2.

Trespass for breaking and entering locks on
carrying away barges and coal.
Pleas, not guilty (by statute), 36 G. 3,

a canal, and

seizing and

c. cii, and payment of
money into court.
At the trial, before Creswell, J. , at the last assizes for Monmouthshire, it was proved that the trespass in question had been committed
by one Cooke, who was the agent of the company, which was incorporated by act of parliament, 36 G. 3, c. cii, and that the barges and
coal had been seized for tolls claimed to be due to them.
The only
question raised was whether trespass would lie against a corporation
aggregate for an act done by their agent within the scope of his
A verdict was taken for the plaintiff, damages ^50, leave
authority.
being reserved to move to enter a verdict for the defendants.
Talfourd, Serjt., in last term, obtained a rule nisi accordingly, or
to arrest the judgment. He cited the case of Sutton's Hospital, 10 Co.
Rep. 32, Anon, 12 Mod. 559; Morgan v. The Corporators of Carmarthen, 3 Keb. 350; Thusfeild and Jones' Case, Skin. 27 Com. Dig.
tit. Franchises (F. 19), 6 Vin. Abr., tit. Corporations (B. a.).
Ludlow, Seijt., now showed cause. The act of parliament by
which the company is incorporated provides that they may sue and
be sued ; it also empowers them to enter on lands.
If they enter
improperly it would seem that they may be sued for the trespass.
The whole doctrine that a corporation can not be sued in trespass
rests on one passage in Bro. Abr. Corporations, 43 ; * where the
reason given is that neither capias nor exigent can go against them. A
distringas, however, may be issued against a corporation. It has been
1 "Nota,
per Thorpe, that trespass lies not against commonalties, to wit, by
the name of corporation, but against the person who did it, by their proper
names; for neither capias nor exigent lies against a commonalty; nor shall a
commonalty implead or be impleaded but with the mayor or bailiffs, if they
have mayor or bailiffs; and there by him (i. e. according to Thorpe) there
may be a corporation by name of a commonalty, without mayor, bailiff or
other head." Citing 22 Ass., p. 67 (22 Ass., fo. 100, pi. 67.)
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will lie against a corporation : Yarborough v. The
Bank of England, 16 East 6, where Lord Ellenborough, C. J., in
giving the judgment of the court, reviews all the authorities upon the
It was a mo(Tindal, C. J. That case was after verdict.
subject.
tion in arrest of judgment; no leave appears to have been reserved.)
But the broad doctrine is laid down that trover would lie ; and there
is no difference in principle between that action and trespass.
The
payment into court in this case admits that the action is rightly
brought. An indictment will lie against a corporation, although all
Various instances are colthe ordinary consequences can not follow.
lected in Kyd on Corporations, vol. i, pp. 223-225, where trespass
has been brought against a corporation.
Other authorities are menSaund.,
n.
The
in
i
tioned
Wms.
principle that a corporation
340,
of
in
for
the
tortious
act
its
is liable
tort
agent, done in its ordinary
in
carried
out
v.
The
Smith
service, is further
Birmingham Gas Com(Tindal, C. J. The process is the same,
pany, i A. & E. 526.
both in case and in trespass
namely, by attachment, distress, capias
If case will lie, it is difficult to see why trespass
and outlawry.
should not lie also.)
Talfourd, Serjt., was then called upon to support the rule, and
admitted that he had nothing to rely upon but the old authorities, and
that in Regina v. The Birmingham and Gloucester Railway Company,
2 Q. B. Rep. 47, the court of queen's bench had, in this term, reThe doctrine
fused to quash an indictment against a corporation.
in Bro. Abr., however, is imported into Com. Dig., tit. Franchises
(F. 19.).
TINDAL, C. J. The process in case and trespass being the same,
it is impossible to see any distinction between the two actions.
Per curiam,
Rule discharged.
decided that trover

See, also, 1839, Whiteman's Ex. v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co., 2 Harr.
Note.
(Del.), 514, 33 Am. Dec. 411; 1848, Hay v. Cohoes Co., 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 42;
1896, Sunnyside, etc., Coke Co. v. Reitz, 14 Ind. App. 478, 43 N. E. Rep. 46.

(4) Assault and battery.

Sec. 391.

EASTERN COUNTIES RAILWAY CO. AND RICHARDSON
1851.

IN THE EXCHEQUER
&

G.) Reports

v.

BROOM.

CHAMBER. 6 Exchequer (Welsby,
2 Eng. L. & Eq. 406.

H.

314-326,

[Broom, a passenger on the railway, brought an action of trespass
for assault, battery and false imprisonment, against the company, and
Richardson, its inspector.
The plaintiff's evidence showed that he
1 Statement
given.

abridged.

Most of arguments
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Only part of opinion
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was a passenger in defendant's car, that he was assaulted in the car,
forcibly taken out of the same, and imprisoned by Richardson, then an
inspector in the service of the company, professing to act in so doing
as its servant, and under assertions of justification which the evidence
failed to establish.
The court, in leaving the evidence to the jury,
"If, beforesaid the company could be liable in one of two ways:
hand, they gave instructions to their servants to remove from their
cars any who disobeyed the by-laws, and commit him to a policeman,
if they gave their directions generally, there was no doubt they would
be liable. They would also,
discovering that their servant, acting
on their behalf, had given the plaintiff into custody, they adopted the
act, and directed their attorney to follow that up and prosecute the
was contended that an action
This was objected to, and
charge."
of trespass for assault and battery does not lie against
corporation
that in order to render the corporation liable for such an
aggregate
act by an agent, the authority to do the act must be given by an instrument under seal
and that such authority must precede the act, since
the corporation can not be rendered liable by ratification.]
PATTESON,
have conferred with my learned brothers upon
this case, and we are all of opinion that there
no reason why we
should defer our judgment. The first question arises on the declaration itself, and
quite independent of the particular circumstances of
this case.
alleged on the part of the plaintiffs in error, as
general
broad proposition of law, that in no case can an action of trespass for
assault and battery lie against
corporation aggregate. Whatever may
be the effect of the authorities in the Year Books,
has been expressly
held, in modern times, that trespass will lie against a corporation agclose, and for seizing goods.
gregate for breaking and entering
This has been decided by several recent cases. .Then the question
whether trespass for assault and battery may lie against
corporation,
and
has been contended that
can not, for
can
said that
neither beat nor be beaten.
as
No doubt that proposition
time of
not,
its
But
follow
that
does
therefore,
respects
corporate capacity.
corporation, by authority under seal, direct a servant to apprehend and imprison
particular person, an action for assault and batcan
not
be
The learned
maintained against the corporation.
tery
counsel who appears for the plaintiffs in error must contend, in order

a

is

It

it

is

it

:

is

it

a

it
is

to show that this declaration can not be supported, that no such action
would lie. But we are all clearly of opinion that
not so, and that
an action of trespass for assault and battery will lie against
corporation whenever the corporation can authorize the act done, and
done by their authority.
We are, therefore, of opinion that the declaration
and
we do not think
good
necessary to go through the
several authorities upon this question.
whether,
The next question
in order to render the corporation liable for the act of their servant,
was necessary that that servant should have an authority by deed.
has been decided, many years ago, that
corporation may be liable
in tort for the acts of their servants, although their authority be not

1246
under

EAST. COUNTIES R. CO.
seal.

It

&

RICHARDSON V. BROOM.

is not necessary, therefore,

391

further to advert to this

point.

With respect to the point, whether the company could ratify the act,
if the act can be said to have been done for the use or benefit of the

The ascompany, there can be no doubt that they could ratify it.
sault and imprisonment of a party liable to the company for not having paid his fare was an act of the servant of the company, which
manifestly might have been for the benefit of the company. Therefore, we are clearly of opinion that there might have been a ratification of that act.
The law is well laid down in distinct terms in the
' l He that receiveth
from
a trespasser, and
the
passage
4 Inst. 317,
agreeth to a trespass after it be done, is no trespasser, unless the trespass was done to his use or for his benefit, and then his agreement
The question of liasubsequent amounteth to a commandment."
bility by ratification depends upon this, whether the act was originally
intended to be done to the use or for the benefit of the party who is
afterwards said to have ratified it.
We are with the plaintiff in this
case, that the action might lie, and the act, though not done with the
knowledge of the company in the first instance, might have been ratified by them ; but we are of opinion that there was no evidence of
any such ratification, and that the direction of the lord chief baron
The result, therefore, is that there must
was wrong in this respect.
be a venire de no-vo.
Venire de novo.
Accord:
1846, Edwards v. Bank, 1 Branch (Fla.) 136; 1851, Railroad Co.
v. Dalby, 19 111. 352; 1867, Brokaw v. R. Co., 32 N.
L. 328, 90 Am. Dec.
659, infra, p. 1249; 1869, Goddard v. Railway Co., 57 Maine 202, 2 Am. Rep.
39; 1876, Rounds v. L. & W. R. Co., 64 N. Y 1^9; 1882, C. & E. R. Co. v.
Flexman, 103 111. 546, 42 Am. Rep. 33; 1887, Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Harris, 122 U. S. 597; 1898, Johnson v. Pioneer Fuel Co., 72 Minn. 405, 8 Am. &
E. C. C. (N. S.) 708, note 712; 1898, Trabing v. Cal. Nav. & Imp. Co., 121
Cal. 137, 8 Am. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 695, note 704; 1899, Southern Ex. Co. v.
Flatten, 36 C. C. A. 46, 93 Fed. Rep. 936, 10 A. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 521; 1899,
Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia, 71 Conn. 369, 71 Am. St. Rep. 213, infra,

J.

p. 1279.

The old doctrine:
Note.
Most of the old (and now obsolete) learning on
the liability of corporations for torts is found well summarized by Burnet, J.,
in Orr v. Bank of U. S., 1 Ohio 36 (1822), as follows:
This is an action for an assault and battery, and false imprisonment. The
declaration is filed in the common form, charging the defendants jointly with
the commission of the trespass, as though they were all natural persons. The
defendants have demurred generally. On the argument two principal questions were raised and discussed.
1. Whether a corporation aggregate is liable to be sued by its corporate
name, in an action of trespass for an assault and battery, and false imprisonment.
2. Whether, if they be not so liable, the defendants, Creighton and Dunn,
can take advantage of the joinder on this demurrer.
On the first question, Chitty has been cited (1 vol., 66), where he says, corporations may be sued in that character, in many instances, for damages
arising from neglect of duty, imposed on them by particular statutes, but they
can not in general be sued in that character in trespass or replevin. The
action must be brought against each person by name, who commits the tort.
In 8 East. 230, Lawrence, Justice, says, trespass does not lie against a cor-

391

TORTS.

1247

Thorp, Justice, says, trespass does not lie against a corporation
name, for a capias and exigent do not lie against
it. 22 Ass. 67. A corporation can not beat nor be beaten, nor commit treason,
nor felony, nor be outlawed, etc. 21 Edw. 4, 7, 12, 27, 67. They can not be
Nor outlawed.
10 Co. 32.
1 Bac. Ab. 507.
Nor attached.
assigned.
Ray,
152.
No replevin lies against them by the name of their corporations.
6 Mod. 183. They
Brownl. 175. They can not be declared against in custody.
are not indictable, though the particular members are.
12 Mod. 559.
They
2 Stra. 1241.
can not sue as a common informer.
For torts they must be
sued individually.
Salk. 192. Trespass does not lie against a corporation,
4 Com. Franchise F. 19.
but against its members.
A corporation can not commit a trespass but by their writing under their
seal. Viri. Ab. Cap. K. 22. Trespass does not lie against commonalty, but
shall be against the persons, by their proper names, for capias and exigent
lie not against commonalty. Vin. Ab. Cap. P. 2. Trespass does not lie
. against a corporation, viz: by the name of corporation, but against the persons who did it, by their proper names, for capias and exigent do not lie.
Vin. Ab. Cap. 2, 15. As outlawry does not lie against an aggregate corporation, therefore trespass does not lie against them, for a capias and exigent do
not eo. 2 Sell. 149; 2 Imp. 675; Bro. Corp. 43. A corporation can neither
maintain nor be made defendant to an action of battery, or such like personal
injuries, for a corporation can neither beat nor be beaten in its body politic.
1 Blac. Com. 503.
It appears also that the civil law ordains (in conformity
with this rule) that for the misbehavior of a body corporate, the directors
only shall be answerable in their personal capacities.
Wooddeson, in his
Lecture on Corporations (1 vol., 494), is very clear and explicit on the subject.
He says : "It is incident to all bodies politic to sue and be sued by their name
of incorporation, but it is manifest that this must be restricted to particular
actions; thus, corporations can neither be plaintiffs nor defendants in actions
of assault and battery."
The case in 12 Johns. 227, cited by the plaintiff, shows that the law in relation to the liability of corporations is so changed by the course of modern
decisions, that they are now held responsible on promises, express or implied,
and that assumpsit may be maintained against them on such promises.
But
because the law has been changed in relation to contracts, it does not follow
that it is also changed in relation to torts, so as to render a corporation liable,
generally, to actions of trespass, or for other torts, by persons not belonging
to the body corporate, at least without showing that they were done by an
authority from them, granted in pursuance of their charter. In short, the
only question decided in that case was that a corporation may make a valid
contract, not under seal ; and this point being settled, there was no incongruity or falsity apparent in the declaration, and, therefore, the court very
properly decided that they would not stop and inquire, in that stage of the
proceedings, whether the contract was made in such manner or by such perThe objection in that case was
sons as to be binding on the defendants.
taken on the broad ground that assumpsits will not lie under any circumstances against a corporation, but the court, having shown very clearly that
the position was not tenable, overruled the demurrer without further inquiry, and it may be remarked that the reasoning of the court is confined exclusively to matters of contract. The same observation may be made respecting the case of the Bank of Columbia v. Patterson (cited from 7 Cran.
299), which was an action of assumpsit for work and labor. Various questions arose in the progress of that cause, none of them, however, having a
direct bearing on the case now before the court. The point most analogous
was that whenever a corporation is acting within the scope of the legitimate
purposes of its institution, all parol contracts made by its authorized agents
are express promises of the corporation, and all duties imposed on them by
law and all benefits conferred at their request raise implied promises for the
enforcement of which an action may well lie.
The case of Dunn v. The Rector," etc. , of St. Andrews' Church (14 Johns.
118) , was also assumpsit for work and labor. The only question agitated was,
poration.

aggregate by its corporate
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whether an action of assumpsit on an implied promise can be maintained
against a corporation, which was decided affirmatively, on the authority of
the two cases just considered.
Much reliance has been placed by the plaintiff on the case of Eiddle v. The
Proprietors of the Locks and Canals on Merrimack River, 7 Mass. Rep. 169.
This was an action on the case, for not sufflcienty opening and keeping in
repair a certain canal, by reason of which the raft of the plaintiff grounded
in attempting to pass it, and was damaged. A verdict was rendered for the
plaintiff, and a motion for a new trial having been overruled, a motion was
made in arrest of judgment, on the ground that at common law no action lies
against a corporation for a tort, because, among other reasons, judgment in
such an action is entered with a capiatur, which would be absurd against a
corporation. The court, in giving their opinion on this point, seem to admit
the doctrine in 21 Edw. 4, 12, 27, 67, that a corporation can not be beaten,
nor beat, nor commit treason, nor felony, nor be imprisoned for a disseizin
with force, nor be outlawed, and they add that these principles result from
the nature of an aggregate corporation. But in remarking on the opinion of
Thorp, Justice, in 22 Ass., pi. 67, in which he says that trespass does not lie
against a corporation aggregate by its corporate name, they express doubts.
Thorp's opinion, they say, has been overruled as to certain trespasses, and
referring to some of the authorities in 16 East., from which they say it is very
clear that some actions of trespass might at common law be maintained
against aggregate corporations,, they conclude that as in these cases no
capiatur could be entered, the omission of this entry could be no objection to
actions on the case. This concise statement is sufficient to show that the
question now in hand did not necessarily arise. The point determined was,
that trespass on the case would lie, and that judgment in such an action
might be entered without a capiatur, and for this purpose only, the authorities relating to trespass and other torts were referred to.
But it can not
escape the most careless observer that neither the case decided, nor those
referred to, support the position now contended for, that assault and battery
can be sustained against a corporation aggregate. Thorp's opinion was questioned only as to certain trespasses, and the court went no farther than to
say that some actions of trespass might be maintained, from which the conclusion naturally follows that, generally, that action can not be maintained,
and they admit that a corporation aggregate, from its nature, can neither beat
nor be beaten, which seems to be decisive of the questions we are considering. It was urged by the plaintiff that the reason on which the law, under
consideration, was originally founded, had ceased to exist, and that therefore the law itself has ceased, in conformity with the maxim Cessat raito,
cessat etiam lex.
But however true this maxim may be in the general, it is
subject to exceptions.
There are many principles of common law settled on
reasons that have ceased, and many more on reasons that have not only
ceased, but are now forgotten, that are still in full force; as, for example, it
is law at the present day that debt and trespass can not be joined, although
the reason of this law no longer exists, which was, that in debt the process
was summons, on which a fine was paid to the king, in proportion to the sum
demanded, but in trespass the process was a capias, and the court set a fine
in proportion to the offense.
It is not, however, admitted that all the reasons, or that the most weighty
reasons of the law in question, have ceased, for although the distinction of
process is done away by our statute, yet it remains a truth that a corporation
aggregate, as such, can not commit the act charged in this declaration, as they
have no personal existence, and can neither beat nor be beaten.
An action
for an assault and battery, committed on a corporation aggregate in their corporate character, would be a novelty in judicial proceedings; and yet it appears to be as contrary to reason and common sense that they should be the
agents in such a trespass as it is that they should be the objects of it. It is a
fact entitled to some weight that among the multitude of adjudged cases relating to corporations, from the year books to the present day, not one can be
found that decides the principle as it is contended for by the plaintiff. Al-
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though it forms no objection to an action that such an one has never before been brought, yet the fact affords strong presumptive evidence that the
law is against it.
On the whole, whatever exceptions may exist to the rule that actions of
trespass generally do not lie against corporations, it is evident that the action
now under consideration can not be one of those exceptions, and, therefore,
that it can not be sustained against the bank. (Opinion on other point

omitted.)

Compare, also, Childs v. Bank of Mo., 17 Mo. 213 (1852), where the same
reasoning is applied to false imprisonment, slander and libel; also P. W. & B.
R. v. Quigley, 21 How. (U. S.) 202 (1858), Justice Daniel dissenting in regard
to libel.

Sec. 392.

Same.
fendants.

BROKAW
1867.

v.

Joinder of

corporation

and

servant as de-

NEW JERSEY R. R. AND TRANSP. CO. 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY.
(3 Vroom) 328, 90 Am. Dec. 659.

32

N.

J.

Law

DEPUE, J. The declaration in this case charges that the New J*erRailroad and Transportation Company, by their servants, and
William Campbell, the other defendant, with force and arms assaulted
the plaintiff, and ejected and expelled him from a certain car in which
he was riding on the New Jersey railroad, and wounded, bruised and
ill treated him.
To this declaration the defendants have filed a general demurrer,
and upon the argument two questions were raised: i. Whether an
action of trespass for an assault and battery can be maintained against
a corporation;
and 2. Whether in such action an individual can be
joined as a co-defendant with a corporation.
[After holding that an
action of trespass for assault and battery will lie against a corporation,
sey

* * *
proceeds] :
The second ground of demurrer is that William Campbell is joined
as a defendant with the New Jersey Railroad and Transportation
Company. The joinder is proper; for in trespass all the actors are
principals, and may be joined in one suit ; and an individual and a
i Vin.
corporation may be joined as defendants in the same suit,

Abr., tit. Abatement, Z, p 32; Brown on Corporations, pi. 24.

Both the defendants are charged as principals, and it does not appear that Campbell was the servant of the company, and if it did the
joinder would still be proper. A joint action of tort in the nature of
trespass may be maintained against a corporation and its servants for
a personal
injury inflicted by the latter, in discharging the duties
imposed on him by the corporation.
Hewett v. Swift, 3 Allen 420;
Moore v. Fitchburg R. Co., 4 Gray 465 (64 Am. Dec. 83).
In considering this case we have not overlooked the case of Orr v.
Bank of the United States, i Ohio 36 (13 Am. Dec. 588), which was
1

Only that part of the opinion relating to joinder of parties is given.
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That case proceeds or
much relied on by the defendants' counsel.
principles long since obsolete, and is against all the later authorities
The demurrer is overruled.
1885, Moore v. Fitchburg R. Corporation, 4 Gray (Mass.) 465,64
Accord:
Am. Dec. 83, note 86; 1887, Hussey v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., 98 N. C. 34, 2
Am. St. Rep. 312.

Sec. 393.

(5) False imprisonment.

THE WHEELER

1887.

&

WILSON

MANUFACTURING CO.

BOYCE.

IN THE SUPREME

1

COURT OF KANSAS.
35-357> 59 Am - Re P- 57 1 -

36

v.

JACOB F.

Kan. Reports

Action by Boyce against The Wheeler & Wilson Manufacturing

Company and two others to recover damages for false imprisonment.
at the April term, 1884, and judgment for plaintiff for $1,000,
with interest and costs. The defendant Company and its agent Baker
The opinion states the facts.
bring the case to this court.
This
is
a
proceeding to reverse a judgment rendered
JOHNSTON, J.
in an action for false imprisonment, brought by Jacob F. Boyce
against the Wheeler & Wilson Manufacturing Company, C. S. Baker
and J. W. Hughes.
Hughes was dismissed from the action, and the
went
The facts upon
only against the plaintiffs in error.
judgment
which the case was disposed of are substantially these: The Wheeler
& Wilson Manufacturing Company, a corporation organized for the
manufacture and sale of sewing machines, was engaged in business
at Topeka, Kan., and C. S. Baker was its general agent at that place.
The company had sold a sewing machine to Mary Hatfield, who subShe paid
sequently married Jacob F. Boyce, the defendant in error.
and signed a contract in substance that
a part of the purchase-money,
the title to the machine should remain in the company until the balance of the purchase-money was paid. In November, 1881, the company directed its general agent to bring an action of replevin against
Mary Boyce to recover the machine, claiming that there was a balance
due thereon, a claim which she denied.
An action of replevin was begun before a justice of the peace, and
a writ was issued and placed in the hands of Constable Hughes, who
reported that he had made search for the machine and was unable to
obtain possession of it.
C. S. Baker, the agent of the company, then
directed Hughes to make and file an affidavit before the justice of the
peace, alleging that Mary Boyce, and her husband, Jacob F. Boyce,
were in possession of the machine, and had refused to deliver it to

Trial

1 Part

of opinion on other points omitted.
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it,

This was done, and
him, and thus obtain a warrant for their arrest.
the justice issued a warrant to the constable commanding him to
arrest Boyce and his wife, and commit them to the Shawnee county
Under
jail, there to remain until they should deliver the machine.
this warrant, Jacob F. Boyce was arrested and placed in jail without
being taken before the justice, and without any examination, hearing,
The constable informed the general agent of the company
or trial.
that he had arrested Boyce, and placed him in the county jail, as
requested, and Baker replied, "Now, I guess, he will give up the maThe replevin action resulted in a judgment in favor of
chine."
Mary Boyce. Jacob F. Boyce was held in the county jail for ten
days, and was never taken before any court or officer for examination
or trial, and was finally discharged at the instance of the plaintiffs in
error, and he became sick in consequence of his confinement.
He at
once instituted this action, and the jury awarded him damages in the
sum of one thousand dollars, and the verdict was approved by the
The plaintiffs in error complain chiefly of the rulings of
trial court.
the court in the matter of charging the jury. The jury were instructed
that if the evidence justified
they could find exemplary damages or

;

,

&

it

is

a

is
a

is

it

smart-money against the defendants.
After the jury had been out some time, and had practically agreed
upon their verdict, the court recalled them and advised them that he
was in error in giving the instruction that they might in their discretion
assess exemplary damages,
from the jury, telling
and withdrew
them that in their deliberations they should not consider the instruction withdrawn.
Objection was made to the withdrawal of the
instruction, and an application of plaintiffs in error for leave to address the jury after the modification had been made was denied, and
this ruling
This decision affords the plaintiffs in
assigned as error.
error no ground for complaint.
The action of the court was favorable rather than prejudicial to their interests.
The instruction given
was predicated upon sufficient facts, was warranted under the law,
and the defendant in error alone had reason to complain of its withdrawal. It
well-established principle of jurisprudence, that corporations may be held liable for torts involving
wrong intention,
such as false imprisonment, and exemplary damages may be recovered against them for the wrongful acts of their servants and agents
done in the course of their employment, in all cases and to the same
extent that natural persons committing like wrongs would be held
liable. In such cases the malice and fraud of the authorized agents
are imputable to the corporations for which they acted.
This princitoo well settled to require argument, and the authorities susple
are numerous and well-nigh unanimous.
taining
(Railroad Co. v.
Slusser, 19 Ohio St. 157; A.
G. W. Rid. Co. v. Dunn, 19 Ohio
St. 162; Goddard v. Grand Trunk Rly^. 57 Maine 202; Railroad
Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 213; Railroad Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489;
Railroad Co. v. Bailey, 40 Miss. 395 Railroad Co. v. Blocher, 27
Md. 277; Hopkins v. Railroad Co., 36 N. H. 9; Railroad v. Hammer, 72 111. 353; Reed v. Home Savings Bank, 130 Mass. 443;
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Fenton v. Sewing Machine Co., 9 Phila. 189; Goodspeed v. East
Haddam Bank, 22 Conn. 530; Boogher v. Life Ass'n of America,
75 Mo. 319; Wheless v. Second National Bank, i Bax. 469; Jordan
v. Railroad Co., 74 Ala. 85; Williams v. Insurance Co., 57 Miss.
759; Vance v. Railway Co., 32 N. J. L. 334; Cooley on Torts,
119; 3 Sutherland on Damages, 270, and cases cited; 2 Wait's Ac-

tions and Defenses, 447, and cases cited.
The same doctrine has been fully recognized on several occasions
by this court.
(L. L. & G. Rid. Co. v. Rice, 10 Kan. 437 ; M.
K. & T. Rid. Co. v. Weaver, 16 Kan. 456; K. P. Rly. Co. v.
Kessler, 18 Kan. 523; K. P. Rly. Co. v. Little, 19 Kan. 269;
Western News Co. v. Wilmarth, 33 Kan. 510.) The withdrawal of
the instruction, although erroneous, was beneficial to the plaintiffs in
error, and there can be no reversal unless the erroneous ruling is injurious to the party complaining.
It is next contended that the company can not be held liable for the
wrongful acts of Baker and the constable, and an instruction is challenged which holds that if the agent of the company caused and procured the illegal arrest and detention of the defendant in error as
Baker was
charged, the company and its agents were both liable.
the managing agent of the company, his authority was general, and
the constable acted wholly under his direction and sanction.
He had
not only authority to sell machines and collect the money due for the
same, but it is conceded that he had authority to institute legal proceedings to recover possession of the machines conditionally sold and
for which payment had not been made in accordance with the terms
of the sale.
The arrest and detention of Boyce was incidental to the
replevin action, and was made as alleged to compel the delivery of
the machine under a provision of the justices' code relating to replevin, which provides that where the defendants or any other persons knowingly conceal the property replevied, or, having the control
thereof, refuse to deliver the same to the officer, they may be committed until they disclose where the property is, or deliver the same
to the officer.
(Comp. Laws of 1879, ch. 81,
69.) He had full
authority to represent the company, and whatever was done by him
was done for the benefit of the company and for the accomplishment
His act, although wrongful, was in the line of his
of its purpose.
employment, was done in the execution of the authority conferred
To
upon him, and must be regarded as the act of the company.
make the corporation responsible it is not necessary, as plaintiffs in
error contend, that the principal should have directly authorized the
particular wrongful act of the agent, or should have subsequently ratified it.
Judge Story, in treating of the liability of principals for the
acts of their agents, says that:
"The principal is held liable to third persons in a civil suit for the
torts, negligences
frauds, deceits, concealments, misrepresentations,
and other malfeasances or misfeasances and omissions of duty of his
agent in the course of his employment, although the principal did not
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authorize or justify or 'participate in, or indeed know of such mishe forbade or disapproved of them."
conduct, or even
"In all such
And to sustain this he cites numerous authorities.
cases," he says, "the rule applies, respondeat superior, and it is
founded upon public policy and convenience, for in no other way
could there be any safety to third persons in their dealings either
directly with the principal or indirectly with him through the instru*
* *
(Story on Agency,
mentality of agents."
452.)
Affirmed.

if

See, 1861, Owsley v. Railroad Co., 37 Ala. 560 ; 1882, Frost v. Machine
133 Mass. 565; 1893, Wachsmuth v. Merchants' National Bank, 96 Mich.
426, 21 L. R. A. 278.
Note.

Co.,

Sec. 394.

(6)

Libel and slander.

BEHRE
1897.

v.

NATIONAL CASH REGISTER CO.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA. 100 Georgia Rep.
213-216, 62 Am. St. Rep. 320, 27 S. E. Rep. 986.

Action of libel.

COBB, JUSTICE.
Charles H. Behre brought his action against the
National Cash Register Company, a corporation, alleging in his petition that he had sustained damage on account of certain slanderous
words which had been uttered by the agent of the defendant while
acting in and about the business of said corporation ; and also by a
libelous writing which the corporation had caused to be published in
certain newspapers.
On demurrer the court dismissed the declaration, holding that the same set forth no cause of action.
To this ruling the plaintiff excepted.
i. The petition alleged that the defendant's agent went about from
place to place, and while in the conduct of the defendant's business
uttered words in reference to plaintiff which were false and malicious.
While it is distinctly alleged that the words complained of were uttered by the agent of defendant within the scope of the agency and
in behalf of and for the interest of the defendant, it failed to allege
that the defendant expressly directed or authorized the agent to speak
the words jn question.
"A corporation will not be liable for any
slander uttered by an officer, even though he be acting honestly for
the benefit of the company and within the scope of his duties, unless
it can be proved that the corporation expressly ordered and directed
that officer to say those very words, for a slander is the voluntary and
tortious act of trie speaker."
Odgers on Libel and Slander, ist Am.
ed. *368; Newell on Defamation, Slander and Libel, ist ed., 361.
2 WIL. CAS. 6
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"As a corporation can act only by or through its agents, and as there
can be no agency to slander, it follows that a corporation can not be
guilty of slander; it has not the capacity for committing that wrong.
If an officer or an agent be guilty of slander he is personally liable,
and no liability results to the corporation."
Townsend on Slander and Libel, 2d ed.,
Co., 59 How.
v.
Bradstreet
Dodge
265.
Prac.

104.

"A

Howe Macorporation may make a libelous publication."
chine Company v. Souder, 58 Ga. 65.
The remaining question to
be determined in this case is, therefore, whether there is a cause of
action as for a libel set forth in the declaration.
The article complained of as libelous was as follows :
"Mr. Chas. H. Behre is no longer connected with the National
Cash Register Company, and has not been since August, 1893. Any
contracts made by him for the company will be void.
(Signed) J.
Block, Agent, National Cash Register Company."
It was alleged that this notice was published in a newspaper in
Albany, Georgia, and that a similar publication appeared in a newsIt was further alleged, "that these pubpaper in Atlanta, Georgia.
lications were made for the purpose of injuring petitioner in his business by bringing him into discredit by making the public believe that
he was undertaking to act as the agent of the said defendant, when in
fact he was doing nothing of the kind, but was keeping as far aloof
from them and their affairs as possible ; and that the motive of the
said defendant was to put him in a false attitude before the business
public, by creating the impression that he was trying to act as their
*
*
*
and was part of a general plan
agent without authority
and purpose of said defendant to injure him in his business and bring
him into disrepute ; and that they were inspired and made by said
defendant for that purpose."
The words complained of may be literally true the statement in the first sentence as a matter of fact,
and the statement in the second sentence as a matter of law.
If the
words were published in good faith for the purpose of protecting the
interest of the defendant, no liability would flow from their publication.
They are not libelous per se ; but the averment as to the intention with which the defendant caused them to be published, and the
effect which they have upon any one reading them, makes them libelThe impression created upon the mind of any one reading this
ous.
notice, is, that the plaintiff is seeking to impose himself upon the
trading public as the agent of the defendant, and that through that
means he is attempting to defraud the persons with whom he comes
in contact, in connection with the sale of the goods of the character
sold by the defendant.
The distinct allegation being that this was
false, and the words quoted above being in effect an allegation of
malice, the petition sets forth a cause of action.
In the case of D. D. Maynard v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, 47 Cal. 207, the words complained of were: "This company
for good and sufficient reasons has resolved to dismiss D. D. Maynard
from its service."
The court in the opinion say: "Words, which on
2.
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their face appear to be entirely harmless, may, under certain circumstances, convey a covert meaning, wholly different from the ordinary
To render such
usually put upon them.
and natural interpretation
words actionable, it is necessary for the pleader to aver that the author
of the libel intended them to be understood, and that they were in
fact understood by those who read them in their covert sense." The
definition of libel in the law of this state is as follows: "A libel is a
false and malicious defamation of another, expressed in print, or
writing, or pictures, or signs, tending to injure the reputation of an
individual, and exposing him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule."
Civil Code, 3832. The plaintiff's petition showing that he was engaged in the business of selling cash registers, there can be no question
but that the words complained of, when published with the intention
alleged, tended to injure the reputation of the plaintiff, and also to
expose him to the hatred, contempt and ridicule of the business public.
There was no error in sustaining the demurrer to so much of the
petition as attempted to set forth a cause of action for slander, but the
demurrer should have been overruled as to the paragraphs referring
to the libel complained of.
All the justices concurring.
Judgment reversed.
Note.
(1) Libel. That a corporation is civilly liable for libel is well settled: 1858, Phil., W. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. (62 TJ. S.) 202; 1867,
Maynard v. Ins. Co., 34 Cal. 48, 91 Am. Dec. 672; 1875, Vinas v. Ins. Co., 27
La. Ann. 367; 1877, Machine Co. v. Souder, 58 Ga. 64; 1877, Johnson v. Dispatch Co., 65 Mo. 539, 27 Am. Rep. 293; 1881, McDermott v. Evening Journal, 14 Vroom 488, 15 Vroom 430, 39 Am. Rep. 606, 43 Am. Rep. 392; 1882,
Southern Express Co. v. Fitzner, 59 Miss. 581, 42 Am. Rep. 379; 1882, Evening Journal Assn. v. McDermott, 15 Vroom (44 N. J. Law) 430, 43 Am. Rep.
392; 1884, Bacon v. Railroad Co., 55 Mich. 224, 54 Am. Rep. 372; 1889, Fogg
v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 148 Mass. 513, 12 Am. St. Rep. 583; 1889, Missouri Pac.
R.Co.v. Richmond, 73 Texas 568, 15 Am. St Rep. 794, 4 L. R. A. 280; 1892,
Belo v. Fuller, 84 Texas 450, 31 Am. St. Rep. 75; 1896, Hoboken Printing Co.
v. Kahn, 59 N. J. Law 218, 59 Am. St. Rep. 585 ; 1899, Washington G. L. Co.
v. Lansden, 172 U. S. 534, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 296.
Compare, 1891, Henry v. Railroad Co., 139 Pa. St. 289, 21 Atl. Rep. 157.
There is an old rule that slander can not be committed by a
(2) Slander:
deputy or agent so as to make the principal liable: Townsend, Libel and
Slander, 265, 7 Am. & E. Enc., 2d ed., 833. But in Reddit v Singer Mfg. Co.,
124 N. C. 100, 32 S. E. Rep. 392 (1899), a charge to the jury that "a corporation is
responsible for slanderous words uttered by its agent in the course and scope
of such agent's employment, and in aid of the company's interest," was held
erroneous, mainly because there was no allegation nor any proof of authority
or ratification.
The court intimated that had such allegation and proof
existed, the corporation could he held liable.
In 1887, Gilbert v. Crystal Fountain Lodge, 80 Ga. 284, on 286, 12 Am. St. 255,
Mr. Chief Justice Bleckley says: "Whether a partnership can slander auybody
might formerly have admitted of some question; for it is an old rule, going
back to Croke's reports
perhaps further still that there could be no joint
action against several persons for oral words.
The courts considered that if
two uttered the same words simultaneously, the vocal act of each would have
a separate identity, and be an individual act; and so actions for such torts
ought to be several and not joint. * * * On principle, we can think of no
reason why a partnership might not slander a third person through agents or
members, authorized to defame orally; or by adoption and ratification, after
defamation by slanderous words." And in 1889, Haney Mfg. Co. v. Perkins,
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78 Mich. 1, on p. 9, Judge Long says: "Each of the partners is an agent of
the partnership as an entirety, and if in the course of that business he injures
the business of another by slander, the partnership is liable therefor, just aa
it might be for any other tort by any other agent;" but the cases he cites, 17
Mass. 182, 133 Mass. 431, 83 Ala. 404, do not &o hold as to slander. The following cases indicate that a corporation is liable for slander: 1880, Dodge v.
Bradstreet, 59 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 104; 1886, Buffalo Lub. Oil Co. v. Standard
Oil Co., 42 Hun (N. Y.) 153, on 157; 1887, Hussey v. Norfolk So. R., 98 N. C.
34, 2 Am. St. Rep. 312.
See also, 1891, Schafner v. Eheman, 139111. 109; 1895, Atlanta Nat'l Bk. v.
Davis, 96 Ga. 334; 1896, Mt. Sterling, etc., Bank v. Green, 99 Ky. 262; 1896,
Svensden v. Bank, 64 Minn. 40; 1899, First Nat'l Bk. v. Railsback Bros., etc.,
58 Neb. 248; compare, 1894, Bank of Commerce v. Goos, 39 Neb. 437.

(7) Malicious prosecution.

Sec. 395.

GOODSPEED
1853.

v.

EAST HADDAM BANK. 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT.
58 Am. Dec. 439.

22

Conn. 530,

J.

This action is based upon the provisions of our
CHURCH, C.
statute, entitled, "An act to prevent vexatious suits," and is subject
to the same general principles as are actions on the case for malicious
prosecutions, at common law.
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants, the East Haddam Bank,
a body politic and corporate, without probable cause, and with a
malicious intent unjustly to vex, harass, embarras and trouble the
plaintiff, commenced by a writ of attachment, and prosecuted against
him, a certain vexatious suit or action for fraudulent representations,
to the injury of said bank, and which action resulted in a verdict and
judgment against the bank, and in favor of the present plaintiff.
On the trial of this cause, by the superior court, the defendants
moved for a nonsuit, on the ground that the plaintiff by his evidence
had failed to make out a prima facie case ; which motion the court
granted, and judgment of nonsuit was entered against the plaintiff,
which he now moves to set aside.
The judgment of the superior court, in granting the nonsuit, as we
understand, was founded solely upon the ground that a corporation
aggregate was not, by law, liable for such a cause of action as was
at least, no other ground of
set up by the plaintiff, in his declaration
nonsuit or objection to the plaintiff's action has been argued before us.
And, therefore, irrespective of the evidence detailed in the motion,
we confine ourselves to what we suppose to be the sole question in
the case.
We assume that the plaintiff has sustained the damage he claims,
by reason of the prosecution of the vexatious suit, and the question
is, has he a legal remedy against the bank?
The claim of the defendants is that the remedy for this injury is to
1 Statement,

Ellsworth,

J.,

except as

omitted.

in the opinion,

arguments, and dissenting opinion of
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a
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be sought against the directors of the bank, or the individuals, whoever they might have been, by whose agency the vexatious suit was
We think, that, to turn
prosecuted, and not against the corporation.
the plaintiff round to pursue the proposed remedy would be trifling
with him and with his just rights, and would be equivalent to declaring him remediless ; and, in this case, at least, that there was a wrong
It is notorious that, ordinarily, the action
where there is no remedy.
of bank directors is private
that their records do not disclose the
names of the individuals supporting or opposing any resolution or
vote, and if they do, that the offending persons may be irresponsible
and insolvent.
The language of Tilghman, C. J., in a case very
similar to the present, in which it was urged that a corporation was
not liable for a suit, but only the individuals committing
ap"This doctrine," he said, "was fallacious in prinplicable here.
tends to introduce
ciple and mischievous in its consequences, as
actual wrongs and ideal remedies, for
turnpike company might do
great injury, by means of laborers having no property to answer damTo the same effect
Rawle, 16).
the lanages," etc. (4 Serg.
guage of Shaw, C. J., in the case of Thayer v. Boston (19 Pick.
511). He says: "The court are of opinion that this argument,
pressed to all its consequences, and made the foundation of an inflexible practical rule, would often lead to very unjust results."
Still more explicit
the opinion of the court in the case of The
Life and Fire Insurance Company v. Mechanics' Fire Insurance
Wend. 31). There, as here,
was contended that the
Company
act was unauthorized, and must, therefore, be considered as the act of
the officers of the tompany, and not of the company itself.
And the
court says: "This would be
most convenient distinction for corporations to establish
that every violation of their charter or assumption of unauthorized power, on the part of their officers, although
with the full knowledge and approbation of the directors,
to be
considered the individual act of the officers, and
not to prejudice
the corporation itself.
There would be no possibility of ever convicting
corporation of exceeding its powers, and thereby forfeiting
its charter, or incurring any other penalty,
this principle could be

;

a

a

a

a

a

a

it

established."
The real nature, as well as the law, of corporations, within the last
half century, has been in progress of development, so that has grown
In the days of Blackfew rules and maxims, into
code.
up, from
stone, the whole subject of corporations, and the laws affecting
them, were discussed within the compass of
few pages now volumes are required for this purpose.
These institutions have so multiplied and extended within
few years, that they are connected with,
and in
great degree influence, all the business transactions of this

a

a

;

country, and give tone and character, to some extent, to society itself.
We do not complain of this but we say, that, as new relations from
this cause are formed, and new interests created, legal principles of
practical rather than of
technical or theoretical character, must be

applied.
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And so, in the course of this progress, it has been. It was said by
Lord Coke, "that corporations had neither souls nor bodies;" and by

somebody else, "that they had no moral sense;" and from thence, or
for some other equally insufficient reason, it was inferred, and so repeatedly adjudged, that they could not be subjected in actions of
trover, trespass, or disseizin, and indeed, that they could not commit
wrongs, nor be liable for torts, with a few exceptions, as we shall see.
Had Lord Coke lived in this age and country, he would have seen,
that corporations, instead of being the soulless and unconscious beings
he supposed, are the great motive powers of society, governing and
regulating its chief business affairs; that they act, not only upon pecuniary concerns ; but, as having conscience and motives, to an almost
unlimited extent, they are entrusted with the benevolent and religious
agencies of the day, and are constituted trustees and managers of large
funds promotive of such objects.
The views of the old lawyers regarding the real nature, power, and
responsibilities of corporations, to a great extent are exploded in modern times, and it is believed, that now these bodies are brought to the
same civil liabilities as natural persons, so far as this can be done pracAnd no good
tically, and consistently with their respective charters.
reason is discovered why this should not be so ; nor why it can not be
done, in a case like this, without violating any sensible or useful
principle.
And although it was truly said, and for obvious reasons, that corporations could not be punished corporally, as traitors or felons, yet
they may be, and have often been, subjected to fines and forfeitures,
for malfeasance, and even to the loss of corporate life, by the revocation of their charters. And now it seems to be generally admitted, that
they are civilly responsible, in their corporate capacities, for all torts
which work injury to others, whether acts of omission or commission;
for negligence merely, and for direct violence.
Yarborough v. Bank
of Eng., 16 East 6; Beach v. Fulton Bank, 7 Cowen 486; Foster v.
Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 503; Riddle v. Proprietors of Locks and
Canals, 7 Mass. 187; Chestnut Hill Turnpike v. Rutter, 4 Serg. &
Rawle 16; 4 Hammond 500, 514; 10 Ohio Rep. 159; Dater v. Troy
Turnpike Co., 2 Hill 630; 23 Pick. 139; 2 Bl. Com. 476; Ang. &
Ames 392; 2 Kent Com. 290; i Sw. Dig. 75; 15 Ohio Rep. 476; 18
Ohio Rep. 229. And indeed, no actions are now more frequent, in
our courts, than such as are brought against corporations, for torts,
Hooker v. New Haven & Northampton
either in case or trespass.
Canal Co., 14 Conn. 146, and the cases there cited, and many others
In a late case in England, it has been adjudged, adsince reported.
versely to former opinions, that an action of assault and battery may
Eastern Counties Railway Co.
be sustained against a corporation.
And it was decided long ago,
v. Broom, 2 Eng. Law & Equity 406.
that a corporation was liable to an action for a false return to a writ
of mandamus, alleged to have been made falsely and maliciously. 16
East 8, 14 Eng. Com. Law 159, 3 Mees. & Wels. 244, Ang. & Ames,
ch. 10, section 9.
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In all the cases, wherein it has been holden that corporations may

civil liabilities for torts, the acts charged as such have
either the directors, or
been the acts of their constituted authorities
We do not intend here to
agents, or servants, employed by them.
discuss or decide the frequently suggested question, how far, or when
a principal, whether an individual person or a corporation, becomes
responsible for the willful or malicious act of his servant or agent, as
distinguished from his mere negligence, although it has been brought
into the argument of this case, because we do not admit that the present case falls within the operation of the rule of law on this subject,
even as the defendants claim it.
The truth is, the action complained of as vexatious was instituted
by the bank, in the name of the bank, and, as should be presumed,
in just the same way and by the same agencies and means, as all other
suits by these institutions are commenced and prosecuted, and nothing
appears here, showing any different procedure than is usual, in actions
The action was brought for the sole benefit of the
by corporations.
bank, for the recovery of money to which the bank was entitled, if
anybody, and for an injury sustained by the bank in its corporate
The bank, by its charter and the general laws, had power
capacity.
to sue for such a cause of action ; ana what seems to us yet more
conclusive, is, that if this suit was originated by the misconduct of
directors, or any officer of the company, it has never been repudiated,
and may, by the acquiescence of the bank, be considered as sanctioned
Ang. & Ames, ch. 10, section 9. No act of agency appears
by it.
here, which does not appear in all suits brought by corporations, and
nothing to show that any individuals are, or ought to be, made responsible for the institution and prosecution of the groundless suit, as
distinct from the corporation itself.
The doctrine, that principals are not responsible for the willful misconduct of their agents, as seems to have been sanctioned in the cases
of McManus v. Crickett, i East 106; Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend.
but
343; Vanderbilt v. Richmond Turnpike Co., 2 Comstock479;
denied by Chief Justice Reeve in his Domestic Relations, 357, we
think, has never been applied to such a case as this, but only to the
acts of -agents or servants, properly so called; or such as act under
instructions and a delegated authority persons whose duty it is to obey,
not to control ; as attorneys, cashiers, or others employed by the corThe president and directors of a bank, instead of being
poration.
mere servants, are really the controlling power of the corporation
the representatives, standing and acting in the place of the interested
Indeed, they are the mind and soul of the body politic and
parties.
In the case
corporate, and constitute its thinking and acting capacity.
of Burrell v. The Nahant Bank, 2 Met. 163, Shaw, C. J., expresses
and defines the true rule of appreciating the character and powers of
bank directors.
He says: "We think the exception takes much too
limited and strict a view of the powers of bank directors.
A board
of directors is a body recognized by law. By the laws of these corporations, and by the usage, so general and uniform as to be regarded
be subjected to
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of the law of the land, they have the general superintendence
and active management of all the concerns of the bank, and constitute, to all purposes of dealing with others, the corporation.
We
think they do not exercise a delegated authority in the sense to which
The same principle is
the rule applies to agents and attorneys," etc.
in
of
the
cases
Bank
Commissioners v.
very distinctly recognized,
Bank of Buffalo, 6 Paige's Ch. 502, and Life and Fire Ins. Co. v.
Mechanics' Fire Ins. Co., 7 Wend. 31. It has been said, that the
constitute the corporation.
It may be so, to the extent
stockholders
to
act
and
have
the
this
is only in the choice of
to which they
power
can
this,
directors, and no more.
Beyond
only be considered as
they
the persons for whose ultimate individual interest the corporation acts.
The directors derive all their power and authority from the charter
and laws, and none from the stockholders.
But the fear is expressed, that, by thus considering and treating the
character and acts of the directors of a bank or other corporation, the
stockholders are subject to loss, without fault of their own. This may
to some extent be true ; but the protection of the law in this matter is
not to be confined to stockholders ; the public and strangers have rights
The stockholders are volunteers, and they have consented to
also.
assume the risk of the faithful or unfaithful management of the corporation. If, in this case, one of two innocent persons or classes is
to suffer, which should it be that one which is brought in to suffer
or the one which has
loss, without its consent or power to prevent
enforce
selected
to
it?
the persons
created the power and
But, after all, the objection to the remedy of this plaintiff against
not so much, that, as a corporathe bank, in its corporate capacity,
for
be
made
torts committed by its directtion,
can not
responsible
for
be
that species of tort which
can not
ors, as that
subjected
The claim is, that, as
in
intention.
motive and
essentially consists
not
from
ideal
can
act
malice, and therefore
corporation
only,
or
vexatious suit.
commence
and
malicious
This
can not
prosecute
been
to
the
have
very satisfactory
syllogism, or reasoning, might
the
who
think,
of
former
more
than
to
school men
so, we
jurist
days;
reasonable and appropriate remedy for every
seeks to discover
To say that
corporation can not have motives, and act
wrong.
to
from motives,
deny the evidence of our senses, when we see
and
them thus acting,
effecting thereby results of the greatest imporis

a

a

a

is

it

a

it

it

is

it,

as a part

is

is
a

it

is

a

if

And
tance every day.
they can have any motive, they can have
If the
intend
bad one they can
to do evil as well as to do good.
be.
In
intention
so
must
the
motive
and
one,
a
act done
corporate
called,
as
was
suit,
that
the
vexatious
to
the present case,
say
instituted, prosecuted and subsequently sanctioned, by the bank, in the
usual modes of its action, and still to claim that, although the acts
were those of the bank, the intention was only that of the individual
distinction too refined, we think, for practical applicadirectors,
tion.

a

is

it

a

is

It
asked, how can the malice of
corporation be proved? It
masaid, as well as alleged, in an action for
must be proved,
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as a distinct and essential fact ; and the declaraof individual members, whether directors or
and
admissions
tions
others, are not admissible to prove it. True, malice must be proved,
and, as we suppose, very much in the same manner as it is proved in
The want
other cases of a similar nature, against individual persons.
of probable cause of action is proof of malice, and for aught we know,
It is enough to say, in
also, the records of the bank may show it.
if
other
the
in
all
that
cases,
this, as
plaintiff can not, in some legitihe
the
malice
has
mate way, prove
alleged, he can not recover; but
no
it
as
a
to
assume
right
legal principle that it can not be
we have
do
it
has
ever been adjudged that a cornot know that
We
proved.
But, among the great varifor
a
libel.
poration is civilly responsible
of
is
these institutions, it
probable that the newspaper
ety and objects
in
of
for its share
the privileges supposed to be enpress has come
joyed under corporate powers. Proof of the falsehood of slanderous
charges is evidence of malice, and which must, as in this case, be
proved ; but would it be endured that an association, incorporated
for the purpose suggested, could, with impunity, assail the character
and break down the peace and happiness of the good and virtuous,
and the law afford no remedy, except by a resort to insolvent and
irresponsible typesetters, and for no better reason than that a corporation is only an ideal something, of which malice or intention can not
And, if, as we have suggested, the directors are, for
be predicated?
all practical purposes, the corporation itself, acting at least as its representatives, we can see no greater difficulty in proving their motives
good or bad, than in thus proving the motives of other associated or
We are sure that this objection of the defendants
conspiring bodies.
was not discovered, or was not regarded as sufficient, nor the difficulty
of proving malice upon a corporation felt, when the case of Merrills
v. The Tariff Manufacturing Co., 10 Conn. R. 384, was tried at the
circuit, and discussed and decided by this court.
That was an action
against a corporation for a malicious injury, and the sole question in
this court was, whether, by reason of the malicious intent, the company was liable for aggravated or vindictive damages ; and it was
holden to be thus liable, in a very elaborate opinion drawn up and
strongly expressed by Huntington, J.
The interests of the community and the policy of the law demand
that corporations should be divested of every feature of a fictitious
character, which shall exempt them from the ordinary liabilities of
natural persons, for acts and injuries committed by them and for
them.
Their immunities for wrongs are no greater than can be
claimed by others, and they are entitled to an equal protection for all
their rights and privileges, and no more.
For the reasons suggested, a majority of the court is of opinion
that the nonsuit granted by the superior court should be set aside, and
a new trial granted.
In this opinion Waite, J., concurred ; Ellsworth and Hinman, J. J.-,
dissent.
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J.)

334, 90 Am. Dec. 665 ;
1867, Vance v. Erie R. Co., 3 Vroom (N.
Accord:
1872, Wheless v. Second Nat'l Bk., 1 Baxter (Tenn.) 469, 25 Am. Rep. 783;
1875, Coptey v. Machine Co., Fed. Gas. 3213; 1878, Carter v. Howe Machine
Co., 51 Md. 290, 34 Am. Rep. 311 ; 1880, Williams v. Planters' Ins. Co., 57
Miss. 759, 34 Am. Rep. 494, note; 1880, Ricord v. Railroad Company, 15 Nev.
167; 1881, Reed v. Home Sav. Bk., 130 Mass. 443, 39 Am. Rep. 4*68; 1882,
Boogher v. Life Assn., 75 Mo. 319, 42 Am. Rep. 413; 1883, Jordan v. Alabama & G. S. R. Co., 74 Ala. 85, 49 Am. Rep. 800; 1884, Pennsylvania Company v. Weddle, 100 Ind. 138; 1884, Hussey v. Norfolk & S. R. Co., 98 N. C.
34, 2 Am. St. Rep. 312; 1900, Walker v. Culman, 9 Kan. App. 691, 59 Pac.
Rep. 606; contra, 1874, Gillett v. Missouri, etc., R. Co., 55 Mo. 315, 17 Am.
Rep. 653.

Fraud, deceit and conspiracy.

Sec. 396.

(8)

JOHNSTON

FIFE HAT COMPANY

1896.

v.

GUTHRIE.

THE NATIONAL BANK OF

l

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OKLAHOMA. 4 Oklahoma Rep.
17-35, 3 A. & E. C. C. N. S. 307.

This is an appeal from a judgment sustaining a
BURFORD, J. :
The plaintiffs brought their action
demurrer to plaintiff's complaint.
in the district court of Logan county, to recover judgment against the
defendant, together with certain other defendants, in which complaint they alleged that the defendants had entered into a conspiracy
by which the plaintiffs were defrauded in the sale of certain merchan*
*
*
dise.
The defendants demurred upon the ground that the same did not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against either of them.
The court sustained the demurrer, and the plaintiffs declining to
plead further, judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants.
The only question presented is as to the sufficiency of the complaint
to constitute a cause of action against the defendant, the National
Bank of Guthrie.
The action is one

ex delicto to recover damages for a tort alleged
to have been committed by a national banking corporation, acting by
and through its president and general agent.
It is contended by counsel for the bank, that the president of the
bank had no authority, either in law or fact, to do the acts alleged to
have been done by him for the bank, and that his acts were not the
acts of the bank as a corporation for which it is in any form of action
liable, and in support of this contention it is argued that a national
bank has no authority to purchase merchandise ; to engage in the
mercantile business, or to assist others in the purchase of such goods,
and hence, if the president of the bank entered into any conspiracy to
aid the Melone Brothers in defrauding plaintiffs as alleged in the complaint, that he was then acting without the scope of his authority as
an officer of the bank and outside its chartered powers, and hence
1

Statement of facts except as appearing in opinion omitted.
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This is an adroit
bank is not liable for such actions on his part.
evasion of the effect of the allegations of the complaint.
It is conceded by counsel for the bank, "that for acts done by the
agents of a corporation, either ex contractu or ex delicto, in the course
of its business and of their employment, the corporation is responsible
as an individual is responsible under similar circumstances."
Applying this rule to the allegations of the complaint, we think it states a good
cause of action against the bank. It is within the power of the bank to
loan money, to take mortgages on chattels as security for such loans, to
foreclose its mortgages and to sell the mortgaged chattels to pay its lien.
It is within the employment of the president of the bank, who has the
active management of its business, to make loans for the bank, to
and to take any necessary steps for the protection
take security for
of its funds loaned or on hand, and in carrying out any of these funcIf, in performing any of the
bound by his acts.
tions the bank
fraud or comduties incident tb such employment, he perpetrates
tort, the bank
liable for such acts.
mits
Applying these observations to the facts alleged in the complaint,
becomes apparent that
set up.
good cause of action
It
alleged in substance that Melone Brothers were engaged in
that they entered into an agreement with the
the mercantile business
large stock of goods
president of the bank that they should purchase
on credit amounting to several thousand dollars
that the bank would
loan them about one thousand dollars, and after the stock arrived,
which was to be purchased under this agreement and before the bills
for same became due, that Melone Brothers should execute
chattel
mortgage to the bank for $10,000; that the bank would foreclose
the mortgage, sell the stock and divide the proceeds with Melone
Brothers, and leave the creditors unpaid. In pursuance of this agreement,
alleged that Melone Brothers purchased the goods in
question from plaintiffs; that they made other purchases in pursuance
of the conspiracy
that the bank loaned them from $1,000 to $1,500;
that the chattel mortgage was executed, the goods taken by the bank
and sold for $5,300, which the bank received, or took
note for.
This amounted to conspiracy to defraud plaintiffs, and
was not
should have
necessary, in order to render the bank liable in tort, that
authority to take each particular step required to consummate the
fraud.
sufficient to charge the bank that
took part in the condid by taking the mortgage
This
spiracy, knowing its purpose.
by seizing and selling the goods; by appropriating the proceeds and
thus aiding in the fraudulent design and purpose.
When one joins an unlawful conspiracy after
has been formed,
at any period, and in the least degree acts in concert or collusion with
the conspirators, their acts become his by adoption and the acts of
one the act of all.
(4 Am. and Eng. Enc. Law, p. 622, and cases
cited.)
We have thus far treated this case upon the theory of the law as
presented by counsel for the defendant.
By the weight of modern
authority this rule has been extended and made to embrace
larger
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number and different class of cases than was originally within its
scope.
In the National Bank v. Graham, 100 U. S. 699, Mr. Justice Swayne,
in speaking of the liability of corporations for torts, said:
"Corporations are liable for every wrong they commit, and in such
cases the doctrine of ultra vires has no application.
They are also
liable for the acts of their servants while such servants are engaged in
the business of their principal, in the same manner and to the same
extent that individuals are liable under like circumstances.
(Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. 604.) An action maybe maintained against a corporation for its malicious or negligent torts, however foreign they may be to the object of its creation or beyond its
It may be sued for assault and battery, for fraud
granted powers.
and deceit, for false imprisonment, for malicious prosecution, for
In certain cases it may be indicted for misnuisance and for libel.
feasance or non-feasance touching duties imposed upon it in which the
Its offenses may be such as will forfeit its expublic are interested.
istence."
The court of appeals of New York, in the case of Craigie v. Hadley, 99 N. Y. 131, i N. E. Rep. 537, indiscussing the extent to which a
corporation may be held liable for the fraud of its officers or agents,
said:
"A corporation may be, in a legal sense, guilty of a fraud. As a
merely legal entity it can have no will, and can not act at all, but in
its relation to the public it is represented by its officers and agents,
and their fraud, in the course of the corporate dealings, is in law the
There is more difficulty in establishing a
fraud of the corporations.
fraud against a corporation than against an individual.
This arises
from the difficulty, in many cases, of determining whether the fraud
There may be knowledge
charged is imputable to the corporation.
of a fact by an agent of a corporation which, if brought home to the
corporation itself, would create responsibility in a given case, but as
to which notice will not be imputed to the corporation merely from
We need not enter into the
the fact that it was known by the agent.
distinctions upon this subject. But the general rule is well established
that notice to an agent of a bank, or other corporation intrusted with
the management of its business, or of a particular branch of its business, is notice to the corporation, in transactions conducted by such
agent, acting for the corporation, within the scope of his authority,
whether the knowledge of such agent was acquired in the course of the
particular dealing, or on some prior occasion."
In Western News Co.v.Wilmarth, 33 Kans. 510, 6Pac.Rep. 786, the
supreme court of Kansas states the rule as laid down by Judge Cooley :
"It is contended that the trial court erred in overruling the demurrer
to the petition, for the reason that 'corporations are not liable for torts
The law is
where the ground of legal responsibility is evil motive.'
otherwise.
'Corporations are responsible for the wrongs committed
or authorized by them, under substantially the same rules which govIt was formerly supposed
ern the responsibility of natural persons.

396

TORTS.

1265

that those torts which involve the element of evil intent, such as batteries, libels and the like, could not be committed by corporations.
Inasmuch as the state, in granting rights for lawful purposes, had conferred no power to commit unlawful acts, such torts committed by
corporate agents must consequently be ultra vires, and the individual
wrongs of the agents themselves; but this idea no longer obtains.'

(Cooley Torts, 119.)"
The supreme court of North Carolina adopts the same rule in
Peebles v. Patapsco Guano Co., 77 N. C. 233:
"There is no reason that occurs to us why a different rule should
A
be applicable to cases of deceit from what applies to other torts.
corporation can only act through its agents, and must be responsible
for their acts. It is of the greatest public importance that it should
be so.
If a manufacturing and trading corporation is not responsible
for the false and fraudulent representations of its agents, those who
deal with it will be practically without redress, and the corporation
can commit fraud with impunity."
In the case of Fogg et al. v. Griffin et al., 2 Allen i, the supreme
court of Massachusetts discusses this question at some length, and well
Chief Justice
states the rule which is applicable to the case at bar.
:
Bigelow says
"If it be true, as urged by the counsel for the plaintiffs, that he
could not bind the corporation by any false and fraudulent representations, because it had no authority to appoint an agent for an unlawful purpose or to use unlawful means, it would follow that no corporation could be held liable for any acts of its authorized agents,- however fraudulent or wicked their conduct might be, or however great
Such a
might be the injury thereby occasioned to third persons.
doctrine finds no support in the law.
A corporation can act only
If they, while exercising the authority conferred on
through agents.
them, are guilty of falsehood and fraud, their principal is liable for
the consequences which may flow therefrom.
The true test of the
liability of the principal in such cases is to ascertain whether, in committing a fraud, the agent was acting in the business of his principal.
If he was engaged in the course of his employment, then parties
injured by his misconduct or fraud can resort for redress to the persons who clothed him with the power to act in their behalf, and who
have received the benefits resulting from his agency.
(Foster v.
Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479, 509.)" * * *
[The court then quoted extensively from Goodspeed v. East Haddam Bank, 22 Conn. 530, supra, and Nims v. Mount Hermon Boys'
School, 160 Mass. 177, 22 L. R. A. 364, infra'].
This same doctrine is upheld by the supreme court of the United
States in Salt Lake City v. Hollister, 118 U. S. 256, Mr. Justice
Miller delivering the opinion. The city of Salt Lake had set up a
distillery, and for some time had been engaged in the business of disHollister, as collector of internal revetilling and producing spirits.
nue, collected from the city the sum of $12,057.75, as revenue on the
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spirits distilled. The city sued to recover this fund as being illegally
exacted from the city treasury.
It was contended on behalf of the city that, under its corporate
powers, it was unauthorized to engage in the distilling business, and
the acts of its officers were ultra vires, and that the city was not liable
for the tax upon the spirits so unlawfully manufactured by its officers
and agents.
The supreme court held the city liable for the tax, and
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the learned justice said :
"But while the city does not deny the actual fact of distillation, and
of fraudulent returns by
denies the whole affair by argument.
It
says that, though
very time the city did distill spirits, did sell
can not be held
them, and did receive the money into its treasury,
liable for this because
had no legal power to do so.
Its want of
to be received as conclucorporate authority to engage in distilling
did not do so, while by the pleading
sive evidence that
admitted
that
did.
Because there was no statute which authorized
as
could engage in this profitable business
city of Utah to distill spirits,
to any extent without paying the taxes which the laws of the United
States require of every one else who did the same thing.
"If the territory of Utah had added to its other corporate powers
that of making and selling distilled spirits, then the city would be liable to the tax, but because
had no such power by law,
could do
without any liability for the tax to the United States or to any one
else.
"It would be fine thing,
this argument
good, for all distillers to organize into milling corporations to make flour, and proceed
to the more profitable business of distilling spirits, which would be
unauthorized by their charters or articles of incorporation, for they
would thus escape taxation and ruin all competitors.
"It said that the acts done are not the acts of the city, but of its
officers or agents who undertook to do them in its name. This would
be
pleasant farce to be enacted by irresponsible parties, who give
no bond, who have no property to respond to civil or criminal suits,
who make no profit out of
while the city grows rich in the performance.
It to be taken as fair inference on this demurrer that
all that the city might have done was done in establishing this business.
The officers who,
said, did this thing, must be supposed
Resolutions or ordito have been properly appointed or elected.
nances of the governing body of the city directing the establishing of
the distillery and furnishing money to buy the plant, must be supposed to have been passed in the usual mode. Everything must have
been done under the same rules and by the same men as
were
town hall. If the demurrer had not admitted this,
hospital or
could no doubt have been proved on an issue denying it.
"But the argument
done by
unsound that whatever
corporation in excess of the corporate powers, as defined by its charter,
as though
was not done at all.
A railroad company authorized to
right of way by such exercise of the right of eminent domain
acquire
as the law prescribes, which undertakes to and does seize upon and
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invade, by its officers and servants, the land of a citizen, makes no
and takes no steps for the appropriation of
a
compensation,
It had
naked trespasser, and can be made responsible for the tort.
no authority to take the man's land or to invade his premises.
But
the governing board had directed the act, the corporation could be
sued for the tort, in an action of ejectment, or in trespass, or on an
implied assumpsit for the value of the land. A plea of ultra vires,
in this case, would be no defense.
"The truth is, that, with the great increase in corporations in very
recent times, and in their extension to nearly all the business transachas been found necessary to hold them responsible for
tions of life,
acts not strictly within their corporate powers, but done in their corporate name, and by corporation officers who were competent to
When such acts are not founded
exercise all the corporate powers.
on contract, but are arbitrary exercises of power in the nature of torts,
or are guasi-crim'mal, the corporation may be held to
pecuniary
responsibility for them to the party injured."
The foregoing observations are peculiarly applicable to the case
The bank took and accepted the mortgage,
under consideration.
It
according to DeSteiguer's fraudulent agreement with Melone.
took possession of the goods that Melone had procured under the
It sold the goods that
dishonest scheme agreed to by its president.
had been procured pursuant to the fraudulent design.
It accepted
the proceeds of the sale as the fruits of the fraud, and now seeks to
escape liability upon the ground that its president was acting without
his lawfully constituted authority.
Courts can not lend themselves to
aid corporations in holding on to money received in such
manner,
When the bank accepted the results
and under such circumstances.
of DeSteiguer's fraudulent schemes,
became equally liable with
him and jointly liable for his acts, and under the facts alleged, plaintiffs are entitled to recover the value of their goods from any and all
of the tort-feasors.
contended by counsel for defendant that the goods belonged to
Melone Brothers, and they had
right to take the mortgage as security, and to sell the same for the payment of their claim. This
contention
based upon
false assumption.
The title to the goods,
under the facts alleged in the complaint, which are confessed by the
demurrer, never passed to Melone Brothers, and they could convey
none by the mortgage to the bank, for
had notice through its manager of all the facts constituting the fraud, and their seizure of the
conversion for which they are liable to the
goods amounted to
owners.
It may be urged that the stockholders of the coiporation ought not
to be held to
loss on account of the unauthorized acts of DeSteiguer.
But the answer to this is, they placed him in this position they intrusted their interests to his management and keeping, and
in carrying on their business he perpetrated a fraud upon innocent persons,
they who made
possible for him to perpetrate the fraud must suffer,
rather than those who are in no wise responsible for his actions.
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The judgment of the district court is reversed with direction to
overrule the defendant's demurrer to the complaint, and for further
proceedings.
Dale, C. J., having presided in the court below, and Bierer, J. r
having been of counsel, not sitting; all the other justices concurring.
Fraud and deceit: Accord, 1846, Bartholomew v. Bentley, 15 Ohio
Am. Dec. 596; 1869, McClellan v. Scott, 24 Wis. 81 ; 1877, Peebles v.
Patapsco Guano Co., 77 N. C. 233, 24 Am. Rep. 447; 1884, Erie City Iron
Works v. Barber, 106 Pa. St. 125, 51 Am. Rep. 508 ; 1885, Cragie v. Hadley,
99 N. Y. 131; 1894, Dorsey Machine Co. v. McCaffrey, 139 Ind. 545, 47 Am.
St. Rep. 290; 1897, Breyfogle v. Walsh, 80 Fed. Rep. 172; 1899, Hindman v.
First Nat'l Bank, 39 C. C. A. 1, with note.
Conspiracy: Accord, 1880, Dodge v. Bradstreet Co., 59 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
104; 1887, Buffalo Lub. Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 106 N. Y. 669; 1894, Dorsey Machine Co. v. McCaffrey, 135 Ind. 545, 47 Am. St. Rep. 290; 1899, Zink
Carb. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 103 Wis. 125, 74 Am. St. Rep. 845, 79 N. W.
Rep. 229; 1901, West Virginia Trans. Co. v. Standard Oil Co.,
W. Va.
.
Note.

659, 45

40 S.

E.

591.

Sec. 397.

(9) Negligence

KIRK E. NIMS
1893.

v.

Ultra vires torts.
MT. HERMON BOYS' SCHOOL.

IN THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
160
39 Am. St. Rep. 467, 22 L. R. A. 364.

Mass. Rep. 177-182,

KNOWLTON,

J.

The

defendant

is

an

educational

corporation.

The plaintiff seeks to recover damages for an injury received through

the negligence of a ferryman in managing a boat on which he was a
passenger, and which, as he alleges, the defendant was using at a
At the
public ferry in the business of carrying passengers for hire.
of
the
ruled
that
there
was
no
the
defendant
presiding justice
request
evidence to warrant a finding for the plaintiff, and directed a verdict
for the defendant.
The defendant contends that the ruling should be
It says, in the first place, that
sustained on one or both of two grounds.
if it maintained the ferry and hired and paid the ferryman, the business
was ultra vires, and therefore it is not liable for negligence in the
management of the boat.
Secondly, it contends that there was no
evidence to connect the corporation with the business of running the
feriy-boat, or to show that the ferryman was its servant.
It is a general rule that corporations are liable for their torts as natural persons are. It is no defense to an action for a tort to show that
the corporation is not authorized by its charter to do wrong.
Recovand
for
for
libel
be
had
assault
against corporations
battery,
ery may
from
for
torts
for
as
well
as
malicious
resulting
and
negprosecution,
Moore v. Fitchburg
ligent management of the corporate business.
Railroad, 4 Gray 465 ; Reed v. Home Savings Bank, 130 Mass.
443; Fogg v. Boston & Lowell Railroad, 148 Mass. 513; Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad v. Quigley, 21 How. 202209 ; Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. 604 ; National Bank
v. Graham, 100 U. S. 699; Gruber v. Washington & Jamesville

TORTS.

397

1269

it

a

&

;

2

a is

a

is

It

it

is

it,

a

a

6

&

76

J.

is

;

a

a

a

1

it

&

a

J.,

a

a

;

it

it

if it,

Railroad, 92 N. C. i ; Hussey v. Norfolk Southern Railroad, 98 N.
C. 34. If a corporation by its officers or agents unlawfully injures a
person, whether intentionally or negligently, it would be most unjust
to allow it to escape responsibility on the ground that its act is ultra
vires. The only plausible ground on which the defendant in the
present case can contend that it should be exempt from liability for
the negligence of its servant in managing the ferry-boat is that the
contract to carry the plaintiff was ultra vires, and therefore invalid,
and that the duty for neglect of which the plaintiff sues arose out of
the contract, and disappears with it when the contract appears to be
void. The defendant may argue that the plaintiff can not maintain
an action for a breach of the contract to use proper care to carry him
safely, and that he stands no better when he sues in tort for failure to
do the duty which grew out of the contract.
In Bissell v. Michigan Southern & Northern Indiana Railroad, 22
N. Y. 258, the plaintiff founded his action on the negligence of the
two defendants while jointly running cars on a railroad in a state to
which the charter of neither of them extended, and it was conceded
that the defendants were acting ultra vires.
The plaintiff recovered,
Comstock, C. J., holding in an elaborate opinion that the corporations were liable under their contract, notwithstanding that the contract was ultra vires, and that if they could not be held under their
contract they could not be held at all, inasmuch as the only negligence
alleged was a failure to . use the care which the contract called for.
Selden, J., in an equally full and elaborate opinion, held that the contract for carriage was invalid, and that there could be no recovery under
nor for negligence founded upon
but
was his opinion
the contract were set aside, the defendants owed the plaintiff
that,
duty founded on his relation to them as an occupant, with their permission, of
place in their car, and that the improper management
of the car was a neglect of that duty for which the plaintiff could reClerke,
cover.
agreed with this view, and all but one of the
other judges concurred in
decision for the plaintiff, without stating
the ground on which they thought the decision should be placed. This
case was followed in Buffett v. Troy
Boston Railroad, 40 N. Y.
68, in which
was held that
railroad corporation was liable for
was running withnegligence of the driver of
stage-coach which
out
business of that kind
but the opinion does
legal right to do
not show whether the decision
founded on the opinion of Comstock,
C. J., given in the former case, or on that of Selden,
Like decisions have been made under similar facts in Central Railroad &
Banking Co. v. Smith,
Ala. 572 New York, Lake Erie
Western Railway v. Haring, 18 Vroom 137, and Hutchinson v. Western
Atlantic Railroad,
Heisk. 634.
The better doctrine seems to be that contract made by corporation in violation of its charter, or in excess of the powers granted to
either expressly or by implication,
invalid, considered merely as a
contract, and so long as
entirely executory, will not be enforced.
not only violation of
private trust, viewed in reference to the
WIL. CAS.-?
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stockholders, but it is against the policy of the law, which intends that
corporations deriving their powers solely from the legislature shall
not pass beyond the limits of the field of activity in which they are
Monument National Bank v.
permitted by their charter to work.
Globe Works, 101 Mass. 57; Attorney-General v. Tudor Ice Co.,
Davis v. Old Colony Railroad, 131 Mass. 258;
104 Mass. 239;
Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 7 1 5 Leslie v. Lorillard, noN.
Y. 519; Linkauf v. Lombard, 137 N. Y. 417; East Anglian RailOn the other
ways v. Eastern Counties Railway, n C. B. 775, 803.
hand, courts have frequently held that, while such contracts considered
merely as contracts are invalid, they involve no such element of moral
or legal wrong as to forbid their enforcement if there has been such
action under them as to work injustice if they are set aside.
Courts
have been astute to discover something in the nature of an equitable
estoppel against one who, after entering into such a contract and
inducing a change of condition by another party, attempts to avoid
It is said that such a plea will
the contract by a plea of ultra vires.
not avail, when to allow it would work injustice and accomplish legal
wrong. Leslie v. Lorillard, no N. Y. 519; Linkauf v. Lombard,
Many cases might be supposed in which it
137 N. Y. 417, 423.
would be most unjust to hold that one who had received the benefits
of such a contract might retain them and leave the other party without remedy, as he might do in a supposable case, where another had
put himself at a disadvantage on the faith of a contract with him to
commit a crime.
Whether in this commonwealth a contract entered into by a corporation ultra vires, and partly performed, will ever be enforced on
See McCluer v. Manequitable grounds, we need not now decide.
chester & Lawrence Railroad, 13 Gray 124; National Pemberton
Bank v. Porter, 125 Mass. 333; Attleborough National Bank v.
Rogers, 125 Mass. 339; Atlas National Bank v. Savery, 127 Mass.
75, 77; Slater Woollen Co. v. Lamb, 143 Mass. 420; Prescott National Bank v. Butler, 157 Mass. 548 ; National Bank v. Matthews, 98
U. S. 621; National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U. S. 99; Parish v.
Wheeler, 22 N. Y. 494; Oil Creek & Allegheny River Railroad v.
Pennsylvania Transportation Co., 83 Pa. St. 160; Bradley v. Ballard, 55 111. 413. In the present case we think it makes no difference
that the defendant was not a manufacturing or trading corporation,
It could acquire
but was chartered for educational purposes only.
and hold property, make contracts, and do anything else incidental to
Doubtless some of its officers or
the maintenance of the school.
agents thought it would be an advantage to its students and managers
to have a public ferry at the place where the plaintiff was injured.
Its maintenance of such a ferry was ultra vires, but its acts in that respect were not different in kind from the ordinary acts of corporations
We are of
in excess of the powers given them by their charter.
opinion, therefore, that if the defendant while running the ferry-boat
accepted the plaintiff as a passenger to be transported for hire, and
undertook to carry him across the river, he was in the boat as a
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licensee, it owed him the duty to use proper care to carry him safely,
and, whether an action could be maintained for a breach of the contract or not, it is liable to the plaintiff in an action of tort for neglect
of that duty.
The other question in the case is whether there was evidence that
Under its by-laws the managethe corporation operated the ferry.
ment of the corporation is vested in a board of trustees.
It does not
appear that any vote was ever taken in regard to the ferry, and it was
not shown that any officer of the corporation took out the license
which was granted to the defendant by the county commissioners, uni, to keep the ferry; but the records of the
der Pub. Sts., ch. 55,
county commissioners show that such a license was granted, and that
a bond with sureties was given to the county of Franklin, with the
condition properly to perform the duty of a ferryman, executed in
behalf of the defendant by one who was designated as superintendent, and witnessed by the defendant's
cashier and paymaster.
It
further appeared that the title to the property used at the ferry was
taken by Ambert G. Moody, one of the trustees of the defendant,
who was then a student in Amherst College, and that he paid for it
and that he
only a nominal sum above the mortgage existing upon
and the defendant's superintendent, who had charge of its farm, employed one Deane to operate the ferry, who was paid by the month,
and who turned over the balance of the receipts of the ferry above
his wages to the defendant's cashier and paymaster.
For the month
of April, Deane was paid for his services by the defendant's paymaster out of the defendant's funds.
In June, 1890,
new ferry-boat
was constructed under an arrangement with Ambert G. Moody and
Dwight L. Moody, both of whom were trustees of the corporation,
and was paid for by the paymaster out of the funds of the corporation.
For six months, and until there was change in the management of the ferry, the defendant's cashier and paymaster sent to the
treasurer, who lived in New York, monthly accounts, showing monthly
receipts and expenses on account of the ferry.
Accompanying the
first of these accounts was
statement that the school was running
the ferry and paying the bills. The treasurer was himself a trustee of
the corporation.
He subsequently rendered his official report to the
corporation, which was audited by another of the trustees, who did
not examine the items in person, but caused the examination to be
made by
man in his employment. This report was accepted by the
trustees and placed on file.
The items of receipts and expenditures
were entered on the books of the treasurer in an account under the
title "Ferry."
The treasurer's report was not put in evidence, and
was not produced, although the defendant was notified to produce it.
There
no evidence of original authority from the defendant to
to
anybody
operate the ferry on its account, but the evidence
plenary that persons connected with the management of its business
assumed so to operate it.
The important question
whether there
was evidence that the corporation ratified the acts of these persons.
We are of opinion that there was evidence from which the jury might
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have found such ratification.
It is not necessary that the ratification
should be by a formal vote.
It is enough if the corporation, acting
through its managing officers, knowing that the business had been
done by those who assumed to act as its agents in doing
and that
the income of the business had been received and the expenses of
paid by its treasurer in his official capacity, and that the balance of
the receipts above the expenditures was in its treasury, adopted the
action of its treasurer, and elected to keep the money.
It was a fair
inference of fact, especially when the corporation failed to produce
the treasurer's report after notice to produce it, that the report contrue statement of the accounts which related to the ferry, and
tained
that
was accepted with full knowledge on the part of the trustees of
what
contained.
ratification by the corporaWhether there was
tion was a question of fact for the jury on all the evidence.
If there was such a ratification, carried with the consequences
which would have followed an original authority.
In Dempsey v.
Chambers, 154 Mass. 330,
was held, after much consideration, that
ratification of an unauthorized act would make the principal liable in
an action of tort for an injury resulting from negligence of the agent
in doing the act.
We are of opinion that the case should have been submitted to the

jury.
Exceptions sustained.

1,

2

I.

8

&

;

;

&

;

;

;

;

9,

&

5

Note.
Negligence:
1839, Lowell v. B. &. L. R. Co., 23 Pick. (Mass.) 24, 34
Am. Dec. 33; 1850, Walling v. Mayor, etc., of Shreveport, La. Ann. 660, 52
Am. Dec. 608; 1857, Hopkins v. A.
St. L. R. Co., 36 N. H.
72 Am. Dec.
287
1865, Illinois Central R. v. Read, 37 111. 484, 87 Am. Dec. 260
1865,
Donaldson v. Mississippi R. Co., 18 Iowa 280, 87 Am. Dec. 391
1869, Helsdorf v. City of St. Louis, 45 Mo. 94, 100 Am. Dec. 352 1873, Flike v. Railroad
Co., 53 N. Y. 549, 13 Am. Rep. 545; 1873, Macon
Augusta R. Co. v. Mayes,
1877, City of Petersburg v. Applegarth, 28 Gratt.
49 Ga. 355, 15 Am. Rep. 678
(Va.) 321 1880, Smith v. Oxford Iron Co., 42 N. J. L. (13 Vroom) 467, 36 Am.
Rep. 535; 1883, Singleton v. S. W. Railroad, 70 Ga. 464, 48 Am. Rep. 574;
P. R. Co. v. Conway,
Colo.
54 Am. Rep. 537; 1887,
1884, Denver S. P.
Am. St. 608; 1888, Dunn
Lancaster Ave.
Co. v. Rhoads, 116 Pa. St. 377,
v. Agricultural Soc., 46 Ohio St. 93, 15 Am. St. Rep. 556; 1890, Elmore v.
Drainage Commrs., 135 111. 269, 25 Am. St. Rep. 363; 1890, American Dist.
Tel. Co. v. Walker, 72 Md. 454, 20 Am. St. Rep. 479; 1894, Mattise v. Manufacturing Co., 46 La. Ann. 1535, 16 So. Rep. 400.
Ultra vires torts: See note, supra, p. 1232.

(10) Charitable corporations.

FIRE INSURANCE PATROL
IN THE SUPREME

COURT

Rep. 624-650,

6

1888.

v.

JULIA

F. BOYD.

OF PENNSYLVANIA.

Am. St. Rep. 745.

1

Sec. 398.

120

Pa, St.

1

a

[Action by the widow and minor son of C. S. Boyd, against the
Fire Insurance Patrol,
corporation, and H. and K., its employes,
Statement

abridged.

Arguments and part of opinion omitted.

398

TORTS.

1273

for damages for negligently killing Boyd. The company, after a fire,
sent H. and K. to remove tarpaulin from the fourth story of the buildInstead of lowering them by a coning where the fire had been.
venient hoist near by, they concluded to throw them out of the window
K. went down to the sidewalk to warn peron to the street below.
sons of the danger, and H. threw out the bundles of tarpaulin, one
of which struck Boyd, who came out of his store near by and started
He was injured so that he died shortly after. He
across the street.
There was a verdict for
was warned by K., but not soon enough.
for
of
all
over
which
plaintiff
$39,000,
$25,000 was remitted, and
for
that
sum
rendered.
The
company brought a writ of
judgment
error.]
As disclosed by the charter, "the object of the corPAXSON, J.
to
was
poration
protect and save life and property in or contiguous to
burning buildings, and to remove and take charge of such property or
As disclosed by the evidence, it
any part thereof, when necessary."
be
a
to
without
corporation
capital stock or moneyed capital ;
appears
that it is supported by voluntary contributions, derived from different
fire insurance companies ; that its object and business is to save life
and property in or contiguous to burning buildings ; that in saving
and protecting such property no difference is made between property
insured and property which is not insured ; that no profits or dividends
*
are made and divided among the corporators.
Is the Insurance Patrol a public charitable institution?
The
learned court below held that it was not, upon the ground that the
main object of the institution was to benefit the insurance companies,
who were the chief contributors to its funds. In other words, the
learned judge tested the nature and character of the institution by the
*
*
*
motives of its contributors.
In Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. 405, it was said by Sir
William Grant that those purposes are considered charitable which
are enumerated in the statute of 43d Elizabeth, or which by analogy
are deemed within its spirit and intendment.
It is true that this
statute of Elizabeth is not in force in Pennsylvania, but its principles
are a part of the common law: Cresson's Appeal, 30 Pa. St. 450. In
British Museum v. White, 2 Sim. & S. 596, a charitable gift was
defined to be, "Every gift for a public purpose, whether local or general, although not a charitable use within the common and narrow
sense of those words."
In Jones v. Williams, Ambler 651, Lord
Camden gives this practical definition, viz.:
"A gift to a general
public use which extends to the poor as well as to the rich." This definition has been repeatedly approved by this and other courts : See
Wright v. Linn, 9 Pa. St. 433 ; Coggeshall v. Pelton, 7 Johns. Ch. 294 ;
Milford v. Reynolds, i Phil. Ch. R. 191 ; Perrin v. Carey, 24 How.
506; Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 556.
These brief citations from the English authorities are deemed sufficient. I now turn to our own and other states. In Cresson's Appeal, 30 Pa. St. 437, this court, after citing with approval Jones v.
Williams, supra, said: "In order to ascertain what are charitable
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uses, the English courts have generally resorted to the preamble of
the act of parliament, 43 Elizabeth.
That enumerates twenty-one,
and among them are found the following:
Repairs of bridges; repairs of ports and havens; repairs of causeways;
repairs of seabanks; repairs of highways; fitting out soldiers; other taxes. And
beyond the enumeration contained in that act, many other gifts
have been recognized as common law gifts to charitable uses, for
example: for cleansing the streets, maintenance of houses of correction ; for the true labor and exercise of husbandry, for public
These cases and many others are collected in Magill v.
benefit.
Brown, Brightly 347. It is true the statute of Elizabeth is not in
force as a statute in Pennsylvania, but, as before stated, its principles
are part of our common law.
The case of Magill v. Brown was a
Pennsylvania case, and there it was held that a bequest for a fire
engine and hose was a gift for a charitable use." Jn Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 556, a charity was denned by Justice Gray as follows:
UA
charity, in legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift to be
applied consistently with existing laws for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under
the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from
disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works,
or otherwise lessening the burdens of government."
This definition
has been cited approvingly, not only by text writers, but by other
courts.
In Miller v. Porter, 53 Pa. St. 292, there was a bequest by Porter to
a university which was to bear his name, and this court said:
"You
say it (The Porter University) was not founded to promote religion
or religious education, but to immortalize the founder, and therefore
it was not a charity.
If the premises be granted, the conclusion does
not follow, because though it has no stamp of religion, and the selfishness of motive may take away from it the high and abstract quality
of a Christian charity, yet it was to be a seat of learning a univera center from which the rays of educated intelligence were to
sity
radiate in all directions ; and, if to found a school-house at the crossroads of a township be a legal charity, though the selfish motive be
apparent, much more to found such a university is a legal charity ;
and, if a charity within the legal sense of that word, then it is as
much within the purview of the statute as a bequest to the West Town
School, and Price v. Maxwell rules the case." Following in this
line of thought is Manners v. The Library Co., 93 Pa. St. 165, where it
was held in the case of a public charity that the intent of the testator
will not be defeated because a secondary intent may be illegal, for if
it be unlawful it will be disregarded. In Appeal of The Humane Fire
Company, 88 Pa. St. 389, it was distinctly ruled by this court that
the association was a public charity.
That company was one of the
members of the old volunteer fire department of the city of Philadelphia ; was organized for the purpose of extinguishing fires, and was
supported just as the Fire Insurance Patrol is supported, by voluntary
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It is true, many of its contributions came from private
contributions.
citizens, but I am unable to see any distinction between contributions
to a fire company or insurance patrol, made by individuals and those
In both cases a corresponding benefit is
made by corporations.
It would be idle to say that the insurance companies do
expected.
not expect to diminish their losses by their support of the Insurance
Patrol. But has the private citizen who contributes to a fire company
any higher motive ? Does he pay his money out of love to God and
love to man, or does he pay it to protect his property?
It will be noticed that in no one of the cases cited is the motive of
the donor made a test of a charity. While it is true that a gift within
the definition of Mr. Binney is a good charitable use, and in a moral
sense perhaps the best, it has never been held that said definition is a
test of a charity. On the contrary, this court held in Martin v. McCord,
accession to a charity need not be by gift,
5 Watts 493, that the
but may be by contract ; and that the accession to the charitable use
from one who gave ground for a school-house, if the neighbors would
go on and build a decent house on it for the benefit of the neighborhood, and for the benefit of his grandson John, whom he wished to
send to school, was good; and Sergeant, J., said "not as a gift, but
as a purchase for a valuable consideration," and the neighbors were
And in Miller v. Porter, supra, we
the trustees for a charitable use.
have already seen that this court expressly repudiated the idea that the
selfish motive affected the legal nature of the gift or use, and held
that the object of the bequest only, and not the motive, governed its
The true test of a legal public charity is the object
legal effect.
sought to be attained ; the purpose to which the money is to be applied, not the motive of the donor.
Our conclusion is that the Fire Insurance Patrol of Philadelphia is
a public charitable institution ; that in the performance of its duties it
is acting in aid and in ease of the municipal government in the preIt remains to inquire whether
servation of life and property at fires.
the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to it. Upon this point we
are free from doubt.
It has been held in this state that the duty of
extinguishing fires and saving property therefrom is a public duty,
and the agent to whom such authority is delegated is a public agent
and not liable for the negligence of its employes.
This doctrine was
affirmed by this court in Knight v. City of Philadelphia, 15 W.
N. 307, where it was said: "We think the court did not commit
any error in entering judgment for the defendant upon the demurrer.
The members of the fire department are not such servants of the
municipal corporation as to make it liable for their acts or negligence.
Their duties are of a public character and for a high order of public
benefit. The fact that this act of assembly did not make it obligatory
on the city to organize a fire department, does not change the legal
liability of the municipality for the conduct of the members of the
organization. The same reason which exempts the city from liability
for the acts of its policemen, applies with equal force to the acts of
the firemen."
And it would seem from this and other cases to make
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no difference, as respects the legal liability, whether the organization
performing such public service is a volunteer or not. Jewett v. New
Haven, 38 Conn. 379; Russell v. Men of Devon, 2. T. R. 672;
Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 C. & F. 506; Riddle v.
Proprietors, 7 Mass. 187; McDonald v. Hospital, 120 Mass. 432;
Boyd v. Insurance Patrol, 113 Pa. St. 269. But I will not pursue this
subject further, as there is another and higher ground upon which our
decision may be placed.
The Insurance Patrol is a public charity; it has no property or
funds which have not been contributed for the purposes of charity,
and it would be against all law and all equity to take those trust
funds, so contributed for a special, charitable purpose, to compensate
injuries inflicted or occasioned by the negligence of the agents or servIt would be carrying the doctrine of respondeat
ants of the patrol.
That doctrine is
superior to an unreasonable and dangerous length.
a hard rule.
trust and believe
as I once before observed
at best
it will never be extended to the sweeping away of public charities; to
the misapplication of funds, specially contributed for a public chariI think it
table purpose, to objects not contemplated by the donors.
may be safely assumed that private trustees, having the control of
money contributed for a specific charity, could not, in case of a tort
committed by one of their members, apply the funds in their hands
A public charity,
to the payment of a judgment recovered therefor.
whether incorporated or not, is but a trustee, and is bound to apply its
funds in furtherance of the charity and not otherwise.
This doctrine
is hoary with antiquity, and prevails alike in this country and in England, where it originated as early as the reign of Edward V, and it
In the Feoffees of
was announced in the Year Book of that period.
Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 C. & F. 506, a person eligible for admission to the hospital brought an action for damages against the
The
trustees for the wrongful refusal on their part to admit him.
case was appealed to the House of Lords, when it was unanimously
held that it could not be maintained.
Lord Cottenham said: "It is obvious that it would be a direct violation, in all cases, of the purpose of a trust if this could be done,
for there is not any person who ever created a trust that provided for
payment out of it of damages to be recovered from those who had
No such provision has been made
the management of the fund.
There is a trust, and there are persons intended to manage
here.
it for the benefit of those who are to be the objects of the charity.
To give damages out of a trust fund would not be to apply it to those
objects which the author of the fund had in view, but would be to
divert it to a completely different purpose."
Lord Brougham said: "The charge is that the governors of the
hospital have illegally and improperly done the act in question, and,
therefore, because the trustees have violated the statute, therefore
what? Not that they shall themselves pay the damages, but that the
trust fund which they administer shall be made answerable for their

I
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misconduct.
The finding on this point is wrong, and the decree of
the court below must be reversed."
Lord Campbell : "It seems to have been thought that if charity
trustees have been guilty of a breach of trust, the persons damnified
That
thereby have a right to be indemnified out of the trust funds.
is contrary to all reason, justice and common sense.
Such a perversion of the intention of the donor would lead to most inconvenient
The trustees would in that case be indemnified against
consequences.
the consequences of their own misconduct, and the real object of the
Damages are to be paid from the pocket
charity would be defeated.
of the wrong-doer, not from a trust fund.
A doctrine so strange, as
the court below has laid down in the present case, ought to have
been supported by the highest authority.
There is not any authority,
not a single shred here to support it.
No foreign or constitutional
writer can be referred to for such a purpose."
I have quoted at some length from the opinions of these great
jurists because they express in vigorous and clear language the law
I have not space to discuss the long line of cases
upon this subject.
in England and this country in which the above principle is sustained.
It is sufficient to refer to a few of them by name: Riddle
v. Proprietors of the Locks, 7 Mass. 187; McDonald v. Massachu-

setts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432; Sherbourne v. Yuba Co., 21
Cal. 113; Brown v. Inhabitants of Vinalhaven, 65 Maine 402;
Mitchell v. City of Rockland, 52 Maine 118; City of Richmond v.
Long, 17 Grattan 375 ; Ogg v. City of Lansing, 35 Iowa 495 ; Murtaugh v. City of St. Louis, 44 Mo. 479 ; Patterson v. Penn. Reform
School, 92 Pa. St. 229; Maximillian v. Mayor, 62 N. Y. 160.
I am glad to be able to say that no state in this country, or in the
world, has upheld the sacredness of trusts with a firmer hand' than the
state of Pennsylvania.
Not only is a trustee for a public or private
use not permitted to misapply the trust funds committed to his care,
but if he convert them to his own use the law punishes him as a thief.
How much better than a thief would be the law itself were it to apply
the trust's funds, contributed for a charitable object, to pay for injuries
The latter is
resulting from the torts or negligence of the trustee?
legally responsible for his own wrongful acts. I understand a judgment has been recovered against the individual whose negligence occasioned the injury in this case.
If we apply the money of the Insurance Patrol to the payment of this judgment, or of the same cause of
action, what is it but a misapplication of the trust fund; as much so
as if the trustees had used it in payment of their personal liabilities?
It would be an anomaly to send a trustee to the penitentiary for squandering trust funds in private speculations, and yet permit him to do
If the
practically the same thing by making it liable for his torts.
principle contended for here were to receive any countenance at the
hands of this court, it would be the most damaging blow at the integWe are not
rity of trusts which has been delivered in Pennsylvania.

prepared to take this step.
We are not unmindful of the fact that it was contended

for the de-
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fendant in error that the case of Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v.
Ross is in conflict with Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, L. R. i E. & I. App.
Cas. (i H. L.) 93, and Parnaby v. Lancaster Canal Co., n Ad. & E.
I am unable to see any such conflict. The two corporations
223.
last named were evidently trading corporations and in no proper sense
In regard to the docks, it was said by Blackburn,
public charities.
are several cases relating to charities which
:
"There
at
J., page 465
were mentioned at your lordship's bar, but were not much pressed,
nor, as it seems to us, need they be considered now ; for whatever
may be the law as to the exemption of property occupied for charitable purposes, it is clear that the docks in question can come within no
such exemption."
I will not consume time by discussing the case of Glavin v. Rhode
Island Hospital, 12 R. I. 411, which, to some extent, sustains the opThere a hospital patient, paying eight
posite view of this question.
dollars per week for his board and medical attendance, was allowed
to recover a verdict against the hospital for unskillful treatment, and
it was held that the general trust funds of a charitable corporation are
liable to satisfy a judgment in tort recovered against it for the negliIt is at least doubtful whether under
gence of its officers or agents.
its facts the case applies, and if it does, we would not be disposed to
follow it in the face of the overwhelming weight of authority the
other way, and of the sound reasoning by which it is supported.
The foregoing is little more than a reassertion of the views of this
court as heretofore expressed in this case by our brother Clark : See
Many of the authorities I have referred to are there
113 Pa. St. 269.
him.
cited by
We are now more fully informed as to the facts of
the case, and can apply to them the law as indicated in the former

opinion.

We are all of opinion that the Insurance Patrol is not liable in this

action, and the judgment against it is therefore

Reversed.

Liability of charitable corporations for torts. Such corporations are
Note.
generally held not liable, on the ground that their funds are trust funds, and
the persons who actually commit the tortious act should be held liable. Educational corporations, charging tuition, Christian associations and churches
are not within the rule of exemption: 1869, Murtaugh v. City of St. Louis, 44
Mo. 479 (city not liable for injury in its city hospital) ; 1876, McDonald v.
Mass. General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529 (hospital not liable) ;
1885, Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20, 52 Am. Rep. 495 (house of refuge not
liable) ; 1885, Benton v. Trustees City Hospital, 140 Mass. 13, 54 Am. Rep. 436
(hospital not liable) ; 1891, Van Tassell v. Manhattan Eye and Ear Hospital,
60 Hun (N. Y.) 585 (not liable) ; 1891, Harris v. Woman's Hospital, 27 Abb.
N. C. 37 (not liable) ; 1893, Haas v. Missionary Society, 6 Miscl. (N. Y.) 281
(religious corporation not liable); 1894, Downes v. Harper Hospital, 101
Mich. 555, 45 Am. St. Rep. 427, 25 L. R. A. 602, 60 N. W. Rep. 42 (not liable) ;
1894, Williams v. Louisville Indus. School, 95 Ky. 251, 44 Am. St. Rep. 243,
23 L. R. A. 200, 24 S. W. Rep. 1065 (not liable) ; 1895, Joel v. Woman's Hespital, 89 Hun 73 (not liable) ; 1895, Richardson v. Carbon Hill Co., 10 Wash.
648, 20 L. R. A. 338, 39 Pac. Rep. 95 (hospital kept by mining company without profit not liable) ; 1895, Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33
Atl. Rep. 595 (public hospital not liable) ; 1895, Eighmy v. Union Pacific R.
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538, 27 L. R. A. 296, 61 N. W. Rep. 1056 (free railroad hospital
1895, Pierce v. Union Pacific R. Co., 66 Fed. Rep. 44, 32 U. S.
App. 48, 13 C. C. A. 323 (free railroad hospital not liable); 1899, Powers v.
Mass. Homeopathic Hospital, 101 Fed. Rep. 896 (not liable) ; 1900, Connor v.
Sisters of Poor, 10 Ohio St. & C. P. Dec. 86 (not liable).
Contra: 1879, Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R. I. 411, 34 Am. Rep.
675 (public charitable hospital is liable).

Co.,

93

Iowa

not liable)

;

A cemetery association (1888, Donnelly v. Boston Catholic Cemetery Association, 146 Mass. 163) ; a fire company (1890, Newcomb v. Boston Protective
Dept., 151 Mass. 215, 6 L. R. A. 778), and a Young Men's Christian Association (1896, Chapin y. Holyoke Y. M. C. A., 165 Mass. 280, 42 N. E. Rep. 1130),
are private corporations and are liable for their torts.
On the general doctrine of non-liability in public functions see note 30 Am.
St. Rep. 376-413.

Sec. 399.

(

1 1

)

Exemplary damages.

MAISENBACKER v. SOCIETY CONCORDIA.
1899.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT.
369-380, 71 Am. St. Rep. 213-219.

71

1

Conn. Rep.

(Action for damages for assault and battery.)
HALL, J. The complaint alleges in substance that the plaintiff,

having contracted with and paid the defendant for the privilege of
dancing at a certain ball, was, by the forcible acts of the defendant's
agents, prevented from exercising her said right, and was thereby
*
* *
caused pain and damage.
Apparently, no question was made at the trial but that under the
pleadings the plaintiff, upon proof that the defendant's agent forcibly
prevented her from dancing, became entitled to a verdict for a sum
sufficient to indemnify her for the actual injuries she sustained, and
which were the direct and natural consequences of the wrongful act
The complaint alleges that in consequence of the
complained of.
assault the plaintiff was deprived of the privileges of the ball, that she
suffered physical and mental pain and anguish, and lost her earnings
in the trade at which she had been employed.
The court instructed
the jury that in determining the amount of compensatory damages to
be awarded the plaintiff, they might take into consideration the indignity she had suffered by an assault in so public a place, the mental as
well as her physical suffering which it caused her, and such loss as
had been proved she had thereby sustained from inability to work at
her trade.
"All the attending acts and circumstances which accompany and
give character to the assault may be given in evidence to enhance the
damages." Brzezinski v. Tierney, 60 Conn. 55, 62. Mental as well
as physical suffering,
when properly alleged, may be proved as an
element of actual damage, and as naturally and directly resulting
from an assault of the character described in the complaint.
Gibney
v. Lewis, 68 Conn. 392. 396; Seger v. Barkhamsted, 22 Conn. 290,
1

Part of opinion omitted.
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The defendant has no
298; Masters v. Warren, 27 Conn. 293, 299.
cause to complain of the charge of the court with reference to the
elements which go to make up compensatory damages.
The complaint alleges that the defendant's agent, in committing
the assault, "addressed the plaintiff in loud, threatening and insulting
language," and that the assault upon the plaintiff was "committed in
a gross, wanton and reckless manner, and with intent to" injure the
plaintiff.
The defendant, in effect, requested the court to charge the jury that
the defendant society could not, upon the proof presented, be held
The 'court did not comply with this
liable in exemplary damages.
request, but instructed the jury that in case they found that a battery had been inflicted upon the plaintiff by the defendant's agent,
"wantonly, maliciously, or in wanton disregard of the plaintiff's
rights," they might add to that sum which they should find sufficient
to compensate the plaintiff for her injuries, "a sum as exemplary or
punitive damages," and might award her as punitive damages such
sum as the jury, from their "knowledge of the course of business in
the courts of law in this state," should find "to be her expense in
conducting this trial," less the taxable costs which she would recover.

verdict for the plaintiff for three hundred dolcase before us, but from the
finding of facts and from the charge of the court, stating the claims
of the parties as to the character and extent of the plaintiff's injuries,
we think the jury may, under such instruction, have included in their
verdict, as an element of damages, the expenses incurred by the
plaintiff in conducting her trial, less the taxable costs ; and unless
this is a case in which such expenses could lawfully be recovered, the
charge of the court was incorrect and a new trial should be granted.
That a plaintiff may, in an action for an assault and battery and in
certain other actions of tort, recover certain damages which are not
compensatory within the technical and legal meaning of that word,
but which are awarded with the view of punishing the defendant for
his wrongful act, has been settled in this state, beyond question, by a
large number of decisions extending from Linsley v. Bushnell, 15
Conn. 225, 38 Am. Dec. 79, to Gibney v. Lewis, 68 Conn. 392.
The cases in which punitive damages may be awarded are only
those actions of tort "founded on the malicious or wanton misconduct
of the defendant," or upon "such culpable neglect of the defendant"
as is "tantamount to malicious or wanton misconduct:"
St. Peter's
Church v. Beach, 26 Conn. 355 ; Welch v. Durand, 36 Conn. 182, 4
Am. Rep. 55; Burrv. Plymouth, 48 Conn. 460. And private corporations, as well as individuals, may for their own acts become liable
in punitive damages: Sedgwick on Damages, 8th ed.,
379; Merrils
v. Tariff Mfg Co., 10 Conn. 384, 27 Am. Dec. 682 ; Murphy v. New
York, etc., R. Co., 29 Conn. 496.
The expenses of litigation are not an element of the damages termed
in law actual or compensatory damages; "they are not the natural
The jury returned

lars.

a

We have not the evidence in the
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and proximate consequence of the wrongful act," and they can only
be considered by the jury in those cases in which exemplary damages
St. Peter's Church v. Beach, 26 Conn. 355 : Platt
may be awarded.
v. Brown, 30 Conn. 336; Mason v. Hawes, 52 Conn. 12-, 52 Am.
Rep. 552 ; Gibney v. Lewis, 68 Conn. 392. Such expenses in excess of taxable costs, in cases in which they may be considered, limit
Wilson v.
the amount of punitive damages which can be awarded.
36 Am. Rep. 51 ; Burr v. Plymouth, 48
cases where they may be considered, it is not usual to

Granby, 47 Conn. 59.

Conn.
prove
460.
the expenses of litigation actually incurred, but the court may admit
relevant evidence for that purpose. Bennett v. Gibbons, 55 Conn. 450.
The case before us, as shown by the record, is not one in which the
defendant society could be held liable in punitive damages.
The defendant is a corporation.
The alleged assault was committed by a
floor manager "appointed by the defendant to have the regulation and
The assault,
charge of the dancing" at a ball given by the defendant.
which the court instructed the jury would, if found to have been committed and to have been inflicted wantonly and maliciously, entitle
the plaintiff to exemplary damages, was the putting of his hand by
one of the floor managers upon the plaintiff's shoulder, "rudely, insolently, or angrily," and while she was upon the ballroom floor, "at
the same time telling her that she could not dance there, and that she
was not a fit person to be there." If these facts are sufficient to show
that the act of the agent was malicious or wanton, they do not prove
that the principal in any way participated in such malicious or wanton
misconduct.
As its agent was acting within the scope of his employment, the law compels the defendant to compensate the plaintiff for
the injuries she has sustained from the wrongful acts of the agent, but
it does not punish the defendant for the malicious purpose or intent
which prompted the agent's conduct.
To render the principal liable in exemplary damages for the acts of
his agent in the course of his employment, but done with such
malicious intent, some misconduct of the former beyond that which
the law implies from the mere relation of principal and agent must
be shown.
It is not claimed that the defendant society directed the
floor manager to remove the plaintiff, or to act toward any person in
the manner in which it is alleged he did, or that the defendant has
since adopted or approved of his action.
In Cleghorn v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 56 N. Y. 44, 47, 15
Am. Rep. 375, Chief Justice Church, in delivering the opinion of the
court, says: "For injuries by the negligence of a servant while engaged in the buiiness of the master, within the scope of his employment, the latter is liable for compensatory damages;
but for such
negligence, however gross or culpable, he is not liable to be punished in punitive damages unless he is also chargeable with gross mis*
conduct."
In the case of Lake Shore, etc., Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S,
101, 107, in which this question is very fully discussed and the de-
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cisions in both the federal and state Courts upon this subject reviewed,
Mr. Justice Gray, speaking for the court, laid down the rule as deducible from the authorities, that "guilty intention upon the part of
the defendant is required in order to charge him with exemplary or
punitive damages. * * * Exemplary or punitive damages, being
awarded, not by way of compensation to the sufferer, but by way
of punishment of the offender, and as a warning to others, can only
A prinbe awarded against one who has participated in the offense.
liable
to
of
course
make
compensation for
cipal, therefore, though
of
the
his
within
his
scope
agent
employment, can
injuries done by
or
liable
for
be
held
punitive damages, merely by
not
exemplary
reason of wanton, oppressive or malicious intent upon the part of the

agent."

In I Sedgwick on Damages, eighth edition, sections 378 and 380,
the author, after citing very fully the conflicting authorities in different

it

it,

"It is the better opinion that
jurisdictions upon this question, says:
be
had against a principal for
can
of
no recovery
exemplary damages
or
unless
the
servant,
of
defendant
an
the tort
agent
expressly authoror
or
it
was
act
as
was
ized the
approved
performed,
grossly negligent in hiring the agent or servant."
In the case at bar, as
appears by the record before us, we think
for
the
injury suffered was the full measure of the decompensation
fendant's responsibility, and that there was error in charging the jury
that they might award the plaintiff as punitive damages the expenses
of trial in excess of taxable costs, and in not charging upon the subject of punitive damages as requested by defendant.
Error and new trial granted.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

9,

,

&

&

5

2

2

:

a

Corporations are liable for exemplary damages under the same cirNote.
cumstances as master for the acts of the servant, and in this case the managing officers represent the corporation 1858, Peoria Bridge Assn. v. Loomis,
20 111. 235, 71 Am. Dec. 263; 1868, Chicago v. Martin, 49 111. 241, 95 Am. Dec.
590; 1869, New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Statham, 42 Miss. 607, 97 Am. Dec.
478; 1869, Goddard v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 57 Maine 202,
Am. Rep. 39;
Am. Rep. 382; 1873,
1869, Atlantic, etc., R. Co. v. Dunn, 19 Ohio St. 162,
Hanson v. European, etc., R. Co., 62 Maine 84, 16 Am. Rep. 404; 1884, Phil.,
etc., R. Co. v. Hoeflich, 62 Md. 300, 50 Am. Rep. 223; 1887, Internat'l, etc.,
Am. St. Rep. 45; 1890, Alabama,
R. Co. v. Telephone Co., 69 Texas 277,
etc., R. Co. v. Hill, 90 Ala. 71, 24 Am. St. Rep. 764; 1892, Spellman v. Richmond, etc., R., 35 S. C. 475, 28 Am. St. Rep. 858; 1892, Samuels v. Richmond, etc., R., 35 S. C. 493, 28 Am. St. Rep. 883; 1893, L. S.
M. S. R. Co.
v. Prentice, 147 TJ. S. 101; 1894, Childers v. San Jose, etc., Pub. Co., 105 Cal.
284, 45 Am. St. Rep. 40; 1894, Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Barger, 80 Md. 23,
45 Am. St. Rep. 319; 1896, Hoboken P.
Pub. Co.v. Kaffn, 59 N. J. L. 218,
59 Am. St. Rep. 585; 1898, Mack v. South Bound R., 52 S. C. 323, 68 Am. St.
Rep. 913; 1899, Washington G. L. Co. v. Lansden, 172 U. S. 534; 1899, Peterson v. W. U. Tel. Co., 75 Minn. 368, 74 Am. St. Rep. 502; 1901, Bingham v.
67 Pac. 98.
Ore.
Liprnan, etc., Co.,
et seq.
See, also, notes 59 Ain. St. Rep. 589, et seq., and 39 C. C. A., p.
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RAILWAY

GLOUCESTER

CO.

IN THE QUEEN'S BENCH. 3 Adolphus & Ellis N. S. 223-233,
43 Eng. C. L. 708.

559.

The report itself
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[Indictment found at the spring assizes for the county of Worcester, 1840, against a corporation aggregate, the Birmingham and Gloucester Railway Company, for disobedience to an order, of justices and
an order of sessions confirming
whereby the defendants, pursuant
to certain provisions contained in the statute incorporating the company, were directed to make certain arches to connect lands which
had been severed by the railway.
The defendants not coming in to
plead under the usual venire, some of the goods of the company were
seized under
distringas.
Afterward the defendants appeared and demurred.]
PATTESON,
was not contended on the
Upon the argument
part of the company that an action of trespass might not be maintained against
corporation for, notwithstanding some dicta to the
contrary in the older cases,
may be taken for settled law, since the
case of Yarborough v. The Bank of England, 16 East
in which
the cases were reviewed, that both trover and trespass are maintainable
but
was said that an indictment will not lie against a corporation. Only one direct authority was cited for this position; and
dictum of Lord Holt in an anonymous case reported in 12 Mod,
as

follows:

"Note:

Per Holt, Chief

not indictable, but the particular members
Justice.
of
are."
What the nature of the offense was to which the observation was intended to apply does not appear, and as
general proposition
number of cases, which show that
corporaopposed to
tion may be indicted for breach of
by law,
duty imposed upon
though not for
felony, or for crimes involving personal violence, as
for riots or assaults:
ch. 66, sec. 13, vol. 2, p.
Hawk. P. C., b.
58, yth ed.
A corporation aggregate may be liable by prescription, and compelled to repair
bridge: Hawk. P. C., b. i, ch. 76,
highway or
sec.
ch. 77, sec. 2, vol. 2, pp. 156, 258; and in the case of Rex v.
The Mayor, etc., of Liverpool,
East 86, the corporation was indicted by its corporate
name for non-repair of
highway, and,
upon argument in this court, the indictment was held to be defective
but no question was made as to the liability of
corporation to be
a

a

a

;

a

3

8,

a

i,

a

a

it

a

it

is

a

it

corporation

indicted.

1

a

In the case of Rex v. The Mayor, etc., of Stratford-upon-Avon, 14
East 348, the corporation was indicted by its corporate name for
Statement abridged, arguments

omitted.
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non-repair of

a bridge, and found guilty, and upon argument in this
court the verdict was sustained, and no question made as to the liability generally of a corporation to an indictment for breach of a duty
*
*
*
cast upon it by law.
In the case of Rex v. Gardner, i Cowp. 79, it was objected that a
corporation could not be rated to the poor, because the remedy by
imprisonment upon failure of distress was impossible; but the court
considered the objection of no weight, though it might be that there
would be some difficulty in enforcing the remedy.
The proper mode of proceeding against a corporation to enforce
the remedy by indictment, is by distress infinite to compel appearance, after removal by certiorari, as suggested by Mr. Baron Parke
in this very case, reported in 9 Car. & Payne 469, and as appears by
Hawk. P. C., b. 2, ch. 27, sec. 14, vol. 4, p. 140, and the cases
cited in 6 Vin. Abr. 310, etc., tit. Corporations (B. a), vol. 4, p.

140.

We are therefore of opinion that upon this demurrer there must be
^ydgment for the crown.
Judgment for the crown.
See note, infra, p. 1286.

O
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THE QUEEN
1846.
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Misfeasance.

THE GREAT NORTH OF ENGLAND RAILWAY CO. 1

IN THE QUEEN'S BENCH.
9 Adolphus & Ellis (N. S.) *3i5~
C. L. 314.
Eng.
327, 58

Indictment of the railway company for cutting through and obstructing a highway by the building of a bridge in a way different
from that conferred upon the company by act of parliament.
LORD DENMAN, C. J. The question is, whether an indictment
will lie at common law against a corporation for a misfeasance, it
being admitted, in conformity with undisputed decisions, that an indictment may be maintained against a corporation for non-feasance.
All the preliminary difficulties, as to the service and execution of
process, the mode of appearing and pleading, and enforcing judgBut the argument is, that
ment, are by this admission swept away.
for a wrongful act a corporation is not amenable to an indictment,
though for a wrongful omission it undoubtedly is ; assuming, in the
first place, that there is a plain and obvious distinction between the
two species of offense.
No assumption can be more unfounded.
Many occurrences may
be easily conceived, full of annoyance and danger to the public, and
involving blame in some individual or some corporation, of which the
1

Statement abridged,

arguments omitted.

CRIMES.

401

1285

most acute person could not clearly define the cause, or ascribe them
with more correctness to mere negligence in providing safeguards or
to an act rendered improper by nothing but the want of safeguards.
If A. is authorized to make a bridge with parapets, but makes it
without them, does the offense consist in the construction of the unsecured bridge, or in the neglect to secure it?
But if the distinction were always easily discoverable, why should
a corporation be liable for the one species of offense and not for the
The startling incongruity of allowing the exemption is one
other?
The law is often entangled in technical
strong argument against it.
It is as easy to charge one
embarrassments ; but there is none here.
with
or
a
erecting a bar across a public road
body corporate,
person,
as with the non-repair of it ; and they may as well be compelled to
pay a fine for the act as for the omission.
Some dicta occur in old cases:
corporation can not be guilty
of treason or felony." It might be added "of perjury, or offenses
The court of common pleas lately held that a
against the person."
in trespass, Maund v. The Monmouthshire
be
sued
corporation might
G.
M.
&
Canal Company, 4
452; but nobody has sought to fix them
These
of
with acts
immorality.
plainly derive their character from
of
mind
the
the corrupted
person committing them, and are violations
A corporation,
of the social duties that belong to men and subjects.
no
can
be
such duties,
not
which, as such, has
guilty in these cases;
but they may be guilty as a body corporate of commanding acts to be
The late case of
done to the nuisance of the community at large.
Regina v. Birmingham and Gloucester Railway Company, 3 Q. B.
223, was confined to the state of things then before the court, which
amounted to nonfeasance only ; but was by no means intended to
deny the liability of a corporation for a misfeasance.
We are told that this remedy is not required, because the individuals who concur in voting the order, or in executing the work, may
Of this there is
be made answerable for it by criminal proceedings.
no doubt.
But the public knows nothing of the former; and the
latter, if they can be identified, are commonly persons of the lowest
rank, wholly incompetent to make any reparation for the injury.
There can be no effectual means for deterring from an oppressive
exercise of power for the purpose of gain, except the remedy by an
that is, the corporation,
indictment against those who truly commit
no principle which places them
acting by its majority; and there
beyond the reach of the law for such proceedings.
The verdict for the Crown, therefore, on the first four counts, will
remain undisturbed.
arrested on the
Judgment to be entered on the first four counts
others.
.

;

is

it,
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WIL.

CAS.
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See note at end of next case.
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Sec. 402.

(3) Libel.
STATE

1879.

402

v.

ATCHISON.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE.
Rep. 729, 31 Am. Rep. 663.

3

Lea (Tenn.)

it,

FREEMAN, J. This is an indictment for libel, quashed in the court
below and appealed by the state. The indictment has two counts,
the first against Atchison and Buck, the second against the Banner
Publishing Company. The matter alleged is the same in both counts.
(After holding that the matter was libelous.)
It is next objected that the joinder of two different counts against
two different parties is error, for which the indictment should have
In the case of the State v. Lea, there was one count
been quashed.
against Polly Bailey for perjury, and a second against Lea for subThe court say: "We are unable to perceive
ornation of perjury.
why these parties were not properly joined in the same indictment,
and charged in separate counts, though their offenses be distinct.
They were of the same nature, admitted of the same plea and same
i Cold. 177. So, in this case, the offense is precisely
judgment."
It is true the corporation
the same the same plea is appropriate.
may not be imprisoned, but the fact that the same measure of punishment can not be inflicted in this way can not vitiate the indictment ;
the judgment is of the same character, that is, a fine and costs. That
imprisonment might possibly be inflicted in one case and not in the
The
other, can not in the least affect the validity of the indictment.
principal of such an objection is that joinder of different offenses
might embarrass the parties in their defense. The fact that one could
not be imprisoned after conviction, certainly can have no influence in
the conduct of the trial on the question of guilty or not guilty.
We see no ground on which the judgment can be sustained, and
reverse
remanding the case for further proceedings.

1

&

a

6

Part of opinion omitted.

7

&

7

1

9

is

:

See, 1701, Anonymous, 12 Mod. 559,
Criminal liability of corporations
Note.
not indictable; also, 1841, State v. Great Works, etc.,
holding corporation
Co., 20 Maine 41, 37 Am. Dec. 38; 1874, Androscoggin Water Co. v. Mill Co.,
64 Maine 441.
But corporations are now generally held to be indictable, for those crimes
that are punished by such penalties as can be applied to corporations, as in
cases of
(a) Non-feasance in failing to make repairs: 1812, Mower v. Leicester,
South. (N. J.) 165,
Am. Dec.
Mass. 247; 1818, State v. Morris, etc., Co.,
579; 1834, People v. Albany, etc., 11 Wend. 539; 1836, Susquehanna, etc., v.
People, 15 Wend. 267; 1850, State v. Murfreesboro, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 217;
1853, Commw. v. Central Bridge Co., 66 Mass. 242; 1855, Boston, etc., R. Co.
El.
B. 453; 1865,
v. State, 32 N. H. 215; 1857, Regina v. Manchester,
S. 631; 1878, People v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., 74
Best.
Queen v. Navigation,
N. Y. 302; 1887, Godwinsville, etc., Co., 49 N. J. L. 266.
Compare, 1841, State v. Great W. Mill Co., 20 Maine 41.
nusiance: 1852, State v. Morris, etc., R. Co.,
(6) Misfeasance, as creating
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N. J. Law 360; 1854, Commw. v. New Bedford Bridge, 68 Mass. 339; 1855,
Commw. v. Vermont, etc., R. Co., 70 Mass. 22; 1859, Louisville, etc., R. Co.
v. State, 3 Head (Tenn.) 523, 75 Am. Dec. 778; 1865, Donaldson v. Mississippi,
etc., R. Co., 18 Iowa 280, 87 Am. Dec. 391 ; 1869, Delaware Div. Co. v. Commw.,
60 Pa. St. 367, 100 Am. Dec. 570; 1895, Commw. v. Lehigh Valley R., 165 Pa.
St. 162; 1898, Paragon Paper Co. v. State, 19 Ind. App. 314.
1876, Bremen v. Tracy, 2 Mo. App. 540 (libel) ; 1879, State
(c) Malfeasance:
v. B. & B. R. Co., 15 W. Va. 362, 36 Am. Rep. 803 (Sabbath-breaking); 1891,
Commw. v. Pulaski Co., 92 Ky. 197; 1892, State v. Passaic Soc., 54 N. J. Law
260 (disorderly house) ; 1892, State v. Security Bank, 2 S. Dak. 538 (usury);
1898, Louisville Tobacco Co. v. Commw., 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1047, 48 S. W. Rep.
420; 1900, Standard Oil Co. v. Commw., 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1339, 55 S. W. Rep. 8.
23

ARTICLE III.

CONTEMPTS.

Sec. 403.

TELEGRAPH NEWSPAPER CO.

v.

COMMONWEALTH.

1

IN THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
Mass. 294, 70 Am. St. Rep. 280, 44 L. R. A. 159, 52 N. E.
Rep. 445.

1899.
172

The Telegram Newspaper Company and the Gazette Company
were convicted of contempt in the publication of an article concernAffirmed.
ing a pending cause during its trial, and bring error.
FIELD, C. J. These are two writs of error, and, although the
pleadings may possibly raise issues of fact as well as issues of law,
the cases were entered, without objection on the part of any of the
parties, upon the docket of the full court, and each case was heard
nullo est erratum." The Telegram Newspaper
upon the plea,
Company is a Massachusetts corporation, having its usual place of
business in Worcester, and publishing there a daily newspaper.
The
Gazette Company is a corporation established under the laws of the
state of Maine, having its usual place of business in Worcester, and
*
*
*
publishing there a daily newspaper.
The petition of Silas H. Loring against the town of Holden at the
time of the publication of the articles in the newspapers was on trial
before the superior court then sitting at Worcester, and it was a petition for the assessment of damages suffered by the taking of land of
the petitioner for the abolition of a grade crossing of the Fitchburg
Railroad Company.
The portion of the articles published which the
court found was calculated to obstruct the course of justice in said
court, and prevent a fair trial of said petition, was, after describing
the petition of Loring against the town of Holden, the following:
"The town offered Loring $80 at the time of the taking, but he demanded $250, and, not getting
went to law," which appeared in
the Worcester Daily Telegram; and "the town offered the plaintiff
$80, but he wanted $250," which appeared in the Worcester Even*
*
ing Gazette.
1

*

it,

"/
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The newspapers were published and circulated in Worcester, and

it was not improbable at the time of publication that the articles
would be read by some of the jurors before the trial of the petition

*
*
*
was finished.
[The corporations were found guilty, and ordered to pay $100
fine, and in default it was to be levied on their property.]
It is contended that a corporation can not be guilty of a criminal
contempt of court, although it may be fined for what is called a
"civil contempt." It is said that an intent can not be imputed to a
It has been decided in this
corporation in criminal proceedings.
commonwealth
that a corporation may be liable civilly for a libel or
Fogg v. Railroad Co., 148 Mass. 513, 20
a malicious prosecution.
Reed
v. Bank, 130 Mass. 443.
We think that a
N. E. Rep. 109;
corporation may be liable criminally for certain offenses, of which a
There is no more diffispecific intent may be a necessary element.
culty in imputing to a corporation a specific intent in criminal proA corporation can not be arrested and imceedings than in civil.
prisoned in either civil or criminal proceedings ; but its property may
be taken, either as compensation for a private wrong or as punishIn most of the states of this country corment for a public wrong
porations may be formed, under general laws, for the purpose of doing
almost any kind of business, as easily as partnerships, and many of
the newspapers are published by corporations.
Although natural
persons who publish or assist in publishing a libel in a newspaper
owned by a corporation may be punished criminally by fine or imprisonment, or both, yet if the corporation can not be punished by a
The authors of libels are
fine, it will escape all criminal liability.
often irresponsible persons, and the remedy by private action against
corporations for the publishing of libelous statements is often inadeThat a corporation may be indicted for a misfeasance as well
quate.
as for a nonfeasance has been decided in this commonwealth.
Com.
v. New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray 339. See Reg. v. Great North of
England Ry., 9 Adol. & E. (N. S.) 315, 326. A corporation may
be indicted for a libel.
State v. Atchison, 3 Lea 729, 31 Am. Rep.
663, and note ; Brennan v. Tracy, 2 Mo. App. 543 ; Pharmaceutical
Soc. v. London & Provincial Supply Ass'n, 5 App. Cas. 857, 869,
870; 2 Bish. New Cr. Law,
935; Newell Defam. (2d ed.),
6418, et
362, 363; Odgers Sland. (3d ed.), 436; 5 Thomp. Corp.,
The publication of an article in a newspaper which is printed
seq.
and circulated in the place where a trial is hadj pending the trial, and
which concerns the cause on trial, and is calculated to prejudice the
jury in the cause and prevent a fair trial, often has been held to be a
criminal contempt of the court trying the cause. O'Shea v. O'Shea,
15 Prob. Div. 59; Ex parte Green, 7 Times Law Rep. 411 ; Daw v.
Eley, L. R. 7 Eq. 55 ; Ramsbotham v. Senior, L. R. 8 Eq. 575 ;
People v. Wilson, 64 111. 195; In re Sturoc, 48 N. 11.428; In re
Cheeseman, 49 N. J. Law 137, 6 Atl. 513; State v. Frew, 24 W.
Va. 416; Oswald Contempt (2d ed.), p. 58, et seq,; 7 Am. & Eng.
Enc. Law (2d ed.), tit. "Contempt," p. 59. If a corporation pub-
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lishes the article, we see no reason why it should not be held liable
Corp.,
6468, etseq.; 7 Am.
for a criminal contempt.
5 Thomp.
& Eng. Enc. Law (zd ed.),p. 847, on Corporations and cases cited.
There are no statutes in this commonwealth regulating the proceed"The sumings in the trial and punishment of contempt of court.
for
and
to
commit
to
obstruct or
tending
contempt
punish
power
mary
defeat the administration of justice is inherent in courts of chancery
and other superior courts, as essential to the execution of their powers
and to the maintenance of authority, and is part of the law of the
land, within the meaning of Magna Charta and of the twelfth article
of our declaration of rights." Cartwright's Case, 114 Mass. 230,
* * *
238; Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U. S. 101, 18 Sup. Ct. 805.
The most important question is whether the publication of these
articles under the circumstances stated could be adjudged a contempt.
The articles published were not defamatory, either as regards the
presiding justice of the court, or the jurors before whom the cause
In one case
referred to was being tried, or the parties to the cause.
the court discharged the treasurer and manager of the newspaper,
and in the other the editor and the publisher, on the ground that they
It is
were not shown to be directly responsible for the publications.
in
the
this
does
not
before
expressly appear
papers
probable (although
us) that the person or persons employed to report for each newspaper
the proceedings of the court wrote the articles, and caused them to be
The superior court has not found that there was an intent
published.
to influence the trial of the cause referred to on the part of anybody.
The articles are objectionable only because they purport to state the
amount of money which they said the town offered to pay the plaintiff,
and the amount the plaintiff demanded, before the petition was
The law encourages attempts to settle or compromise disbrought.
putes, without subjecting the parties to any liability, if the attempts
fail, of having any concessions therein made to avoid litigation put in
evidence against them in the subsequent litigation.
Upton v. Railroad Co., 8 Cush. 600; Harrington v. Inhabitants of Lincoln, 4 Gray
563 ; Gay v. Bates, 99 Mass. 263; Draper v. Inhabitants of Hatfield,
We are content to assume that the person or persons
124 Mass. 53.
who wrote and caused the articles to be published did not know this
rule of law, and acted without any intent to pervert the course of
As the only intent which can be imputed to .the corporation
justice.
is the intent of its officers or agents, the question is whether the publication of these articles without any intent to pervert the course of
In Hall Co. v. Lake, 58 Law
justice can be adjudged a contempt.
be
Ch.
it
is
said
that
it
must
shown that the articles were
513,
J.
published with knowledge of the pending cause, and that appears in
the present cases.
In Cartwright's Case, supra, it is said by the
court, "But the jurisdiction and power of the court do not depend
upon the question whether the offense might or might not be punished
by indictment."
" 'As regards the question whether a contempt has or has not been
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committed, it does not depend upon the intention of the party, but
By Taney, J., in Wartman v. Wartman,
upon the act he has done.'
If a person talk with or
Taney 362, 370, Fed. Cas. No. 17210."
send a statement to a juror about a cause, during the trial of
in
such manner that
may cause prejudice or bias in the cause, although
the intent with which the person acted may affect the amount of his
punishment, he can not justify his conduct by showing that he had no
evil intent, and knew no better.
It was not necessary that the superior court should find that the
articles published actually had been read by some of the jurors while
trying the cause to which the articles referred. They plainly had been
read by the presiding justice during the trial, and
was likely that they
The intention of the publisher
had been read by some of the jurors.
should be bought and read by persons within
that
of newspaper
circulates.
Cases should be determined on the evithe place where
It an inevitable perversion of the proper
dence presented in court.
administration of justice to attempt to influence the judge or jury in
cause pending before them by statements outthe determination of
side of the court-room, and not in the presence of the parties, which
they are true, are not in law admissible in
may be false, and, even
evidence.
We can not say that
appears that the superior court
erred in adjudging that the publication of these articles, under the cirand
cumstances stated, was
was for that
contempt of that court
was necessary to institute proceedings
court to determine whether
for contempt in order to vindicate its authority to secure the due administration of justice in a cause pending before it. The publications
contained statements of facts, evidence of which was not competent at
the trial, and was not introduced at the trial; and they were so made
that
was likely that the presiding justice and the jurors would read
them during the trial, and the natural and probable effect of them was
improperly to influence the court and jury in the determination of the
cause.
The proper method of collecting fine imposed upon
corporation
Rex v. Woolf,
by levy of an execution, to be issued by the court.
Aid. 609,
Barn.
Ohio St.
Chit. 583; Huddleson v. Ruffin,
Bish. New Cr. Proc.,
Chit. Cr. Law (2d ed.) 811;
604,
1303,
et seq.

Judgments affirmed.
&
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;

Accord: I860, People v. Albany
Vermont R. Co.,
v. Catlin, 128 111. 556, 15 Am. St. Rep. 147.
Duer 484.
Contra, Davis v. Mayor,

Note.

1889, Sercomb

PART IV.
SPECIAL RELATIONS ARISING FROM THE EXISTENCE
OF A CORPORATION.
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TITLE I.

I.

RELATIONS.

CORPORATE

THE CORPORATION

CHAPTER

AND THE STATE.

16.

GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL OF CORPORATIONS.
SUBDIVISION

I.

ARTICLE I.

GENERAL DOCTRINES.
BY THE COURTS.

I. Generally, by permitting actions at law, and suits
in equity by and against corporations, as in the case of individuals, for breaches of contracts or wrongs done.

Sec. 404.

See supra,

Sec. 405.

322-6.

2.

Particularly,

by visitation:

"Corporations being composed of individuals, subject to human
frailties, are liable, as well as private persons, to deviate from the
end of their institution.
And for that reason, the law has provided
proper persons to visit, inquire into, and correct all irregularities that
arise in such corporations, either sole or aggregate, and whether
ecclesiastical, civil or eleemosynary."
"With respect to all ecclesiastical corporations, the ordinary is
their visitor, so constituted by the canon law, and from thence Derived
* * *
to us.

(1291)

1292
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"With respect to all lay corporations, the founder, his heirs or assigns, are the visitors, whether the foundation be civil or eleemosynary.
* * * The founder of all corporations, in the strictest and original
sense, is the king alone, for he only can incorporate a society, and in
civil incorporations, such as mayor or commonalty, etc., where there
are no possessions or endowments given to the body, there is no other
founder but the king: but in eleemosynary foundations, such as colleges
and hospitals, where there is an endowment of lands, the law distinguishes, and makes two species of foundation: the one fundatio
incipiens, or the incorporation, in which sense the king is the general
founder of all colleges and hospitals; the other fundatio perficiens,
or the dotation of it, in which sense the first gift of the revenues is the
foundation, and he who gives them is in law the founder. * * * And,
in general, the king being the sole founder of all civil corporations,
and the endower the perficient founder of all eleemosynary ones, the
right of visitation of the former results, according to the rule laid
down, to the king; and of the latter to the patron or endower. "
" The king being thus constituted by law visitor of all civil corporations, the law has also appointed the place wherein he shall exercise
this jurisdiction, which is the court of king's bench ; where, and
where only, all misbehaviors of this kind of corporations are inquired
*
*
* "
into and redressed, and all their controversies decided.
'

"As to eleemosynary corporations, by the dotation the founder
and his heirs are of common right the legal visitors to see that such
property is rightly employed, as might otherwise have descended to
the visitor himself, but, if the founder has appointed and assigned
any other person to be visitor, then his assignee so appointed is invested with all the founder's power, in exclusion of his heir. * * *"
i Bl. Comm., pp. 480-2.

"To

render the charter or constitutions, ordinances and by-laws of
of perfect obligation, and generally to maintain their
corporations
and
peace
good government, these bodies are subject to visitation; or
in other words, to the inspection and control of tribunals recognized
by the laws of the land. Civil corporations are visited by the government itself, through the medium of the courts of justice ; but the
internal affairs of ecclesiastical and eleemosynary corporations are, in
" Angell &
general, inspected and controlled by a private visitor.
Ames Corp.,
See infra,
684.
436.

ARTICLE II.

BY LEGISLATIVE BODIES.

In the United States, certain powers of control over
Sec. 406.
corporations are either inherent in congress or the state legislatures, or result to them from express or implied constitutional provisions, or by virtue of powers reserved to them in
the creation of corporations, but subject generally to other
Those in the national constitution
constitutional provisions.
are:

CONSTITUTIONAL

.407

I.

Powers of congress

LIMITS.
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:

U. S. Const. , Art. I, 8. Congress shall have the power : To lay and
collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States.
To borrow money on the credit of the United States.
To regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes.
To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin.

To

establish post-offices

and post-roads.

To make all laws which shall be necessaiy and proper for carrying

into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by
this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

Sec.

407.

Limits on powers of congress:

2.

U. S. Const., Art. I, 2. Representatives and direct taxes shall
* *
* according to their
be apportioned among the several states
*
*
*
respective numbers.
U. S. Const., Art. I, 9. No bill of attainder or ex post facto law
shall be passed.
No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion
* * *
to the census.
No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state.
No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or rev-

enue to the ports of one state over those of another ; nor shall vessels
bound to or from one state be obliged to enter, clear or pay duties in
another.
Am. U. S. Const., Art. V. No person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Sec. 408.

3.

Limits on powers of the states:

* * coin money;
*
U. S. Const., Art. I,
10.
No state shall
emit bills of credit ; make anything but gold and silver coin a tender
in payment of debts ; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law or
*
*
*
law impairing the obligation of contracts.
No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any imposts or
duties on imports or exports, except what may be necessary for executing its inspection laws ; and the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any state on imports and exports shall be for the use of
the treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject
to the revision and control of the congress.
No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any duty of tonnage.

*

*

*
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Sec.
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General provisions:

4.

U. S. Const., Art. IV,
entitled
states.

2.
The citizens of each state shall be
to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several

U. S. Const., Art. VI. This constitution, and the laws of the
United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all
treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the land ; and the judges
in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or
laws of any state to the contrary, notwithstanding.
U. S. Const., Am. Art. XIV. All persons born or naturalized in
the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law ;
Nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
5 .

State constitutional limitations

:

These, so far as they apply to corporations, usually are such as relate in a general way to the protection of individual rights, as "no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law," "the right to trial by jury shall be inviolate," etc.,
and such as prevent the granting of special privileges, or the creation
of corporations by special act.
See supra,

6, 7, 57, 58, 68-75.

II.

SUBDIVISION

THE STATE AND ITS OWN CORPORATIONS.

ARTICLE I.
Sec. 410.

LYON,
1879.

(i)

CONTROL BY THE COURTS.

Methods in general.

J., IN THE STATE, Ex

REL.

CUPPEL,

v.

OF COMMERCE.

IN THE SUPREME

MILWAUKEE CHAMBER

COURT OF WISCONSIN.
679-80.

"The visitorial or superintending power of

47

Wis. 670, on

the state over corporabe
exercised, in proper
will
created
the
tions
legislature
always
by
of
of
the
courts
the
state, to keep those
the
medium
cases, through
of
their
lawful
within
the
limits
powers, and to correct
corporations
To this end the courts will
and punish abuses of their franchises.
issue writs of quo ivarranto, mandamus, or injunction, as the exigen-
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cies of the particular case may require ; will inquire into the grievance
complained of, and, if the same is found to exist, will apply such
Every corporation of the state, whether
remedy as the law prescribes.
public or private, civil or municipal, is subject to this superintending
control, although in its exercise different rules may be applied to
different classes of corporations."
As to history of quo icarranto, and information in nature of quo warNote.
ranto: 1698, The Mayor v. Hertford, 1 Ld. Raym. 426; 1725, Sir Wm. Lowther's Case, 2 Ld. Raym. 1409; 1726, Ibbotson's Case, Lee t. Hardw. 261 ; 1757,
R. v. Williams, 1 Burr. 402; 1772, R. v. Gregory, 4 T. R. 240 . ; 1785, R. v.
Stacey, 1 T. R. 1 ; 1819, R. v. Trevenen, 2 Barn. & Ad. 339; 1829, R. v. Ogden,
10 Barn. & Cress. 233; 1846, Darley v. The Queen, 12 Cl. & F. 520, 536, et seq.
As to scire facias: 1847, State v. Merchants' Trust Co., 8 Humph. (Tenn.)
235; 1851, The State v. Moore, 19 Ala. 514; 1862, Commw. v. Delaware, etc.,
Co., 43 Pa. St. 295; 1885, Green v. St. Albans Trust Co., 57 Vt. 340.

Sec. 411.

(2) Power
STATE, Ex

1892.

of courts to issue the necessary
REL.

LAMB,

v.

CUNNINGHAM.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN.
170, 35 Am. St. Rep. 27.

83

writs.

1

Wis. Rep. 90-

[Action for purpose of restraining the defendant, as secretary of
and
state, from publishing election notices in certain newspapers,
filing and preserving in his office certificates of nomination, etc. The
suit involves the authority of courts in matters of quo warranto, mandamus, injunction, etc. ]
CASSODAY, J.
i. Counsel for the defendant challenges the jurisdiction of this court in this cause, and supports such contention with
much learning and ability.
The question of the original jurisdiction
or power of this court under sec. 3, art. vii, of the constitution,
"to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo ivarranto,
certiorari, and other original and remedial writs, and to hear and
determine the same," has frequently been considered by this court.
*
*
*
(Citing many cases.)
the
so
Among
propositions
firmly established as to require no
further exposition from this court are those to the effect that the constitutional clause quoted "was designed to give this court original jurisdiction of all judicial questions affecting the sovereignty of the state, its
franchises or prerogatives, or the liberties of the people;" that such
prerogative writs, including injunction as a quasi- prerogative writ,
can properly issue only at the suit of. the state or the, attorney-general
in the right of the state; that "in matters strictly publici juris, in
which no one citizen has any right or interest other than that which is
common to citizens in general, a petition by a private person for leave
to commence an action in this court in the name of the state can not
1

Statement a'bridged, and only part of opinion given.

Arguments omitted.

I2Q6
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1

properly be considered until the attorney-general has been requested
to move in the matter, and has refused or unreasonably delayed to do
so;" that in all cases in which an exercise of such original jurisdiction
is sought, whether by such private citizen or the attorney-general,
leave must first be obtained from this court upon a prima facie showing that the case is one calling for the exercise of such jurisdiction ;
that the official acts of the secretary of state in issuing or publishing
notices of an election of members of the legislature under an apportionment act alleged to be invalid, are purely ministerial; and hence,
in the exercise of such original jurisdiction, this court may control the
same either by mandamus or injunction as the exigencies of the case
We do not understand counsel fpr the defendant to
may require.
question the correctness of the decision in State, ex rel. Att'y-Gen.,
v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440; and hence it is, in effect, conceded
that the court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the case at bar.
The precise objection to the jurisdiction here presented is that its
exercise has not been invoked by the attorney-general,
and hence,
that the court is powerless to consider the case at all without his consent and co-operation. In State, ex rel. Wood, v. Baker, 38 Wis. 80,
"The jurisdiction conferred on this court
81, Ryan, C. J. , said:
by the constitution is of informations in the nature of quo ivarranto,
as substituted in modern times for the use of the ancient writ itself,
This was a prerogaand as used when the constitution was framed.
tive proceeding, ^ao^z'-criminal and quasi-c\v\\ in its character,
according to its use, but always classed with criminal informations.
*
*
*
The mode of proceeding under this jurisdiction might be
regulated by statute, but the jurisdiction itself could not be defeated
*
*
* It was undoubtedly competent for the legisor abridged.
lature to give a quasi-c\v\\ proceeding in such cases, but not to abolish
the ^<wz'-criminal jurisdiction vested in the court by the constitution.
This appears to us to be a matter of substance, not of form." * * *
In Attorney-General v. Railroad Cos., 35 Wis. 512523, Chief
"The grant of original
Justice Ryan said, among other things:
jurisdiction is one entire thing, given in one general policy, for one
general purpose, though it may have many objects and many modes
*
*
*
of execution."
He then contrasted injunction and mandamus, and said: "The
latter commands, the former forbids.
Where there is nonfeasance,
mandamus compels duty.
Where there is malfeasance, injunction
And so near are the objects of the two writs, that
restrains wrong.
there is sometimes doubt which is the proper one ; injunction is frequently mandatory, and mandamus sometimes operates restraint.
*
*
*
And it is very safe to assume that the constitution gives injunction to restrain excess in the same class of cases as it gives mandamus to supply defect, the use of the one writ or the other in each
or shortcoming of
case turning solely on the accident of overaction
the defendant.
And it may be that where defect and excess meet in
a single case, the court might meet both, in its discretion, by one of
the writs, without being driven to send out both, tied together with
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* * * The prerogative writs proper
red tape, for a single purpose.
can issue only at the suit of the state or the attorney-general in the
right of the state ; and so it must be -with the writ of injunction, in
All may go on the relation of a
its use as a j'aasz-prerogative writ.
private person, and may involve private right."
The "one entire thing" the "one general policy" the "one genthrough the "one jurisdiction" by
eral purpose" to be accomplished
the five several writs grouped together in one clause of the constitution, as mentioned by the learned chief justice, manifestly has reference to "judicial questions affecting the sovereignty of the state, its
franchises or prerogatives, or the liberty of its people;" for it is only
of such, as therein indicated, that this court takes original jurisdicThe irresistible logic of the opinion is to the effect that
tion at all.
the power to thus issue the five writs thus grouped together, for the
one purpose named, was by the clause of the constitution
quoted
vested in this court absolutely and unconditionally, and is in no way
dependent upon the volition of the attorney-general or any other official. This is confirmed by what he said in State, ex rel. Wood, v.
Baker, 38 Wis. 71, quoted above, to the effect that, while the legislature might regulate the mode of procedure in such cases, they could
not defeat nor abridge the jurisdiction itself; that the appearance in
or his consent, was a mere matter of
the case by the attorney-general,
form and not of substance, and hence could be supplied upon the
Indeed, it would be a solecism to hold, as
hearing nunc pro tune.
his court frequently has held in several of the cases cited, to 'the
has no right or power to commence
effect that the attorney-general
without first obtaining leave
such an action, much less to prosecute
from this court, and then hold that this court has no power to take
jurisdiction in any such case without first obtaining the permission of
This court can not play fast and loose with the
the attorney-general.
of
either has
absolutely whenever
proper
subject
jurisdiction.
or
has
at all.
If has jurisdicelse
not
cause
got
presented,
because
has been conferred on the court
tion in such
cause,
in
their sovereign capacity, in the clause of the organic
by the people
If
as
such jurisdiction
law quoted.
thereby vested in the court
to
be
idle
the
would seem
to deny
must be conceded by all then
jurisdiction in such action merely because the attorney-general has re*
*
fused to co-operate or consent.
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Sec. 412. A. By courts of law. ( i) By quo warranto, scire facias,
or information in nature of quo warranto.

PEOPLE, Ex REL. ATTORNEY-GENERAL,
CIATION. 1
1890.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

v.

THE DASHAWAY ASSO-

OF CALIFORNIA.

84 Cal.

Rep.

114-123.

[Information in nature of quo 'warranto to forfeit the charter of the
The corporation
association, and escheat the property to the state.
was organized to promote temperance ; it had no capital stock, but
had acquired property by gift and otherwise to the extent of over
$111,000, of which it was alleged $72,000 had been perverted from
the use for which it was designed by paying the same to its members, and that it proposes to distribute the remaining $39,000.
The
defendant demurred, and this was sustained in the court below, with
judgment for defendant, from which the relator appeals.]
BY THE COURT. * * * Corporations are creatures of the law, and
when they fail to perform duties which they were incorporated to perform, and in which the public have an interest, or 'do acts which are
not authorized or are forbidden them to do, the state may forfeit their
franchises and dissolve them by an information in the nature of a quo
warranto.
(People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. 358, 8 Am. Dec.
243; People v. Pittsburg R. R. Co., 53 Cal. 694; Golden Rule v.
People, 118 111. 492.)
The grant of corporate franchises is always subject to the implied
condition that they will not be abused.
(Chicago Life Ins. Co. v.
Needles, 113 U. S. 574.)
"In its relation to the government, and when the acts or neglects of
a corporation, in violation of its charter or of the general law, become
the subject of public inquiry, with a view to the forfeiture of its charter, the willful acts and neglects of its officers are regarded as the acts
and neglects of the corporation, and render the corporation liable to a
(Angell and Ames on Corporajudgment or decree of dissolution."
tions, section 310; Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics' Ins. Co., 7 Wend. 31 ;
Bank Commissioners v. Bank of Buffalo, 6 Paige 497; Ward v. Sea
Ins. Co., 7 Paige 294.)
This reasoning proceeds upon the theory that the corporation is
cognizant of and approves of the acts of its agents ; and where it is
made to appear that the agent has departed from his duties as prescribed by the corporation, or violated his instructions in the performance of the acts complained of and relied upon as a basis for forfeiture,
no such forfeiture will be declared.
(State v. Commercial Bank, 6
Smedes & M. 237.)
In People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. 358, 8 Am. Dec. 243, an
application had been previously made by the attorney-general to a
court of chancery for an injunction to restrain the company from
1

Statement

abridged; part of opinion omitted.
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of banking, which

application was refused
and
because there was
adequate remedy at law by an
of
in
nature
a
the
information
People v. Bank of
quo ivarranto.
v.
and
Warren Bank, 6
6
Cow. 196; People
Washington
Niagara,
6
Hudson,
v.
Bank
of
Cow.
and
People
Cow. 211,
217, are authority
in
the
is
the name of the
that
action
to the point
properly brought
in
the
their
and
against
corporate names, in cases
corporations
people,
franchises
as
not granted by
where they had,
corporations, usurped
Geneva,
v.
Trustees
of
also,
charters.
their
People
(See
5 Wend.
usurping the franchise

a complete

211.)
The writ of scire facias was formerly used by government as a
mode to ascertain and enforce the forfeiture of a corporate charter, in
cases where there was a legal existing body capable of acting, but
who had abused their power. It would not lie in cases of mere
de facto corporations.
It was necessary that the government be a
party to the suit, for the judgment was that the parties be ousted and
the franchises seized into the hands of the government.
(2 Kent's
Com., 313.)
The writ of quo ivarranto was a writ which issued to bring the
defendant before the court to show by what authority he claimed an
office or franchise,
and was applicable alike to cases where the
defendant never had a right, or where, having a right or franchise, he
had forfeited it by neglect or abuse.
(3 Bla. Com., 262, 263.)
An information in the nature of quo ivarranto, which has succeeded the writ of that name, was originally in form a criminal proceeding to punish the usurpation of the franchise by a fine, as well as
This information has, in process of time, beto seize the franchise.
come, in substance, a civil proceeding to try the mere right to the
franchise or office.
It was a peculiarity of both the quo ivarranto and information in
the nature of quo ivarranto that the ordinary rule of pleading was
reversed, and the state was bound to show nothing, and the defendant was required to show his right to the franchise or office in question, and if he failed to show authority, judgment went against him.
(Angell and Ames on Corporations, section 756.)
The practice has, however, become quite general in this country
for the information to set forth the facts relied upon to show the intrusion, misuser or non-user complained of.
In information of quo ivarranto there were two forms of judgment.
When against an officer or individual, the judgment was ouster, when
against a corporation by its corporate name, the judgment was ouster
and seizure.
In the first case, there being no franchise forfeited, there is none
to seize ; in the second case there is, consequently the franchise is
seized.
(2 Kent's Com., 312, and note.)
But there may be a judgment of ouster of a particular franchise,
and not of the whole charter.
(People v. S. & R. R. R. Co., 15

Wend. 113.)

By such ouster and seizure the franchises are not destroyed, but
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The corporation was destroyed,
pass to and exist in the state.
and ceased to be the owner or possessor of lands, or goods, or rights,
or credits.
The lands reverted to the grantor and his heirs, and the
goods escheated to the state.
The principle of a forfeiture is, that the franchise is a trust ; and
the terms of the charter are conditions of the trust, and if any one of
the conditions of the trust be violated, it will work a forfeiture of the
charter.
Cases of forfeiture are said to be divided into two great classes :
1.
Cases of perversion ; as where a corporation does an act inconsistent with the nature and destructive of the ends and purposes of
the grant.
In such cases, unless the perversion is such as to amount
to an injury to the public, who are interested in the franchise, it will
not work a forfeiture.
2. Cases of usurpation ; as where a corporation exercises a power
which it has no right to exercise.
In this last case the question of
forfeiture is not dependent, as in the former, upon any interest or
*
*
*
injury to the public.
(The court here showed that in 1872, the writs of scire facias,
quo warranto, and information in the nature of quo warranto, were
abolished, and an action by the attorney-general in the name of the
people substituted therefor; but that the Code of 1880 reinstated
the writ of quo warranto', the form of proceeding was therefore
held to be sufficient.)
The vital question, however, remaining in either case is this: Has
there been a perversion by the defendant of its funds under such cir*
cumstances as to amount to an injury to the public ? * *
We are of the opinion that the term used in the information here is
too vague and uncertain to enable us to say therefrom that the fund
in question is a public charity, which can be administered by a court
of equity.
It follows that the perversion of the fund is not an injury to the
public, and hence that the forfeiture can not be maintained.
The judgment is affirmed.

Sec. 413.

Same.

Abuse and misuse, meaning of.

See Erie and Northeast Railroad Company v. Casey, 26 Pa. St.
287, 318; infra, p. 1435, on 1442.

Illustrations of use of quo warranto
Sec. 414.
Same.
for abuse, misuse or perversion.

to forfeit

(a) Unlawful combinations: People v. North River Sugar Ref.
Co., 121 N. Y. 582, supra, p. 100; People v. Chicago Gas Trust
Co., 130 111. 268, supra, p. 1054; Distilling, etc., Co. v. People,
156

111.

448, supra, p. 978.
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See, also, 1862, Washington, etc., Road Co. v. State, 19 Md. 239;
Note.
State of Ohio v. Oberlin, etc., Assn., 35 Ohio St. 258; 1890, State v.
Nebraska Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700; 1892, State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio
St. 137 ; 1892, People v. Buffalo Stone, etc., Co., 131 N. Y. 140; 1895, People v.
Milk Exchange, 145 N. Y. 267, 45 Am. St. R. 609 ; 1897, Hartnett v. Plumbers'
Assn., 169 Mass. 229, 38 L. R. A. 194, 7 Am. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 183; 1897,
People v. Chicago L. S. Ex., 170 111. 556, 62 Am. St. R. 404; 1899, Independent Med. Col. v. People, 182 111. 274, 55 N. E. Rep. 345; 1899, State v. Portland
Natural Gas Co., 153 Ind. 483, 53 N. E. Rep. 1089, 53 L. R. A. 413; 1899,
National Lead Co. v. Grote P. S., 80 Mo. App. 247; 1900, State v. Buckeye
Pipe Line Co., 61 Ohio St. 520, 56 N. E. Rep. 464; 1900, Crystal Ice Co. v.
State, 23 Texas Civ. App. 293, 56 S. W. Rep. 562.
See notes 8 Am. St. R. 179, et seq.; 100 Am. Dec. 268; 30 Am. Dec. 44; 1882,
1 ; 1839, Mclntire Poor
Chesapeake & O. Canal Co. v. B. & O. R., 4 Gill &
School v. Zanesville, etc.. Co., 9 Ohio 203, 34 Am. Dec. 436; 1842, State v. N.
O. G. L. & B. Co., 2 Rob. (La.) 529; 1849, Lumbard v. Stearns, 4 Cush.
1879,

J.

60.

(Mass.)

(b) Illegal insurance: State v. Standard Life & Ace. Assn., 38
Ohio St. 281, supra, p. 1234.
Aid, etc., Assn., 38 Ohio St. 300; 1898, State
Kan. 772, 51 Pac. Rep. 881; 1899, State v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 52 S. W. Rep. 595; 1899, ^Etna Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 21
Ky. L. Rep. 503, 45 L. R. A. 355, 51 S. W. Rep. 624; 1899, State v. ^Etna Ins.
Co., 150 Mo. 113, 51 S. W. Rep. 413.
Note.
v. Mut.

See, 1883, State v. Mut.

Life Ins. Co.,

59

Bank v. State, i Blackf. (Ind.) 267,
People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. (N. Y. ) 358,

(c) Illegal banking:

supra, p.
supra, p.

891

;

State

113.

See, also, 1826, People v. Bank of Niagara, 6 Cowen
Note.
ple v. Phoenix Bank, 24 Wend. 431 ; 1841, State v. Com. Bk.
St. 535; 1855, State v. Seneca Co. Bank, 5 Ohio St. 172; 1857,
v. Commercial Bank, 28 Pa. St. 383; 1859, State v. Bank of

Miss.

196 ; 1840, Peoof Cin., 10 Ohio
Commonwealth
Manchester, 33.

474.

(d) Fraudulent organization:

Holman

v.

State,

supra, p. 590.

See, 1866, Commonwealth v. Central Penna.
38 Am. St. Rep. 151
State v. Webb, 97 Ala.

Ill,

105

Ind.

569,

R. Co.,

52 Pa. St. 506; 1892,
Benton v. Minneapolis
First Nat'l Bk. v. Trebein

; 1898,

Tailoring Co., 73 Minn. 498, 76 N. W. Rep. 265 ; 1898,
Co., 59 Ohio St. 316, 52 N. E. Rep. 834.
Compare, 1879, Rice v. National Bank, 126 Mass. 300;
v. Mowry, 182 111. 256, 55 N. E. Rep. 330.

1900,

Kingman & Co.

(e) Willful or negligent non-user:
See, 1831, State v. Pasumpsic Tp. Co., 3 Vt. 178; 1839, People v. Royalton,
etc., Tp. Co., 11 Vt. 431 ; 1839, Mclntire Poor School v. Zanesville, etc., Canal
Co., 9 Ohio 203, 34 Am. Dec. 436 ; 1842, State v. N. O. Gas L. & B. Co., 2 Rob.
(La.) 529; 1862, Washington, etc., Tp. Road v. State, 19 Md. 239; 1862, People
v. Albany, etc., R. Co., 24 N. Y. 261, 82 Am. Dec. 295; 1867, State v. Pawtuxet
Tp. Co., 8 R. I. 521, 94 Am. Dec. 123; 1875, Harris v. Miss. Valley, etc., R.
Co., 51 Miss. 602; 1875, Coon v. Plymouth Plank-Road Co., 32 Mich. 248;
1879, People v. Pittsburgh R. Co., 53 Cal. 694; 1881, State v. Council Bluffs,
etc., Ferry Co., 11 Neb. 354; 1881, Ward v. Farwell, 97 111. 593; 1882, State
v. Pipher, 28 Kan. 127; 1886, State v. Minnesota, etc., R. Co., 36 Minn. 246;
1887, Darnell v. State, 48 Ark. 321; 1895, People v. Plainfield Gravel R. Co.,
105

Mich.
2

9, 62

WIL.

N. W. Rep.

CAS.

9

998.
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STATE
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Same.
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Proceedings.
LOAN COMPANY.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA..
1874-1889, 26 So. R. 600.

51

1

La. Ann. Rep.

[Suit by the state to have the charter of the Debenture Company
declared null and void, because not authorized by law, or if found to
be authorized, to declare a forfeiture of it for misuser. It was alleged
that the company was organized under an act of 1888, allowing three
persons to incorporate for the purpose of carrying "on any lawful
business or enterprise not otherwise specially provided for," with a
capital stock of $120,000 in 10,000 shares of $12 each, and authority
to begin business when i ,000 shares were subscribed ; its objects were
to buy, sell and guarantee the payment of debentures, and loan money
on the same ; and in order to do so to levy an assessment or premium
upon the same to be paid in advance, and the debenture to be redeemed at a time agreed upon by the premiums paid and forfeited
It was forbidden to engage in stock jobbing of
for non-payment.
The company defended upon the ground that the state
any kind.
was not an interested party, that the matters involved related to
purely private business transactions between citizens, and not to the
exercise of any public franchise or function of the state.
These defenses were overruled, and upon a hearing the charter was annulled.
Defendant appealed.]
NICHOLLS, C. J. * * * The right of the state to inaugurate
proceedings against an existing corporation for forfeiture of its charter, for specially assigned and properly pleaded grounds, is not, we
think, disputed.
If we apprehend defendant's position, it is, that the
state, after the general assembly had authorized by statute the formafor "any lawful business," and parties have
mation of corporations
acted upon that statute, can not inaugurate proceedings to have the
for the reason that in the opinion of the attorney-general or other state officials, the object and purposes of the corporation were not wise nor judicious, but that, the
operation of the corporation would be bound to terminate ultimately
in disaster to all parties.
That it would require legislative action of some kind to place a
particular kind of business under the ban, or to authorize judicial
following that particular kind of
proceedings against corporations
business, to warrant or justify such an action.
The right of individuals to organize themselves into a corporation,
is not an original, but a derivative and expressly conferred right.
Legislative authority is essential to its exercise, and hence it is that
corporations in describing themselves either in judicial pleadings or
authentic acts, always refer to themselves as a corporation created and
organized under the laws of Louisiana.

corporation declared "non-existent,"

1
Statement abridged, and part of opinion omitted.
by supreme court of the United States, 180 U. S. 320.

This case was affirmed
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The body having authority to bestow such a right or privilege has
necessarily the power and authority to select the object and purposes
for which it can and shall be granted, and to attach such conditions
and limitations as it may think proper to the exercise of the right.
Before the passage of general laws on this subject, the general assembly acted itself directly upon individual cases presented to it for
its consideration.

is

is

a

if

it,

*

it,

The granting of the right by act of the general assembly in a special case carried with it as a consequence legislative recognition and
approval of the public utility and advantage of that corporation, and
thus removed and withdrew, unless under extraordinary circumstances, the propriety of the existence of the same from judicial control.
In course of time, the legislature thought proper to announce in
advance in general terms certain objects as commanding their approval, and permitted parties to form corporations for such purposes
*
* *
on declared terms and conditions.
The matter of the public utility and advantage of the corporations
to be formed was left at large ; and especially was this the case in act
No. 36 of 1888.
had constantly
Throughout the whole legislation and behind
"for the proshould
be
created
rested the principle that corporations
of
and
for
none
motion of some object
other.
general utility"
It can not be conceived that the legislature should have ever intended to confer upon three or more persons the right to determine of
themselves and for themselves (and that finally) that the objects for
which they were about to organize were legal and useful and proper,
and to be permitted on the strength of that conclusion to do business
as such without let or hindrance from any quarter, except in cases of
*
*
violation of the provisions of their various charters.
There are so many possible injuries to result in different ways and
to different persons from unauthorized action of this character, that
the right of the state to put an end to
existing, can not, we think,
be properly questioned.
To permit
small number of persons to operate in business to an
indefinite
limited liability, without the
extent, under exceptional
necessity of making report at any time of the changing, shifting conditions of such business, and without any official authority provided
for supervision over their action,
an extraordinary and dangerous
condition of things, and the only wonder
that more disastrous
results should not have followed from its existence than seems to have

if

a

a

is

is

It

*

been the case.
*
The state has, undoubtedly, the right to be heard in this case. *
urged that the state by citing the defendant as
corporation,
and through parties acting as officers of
corporation, has admitted
the existence of the corporation and estopped itself from contesting
the same.
claimed that the action,
It
admissible at all, should have been
directed against the parties who organized the corporation or those

1304

STATE V. DEBENTURE GUARANTEE

&

LOAN CO.

415

claiming to be now members of it. There is no force whatever in
that proposition. When the parties who signed the act by which this
defendant is claimed to have come into existence as a corporation did
so, they ceased to have any authority to represent individually the
rights or obligations of the intellectual body which they claim to have
thus created, a body which, if it really existed, was (under the terms
of our civil code) a body separate and distinct from the persons who
composed it.

A

judgment declaring the corporation never to have existed, or
declaring its charter forfeited, if held to have ever existed, would not
be res judicata against the body itself if not present and represented
* * *
in the litigation by its declared legal representatives.
a
The real self-styled corporation has
right to be heard in the matter; in fact, no effective judgment could be rendered in the premises
without it. * * *
There are good reasons why all the present stockholders should not
be made parties ; in the first place, they are too numerous, and in
the next place, their names were not of record in the recorder's office
when this suit was brought, and the state could not be expected to
know, or be called upon to ascertain who they were.
We see no
inconsistency in calling the defendant into this litigation as a corporation and citing it as a corporation through its officers and asking the
court to declare that it had never had existence as such.
Homestead
Co. v. Lingman, 46 Ann. 1123.
The parties who are acting on its behalf do not pretend to be acting on their own account.
The wrong asserted by the state, and so far as the state is concerned is, that certain business is being carried on under the sanction
of its name without right or authority, and that this condition of things
should be stopped by injunction.
The state is not attacking the business carried on as an illegal business, carried on by the parties as individuals, but as carried on as a
corporation.
For that purpose, the parties representing the so-called corporation
are certainly those with whom the state should proceed contradictorily.
The demand of the state, if sustained, will certainly have its corthe discontinuance of the business under the guise
rect legal result
of its being conducted by a corporation under a limited liability on
the part of those connected with it.
There is no more inconsistency in bringing defendant into court as
a corporation to have it declared to be not such, than there would be
to allege in a pleading the existence of a judgment, and to pray that
it be decreed to have been and to be an absolute nullity, nor to bring
into court a party as a husband to have his marriage with the plaintiff
decreed never to have legally existed.
The existing status is recognized temporarily, solely for the very
We
avowed purpose of having it declared to be without foundation.
think the attorney-general was vested with full authority to bring this
*
*
*
action on behalf of the state.

CONTROL BY COURTS.
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(The court held that the business of defendant was in effect stock-

jobbing, and that it had begun business before the i ,000 shares were
subscribed, and for these reasons affirmed the decision below).

6C.

416.

Same.

Illustrations of ouster for usurpation.

(a) Unlawful purpose: People v. Insurance Co., 15 Johns. 358,
supra, p. 113; Attorney-General v. Lorman, 59 Mich. 157, supra,
p. 605.
See note, 8 Am. St. Rep. 179.

State v. Dawson, 16
(b) Imperfect or insufficient organization:
Ind. 40, supra, p. 412; State v. Insurance Co. ,49 Ohio St. 440,
supra, p. 406; Commonwealth v. Cullen, 13 Pa. St. 133, supra, p.
417; Philadelphia v. Sav. Inst., i Whart. 461, supra, p. 464.
(c) Continuing to exercise corporate powers after expiration of
charter: State v. Payne, 129 Mo. 468, supra, p. 830.
(d) Intrusion into office by illegal election of corporate officers:
State v. Parsons, 40 N. J. Law i, supra, p. 333 ; Commonwealth v.
Cullen, 13 Pa. St. 133, supra, p. 417.

Sec. 417.

Same.

Statute of limitations.

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND v. PAWTUXET TURNPIKE COMPANY.
1867.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND.
521-526, 94 Am. Dec. 123.

8

1

R. I. Rep.

[Application by the defendants for a rehearing upon an information in the nature of quo ivarranto, and to set aside the former judgment of forfeiture.]
DURFEE, J. The leading ground assigned for this application is,
that the prosecution was not instituted in behalf of the state until after a
lapse of over six years from the happening of the cause of forfeiture ;
and we are referred to Angell and Ames on Corporations (7th ed.),
743, and the cases there cited, as showing that after the lapse of so
long a time, we ought not to entertain the proceeding. The cases
cited in Angell and Ames show that the English rule is, not to allow
an information in the nature of a quo ivarranto to be filed, at the instance of a private individual, for the purpose of impeaching the
title to a corporate office or purchase, where the same has been held
or exercised without complaint for more than six years from the time
of the alleged usurpation. An information in the nature of a quo
warranto can not be filed by a private individual without leave, which
1

Part of opinion omitted.
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the court may, at its discretion, either grant or refuse.
To regulate
their discretion, as affected by the lapse of time, the English courts
But the attorney-general,
adopted the rule which we have stated.
representing the crown in England and the state in this country, may
file an information in the nature of a quo ivarranto, without leave,
according to his own discretion ; and we find no English law which
holds that an information, so filed, can be barred by the lapse of six
On the contrary, in
years independently of any statute to that effect.
the leading case of Rex v. Wardroper, 4 Burr. 1963, where, after a
lapse of nineteen years, the court refused leave to file an information,
the judges were careful to express a reservation in favor of the crown,
and said: "Indeed, no length of usurpation shall affect the crown,
nullum tempus occurrit regi."
The only case which we find that
claims a discretion for the court, in this regard, over an information
filed by the attorney-general, is the People v. Oakland County Bank,
i Douglas (Mich.) R. 285. The court in that case do not profess to
follow any precedent, but stand on their own opinion of what is salWe think the case of Rex v. Wardroper, suutary and reasonable.
pra, declares the sounder doctrine. The attorney-general being a
public officer, may be presumed to be capable of a salutary and
reasonable discretion, as well as the court, and when, acting in behalf
of the state, he deems it his duty to prosecute for a forfeiture, it is not
for the court, in the absence of any statutory limitation, to say he is too
late.
Indeed this court has itself decided that, after the information
has once been filed, its discretion ceases, and it has then nothing to
do but administer the law the same as in any other case.
State v.
Brown,
R. I. i. * * *
5

Application dismissed.

52

See, also, 1888, People v. Stanford, 77 Cal. 360, 18 Pac. Rep. 85
Am. St. R. 312.

Sec. 418.

Same.

and note

in

Waiver.

THE PEOPLE
1840.

;

v.

THE PHCENIX BANK.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.
Rep. 431-434.

24

Wend.

(N. Y.)

[Information in nature of quo -warranto against the defendants for
claiming to be and acting as a corporation.]
*
*
*
The attorney-general alleges that the deBRONSON, J.
fendants have forfeited their corporate privileges by taking usury.
The defendants answer that a state director has since been appointed
by the governor and senate ; and this act, they insist, amounts to a
waiver or pardon of the forfeiture. The conclusion does not follow
from the premises.
No one could take advantage of the forfeiture in a collateral manner. It could only be asserted by a direct legal proceeding on the

41 8
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Notwithstanding
part of the government to dissolve the corporation.
the existing cause of forfeiture, the defendants were a corporation
de facto, and might continue to exercise their franchise until judgIn the meantime,
ment of ouster should be pronounced against them.
of
well
the governor and senate, as
as all others, to
it was the duty
a
treat the defendants as
legally existing corporation. The appointment of a state director was, therefore, perfectly consistent with the
intention to continue this prosecution and insist on the forfeiture.
Should it be conceded that the governor and senate had a dispensing
* *
*
power, it does not appear that the power has been exercised.
But I must not be understood as admitting that the governor and
senate, without the concuri'ence also of the assembly, had any dispensing power. They had no more authority to waive or pardon
Indeed,
the forfeiture than any other public officer or body of men.
the attorney-general
had more power over this matter than the governor and senate united ; for if he refused to prosecute, the wrong
charged upon the defendants would go unpunished, and the corporation would continue to exist and enjoy its privileges in the same manStill, the
ner as though there had been no violation of the charter.
neglect to prosecute would not amount to a pardon ; it could only
operate as a waiver so long as the omission continued, and would be
no answer to a qtio -warranto whenever he, or his successor in office,
might choose to insist on the penalty.
In England, where corporations may be created by royal charter,
the king can pardon a forfeiture by granting a restitution; but he has,
I think, no such power in relation to corporations created by act of
parliament. The King v. Amery, 2 T. R. 568, 569; Newling v.
Francis, 3 T. R. 189; The King v. Miller, 6 T. R. 277. So here,
where corporations are created by the legislature, that body can waive
the forfeiture, by ratifying and confirming the original grant.
The
People v. The Manhattan Company, 9 Wendell 351. But no other
body of men has any such dispensing power. The franchise is granted
upon condition that it shall become void in case of misuser ; and
although the corporation will continue to exist until the forfeiture is asserted in the forms prescribed by law, the condition can only be changed,
or the penalty released, by the power which made the original grant.
The legislature may, perhaps, delegate its authority to pardon the
offense; but that has not been done.
Judgment for people.
See, 1844, State v. Fourth N.
& D. R. Co., 128 N. Y. 240.

H. Tp. Co.,

15 N.

H.

162; 1891, People v. Ulster
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Sec. 419.

420

See State v.

Specific duty.

N. E. R. Co.,

Dec. 551, supra, p. 44.

9

Rich. Law (S. C.) 247,

67

Am.

Same.

PEOPLE v. N. Y. CENTRAL
1883.

H. R. R. CO.

(2) Mandamus.
(a)

Sec. 420.

&

&

HUDSON

PANY. 1

EIVER RAILROAD COM-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.
Re P- 543-5 6 -

28

Hun (N.

Y.)

[Appeal from orders granting motion to quash, and denying
application by the attorney-general for a peremptory writ of mandamus, commanding the railroad company to forthwith operate their
road., and receive and transport freight as usual.
The company's
excuse for not so doing since June, 1882, was a strike of its employes
for higher wages not alleged to be accompanied by violence, riot or
other unlawful interference.]
DAVIS, P. J. * * * The question presented by the motion is
one of signal importance.
It is whether the people of the state can
invoke the power of the courts to compel the exercise by railroad
corporations of the most useful public functions with which they are
If the people have that right, there can be no doubt that
clothed.
their attorney-general
is the proper officer to set it in effective operation on their behalf,
(i R. S. 179, i ; Code of Civ. Proc., 1993 ;
People v. Halsey, 37 N. Y. 344; People v. Collins, 19 Wend. 56.)
The question involves a consideration of the nature of this class of
corporations, the objects for which they are created, the powers conferred and the duties imposed upon them by the laws of their creation
and of the state.
As bodies corporate, their ownership may be and
usually is altogether private, belonging wholly to the holders of their

capital stock ; and their management may be vested in such officers or
agents as the stockholders and directors under the provisions of law
In this sense they are to be regarded as trading or primay appoint.
vate corporations, having in view the profit or advantages of the corBut these conditions are in no just sense in conflict with
porators.
their obligations and duties to the public.
The objects of their creation are from their very nature largely different from those of ordinary
Railroads are, in every essential
private and trading corporations.
quality, public highways, created for public use, but permitted to be
owned, controlled and managed by private persons.
But for this
quality the railroads of the respondents could not lawfully exist.
1

Statement

abridged.

Part of opinion omitted.
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Their construction depended upon the exercise of the right of eminent

to the state in its corporate capacity alone,
The state
and can not be conferred, except upon a "public use,"
has no power to grant the right of eminent domain to any corporation
or person for other than a public use. Every attempt to go beyond
that is void by the constitution ; and although the legislature may determine what is a necessary public use, it can not by any sort of enactment divest of that character any portion of the right of eminent
This characteristic of public use is in
domain which it may confer.
no sense lost or diminished by the fact that the use of the railroad by
the corporation which constructs or owns it must from its nature be
That incident grows out of the method of use which does
exclusive.
The general
not admit of any enjoyment in common by the public.
and popular use of a railroad as a highway is, therefore, handed over
exclusively to corporate management and control, because that is for
*
* *
the best and manifest advantage of the public.
In Olcott v. The Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678, 694, the supreme court
of the United States adjudge :
"Whether the use of a railroad is a public or a private one, depends
in no measure upon the question who constructed it or who owns it.
It has never been considered a matter of any importance that the road
No matter who is
was built by the agency of a private corporation.
the agent, the function performed is that of the state.
Though the
*
*
*
The owners may
ownership is private, the use is public.
be private companies, but they are compellable to permit the public
to use their works in the manner in which such works can be used.
That all persons may not put their own cars upon the road, and use
their own motive power, has no bearing upon the question whether
the road is a public highway.
It bears only upon the mode of use,
*
*
*
of which the legislature is the exclusive judge."
The maintenance and control of most other classes of public highways are so devolved, [upon public officers] and the performance of
every official duty in respect of them may be compelled by the courts,
on application of the state, while private damages may also be reThe analogy between such officials
coverable for individual injuries.
and railroad corporations in regard to their relations to the state, is
strong and clear, and so far as affects the construction and proper and
efficient maintenance of their railways will be questioned by no one.
It is equally clear, we think, in regard to their duty as carriers of persons and property.
This springs sharply out of the exclusive nature of
their right to do those things.
On other public highways every person
may be his own carrier; or he may hire whomsoever he will to do
that service.
Between him and such employe a special and personal
relation exists, independent of any public duty, and in which the state
has no interest.
In such a case, the carrier has not contracted with
the state to assume the duty as a public trust, nor taken the right
and power to do it from the state by becoming the special donee and
A good reason may, therefore, be assigned
depositary of a trust.

domain, which belongs
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state will not by mandamus enforce the performance
of his
But the reason for such a rule altogether
contract by such a carrier.
x
ails when the public highway is the exclusive property of a body
in
manner which of
corporate, which alone has power to use
necessity requires that all management, control and user for the purcondition
poses of carriage must be limited to itself, and which, as
of the franchise that grants such absolute and exclusive power over
and user of
public highway, has contracted with the state to accept
the duty of carrying all persons and property within the scope of its
charter, as
public trust.
The relation of the state to such
body
entirely different from
bears to the individual users of
common highway, as
that which
between whom and the state no relation of trust exists
and there
small reason for seeking analogies between them.
the duty of
the state to make and maintain public highways.
That duty
perscheme of laws, which set in operation the functions of its
forms by
political divisions into counties, towns and other municipalities, and
their officers.
It can and does enforce those duties whenever necesnot the duty of the state to be or besary through its courts.
come
common carrier upon its public highways but
may, in some
cases, assume that duty, and whenever
lawfully does so, the execution of the duty may be enforced against the agents or officers upon
whom the law devolves it. It may grant its power to construct
public highway to
corporation or an individual and with that power its
right of eminent domain in order to secure the public use and may
make the traffic of the highway common to all on such terms as
In such case
its duty to secure that common traffic,
may impose.
when refused, by the authority of its courts.
(People v. Collins, 19
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Cow. 23.)
Wend. 56; People v. Commissioners of Salem,
Or
may grant the same powers of construction and maintenance with the
exclusive enjoyment of use which the manner of use requires, and
that excludes all common travel and transportation
may impose on
the corporation or person the duty to furnish every requisite facility
for carrying passengers and freight, and to carry both in such manner
that duty, in
and at such times as public needs may require.
Why
respect of the power to compel its performance through the courts,
The writ
not in the category of all others intrusted to such
body
of mandamus has been awarded to compel a company to operate its
road as one continuous line (Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Hall, 91 U.
to compel the running of passenger trains to the terminus
343)
of the road (State v. H.
N. H. Ry. Co., 29 Conn. 538); to
compel the company to make fences and cattle-guards (People, ex
rel. Garbutt, v. Rochester State Line R. R. Co., 14 Hun 373; s. c.,
N. Y. 284) to compel
to build
bridge (People, ex reL Kimball, v. B.
A. R. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 569); to compel
to construct its road across streams, so as not to interfere with navigation
to run
(State v. N. E. R. R. Co. ,9 Richardson 247); to compel
re New Brunswick, etc., R. R.,
P.
B. 667); to
daily trains
compel the delivery of grain at
particular elevator (Chicago and

420
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Northwestern R. R. Co. v. People, 56 111. 365) ; to compel the completion of its road (Farmers' Loan and Trust Company v. Henning,
17 Am. Law Reg. [N. S.] 266); to compel the grading of its track
so as to make crossings convenient and useful (People, ex rel. Green,
v. D. & C. R. Co., 58 N. Y. 152; N. Y. C. & H. R. R R. Co. v.
People, 12 Hun 195; s. c., 74 N. Y. 302; Indianapolis R. R. Co.
v. The State, 37 Ind. 489) ; to compel the re-establishment of an
abandoned station (State v. R. R., 37 Conn. 154); to compel the
replacement of a track taken up in violation of its charter (Rex v.
Severn and Wye Ry. Co., 2 Barn. & Aid. 646); to prevent the
abandonment
of a road once completed (Talcott v. Pine Grove,
i
Flippin
supra,
145), and to compel a company to exercise its franchise (People v. A. & V. R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 261.)
These are all
or
from
of the railthe
charters
express
implied obligations arising
road companies, but not more so than the duty to carry freight and
That duty is, indeed, the ultima ratio of their existpassengers.
ence ; the great and sole public good for the attainment and accomplishment of which all the other powers and duties are given or imIt is strangely illogical to assert that the state, through the
posed.
courts, may compel the performance of every step necessary to bring
a corporation in'o a condition of readiness to do the very thing for
which it is created, but is then powerless to compel the doing of the
thing itself.
We can not bring our minds to entertain a doubt that a railroad
corporation, is compellable by mandamus to exercise its duties as a
carrier of freight and passengers ; and that the power so to compel it
rests equally firmly on the ground that that duty is a public trust,
which, having been conferred by the state and accepted by the corporation, may be enforced for the public benefit; and also upon the
contract between the corporation and the state, expressed in its charter
or implied by the acceptance of the franchise (Abbott v. Johnstown
R. Co., 80 N. Y. 31) ; and also upon the ground that the common
right of all the people to travel and carry upon every public highway
of the state has been changed in the special instance, by the legislature for adequate reasons, into a corporate franchise, to be exercised
solely by a corporate body for the public benefit, to the exclusion of
all other persons, whereby it has become the duty of the state to see
to it that the franchise so put in trust may be faithfully administered
by the trustee.
But it is said that the state is not injured and has no interest in the
question whether the corporation perform the duty or not. The state
may suffer no direct pecuniary injury, as it may not by the neglect of
one or more of its numerous political officers who hold in trust for
the people the official duties reposed in their hands ; but that is no
test of the power or duty of the state in either case. The sovereignty
of the state is injured whenever any public function vested by it in
any person, natural or artificial, for the common good is not used or
is misused, or is abused ; and it is not bound to inquire whether some
one or more of its citizens has not thereby received a special injury
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for which he may recover damages in his private suit. Such an injury

the sovereignty of the state and thereby, in a legal sense,
The state, in such a case as this, has
injures the entire body politic.

wounds

no other adequate remedy.
It may proceed, it is true, to annul the
corporation, as has been held in many cases where corporations had
neglected public duties.
(People v. Fishkill & B. P. R. Co.,. 27
Barb. 452, 458; People v. H. & C. Turnpike Co., 23 Wend. 254;
Turnpike Co. v. State, 3 Wall. 210; People v. K. & M. Turnpike
Co., 23 Wend. 208; People v. B. & R. Turnpike Co., 23 Wend.
222; Chaises River Bridge Co. v. Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. 344.)
But that remedy is not adequate, for it only destroys functions where
the public interests require their continued existence and enforcement.
It has, therefore, an election which of these remedies to pursue.
(State v. H. & N. H. Railroad Co., 29 Conn. 538; People v. A. &
V. Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 261 ; Talcott v. Pine Grove, supra.} * * *
Nor do we think the fact that injured individuals may have private
remedies for the damages they have sustained by neglect of duties
precludes the state from its remedy by mandamus. Where the injury
is to a single person under circumstances which do not affect the general public the courts, in the exercise of their discretion, have properly
The injured party is then the
refused this remedy on his relation.
suitor; he has an adequate remedy by private action for damages.
That was the case of People, ex rel. Ohlen, v. Erie Railway Company (22 Hun 533), relied upon by the court below, in which the court
held that the relator's remedy was by suit for damages and not by
mandamus.
That case is not authority for denying the writ to the
attorney-general for a neglect or refusal by corporations to exercise
their franchises to an extent which affects a great number of citizens,
and continues for a considerable period of timeu nor does it deny the
right of the people acting on their own behalf and in their own suit
to pursue this remedy in any case of neglect or refusal to exercise a
public function which the interest of the people require should be
kept in vigorous and efficient use.
The court, in that case, recognizes the distinction when it says "an
*
*
*
where a corporation suspends the exexception exists,
ercise of its franchises." The suspension of the exercise of corporate
functions is the gravamen of the complaint in this case, and the case
cited is no authority for denying the writ when the people come into
court with their own suit by their attorney-general to move for a writ
of mandamus on allegations of an alleged long-continued and very
*
* *
general suspension of a corporate duty.
Having determined the question of the right of the state to prosecute
the writ of mandamus on the ground of refusal or neglect of a corporation to exercise its duty of carrier, it remains to be seen whether a
case which would justify the granting of the writ was presented. The
case stands altogether upon the facts presented by the appellants.
The course taken by the respondents must be regarded as an admission
*
* *
of the material facts contained in the petition and affidavits.
The excuse appears only in the statements of the reasons assigned
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by the respondents for their refusal to accept, transport and deliver
In the petition it is stated in these words,
the freight and property.
"that the persons in their employ handling such freight refuse to perform their work unless some small advance, said to be three cents per
The affidavits
hour, is paid them by the said railroad corporation."
show, it may in short be said, that the skilled freight handlers of the respondents, who had been working at the rate of seventeen cents per
hour (or one dollar and seventy cents for ten hours), refused to work
unless twenty cents per hour, or two dollars per day of ten hours, were
paid, and that their abandonment of the work, and the inefficiency
of the unskilled men afterwards employed, caused the neglect and
*
*
*
refusal complained of.
These facts reduce the question to this: Can railroad corporations
refuse or neglect to perform their public duties upon a controversy
with their employes over the cost or expense of doing them?
We
The excuse has in law
think this question admits of but one answer.
no validity.
The duties imposed must be discharged at whatever
cost.
They can not be laid down or abandoned or suspended without the legally expressed consent of the state.
The trusts are active,
potential and imperative, and must be executed until lawfully surrendered, otherwise a public highway of great utility is closed or obstructed without any process recognized by law.
This is something
no public officer charged with the same trusts and duties in regard to
other public highways can do without subjecting himself to mandamus
*
* *
or indictment.

Reversed.
See note, infra, p. 1318.

Sec. 421.

(b) No specific duty.

SAN ANTONIO STREET
1897.

RAILWAY

CO. v. STATE OF

TEXAS. 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS. 90 Tex. Rep. 520-528,
59 Am. St. R. 834.

[Error to court of civil appeals.]
GAINES, C. J. This case arose by a petition filed in the name of
the state of Texas upon the relation of Henry Elmendorf and others
to compel the plaintiff in error to operate a part of its lines, upon
which it had ceased to run its cars. Demurrers to the petition were
overruled, and exceptions to the answer of respondent were sustained,
and thereupon the peremptory writ was awarded as prayed for in the
This judgment was affirmed upon appeal, and to the judgpetition.
ment of affirmance this writ of error has been granted.
The first question is : Did the facts alleged authorize the relief
1

Part of opinion omitted.
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prayed for in the petition ? It was alleged that the respondent company was a corporation, chartered by a special act of the legislature
passed May 2, 1874, and authorized to operate street railways in the
city of San Antonio for the term of fifty years ; that it applied to the
city council of the city for authority to construct certain lines within the
city limits and that the privilege was granted by an ordinance. * * *
It is not expressly averred that at the time the ordinance was
passed the company had already constructed and had in operation a
line or lines of street railway in the city; but we think that this is to
be inferred from section i, which speaks of the streets over which the
privilege to construct and operate was thereby granted as "additional
streets and avenues."
It was further averred that the company had
constructed and for a time had operated the line from its beginning
point to Highland Park, but that while it had continued to operate
that portion of that line nearest the city, it had abandoned the operation of a part.
The prayer was for a writ of mandamus to compel
the respondent to operate that entire line.
It is a well-settled doctrine that a corporation maybe compelled by
the writ of mandamiis to perform a duty imposed by statute.
The
need
be
it
be
when
it
not
duty
implied.
express;
may
apClearly,
pears by fair implication from the terms of its charter, it is as imperative as if the obligation were expressed.
But as to corporations
in
such
for
as
those chartered for the
character,
quasi-public
example
of
are
and
there
decisions
which hold that
carriage
freight,
passengers
they owe certain duties to the public which they may be compelled to
perform, although not enjoined by their charters, either in express
terms or by specific implication.
But we have been unable to discover that any well-defined rule has been laid down by the authorities
by which we may determine in every case what implied duties are assumed by such a corporation by the acceptance of its charter.
It has
been held that, in the absence of some direct statutory requirement, a
railroad company can not be compelled to establish and maintain a
station at a particular point on its line, although it may be shown that
the convenience of the public demands it.
Northern Pacific Ry. Co.
v. Washington, 142 U. S. 492 ; People v. Railway, 104 N. Y. 58. A
contrary doctrine seems to have been acted upon in State v. Railway,
It is one thing
17 Neb. 647, and in People v. Railway, 130 111. 175.
to hold that a company, which has accepted a charter authorizing it
to construct a line of railroad, with power to condemn property, and
has constructed and is maintaining its line, may be compelled to so
operate its line as reasonably to meet the necessities of the public;
and, as we think, it is quite a different one that a railroad company,
by the acceptance of its charter, which simply makes it lawful to construct and maintain a railroad, assumes an obligation to construct it
and to maintain its operation so long as its corporate existence may
continue.
The latter question was presented in the case of the York and
North Midland Railway Company v. The Queen, i Ell. & BL, 858.
There the company had constructed its line in part only. The pur-
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it

a

a

a

is

it,

pose of the suit was to compel it by the writ of mandamus to conIn the court of Queen's Bench, there was a
struct the entire road.
relators
two of the judges concurring in opinion,
judgment for the
This judgment was reversed in the exchequer
and one dissenting.
chamber by the unanimous opinion of the nine judges who sat upon
The chief justice, who delivered the opinion of the court
the case.
upon the hearing of the writ of error, after stating the facts, pro"Upon these facts
pounded the questions to be decided as follows:
i. Does the statute of 1849 cast upon the
several points arise:
2. If it does not, is
plaintiffs in error a duty to make this railway?
there, under the circumstances, a contract between the plaintiffs in
error and the land-owners which can be enforced by mandamus"*
3. And, failing these propositions, does a work which in its inception
is permissive only become obligatory by part performance?"
The
The charter in this case
second question does not concern us here.
did not involve nor did it grant the taking of private property for the
public use. After concluding that there was no language in the
statute from which it could be inferred that it was the intention of
parliament to make it obligatory upon the company by the acceptance
of the charter to construct the entire line of railroad, the court in their
opinion decide the first question as follows: "It seems to us, therefore, that these statutes do not cast upon the plaintiff in error this
duty, either by express words or by implication ; that we ought to
adhere to the plain meaning of the words used by the legislature,
which are permissive only; and that there is no reason in policy or
otherwise why we should endeavor to pervert them from their natural
"There
meaning."
Upon the third the court speak as follows:
remains but one further view of the case to be considered ; and of
that we have partly disposed in the observations which we have
But inasmuch as Lord Campbell proceeded upon
already made.
this ground only in the court below, although it was not much relied
upon before us in argument, we have out of respect to his high
and are of opinion that the
authority most carefully examined
mandamus can not be supported upon the ground that the railway
company, having exercised some of its powers, and made part of
their line, are bound to make the whole railway authorized by their
statutes." The opinion throughout bears the marks of the most careful consideration and
supported, as we think, by argument which
can not be satisfactorily answered.
The authorities upon the precise point are but few. But the question arose in the case of Minnesota v. The Southern Minnesota Railroad Company, 18 Minn. 40, and the writ of mandamus was refused
because the statute which authorized the construction of the railroad
neither in express terms nor by reasonable construction imposed upon
the company the specific legal duty of constructing it.
The general
principle was also affirmed in the case of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. Washington, 142 U. S. 492.
The attempt in that
case was to compel
railroad to establish and maintain
station at
point where
was alleged the interest of the public required such
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conflict.

But upon the point decided in that
*

*

*

case the decisions

42

I

are in

(Citing and commenting upon State v. Hartford & N. H. R. R.
Co., 29 Conn. 538; City v. Railway, 51 Kan. 609; People v. Rail-

way, 24 N. Y. 261.)
The allegations in the petition in this case show that the respondent
company was chartered merely for the purpose of constructing and
The special act merely gave it
operating street railways in the city.
the right of corporate existence for the purpose indicated.
(Tugwell
The streets were under
v. Eagle Pass Ferry Co., 74 Texas 480.)
the control of the city council. The company could do nothing without the consent of the council. The franchise in question was granted
by the city council, and the claim is that it is by virtue of that concession, and its acceptance by the company, that the duty arose. But
the ordinance merely grants "the privilege" of constructing and mainNo clearer
taining street railways over the lines therein designated.
Not only this,
words of mere permission could have been employed.
but there is in the ordinance neither sentence, phrase nor word that
indicates that it was the intention of the council to make it a condition
of the acceptance of its grant that the company should be bound to
construct and operate railways over the streets 'which were therein
The company are required to observe all the ordinances of
specified.
the city then existing, but it is not averred that there was any ordinance
in existence at the time of the acceptance of the franchise which im* *
*
posed that obligation.
The following succinct and accurate statement of the law from
Redfield on Railways h.as been often quoted with approval: "Where
the charter of a corporation, or the general statute in force and applicable to the subject, imposes a specific duty, either in terms or by
fair and reasonable construction and implication, and there is no
specific or adequate remedy, the writ of mandamus will be awarded."
It is clear that the ordinance in this case neither by express terms nor
If the duty to
by implication imposes the duty upon the company.
construct and maintain the line is to be established, it must be upon
the assumption that every privilege granted by a legislative body in
reference to matter of public interest imposes upon the grantee who
accepts it the duty to perform the acts he is allowed to perform.
The assumption, in our opinion, is, as we have already intimated,
not based upon sound reason, and is in opposition at least to the
*
*
*
weight of authority.
We are of opinion also that the fact that the road has been constructed
and operated, and that a part is now operated, makes no difference.
Under the grant of a privilege to construct and maintain, if after acceptance it is permissive only to construct, it is not obligatory to
maintain. But we do not hold that the company can, against the will
of the city, operate a part of its line and not the whole. A privilege to
establish an entire line of street railway may be granted when the
privilege of constructing and operating a part only would not be ;
and for a failure to operate a part, it would seem that the whole
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It seems to us that the remedy in this case is to
might be forfeited.
The
forfeit the franchise to operate the branch line in controversy.
defendant in its answer offers to discontinue the operation of the
branch, and apparently this would have been a good answer to the
*
* *
petition if an answer had been necessary.
Reversed.
See note, infra, p. 1318.

Sec. 422,

(c)

Who may complain.

RICHMOND RAILWAY AND ELECTRIC CO.
1899.

v.

BROWN. 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA.
Rep. 25-37,

32

S.

E. Rep.

97

Va.

775.

[Error to judgment of circuit court awarding

a mandamus, upon
complaint of Brown stating that he was not accorded the rights
of a passenger in being transferred from one part of the railway to
another without paying an extra fare, as required by the provisions of
the agreement with the county court, under legislative authority, permitting an extension of the line and its operation, in the territory
A demurrer to the petition was filed,
where the controversy arose.
which was overruled, and this is assigned as error.]
*
*
*
The first ground of demurrer is that
HARRISON, J.
the petition should not have been brought in the name of a private
individual, but in the name of some officer authorized to represent
The practice contended for does not obtain in
the commonwealth.
Virginia, and is not sustained by the weight of authority elsewhere.
That private persons may move for mandamus to enforce a public
duty, not due to the government as such, without the intervention of
a law officer of the government,
is settled by the highest authority.
Railroad Co. v. Hall, 91 U. S. 355. * * *
The court is further of opinion that the motion to quash the petition was properly overruled.
The first ground assigned in support
the

of this motion was that the remedy was complete and adequate at
law by a suit for damages.
In order that the existence of another
remedy shall constitute a bar to relief by mandamus, such other remedy
must not only be "adequate," in the general sense of the term, but
it must be specific and appropriate to the circumstances of the
particular case. The remedy at law which will operate as a bar to
mandamus must generally be such a remedy as will enforce a right
or the performance of a duty.
A remedy can not be said to be fully
adequate to meet the justice and necessities of a case, unless it reaches
the end intended, and actually compels a performance of the duty in
Such other remedy, in order to constitute a bar to manquestion.
damus, must be adequate to place the injured party, as nearly as the
circumstances of the case will permit, in the position which he occu1

Only part of opinion given.
10
2 WIL. CAS.
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pied before the injury or omission of the duty complained of. The
controlling question is not, "Has the party a remedy at law?" but,
"Is that remedy fully commensurate with the necessities and rights of
Or,
the party, under all the circumstances of the particular case ?"
as was said in one case: "To supersede the remedy by mandamus,
the party must not only have a specific remedy, but one competent to
afford relief upon the very subject-matter of his application, and one
which is equally convenient, beneficial and effective as the proceeding

2 Spell. Extr. Relief,
1375.
bar the mandamus was sought to compel the plaintiff
in error to transfer the defendant in error from one to another of its
If the defendant in error was
street cars without additional charge.
entitled, as alleged, to the transfer, it is manifest that a suit at law
for damages for a failure to perform that duty was not an adequate
remedy, and would not actually compel the performance of the duty
in question. The wrong suffered was a constantly recurring and continual one, and, whatever may have been the result of repeated suits
for damages, the remedy was not as convenient, as beneficial or as
effective as the proceeding by mandamus.
(After holding that the terms and conditions prescribed by some
other designated authority, when so fixed and prescribed become a
part of the organic law of the corporation, and can be enforced by
mandamus, the decision below was affirmed.)

by mandamus."

In the

case at

Note.
Mandamus to corporations.
1 . General principles :
Whenever a specific and determined (1900, Mackin v. Gas Co., 38 Ore. 120,

i
61

Pac. Rep.

134),

legal duty (1799, Runkel v. Winemiller, 4 Harris & McH. (Md.) 429,1 Am.
Dec. 411; 1810, Commonw. v. Rossiter, 2 Binn. (Pa.y 360, 4 Am. Dec. 451;
1855, Union Church v. Sanders, 1 Hous. (Del.) 100, 63 Am. Dec. 187,
is imposed upon a private corporation, expressly or impliedly, either by
statute, 1819, Rex v. Severn & Wye R. Co., 2 Barn. & Aid. 646, 7 Eng. R.
Cas. 445; 1842, Reg. v. Bristol Dock Co., 2 Q. B. 64, 7 Eng. R. Cas. 449; 1853,
York N. Mid. Ry. v.The Queen, 1 El. & Bl. 858, 22 L.
(Q. B.) 225; 1880,
Boggs v. R. Co., 54 Iowa 435; 1887, People v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., 104 N. Y.
58 ; 58 Am. Rep. 484 ; 1887, 0. & M. R. Co. v. People, 120 111. 200 ; 1888, Cummins
v. R. Co., 115 Ind. 417; Reg. v. Great W. R. Co., 62 L.
(Q. B.) 572, 69 L.
T. 572 ; 1896, C., B. & Q. R. v. State, 47 Neb. 549, 53 Am. St. Rep. 557, 41 L. R.
A. 481 ; 1897, San Antonio, etc., Ry. Co. v. State, 90 Texas 520, 59 Am. St. Rep.
834; 1899, People v. Suburban R. Co., 178 111. 594, 53 N. E. Rep. 349,
charter provision, 1861, State v. Hartford, etc., R. Co., 29 Conn. 538; 1875,
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Hall, 91 U. S. 343,
or by the common law, 1842, In re Trenton Water Power Co., 20 N.
L. 659 ;
1861, State v. Hartford, etc., R. Co., 29 Conn. 538; 1873, People v. Chicago,
etc., R. Co., 67 111. 118; 1873, R. Commrs. v. Portland, etc., R. Co., 63 M. 269,
18 Am. Rep. 208; 1885, State v. Republican Valley R. Co., 17 Neb. 647, 52

J.

J.

J.

Am. R. 424,
and there is no other adequate remedy provided for its enforcement : 1810,
Commw. v. Rossiter, 2 Binn. (Pa.) 360; 1877, State v. Mobile, etc., R. Co., 59
Ala. 321; 1881, Lamphere v. Grand Lodge, 47 Mich. 429; 1898, Nebraska
Tel. Co. v. State, 55 Neb. 627; 1898, Village of Waverly v. W. & S. R. Co., 35
App. Div. (N. Y.) 38; 1898, In re Baldwinville Tel. Co., 24 Miscl. (N. Y.) 221 ;
mandamus will lie, in a suit by or on behalf of the state, to enforce the
public duty (1887, Crane v. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co., 74 Iowa 330, 7 Am.
St. Rep. 479, note 484),
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or in case of a private right, on behalf of the person to whom the duty is due
People v. Central, etc., R. Co., 41 Mich. 166; 1898, State v. Spokane St.
R. Co., 19 Wash. 518, 67 Am. St. Rep. 739; 1900, Mercury. Media El. L., etc.,
Co., 7 Del. Co. Rep. 586) ; but see, 1897, Baylor v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 183
Pa. St. 167, 63 Am. St. Rep. 749,
but not to enforce a mere optional corporate privilege or to control discretion,
1871, State v. Canal, etc., R. Co., 23 La. Ann. 333; 1887, People v. N. Y., etc.,
R. Co., 104 N. Y. 58, 58 Am. Rep. 484; 1893, Florida, etc., R. Co. v. State, 31
Fla. 482, 34 Am. St. Rep. 30; 1895, State v. Richards, 16 Mont. 145, 50 Am.
St. Rep. 476; 1896, State v. Board, etc., 134 Mo. 296, 56 Am. St. Rep. 503.
See generally, 1885, Richardson v. Swift, 7 Houst. (Del.) 137, 40 Am. St.
Rep. 127 (History of the Writ) ; notes, 89 Am. Dec. 728; 98 Am. Dec. 375;
61 Am. Rep. 78 ; 3 Am. St. Rep. 807 ; 7 Am. St. Rep. 484 ; 37 Am. St. Rep. 317 ;
59 Am. St. Rep. 198.
2. Particular applications:
(1) As to members.
(a) To compel admission of duly qualified persons: 1865, People v. Medical Soc., 32 N. Y. 187; 1869, State v. Georgia Med. Soc., 38 Ga. 608, 95 Am.
Dec. 408, supra, p. 136; 1879, State v. Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce, 47
Wis. 670. See further note, supra, p. 1171, 354, and note 59 Am. St. Rep. 198.
(b) To restore to membership, when unlawfully deprived, 1875, People v.
N. Y. B. S. of Masons, 6 Thomp. & Co. 85, 3 Hun 361 ; 1899, Weiss v. Mus.
Mut., etc., Union, 189 Pa. St. 446, 69 Am. St. Rep. 820. See further note,
supra, p. 1171,
354.
But see, contra, 1855, Union Church of Africans v. Sanders, 1 Houst. (Del.)
100, 63 Am. Dec. 187; 1879, State v. Hebrew Cong., etc., 30 La. Ann. 205,
33 Am. Rep. 217 ; 1883, Sale v. First Baptist Church, 62 Iowa 26, 49 Am.
(1879,

Rep. 136.
(c) To compel the calling of meetings, 1875, State v. Wright, 10 Nev. 167 ;
1878, People v. Cummings, 72 N. Y. 433.
(d) To compel the transfer of stock, on the books of the company by seller,
or purchaser, or by sheriff under execution sale, 1868, Bailey v. Strohecker,
38 Ga. 259, 95 Am. Dec. 388; 1883, State v. First Nat'l Bank of Jeffersonville,
89 Ind. 302 ; see, infra,
569.
But see, contra, 1872, Kimball v. Union Water Co., 44 Cal. 173, 13 Am. Rep.
157; 1879, Cushman v. Thayer Mfg. Co., 76 N. Y. 365, 32 Am. Rep. 315; 1884,
Treon v. Carriage Co., 42 O. S. 31, 51 Am. Rep. 794, note 798; 1886, Tobey v.
Hakes, 54 Conn. 274, 1 Am. St. Rep. 114.
(e) To compel inspection of books, by members ; 1898, Weihenmayer v.
Bitner, 88 Md. 325, 42 Atl. 245; 1899, In re Steinway, 159 N. Y. 250, 45 L. R.
A. 461, 53 N. E. Rep. 1103; 1899, State v. Pacific Br. Co., 21 Wash. 451, infra,
p. 1645; 1900, Inre Journal Pub. Co., 30 Miscl. (N. Y.) 326, 63 N. Y. S. 465;
compare, 1899, Mathews v. McClaughry, 83 111. App. 224; 1899, In re Pierson,
44 App. Div. (N. Y.) 215, 60 N. Y. S. 671; 1900, People v. Am.Un. L. Ins. Co.,
31 Miscl. (N. Y.) 617, 64 N. Y. S. 916.
See further note, infra, p. 1651,
551.
As to inspecting books of foreign corporations, see, 1885, Richardson v.
Swift, 7 Houst. (Del.) 137, 40 Am. St. Rep. 127; infra, p. 1653; 1898, Weihenmayer v. Bitner, 88 Md. 325; 1899, In re Crosby, 59 N. Y. S. 340; 1899, In re
Rappleye, 43 App. Div. (N. Y.) 84, 59 N. Y. S. 338, infra, p. 1651.
(2) As to third parties or the public.
(a) To compel inspection of books by public officers: 1865, Firemens Ins.
Co. v. Mayor, etc., 23 Md. 296; 1869, People v. State Ins. Co., i9 Mich. 392;
1898, State v. Real Estate, etc., Assn., 151 Ind. 502, 51 N. E. Rep. 1061; 1899,
State v. Workingmen's, etc., Assn., 152 Ind. 278, 53 N. E. Rep. 168.
(b) To pay taxes assessed upon its stock, 1874, Emory v. State, 41 Md. 38 ;
1875, Barney v. State, 42 Md. 480; 1885, Town of St. Albans v. National Car
Co., 57 Vt. 68.
(c) To enforce religious trusts, 1848, People v. Steele, 2 Barb. 397; 1872,
Feizel v. Trustees of First German Soc., 9 Kan. 592.
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(d) To compel cemetery association to permit burial ; 1876, Mt. Moriah C.
A. v. Commw., 81 Pa. St. 235, 22 Am. Rep. 743.
(e) To compel gas companies to furnish gas to one complying with requisite conditions, on the same terms as others ; 1870, People v. Manhattan G.
L. Co., 45 Barb. (N. Y.) 136; 1900, Mercur v. Media El. L. Co., 7 Del. Co.
Rep. 586; compare, 1900, Mackin v. Portland Gas Co., 38 Ore. 120, 61 Pac.
Rep. 134.
(f) To compel city water companies to furnish water; 1891, Haugen v.
Albina L., etc., Co., 21 Ore. 411 ; 1895, Am. Water W. v. State, 46 Neb. 194,
50 Am. St. Rep. 610; 1899, People v. Water Co., 38 App. Div. (N. Y.) 413;
1893, State v. Joplin Water-W., 52 Mo. App. 312.
(g) To compel an irrigating 1 company to furnish water ; 1880, Price v. Riverside, etc., Irrigating Co., 56 Cal. 431 ; 1887, Wheeler v. Northern, etc., Co., 10>
Colo. 582, 3 Am. St. Rep. 603; 1892, Combs v. Ag. Ditch Co., 17 Colo. 146, 31
Am. St. Rep. 275; 1898, People v. Farmers' High L., etc., Co., 54 Pac. Rep.
626.

(h) To compel telephone, telegraph and news gathering companies to furnish service to those complying with reasonable regulations.
1885, State v. Nebraska T. Co., 17 Neb. 126. 52 Am. Rep. 404; 1888, Central
Union Tel. Co. v. State, 118 Ind. 194, 10 Am. St. Rep. 114; 1888, Commer.
Union Tel. Co. v. N. E. Tel. Co., 61 Vt. 241, 15 Am. St. Rep. 893; 1889, West
U. Tel. Co. v. Dubois, 128 111.248, 15 Am. St. Rep. 109; 1890, Central Union
T. Co. v. State, 123 Ind. 113; 1898, Nebraska Tel. Co. v. State, 55 Neb. 627;
1899, Cumberland Tel. & T. Co. v. Morgans L. & T. Co., 51 La. Ann. 29,
24 So. 803; 1900 Inter Ocean Pub. Co. v. Associated Press, 184 111. 438,75
Arn. St. Rep. 184. Contra, 1881, American Rap. Tel. Co. v. Conn. Tel. Co.,
49 Conn. 352, 44 Am. Rep. 237, note 241 ; 1898, In re Baldwinsville Tel. Co.,
24 Miscl. CN. Y.) 221, 53 N. Y. S. 574.
(i) To compel ditch, canal, irrigating, or railroad companies to construct and repair bridges, viaducts, farm and street crossings over their ways.
1871, Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. State, 37 Ind. 489; 1873, People v. Chicago,
etc., R. Co., 67 111. 118; 1877, People v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 70 N. Y. 569;
1880, Boggs v. R. Co., 54 la. 435; 1884, New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Mississippi, 112 U. S. 12; 1885, Fresno v. Fowler Sw. C. Co., 68 Cal. 359; 1885,
State v. Missouri, etc., R. Co., 33 Kan. 176; 1886, State v. St. Paul, etc., R.
Co., 35 Minn. 131, 59 Am. Rep. 313; 1888, State v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co.,.
39 Minn. 219; 1888, Cummins v. R. Co., 115 Ind. 417, 18 N. E. Rep. 6; 1889,
City of Oskosh v. R. Co., 74 Wis. 534, 43 N. W. Rep. 489; 1890, Commw. v.
R. Co., 138 Pa. St. 58, 20 Atl. 951 ; 1891, State v. C. M. & N. R. Co., 79 Wis.
259, 12 L. R. A. 180; 1892, Moundsville v. Ohio R. Co., 37 W. Ve. 92; 1892,
State v. Jacksonville St. R., 29 Fla. 590; 1896, C., B. & Q. R. Co. v. State, 47
Neb. 549, 55 St. 557, 41 L. R. A. 481, s. c. (1898) 170 U. S. 57; 1897, State v.
L. E. & W. R. Co., 83 Fed. 284; 1898, Chicago G. W. R. v. People, 79 111.
App. 529; 1898, State v. R. R. Co., 71 Conn. 43.
Compare, 1899, People v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R., 158 N. Y. 410, 53 N. E. 166.
(j) To compel a railroad company to build its road according to its charter or articles of association, or the statute under which it is organized.
1819, Rex v. Severn & Wye R. R. Co., 2 Barn. & Aid. 646, 7 Eng. R. Co. 445;
1849, Cohen v. Wilkinson, 12 Beav. 125; 1856, State v. North Eastern R. Co.,
9 Rich. Law (S. C.) 247, 67 Am. Dec. 551, supra, p. 44; , 1861, State v. Hartford, etc., R. Co., 29 Conn. 538; 1871, State v. Southern Minn. R. Co., 18
Minn. 40; 1873, Railroad Commrs. v. Portland, etc., R. Co., 63 Me. 269, 18
Am. Rep. 208; 1898, State v. Spokane St. R. Co., 19 Wash. 518, 67 Am. St.
Rep. 739 ; compare, 1900, State v. Cowgill, etc., Co., 156 Mo. 620, 57 S. W. Rep.
1008.

See the next paragraph (k).
(k) To compel a railroad company to operate its road according to its
charter: 1819, Rex v. Severn & Wye R. R., 2 Barn. & Aid. 646 ; 1873, Railroad
Commissioners v. Portland, etc., R. Co., 63 Maine 269, 18 Am. Rep. 208; 1878,
State v. S., C. & P. R. Co., 7 Neb. 357; 1885, State v. Repub. Valley R. Co.,
17 Neb. 647; 1893, City of Potwin Place v. Topeka R. Co., 51 Kan. 609, 37 Am.

-
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St. Rep. 312; 1898, State v. Spokane St. R. Co., 19 Wash. 518, 67 Am. St. Rep.
739; 1899, People v. Suburban R. Co., 178 111. 594; 1899, City of Bridgeton v.
Bridgeton, etc., Co., 62 N. J. Law 592, 43 Atl. Rep. 715; compare, 1890, People v. Colorado Central R. Co., 42 Fed. Rep. 638 ; contra, 1886, People v. Rome,
etc., R. Co., 103 N. Y. 95; 1887, People v. N.Y., L. E. & W. R. Co., 104 N. Y.
Pac. R. Co. v. Dustan, 142 U. S. 492;
.58, 58 Am. Rep. 484; 1892, Northern
1895, State v. Mo. Pac. R., 55 Kan. 708, 49 Am. St. Rep. 278; 1897, San Antonio St. R. v. Texas, 90 Texas 520, 59 Am. St. Rep. 484.
(1) To compel transportation companies to furnish facilities fortranspor
tation without discrimination: 1869, Commonwealth v. Eastern R. Co., 103
Mass. 254; 1870, Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. People, 55 111. 95, 8 Am. Rep. 631 ;
1881, Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 469, 10 Saw.
441 ; 1886, State v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 48 N. J. Law 55, 57 Am. Rep. 543;
1887, State v. Fremont, etc., R. Co., 22 Neb. 313; 1887, People v. Louisville,
etc., R. Co., 120 111. 48; 1890, People v. Colorado, etc., R. Co., 42 Fed. Rep.
638; 1891, Cornigton, etc., Co. v. Keith, 139 U. S. 128; 1893, Savannah v.
Ogeechee C. Co. v. Shuman, 91 Ga. 400, 44 Am. St. Rep. 43; 1898, People
v. St. L., A. & T. H. Co., 176 111. 512, 52 N. E. Rep. 292; 1898, AttorneyGeneral v. Am. Ex. Co., 118 Mich. 682, 77 N. W. Rep. 317 ; 1899, People v. Suburban R. Co., 178 111.594; 1899, Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Brown, 97 Va.
26, 32 S. E. Rep. 775; 1900, State v. Texas & Pac. R. Co., 52 La. Ann. 1850,
28 So. Rep. 284; contra, 1886, People v. Rome, etc., R. Co., 103 N. Y. 95;
1887, People v. N. Y., "etc., R. Co., 104 N. Y. 58; 1892, Northern Pac. R. Co.
v. Dustan, 142 U. S. 492; 1895, State v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 55 Kan. 708, 49 Am.
St. Rep. 278; 1897, Saylor v. Penn. Canal Co., 183 Pa. St. 167, 63 Am. St.
Rep. 749.

Sec. 423.

(3) Indictment.

See State v. The N. E. R. R. Co.,
Am. Dec. 551, supra, p. 44.
See, also, Art. II, supra, p. 1283,

Sec. 424. B.
( i )

HUNT,
1892.

9

Rich. (S. C.) Law, 247, 67
400-402.

In courts of equity.

Dissolution,

general rule.

ATTORNEY GENERAL, v. THE LE GRAND ROLLER SKATING RINK COMPANY ET AL. 1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.

143

111.

Rep. 118-127.

[Appeal from superior court.]
BAKER, J. This was an information in equity, filed in the superior
court of Cook county by the attorney-general, for and in behalf of the
people of the state of Illinois, against the Le Grand Roller Skating
Rink Company, otherwise called the Le Grand Company, and its
stockholders, under section 25 of the corporations act, to dissolve the
corporation and obtain a decree declaring the forfeiture of its charter
and franchises.
The superior court sustained a demurrer to the information, and dismissed the same out of court.
1
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Two questions

SKATING CO.
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in the briefs and arguments of counand
sel :
to file an
First, the right
authority of the attorney-general
information in equity under section 25 of the corporations act; and
second, the sufficiency of the information here filed to warrant the
In the view we have taken of the matter it
relief prayed for therein.
consider
is necessary to
only the first of these questions.
of
section
that
is material to the present inquiry reads as
All
said
follows: "If any corporation or its authorized agents shall do or refrain from doing any act which shall subject it to a forfeiture of its charter or corporate powers, or shall allow any execution or decree of any
court of record for a payment of money, after demand made by the
officer, to be returned 'no property found,' or to remain unsatisfied
for not less than ten days after such demand, or shall dissolve or cease
doing business, leaving debts unpaid, suits in equity may be brought
against all persons who were stockholders at the time, or liable in any
way for the debts of the corporation by joining the corporation in
such suit, and each stockholder may be required to pay his pro rata
share of such debts or liabilities to the extent of the unpaid portion of
his stock after exhausting the assets of such corporation ; and if any
stockholder shall not have property enough to satisfy his portion of
such debts or liabilities, then the amount shall be divided equally
And courts of equity
among all the remaining solvent stockholders.
on
cause
shown, to dissolve or close up
shall have full power,
good
of
to
the business
appoint a receiver therefor, who
any corporation,
name
of
the receiver of such corporation
shall have authority, by the
in
all
courts and do all things necessary to
(giving the name), to sue
commanded
closing up its affairs, as
by the decree of such court." * * *
of
common
law
The doctrine
the
is that a corporation can not be
of
an
individual, and that the state, or the
dissolved at the instance
of the state, is a necessary
as the representative
attorney-general,
a
corporation for^ a forfeiture of its charparty to any suit to dissolve
But it is entirely competent for the legislative power to provide,
ter.
by statute, for the absolute and final dissolution of a corporation at a
suit of an individual, even though that is no part of the usual or general jurisdiction of either a court of law or a court of chancery.
(Folger V.Columbian Ins. Co., 99 Mass. 267; Mickles v. Rochester
City Bank, n Paige 118, 4 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 304, and
authorities cited in note i.) It is not only the rule that without authority from statute a corporation can not be dissolved at the suit of
an individual, but it is also the rule that without statutory authority a
court of chancery has no jurisdiction to decree the dissolution of a
* * *
corporation.
We think it clear that.it was the intention of the legislature, by the
enactment of said section 25, to afford remedies to creditors of corporations for the enforcement of their private and personal rights, and
this even to the extent of permitting courts of equity, for good cause
*
* *
shown, to decree the dissolution of the corporation sued.
There being no power at common law to file this information, and
no authority in the statutes unless it can be deduced from said section
are discussed

CONTROL BY COURTS.

425

1323

act itself, the question arises whether it was
25 of the corporations
the legislative intention to confer by that section upon the attorneyNo
general power to bring suits in equity to dissolve corporations.
The
language is used in the section that expresses such intention.
apparent scope of the section is merely to provide remedies to individuals for the enforcement of private and personal rights. The state
and the attorney-general already had, and still have, full and adequate
remedies at law for the enforcement of forfeitures of corporate charters
and franchises and the dissolving of corporations, by writs of scire
facias and by informations in the nature of quo -warranto. So there
was no occasion for vesting the attorney-general with power to bring
as a matter of public
suits in equity, unless it was contemplated,
policy, to impose upon the state the duty of winding up the affairs of
all corporations organized under the corporations act. * * *
In our opinion the superior court was right in its conclusion that
the attorney-general is not authorized by law to file a bill or information in equity, under section 25 of the act concerning corporations,
for the purpose of dissolving a corporation for a forfeiture of its
charter.
, The decree is affirmed.
Note.
As a general rule, in the absence of special statutory authority,
courts of equity have no jurisdiction to decree a dissolution of a corporation :
1830, Society v. Morris Canal Co., 1 Saxton (N. J.) 157,21 Am. Dec. 41;
1831, Attorney-General v. Stevens, 1 Saxton Ch. (N. J.) 369, 22 Am. Dec. 526;
1868, Folger v. Columbia Ins. Co., 99 Mass. 268, 96 Am. Dec. 747 ; 1877, Thornton v. Marginal Frt. Co., 123 Mass. 32; 1878, Hardon v. Newton, 14 Blatch.
376; 1879, Eice v. Nat'l Bank, 126 Mass. 300; 1880, Demke v. N. Y. & R. Cement Co., 80 N. Y. 599; 1882, Strong v. McCogg, 55 Wis. 624; 1882, AttorneyGeneral v. Aqueduct Corp., 133 Mass. 361 ; 1892, Wheeler v. Pullman I. & S.
Co., 143 111. 197; 1893, Repub., etc., Co. v. Brown, 58 Fed. Rep. 644, 24 L. R.
A. 776; 1893, Mason v. Supreme Court, 77 Md. 483, 39 Am. St. Rep. 433; 1897,
Wallace v. Pierce W. Pub. Co., 101 Iowa 313, 63 Am. St. Rep. 389, 38 L. R. A.
122, infra, p. 1747; 1900, Law v. Rich, 47 W. Va. 634, 35 S. E. Rep. 858.
See next case.

Sec. 425.

Same.

Exception.

MINER v. THE BELLE ISLE ICE COMPANY, ET
1892.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN.
118, 53

N. W. Rep.

218.

93

AL.

Mich. Rep. 97-

[Bill for a receiver, an accounting, and to wind up the affairs of the
ice company.
In 1874, Miner and Lorman were partners in the ice
business, and joint owners of property valued at $23,500.
They concluded to form a corporation, and Miner put in $1,500 more, and the
corporation was formed with a capital stock of $25,000, 1,000 shares
of $25 each, Miner and Lorman with 435 shares each, I. J. C. 30
shares and L. C. 100 shares.
In 1882 some difficulty arose between
1

Statement

abridged

;
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Miner, who looked after filling the ice houses, and Lorman who
handled the ice tickets, due bills and cash, each then drawing a salary
of $1,200, and amended articles of association were filed whereby
the stock was made $50,000 of 2 ,000 shares, with Lorman i ,006, Miner
694, L. C. 259, with seven others holding small sums, three of whom
In 1882, a stockholders' meetheld their stock in trust for Lorman.
ing was held, and Lorman, Miner and Linn were elected directors.
At the first meeting of the directors in 1882 Lorman and Linn elected
Lorman president and general manager at a salary of $4,000, over
the protest of Miner, who left the meeting, and was thereupon discharged from the employ of the company; at subsequent meetings of
the directors Lorman was continued at the same salary for seven
years, during which time it was shown that only a few annual meetings had been held, and those secretly; that the corporation was
wholly controlled by Lorman, that the board did what he told them ;
that purchases of land were made by the corporation, and then sold
for a less sum to Lorman, when there had been no decrease in value ;
that Lorman leased land worth $3,500 to the corporation "and for
five years thereafter he paid himself in rentals therefor, $4,650."
Much other evidence of fraud was produced.]
*
*
*
McGRATH, J.
The only question of difficulty in the
There is no doubt of the power of a court
case is as to the remedy.
of equity, in case of fraud, abuse of trust, or misappropriation of
corporation funds, at the instance of a single stockholder, to grant relief, and compel a restitution ; and where the holders of the majority
of the stock control the directorate, and are themselves the wrongdoers, without any showing that the directors have been requested, or
the corporation has refused, to act.
Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How.
Co.,
280; Brewer v. Boston
12
Blatchf.
Pond
v.
Railroad
331;
Theatre, 104 Mass. 378; Gregory v. Patchett, 33 Beav. 595; Peabody v. Flint, 6 Allen 52; March v. Railroad Co., 40 N. H. 567;
Mason v. Harris, n Ch. Div. 97; Atwood v. Merryweather, L. R.
Ervin v. Railway Co., 27 Fed. Rep. 625; Allen v.
5 Eq. 464;
Curtis, 26 Conn. 456; Hersey v. Veazie, 24 Maine 9.
The general rule undoubtedly is that courts of equity have no power
This
to wind up a corporation in the absence of statutory authority.
rule is, however, subject to qualifications. It has been held that,
when it turns out that the purposes for which a corporation was formed
can not be attained, it is the duty of the company to wind up its
affairs ; that the ultimate object of every ordinary trading corporation
is the pecuniary gain of its stockholders ; that it is for this purpose,
and no other, that the capital has been advanced, and if circumstances have rendered it impossible to continue to carry out the purpose for which it was formed with profit to its stockholders, it is the
To continue the
duty of its managing agents to wind up its affairs.
business of the company under such circumstances would involve
both an unauthorized exercise of the corporate franchises and a breach
of the charter contract. Mor. Corp.,
217, 407. The rule applicable
in cases of a copartnership has been held to apply in case of a corpora-
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2

it were shown to the court that the whole substratum of the
partnership, the whole of the business which the company was incorporated to carry on, has become impossible, I apprehend the court
might, either under the act of parliament or on general principles,
order the company to be wound up. But what I am prepared to hold
is this: That this court, and the winding-up process of the court, can
not be used as the means of evoking a judicial decision as to the probable success or non-success of a company as a commercial specula-

tion."
In the present case, we have

a corporation that for seven years has
not paid a dividend. Complainant has had invested and tied up nearly
The only reason why it has failed to pay dividends, for
$18,000.
part of the time at least, is because defendant Lorman, owning a majority of the stock, has controlled the corporation in his. own interest
Is a court of equity powerless to give an adequate remedy
and profit.
because the failure to pay dividends is not attributable to natural
causes, but by reason of gross frauds perpetrated by the management ? Would the court hesitate an instant in case this were a copart*
*
nership ? *
(Citing and quoting from Ervin v. Railway Co., 27 Fed. Rep. 625,
630; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331.)
In Wallworth v. Holt, 4 Mylne & Co. 635, Lord Cottenham says:
think it is the duty of this court to adapt its practice and course
of proceeding to the existing state of society, and not, by too strict
an adherence to rules and forms established under different circumstances, to decline to administer justice, and to enforce rights for which
there is no other remedy."
Sir James Wigram, in Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 491, says:
"Corporations of this kind are in truth little more than private partnerships ; and in cases which may be easily suggested it would be too
much to hold that a society of private persons associated together in
undertakings which, though certainly beneficial to the public, are nevertheless matters of private property, are to be deprived of their civil
rights inter se, because, in order to make their common objects more
attainable, the crown or legislature have conferred upon them the
benefit of a corporate character."
In Bacon v. Robertson, 18 How. 480, which was a proceeding to
compel the trustees to distribute among the stockholders the effects of
a corporation whose charter had been forfeited, there is an able discussion by Campbell, J., of the powers of courts of equity relating
to corporations.
Campbell, J., referring to the cases just cited, says:
"These just views which have afforded to wise chancellors a sufficient motive to enlarge the scope and relax the vigor of the rules of
chancery proceedings, so as to bring the civil rights of individuals, in
whatever form they may exist, or however complicated or ramified,
under the protection of legitimate judicial administration, have been
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of
adopted in the United States, not simply for the improvement
methods of proceeding, but also for the adjustment of rights and the
assertion of responsibilities among the members of such associations."
The present case furnishes an instance of gross abuse of trust.
Must the cestui que trust be committed to the domination of a trustee
The law
who has for seven years continued to violate the trust?
requires of the majority the utmost good faith in the control and
It is of the
management of the corporation as to the minority.
essence of this trust that it shall be so managed as to produce for
each stockholder the best possible return for his investment.
The
What is the outlook for the
trustee has so far absorbed all returns.
future? This court, in view of the past, can give no assurances.
It
can make no order that can prevent some other method of bleeding
this corporation, if it is allowed to continue. If Lorman be removed,
He has the absolute power to determine.
who shall take his place?
There are
Once deposed he may elect a dummy to fill his place.
practically but three persons concerned, Miner, Lorman and Lorissa
Carpenter, and she has for seven years, in fraud of complainant's
Who has
rights, been paid a dividend to secure her acquiescence.
any right to complain if ample and complete justice is awarded to
Miner?
Who should be permitted to stand between him and an
This corporation has utterly failed of its puradequate remedy?
pose, not because of matters beyond its control, but because of
fraudulent mismanagement and misappropriation of its funds.
Complainant has a right to insist that it shall not continue as a cloak for a
fraud upon him, and shall not longer retain his capital to be used for
the sole advantage of the owner of the majority of the stock, and a
court of equity will not so far tolerate such a manifest violation of
the rules of natural justice as to deny him the relief to which his situation entitles him.
I think a court of equity, under the circumstances of this case, in
the exercise of its general equity jurisdiction, has the power to grant
to this complainant ample relief, even to the dissolution of the trust
relations.
A
Complainant is therefore entitled to the relief prayed.
receiver will be appointed, and the affairs of this corporation wound
Defendant Lorman must account, and pay over all moneys
up.
illegally received by him, paid to him, or paid out by him from the
funds of the corporation. * * *
Decree accordingly.

Sec. 426.

(2) Injunction.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL
1870.

IN THE
104

v.

TUDOR ICE COMPANY.

1

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
Mass. Rep. 239-244, 6 Am. Rep. 227.

on behalf of the
by the attorney-general
from engaging in various lines of businessThe company was organized in 1861, for purpose of "cutting, storing

[Information

in equity

state to restrain defendants
1
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is

i

3

a

it

a

a

a

a

a

2

is

is

it,

It engaged in
and selling ice," with a capital stock of $360,000.
this business, and also chartering vessels and shipping ice to East
Indies, along with kerosene, tobacco, rosin and lumber; purchased
and imported paddy, jute, linseed and tea ; also, engaged in manufacture of tobacco, gunny cloth, linseed oil, etc. ; the capital invested
in such manufacture being three or four times larger than its capital
stock; this business has been profitable but unnecessary. No creditors
are in danger of loss, and no objection is made except that these lines
are unauthorized, and alleged to be against public policy.]
GRAY, J. This court, sitting in equity, does not administer punishment or enforce forfeitures for transgressions of law ; but its jurisdiction is limited to the protection of civil rights, and to cases in which
full and adequate relief can not be had on the common-law side of
this court or of the other courts of the commonwealth.
The Tudor Ice Company is a private trading corporation. It is
This is not a suit by
not in any sense a trustee for public purposes.
a stockholder or a creditor.
The acts complained of are not shown
to have injured or endangered any rights of the public, or of any individual or other corporation; and can not, upon any legal construction,
be held to constitute a nuisance.
It is expressly stated, in the report
of the chief justice, that "it does not appear that any of the creditors
no objection
of the company are in danger of losing by
and there
to its proceedings, except that th^y are not authorized by its act of
incorporation and are alleged to be against public policy for that
reason." No case
therefore made upon which, according to the
principles of equity jurisprudence and the practice of this court, an
injunction should be issued upon an information in chancery.
In Attorney-General v. Utica Insurance Co.,
Johns. Ch. 371,
thorChancellor Kent, in
very able and elaborate judgment, after
ough discussion of the question on principle, and an extensive examination of the earlier authorities, held that such an information could
not be maintained to restrain an insurance company from exercising
statute of New York, but that the
banking powers in violation of
proper remedy was at law, by information in the nature of quo warranto, and no appeal appears to have been taken from his decree. An
information in the nature of
quo tuarranto was thereupon filed, and
sustained by the supreme court of New York, and judgment rendered
had
thereon that the corporation be ousted from the franchise which
usurped.
People v. Utica Insurance Company, 15 Johns. 358. Similar proceedings may be had at law in this commonwealth in
proper
case.
Goddard v. Smithett,
Attorney-GenGray 116, 122, 123.
eral v. Salem, 103 Mass. 138; Boston and Providence Railroad Co.
v. Midland Railroad Co.,
Gray 340; Gen. Sts., ch. 145,
16-24.
One early English case of high authority, not cited by Chancellor
Kent, nor at the argument of the present case,
so much in point as
to be worth quoting in full.
Upon a bill in equity, filed by the attorney-general, at the relation of several freemen of the Weavers' Company, against the officers of that company, setting forth "that the
defendants had been guilty of many breaches and violations of their

1328

ATTORNEY-GENERAL

charters, and had oppressed

V.

TUDOR ICE CO.

the freemen, etc., and mentioned
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some

particulars, and for a discovery of the rest, and that they might be
decreed for the future to observe the charters, and to have an account
of the revenue of the corporation which the defendants had misspent,
To which the defendants demurred,
etc., was the end of the bill.
because, as to part of the bill, it was to subject them to prosecutions
at law, and to a quo -warranlo; and as to the other parts, the plaintiffs
had remedy by mandamus, information or otherwise, and not here.
And of the same opinion," the report proceeds, was Lord Cowper,
"who said it would usurp too much on the king's bench, and that he
never heard of any precedent for such a case as this, and so allowed
the demurrer."
Attorney-General v. Reynolds, i Eq. Cas. Ab. (3d
ed.) 131.
The modern English cases, cited in support of this information,
were of suits against public bodies or officers exceeding the powers
conferred upon them by law, or against corporations vested with the
powers of eminent domain and doing acts which were deemed inconsistent with rights of the public.
Some of them were cases of misapplication of funds raised by
taxation and held by municipal corporations or officers upon specific
public trusts. Such were Attorney-General v. Norwich, 16 Sim. 225,
Attorney-General v. Guardians of Poor of Southampton, 17 Sim. 6,
and Attorney-General v. Andrews, 2 Macn. & Gord. 22^.
The hypothetical case, in which Lord Westbury, in Stockport District Waterworks v. Manchester, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 266, said that he
should " pi'obably not hesitate" to act upon the information of the
attorney-general, was of a suit to restrain the making of a contract
between an aqueduct corporation and a city to carry water beyond the
limits which the city was authorized by law to supply.
The passages cited from Liverpool v. Chorley Water Works Co., 2
De Gex, Macn. & Gord. 852, 860, and Ware v. Regent's Canal Co.,
212, 228, were but dicta that an unauthorized
3 De Gex & Jones
diversion of water or flowing of land by an aqueduct or canal corporation, without proof of actual or imminent injury to property, gave
no right of suit to an individual, and could only be checked on an application to the court by the attorney-general.
The case of Attorney-General v. Great Northern Railway Co., 4
De Gex & Smale 75, was a clear case of nuisance, the unlawful obThat of Attorney-Genstruction of a public highway by a railroad.
eral v. Oxford, Worcester and Wolverhampton Railway Co., 2 Weekly
Rep. 330, was the case of the opening of a railway line in violation
of an order which an authorized public board had made upon the
ground that it would be unsafe to the public.
The single case, in which an information has been sustained in an
English court of chancery against a corporation for carrying on a
business beyond its corporate powers, is Attorney-General v. Great
Northern Railway Co., i Drewry & Smale 154, in which Vice-Chancellor Kindersley in 1860 restrained a railway company from trading
in coal in large quantities, upon the ground that there was danger
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that, if allowed to go on, it might get into its hands the coal trade of
the whole district from or through which its railway ran, and thus acThat case is evidently the
quire a monopoly injurious to the public.
foundation of the dictum of Vice-Chancellor Wood, two years later,
in Hare v. London and Northwestern Railway Co., 2 Johns. &Hem.
80,
In Attorney-General v. Mid Kent Railway Co., Law Rep. 3 Ch.
100, a mandatory injunction was granted upon the information of the
attorney-general to compel a railway company to construct a bridge
over a public road, and with as gradual a slope as was required by a
special clause in its charter; and the objection that the attorney-general might have had an equal and complete remedy at law was stated
by each of the lords justices as if it required no answer and afforded
no ground for refusing to entertain jurisdiction in equity. It is often
said, in the English books, that the king or his attorney-general, suing
in behalf of the public, has the election to sue in either of his courts,
and may therefore enforce a legal right in the court of chancery,
i
Dan. Ch. Pract. (3d Am. Ed.) 6, 7; Attorney-General v. Galway,
i Molloy 95, 103.
However that may be, by our statutes the general equity jurisdiction of this court is limited to cases where there is
no plain, adequate and complete remedy at law, as well in suits by
the commonwealth as in those brought by private persons.
Gen.
Sts., ch. 113, 2; Commonwealth v. Smith, 10 Allen 448; Clouston
v. Shearer, 99 Mass. 209, 211, and other cases there cited.
The
of
the
former
in
of
rules
this
court
chancery
38th
(14 Gray 360) by
which the court adopted, as the outlines of its practice, the practice
of the high court of chancery in England, so far as the same was not
repugnant to the constitution and laws of the commonwealth, nor to
those or such other rules as the court might from time to time make,
can not enlarge the jurisdiction of this court as defined by statute,
and has been repealed by the new rules recently established.
Rules
of 1870, post, 104 Mass. 555.
The only cases in which informations in equity in the name of the
attorney-general have been sustained by this court are of two classes.
The one is of public nuisances, which affect or endanger the public
safety or convenience, and require immediate judicial interposition,
like obstructions of highways' or navigable waters.
District Attorney
v. Lynn and Boston Railroad Co., 16 Gray 242; Attorney-General
v. Cambridge, 16 Gray 247; Attorney-General v. Boston Wharf Co.,
12 Gray 553; Rowe v. Granite Bridge Co., 21 Pick. 344, 347.
The
other is of trusts for charitable purposes, where the beneficiaries are
so numerous and indefinite that the breach of trust can not be effectively redressed except by suit in behalf of the public.
County
Attorney v. May, 5 Cush. 336; Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539,
579; Attorney-General v. Garrison, 101 Mass. 223; Gen. Sts., ch.
20.
If there are any other cases to which this form of remedy
14,
is appropriate, that of a private trading corporation, whose proceedings are not shown to have injured or endangered any public or
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are objected to solely upon the ground that they
are not authorized by its act of incorporation and are therefore against
public policy, is not one of them.
Information dismissed.

private rights, and

Sec. 427.

Same.

EEL. J. B. NAYLOR, v. THE DODGE
CITY, MONTEZUMA AND TRINIDAD RAILWAY COMPANY.

THE STATE OF KANSAS, Ex
1894.

IN THE SUPREME

ALLEN,

COURT OF KANSAS.
Am. St. Rep. 295.

379, 42

53

Kan. Rep. 377-

This action was instituted by the county attorney of
in
the name of the state, to restrain the defendant from
Gray county,
tearing up and removing the track, ties and iron from that part of the
road-bed of the Dodge City, Montezuma and Trinidad Railroad in
A restraining order was granted by the district judge,
Gray county.
to continue in force until December 22, 1893, which time was fixed
A hearing
for hearing the application for a temporary injunction.
The
was had at that time, and the temporary injunction was denied.
the
here
for
review.
case
brings
plaintiff
While the title to a completed railroad is vested in the corporation,
it is only private property in a qualified sense. Railroads, like all
The power
other public thoroughfares, are public instrumentalities.
to construct and maintain railroads is granted to corporations for a
public purpose. The right to exercise the very high attributes of sovereignty, the power of eminent domain and of taxation, to further the
construction of railways, could not be granted to aid a purely private
The railway corporation takes it franchises subject to the
enterprise.
burden of a duty to the public to carry out the purposes of the charThe road, when constructed, becomes a public instrumentality,
ter.
and the road-bed, superstructure and other permanent property of the
corporation are devoted to the public use. From this use neither the
corporation itself, nor any person, company or corporation deriving
its title by purchase, either at voluntary or judicial sale, can divert it
without the assent of the state. It matters not whether the enterprise
as an investment be profitable or unprofitable, the property may not
be destroyed without the sanction of that authority which brought it
into existence.
Without legislative sanction, railroads could not be
constructed.
When once constructed, they may only be destroyed
with the sanction of the state. The legislature unquestionably has
the power to authorize the abandonment of railroads when they cease
to be of public utility. It may be, also, that in an action prosecuted by
the attorney-general, on behalf of the state, to forfeit the charter and
wind up the affairs of a railroad corporation, for any proper cause, the
court might make all necessary orders for the disposition of the property of the company; but in this case the state appeared, by the county

J.
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attorney of the county in which the
the removal of the superstructure
fusing the injunction asked.
The general propositions stated
authority: E. & N. E. R. Co. v.

1

33

I

road was located, protesting against
The court erred in re-

of the road.

above are abundantly supported by
Casey, 26 Pa. 287; The State v.
S. C. & T. R. Co., 7 Neb. 357; People v. L. & N. R. Co., 10 N.
E. Rep. (111.) 657; Railroad Com'rs v. P. & O. C. R. Co., 63
Maine 269; Railway Co. v. Mining Co., 68 111. 489; Gates v. Railroad Co., 53 Conn. 333; Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 71;
Railroad Co. v. Winans, 17 How. 30; Pierce v. Emery, 32 N. H.
484; People v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 28 Hun 543.
These views are also in accordance with prior decisions of this
&
court: Com'rs of Leavenworth Co. v. Miller, 7 Kan. 479; St.
D. C. R. Co. v. Ryan, n Kan. 603; The State, ex reL, v. Bridge

J.

Co.,

22

Kan. 438; City of Potwin Place v. Topeka R. Co.,

51

Kan.

609.

We have decided this case on what appears in the record, without
reference to facts developed on the hearing of other cases relating to
the same railroad company, which may deprive the plaintiff of any
The order of the
substantial benefit from the decision in this case.
district court, refusing the temporary injunction, is reversed.
All the justices concurring.
An injunction may be granted upon the application of the state,
Note.
whenever a corporation is abusing the powers given to it for a public purpose,
or acting adversely to the public, or creating a nuisance, or threatening to do
1829, In re Binney, 2 Bland (Md.) 99; 1860, Attorney-General
any of these.
v. Great Northern R. Co., 1 Drew & Sm. 154; 1873, State v. County Court, 51
Mo. 350, 11 Am. Rep. 454; 1874, Attorney-General v. Chicago & N. W. Ry.
Co., 35 Wis. 425 ; 1875, Appeal of Edgewood R. Co., 79 Pa. St. 257 ; 1882, Attorney-General v. Aqueduct Corp., 133 Mass. 361 ; 1895, Chicago Fair Grounds
Assn. v. People, 60 111. 488; 1895, Columbia Athletic Club v. State, 143 Ind.
98, 52 Am. St. Rep. 407; 1901, State v. Schlitz Brewing Co., 104 Tenn. 55.
So too, a private party that will be injurously affected may have an injunc1832, Scudder v. Trenton,
tion, if damages would be an inadequate remedy.
etc., Falls Co., 1 N. J. Eq. 694, 23 Am. Dec. 756; 1852, Christopher v. City of
New York, 13 Barb. (N. Y.) 569; 1860, West Md. R. Co. v. Owings, 15 Md.
199, 74 Am. Dec. 563; 1869, Mayor v. Groshon, 30 Md. 436, 96 Am. Dec. 591 ;
1875, Ottawa, O. & F., etc., R. Co. v. Black, 79 111. 262; 1887, Iron Age Pub.
Co. v. W. U. Tel. Co., 83 Ala. 498, 3 Am. St. 758; 1895, Bienville Water Supply v. Mobile, 112 Ala. 260, 57 Am. St. Rep. 28 ; 1899, Harding v. Am. Glucose
Co., 182 111.551, 74 Am. St. R. 189; 1900, Inter Ocean Pub. Co. v. Assoc.
Press, 184 111. 438, 75 Am. St. Rep. 184. Contra, 1865, Buck Mountain Coal
Co. v. Lehigh Coal Co., 50 Pa. St. 91, 88 Am. Dec. 534.
It seems, too, that the state can complain and prevent the dissipation of the
funds of a public charitable trust when the beneficiaries are so numerous and
indefinite that the trust can not be effectively protected, except through the
public authorities. Clark Corp., 84, p. 247; citing Parker v. May, 5 Gush.
(Mass.) 336; Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen (Mass.) 539; Attorney-General v.
Garrison, 101 Mass. 223.
A single shareholder may enjoin the acceptance of fundamental changes
in the corporate constitution, the diversion of the corporate funds, or the
consummation of executory ultra vires transactions. 1853, Kean v. Johnson,
9 N. J. Eq. 401; 1855, Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. (U. S.) 331, supra, p. 88;
1856, Sears v. Hotchkiss, 25 Conn. 171, 65 Am. Dec. 557; 1858, Bliss v. Anderson, 31 Ala. 612, 70 Am. Dec. 511; 1860, March v. Eastern R. Co., 40 N.
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548, 77 Am. Dec. 732; 1861, Abbott v. Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578;
1867, Zabriskie v. Hackensack, etc., R. Co., 18 N.
Eq. 178, 90 Am. Dec.
617, infra, p. 1466.
1890, Gamble v. Queens Co. Water Co., 123 N. Y. 91, 9 L. R. A. 527, 31 Am
& Eng. C. C. 313; 1896, Green v. Hedenberg, 159 111. 489, 50 Am. St. Rep'
178; 1899, Harding v. Am. Glucose Co., 182 111. 551, 74 Am. St. Rep. 189[
See infra, Shareholder and corporation,
513, 585.

J.

ARTICLE II.

v.

VISITORS OF THE THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTION IN
PHILLIPS ACADEMY IN ANDOVER. 1

TRUSTEES OF
1891.

OF CORPORATIONS.

I. Private visitor.

Sec. 428.

SMYTH

VISITATION

IN THE

PHILLIPS ACADEMY
SUPREME
154

v.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL ET AL.

JUDICIAL COURT OF
Mass. Rep. 551-569.

MASSACHUSETTS.

[Appeal by Smyth from decree of visitors, dismissing him from a
professorship, and bill in equity by trustees against visitors, for instructions as to effect and validity of the decree dismissing professors.
In 1778 Phillips Academy to instruct youth in the common branches
of learning was founded, and in 1780, its board of trustees were incorporated, and with their successors were to "be the true and sole
visitors, trustees and governors of said Phillips Academy, in perpetual
succession forever."
By an act of 1807, the corporation was authorized to hold other real and personal property, the income to be applied
to the purposes of a theological institution "agreeably to the will of
the donors."
Gifts for this purpose were accordingly made to the
corporation, in which, by the consent of the trustees, visitorial powers
*
*
*
were reserved whereby "every founder of a professorship
will have the exclusive right of prescribing the regulations and statutes
to be observed by the trustees in conducting the concerns of the same
(consistent with the objects of the institution) with the right, for the
*
* such local visitor as he may
term of his life, of appointing
think proper, and endow him with all visitorial power necessary, etc."
In 1808, the various donors and the trustees agreed to ''Associate
Statutes" whereby all the control and management of the theological
institution was left to the trustees who hold the property, subject to a
visitorial power in a board of visitors, created by these associate
statutes, giving authority, among other things "to take care that the
* * be intelligibly and faithfully disduties of every professor
charged, and to admonish or remove him either for misbehavior,
In
heterodoxy, incapacity, or neglect of the duties of his office."
1823, this board of visitors was incorporated, with the powers given
Statement abridged; part of opinion of Knowlton,
opinion of Field, C. J., omitted.
1

J., and all

of dissenting

VISITORS.
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At the hearing before the visitors that
in the Associate Statutes.
resulted in the removal of Smyth and four other professors, the trustees applied for leave to be heard, but were refused.]
KNOWLTON, J. * * * The nature of the duties of visitors of educational or charitable institutions is to some extent implied in the name
which these officers bear. They are to visit the corporation. They are
to go where it is, and see it and its representatives face to face.
2
Kent Com. (i3th ed.) 302. The King v. Bishop of Ely, i Wm. Bl.
Their visitation is for the
71, 82 ; Eden v. Foster, 2 P. Wms. 325.
condition,
into
its
and
of
inquiring
ascertaining whether it is
purpose
and
in all respects it is conor
whether
improperly managed,
properly
of
its
to
the
foundation.
A visitation may
principles
ducted according
and
under
or
most
foundations,
English
be general
to protect
special;
the managing board from too frequent interference, a general visitation can only take place at the expiration of a certain interval, as one,
Following this theory, the Andover statutes
three, five or ten years.
shall be once in a year.
visitations
that
Associate
general
prescribe
A
visitation
20.
Statutes, art.
special
may be made at any time at the
request] of the governing body, or of any one claiming a grievance
and who on that account has
right to promote the office
against
of the visitors. When special duties are imposed on the board of
visitors by the founder, the visitors may perform them at such times
as required by the statutes which confer their authority.
Ordinarily
at
necesspecial visitation the managing body of the institution
formal party before the visitors, because the visitation prosarily
formal application by the managers, or by some one askceeds on
When questions arise at general visitation,
ing relief against them.
whatever the form of the proceedings, the real party whose conduct
on trial
the managing board, by reason of whose act or omission
the institution
alleged to have gone astray.
Although the visitors
are not
court, in the performance of some of their duties they act
judicially, and they must be governed by the will of the founder as
It a fundamental principle of all judicial
expressed in his statutes.
called in question shall be heard
proceedings that one whose conduct
in his defense, and this principle
as important in its application to
the managing board of
charitable corporation whose acts or omissions are under investigation by
board of visitors as to an individual
crime.
Murdock, Appellant,
charged with the commission of
Pick. 303; Murdock v. Phillips Academy, 12 Pick. 244. It
inconceivable that
board of visitors intending to be governed by prinmoment think of refusing the managing
ciples of justice should for
body hearing in case where the proceedings are directly against
to set aside its action.
should not be forgotten that almost
But
board of visitors
everything which comes within the jurisdiction of
trial of the
acting under their general visitatorial power involves
managing board, and the jurisdiction of the visitors to deal with the
agents or servants or individual beneficiaries of the institution is, ordinarily, merely incidental to their jurisdiction over the institution itself
WIL.

CAS.

11
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as represented by its managing officers.
If by the statutes they are
given express authority to act in a visitatorial capacity in regard to an
agent, their action may no less directly affect the institution itself.
The form of the proceedings is immaterial ; if the visitors are in fact
seeking to revise the action of the managers by virtue of their supervisory power, the managers should have an opportunity to be heard.
So far as the industry of the counsel on either side has furnished us
with authorities, we have found nothing to indicate that visitations
of educational or charitable institutions, under foundations like that
which we are considering, have ever been had without notice to the
In some relations, under the ecclesiastical system
managing board.
in England, the bishop has visitatorial power of a different kind, which
we need not consider ; but in institutions like the theological department of Phillips Academy the right of the managing board to be
heard before the visitors in every proceeding affecting the corporation
seems to have been always assumed.
In The King v. Bishop of Ely,
2 T. R. 290, 336, 338, 345, in considering the question
whether a
visitor acted in his official capacity, Ashhurst, J., said: "But even
supposing that this matter was within the bishop's visitatorial authority,
The exercise of a
yet he has not acted in the character of a visitor.
visitor's power, in a case like the present, is a judicial act, and a judge
can not determine without hearing the parties concerned.
So that even
if he had the right to exercise such a power, he should have done it in a
formal manner, and should at least have convened the parties interested to give them an opportunity of making a defense." Buller, J.,
used the following language: "His proceedings, therefore, have not
even the show of a visitation, for whenever that is intended the parties

whose conduct or whose rights are objected to should be heard, or at
least convened before him, and have an opportunity of being heard,
but in the present instance this ceremony was totally omitted." Grose,
J. , said: "Neither did he himself conceive that he was acting as visitor ; his acts show that he was not ; and he acted without giving notice
to the persons on whom he was judging."
Not only is this language
applicable in terms to the governing board of a corporation whose
conduct is called in question, but the facts of that case show that the
judges had reference to the governing board of Peterhouse College,
to whose action the controversy related.
In those cases under royal
charters, where the visitatorial power is in the king, visitatorial proceedings in regard to the management of the affairs of the corporation have been conducted before the lord chancellor, who has observed
the same rules as to bringing before him all parties interested as in
ordinary cases in chancery ; and every reason that exists in any case
why parties interested in a proceeding should have a right to be heard
applies in cases like the present.
The counsel for the trustees asserted at the argument that it had
been the universal practice in England for visitors to give notice and
an opportunity of being heard to the managing body before making a
decree affecting the management of an eleemosynary institution, and
they offered to present affidavits showing the result of extended re-
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searches in regard to the subject ; but, the respondents objecting, and
the facts not being regularly before us as evidence, we have considered
only such cases as appear in the reports or come within general historical knowledge. These indicate that the practice in England has
been as contended by the trustees.
Philips v. Bury, 2 T. R. 346; s.
The
King v. Bishop of Ely, 2 T. R. 290; Attorc. i Ld. Raym. 5 ;
ney-General v. Dixie, 13 Ves. 519; Attorney-General v. Earl of

Clarendon,

17

Ves. 491.

It can not be maintained that the visitors are the corporation that

holds the property and is primarily responsible for the affairs of the
seminary, or that they sufficiently represent the corporation when sitting as judges. They are incorporated as a separate board, and are
the judicial department of the theological institution.
They are not
supposed to be familiar with the details of the business of the principal
corporation, nor to understand the practical effect of many things in
its management.
They do not represent the corporation as an administrative board, and at a hearing in regard to the management of
its affairs they would ordinarily need the aid of facts, suggestions, and
arguments which the managers alone could properly present. Besides,
while they act as judges, they are not in a position to defend ardently
and vigorously acts of the corporation which might be unjustly and
vigorously attacked by others.
It is a mistake to treat a proceeding before the visitors to remove
five of the professors of an institution like the theological seminary at
Andover as a suit against the professors alone.
If they are wrongly
The proceedings
there, the trustees should have removed them.
look to a change which would be likely to concern very deeply the
interests of the seminary.
Can it be said that the officers of the corporation who have been charged with its management in the past,
and who will be held responsible for its conditions in the future, are
* *
*
not interested in a matter so vitally affecting it?
In the present case the trustees were not heard before the visitors,
although they made a formal application for leave to become a party
at the trial.
The action of the visitoi's in this particular is subject to
revision by the justices of this court, who are expressly given authority, under article 25 of the associate statutes, to set aside any decree
which they deem contrary to the statutes, or beyond the just limits of
the power of the visitors.
By article 20 the visitors are required to
administer justice impartially, and exercise the functions of their
office "according to the said statutes, the constitution of this seminary, and the laws of the land." We do not intimate that visitors,
in determining questions before them, are to be held to all the rules
and formalities which would be observed by a court of law under
similar circumstances, nor that their action can ordinarily be revised
by a court in the absence of an express provision to that effect in the
statutes, unless it so affects a charity that a court of equity ought to
interfere under its jurisdiction for the protection of trusts.
But where
a principle essential to a fair and proper adjudication of the rights of
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parties is disregarded in deciding a question, their action under stat*
*
*
utes like those before us is invalid.
For these reasons we are of opinion that the action of the visitors
was not in accordance with the statutes which they were trying to
maintain, and that their decree must be set aside. * * *

Decree accordingly.
Note.
Visitation of corporations: Blackstone says: "As to eleemosynary corporations, by the dotation the founder and his heirs are of common
right the legal visitors to see that such property is rightly employed, as might
otherwise have descended to the visitor himself, but, if the founder has appointed and assigned any other person to be visitor, then his assignee so appointed is invested with all the founder's power in exclusion of his heir." 1
Comm., p. *482. The visitor had exclusive jurisdiction to control according to
the statutes or trusts upon which the corporation was founded, and his judgments, if they were not in excess of these, were not reviewable by the courts.
So, too, the visitor has no authority to modify, or accept any material amendments in the statutes of the original foundation, without consent of the beneficiaries. At common law, where the rules of primogeniture obtained, there
was but little inconvenience resulting, in case the donor did not appoint a
visitor for the rules of descent would carry the right to the eldest son as in
other cases. In this country, after a few descents are cast the heirs are likely
to become so numerous that great inconvenience, if not an impossibility of
While it is usual
properly controlling such corporations in this way, results.
to say that, in the absence of any other provision, the common-law rules of
visitation apply, yet there is some question as to this rule of the common law
being applicable to our condition. In any event, the statutes, or the provisions of the foundation, usually designate some one to be selected as a visitor
by some public authority, such as the court where the corporation is to be
located, or the council of the municipality, etc. And it seems that if the
trustees of the corporation created to manage the property generally are
clothed with "all the powers of management," their power will include that
of the visitors; but in such case the state through its courts would undoubtedly have the powers of control through quo warranto, or similar proMost of the learning receedings, as it has in civil corporations generally.
lating to the visitation of corporations by private visitors is to be found in the
following cases: 1694, Phillips v. Bury, 1 Ld. Raym5; 4 Mod. 106; Show.,
85; Skinn.,407;
Salk.,408; Garth. ,180; 1815, Trustees of Phillips Acad. v.
King, 12 Mass. 547, 575; 1816, Rex v. Bishop of Worcester, 4 M.& S. 415;
1819, Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, on 668,
674, supra, p. 708, on 729, 742 ; 1827, Fuller v. Plainfield Academy, 6 Conn. 532,
544; 1828, Amherst Academy v. Cowls, 6 Pick. (23 Mass.) 427, 17 Am. Dec.
387; 1828, Appeal of Murdock, 7 Pick. (24 Mass.) 303; 1831, Murdock v.
Phillips Academy, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 244; 1833, Allen v. McKean, 1 Sum. 276,
Fed. Cas. 229 ; 1838, Regents of Univ. of Md. v. Williams, 9 G. & J. (Md.) 401,
31 Am. Dec. 72; 1841, Chambers v. Baptist Ed. Soc., 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 213, 219;
1848, Nelson v. Cushing, 2 Cush. (56 Mass.) 519; 1863, Thompson v. Univ. of
London, 33 L. J. Ch. 625; 1869, State v. Georgia Med. Col., 38 Ga. 608, supra,
p. 136; 1869, State v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570; 1875, In re Taylor Orphan Asylum,
36 Wis. 534; 1877, Juvenile Guardian Soc. v. Roosevelt, 7 Daly (N. Y.) 188;
1878, United States v. Union Pac. R. Co., 98 U. S. 569; 1881, American Printing House v. Trustees, 104 U. S. 711 ; 1894, Trustees v. Hunn, 7 Tex. Civ.
App. 249.
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Public visitor or officer.

2.

See Eagle Insurance Co. v. Ohio, 153 U. S. 446, infra, p. 1363;
Sinyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, infra, p. 1352.

ARTICLE III.

CONTROL

BY LEGISLATIVE

I. Ordinary.

Sec. 430.
(

i

)

Eminent domain proceedings.

See Proprietors of Piscataqua Bridge v.

7

ACTION.

N. H. 35, supra, p. 309.

Sec. 430a.

New Hampshire Bridge,

Same.

THE WEST RIVER BRIDGE COMPANY v. DIX Er.
1848.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
(6 How. ) Rep. 507-550.

AL.

47

U. S.

In 1795 the bridge comfor
100
with
was
the
exclusive privilege of
years
pany
incorporated
over
river, and taking tolls
a
at
a
certain
West
bridge
erecting
place
for the same; the bridge was duly constructed.
In 1839, the legislature of Vermont provided by general law for the taking "of any real
estate, easement, or franchise of any turnpike or other corporation"
when the public good should require, upon making compensation.
Under these statutes the public authorities laid out a public highway
passing over this bridge, and took the proper steps to appropriate it
to the public use.
The bridge company presented a bill to enjoin
these proceedings; this bill, upon demurrer, was dismissed, and error
prosecuted in the supreme court, which affirmed the decision below.]
* * * In considering the question proMR. JUSTICE DANIEL.
pounded in these causes, there can be no doubt, nor has it been
doubted in argument, on either side of this controversy,
that the
charter of incorporation granted to the plaintiffs in 1793, with the
rights and privileges it declared or implied, formed a contract between
the plaintiffs and the state of Vermont, which the latter, under the
inhibition in the tenth section of the first article of the constitution,
could have no power to impair. Yet this proposition, though taken
as a postulate on both sides, determines nothing as to the real merits
of these causes. Tine, it furnishes a guide to our inquiries, yet leaves
those inquiries still open, in their widest extent, as to the real position
of the parties with reference to the state legislation or to the constitu[Error from supreme court of Vermont.

1
Statement abridged.
Part of opinion of Justice Daniel, all of concurring
opinions of McLean and Woodbury, JJ., and arguments omitted.
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tion.
Following the guide thus furnished us, we will proceed to
ascertain that position.
No state, it is declared, shall pass a law impairing the obligation of conti'acts ; yet, with this concession constantly yielded, it can "not be justly disputed that in every political
sovereign community there inheres necessarily the right and the duty
of guarding its own existence, and of protecting and promoting the
interests and welfare of the community at large.
This power and
this duty are to be exerted not only in the highest acts of sovereignty,
and in the external relations of governments ; they reach and comprehend likewise the interior polity and relations of social life, which
should be regulated with reference to the advantage of the whole
This power, denominated the eminent domain of the state,
society.
is, as its name imports, paramount to all private rights vested under
the government, and these last are, by necessary implication, held in
subordination to this power, and must yield in every instance to its
proper exercise.
The constitution of the United States, although adopted by the sovereign states of this union, and proclaimed in its own language to be
the supreme law for their government, can, by no rational interpretation, be brought to conflict with this attribute in the states ; there is
no express delegation of it by the constitution, and it would imply an
incredible fatuity in the states to ascribe to them the intention to reA corlinquish the power of self-government and self-preservation.
rect view of this matter must demonstrate, moreover, that the right
of eminent domain in government in nowise interferes with the inviolability of contracts ; that the most sanctimonious regard for the
one is perfectly consistent with the possession and exercise of the
other.
Under every established government the tenure of property is derived mediately or immediately from the sovereign power of the political body, organized in such mode or exerted in such way as the
It can rest
community or state may have thought proper to ordain.
on no other foundation, can have no other guarantee.
It is owing to
these characteristics only, in the original nature of tenure, that appeals can be made to the laws either for the protection or assertion of
the rights of property.
Upon any other hypothesis the law of property would be simply the law of force.
Now it is undeniable that
the investment of property in the citizen by the government, whether
or founded on conditions of civil
made for a pecuniary consideration
or political duty, is a contract between the state, or the government
acting as its agent, and the grantee, and both the parties thereto are
bound in good faith to fulfill it. But into all contracts, whether made
between states and individuals or between individuals only, there enter
conditions which arise not out of the literal terms of the contract
itself; they are superinduced by the pre-existing and higher authority
of the laws of nature, of nations, or of the community to which the
parties belong; they are always presumed, and must be presumed, to
be known and recognized
by all, are binding upon all, and need
never, therefore, be carried into express stipulation, for this could add

430a

CONTROL BY LEGISLATURES.

1339

nothing to their force. Every contract is made in subordination to
them, and must yield to their control, as conditions inherent and
paramount, wherever a necessity for their execution shall occur. Such
domain. This right does not
a condition is the right of eminent
operate to impair the contract effected by it, but recognizes its obligation in the fullest extent, claiming only the fulfillment of an essential
Thus, in claiming the resumption or
and inseparable condition.
qualification of an investiture, it insists merely on the true nature and
character of the right invested.
The impairing of contracts inhibited by the constitution can scarcely,
by the greatest violence of construction, be made applicable to the enforcing of the terms or necessary import of a contract; the language
and meaning of the inhibition were designed to embrace proceedings
attempting the interpolation of some new term or condition foreign to
the original agreement, and, therefore, inconsistent with and violative
It, then, being clear that the power in question not being
thereof.
within the purview of the restriction imposed by the tenth section of
the first article of the constitution, it remains with the states to the full
extent in which it inheres in every sovereign government, to be exercised by them in that degree that shall by them be deemed commensurate with public necessity.
So long as they shall steer clear of the
single predicament denounced by the constitution, shall avoid interference with the obligation of contracts, the wisdom, the modes, the
policy, the hardship of any exertion of this power are subjects not
within the proper cognizance of this court.
This is, in truth, purely
a question of power; and, conceding the power to reside in the state
government, this concession would seem to close the door upon all
further controversy in connection with it. The instances of the exertion of this power, in some mode or other, from the very foundation of civil government, have been so numerous and familiar that it
seems somewhat strange, at this day, to raise a doubt or question concerning it. In fact, the whole policy of the country, relative to roads,
mills, bridges and canals, rests upon this single power, under which
lands have been always condemned, and without the exertion of this
power, not one of the improvements just mentioned could be constructed.
In our country it is believed that the power was never, or,
at any rate, rarely questioned, until the opinion seems to have obtained that the right of property in a chartered corporation was more
sacred and intangible than the same right could possibly be in the person of the citizen, an opinion which must be without any grounds to
rest upon, "until it can be demonstrated either that the ideal creature
is more than a person, or the corporeal being is less.
For, as a question of the power to appropriate to public uses the property of private
persons, resting upon the ordinary foundations of private right, there
would seem to be room neither for doubt nor difficulty. A distinction has been attempted, in argument, between the power of a government to appropriate for public uses property which is corporeal, or
may be said to be in being, and the like power in the government to
resume or extinguish a franchise.
The distinction thus attempted we
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regard as a refinement which has no foundation in reason, and one
that, in truth, avoids the true legal or constitutional question in these
causes, namely, that of the right in private persons, in the use or enjoyment of their private property, to control and actually to prohibit
the power and duty of the government to advance and protect the general good.
We are aware of nothing peculiar to a franchise which
can class it higher, or render it more sacred, than other property.
A franchise is property, and nothing more ; it is incorporeal property, and is so defined by Justice Blackstone, when treating, in his
second volume, ch. 3, page 20, of the Rights of Things.
It is its
character of property only which imparts to it value, and alone authorizes in individuals a right of action for invasions or disturbances of its
Vide Bl, Com., Vol. Ill, ch. 16, p. 236, as to injuries
enjoyment.
to this description of private property, and the remedies given for reA franchise, therefore, to erect a bridge, to construct
dressing them.
a road, to keep a ferry and to collect tolls upon them, granted by the
authority of the state, we regard as occupying the same position, with respect to the paramount power and duty of the state to promote and protect the public good, as does the right of the citizen to the possession and
enjoyment of his land under his patent or contract with the state, and it
can no more interpose any obstruction in the way of their just exertion.
Such exertion we hold to be not within the inhibition of the constituThe power of a state in the extion, and no violation of a contract.
ercise of eminent domain, to extinguish immediately a franchise it had
granted, appears never to have been directly brought here for adjudication, and consequently has not been heretofore formally propounded
from this court ; but in England this power, to the fullest extent, was
recognized in the case of the Governor and Company of the Cast Plate
Manufacturers v. Meredith, 4 T. R. 794, and Lord Kenyon, especially
in that case, founded solely upon this power the entire poiicy and
authority of all the road and canal laws of the kingdom.
The several state decisions cited in the argument, from 3 Paige
(N. Y.) 45, from 23 Pick. (Mass.) 361, from 17 Conn. 454, from 8
N. H. 398, from 10 N. H. 371 and from n N. H. 20, are accordant
with the decision above mentioned, from 4 T. R., and entirely sup*
*
*
ported by it.
Decision of supreme court of Vermont affirmed.
Justice Wayne
dissented.
See note, infra, p. 1343.

Sec. 431.

CLOPTON,
1888.

Same.

J.,

IN

MOBILE & GIRARD RAILROAD CO.
MIDLAND RAILWAY CO.

IN THE SUPREME

COURT OF ALABAMA.
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being first

*
*
*
made, is conceded.
The settled rule is, that the legislative intent to grant authority to
one railroad to take and condemn a franchise of another must appear
in express terms, or must arise from necessary implication, founded
No room for doubt or unceron an existing and particular need.
be
left.
the
must
Should
general
assembly empower a comtainty
a
railroad
between
construct
to
designated and fixed terminal
pany
this
and,
to
accomplish
object, it becomes necessary to take
points,
the franchises, or any part, of another corporation, power to do so
arises from necessary implication, the presumption being that the legislature deemed the later use the more important and of greater public
The implication rests on the general rule that the grant of
benefit.
do
to
a particular thing of a public nature carries with it impower
plied authority to do all that is necessary to accomplish the principal
*
*
*
and general purpose.
A franchise to acquire, hold and use land for a right of way, is in
its very nature exclusive, that the privileges and powers granted in
respect to its use may be fully exercised.
Dispossession of property,
subject to the use of a franchise and in actual use, is, to all intents,
deprivation of the right to exercise the franchise as to such property
tantamount, in its legal effect, to the taking of the franchise pro tanto.
We adopt the rule as stated, i Wood's Railway Law,
229: "One
public corporation can not take the lands or franchises of another
public corporation in actual use by it, unless expressly authorized to
flo so by the legislature ; but the lands of such a corporation not in
actual use may be taken by another corporation authorized to take
lands for its use in invitum, whenever the lands of an individual may
be taken, subject to the qualification that there is a necessity therefor;" with the modification, in order to avoid misunderstanding, that
the authority may be implied in a proper case, and the use must be
not for the
reasonably requisite to the free exercise of the franchise
mere purpose to prevent the exercise of the right of eminent domain.
This rule furnishes the boundary of the delegated authority to take,
which is actual use of the property by the adversary corporation, and
the reasonable necessity of its use to the safe, proper and convenient
management of the corporate business, and the accomplishment of
the purposes of its creation.
Taking the property must not materially
diminish or impair the usefulness of a franchise in exercise. * * *
It would be difficult to lay down any specific rule as to the measure
of the necessity of sufficient scope to include all cases. It may be observed generally that necessary, in this connection, does not mean an
absolute or indispensable necessity, but reasonably requisite and proper
for the accomplishment of the end in view under the particular cir*
*
*
sumstances of the case.
See note, infra, p. 1343.
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SHARON

RAILWAY COMPANY'S APPEAL.

IN SUPREME

122 Pa. St
COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
on 544, 9 Am. St. Rep. 133, on 135.

533,

We have then the finding of the master, based upon ample testimony, that the land in question was acquired by the appellant company for the uses of its road, and that the same is necessary therefor.
Can it now be taken 'by another corporation for the same or a similar
use?
It certainly can not be done for the mere convenience or profit
To justify such taking there must be a necessity, "a
of the latter.
necessity so absolute that without it the grant itself will be defeated. It
must also be a necessity that arises from the very nature of things over
which the corporation has no control ; it must not be created by the
company itself for its own convenience or for the sake of economy."
Pennsylvania Railroad Co.'s Appeal, 93 Pa. 150. To the same effect

.is Pittsburgh Junction Railroad Co.'s Appeal, 122 Pa. St. 511. I
will not stop to discuss or vindicate this rule. It is settled law, and
rests upon sound principles.

Sec. 433.
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MR. CHIEF JUSTICE DICKEY
SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO.

IN LAKE SHORE
v. CHICAGO AND

DIANA RAILROAD CO.

1 88 1.

IN THE SUPREME

COURT

OF

ILLINOIS.

AND MICHIGAN
WESTERN IN-

97

111.

Rep. 506, on

Counsel for plaintiffs in error, after stating the proposition, that the
general assembly of this state has no power, under our constitution, to
take, or to authorize the taking, of private property from one owner for
the mere purpose of giving it to another, and that it is only where
such taking is "for public use" that the power of eminent domain
can rightfully be exercised, insist that where property has already
been appropriated to public use, and is, in fact, in such use in the
hands of one corporation, it can not be rightfully taken (even by the
authority of the statute to that effect) away from such corporation, for
the purpose of subjecting it to the same public use in the hands of another corporation.
This position we do not question.
Where the
public use in question is the same, such taking would undoubtedly
degenerate into a taking from one for the mere purpose of giving
to another, which we hold (under our institutions) is not within the
domain of legislative power.
To warrant the taking of property of one party, already appropriated to a public use, and placing it wholly or in part in the hands of
another party for a public use, it is essential that the new use be a
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different use, and also that the change from the present use to the new
Whether the new use be
for the benefit of the public.
different from the present use, is a judicial question which courts may
decide.
But where the new use, in its nature, may be a public benefit, whether the change -will be for the benefit of the public is a political question, to be determined by a political department of the government, and generally, if not always, by the law-making power.
The new use in the case at bar, in its nature, may be a public benefit,
and clearly it is not the same use.
By the present use the public has
of
benefit
an
easement
these
the
upon
premises for the passage of
and
the
lines
freight
passengers along
already constructed, leading to
and from certain points and regions of country.
By the new use the use sought by the condemnation proceedings
in question
the public will have the benefit of an easement upon
these premises for the passage of freight and passengers along another
and an additional line leading to and from certain other and different
Heretofore these premises have been subjected
points and regions.
to the exclusive use of complainants in the movement of their trains.
The new use to which it is proposed to subject these premises is a
joint use, or rather, a co-operative use, to be exercised and enjoyed
by both complainants and defendants, so as to furnish to the public
an additional line of travel and transportation.
use shall be

Note.
Eminent domain taking property already devoted to a public use.
Property already devoted to a public use may, by express statutory authority,
be taken for another public use under eminent domain proceedings, and by
the weight of authority it may be taken for a similar or the same public use.
But such a right will not be impHed, unless the necessity is so great as that
the subsequent grant would be ineffective, or unless the interference is so
slight or so usual as to be fairly contemplated by the grant made : 1834, Piscataqua B. Co. v. N. H. Bridge Co., 7 N. H. 67, supra, p. 309; 1837, Charles River
Bridge Co. v. Warren Bridge Co., 11 Pet. (U. S.) 420; 1840, Tuckahoe Canal
Co. v. Tuckahoe R. Co., 11 Leigh (Va.) 42, 36 Am. Dec. 374; 1840, Backus v.
Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19, 35 Am. Dec. 466 (a toll road may be taken and converted into a free road) ; 1843, Armington v. Barnet, 15 Vt. 745, 40 Am. Dec.
705 (same) ; 1848, West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. (47 U. S.) 507, supra,
p. 1337 (a toll bridge may be made free) ; 1853, Northern R. Co. v. Concord,
etc., R., 27 N. H. 194 (one railroad can take half a mile of the right of
way of another) ; 1859, Boston & Lowell R. Co. v. Salem & L. R.
Co., 2 Gray 1 (an exclusive grant can be taken under power of
eminent domain); 1859, Lafayette Plank Road v. New Albany, etc., R.
Co., 13 Ind. 90, 74 Am. Dec. 246 (railroad parallel to a turnpike);
1859, State v. S. P. R. Co., 24 Texas 80, on 127 ; 1862, In re Petition of Clev. &
P. R., 2 Pitts. Rep. 348, 10 Pitts. Rep. 74; 1864, In matter of Kerr, 42 Barb.
(N. Y.) 119 (a street car company may be authorized to use the tracks of another street car company) ; 1869, New York, etc., R. Co. v. Boston, etc., R.
Co., 36 Conn. 196; 1869, City of Bridgeport v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., 36 Conn.
255, 4 Am. Rep. 63; 1871, Bait. &H. G.T. Co. v. Union R., etc., 35 Md. 224, 231
(railroad can be authorized to cross a turnpike) ; 1872, Eastern R. Co. v. Boston & M. R.,
Mass. 125, 15 Am. Rep. 13 (one railroad company may take
the property of another for a passenger station) ; 1872, Peoria P. & J. R. Co.
v. Peoria & S. R. Co., 66 111. 174 (railroad lands not actually in use may be
appropriated by another railroad company) ; 1874, Chicago, etc., R. Co. v.
Town of Lake, 71 111. 333; 1874, Cincinnati L. F., etc., R. Co. v. Danville, etc.,
R. Co., 75 111. 113, supra, p 664, (fraudulent appropriation) ; 1875, In re N. Y.
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C. & H. R. Co. v. M. G. L. Co., 63 N. Y. 326, 334 (lands of a gas company can
be appropriated by a railroad company) ; 1875, Metropolitan R. Co. v. Highland St. R. Co., 118 Mass. 290 (a street railway company may be authorized
to take the tracks of another, or appropriate the right to use them) ; 1875,
Evergreen Cemetery Assn. v. New Haven, 43 Conn. 234, 21 Am. Rep. 643
(taking land of a cemetery for a road) ; 1876, The Central City Horse R. Co.
v. The Ft. C. H. R. Co. 81 111. 523 fa new railroad company can condemn the
property of an old) ; 1877, Metropolitan City R. Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.,
87 111. 317 (one street car company can condemn
the right of another company not to have cars run on a particular street ); 1877, Grand Rapids, etc., R.
Co. v. G. R. & I. R., 35 Mich. 265, 24 Am. Rep. 545 (railroad crossing another) ;
1878, Boston & M. R. Co. v. Lowell & I. R. Co., 124 Mass. 368 (a longitudinal
taking requires an express grant); 1880, St. Louis, Jacksonville, etc., R. Co.
v. Springfield, etc., R. Co., 96 111. 274 (railroad crossing another); 1880, CitiEq. 267 (use of a street upon which
zens' Coach Co. v. Camden H. R., 33 N.
is a railway by other parties) ; 1881, A.,T. & S. F. R. Co. v. A. & W. R. Co.,
75 Va. 780 (property of one company may be taken for the same use by another
company, if expressly authorized); 1881, Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. P., W.
& Ky. R., 17 W. Va. 812 (same) ; 1883, Pennsylvania R. Co. v. B. & O. R.
Co., 60 Md. 263 ("taking of five miles of railroad for use of another railroad
company) ; 1884, East St. Louis C. R. Co. v. E. St. L. TJ. R. Co., 108 111. 265
Tparallel lines) ; 1884, C. & N. W. R. Co. v. C. & E. R. Co., 112 111. 589
(where there is a change of use the question is one of legislative intent);
1887, Illinois Central R. v. Chicago, B. & N. R. Co., 122 111. 473 (taking of
eleven miles of railroad by another railroad company legislature can authorize) ; 1888, Appeal of Pittsburgh Junction R., 122 Pa. St. 511, 9 Am. St. Rep.
128 (special authority required) ; 1888, Appeal of Sharon R.. 122 Pa. St. 533,
9 Am. St. Rep. 133, note 137, supra, p. 1342 ; 1888, Philadelphia, N., etc., R.
Co. Appeal, 120 Pa. St. 90 (a turnpike may be converted into a free road) ;
1888, Mobile & G. R. Co. v. Alabama, etc., 87 Ala. 591, supra, p. 1340; 1890,
Colorado E. Ry. Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 41 Fed. Rep. 293 (property
of one railroad company not already in use may be taken by another) ; 1895;
Butte A. & P. R. Co. v. Montana U. R. Co., 16 Mont. 504 (in case of necessity
one railroad company may take part of the right of way of another).
A stricter rule than the one stated above is maintained by the following
cases : 1832, Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Co. v. B. & O. R., 4 Gill &
(Md.)
R. Co., 97 111. 506, snpra,p. 1342; 1888,
1 ; 1881, L. S. & M. S. R. v. C. W. &
Mobile & G. R. Co. v. Alabama, etc., Co., 87 Ala. 501, supra, p. 1340.

J.
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\
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Vt. Rep. 140-

for sheep killed by the dethe sheep had escaped
track,
their
where
fendants' locomotives, upon
as
been
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because no cattle-guard had
required by the law
of
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which
contained no such
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of 1849, enacted after the grant

[Action on the

case to recover damages

As to control of national government over state corporations, see, infra,
499-505.
"Much of opinion omitted; only the line of argument given.
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provision, and no provision for repealing or amending the charter,
Decision below for plaintiff.]
I. The present case involves the question of
REDFIELD, CH. J.
the right of the legislature to require existing railways to respond in
damages for all cattle killed or injured by their trains until they erect
No question could be made
suitable cattle-guards at farm-crossings.
where such a requisition was contained in the charter of the corporation, or in the general laws of the state at the date of the charter.
But where neither is the case, it is claimed that it is incompetent for
the legislature to impose such an obligation by statute, subsequent to

is,

the date of the charter.
It has never been questioned, so far as I know, that the American
legislatures have the same unlimited power in regard to legislation
which resides in the British parliament, except where they are reThat must be conceded, I think,
strained by written constitutions.
to be a fundamental principle in the political organizations of the
American states. We can not well comprehend how, upon principle,
The people must, of course, possess all legit should be otherwise.
islative power originally.
They have committed this in the most general and unlimited manner to the several state legislatures, saving
only such restrictions as are imposed by the constitution of the United
I am not aware that
States, or of the particular state in question.
the constitution of this state contains any restriction upon the legislature in regard to corporations, unless it be that where "any person's
property is taken for the use of the public, the owner ought to receive an equivalent in money," or that there is any such restriction in
the United States constitution, except that prohibiting the states from
"passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts."
It is a conceded point, upon all hands, that the parliament of Great
Britain is competent to make any law binding upon corporations,
however much it may increase their burdens or restrict their powers,
whether general or organic, even to the repeal of their charters.
This extent of power is recognized in the case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518, and the leading authorities are
there referred to.
Any requisite amount of authority, giving this unlimited power over corporations to the British parliament, may readily
be found.
And if, as we have shown, the several state legislatures
have the same extent of legislative power, with the limitations named,
the inviolability of these artificial bodies rests upon the same basis in
the American states with that of natural persons, and there are, no
doubt, many of the rights, powers and functions of natural persons
Such, for instance, as
which do not come within legislative control.
are purely and exclusively of private concern, and in which the body
politic, as such, have no special interest.
II. It being assumed, then, that the legislature may control the action,
prescribe the functions and duties of corporations, and impose restraints upon them to the same extent as upon natural persons, that
in all matters coming within the general range of legislative au-
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thority, subject to the limitation of not impairing the obligation of
contracts, provided the essential franchise is not taken without compensation, it becomes of primary importance to determine the extent
to which the charter of a corporation may fairly be regarded as a con*
*
*
tract within the meaning of the United States constitution.
Chief Justice Marshall, in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4
Wheaton 518, says: "A corporation is an artificial being the mere
it possesses only those properties which the charcreature of the law
either expressly or as incidental to
ter of its creation confers upon
its very existence." The decision throughout treats this as the fundamental idea, the pivot upon which the case turns.
The charter of
an imcontract, inasmuch as
thus regarded as
corporation
plied undertaking on the part of the state, that the corporation, as
such, and for the purposes therein named or implied, shall enjoy the
And any statute espowers and franchises by its charter conferred.
these
franchises
there regarded as
corporate
sentially modifying
violation of the charter. But when we come to inquire what
meant
of
a
the
arises.
the
franchise
Cercorporation,
principal
difficulty
by
are
beneficial
essential
the
existence
tain things,
to
and
agreed,
successful operation of a corporation, such as individuality and perunlimited the power to sue and to be sued,
petuity, when the grant
railroad,
to have a common seal and to contract; and in the case of
to have
common stock to construct and maintain its road, and to
Certain
operate the same for the common benefit of the corporators.
other things, as incident to the beneficial use of these franchises, are
But there
wide field of debatable ground
necessarily implied.
It conceded that the powers expressly, or by
outside of all these.
necessary implication, conferred by the charter, and which are essential
*
to the successful operation of the corporations, are inviolable.
"The great object of an incorporation
to bestow the character
and properties of individuality on
collected and changing body of
men.
from the burdens comwhich
Any privileges
may exempt
mon to individuals do not flow necessarily from the charter, but must
be expressed in it, or they do not exist."
This
sufficiently explicit, and upon examination will be found,
think, to have placed the matter upon its true basis.
In reason,
would seem that no fault could be found with the rule here laid down
As to the
by the great expounder of American constitutional law.
control,
to
natural
legislative
persons and
general liability
places
the
And
the true
same
ground.
corporations precisely upon
one
and
the
and
liabilities
which
upon
equal rights
ground,
only
just
*
and duties can be fairly based.
We think the power of the legislature to control existing railways
in this respect, may be found in the general control over the police of
the country, which resides in the law- making power in all free states,
and which is, by the fifth article of the bill of rights of this state, expressly declared to reside perpetually and inalienably in the legislature, which is, perhaps, no more than the enunciation of
general
principle applicable to all free states, and which can not, therefore,
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be violated so as to deprive the legislature of the power, even by exAnd when the
press grant to any mere public or private corporation.
regulation of the police of a city or town, by general ordinances, is
given to such towns and cities, and the regulation of their own internal police is given to railroads to be carried into effect by their by
laws and other regulations, it is, of course, always in all such cases,
That is a responsisubject to the superior control of the legislature.
bility which legislatures can not divest themselves of, if they would.
This police power of the state extends to the protection of the lives,
limbs, health, comfort and quiet of ail persons, and the protection of
all property within the state. According to the maxim, Sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas, which, being of universal application, it
must, of course, be within the range of legislative action to define the
mode and manner in which every one may so use his own as not to
So far as railroads are concerned, this police power,
injure others.
which resides primarily and ultimately in the legislature, is twofold:
1. The police of the roads, which, in the absence of legislative control, the corporations themselves exercise over their operatives, and
to some extent over all who do business with them, or come upon
their grounds, through their general statutes, and by their officers. We
apprehend there can be no manner of doubt that the legislature may,
of which they are to judge,
if they deem the public good requires
final, require the several
and in all doubtful cases their judgment
railroads in the state to establish and maintain the same kind of police
which
now observed upon some of the more important roads in the
found upon
police as
country for their own security, or even such
the English railways, and those upon the continent of Europe. * * *
2. There
also the general police power of the state, by which
persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity
of the state, of the perfect right, in the legislature to do which no
question ever was, or, upon acknowledged general principles, ever
cercan be made, so far as natural persons are concerned.
And
and
that
the
to
do
the
alarm,
calculated
to
excite
right
surprise
tainly
This
same in regard to railways should be made
serious question.
i. That
made generally upon two grounds:
subjects
objection
2=
That
the
and
to
virtual
destruction
legislature
corporations
by
an attempt to control the obligation of one person to another, in
matters of merely private concern.
All the cases agree that the indispensable franchises of corporaThis
the very
tion can not be destroyed or essentially modified.
point upon which the leading case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward was decided, and which every well-considered case in this counBut when
try maintains.
attempted upon this basis to deny the
of
the
internal
power
police of the railroads, and their mode
regulating
of transacting their general business, so far as
tends unreasonably to
others,
the
or
of
interests
infringe
rights
putting the whole subject
*
of railway control quite above the legislation of the country.
do not now perceive any just ground to question the right of the
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legislature to make railways liable for all cattle killed by their trains.
It might be unjust or unreasonable, but none the less competent.
Girtman v. Central Railroad, i Kelly (Georgia) 173, is sometimes
quoted as having held a different doctrine, but no such point is to be
found in the case. The British parliament for centuries, and most of
the American legislatures, have made the protection of the lives of
domestic animals the subject of penal enactm'ent.
It would be wonderful if they could not do the same as to railways, or if they could
not punish the killing, by requiring them to compensate the owner,
or, as in the present case, to do it until they used certain precautions
in running their trains, to wit: Maintained cattle-guards at roads
*
*
*
and farm-crossings.
Bennet, J., dissenting.
Judgment affirmed.
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U.

J. It is now too late to contend that any contract which
actually enters into when granting a charter to a private corporation, is not within the protection of the clause in the constitution
of the United States that prohibits states from passing laws impairing
Article i, section 10. The doctrines of
the obligation of contracts.
the Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, announced by this court more than sixty years ago, have become so imbedded in the jurisprudence of the United States as to make them, to
all intents and purposes, a part of the constitution itself. In this connection, however, it is to be kept in mind that it is not the charter
which is protected, but only any contract the charter may contain. If
there is no contract, there is nothing in the grant on which the constitution can act.
Consequently, the first inquiry in this class of cases
always is, whether a contract has, in fact, been entered into, and if
so, what its obligations are.
In the present case the question is, whether the state of Mississippi,
in its sovereign capacity, did, by the charter now under consideration,
bind itself irrevocably by a contract to permit "The Mississippi Agricultural, Educational and Manufacturing Aid Society," for twentyfive years, "to receive subscriptions, and sell and dispose of certificates
of subscriptions which shall entitle the holders thereof to" "any lands,
books, paintings, antiques, scientific instruments or apparatus, or any
other property or thing that may be ornamental, valuable or useful,"
"awarded to them" "by the casting of lots, or by lot, chance or otherwise." There can be no dispute but that, under this form of words,
the legislature of the state chartered a lottery company, having all the
powers incident to such a corporation, for twenty-five years, and that,
WAITE, C.

a state
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thereof, the company paid into the state treasury
a university, and agreed to pay, and until the
commencement of this suit did pay, an annual tax of $1,000 and "onehalf of one per cent, on the amount of receipts derived from the sale
If the legislature that granted this charter
of certificates or tickets."
had the power to bind the people of the state and all succeeding legislatures to allow the corporation to continue its corporate business during the whole term of its authorized existence, there is no doubt about
the sufficiency of the language employed to effect that object, although
there was an evident purpose to conceal the vice of the transaction by
Whether the alleged contract exists,
the phrases that were used.
therefore, or not, depends upon the authority of the legislature to
bind the state and the people of the state in that way.
All agree that the legislature can not bargain away the police power
of a state.
"Irrevocable grants of property and franchises may be
made if they do not impair the supreme authority to make laws for
the right government of the state ; but no legislature can curtail the
power of its successors to make such laws as they may deem proper
in matters of police." Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34
N. Y. 657; Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S. 645. Many attempts have
been made in this coui't and elsewhere to define the police power, but
It is always easier to determine whether a
never with entire success.
particular case comes within the general scope of the power than to
give an abstract definition of the power itself which will be in all reNo one denies, however, that it extends to all matspects accurate.
ters affecting the public health or the public morals. Beer Company
v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25; Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501.
Neither can it be denied that lotteries are proper subjects for the exercise of this power.
We are aware that formerly, when the sources
of public revenue were fewer than now, they were used in some or all
of the states, and even in the District of Columbia, to raise money
for the erection of public buildings, making public improvements, and
not unfrequently for educational and religious purposes; but this court
said, more than thirty years ago, speaking through Mr. Justice Grier,
in Phalen v. Virginia, 8 How. 163, 168, that "experience has shown
that the common forms of gambling are comparatively innocuous
when placed in contrast with the widespread pestilence of lotteries.
The former are confined to a few persons and places, but the latter
infests the whole community; it enters every dwelling; it reaches
every class ; it preys upon the hard earnings of the poor, and it plunders the ignorant and simple."
Happily, under the influence of restrictive legislation, the evils are not so apparent now ; but we very
much fear that, with the same opportunities of indulgence, the same
results would be manifested.
If lotteries are to be tolerated at all, it is, no doubt, better that they
should be regulated by law, so that the people may be protected as
far as possible against the inherent vices of the system ; but that they
are demoralizing in their effects, no matter how carefully regulated,
can not admit of a doubt.
When the government is untrammeled by
in consideration
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any claim of vested rights or chartered privileges, no one has ever
supposed that lotteries could not lawfully be suppressed, and those
who manage them punished severely as violators of the rules of social
From 1822 to 1867, without any constitutional requiremorality.
ment, they were prohibited by law in Mississippi, and those who conducted them punished as a kind of gamblers.
During the provisional
government of that state, in 1867, at the close of the late civil war,
the present act of incorporation, with more of like character, was
The next year, 1868, the people, in adopting a new constipassed.
tution with a view to the resumption of their political rights as one of
the United States, provided that "the legislature shall never authorize
any lottery, nor shall the sale of lottery tickets be allowed, nor shall
any lottery heretofore authorized be permitted to be drawn, or tickets
Art. 12, 15. There is now scarcely a state in
therein to be sold."
the union where lotteries are tolerated, and congress has enacted a
special statute, the object of which is to close the mails against them.
2
Rev. St.,
3894; 19 Stat. at L., 90,
The question is, therefore, directly presented, whether, in view of
these facts, the legislature of a state can, by the charter of a lottery
company, defeat the will of the people, authoritatively expressed, in
relation to the further continuance of such business in their midst.
We think it can not. No legislature can bargain away the public
The people themselves can not do
health or the public morals.
The supervision of both these subjects of
much less their servants.
continuing in its nature, and they are to be
power
governmental
dealt with as the special exigencies of the moment may require. Government
view to their preservation, and can not
organized with
For this purpose,
divest itself of the power to provide for them.
allowed, and the discretion can not
the largest legislative discretion
be parted with any more than the power itself.
Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, supra.
In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
Wheat. 518,
was argued that the contract clause of the constitution,
given the
effect contended for in respect to corporate franchises, "would be an
unprofitable and vexatious interference with the internal concerns of
state, would, unnecessarily and unwisely, embarrass its legislation,
and render immutable those civil institutions which are established for
the purpose of internal government, and which, to subserve those purposes, ought to vary with varying circumstances" (p. 628) but Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall, when he announced the opinion of the court,
was careful to say (p. 629), "that the framers of the constitution did
not intend to restrain states in the regulation of their civil institutions,
adopted for internal government, and that the instrument they have
The present case, we think,
not to be so construed."
given us
comes within this limitation.
We have held, not, however, without
corporation in
strong opposition at times, that this clause protected
While taxation is, in general,
its charter exemptions from taxation.
not part of the governnecessary for the support of government,
ment itself.
Government was not organized for the purposes of tax-
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ation, but taxation may be necessary for the purposes of government.
As such, taxation becomes an incident to the exercise of the legitimate
No government, defunctions of government, but nothing more.
for
on
can
taxation
bargain
support,
pendent
away its whole power of
taxation, for that would be substantially abdication.
All that has
been determined thus far is, that for a consideration
it may, in the
exercise of a reasonable discretion, and for the public good, surren*
* *
der a part of its powers in this particular.
But the power of governing is a trust committed by the people to
the government, no part of which can be granted away.
The people,
in their sovereign capacity, have established their agencies for the preservation of the public health and the public morals, and the protection of public and private rights. These several agencies can govern
according to their discretion, if within the scope of their general authority, while in power ; but they can not give away nor sell the discretion of those that are to come after them, in respect to matters the
government of which, from the very nature of things, must "vary
with varying circumstances."
They may create corporations, and
give them, so to speak, a limited citizenship; but as citizens, limited
in their privileges, or otherwise, these creatures of the government
creation are subject to such rules and regulations as may from time to
of health and
time be ordained and established for the preservation

morality.
The contracts which the constitution protects are those that relate
It is not always easy to tell
to property rights, not governmental.
on which side of the line which separates governmental
from property rights a particular case is to be put; but in respect to lotteries
there can be no difficulty.
They are not, in the legal acceptation of
the term, mala in se, but as we have just seen, may properly be made
mala prohibita. They are a species of gambling, and wrong in their
influences.
They disturb the checks and balances of a well-ordered
community. Society built on such a foundation would almost of necessity bring forth a population of speculators and gamblers, living
on 'the expectation of what, "by the casting of lots, or by lot, chance or
otherwise," might be "awarded" to them from the accumulations of
others.
Certainly the right to suppress them is governmental, to be
exercised at all times by those in power, at their discretion.
Anyone,
therefore, who accepts a lottery charter, does so with the implied understanding that the people, in their sovereign capacity and through
the'ir properly constituted agencies, may resume it at any time when
the public good shall require, whether it be paid for or not.
All
that one can get by such a charter is a suspension of certain governmental rights in his favor, subject to withdrawal at will.
He has,
in legal effect, nothing more than a license to enjoy the privilege on the terms named for the specified time, unless it be sooner
It is a permit, good
abrogated by the sovereign power of the state.
as against existing laws, but subject to future legislative and constitutional control or withdrawal.
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On the whole, we find no error in the record,
affirmed.

and the judgment is

See note, infra, p. 1366.
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of various railroad companies, on behalf
and
of themselves
others similarly situated, against their respective
and
certain
officers of the State of Nebraska, constituting
companies,
of transportation of that state, and the three
the
board
ex officto
state
of
board,
said
to enjoin the enforcement of certain rates of
secretaries
fixed
an
act of the Nebraska legislature passed
transportation
by
to
effect
April 12, 1893,
August I, 1893, on the ground that
go into
it was repugnant to the constitution of the United States. The board
of transportation had been established by a former act, with authority
to inquire into the management of the business of all common carriers, to compel attendance and testimony of witnesses, production of
books, papers, documents, and for the purpose could invoke the aid of
the state courts to compel attendance subject to penalty as for contempt, and evidence could not be withheld, though it might tend to
criminate the witness, but should not be used against him.
The confrom
time
to time pass
stitution provided that "the legislature may
laws establishing reasonable maximum rates of charges for the transportation of passengers and freight on the railroads in this state."
The act of 1893 provided that all freight to be transported from
one point in the state to another therein shall be classified as in, the
act designated and set forth in detail, and any other classification was
prohibited and made unlawful. The act also fixed a schedule of rates
for distances specified in detail upon the classes of freight mentioned,
and said "any higher or greater rate for the distance hauled than that
herein fixed and established is prohibited and declared to be unlawful." The board of transportation was clothed with authority to reduce rates and enforce the same, but not to raise them above those
fixed in the act, whenever it should deem it reasonable and just to do
so, upon giving certain public notice ; articles not mentioned should
be classed with analogous articles, and charged like rates.
If any
railroad company could show that the rates established would be unupon complaint made to the supreme
just and unreasonable to
it,

[Suit by the stockholders

The case
part of opinion and arguments omitted.
Bryan, Mr. John L. Webster, for appellants, and
M. Woodworth and Mr. James C. Carter, for appellees.

1

Statement abridged;
was argued by Mr. W.

by Mr.
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court, in which the fullest disclosure of all matters pertaining to its
property and business in detail should be made, the court might increase rates upon that road to a sum not greater than those rates
All violations of the act
charged by such company January i, 1893.
by any carrier, either by commission or omission, made the same liable
to any one damaged, including costs and attorney's fees, and to fines of
in each case the parties to have right of trial
from $1,000 to $25,000
by jury. The decision of the court below the circuit court of the
United States for the district of Nebraska Mr. Justice Brewer presiding, was for the complainants, and the defendants were permanently enjoined from carrying out the provisions of the act, on the
The
ground that it violated the constitution of the United States.
board of transportation brought this appeal.
64 Fed. Rep. 165.]
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN (after disposing of some preliminary ques*
*
* We are now to inquire whether the Nebraska stattions).
ute is repugnant to the constitution of the United States.
By the fourteenth amendment it is provided that no state shall
deprive any person of property without due process of law, nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. That corporations are persons within the meaning of this
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific
amendment is now settled.
Railroad, 118 U.S. 394,396; Charlotte, Columbia and Augusta Railroad v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386, 391 ; Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe
Railway v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 154. What amounts to deprivation
of property without due process of law or what is a denial of the equal
protection of the laws is often difficult to determine, especially where
the question relates to the property of a quasi-public corporation and
the extent to which it may be subjected to public control.
But this
court, speaking by Chief Justice Waite, has said that, while a state
has power to fix the charges by railroad companies for the transportation of persons and property within its own jurisdiction, unless restrained by valid contract, or unless what is done amounts to a regulation of foreign or interstate commerce, such power is not without
limit; and that, "under pretense of regulating fares and freights, the
state can not require a railroad corporation to carry persons or property without reward, neither can it do that which in law amounts to
the taking of private property for public use without just compensation, or without due process of law."
Railroad Commission Cases,
1 16 U. S. 307, 325,
was recognized in Dow v.
This
principle
331.
Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680, 689, and has been reaffirmed in other
cases.

In Georgia Railroad and Banking Company v. Smith,

128

U. S.

174, 179, it was said that the power of the state to prescribe the
charges of a railroad company for the carriage of persons and merchandise within its limits
in the absence of any provision in the
charter of the company constituting a contract vesting it with authority
over those matters
was "subject to the limitation that the carriage is
not required without reward, or upon conditions amounting to the
taking of property for public use without just compensation, and that
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what is done does not amount to

commerce."

a

regulation of foreign or interstate

In Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway v. Min-

nesota, 134 U. S. 418, 458, it was said: "If the company is deprived
of the power of charging reasonable rates for the use of its property,
and such deprivation takes place in the absence of an investigation by
judicial machinery, it is deprived of the lawful use of its property,
and thus, in substance and effect, of the property itself, without due
process of law and in violation of the constitution of the United States,
and in so far as it is thus deprived, while other persons are permitted
to receive reasonable profits upon their invested capital, the company
is deprived of the equal protection of the laws."
In Chicago and
Grand Trunk Railway v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 344, the court, in
answer to the suggestion that the legislature had no authority to prescribe maximum rates for railroad transportation, said that "the legislature has power to fix rates, and the extent of judicial interference is
In Budd v. New York, 143
protection against unreasonable rates."
U. S. 517, 547, the court, while sustaining the power of New York
by statute to regulate charges to be exacted at grain elevators and
warehouses in that state, took care to state, as a result 01 former
decisions, that such power was not one "to destroy or a power to
compel the doing of the services without reward, or to take private
property for public use without just compensation or without due
process of law."
In Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 399,
which involved the validity of certain rates for freights and passengers
prescribed by a railroad commission established by an act of the legislature of Texas, this court, after referring to the above cases, said:
"These cases all support the proposition that while it is not the province of the courts to enter upon the merely administrative
duty of
framing a tariff of rates for carriage, it is within the scope of judicial
power and a part of judicial duty to restrain anything which, in the
form of a regulation of rates, operates to deny to the owners of property invested in the business of transportation that equal protection
which is the constitutional
right of all owners of other property.
There is nothing new or strange in this. It has always been a part of
the judicial function to determine whether the act of one party
(whether that party be a single individual, an organized body or the
public as a whole) operates to divest the other party of any rights of
In every constitution is the guarantee against the
person or property.
taking of private property for public purposes without just compensation.
The equal protection of the laws, which, by the fourteenth
amendment, no state can deny to the individual, forbids legislation,
in whatever form it may be enacted, by which the property of one individual is, without compensation, wrested from him for the benefit of
This, as has been often observed, is a govanother, or of the public.
ernment of law, and not a government of men, and it must never be
forgotten that under such a government, with its constitutional limitations and guarantees, the forms of law and the machinery of government, with all their reach and power, must, in their actual work-
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ings, stop on the hither side of the unnecessary and uncompensated
taking or destruction of any private property, legally acquired and
legally held. It was, therefore, within the competency of the circuit
court of the United States for the western district of Texas, at the instance of the plaintiff, a citizen of another state, to enter upon an inquiry as to the reasonableness and justice of the rates prescribed by
Indeed, it was in so doing only exercising
the railroad commission.
a power expressly named in the act creating the commission."
So, in St. Louis and San Francisco Railway v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649,
657, it was said that "there is a remedy in the courts for relief against
legislation establishing a tariff of rates which is so unreasonable as to
practically destroy the value of property of companies engaged in the
carrying business, and that especially may the courts of the United
States treat such a question as a judicial one, and hold such acts of
legislation to be in conflict with the constitution of the United States,
as depriving the companies of their property without due process of
law, and as depriving them of the equal protection of the laws." In
Covington and Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S.
578, 584, 594, 595, 597, which involved the validity of a state enactment prescribing rates of toll on a turnpike road, the court said: "A
a turnpike comstatute which, by its necessary operation, compels
pany, when charging only such tolls as are just to the public, to submit to such further reduction of rates as will prevent it from keeping
its road in proper repair, and from earning any dividends whatever
for stockholders, is as obnoxious to the constitution of the United
States as would be a similar statute relating to the business of a railroad corporation having authority, under its charter, to collect and receive tolls for passengers and freight."
And in Chicago, Burlington
and Quincy Railroad v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 241, it was held that
"a judgment of a state court, even if it be authorized by statute, whereby private property is taken for the state or under its direction for public
use, without compensation
made or secured to the owner, is, upon
and
principle
authority, wanting in the due process of law required by
the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States,
and the affirmance of such judgment by the highest court of the state
is a denial by that state of a right secured to the owner by that instrument."
In view of the adjudications these principles must be regarded as
settled

:

A

railroad corporation is a person within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment, declaring that no state shall deprive any person of property without due process of law, nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
2. A state enactment, or regulations made under the authority of
a state enactment, establishing rates for the transportation of persons
or property by railroad that will not admit of the carrier earning such
compensation as under all the circumstances is just to it and to the
public, would deprive such carrier of its property without due process
of law and deny to it the equal protection of the laws, and would,
1.
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therefore, be repugnant to the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States.
3. While rates for the transportation of persons and property within
the limits of a state are primarily for its determination, the question
whether they are so unreasonably low as to deprive the carrier of its
property without such compensation as the constitution secures, and,
therefore, without due process of law, can not be so conclusively determined by the legislature of the state or by regulations adopted
under its authority, that the matter may not become the subject of

judicial inquiry.
The cases before us directly present the important question

last

stated.

Before entering upon

is it

is

is

it

is

is

it

a

it,

its examination, it may be observed that the
in
the constitution of Nebraska of the power
to
the
legislature
grant
to establish maximum rates for the transportation of passengers and
freight on railroads in that state has reference to "reasonable" maximum rates. These words strongly imply that it was not intended to
give a power to fix maximum rates without regard to their reasonableness. Be this as it may, it can not be admitted that the power granted
may be exerted in derogation of rights secured by the constitution of
the United States, or that the judiciary may not, when its jurisdiction
is properly invoked, protect those rights.
What are the considerations to which weight must be given when
we seek to ascertain the compensation that a railroad company is entitled to receive, and a prohibition upon the receiving of which may
be fairly deemed a deprivation by legislative decree of property without due process of law?
Undoubtedly that question could be more
commission
determined
a
composed of persons whose special
by
easily
skill, observation and experience qualifies them to so handle great
problems of transportations as to do justice both to .the public and to
those whose money has been used to construct and maintain highways
But despite the diffifor the convenience and benefit of the people.
culties that confessedly attend the proper solution of such questions,
the court can not shrink from the duty to determine whether it be
true, as alleged, that the Nebraska statute invades or destroys rights
will
secured by the supreme law of the land. No one, we take
in harmony with that law simply bestate enactment
contend that
cause the legislature of the state has declared such to be the case, for
that would make the state legislature the final judge of the validity of
its enactment, although the constitution of the United States and the
laws made in pursuance thereof are the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. Article VI. The idea that any legislature, state or
federal, can conclusively determine for the people and for the courts
that what
enacts in the form of law, or what
authorizes its agents
in opposition to the
to do,
consistent with the fundamental law,
The duty rests upon all courts, federal
theory of our institutions.
and state, when their jurisdiction
that
properly invoked, to see to
no right secured by the supreme law of the land
impaired or
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destroyed by legislation. This function and duty of the judiciary distinguishes the American system from all other systems of governThe perpetuity of our institutions and the liberty which is
ment.
enjoyed under them depend, in no small degree, upon the power given
the judiciary to declare null and void all legislation that is clearly repugnant to the supreme law of the land.
We turn now to the evidence in the voluminous record before us
looking at the cases in the
for the purpose of ascertaining whether
the
light of the facts as they existed when the decrees were rendered
Nebraska statute, if enforced, would, by its necessary operation,
and bondholders
have deprived the companies, whose stockholders
for the servhere complain, of the right to obtain just compensation
ices rendered by them.
The first and most important contention of the plaintiffs is that, if
the statute had been in force during any one of the three years preceding its passage, the defendant companies would have been compelled to use their property for the public substantially without reward
We think
or without the just compensation to which it was entitled.
this mode of calculation for ascertaining the probable effect of the
Nebraska statute upon the railroad companies in question is one that
may be properly used.
The conclusion reached by the circuit court was that the reduction
made by the Nebraska statute in the rates for local freight was so unjust and unreasonable as to require a decree staying the enforcement
Ames v.
of such rates against the companies named in the bill.

That conclusion
Union Pacific Railway, 64 Fed. Rep. 165, 189.
was based largely upon the figures presented by Mr. Dilworth, while
he was a secretary of the state board of transportation, as well as a defendant and one of the solicitors of the defendants in these causes.
He was a principal witness for that board.
His general fairness and
his competency to speak of the facts upon which the question before
us depends are apparent on the record.
He stated that the average
reduction made by the statute on all the "commodities of local
rates" was 29.50 per cent., and this estimate seems to have been acHe estimated that the percentage
cepted by the parties as correct.
of operating expenses on local business would exceed the percentage
of operating expenses on all business by at least 10 per cent., and
that it might go as high as 20 per cent, or higher.
And this view is
more than sustained by the evidence of witnesses possessing special
knowledge of railroad transportation and of the cost of doing local
Indeed,
business as compared with what is called through business.
one of those witnesses states that the cost of carrying local freight is
four times as much as the cost of through freight per ton per mile;
another, that the cost of the short haul is "reasonably double the long

haul." If due regard be had to the testimony
and we have no
other basis for our judgment we are not permitted to place the extra
cost of local business at less than 10 per cent, greater than the percentage of the cost of all business.
In answer to questions propounded to him by the defendants con-
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stituting the state board of transportation, Mr. Dilworth stated that he
had prepared himself with an estimate showing the number of tons of
freight, commonly spoken of as local freight, hauled on the respective
railways in Nebraska, and the amount received by the railway companies by way of tariff on tons of freight hauled, including through
as well as local freight, and was qualified to speak as to the amount
received by the companies for both passengers and freight within the
state, and the reduction that would take place in rates under the statute
in question.
He presented various tables showing the results of his
*
*
*
investigations.
[Here follow tables, showing in detail percentages of earnings to
operating expenses upon the various roads, tons of local freight hauled,
amount received per mile for the same, reduction the new law would
cause, etc.]
In view of the reduction of 29.50 in rates prescribed by the statute
and of the extra cost of doing local business, as compared with other
business, what do these facts show?
Take the case of the Burlington road from July i, 1890, to June
30, 1891. Looking at the entire business done on it during that period
within the limits of the state, we find that the percentage of operating
which, as stated, does not inexpenses to earnings on all business
clude the extra cost of local business
Add to this the
was 66.24.
extra cost of local business, estimated at at least ten per cent., and
the result is that, under the rates charged during the period stated,
the cost to the Burlington Company of earning $100 would have been
Now, if the reduction of 29^2 per cent, made by the act of
$76.24.
1893 had been in force prior to July r, 1891, the company would have
received $70.50 as against $100 for the same service, showing that in
that year the operating expenses wouM have exceeded the earnings
* * *
by $5.74 in every $100 of the amount actually received by it.
Under the rates prescribed by the act of 1893 the cost to the respective companies of local business in Nebraska would have exceeded the earnings for the years ending June 30, 1891, 1892 and
1893, respectively, in every one hundred dollars of the amount actually
received, as follows:
To the Burlington Company, by $5.74, $3-73
and $5.01 ; to the St. Paul Company, by $10.28, $5.46 and $4.08;
to the Omaha Company, by $59.76, $32.62 and $33.64; to the St.
Joseph Company, by $35.94, $13.73 anc * $ r -55; an ^ to tne Kansas
The cost to the
City Company, by $39.04, $14.69 and $16.00.
Union Pacific Company for the year ending June 30, nS9i, of its local
business, under the rates prescribed by the statute of 1893, would have
caused a loss of $8.44 in every one hundred dollars of the amount
*
*
*
actually received.
There are other views of the case suggested by the above exhibits
and table which show the same results.
In the year ending June 30, 1891, under the rates then in force, the
Burlington Company received $1,066,871 for tons carried locally. If
the business had been done under the rates prescribed by the act of
1893, it would have received 29^ per cent, less, that is, only $752,-
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it did receive.
145 or $314,726 less than
to earnings, including the extra cost of

it,

The percentage of expenses
local business, was $76.24;
So that the difference
that is, it cost $813,382 to earn $1,066,871.
between $813,382 and $752,145 shows that, if the rates prescribed
by the statute of 1893 had been in force during the year ending June
30, 1891, the amount received would have been less than the oper*
*
*
ating expenses of the Burlington Company by $61,237.
[Like calculations show a similar loss to this company in 1892, of
$46,172; and in 1893 of $62,243.]
By the same mode of calculation, it would be found that, if the
statute of 1893 had been enforced during the years ending the 3Oth
days of June, 1891, 1892 and 1893, respectively, the other companies
would have lost, that is, their expenses would have exceeded their
earnings during those years by the following amounts : The St. Paul
Company, $11,403, $6,716 and $5,814; the Fremont Companv,
$34,377 for the yeaf ending June 30, 1892 ; the Union Pacific Company, $23,480, for the year ending June 30, 1891 ; the Omaha Company, $45,166, $28,813 an d $ 2 7)85; the St. Joseph Company,
$7,840, $4,256 and $523; and the Kansas City Company, $2,627,
$974 and $1,510; while the earnings of the Union Pacific Company
would have exceeded its expenses for the years ending the 3oth days
of June, 1892 and 1893, respectively, by $16,170 and $8,234, and
those of the Fremont Company by $37,037 and $29,036 for the years
*
*
*
ending the 3Oth days of June, 1891 and 1893, respectively.
It is further said, in behalf of the appellants, that the reasonableness of the rates established by the Nebraska statute is not to be determined by the inquiry whether such rates would leave a reasonable
net profit from the local business affected thereby, but that the court
should take into consideration, among other things, the whole business
of the company, that is, all its business, passenger and freight, interIf it be found upon investigation that the profits
state and domestic.
derived by a railroad company from its interstate business alone are
sufficient to cover operating expenses on its entire line, and also to
meet interest and justify a liberal dividend upon its stock, may the
legislature prescribe rates for domestic business that would bring no
reward and be less than the services rendered are reasonably worth?
Or, must the rates for such transportation as begins and ends in the state
be established with reference solely to the amount of business done by
the carrier wholly within such state, to the cost of doing such local busiwithout
ness, and to the fair value of the property used in conducting
busiand
its
interstate
cost of
taking into consideration the amount
ness and the value of the property employed in it? If we do not
misapprehend counsel, their argument leads to the conclusion that the
state of Nebraska could legally require local freight business to be

a

it

it

if

conducted even at an actual loss
the company earned on its interbusiness
state
enough to give
just compensation in respect of its
line
and
all
entire
its business, interstate and domestic.
We can not
in
be
held
concur
this view. In our judgment
must
that the reasonableness or unreasonableness of rates prescribed by
state for the
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transportation of persons and property wholly within its limits must
be determined without reference to the interstate business done by the
The state can not justify uncarrier, or to the profits derived from it.
reasonably low rates for domestic transportation, considered alone, upon
the ground that the carrier is earning large profits on its interstate business, over which, so far as rates are concerned, the state has no control.
Nor can the carrier justify unreasonably high rates on domestic business
upon the ground that it will be able only in that way to meet losses on its
So far as rates of transportation are concerned,
interstate business.
should
not be made to bear the losses on interstate
domestic business
nor
the
latter
the losses on domestic business.
business,
It is only
for
rates
the transportation of persons and property between points
within the state that the state can prescribe ; and when it undertakes
to prescribe rates not to be exceeded by the carrier, it must do so with
reference exclusively to what is just and reasonable, as between the
carrier and the public, in respect of domestic business.
The argument that a railroad line is an entirety; that its income goes into, and
its expenses are provided for out of, a common fund; and that its
capitalization is on its entire line, within and without the state, can
have no application where the state is without authority over rates on
the entire line, and can only deal with local rates and make such
regulations as are necessary to give just compensation on local busi*
*
*
ness.
from
what has been said, that if the rates prescribed by
It appears,
of
had
been in force during the years ending June 30,
the act
1893
and
1893, the Fremont Company, in the years ending
1891, 1892
and
June 30, 1893, and the Union Pacific Company,
June 30, 1891,
in the years ending June 30, 1892, and June 30, 1893, would each
have received more than enough to pay operating expenses. Do those
facts affect the general conclusion as to the probable effect of the act
of 1893? In the discussion of this question, the plaintiffs contended
that a railroad company is entitled to exact such charges for transportation as will enable it, at all times, not only to pay operating expenses, but also to meet the interest regularly accruing upon all its
outstanding obligations, and justify a dividend upon all its stock; and
that to prohibit it from maintaining rates or charges for transportation
adequate to all those ends will deprive it of its property without due
This
process of law, and deny to it the equal protection of the laws.
discussion;
of
it
and,
was
the
as
bears
contention
elaborate
subject
upon each case in its important aspects, it should not be passed without examination.
In our opinion, the bi'oad proposition advanced by counsel involves
some misconception of the relations between the public and a railroad
corporation. It is unsound, in that it practically excludes from consideration the fair value of the property used, omits altogether any
consideration of the right of the public to be exempt from unreasonable exactions, and makes the interests of the corporation maintaining a public highway the sole test in determining whether the rates
established by or for it are such as may be rightfully prescribed as be-

436

CONTROL BY LEGISLATION.

1361

tween it and the public. . A railroad is a public highway, and none
the less so because constructed and maintained through the agency of
Such
a corporation deriving its existence and powers from the state.
It performs a funca corporation was created for public purposes.
Its authority to exercise the right of eminent dotion of the state.
main and to charge tolls was given primarily for the benefit of the
public. It is under governmental control, though such control must
be exercised with due regard to the constitutional
guarantees for the
Olcott v. The Supervisor, 16 Wall. 678,
protection of its property.
Cherokee Nation v.
694; Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 7> 7*9
It can not, thereSouthern Kansas Railway, 135 U. S. 641, 657.
fore, be admitted that a railroad corporation maintaining a highway
under the authority of the state may fix its rates with a view solely to
But the
its own interests, and ignore the rights of the public.
rights of the public would be ignored if rates for the transportation of
persons or property on a railroad are exacted without reference to the
fair value of the property used for the public or the fair value of the
services rendered, but in order simply that the corporation may meet
operating expenses, pay the interest on its obligations, and declare a
dividend to stockholders.
If a railroad corporation has bonded its property for an amount
that exceeds its fair value, or if its capitalization is largely fictitious,
it may not impose upon the public the burden of such increased rates
as may be required for the purpose of realizing profits upon such excessive valuation or fictitious capitalization; and the apparent value
of the property and franchises used by the corporation, as represented
by its stocks, bonds and obligations, is not alone to be considered
when determining the rates that may be reasonably charged.
What
was said in Covington and Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 596, 597' * s pertinent to the question under conIt was there observed:
"It can not be said that a corsideration.
of
is
as
and
reference to the interests
without
entitled,
right,
poration
of the public, to realize a given per cent, upon its capital stock. When
the question arises whether the legislature has exceeded its constitutional power in prescribing rates to be charged by a corporation controlling a public highway, stockholders are not the only persons whose
The rights of the public are
rights or interests are to be considered.
not to be ignored.
It is alleged here that the rates prescribed are unreasonable and unjust to the company and its stockholders.
But that
involves an inquiry as to what is reasonable and just for the public.
*
*
* The public can not properly be subjected to unreasonable
rates in order simply that stockholders may earn dividends.
The legislature has the authority, in every case, where its power has not been
restrained by contract, to proceed upon the ground that the public
may not rightfully be required to submit to unreasonable exactions for
the use of a public highway established and maintained under legislative authority.
If a corporation can not maintain such a highway
and earn dividends for stockholders, it is a misfortune for it and them
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is

it

a

it

it,

it

it

it,

which the constitution does not require to be remedied by imposing
So that the right of the public to
unjust burdens upon the public.
use the defendant's turnpike upon payment of such tolls as in view of
the nature and value of the services rendered by the company are
reasonable, is an element in the general inquiry whether the rates
established by law are unjust and unreasonable."
A corporation maintaining a public highway, although it owns the
property it employs for accomplishing public objects, must be held to
have accepted its rights, privileges and franchises subject to the condior the government within whose
tion that the government creating
conducts its business, may by legislation protect the people
limits
It can
against unreasonable charges for the services rendered by it.
not be assumed that any railroad corporation, accepting franchises,
rights and privileges at the hands of the public, ever supposed that
the power to construct
was intended to grant to
acquired, or that
and maintain
public highway simply for its benefit, without regard
to the rights of the public.
But
equally true that the corporation
performing such public services and the people financially interested
in its business and affairs have rights that may not be invaded by legislative enactment in disregard of the fundamental guarantees for the
protection of property. The corporation may not be required to use
its property for the benefit of the public without receiving just comHow such compensation
pensation for the services rendered by it.

it

it

is

is

a

it

is

a

a

a

is

may be ascertained, and what are the necessary elements in such an
As said in the
inquiry, will always be an embarrassing question.
case last cited:
"Each case must depend upon its special facts;
and when
recourt, without assuming itself to prescribe rates,
quired to determine whether the rates prescribed by the legislature for
corporation controlling
public highway are, as an entirety, so unjust as to destroy the value of its property for all the purposes for
was acquired, its duty
which
to take into consideration the interests both of the public and of the owner of the property, together
with all other circumstances that are fairly to be considered in determining whether the legislature has, under the guise of regulating rates,
exceeded its constitutional authority, and practically deprived the owner
*
* *
of property without due process of Ir.w.
The utmost that
public highway can rightfully demand at
any corporation operating
that
the hands of the legislature, when exerting its general powers,
such compensation
receive what, under all the circumstances,
for the use of its property as will be just both to
and to the

public."
We hold, however, that the basis of all calculations
it

a

a

as to the reacorporation maintaining
sonableness of rates to be charged by
highway under legislative sanction must be the fair value of the propfor the convenience of the public.
And in orerty being used by
der to ascertain that value, the original cost of construction, the
amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount and market
value of its bonds and stock, the present as compared with the original cost of construction, the probable earning capacity of the prop-
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erty under particular rates prescribed by statute, and the sum required
to meet operating expenses, are all matters for consideration, and are
to be given such weight as may be just and right in each case.
We
do not say that there may not be other matters to be regarded in estimating the value of the property. What the company is entitled to
ask is a fair return upon the value of that which it employs for the
On the other hand, what the public is entitled
public convenience.
to demand is that no more be exacted from it for the use of a public
highway than the services rendered by it are reasonably worth. But
even upon this basis, and determining the probable effect of the act of
1893 by ascertaining what could have been its effect if it had been in
operation during the three years immediately preceding its passage,
we perceive no ground on the record for reversing the decree of the
circuit court.
On the contrary, we are of opinion that as to most of
the companies in question there would have been, under such rates as
were established by the act of 1893, an actual loss in each of the years
ending June 30, 1891, 1892 and 1893; and that, in the exceptional
cases above stated, when two of the companies would have earned
something above operating expenses, in particular years, the receipts
or gains, above operating expenses, would have been too small to affect the general conclusion that the act, if enforced, would have deprived each of the railroad companies involved in these suits of the
Under the
just compensation secured to them by the constitution.
evidence there is no ground for saying that the operating expenses of
*
* *
any of the companies were greater than necessary.

Affirmed.
See note at end of the next case.

Sec. 487.

Same.

(c. ) Requiring reports.
EAGLE INSURANCE COMPANY
1894.

v.

OHIO. 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
Rep. 446-456.

153

U. S.

[Error to the supreme court of Ohio. The insurance company,
plaintiff in error, was incorporated in 1850 by a special act of the
Ohio legislature, without reserving the right to repeal or amend the
same.
Afterward, sections 3654, 3655, of the Revised Statutes of
Ohio, were enacted, requiring all insurance companies to make full
and specified returns in detail to designated state officers, of their business condition, liabilities, losses, premiums, taxes, dividends, expenses, etc., upon blanks furnished by such officers.
Blanks were duly
'Statement abridged, and small part of the opinion omitted.
The charter
in full, and the details of the items to be reported, are given in the report on
pp. 446-452.
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furnished, and upon refusal by the company to make the required returns, mandamus proceedings were begun, and upon hearing, the suError was brought on the
preme court issued a peremptory writ.
ground that the law impaired the obligation of the charter contract.]
MR. JUSTICE WHITE. The only question presented is whether or
not the charter of the plaintiff in error exempted it from obligation to
comply with the subsequently established police regulations of the
state, contained in sections 3654 and 3655 of the Revised Statutes of
Ohio.
This subject was fully considered by this court in the case of
The Chicago Life Insurance Company v. Needles, 113 U. S. 574.
There the company had been chartered by the state of Illinois to carry
on a life insurance business, and the question was whether subsequently enacted police regulations of that state for the inspection of
such business, and for the liquidation thereof, in the event of insolvency, could be enforced against a corporation working under a prior
charter without impairing the obligation of the contract.
The statute considered in the Needles Case authorized the auditor, whenever
the actual funds of any life insurance company doing business in the
state were not of a net value equal to the net value of its policies, according to the "combined experience" or "actuaries'" rate of mortality, with interest at four per cent., to give notice to such company
and its agent to discontinue issuing policies in the state until such time
as its funds should become equal to its liabilities, valuing its policies
as aforesaid.
The law, in addition, required every life insurance company incorporated in Illinois to transmit to the auditor, on or before
the ist day of March in each year, a sworn statement of its business,
standing and affairs, in the form prescribed and authorized by law.
It also empowered the officer to address inquiries to any company in
relation to its "doings and condition," and any other matter connected with its transactions, which inquiries, it provided, should be
"promptly answered;" and it imposed upon him the duty of making
of the condition and affairs of any company, whenan examination
ever he deemed it expedient to do so, and had reason to suspect the
correctness of any annual statement, or that the company was in an
unsound condition.
By another statute it was provided that if, upon
examination of the affairs of any insurance company, the auditor
should conclude that it was insolvent, or that its further continuance in
business would be hazardous to the insured or the public, he should
apply by petition to the judge of any circuit court for an injunction
restraining the company from proceeding with its business until further
Upon the case as thus presented, the court said :
hearing, etc.
" The case upon the merits, so far as they involve any question of
which this court may take cognizance, is within a very narrow comThe main proposition of the counsel is that the obligation of
pass.
the contract which the company had with the state in its original and
amended charter will be impaired if that companv be held subject
to the operation of subsequent statutes regulating the business of life
insurance and authorizing the courts, in certain contingencies, to suspend, restrain or prohibit insurance companies incorporated in Illinois

CONTROL BY LEGISLATION.

437

1365

This position can not be susfrom further continuance in business.
tained consistently with the power which the state has, and, upon
every ground of public policy, must always have, over corporations of
Nor is it justified by any reasonable interpretation
her own creation.
The right of the plaintiff
of the language of the company's charter.
in error to exist as a corporation, and its authority, in that capacity, to
conduct the particular business for which it was created were granted,
subject to the condition that the privileges and franchises conferred
upon it should not be abused, or so employed as to defeat the ends
for which it was established, and that, when so abused or misemployed, they might be withdrawn or reclaimed by the state in such
way and by such modes of procedure as were consistent with law.
Although no such condition is expressed in the company's charter, it
is necessarily implied in every grant of corporate existence.
Terrett
v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43, 51 ; Angell & Ames on Corporations, pth
ed., paragraph 774, note.
"Equally implied, in our judgment, is the condition that the corporation shall be subject to such reasonable regulations, in respect to
the general conduct of its affairs, as the legislature may from time to
time prescribe, which do not materially interfere with or obstruct
the substantial enjoyment of the privileges the state has granted, and
serve only to secure the ends for which the corporation was created.
Commonwealth v. Farmers' and
Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 7
Mechanics' Bank, 21 Pick. 542; Commercial Bank v. Mississippi, 4
Sm. & Marsh. 497, 503. If this condition be not necessarily implied,
then the creation of corporations, with rights and franchises which do
not belong to individual citizens, may become dangerous to the public
welfare through the ignorance, or misconduct, or fraud of those to
whose management their affairs are entrusted.
It would be extraordinary if the legislative department of a government, charged with
the duty of enacting such laws as may promote the health, the morals,
and the prosperity of the people, might not, when unrestrained by
limitations upon its authority, provide, by reasonable
constitutional
regulations, against the misuse of special corporate privileges which
it has granted, and which could not, except by its sanction, express or
implied, have been exercised at all."
These views are decisive of the issue here. An attempt is made to>
distinguish that case from this upon the ground that, in the former,,
the proceedings were for the purpose of compelling the company to
cease from business because of insolvency; while, in this case, the
question is as to the obligation of the company to make the statements
required by the statute. This distinction is without foundation. In
the Needles Case, the duty was expressly imposed upon the corporation to make statements identical in form and substance with those
which insurance companies are required to make under the Ohio statute we are here considering.
Many additional police powers were
conferred by the Illinois law, among them being the authority which,
as stated above, was given to the state auditor to apply for an injunction restraining a company from continuing its business, whenever, by
2 WIL. CAS.
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It is, indeed, true
its statement, it appeared to him to be insolvent.
that the relief there invoked was the restraint of the corporation from
But that case substandoing business on the ground of insolvency.
tially involved not only the right to compel the statement, but the
greater right to prevent, in case of insolvency, the continuance of the
Hence, as the greater includes the less, the
business of the corporation.
Needles Case necessarily embraces every issue presented here. * * *
Affirmed.

Note.
Police power. 1
1. Definition and general extent:
Mr. Justice Field, in 1885, Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, on 31, defines this as " the power to prescribe regulations
to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people,
and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity."
See, also, Thorpe v. R. & B.
R. Co., 27 Vt. 140, supra, p. 1344; 1893, Virginia Development Co. v. Crozier
Iron Co., 90 Va. 126, 129; 1897, Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366.
This power is so necessary and so important that the state can not, even
by express legislation, bargain it away or divest itself of it : 1850, Phalen v.
Virginia, 8 How. 163, 168; 1879, Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814, supra, p.
1348; 1886, Stone v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 116 U. S. 307; 1896, Commonwealth v. Douglass, 100 Ky. 116, 66 Am. St. Rep. 328; 1897, Douglass v. Ken-

tucky,

168

U.

S. 488.

Such a power, as Mr. Justice Miller says, is "from its very nature incapable of any very exact definition or limitation"
Slaughter-House Cases, 16
Wall. 36, 62 (1872) ; its limits have not been defined with precision, but they
are determined by the "gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion"
Post, C. J., in, 1896, Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. State, 47 Neb. 549, 53 Am. St.
Rep. 557, on 565.
While upon the one hand constitutional rights can not be abridged by legislation under the guise of police regulation, as the right to engage or refuse
to engage in any lawful business or enterprise: 1888, People v. Gillson, 109
N. Y. 389, 4 Am. St. Rep. 465 ; 1895, State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163, 50 Am. St. Rep.
443; cf. Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183; nor can valid contracts be annulled: 1899, Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684; 1900, Stearns
v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223; yet upon the other hand the provisions of the
14th amendment of the United States constitution were not "designed to
limit the subjects upon which the police power of the state may be exerted"
1885, Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27; 1887, Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S.
663; 1889, Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26. The provisions of this amendment, however, do prevent the states, under the guise
of the police power, from making unjust discriminations: 1886, Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; cf. 1885, Soon Hingv. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, and
1885, Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, or taking property, or divesting vested
rights without due process of law: 1859, Commonwealth v. Essex Co., 13
Gray (Mass.) 239; 1875, O. & M. R. Co. v. Lackey, 78 111. 55; 1880, Detroit
v. Det. &. H. P. R. Co., 43 Mich. 140; 1888, People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1 ;
1897, Gulf, Col. & S. F. R. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150; 1898, Smyth v. Ames, 169
U. S. 466, supra, p. 1352; 1899, L. S. & M. S. R. Co. v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684.
The police power of the states is also, to a considerable extent, affected, and
in considerable measure limited by the power of congress to regulate interHere it is settled, in general, " that neither unstate and foreign commerce.
der the guise of inspection nor revenue laws can the states forbid or impede
the introduction of products, universally considered harmless" : 1890, Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313; 1891, Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78; nor
can they burden foreign or interstate commerce by taxation or otherwise, for
the purpose of creating discrimination in favor of domestic producers or man-

^his note is meant to be only an outline of the cases in which the police
power especially affects corporations.
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ufacturers: 1849, Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; 1875, Welton v. Missouri,
U. S. 275; 1875, Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259; 1877, Hannibal &
Asto
St. J. R. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465; 1879, Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434.
commerce, see further, below in this note.
Police laws may provide especially for
2. Illustrations:
(a) The safety of person and property by requiring railroad engineers or other
employes to be examined for color blindness or other defect of vision : 1888,
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465; 1888, Nashville, C. & St. L. R. y. Alabama,
128 U. S. 96; or require railroads to construct fences: 1885, Missouri Pac.
R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512; 1889, Minnesota, etc., R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129
U. S. 26 ; 1893, Minnesota & St. L. R. v. Emmons, 149 U. S. 364 ; or require the
abolition of grade crossings and the construction of viaducts over such railroads at the expense of the company : 1885, State v. Missouri Pac. R., 33 Kan.
176; 1894, N. Y. & N. E. R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556; 1897, Wabash R. Co.
v. Defiance, 167 U. S. 88; 1898, C., B. & Q. R. Co, v. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 57,
or forbid the heating" Of cars with stoves: 1897, New York, etc., R. Co. v.
New York, 165 U. S. 628(citing cases fully, p. 631) ; or make railroads liable
for destruction of property by fire from engines, and require the payment of
a reasonable attorney fee as part of the damages : 1897, St. Louis & S. R. v.
Mathews, 165 U. S. 1 (reviewing cases); 1899, Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v.
Matthews, 174 U. S. 96 (with list of cases on p. 105) ; s. c., 43 L. ed. 909, 19 S.
Ct. 609 ; or destroy property to prevent the spread of conflagrations : 1845, Russell v. Mayor of New York, 2 Den. (N. Y.) 461; 1851, Am. Print Works v.
Lawrence* 23 N. J. L. 590.
(b) The public, health and comfort, by forbidding the introduction of diseased
cattle: 1898, Missouri K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613; cf. 1877, Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465. Or require the removal of
nuisances: 1827, Coates v. Mayor, etc., 7 New York, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 585;
Or prevent the manufacture
1878, Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659.
and the sale, except in the original package of interstate or foreign commerce, of articles considered injurious to the public welfare, as cigarettes:
1897, State v. Goetze, 43 W. Va. 495, 64 Am. St. Rep. 871 ; 1898, McGregor v.
Cone, 104 Iowa 465, 65 Am. St. Rep. 522; 1898, Austin v. State, 101 Tenn. 563,
70 Am. St. Rep. 703 ; 1900, Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, Adv. Sheets, January 15, 1901, p. 132; or oleomargarine (at least the fraudulent sale of such a
product) : 1882, State v. Addington, 77 Mo. 110; 1885, People v. Marx, 99 N.
Y. 377; 1887, People v. Arenberg, 105 N. Y. 123; 1888, State v. Marshall, 64
N. H. 549; 1888, Waterbury v. Newton, 50 N. J. L.534; 1888, Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678; 1888, Walker v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 699; 1894,
Pluraley v. Mass., 155 U. S. 461 ; 1898, Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.
S. 1 ; 1898, Collins v. New Hampshire, 171 U. S. 30; or intoxicating 1 liquors:
1873, Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129; 1877, Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.
S. 25; 1884, Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S. 201; 1886, Walling v. Michigan, 116
U. S. 446; 1888, Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R., 125 U. S. 465; 1890, Leisy v.
Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; 1891, In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, infra, p. 1530; 1896,
Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58. The states can also provide for the protection
of health and property by reasonable inspection and quarantine laws.
(See below, in this note).
(c) The public morals, by preventing the continuance of lotteries: 1879, Stone
v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814, supra, p. 1348; 1886, New Orleans v. Houston, 119
U. S. 265; 1897, Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U. S. 488.
(d) The public comfort, convenience and quiet, such as stopping trains at
cities and towns, delivering telegrams promptly, etc. (see below, in this note).
(e) The public information, in regard to the carrying on of business of corporations affecting the public, by requiring reports, as in the case of insurance companies: 1885, Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 574; 1894.
Eagle Insurance Co. v. Ohio, 153 II. S. 446, supra, p. 1366; 1898, Louisville,
etc., Co. v. Commonwealth,
Ky. , 11 Am. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 201 ; also in
the case of railroad and other quasi-public companies (see below under the
next division of this note).
(f) The regulation of public service occupations: Here those who engage in
91
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an occupation "clothed with a public interest," must serve all who comply
with reasonable regulations, without unjust discrimination, and at reasonable
rates, which are under the control and regulation of the state, either by requiring reports, fixing rates by direct legislation, or through commissions
appointed for the purpose, subject, however, to the limit that such rates must
not be so low as to deprive persons of their property without due process of
law, the final question as to the reasonableness of rates fixed being a judicial,
and not a legislative one. What business is so clothed with a "public interest," is determined by the slow process of "judicial inclusion and exclusion."
The following have been held to be such :
(1) Associated press and newsgathering associations: 1900, Inter-Ocean
Pub. Co. v. Assoc. Press, 184 111. 438, 75 Am. St. Rep. 184; contra, 159 Mo. 410;
(2) Boards of trade, and stock exchanges: 1889, Stock Exchange v. Board
of Trade, 127 111. 153, 11 Am. St. Rep. 107 ;
(3) Gas companies: 1878, State v. Gas Co., 34 Ohio St. 572; 32 Am. Rep.
390; 1889, Zanesville v. G. L. Co., 47 Ohio St. 1. See, jupra, note on.
subject of Mandamus, p. 1318;
(4) Hacks: 1888, Veneman v. Jones, 118 Ind. 41, 10 Am. St. Rep. 100; 1893,.
Lindsay v. Mayor, etc., 104 Ala. 261, 53 Am. St. Rep. 44;
See below, No. (10) ;
(5) Hotels: 1886. Bostick v. State, 47 Ark. 126.
(6) Mills, such as grist and flour: 1866, Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532,
89 Am. Dec. 221; 1876, Burlington v. Beasley, 94 U. S. 310; 1885, Head v.
Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U. S. 9; 1893, State v. Edwards, 86 Me. 102, 41 Am.
See note, 22 Am. Dec. 699;
St. Rep. 528.
(7) Railroads: 1876, C., B. & Q. R. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155; 1876, Peik v. C. &
N. W. R. Co., 94 U. S. 164; 1886, Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307;
As to limits upon the
1894, Reagan v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 154 U. S. 362.
power to fix rates, requiring them to be reasonable and not amount to confiscation, see, 1888, Georgia R. Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174, 179; 1889, Chicago,
M. & St. P. R. v. Minn., 134 U. S. 418; Id92, Chicago & G. T R. v. Wellman,
143 U. S. 339; 1895, St. L. & S. F. R.v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649, 657; 1896, Covington & L. Tp. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 584, 594; 1897, Chicago, B. & Q.
R. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 241; 1898, Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, supra,
See also especially
p. 1352; 1899, L. S. & M. S. R. Co. v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684.
note 62 Am. St. Rep. 289; also note, supra, p. 1318, under Mandamus, and below No. (10).
The state can not make rates to apply outside of the state, or upon goods
starting upon a continuous trip from one place in the state and consigned to
Neither
a place outside : 1886, Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557.
can they violate specific charter provisions: 1891, Cleveland G. & Co. v. City
of Cleveland, 71 Fed. Rep. 610; 1897, Central Trust Co. v. Citizens' St. Ry.

Co.,

82
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Stock yards: 1897, Cotting v. Kan. City, etc., Co., 82 Fed. Rep. 839.
Telegraph and telephone companies : 1883, West. Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 95 Ind. 12, 48 Am. Rep. 692; 1885, Webster Tel. Case, 17 Neb. 126;
1885, Hockett v. State, 105 Ind. 250, 55 Am. Rep. 201 ; 1885, Central U. Tel.
Co v Bradbury, 106 Ind.' 1; 1886, Chesapeake & P. Tel. Co. v. B. & O. R.
Co 66 Md. 399; 1888, Cent. U. Tel. Co. v. State, 118 Ind. 194, 10 Am. St. Rep.
114; 1888, Commercial Union Tel. Co. v. N. E. Tel. Co., 61 Vt. 241, 15 Am.
St. Rep. 893.
Cases, 109 U. S.
(10) Theaters, trains, restaurants, etc.: 1883, Civil Rights
3 ; 1888, People v. King, 110 N. Y. 418, 6 Am. St. Rep. 389 ; 1890, Ferguson v.
Gies, 82 Mich. 358, 21 Am. St. Rep. 576; 1890, Louisville, N. O.&T. R. Co. v.
Miss., 133 U. S. 587; 1896, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537; 1900, Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 179 U. S. 388; compare, 1877, Hall v. DeCuir,
95 U. S. 485; 1892, Younger v. Judah, 111 Mo. 303, 33 Am. St. Rep. 527.
(11) Warehouses and elevators: 1876, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; 1882,
Nash v. Page, 80 Ky. 539, 44 Am. Rep. 490; 1892, Budd v. New York, 143 U. S.
517; 1894, Brass v. Stoeser, 153 U. S. 391; 1896, Stewart v. Great N. R., 65
Minn. 515. See note, 62 Am. St. Rep. 289.
(8)
(9)
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(12) Water companies: 1884, Spring Valley Water W. Co. v. Schottler, 110 U.
S. 347; 1887, Wheeler v. Northern, etc., Co., 10 Colo. 582, 3 Am. St. Rep. 603;
1895, American W. W. v. State, 46 Neb. 194, 50 Am. St. Rep. 610; 1896,
White v. Canal Co., 22 Colo. 191; 1897, San Diego W. Co. v. City of San
Diego, 118 Cal. 556, 62 Am. St. Rep. 261, note 289. See note supra, p. 1318, un-

der Mandamus.

Wharves, if they are held out to be for the public use: 1861, Dutton v.
(13)
Strong, 1 Black (U. S.) 23; 1896. Barrington v. Dock Co., 15 Wash. 170.
3. As affected by the poioer of congress to regulate, commerce:
Mr. Justice
Brown in 1893, Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, on 209 et
seq., says "the powers of the states over the general subject of commerce are
divisible into three classes," viz. (citing most of the cases following) :
(1.) Exclusive in the states, including all those which "concern the strictly
internal commerce of the state, and while the regulations of the state may
affect interstate commerce indirectly, their bearing upon it is so remote that
it can not be termed in any just sense an interference." Under this the
states

:

" May authorize the construction of highways, turnpikes, railways and
(a)
canals between points in the same state, and regulate the tolls for the us"e of
the same," and the management of them: 1874, Railroad v. Maryland, 21
Wall. 456; 1897, Gladson v. State of Minn., 166 U. S. 427;
(b) May "build bridges over non-navigable streams, or regulate the navigation of internal waters, if they do not themsel'ves, or with others, form continuous highways of interstate commerce:" 1852, Veazie v. Moor, 14 How.
568; 1870, The Montello, 11 Wall. 411, s. c. 1874, 20 Wall. 430;
" regulate its strictly internal trade:" 1866, License Tax Cases, 5
(c) May
Wall. 462, 470, 471; 1869, U. S. v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41; 1878, Patterson v.
Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501 ;
" prescribe the form of all commercial contracts :" 1879, The
(d) And may
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82.
(2.) Concurrent with those of congress, at least till congress acts inconsistently with the state regulations. The powers here are :
(a) To regulate pilots: 1851, Cootey v. Phil. Board of Wardens, 12 How.
299; 1864, Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wafl. 450; 1871, Ex parte McNiel, 13
Wall. 236; 1880, Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U. S. 572.
(b) To enact quarantine and inspection laws, and provide for policing
harbors: 1824, Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 203; 1837, City of New York
v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102; 1882, Baker v. State, 54 Wis. 368; 1882, Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S. 38; 1886, Morgan Steamship Co. v. Louisiana, 118 U. S. 455;
1888, Faircloth v. DeLeon, 81 Ga. 158; 1890, Stokes v. Dept. of Agriculture,
106 N. C. 439; 1893, Vanmeter v. Spurrier, 94 Ky. 22; 1894, Kirby v. Huntsvilte Fertilizer Co., 105 Ala. 529; 1898, Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina,
But such regulations must not be unreasonable, or be in fact
171 U. S. 345.
regulations of interstate commerce: 1877, Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465;
1886, Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446; 1890, Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.
S. 313; 1891, Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78; 1891, Voight v. Wright, 141
U. S. 62; 1897, Scott y. Donald, 165 U. S. 58.
(c) To improve navigable channels : 1880, County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102
U. S. 691 ; 1882, Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678; 1886, Huse v. Glover,
119U. S. 543.
(d) To regulate wharves, piers and docks: 1874, Cannon v. New Orleans,
20 Wall. 577; 1877, Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80; 1879, Packet Co. v. St.
Louis, 100 U. S. 423; 1881, Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U. S. 559; 1882,
Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S.691 ; 1887, Ouachita Packet Co. v.
Aiken, 121 U. S. 444.
(e) To bridge or dam navigable waters of the state: 1829, Wilson v. Black
Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245; 1877, Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459; 1885,
Cardwell v. Am. Br. Co., 113 U. S. 205.
(f) To establish ferries: 1861, Conway v. Taylor's Executor, 1 Black 603.
(g) To forbid the running of through freight trains upon Sunday: 1896,
Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299.
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(h) To require a reasonable number of trains to stop at places to accommodate the traffic: 1897, Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427; 1899, Lake
Shore & W. S. R. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, but not to go an unreasonable distance out of the main way for such purpose; 1896, Illinois Central R. v.
Illinois, 163 U. S. 142.
(i) To forbid the heating of cars by stoves: 1897, New York, etc., R. Co.
v. New York, 165 U. S. 628 (citing cases p. 631).
(i) To require the prompt delivery of telegrams : 1896, West. U. Tel. Co.
v. James, 162 U. S. 650 ; compare, 1887, Western U. Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122
U. S. 347.
In this class of cases, while the powers of the states and the nation are
concurrent so far as they are compatible, yet where they become incompatible the legislation of congress necessarily supersedes that of the states ; it is
not, however, " the mere existence of such a powep, but its exercise by congress
which may be incompatible with the exercise of the same power by the states,
and the states may legislate in the absence of congressional legislation ;" 1851,
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 318; 1855, Pennsylvania v. Wheeling, etc., Co., 18 How. 421; 1882, Escanaba Co. V.Chicago, 107 U. S. 678;
1886, Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543; 1896, Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S.
299; 1897, Gladson v. State of Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427; 1899, L. S. & M. S.
R. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285.
" Under this power also the states may tax the instruments of interstate commerce as it taxes other similar property, provided such tax be not laid upon
the commerce:" 1893, Covington, etc., Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204.
212.

(3.) Exclusive in congress; Whenever the matters instead of being of a local
nature, are national in their character, or admit of a uniform system or plan
of regulation, " the non-action of congress indicates its will that such comhere " the states have no right to immerce shall be free and untrammelled,"
pose restrictions, either by way of taxation, discrimination, or regulation,
upon commerce between the states:" 1824, Gibbon v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1;
1885, Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622; 1887, Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S, 489; 1888, Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R., 125 U. S. 465; 1890,
Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; 1893, Covington, etc., Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204; 1896, Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58; 1898, Schollenberger
v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.' S. 1 ; 1900, Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343.
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(3) Taxation.
(a) Corporate

elements subject to taxation.

FARRINGTON
1877.

IN THE SUPREME

v.

TENNESSEE.

1

CURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
S. Rep. 679694.

95

U.

court of Tennessee.
Farrington was the
of
owner of 150 shares
$100 each of the stock of the U. & P. Bank
of Memphis, incorporated in 1858, by the legislature of Tennessee;
the charter provided "that the said company shall pay to the state an
annual tax of one-half of one per cent, on each share of the capital
stock subscribed, which shall be in lieu of all other taxes."
In 1872,
the state taxed the shares of Farrington, under the state and county

[Error from supreme

J.

1

Statement abridged; part of opinion, and dissenting opinion of Story,
(Clifford & Field, JJ., concurring), omitted.

CONTROL BY LEGISLATION.

438

1

37

I

revenue laws, to the amount of $240 in addition to the tax paid by
the bank.
Farrington objected that the revenue laws were unconstiThe state sututional as impairing the obligation of the contract.
error
the
valid
this
is
the
taxes
;
assigned] .
preme court adjudged
*
*
*
This
case
turns
MR.
SWAYNE.
upon the con-
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struction to be given to the tenth section of the charter of the bank.
Our attention has been called to nothing else.
The exercise of the taxing power is vital to the functions of government.
Except where specially restrained the states possess it to the
fullest extent. Prim a facie it extends to all property, corporeal and
incorporeal, and to every business by which livelihood or profit is
When exemption is
sought to be made within their jurisdiction.
claimed it must be shown indubitably to exist.
At the outset every
A well-founded doubt is fatal to the claim.
presumption is against it.
It is only when the terms of the concession are too explicit to admit
fairly of any other construction that the proposition can be supported.
West Wisconsin Railway Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 93 U. S. 595;
Tucker v. Ferguson, 22 Wall. 527.
Can the exemption here in question, examined by the light of these
rules, be held valid?
Upon looking into the section several things clearly appear:
i. The tax specified is upon each share of the capital stock, and
not upon the capital stock itself.
2. It is upon each share subscribed.
Nothing is said about what is paid in upon it. That is immaterial.
The fact of subscription is the test, and that alone is sufficient.
3.
This tax is declared to be "in lieu of all other taxes." Such was the
contract of the parties.
The capital stock and the shares of the capital stock are distinct
The capital stock is the money paid or authorized or rethings.
quired to be paid in as the basis of the business of the bank, and the
means of conducting its operations.
It represents whatever it may
be invested in. If a large surplus be accumulated and laid by, that
does not become a part of it.
The amount authorized can not be increased without proper legal authority.
If there be losses which imthere can be no formal reduction without the like sanction.
pair
No power to increase or diminish
belongs inherently to the corporation.
trust fund held by the corporation as
trustee.
It
If the bank fail, equity may
subject to taxation like other property.
administer
lay hold of
pay the debts, and give the residuum,
there be any, to the stockholders.
If the corporation be dissolved by
judgment of law, equity may interpose and perform the same functions.
Wood v. Dummer,
Mason 308; Curran v. Arkansas, 15
How. 304; Gordon v. The Appeal Tax Court,
How. 133; People
v. The Commissioners,
Wall. 244; Van Allen v. The Assessors,
Wall. 573; Queen v. Arnaud,
Ad. &E. (N. S.) 806; Bank Tax
Cases,
Wall. 200.
The shares of the capital stock are usually represented by certificates.
cestui que trust to the extent of his ownerEvery holder
The shares are held and may be bought and sold and taxed
ship.
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like other property. Each share represents an aliquot part of the
But the holder can not touch a dollar 'of the principal.
capital stock.
He is entitled only to share in the dividends and profits.
Upon the
dissolution of the institution, each shareholder is entitled to a proporThe liens
tionate share of the residuum after satisfying all liabilities.
of all creditors are prior to his.
The corporation, though holding
and owning the capital stock, can not vote upon it.
It is the right
and the duty of the shareholders to vote.
in
this
They
way give conthe
life
of
to
the
and
thus
control
and direct
corporation,
tinuity
may
its management and operations.
The capital stock and the shares
The bank may be
may both be taxed, and it is not double taxation.
of
to
the
its
be authorized to
tax
out
or
required
pay
corporate funds,
deduct the amount paid for each stockholder out of his dividends.
Angell & A. on Corp., sections 556, 557; Union Bank v. The State,
9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 489; Van Allen v. The Assessors, supra; Bradley
v. The People, 4 Wall. 459; Queen v. Arnaud, supra; National
Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 353 ; The State v. Branin, 3 Zab.
(N. J.) 484; M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316.
There are other objects in this connection liable to taxation.
It
be
to
well
advert
to
some
of
them.
may
1. The franchise to be a corporation
and exercise its powers in the
of
its
business.
prosecution
Burroughs on Taxation,
85 ; Hamilton v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 632; Wilmington Railroad v. Reid, 13

Wall. 264.
2.

Accumulated earnings.

3.

Profits and dividends.

The State v. Utter,

34

N. J. L.

The St. Louis Mutual Insurance Co. v. Charles, 47 Mo. 462.

489

;

The Attorney-General v. Bank, etc., 4

(N. C.) Eq. 287.
4. Real estate belonging to the corporation and necessary for its
business.
Wilmington Railroad v. Reid, supra; The Bank of Cape

Jones

5 Ired. (N. C.) L. 516.
Banks
and
are taxed by the United States:
bankers
5.
i. On their deposits. 2. On the capital employed in their business.
4. On the notes of every person or
3. On their circulation.
Rev. St. 673, et seq.
state bank used and paid out for circulation.
The states are permitted, in addition, to tax the shares of the
Rev. St. 1015.
national banks.

Fearv. Edwards,

This enumeration shows the searching and comprehensive taxation
to which such institutions are subjected, where there is no protectioa
by previous compact.
M'Culloch v.
Unrestrained power to tax is power to destroy.

Maryland, supra.
When this charter was granted the state might have been silent as
to taxation.
In that case, the power would have been unfettered.
The Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514. It might have reserved the power as to some things, and yielded it as to others.
It
had the power to make its own terms, or to refuse the charter.
It
chose to stipulate for a specified tax on the shares, and declared and
bound itself that this tax should be "in lieu of all other taxes."
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There is no question before us as to the tax imposed on the shares
But the state has by her revenue law imposed anby the charter.
This is one of
other and an additional tax on these same shares.
" which it had
The identhose " other taxes
stipulated to forego.
tity of the thing doubly taxed is not affected by the fact that in one
case the tax is to be paid vicariously by the bank, and in the other by
The thing thus taxed is still the
the owner of the share himself.
same, and the second tax is expressly forbidden by the contract of the
After the most careful consideration, we can come to no
parties.
Such, we think, must have been the understandother conclusion.
ing and intent of the parties when the charter was granted and the
bank organized. Any other view would ignore the covenant that the
It would blot
tax specified should be "in lieu of all other taxes."
those terms from the context, and construe it as if they were not a
*
* *
part of it.
Reversed.

See, generally: 1836, Union Bank v. State, 9 Yerger (Tenn.) 490;
Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573; 1875, Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
State, 8 Heisk. (55 Tenn.) 663, 795; 1877, Memphis v. Farrington, 8 Baxter
(Tenn.) 539; 1886, Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U. S. 129, 139; 1896, Shelby
Co. v. Union and Planters' Bank, 161 U. S. 149, 3 Am. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 333;
see other cases in 161 U. S. on pp. 134, 16L, 174, 186, 193, 198 and 200; 1897,
New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank, 167 U. S. 371, on 402; 1899, Owensboro Nat.
Bank v. City of Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664. See also note supra, p. 781, et seq.
By the great weight of authority, the shares held by the shareholders are
taxable to them, notwithstanding the property, capital, or capital stock, or
franchise, has been taxed also. In some states, however, this is considered
doubte taxation:
1866, Dwight v. Mayor, 12 Allen (Mass.) 316, 90 Am. Dec.
149; 1873, City of Memphis v. Ensley, 6 Baxter (Tenn.) 553, 32 Am. Rep. 532;
1876, Dyer v. Osborne, 11 R. I. 321, 23 Am. Rep. 460; 1880, Worth v. Ashe
Cb., 82 N. C. 420, 33 Am. Rep. 692; 1880, Bradley v. Bauder, 36 O. S. 28, 38
Am. Rep. 547; 1888, Street R. Co. v. Morrow, 87 Tenn. 406, 2 L. R. A. 853;
1894, Commonwealth v. Charlottesville, etc., Co., 90 Va. 790, 44 Am. St. Rep.
960, note ; 1900, Greenleaf v. Board of Review, 184 111. 226, 75 Am. St. Rep.
168; 1900, Jennings v. Commwealth, 98 Va. 87, 34 S. E. Rep. 981; 1900, Atlanta Natl.B. & L. Ass'n v. Stewart, 109 Ga. 80, 35 S. E. Rep. 73; see, contra,
1899, In re Newport Reading Room, 21 R. I. 440, 44 Atl. 511.
Nate.

1865,
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(b) Capital and capital stock.

Fire Ins. Co. v. Board of Revenue, 99 Ala. i,
p.
supra,
773; People, ex rel. U. T. Co. v. Coleman, 126 N. Y.
433 supra, p. 778, note 781, et seq.
See Commercial

Note.
Mr. Beach, Private Corporations,
"There are eight
802, says:
methods of taxing capital stock of corporations, to wit: (1) A tax upon the
capital stock when the company during any year makes dividends to six per
cent, or more on the par value of its capital (People v. Horn Silver M. Co. ,105
Law, April 18,
N. Y. 76) ; (2) a tax upon the whole capital stock at par (N.
1884) ; (3) upon the capital stock at its actual cash or market value (Ind. R. S.
1887,
6357 ; 111. R. S., ch. 120,
3) ; (4) upon so much of the capital stock as
has been subscribed to and paid in (Md. Laws 1878, ch. 178) ; (5) upon the capital stock plus the bonded debt of the company at market value (Lehigh Valley
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R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 129 Pa. St. 429) ; (6) upon the capital stock plus the
3919); (7) upon the capitotal debt, both funded and floating (Conn. G. S.,
3; Ala.
tal stock less property otherwise taxed (N. Y. Laws 1837, ch. 456,
453, sub. 9) ; (8) upon the capital stock less the indebtedness of the corCode,
poration (People v. Coleman, 1 N. Y. Supp. 666.)"
See, also, 1891, Foster v. Stevens, 63 Vt. 145, 13 L. R. A. 166, and note; 1891,
Hyland v. Central I. & S. Co., 129 Ind. 68, 13 L. R. A. 515, note.
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(c) Tangible property, and movable property.

PULLMAN'S PALACE CAR COMPANY
1891.

IN THE SUPREME

COURT

OF

v.

PENNSYLVANIA.

THE UNITED STATES.

S. Rep. 18-36.

1

141

U

a

it,

[Action by the state of Pennsylvania to collect taxes assessed in
that state against the car company. for the years 1870 to 1880; the
those for the years 1870
taxes were assessed under successive laws
of
mill
on
one
at
the
rate
half
a
per cent, of dividend
every
1874
of
the
stock
business in Penndoing
corporation
capital
upon
every
for
the
rate
of
nine-tenths
of a mill on
those
at
;
sylvania
18751877
every one per cent, of dividend on the capital stock of "all corporaof freight or passentions in any way engaged in the transportation
gers ;" those for 18781880, at the rate of half a mill on each one per
cent, of dividend of six per cent, or more on the par value of the capital stock, and when the dividend was less, at three mills on a valuation of the capital stock, on all corporations (with certain excepThe car company was organized in Illinois and had its printions).
cipal office in Chicago. Its business was to furnish sleeping coaches
to various railroad companies which attached them to their trains, no
The railroad
charge being made by either party against the other.
companies collected the usual fares from passengers, and the car comIn this way between
pany a separate charge for seats, berths, etc.
in
use on the Pennsyland
the
defendant
had
1880,
continuously
1870
vania railroads running into, through and out of the state, about 100
of its cars and coaches.
The lower court held "that the proportion
of the capital stock of the defendant invested and used in Pennsylvania was taxable under these acts, and that the amount of the tax may
be properly ascertained by taking as a basis the proportion which the
number of miles operated by the defendant in this state bears to the
whole number of miles, operated by
without regard to the question
where any particular car or cars were used," and gave judgment for
the state.
This was affirmed by the supreme court of the state, and
the car company sued out
writ of error because the state courts erred
in holding that any part of its capital stock was subject to taxation in
1

Statement
Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley (Mr.
abridged.
Justice Field and Mr. Justice Harlan concurring) omitted.
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Pennsylvania, by reason of its running any of

its cars into, out of, or
state,
in
that
the
interstate
through
transportation of passengers.]
MR. JUSTICE GRAY: Upon this writ of error, whether this tax
was in accordance with the law of Pennsylvania is a question on
The
which the decision of the highest court of the state is conclusive.
of
which
this
court
is
the
has
whether
tax
only question
jurisdiction
was in violation of the clause of the constitution of the United States
granting to congress the power to regulate commerce among the
The plaintiff in error contends that its cars could be
several states.
taxed only in the state of Illinois, in which it was incorporated and
had its principal place of business.
No general principles of law are better settled, or more fundamental, than that the legislative power of every state extends to all property
within its borders, and that only so far as the comity of that state allows can such property be affected by the law of any other state. The
old rule, expressed in the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam, by which
personal property was regarded as subject to the law of the owner's
domicile, grew up in the Middle Ages, when movable property consisted chiefly of gold and jewels, which could be easily carried by the
owner from place to place, or secreted in spots known only to himself.
In modern times, since the great increase in amount and variety
of personal property, not immediately connected with the person of
the owner, that rule has yielded more and more to the lex situs, the
law of the place where the property is kept and used.
Green v.
Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307, and 7 Wall, 139; Hervey v. Rhode
Island Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664; Harkness v. Russell,
118 U. S. 663, 679; Walworth v. Harris, 129 U. S. 355; Story on
Conflict of Laws,
550; Wharton on Conflict of Laws,
297-311.
As observed by Mr. Justice Story, in his commentaries, just cited,
"although movables are for many purposes to be deemed to have no
situs, except that of the domicile of the owner, yet this being but a
legal fiction, it yields, whenever it is necessary for the purpose of justice that the actual situs of the thing should be examined.
A nation
within whose territory any personal property is actually situate has an
entire dominion over it while therein, in point of sovereignty and
jurisdiction, as it has over immovable property situate there."
For the purposes of taxation, as has been repeatedly affirmed by
this court, personal property may be separated from its owner and he
may be taxed, on its account, at the place where it is, although not
the place of his own domicile, and even if he is not a citizen or a resident of the state which imposes the tax.
Lane County v. Oregon, 7
Wall. 71, 77; Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 300, 323, 324,
328; Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 29; Tappan v. Merchants' Bank, 19 Wall. 490, 499; State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.
S. 575, 607, 608; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622; Coe v. Errol,
116 U. S. 517, 524; Marye v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 127 U.S.
117,

123.
is equally well settled that there is nothing in the constitution or
laws of the United States which prevents a state from taxing personal
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property, employed in interstate or foreign commerce, like other perDelaware Railroad Tax, 18
sonal property within its jurisdiction.
Wall. 206, 232; Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, 464; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 206, 211 ; Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Attorney-General of Massachusetts, 125 US. 530, 549; Marye v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 127 U. S. 117,
124; Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 649.
Ships or vessels, indeed, engaged in interstate or foreign commerce
upon the high seas, or other waters which are a common highway,
and having their home port at which they are registered under the
laws of the United States, at the domicile of their owners in one state,
are not subject to taxation in another state at whose ports they incidentally and temporarily touch for the purpose of delivering or receiving passengers or freight, But that is because they are not, in
any proper sense, abiding within its limits and have no continuous presence or actual situs within its jurisdiction and, therefore, can be taxed
only at their legal situs, their home port and the domicile of their
owners.
Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. 596; St.
Louis v. Ferry Co., n Wall. 423; Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall, 471 ;
Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365 ; Gloucester Ferry
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196.
Between ships and vessels, having their situs fixed by act of
congress, and their course over navigable waters, and touching land
only incidentally and temporarily; and cars or vehicles of any kind,
having no situs so fixed, and traversing the land only, the distinction is
obvious. As has been said by this court: "Commerce on land between the different states is so strikingly dissimilar, in many respects,
from commerce on water, that it is often difficult to regard them in
the same aspect in reference to the respective constitutional powers
No doubt comand duties of the state and federal governments.
merce by water was principally in the minds of those who framed and
although both its language and spirit emadopted the constitution,
brace commerce by land as well.
Maritime transportation requires
Nature has prepared to hand that portion of
no artificial roadway.
The navigable waters of the earth are
the instrumentality employed.
of
trade and intercourse.
No franchise
public
highways
recognized
is needed to enable the navigator to use them.
Again, the vehicles of
commerce by water being instruments of intercommunication with
other nations, the regulation of them is assumed by the national legislature.
So that state interference with transportation by water, and
especially by sea, is at once clearly marked and distinctly discernable.
But it is different with transportation by land." Railroad Co. v.
Maryland, 21 Wall. 456, 470.
In Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, on which the plaintiff in
error much relies, the New Jersey corporation taxed by the state of
Pennsylvania, under one of the statutes now in question, had no
property in Pennsylvania except a lease of a wharf at which its steamboats touched to land and receive passengers and freight carried across
the Delaware river ; and the difference in the facts of that case and of
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this, and in the rules applicable, was clearly indicated in the opinion
of the court as follows:
"It is true that property of corporations
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce, as well as the property of
corporations engaged in other businness, is subject to taxation, provided always it be within the jurisdiction of the state." 1 14 U. S. 206.
"While it is conceded that the property in a state belonging to a foreign corporation engaged in foreign or interstate commerce may be
taxed equally with like property of a domestic corporation engaged
in that business, we are clear that a tax or other burden imposed on
the property of either corporation because it is used to carry on that
commerce, or upon the transportation of persons or property, or for
the navigation of the public waters over which the transportation
is
made, is invalid and void, as an interference with, and an obstruction
of, the power of congress in the regulation of such commerce." 114

U. S.

211.

Much reliance is also placed by the plaintiff in error upon the cases
in which this court has decided that citizens or corporations of one
state can not be taxed by another state for a license or privilege to
But in each
carry on interstate or foreign commerce within its limits.
of those cases the tax was not upon the property employed in the
business, but upon the right to carry on the business at all, and was
therefore held to impose a direct burden upon the commerce itself.
Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. 69, 74; Pickard v. Pullman's
Southern Car Co., 1171!. S. 34, 43 ; Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 497; Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 644.
For the same reason, a tax upon the gross receipts derived from the
transportation of passengers and goods between one state and other
states or foreign nations has been held to be invalid.
Fargo v.
Michigan, 121 U. S. 230; Philadelphia & Southern Steamship Co.
v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326.
The tax now in question is not a license tax or a privilege tax ; it is
not a tax on business or occupation; it is not a tax on, or because of,
the transportation, or the right of transit, of persons or property
The tax is imposed
through the state to other states or countries.
equally on corporations doing business within the state, whether domestic or foreign, and whether engaged in interstate commerce or
not.
The tax on the capital of the corporation, on account of its
property within the state, is, in substance and effect, a tax on that
property. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 1 14 U. S. 196, 209 ;
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Attorney-General of Massachusetts,
This is not only admitted, but insisted on, by
125 U. S. 530, 552.
the plaintiff in error.
The cars of this company within the state of Pennsylvania are employed in interstate commerce, but their being so employed does not
exempt them from taxation by the state, and the state has not taxed
them because of their being so employed, but because of their being
within its territory and jurisdiction.
The cars were continuously and
fro upon certain routes of
in
and
to
permanently employed
going
travel.
If they had never passed beyond the limits of Pennsylvania it
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is

it

;

it

is

a

a

is

it
is

a

;

it,

could not be doubted that the state could tax them, like other property within its borders, notwithstanding they were employed in interThe fact that, instead of stopping at the state
state commerce.
boundary, they cross that boundary in going out and coming back can
not affect the power of the state to levy a tax upon them.
The state
having the right, for the purposes of taxation, to tax any personal
property found within its jurisdiction, without regard to the place of
the owner's domicile, could tax the specific cars which at a given moThe route over which the cars travel
ment were within its borders.
extending beyond the limits of the state, particular cars may not remain within the state, but the company has at all times substantially
the same number of cars within the state, and continuously and constantly uses there a portion of its property; and it is distinctly found,
as matter of fact, that the company continuously, throughout the
periods for which these taxes were levied, carried on business in Pennsylvania and had about one hundred cars within the state.
The mode which the state of Pennsylvania adopted to ascertain the
proportion of the company's property upon which it should be taxed
in that state, was by taking as a basis of assessment such proportion
of the capital stock of the company as the number of miles over which
it ran cars within the state bore to the w rhole number of miles in that
This was a just and
and other states over which its cars were run.
equitable method of assessment, and if it were adopted by all the
states through which these cars ran, the company would be assessed
upon the whole value of its capital stock, and no more.
The validity of this mode of apportioning such a tax is sustained
by several decisions of this court, in cases which came up from the
circuit courts of the United States, and in which, therefore, the jurisdiction of this court extended to the determination of the whole case,
and was not limited, as upon writs of error to the state courts, to
questions under the constitution and laws of the United States.
In the State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, it was adjudged
that a statute of Illinois, by which a tax on the entire taxable property of a railroad corporation, including its rolling stock, capital and
franchise, was assessed by the state board of equalization, and was
collected in each municipality in proportion to the length of the road
was lawful, and not in conflict with the constitution of the
within
and Mr. Justice Miller delivering judgment said:
state
"Another objection to the system of taxation by the state is, that
the rolling stock, capital stock and franchise are personal property,
local situs at the
and that this, with all other personal property, has
principal place of business of the corporation, and can be taxed by
no other county, city or town but the one where
so situated.
based upon the general rule of law that personal
This objection
It may be
property, as to its situs, follows the domicile of its owner.
rule can be applied to
raildoubted very reasonably whether such
road corporation as between the different localities embraced by its
But, after all, the rule
line of road.
merely the law of the state
and when
-called into operation as to property
which recognizes
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located in one state, and owned by a resident of another, it is a rule
of comity in the former state rather than an absolute principle in all
Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 312. Like all other laws of
cases.
a state, it is, therefore, subject to legislative repeal, modification or
limitation ; and when the legislature of Illinois declared that it should
not prevail in assessing personal property of railroad companies for
taxation, it simply exercised an ordinary function of legislation."
92
U. S. 607, 608.
"It is further objected that the railroad track, capital stock and
franchise is not assessed in each county where it lies, according to its
value -there, but according to an aggregate value of the whole, on
which each county, city and town collects taxes according to the
"It may well be doubted
length of the track within its limits."
whether any better mode of determining the value of that portion of
the track within any one county has been devised than to ascertain
the value of the whole road, and apportion the value within the
"This court has excounty by its relative length to the whole."
held
in
of
two
the
road
a
cases,
where
corporation ran through
pressly
different states, that a tax upon the income or franchise of the road
was properly apportioned by taking the whole income or value of the
franchise, and the length of the road within each state, as the basis of
Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206; Erie Railroad Co.
taxation.
v. Pennsylvania, 21 Wall. 492." 92 U. S. 608, 611.
So in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Attorney-General of Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530, this court upheld the validity of a tax imposed by the state of Massachusetts upon the capital stock of a telegraph company, on account of property owned and used by it within
the state, taking as the basis of assessment such proportion of the
value of its capital stock as the length of its lines within the state bore
to their entire length throughout the country.
Even more in point is the case of Marye v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, i2yU. S. 117, in which the queston was whether a railroad
company incorporated by the state of Maryland, and no part of whose
own railroad was within the state of Virginia, was taxable under general laws of Virginia upon rolling stock owned by the company, and
employed upon connecting railroads leased by it in that state, yet not
assigned permanently to those roads, but used interchangeably upon
them and upon roads in other states, as the company's necessities reIt was held not to be so taxable, solely because the tax laws
quired.
of Virginia appeared upon their face to be limited to railroad corporations of that state ; and Mr. Justice Matthews, delivering the unanimous judgment of the court, said :
"It is not denied, as it can not be, that the state of Virginia has
rightful power to levy and collect a tax upon such property used and
found within its territorial limits, as this property was used and
found, if and whenever it may choose, by apt legislation, to exert its
It is quite true, as the situs of the Baltiauthority over the subject.
more and Ohio Railroad Company is in the state of Maryland, that,
also, upon general principles, is the situs of all its personal property;
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but for purposes of taxation, as well as for other purposes, that situs
may be fixed in whatever locality the property may be brought and
used by its owner by the law of the place where it is found.
If the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company is permitted by the state of
Virginia to bring into its territory, and there habitually to use and
employ a portion of its movable personal property, and the railroad
company chooses so to do, it would certainly be competent and legitimate for the state to impose upon such property, thus used and employed, its fair share of the burdens of taxation imposed upon similar property used in the like way by its own citizens.
And such a
tax might be properly assessed and collected in cases like the present,
'
where the specific and individual items of property so used and employed were not continuously the same, but were constantly changing,
In such cases the tax
according to the exigencies of the business.
might be fixed by an appraisement and valuation of the average
amount of the property thus habitually used, and collected by distraint upon any portion that might at anytime be found.
Of course,
the lawlessness of a tax upon vehicles of transportation used by common carriers might have to be considered in particular instances with
reference to its operation as a regulation of commerce among the
states, but the mere fact that they were employed as vehicles of transportation in the interchange of interstate commerce would not render
their taxation invalid."
127 U. S. 123, 124.
For these reasons, and upon these authorities, the court is of opinion that the tax in question is constitutional and valid. The result of
holding otherwise would be that, if all the states should concur in
abandoning the legal fiction that personal property has its situs at the
owner's domicile, and in adopting the system of taxing it at the place
at which it is used and by whose laws it is protected, property employed in any business requiring continuous and constant movement
from one state to another would escape taxation altogether.

Judgment affirmed.

Note: Taxation of railroads, rolling stock, vessels, and migratory property: See generally, notes 56 Am. Dec. 525, 535; 79 Am. Dec. 333; 62 Am.
St. Rep. 459, 470, 476.
Railroads: 1852, Sangamon, etc., R. Co. v. Morgan Co., 14 111. 163, 56 Am.
Dec. 497, note 525; 1865, Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. State, 25 Ind. 177, 87 Am.
Dec. 358; 1868, Applegate v. Ernst, 3 Bush (Ky.) 648, 96 Am. Dec. 272; 1870,
Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 66 Pa. St. 73, 5 Am. Rep. 344;
1873, Delaware R. Tax, 18 Wall. 206 ; 1874, Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 21
Wall. (U. S.) 456; 1894, Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421;
1895, New York, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 158 U. S. 431 ; 1899, Territory of
New Mexico v. TJ. S. Trust Co., 174 U. S. 545; 1899, Ames v. People, 26 Oolo.
83, 56 Pac. Rep. 656.
Rolling stock: 1852, Sangamon, etc., R. Co. v. Morgan Co., 14 111. 163, 56
Am. Dec. 497, note 525; 1873, Randall v. Elwejl, 52 N. Y. 521, 11 Am. Rep.
747 ; 1876, Elizabethtown, etc., R. v. Elizabethtown, 12 Bush (Ky.) 233 ; 188T4,
Pickard v. Pullman, etc., Car Co., 117 U. S. 34; see also, p. 51; 1885, Carlisle
v. Pullman Pal. Car Co., 8 Colo. 320, 54 Am. Rep. 553; 1888, Atlantic & Pac.
R. Co. v. Lesueur (Ariz.), 1 L. R. A. 244; 1890, Bain v. Richmond, etc., R.
Co., 105 N. C. 363, 18 Am. St. Rep. 912, 8 L. R. A. 299, note; 1891, Denver,
etc., R. Co. v. Church, 17 Colo. 1, 31 Am. St. Rep. 252 ; 1897, Hall v. American
Refrigerator Co., 24 Colo. 291, 65 Am. St. Rep. 223 ; 1898, State v. Stephens, 146
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Mo. 662, 69 Am. St. Rep. 625; 1900, Union Refrig. Transit Co. v. Lynch, 177
U. S. 149 ; 1901, Pullman v. Adams, 78 Miss. 814, 84 Am. St. Rep. 647, 30 So. 757,
1846, Battle v. Mobile, 9 Ala. 234, 44 Am. Dec. 438; 1878, TransVessels:
portation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. 8. 273 ; 1879, Irvin v. N. O. R. Co., 94 111. 105,
34 Am. Rep. 208; 1883, San Francisco v. Central Pac. R. Co., 63 Cal. 467, 49
Am. Rep. 98; 1896, Johnson v. De Bary-Baya M. L., 37 Fla. 499, 37 L. R. A.
518, note ; 1899, Norfolk & W. R. v. Board of Public Works, 97 Va. 23, 32
S. E. Rep. 779.
Migratory property, in course of transportation: See, 1890, Bain v. Richmond,
etc., R. Co., 105 N. C. 363, 18 Am. St. Rep. 912; 1896, Myers v. County
Comm'rs, 83 Md. 385, 55 Am. St. Rep. 349; 1898, State v. Stephens, 146 Mo.
662, 69 Am. St. Rep. 625; 1898, Kelley v. Rhoads, 7 Wyo. 237, 75 Am. St.
Rep. 904.

Sec. 441.

(d) Intangible property.

ADAMS EXPRESS COMPANY
1897.

v.

OHIO STATE AUDITOR.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE UNITED STATES.
Rep. 194-256.

165

1

U. S.

of Ohio of April 27, 1893, 9 Laws Ohio
Laws Ohio 220), created a board of
330
appraisers and assessors and required each telegraph, telephone and
express company doing business within the state to make returns of
the number of shares of its capital, the par value and market value
thereof, its entire real and personal property, and where located and
the value thereof as assessed for taxation, its gross receipts for the year
of business wherever done, and of the business done in the state of
Ohio, giving the receipts of each office in the state, and the whole
length of the line of rail and water routes over which it did business
within and without the state. It required the board of assessors to
"proceed to ascertain and assess the value of the property of said
express, telegraph and telephone companies in Ohio, and in determining the value of the property of said companies in this state, to be
taxed within the state and assessed as herein provided, said board
shall be guided by the value of said property as determined by the
value of the entire capital stock of said companies, and such other
evidence and rules as will enable said board to arrive at the true value
in money of the entire property of said companies within the state of
Ohio, in the proportion which the same bears to the entire property
of said companies, as determined by the value of the capital stock
thereof, and the other evidence and rules as aforesaid."
*
* *
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER.
The legislation in question is claimed to be repugnant to the constitution of the United
States because in violation of the commerce clause of that instrument,
The statute of the
(amended May

state

10, 1894, 91

1
Statement as given in the syllabus; arguments, part of opinion, and all of
the dissenting opinion of White, J. (Field, Harlan and Brown,
concurring), omitted. Upon a rehearing, 166 U. S. 185, this decision was affirmed,
Mr. Justice Brewer delivering the opinion of the court. This should be read.
2 WIL. CAS.
14

JJ.,
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and because operating to deprive appellants of their property without
due process of law, and of the equal protection of the laws.
We assume that the assessments complained of were rriade in pursuance of the definite rule or principle of appraisement recognized
and established by the Nichols law,- as construed by the supreme
court of Ohio, and the question is whether the law prescribing that
rule is valid under the federal constitution.
The principal contention is that the rule contravenes the commerce
clause because the assessments, while purporting to be on the property of complainants within the state, are in fact levied on their business, which is largely interstate commerce.
Although the transportation of the subjects of interstate commerce,
or the receipts received therefrom, or the occupation or business of
carrying it on, can not be directly subjected to state taxation, yet
property belonging to corporations or companies engaged in such
commerce may be ; and whatever the particular form of the exaction, if
it is essentially only property taxation, it will not be considered as
falling within the inhibition of the constitution.
Corporations and
companies engaged in interstate commerce should bear their proper
proportion of the burdens of the governments under whose protection
they conduct their operations, and taxation on property, collectible by
the ordinary means, does not affect interstate commerce otherwise
than incidentally, as all business is affected by the necessity of conPostal Telegraph Cable
tributing to the support of government.
Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688.
As to railroad, telegraph and sleeping-car companies, engaged in
interstate commerce, it has often been held by this court that their
property, in the several states through which their lines or business
extended, might be valued as a unit for the purposes of taxation, taking into consideration the uses to which it was put and all the elements making up aggregate value, and that a proportion of the whole
fairly and properly ascertained might be taxed by the particular state
Western Union Telegraph
without violating any federal restriction.
v. Western
Co. v. Massachusetts,
125 U. S. 530; Massachusetts
Union Telegraph Co., 141 U. S. 40; Maine v. Grand Trunk Railway, 142 U. S. 217; Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, etc., Railway v. Backus,
154 U. S. 421; Cleveland, Cincinnati, etc., Railway v. Backus, 154
U. S. 439; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Taggart, 163 U. S. i ;
Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18. The valuation was, thus, not confined to the wires, poles and instruments of
the telegraph company; or the roadbed, ties, rails and spikes of the
railroad company; or the cars of the sleeping-car company; but included the proportionate
part of the value resulting from the combination of the means by which the business was carried on, a value
existing to an appreciable extent throughout the entire domain of
And it has been decided that a proper mode of asceroperation.
taining the assessable value of so much of the whole property as is
situated in a particular state, is, in the case of railroads, to take that
part of the value of the entire road which is measured by the propor-
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tion of its length therein to the length of the whole.
Pittsburgh,
etc., Railway v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421; or taking as the basis of
assessment such proportion of the capital stock of a sleeping-car company as the number of miles of railroad over which its cars are run in
a particular state bears to the whole number of miles traversed by
Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylthem in that and other states.
vania, 141 U. S. 18; or such proportion of the whole value of the
capital stock of a telegraph company as the length of its lines within
a state bears to the length of all its lines everywhere, deducting a sum
equal to the value of its real estate and machinery subject to local
taxation within the state.
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Taggart, 163

U. S. i.

Doubtless there is a distinction between the property of railroad and
The physical
telegraph companies and that of express companies.
unity existing in the former is lacking in the latter; but there is the
same unity in the use of the entire property for the specific purpose,
and there are the same elements of value arising from such use.
The cars of the Pullman Company did not constitute a physical
unity, and their value as separate cars did not bear a direct relation to
the valuation which was sustained in that case.
The cars were
moved by railway carriers under contract, and the taxation of the
corporation in Pennsylvania was sustained on the theory that the
whole property of the company might be regarded as a unit plant,
with a unit value, a proportionate part of which, value might he
reached by the state authorities on the basis indicated.
No more reason is perceived for limiting the valuation of the property of express companies to horses, wagons and furniture than that of
railroad, telegraph and sleeping-car companies, to roadbed, rails and
ties ; poles and wires; or cars.
The unit is a unit of use and management, and the horses, wagons, safes, pouches and furniture; the contracts for transportation
facilities ; the capital necessary to carry on
business, whether represented in tangible or intangible property, in
Ohio, possessed a value in combination and from use in connection
with the property and capital elsewhere, which could as rightfully be
recognized in the assessment for taxation in the instance of these
companies as the others.
We repeat that while the unity which exists may not be a physical
unity, it is something more than a mere unity of ownership. It is a
unity of use, not simply for the convenience or pecuniary profit of
the owner, but existing in the very necessities of the case
resulting
*
*
*
from the very nature of the business.
It is this which enables the companies represented here to charge
and receive within the state of Ohio for the year ending May i, 1895,
$282,181, $358,519 and $275,446, respectively, on the basis, according to their respective returns, of $42,065, $28,438 and $23,430, of
personal property owned in that state, returns which confessedly do
not, however, take into account contracts for transportation and ac-

companying facilities.
Considered as distinct

subjects

of taxation,

a horse

is, indeed, a
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horse; a wagon, a wagon; a safe, a safe; a pouch, a pouch; but
how is it that $23,430 worth of horses, wagons, safes and pouches
Or $28,438 worth, $358,519?
produces $275,446 in a single year?
* *
*
The answer is obvious.
Assuming the proportion of capital employed in each of several
states through which such a company conducts its operations has been
fairly ascertained, while taxation thereon, or determined with reference
thereto, may be said in some sense to fall on the business of the
The taxation is essentially a property
company, it is only indirectly.
tax, and, as such, not an interference with interstate commerce.
Nor, in this view, is the assessment on property not within the jurisdiction of the taxing authorities of the state, and for that reason
The
amounting to a taking of property without due process of law.
property taxed has its actual situs in the state and is, therefore, subject to the jurisdiction, and the distribution among the several counties
Pullman's Palace
is a matter of regulation by the state legislature.
Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 22; State Railroad Tax
Cases, 92 U. S. 575; Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206; Erie
Railway v. Pennsylvania, 21 Wall. 492 ; Columbus Southern Railway
v. Wright, 151 U. S. 470.
In Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, the rule is considered
that personal property may be separated from its owner and he may
be taxed on its account at the place where it is, although not the place of
his own domicile, and even if he is not a citizen or a resident of the
state which imposes the tax, and the distinction between ships and vesThe authorities are
sels and other personal property is pointed out.
largely examined and need not be gone over again.
There is here no attempt to tax property having a situs outside of the
state, but only to place a just value on that within.
Presumptively
all the property of the corporation or company is held and used for
the purposes of its business, and the value of its capital stock and
* *
*
. bonds is the value of only that property so held and used.
The states through which the companies operate ought not to be
compelled to content themselves with a valuation of separate pieces
of property disconnected from the plant as an entirety, to the proportionate part of which they extend protection, and to the dividends of

*
whose owners their citizens contribute.
We are, also, unable to conclude that the classification of express
companies with railroad and telegraph companies as subject to the
That provision in
unit rule, denies the equal protection of the laws.
the fourteenth amendment "was not intended to prevent a state from
adjusting its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways,"
nor was that amendment "intended to compel a state to adopt an iron
Bell's Gap Railroad v. Pennsylvania, 134
rule of equal taxation."

U. S. 232.
In Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert,

142 U. S. 339, 351, in which a
tax on gross receipts of express companies in the state of Missouri
was sustained, Mr. Justice Lamar, speaking for the court, well says:
"This court has repeatedly laid down the doctrine that diversity of
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taxation, both with respect to the amount imposed and the various
species of property selected either for bearing its burdens or for being
exempt from them, is not inconsistent with a perfect uniformity and
equality of taxation in the proper sense of those terms; and that a
system which imposes the same tax upon every species of property,
irrespective of its nature or condition or class, will be destructive of
the principle of uniformity and equality in taxation and of a just
adaptation of property to its burdens."
And see Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321 ; Home In*
* *
surance Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594.
Considering, as we do, that the unit rule maybe applied to express
companies without disregarding any other federal restriction, we think
it necessarily follows that this law is not open to the objection of denying the equal protection of the laws. * * *
Decrees affirmed.
Accord:
1897, Henderson Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 166 TJ. S. 150 ;
Note.
1897, Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 171 ; 1897, Adams Express
Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U. S. 185, 6 Am. & Eng. C. C. (N. S.) 404. See,
also, following cases on patents, good-will, franchises, etc., with notes.

Sec. 442.

(e) Patents, copyrights,

and good-will.

PEOPLE, Ex REL., THE A. J. JOHNSON COMPANY, APPELLANT, v.
JAMES A. ROBERTS, COMPTROLLER, RESPONDENT. 1
1899.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.
Rep., 70-86, 45 L. R. A. 126.

159

N. Y.

[Appeal from an order of appellate division affirming the comptroller's assessment of a tax upon relator's privilege of doing business
in the state. The relator was incorporated in West Virginia, to publish and sell Johnson's Universal Encyclopedia, under copyrights asIt had no office in West Virginia, and substantially all
signed to it.
Its authorof its business was conducted from its New York office.
ized capital stock was $250,000
$135,500 of preferred and $S8,ooo
The comptroller
common, $70,000 worth of which had been issued.
based his tax upon $148,600, as the capital stock employed in the
state, including in his estimate the "books, copyrights, and good-will
of the corporation," as having their situs within the state and subject
to taxation under section 182 of the tax law.
The relator objected
that neither the copyrights nor good-will were subject to taxation
within the state.]
VANN, J. Copyrights clearly stand on the same b^sis as patent rights,
with reference to the subject of taxation by the state, and as we have
held that the former are exempt the latter should be held exempt also.
(People, ex rel., Edison Electric II. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 156
1

Statement

much of opinion of Vann, J., and all of dissenting
(O'Brien & Haight, JJ., concurring), omitted.

abridged,

opinion of Gray,

J.
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N. Y. 417.)

The comptroller, therefore, erred when he included the
copyrights of the relator "among the items of property which went to
make up" the amount "of the capital employed by it within this
state." (L. 1896, ch. 908, section 182; L. 1880, ch. 542, section 3.)
No other item is open to discussion except the "good-will of the
corporation and the good-will acquired by it," neither of which, as
the appellant claims, was properly included as an element of value,
because each is an intangible asset and beyond legislative control in
this state.
In the Wiebusch Case (154 N. Y. 101) it was held that "the
" a domestic corporation "is the
actual value of the capital stock of
value of its assets, after deducting its liabilities and adding to the sum
then remaining the value of the good-will of the business, including
its right to conduct it under its franchise."
By this decision it is established that the good-will of a domestic corporation is property
which was taxable as a part of its capital stock under the act of 1880.
That act was repealed by chapter 908 of the laws of 1896, known as
The substance of the
the tax law, which took effect June 15, 1896.
earlier act was re-enacted in the later with a decided change of arrangement and phraseology but, perhaps, with no change of meaning
so far, at least, as the question now before us is concerned.
By section 182 of the tax law it is provided that "every corporation * * *
formed under, by or pursuant to law in this state, shall pay to the
state treasurer annually an annual tax to be computed upon the basis
of the amount of its capital stock employed within this state and
*
*
* Every corporation
upon each dollar of such amount.
*
* formed under the laws of any other state or country shall
*
pay a like tax for the privilege of exercising its corporate franchises
or carrying on its business in such corporate or organized capacity in
this state, to be computed upon the basis of the capital employed by
it within this state."
The remaining question presented for decision, therefore, is whether
the good-will of the relator was " capital employed by it within this
state."
Good- will

is a modern but important growth of the law, not mentioned by some of the early writers, but given great prominence at
In 1810 Lord Eldon defined it as " the probability
the present time.
that the old customers will resort to the old place."
(Cruttwell v.
Lye, 17 Yes. Jr. 335, 346.) * * *
[Quoting from several cases and text-books as to the meaning of

good-will.]

Good-will embraces at least two elements, the advantage of continuing an established business in its old place, and of continuing it

While it is not necessarily altogether
under the old style or name.
local, it is usually to a great extent, and must, of necessity, be an incident to a place, an established business or a name known to the
*
*
*
trade.
A tax of the kind under consideration is levied upon a foreign corporation "for the privilege of exercising its corporate franchises or
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The
carrying on its' business" in this state. (Tax law,
182.)
good-will of the relator, aside from that purchased of Mr. Johnson, is
the result of exercising its corporate franchises and carrying on its
business in this state, and is inseparable from that business.
It is
the product of an investment of capital in this state, and the exercise
To hold that it was
here of the privilege for which the tax was laid.
not capital employed in this state, upon the ground that the domicile
of the corporation is in West Virginia, where it never transacted any
business nor earned any good-will by fair dealing and efficient methods, would exalt form above substance.
As the good-will is the
and an incident to an esresult of the employment of capital
for no practical purpose
business,
tablished
it can exist
in
the state where the relator was organized and where it never
nor did any business.
invested any capital
The good-will of
th* relator belongs to its old and well-established business, which
i' conducted
It is as much a part of
wholly in this state.
The good name of
its business as the books which it publishes.
those books is a portion of
acquired partly by purchase from the
originator of the cyclopedia, who resided in this state. The value of
that name has been increased by the enterprise of the relator in expending in this state over $200,000 to enlarge and perfect the work.
The value of the books and the other tangible property used in their
The mere fact that
augmented by the good-will.
production,
out of the state, so far as the
good-will
intangible does not take
concerned, because
right of taxation
inseparably attached to
property which
tangible, located in this state. (Matter of HouIt exists at the place where
has
market
dayer, 150 N. Y. 37.)
where the relator carried on its business and earned
value, which
This reputareputation for superior work and honorable conduct.
tion was not built up in West Virginia, where
did no business, but
in New York, where
did all its business.
It could neither be sold
*
*
nor used to advantage in the former state.
Reversed for error as to copyright.

;

;

&

&

3

;

4

is

Note.
Taxation of patents, copyrights, etc. The right to the invention or
stock invested in the patents, etc., themselves, or in licenses to sell the same,
not taxable by the states; but stock invested in patented articles, or the
articles themselves, may be taxed by the state: 1831, Jordan v. Overseers of
Dayton, Ohio 295 1878, Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501 1879, State v.
Butler, Lea (Tenn.) 222; 1880, Webber v. Virginia, 103U. S. 344; 1880, State
v. Telephone Co., 36 Ohio St. 296, 38 Am. Rep. 583; 1891, Commonwealth v.
Brush Co., 145 Pa. St. 147; 1891, Commonwealth v. Cent. Dist.
P. T. Co.,
145 Pa. St. 121,27 Am. St. Rep. 677; 1891, Commonwealth v. Edison El. L.
Co., 145 Pa. St. 131, 27 Am. St. Rep. 683; 1892, Commonwealth v. Westinghouse El.
Mfg. Co., 151 Pa. St. 265; 1893, People, ex rel., Edison, etc., Co. v.
Barker, 139 N. Y. 55 1893, Commonwealth v. Edison El. L. Co., 157 Pa. St. 529,
37 Am. St. Rep. 747, note; 1893, People v. Campbell, 138 N. Y. 543; 1895,
Commonwealth v. Petty, 96 Ky. 452, 29 L. R. A. 786, note; 1898, People, ex
rel., Edison El., etc., Co. v. Board, etc., 156 N. Y. 417, 42 L. R. A. 290; 1898,
Marsden Co. v. Board of Assessors, 61 N.
L. 461 1898, People, ex rel.,
Tel. Co. v. Neff, 156 N. Y. 701 1898, Crown Cork
Seal Co. v. State, 87 Md.
687, 67 Am. St. Rep. 371; 1899, State v. Halliday, 60 0. S. 592, 56 N. E. 118;
&

;

1899,

In

re

Jones,

28

Misc. (N. Y.)

;

J.

356

(good-will).
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WATER WORKS CO. V. SCHOTTLER.
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Special franchises.

SPRING VALLEY WATER WORKS

CO. v. SCHOTTLER,

supra, p. 120.

62

Cal.

69,

Note.
Taxation of corporate franchises :
1848, Mayor and City of Bait. v. B. &. O. R.
(1) The primary franchise:
Co., 6 Gill (Md.) 288, 48 Am. Dec. 531 ; 1868, Manufacturers' Ins. Co. v. Loud,
9 Mass. 146,96 Am. Dec. 715, note 716; 1882, Spring Valley W W
Co v
Schottler, 62 Cal. 69, supra, p. 120; 1888, Atlantic & Pac. R. Co. v. Lesueur
(Ariz.), 1 L. R. A. 244, note; 1889, Home Ins. Co. v. New York 134 U S
594; 1892, Horn Silver Min. Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305; 1895, People
v'
l\/T^fy/^*-v*-vl
-*4-r*-*\ T> ~\A* AT "\7" f}f\.1 . i on*? T _ _ i
i

views case); 1899, New York v. Roberts, 158 N. Y. 709; 1899, Owensboro
Nat 1 Bank v. City of Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664; 1899, Louisville Tobacco
W. Co. v. Commonwealth, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1747, 48 S. W. Rep. 1069- 1899
Latonia Agricultural, etc., Assn. v. Donnelly, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1891, 50 S. W
Rep. 251; 1900, Board of Councilmen v. Stone,
Ky.
, 56 S W Rep 6791900, Providence Banking Co. v. Webster Co.,
Ky.
57 S. W. Rep 14see, also, cases infra, section 446.
State can not tax the primary federal franchise : 1888, California v. Cent. Pac.
R. Co., 127 U.S.I; but may tax state franchises held by federal corporations :
1896, Central Pac. R. Co. v. California, 162 U. S. 91; 1896, Southern Pac. R.
Co. v. California, 162 U. S. 167.
(2) Special or secondary franchises: 1892, Yellow Riv. Imp. Co. v. Wood
Co., 81 Wis. 554, 17 L. R. A. 92, note; 1897, Crescent City R. Co. v. Assessors,
51 La. Ann. 335, 25 So. Rep. 311; 1899, Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. City of
Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664; 1899, State v. Duluth Gas W. Co., 76 Minn. 96,
78 N. W. Rep. 1032; 1899, Commercial El. L. Co. v. Judson, 21 Wash. 49, 56
Pac. Rep. 829; 1899, Paducah St. R. Co. v. McCracken Co., 20 Ky. L. Rep.
1294, 9 A. & E. Corp. Cas. N. S. 705, note 710; 1899, Ghee v. Northern U. Gas
Co., 158 N. Y. 510; 1900, Edison Elec. II. Co. v. Spokane Co., 22 Wash. 168,
60 Pac. Rep. 132; see article by J. N. Fiero, Esq., in 60 Alb. L. J. 277.
(3) Property connected with the use of special franchises, such as water and
gas pipes, etc., rights of way, etc. : 1851, Providence Gas Co. v. Thurber, 2
R. I. 15, 55 Am. Dec. 621; 1869, Memphis G. L. Co. v. State, 6 Cold. (Tenn.)
310, 98 Am. Dec. 452; 1876, W. U. Tel. Co. v. State, 9 Baxt. (Tenn.) 509,
40 Am. Rep. 99; 1880, People v. Commissioners, 82 N. Y. 459; 1892, Yellow
Riv. Imp. Co. v. Wood, 81 Wis. 554, 17 L. R. A. 92, note; 1893, Paris v.
way Water Co., 85 Me. 330, 35 Am. St. Rep. 371 ; 1898, City of Grand Haven
v. Grand Haven W. W., 119 Mich. 652, 78 N. W. Rep. 890.
See, especially, note 9 Am. &
(4) Methods of valuing corporate franchises:
E. C. C. (N. S.) 710, and article of J. N. Fiero, Esq., in 60 Alb. L. J. 277. In
25 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 635, it is said:
"Franchise taxes may be
measured, (l)by dividends (People v. Alb. Ins. Co., 92 N. Y. 458, 1 Am. &
Eng. C. C. 466; People v. Home Ins. Co., 92 N. Y. 328, 3 Am. & Eng. C. C.
363) ; (2) by amount of capital stock (Com. v. Lancaster Bank, 123 Mass. 493) ;
(3), by extent of business transacted (same case) ; (4) by gross receipts (State v.
Phil., etc., R. Co., 45 Md. 361, 24 Am. Rep. 511) ; (5) by net earnings (Belo v.
Forsythe Co., 82 N. C. 415, 33 Am. Rep. 688) ; (6) by average amount of deposits (Com. v. Lancaster Sav. Bk., 123 Mass. 495); (7) by market value of
shares, less the value of real and personal property (Spring Valley W. W. v.
Schottler, 62 Cal. 69, supra; (8) by deduction of the aggregate amount of the
equalized or assessed valuation of all tangible property from the sum of the
market or fair cash value of the shares of the capital stock and the market or
fair cash value of the debt (exclusive of debt for current expenses) : Porter v.
Rockford, etc., Co., 76 111. 561 ; State R. Tax Case, 92 U. S. 575; (9) by the
amount of original stock actually paid in (Portland Bank v. Apthorp, 12 Mass.
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259) ; (10) by the market value of the shares of the capital stock (Manufacturers' Ins. Co. v. Loud, 99 Mass. 146) ; (11) by the value of life-insurance policies
in effect (Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Com., 133 Mass. 161) ; (12) by the number
of tons ofcoalmined (Kittanning Coal Co. v. Com., 79 Pa. St. 100)."

Sec. 444.

(g) Gross receipts.

MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY IN PHILADELPHIA & SOUTHERN STEAMSHIP COMPANY v. PENNSYLVANIA.
1887.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

122

U. S.

Rep. 326, on 335, 336, 338.

may

it,

a

*

it,

The question which underlies the immediate question in the case
is whether the imposition of the tax upon the Steamship Company's
receipts amounted to a regulation of, or an interference with, interstate and foreign commerce, and was thus in conflict with the power
granted by the constitution to congress ? The tax was levied directly
upon the receipts derived by the company from its fares and freights
for the transportation of persons and goods between different states,
and between the states and foreign countries, and from the charter of
This transportation was
its vessels which was for the same purpose.
It was the carrying on of
an act of interstate and foreign commerce.
It was that and nothing else. In view of the decissuch commerce.
ions of this court it can not be pretended that the state could constiBut taxing
tutionally regulate or interfere with that commerce itself.
It is one of the principal forms.
is one of the forms of regulation.
Taxing the transportation, either by its tonnage, or its distance, or by
the number of trips performed, or in any other wav, would certainly be
burden upon it.
a regulation of the commerce, a restriction upon
Clearly, this could not be done by the state without interfering with
*
*
the power of congress.
If, then, the commerce carried on by the plaintiff in error in this
case could not be constitutionally taxed by the state, could the fares
and freights received for transportation in carrying on that commerce
If the state can not tax the transportation,
be constitutionally taxed?
nevertheless,

tax the fares

and freights

received

therefor?

*

is

a

*

a

it
is

is

Where
the difference?
Looking at the substance of things, and
The one
not at mere forms,
very difficult to see any difference.
It would seem to be rather
thing seems to be tantamount to the other.
metaphysics than plain logic for the state officials to say to the com"We will not tax you for the transportation you perform, but
pany:
we will tax you for what you get for performing it." Such
position
*
can hardly be said to be based on sound method of reasoning.
The very object of his engaging in transportation
to receive pay
for it. If the regulation of the transportation belongs to the power

of congress to regulate commerce, the regulation of fares and freights

MAINE V. GRAND TRUNK RAILWAY
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receivable for such transportation must equally belong to that power;
and any burdens imposed by the state on such receipts must be in conflict with it. To apply the language of Chief Justice Marshall, fares
and freights for transportation
in carrying on interstate or foreign
commerce are as much essential ingredients of that commerce as
*
*
*
transportation itselL
State
Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232, and Railway
[After reviewing
Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284, and criticising if not overruling the
Held, the tax was a regulation of interstate commerce, and
latter.]

void.

Note:

See next case.

Sec. 445.

Same,

MR. JUSTICE

1891.

(h) Excise.

FIELD IN MAINE

v.

GRAND TRUNK

PANY. 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE

Rep. 217, on

RAILWAY COM-

UNITED STATES.

142

U. S.

227, 8, 9.

[The railway company, a foreign corporation, operated a leased
In 1881,
railroad, part of which was located in the state of Maine.
this state provided " an annual excise tax for the privilege of exercising its franchises" upon all corporations operating railroads within the
state, to be ascertained by dividing the total gross receipts by the total
mileage, to ascertain the average gross receipts per mile ; and when
these do not exceed $2,250 per mile, the tax shall be one-fourth of one
per cent.; and when between $2,250 and $3,000 per mile, the tax
shall be one-half of one per cent., and so increasing at the rate of
one-fourth of one per cent, for each increase of $750 per mile.]
The privilege of exercising the franchises of a corporation within
and often of great value, and
a state is generally one of value,
It is natural, therefore, that
the subject of earnest contention.
the corporation should be made to bear some proportion of the burAs the granting of the privilege rests entirely in
dens of government.
the discretion of the state, whether the corporation be of domestic or
foreign origin, it may be conferred upon such conditions, pecuniary
or otherwise, as the state in its judgment may deem most conducive
It may require the payment into its treasury,
to its interests or policy.
each year, of a specific sum, or may apportion the amount exacted according to the value of the business permitted, as disclosed by its
The character of the
gains or receipts of the present or past years.
tax, or its validity, is not determined by the mode adopted in fixing
The
its amount for any specific period or the times of its payment.
1

Dissenting opinonly a small part of opinion given.
(Harlan, Lamar and Brown concurring), omitted.

Statement abridged,

ion of Bradley,

J.
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whole field of inquiry into the extent of revenue from sources at the
command of the corporation, is open to the consideration of the state
The
in determining what may be justly exacted for the privilege.
rule of apportioning the charge to the receipts of the business would
seem to be eminently reasonable, and likely to produce the most satisfactory results, both to the state and the corporation taxed.
The court below held that the imposition of the taxes was a regulation of commerce, interstate and foreign, and therefore in conflict
with the exclusive power of congress in that respect ; and on that
This ruling was
ground alone it ordered judgment for the defendant.

founded upon the assumption that a reference by the statute to the
transportation receipts and to a certain percentage of the same in determining the amount of the excise tax, was in effect the imposition
of the tax upon such receipts, and therefore an interference with inBut a resort to those receipts was
terstate and foreign commerce.
simply to ascertain the value of the business done by the corporation,
and thus obtain a guide to a reasonable conclusion as to the amount
of the excise tax which should be levied ; and we are unable to perceive in that resort any interference with transportation, domestic or
foreign, over the road of the railroad company, or any regulation of
If the amount ascommerce which consists in such transportation.
certained were specifically imposed as the tax, no objection to its
And if the inquiry of the state as to
validity would be pretended.
the value of the privilege were limited to receipts of certain past years
instead of the year in which the tax is collected, it is conceded that
the validity of the tax would not be affected ; and if not, we do not
see how a reference to the results of any other year could affect its
There is no levy by the statute on the receipts themselves,
character.
either in form or fact; they constitute, as said above, simply the
*
*
*
means of ascertaining the value of the privilege conferred.

Reversed.

Note: See, 1867, Southern Express Co. v. Hood, 15 Rich. Law (S. C.) 66, 94
Am. Dec. 141 ; 1872, State Tax on Grose Receipts, 15 Wall. 284 ; 1878, Insurance
Co. v. Commonwealth, 87 Pa. St. 173, 30 Am. Rep. 352; 1883, Worth v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co., 89 N. C. 291, 45 Am. Rep. 679; 1887, Fargo v. Michigan,
121 U. S. 230; 1888, Ratterman v. West. U. Tel. Co., 127 U. S. 411 ; 1889, West.
U. Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 132 U. S. 472; 1892, Lehigh Valley R. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 192; 1895, Southern Building, etc., Assn. v. Norman, 98 Ky.
294, 56 Am. St. Rep. 367 ; 1898, McHenry v. Alford, 168 U. S. 651, 670.
See
note to section 449, infra.
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STANDARD, ETC., CABLE CO. V. ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
446.

(i)

License.

THE STANDARD UNDERGROUND CABLE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, RESPONDENT. 1
1889.

446

v.

IN THE COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF NEW JERSEY.
46 N. J. Eq. Rep. 270-279, 19 Am. St. Rep. 394.

[Appeal from orders of injunction advised by the vice-chancellor
under statutes, to restrain the
on application of the attorney-general
company from exercising its franchises until taxes were paid. This
company was incorporated in New Jersey as a manufacturing company to do business in Pennsylvania, and had an office in New Jersey.
The New Jersey law provided that corporations incorporated in the
state, but not carrying on its business there, " shall pay a yearly
license fee or tax of one-tenth of one per centum on the amount of
The constitution provided
the capital stock of such corporation."
" that property shall be assessed for taxes under general laws, and by
It was contended the tax
uniform rules, according to its true value."
violated this provision.]
KNAPP, J. * * * The fault of this position is the assumption
Such, manifestly, is not the case.
that this tax is one upon property.
The law in question imposes a tax on certain corporations by way of
It is declared to be such
a license for exercising coiporate franchises.
tax by the act, and, although it is laid on this class of corporations
with respect to the capital stock, the tax possesses the legal quality of
a license or franchise tax.
Evening Journal Association v. State
Board of Assessors. 48 N. J. L. 36; Cooley Tax. (ad ed.) 379, and
cases cited.
Upon the power of the legislature to impose such a tax there exists
As a license or franchise tax, it is
no restriction in our constitution.
not within the equality clause of the constitution referred to.
In those states in the union having constitutional provisions requiring equality in the taxation of property, it is uniformly held that such
provisions do not abridge or apply to the legislative power of indirect
taxation by taxes on franchises, privileges, trades and occupations :
Cooley Tax., ij6et seq., and cases cited; State Board of Assessors
v. Central R. Co., 48 N. J. L. 146, 356.
It is next insisted that this law is void because it is a regulation of
commerce between the states, and an infringement upon the exclusive
power of congress over that subject under the provisions of the federal constitution.
This position seems to be based on two grounds: First, that all corporations holding a franchise from one state and performing their
functions in another are engaged in interstate commerce ; and, second,
that the business of this particular corporation, namely, the manufacture of electric cables, is itself internal commerce.
1

Statement

point is given.

abridged, and only so much of opinion

as

relates to the single
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These grounds impi'ess me only by their novelty.
Our general
laws for the organization of corporations permit companies to transIt certainly has not been supposed
act their business in other states.
that the exercise of this right put them beyond the reach of taxation
everywhere, or brought them into any relations whatever with the proNo case is cited giving
vision in the federal constitution referred to.
the slightest countenance to the notion that to hold a charter from one
state, when the corporate property is located, or corporate business
transacted, in another state, relieves the corporation in both or either
state from taxation in any form which the legislative power may under
its state constitution adopt; nor any case in which these conditions
are given the slightest consequence in ascertaining
the limit of the
state power to tax either the property of the corporation where such
property has its situs, or its franchises in the state which granted
them.
Under the point that the appellant is engaged in, or is an instrument in, interstate commerce, cases in the federal courts are liberally
cited in the brief of counsel throwing light on the relation which
state taxation holds to the exclusive power of congress to regulate
commerce between the states, and defining what is internal commerce,
such as is removed from state interference and obstruction.
It is
scarcely necessary to say that none of those cases gives the slightest
countenance to the notion that the manufacture of that which may become a subject of commerce, and which may ultimately pass into
protected trade, is commerce itself, or that manufactories of any sort
* * *
can be instruments in commerce.
Affirmed.
Note:

License taxes: See, 1848, Mayor, etc., of Baltimore v. B. & O. R<, 6
Am. Dec. 531 ; 1870, Erie R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 66 Pa. St. 84, 5
Am. Rep. 351; 1874, Railroad Company v. Maryland, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 456;
1876, Western U. Tel. Co. v. State, 9 Baxter (Tenn.) 509, 40 Am. Rep. 99;
125 U. S. 530; 1889, Common1888, Western U. Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts,
wealth v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., 129 Pa. St. 463, 15 Am. St. Rep. 724; 1890, Bell's
Gap R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 II. S. 232; 1890, New Orleans v. Orleans R. Co.,
42 La. Ann. 4, 21 Am. St. Rep. 365; 1892, New Orleans, etc., Co. v. New Orleans, 143 U. S. 192; 1892, Horn Silver Min. Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305;
1895, Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Denver, 21 Colo. 350, 52 Am. St. Rep. 239; 1897,
Phoenix Carpet Co. v. State, 118 Ala. 143, 72 Am. St. Rep. 143. See, also,
notes, 25 Am. St. Rep. 870, 885, and note, infra, section 447.
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RAILROAD COMPANY v. PENNSYLVANIA.
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
S. Rep. 114-120.

1

U.

act of the legislature of Pennsylvania, June 7, 1879, provided
thereafter no foreign corporation which does not invest and use

[An

that

136

1

Statement

abridged ; part of opinion omitted.

1394

N-

&

w - R - co - v - PENNSYLVANIA.

447

its capital in the state, shall have an office in the state for the use of
its officers, stockholders, agents or employes, unless it shall have obtained an annual license so tq do from the auditor-general, for which
it shall pay annually one-fourth of one mill on each dollar capital
and the license shall not issue
stock which it is authorized to have,
this
act the auditor-general
assessed a
until this fee is paid. Under
license tax against the railroad company upon its capital stock of
on account of its having an office at Philadelphia.
$25,000,000,
There was a special finding of facts that the railroad company existed
tinder the laws of Virginia and West Virginia, and all its lines lay
wholly within these states ; its lines, however, connect with others at
various points, so that "by virtue of these connections and certain traffic
contracts and agreements, it has become a link in a through line of
road, over which, as part of the business thereof, freight and passengers
The main office was
are carried into and out of this commonwealth."
Roanoke,
Va.,
in
maintained
an
office
at
but it
Philadelphia "for the
and
of
its
officers, stockholders, agents
use
employes." Except in this
no
had
no
owned
and
capital invested for corporate
property,
way it
in
to pay the license fee, and
It
refused
Pennsylvania.
purposes
rendered
the
against
company; this was affirmed by
judgment was
of
and
this
writ
error
sued out, on the ground that
the supreme court,
it had been denied its rights as a citizen "entitled to all the privileges
of citizens of the several states" under article IV of the constitution
of the United States; also the "equal protection of the laws" under
the fourteenth amendment, and that the law violated the constitutional power of congress to regulate commerce among the states.]
*
*
*
MR. JUSTICE LAMAR:
[After ruling against the railroad company on the first two points, as having been settled by Pembina Min. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181].
The only question for consideration, therefore, arises under the
third assignment of error, above set forth. It is well settled by
numerous decisions of this court, that a state can not, under the guise
of a license tax, exclude from its jurisdiction a foreign corporation
engaged in interstate commerce, or impose any burdens upon such
commerce within its limits.
Some of the cases sustaining this proposition are collected in McCall v. California, just decided, 136 U. S.
104, and need not be repeated here.
The question before us is thus narrowed to the two following inquiries : ( i ) Was the business of this company in the state of Pennsylvania
interstate commerce?
(2) If so, was the tax assessed against it for
in
for the use of its officers, stockholdoffice
an
Philadelphia,
keeping
ers, agents and employes, a tax upon such business?
We have no
in
in
of
these
the
the
first
affirmative.
inquiries
answering
difficulty
Although the findings of fact are somewhat meager on this question
much more so, indeed, than the undisputed evidence in the case
warranted
enough is stated in the second paragraph of the aforesaid
finding to show that the company is engaged in interstate commerce
in the state. It is there said, in substance:
By virtue of its connections and certain traffic contracts with other railroads the Norfolk and
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Western Railroad Company "has become a link in a through line of
road, over which, as part of the business thereof, freight and passenThat is to
gers are carried into and out of this commonwealth."
say, the business of the through line of railroad, of which the plaintiff in error forms a part or in which it is a link, consists, in a measure,
of carrying passengers and freight into Pennsylvania from other states,
It certainly requires no citaand out of that state into other statesthat is, the busition of authorities to demonstrate that such business
is interstate commerce.
That
ness of this through line of railroad
being true, it logically follows that any one of the roads forming a part
of, or constituting a link in, that through line, is engaged in interstate
commerce, since the business of each one of those roads serves to
increase the volume of business done by that through line.
On this point The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 565, is an authority.
In that case the steamer Daniel Ball was engaged in transporting
goods on Grand river, wholly within the state of Michigan, destined
for other states, and goods brought from other states destined for
places in the state of Michigan, but did not run in connection
with, or in continuation of, any line of vessels or railway leading to
other states ; and the contention was, that she was not engaged in
interstate commerce.
But this court held otherwise, and said: "So
far as she was employed in transporting goods destined for other
states, or goods brought from without the limits of Michigan and destined to places within that state, she was engaged in commerce between the states, and however limited that commerce may have been
she was, so far as it went, subject to the legislation of congress.
She
was employed as an instrument of that commerce ; for whenever a
commodity has begun to move as an article of trade from one state to
another, commerce in that commodity between the states has commenced.
The fact that several different and independent agencies
are employed in transporting the commodity, some acting entirely in
one state, and some acting through two or more states, does in no reTo the extent in which
spect affect the character of the transaction.
each agency acts in that transportation, it is subject to the regulation
of congress." See, also, Wabash, etc., Railway Co. v. Illinois, 118
U. S. 557, and cases cited.
We pass to the second inquiry above stated, viz. : Was the tax assessed against the company for keeping an office in Philadelphia, for
the use of its officers, stockholders, agents and employes, a tax upon
the business of the company? In other words, was such tax a tax
upon any of the means or instruments by which the company was
enabled to carry on its business of interstate commerce?
We have
no hesitancy in answering that question in the affirmative.
What was
the purpose of the company in establishing an office in the city of
Philadelphia?
Manifestly for the furtherance of its business interests in the matter of its commercial relations.
One of the terms of
the contract by which the plaintiff in error became a link in the
through line of road referred to in the findings of fact, provided that
4
'it shall be the duty of each initial road, member of the line, to
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solicit and procure traffic for the Great Southern Despatch (the name
of said through line) at its own proper cost and expense." Again,
the plaintiff in error does not exercise, or seek to exercise, in Pennsylvania any privilege or franchise not immediately connected with
interstate commerce and required for the purposes thereof.
Before establishing its office in Philadelphia it obtained from the secretary of
the commonwealth the certificate required by the act of the state legislature of 1874 enabling it to maintain an office in the state.
That
office was maintained because of the necessities of the interstate
business of the company, and for no other purpose.
A tax upon it
was, therefore, a tax upon one of the means or instrumentalities of
the company's interstate commerce; and as such was in violation of
clause of the constitution
of the United States.
the commercial
Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196; Philadelphia
Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, and cases cited ; MeCall v. California, just decided, 136 U. S. 104.
Reversed.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, MR. JUSTICE GRAY and MR. JUSTICE BREWER, dissented.
Compare, 1868, Attorney-General v. Bay State, etc., Co., 99 Mass.
Note.
148, 96 Am. Dec. 717, note 720 ; 1890, McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104 ;
1891, Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47; 1892, People v. Wemple, 131 N. Y.
64, 27 Am. St. Rep. 542, note; 1897, McNaughton Co. v. McGirl,20 Mont. 124,
63 Am. St. Rep. 610; 1900, Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270
See, also, notes,
25 Am. St. Rep. 870-890, 27 Am. St. Rep. 547-568.

Sec. 448.

(k) Equal protection

of the laws in taxation.

SEE THE RAILROAD TAX CASES,

13

Fed Rep.

722,

supra, p. 36.

See, 1851, Commonwealth v. Milton, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 212, 54 Am.
Note.
Dec. 522; 1864, Erie Railway Co. v. State, 2 Vroom (N. J.) 531, 86 Am. Dec.
226; 1868, Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 5 Bush (Ky.) 68, 96 Am. Dec.
331; 1885, Santa Clara Co. v. So. Pac. R. Co., 118 U. S. 394; 1885, Kentucky
R. Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321 ; 1887, San Francisco v. Liverpool Ins. Co., 74Cal.
113, 5 Am. St. Rep. 425; 1888, Pembina, etc., Min. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125
U. S. 181; 1888, Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Mackey. 127 U. S. 205; 1889, Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S.26; 1890, Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232; 1892, Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339;
1897, St. Louis, etc., Railway Co. v. Paul, 64 Ark. 83, 62 Am. St. Rep. 154 ;
West. Union Tel. Co. v. Indiana, 165 U. S. 304; 1897, Gulf, etc., R. Co. v.
Ellis, 165 U. S. 150; 1897, Knoxville & S. R. R. Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684,
53 L. R. A. 921 ; 1898, New York v. Roberts, 171 U. S. 658; 1898, Pittsburgh,
etc., R. Co. v. Montgomery, 152 Ind. 1, 71 Am. St. Rep. SOI; 1900, Am. Sug.
Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89; 1900, People, etc., ex rel. N. Y. Clearing
House, etc., v. Roberts, 179 U. S. 279; 1900, Reyman Brewing Co. v. Blister,
179 U. S. 445.
See, also, note, supra, p. 56 and note, 62 Am. St. Rep. 165, 175.
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v.

TEXAS. 1

COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
S. Rep. 460-466.

105

U.

[Error to the supreme court of Texas. The Western Union Telegraph had accepted the provisions of the act of congress authorizing
it to use the public domain and the United States military and post
roads, and in consideration therefor had bound itself to give the United
States precedence in the use of its lines for public business at rates to
and had thereby become a govbe fixed by the postmaster-general,
ernment agent for the transmission of messages concerning public
The company had 125 offices in Texas. Pursuant to a
business.
provision in the Texas constitution authorizing an occupation tax, the
legislature of that state imposed a tax of one cent upon each full rate,
and one-half cent upon each less than full rate message, sent from
offices in the state ; many of the messages sent went to places outside
of the state, and many were sent by United States government offiThe supreme court of Texas sustained the tax.]
cers.

In Pensacola Telegraph Co. v.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE:
Western Union Telegraph Co (96 U. S. i), this court held that the
telegraph was an instrument of commerce, and that telegraph companies were subject to the regulating power of congress in respect to
A telegraph company occutheir foreign and interstate business.
pies the same relation to commerce as a carrier of messages, that a
Both companies are
railroad company does as a carrier of goods.
instruments of commerce, and their business is commerce itself. * * *
In Case of the State Freight Tax (15 Wall. 232) this court decided
that a law of Pennsylvania requiring transportation companies doing
business in that state to pay a fixed sum as a tax "on each two thousand pounds of freight carried," without regard to the distance moved,
or charge made, was unconstitutional, so far as it related to goods
taken through the state, or from points without the state to points
within, or from points within to points without, because to that extent
it was a regulation of foreign and interstate commerce, -fin this the
court but applied the rule, announced in Brown v. Maryland (12
Wheat. 419), that where the burden of a tax falls on a thing which is
the subject of taxation, the tax is to be considered as laid on the thing
rather than on him who is charged with the duty of paying it into
the treasury.
In that case, it was said, a tax on the sale of an article,
To the same
imported only for sale, was a tax on the article itself.
of
S.
Missouri,
are
v.
effect
Welton
State
U.
general
275; Cook
91
v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566; and Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S.
Taxes upon passenger carriers of a specific amount for each
344.
passenger carried were held to be taxes on the passengers, in Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283 ; Crandall v. State of Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 ;
1

Statement abridged
2 WIL. CAS.
15.

;

arguments

and part of opinion omitted.
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Taxes on vessels acand Henderson v. The Mayor, 92 U. S. 259.
without
reference
to value, were deany
cording to measurement,
State Tonnage Cases, 12 Wall. 204;
clared to be taxes on tonnage.
Peete v. Morgan, 19 Wall. 581 ; Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall.
v. Tinker, 94 U. S. 238.
577 ; and Inman Steamship Co.
it
seems
to us, comes within this principle.
The present case, as
on
The tax is the same
every message sent, and because it is sent,
It is in
without regard to the distance carried or the price charged.
If the mesno respect proportioned according to the business done.
sage is sent the tax must be paid, and the amount determined solely
If it is full rate the tax is one cent,
by the class to which it belongs.
rate,
one-half cent. Clearly if a fixed tax for
and if less than full
every two thousand pounds of freight carried is a tax on the freight,
or for every measured ton of a vessel a tax on tonnage, or for every
passenger carried a tax on the passenger, or for the sale of goods a
As such, so
tax on the goods, this must be a tax on the messages.
far as it operates on private messages sent out of the state, it is a regulation of foreign and interstate commerce and beyond the power of
As
That is fully established by the cases already cited.
the state.
to the government messages, it is a tax by the state on the means employed by the government of the United States to execute its constiIt was so decided in McCultutional powers, and, therefore, void.
loch v. Maryland (4 Wheat. 316) and has never been doubted since.
* *
*

[Holding, however, that the tax upon messages sent between places
in the state, and not on government business, would be valid.]
Reversed.

Note;

As to taxation of interstate, or government agencies: See
Telegraph companies:
1876, Western U. Tel. Co. v. State, 9 Baxter (Tenn.)
509, 40 Am. Rep. 99, note 104 ; 1888, Western U. Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts,
125 U. S. 530; 1891, Massachusetts
v. Western U. Tel. Co., 141 U. S. 40; 1895,
Postal Tel. Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688 ; 1895, Western Union Tel. Co. v. Taggart, 163 U. S. 1, 4 Am. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 412.
1861, O'Neal v. Virginia B. Co., 18 Md. 1, 79 Am. Dec.
Interstate bridges:
669; 1878, Quincy R. Bridge v. Adams Co., 88 111. 615, supra, p. 988; 1888,
Buttenuth v. St. Louis Bridge Co., 123 111. 535, 5 Am. St. Rep. 545; 1891,
Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 141 U. S. 679; 1894, Chicago & Alton
R. v. People, 153 111. 409, 29 L. R. A. 69, note; 1897, Henderson Bridge Co.
v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 150.
National banks: See, generally, only so far as allowed by act of congress:
1819, McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; 1824, Osborn v. Bank of U. S.,
9 Wheat. 738; 1864, Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 200; 1865, Van Allen v.
Assessors, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 573; 1875, Farmers' Nat'l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.
S. 29; 1879, People v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 539; 1897, Aberdeen Bank v. Chehalis Co., 166 U. S. 440; 1898, People v. National Bank, 123 Cal. 53, 69 Am.
1899, National Bank v. Chapman, 173 U.S. 205; 1900, First
St.. Rep. 32;
National Bank v. Turner, 154 Ind. 456, 57 N. E Rep. 110; 1900, Jenkins v.
Neff, 163 N. Y. 320.
See especially, notes, 69 Am. St. Rep, 38, and 45 L. R. A.
737.
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Situs of shares for taxation.
COLLECTOR, v.

MERCHANTS'

NATIONAL BANK. 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
(19

Wall.)

86

U. S.

Rep. 490-505.

[Appeal from circuit court. Suit by the bank to enjoin the collection of taxes upon shares of the bank assessed under the Illinois
act of 1867, providing shareholders should be taxed in the county
The national act under which the bank
where the bank was located.
was formed provided for taxing the shares of non-residents by the
state, "in the city or town where the bank is located," but at a rate
not greater than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands
of individual citizens of the state. The state constitution provided
that the taxes assessed in the various counties shall "be uniform in
respect to persons and property," and upon all the property therein.
The bank was located in Cook county, some of its shareholders residing there, others elsewhere within the state, and still others out of
It was contended that the constitution required shareholdthe state.
ers not residing in Cook county to be taxed at their residence,
hence
they could not be at the bank in Cook county ; and since the law of
1867 required all to be taxed in Cook county, those within the county
were improperly taxed, if those out of the county were not properly
taxed; and since those within the state were not validly taxed, those
This presented the validity of the act of
out of the state were not.
1867.]

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE: We are called upon in this case to
determine whether the general assembly of the state of Illinois could,
in 1867, provide for the taxation of the owners of shares of the capital stock of a national bank in that state, at the place, within the state,
where the bank was located, without regard to their places of residence.
The statute of Illinois, under the authority of which the taxes
complained of were assessed, was passed before the act of congress,
approved February 10, 1868, which gave a legislative construction to
the words, "place where the bank is located, and not elsewhere," as
used in section 41 of the national banking act, and permitted the state
to determine and direct the manner and place of taxing resident shareholders, but provided that non-residents should be taxed only in the
city or town where the bank was located.
The power of taxation by any state is limited to persons, property,
Personal property, in the absence
or business within its jurisdiction.
of any law to the contrary, follows the person of the owner, and has
But, for the purposes of taxation, it may be
its situs at his domicile.
him,
from
he
and
separated
may be taxed on its account at the place
where it is actually located.
These are familiar principles, and have
If
been often acted upon in this court and in the courts of Illinois.
1
Statement abridged ; arguments and part of opinion omitted. For a vigorous criticism of this case, see Waples Law of Debtor and Creditor, relative to
The Situs of Debt, p. 138, et seq.
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the state has actual jurisdiction of the person of the owner, it operates
directly upon him. If he is absent, and it has jurisdiction of his property, it operates upon him through his property.
Shares of stock in national banks are personal property. They are
made so in express terms by the act of congress under which such
banks are organized.
They are a species of personal property which
is, in one sense, intangible and incorporeal, but the law which creates
them may separate them from the person of their owner for the purThis has been
poses of taxation, and give them a situs of their own.
done.
By section 41 of the national banking act it is in effect provided that all shares in such banks, held by any person or body corporate, may be included in the valuation of the personal property of
such person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed under
state authority, at the place where the bank is located, and not elsewhere.
This is a law of the property. Every owner takes the property subject to this power of taxation under state authority, and every
non-resident, by becoming an owner, voluntarily submits himself to
the jurisdiction of the state in which the bank is established for all
the purposes of taxation on account of his ownership.
His money invested in the shares is withdrawn from taxation under the authority
of the state in which he resides and submitted to the taxing power of
the state where, in contemplation of the law, his investment is located.
The state, therefore, within which a national bank is situated
has jurisdiction, for the purposes of taxation, of all the shareholders
of the bank, both resident and non-resident, and of all its shares, and
may legislate accordingly.
The state of Illinois thus having had, in 1867, the right to tax all
the shareholders of national banks in that state on account of their
shares, it remains to consider at what place or places within the state
such taxes could be assessed.
It is conceded that it was within the power of the state to tax the
shares of non-resident shareholders at the place where the bank was
located, but it is claimed that under the constitution of the state resident shareholders could only be taxed at the places of their residence.
*
*
#

This power of locating personal property for the purpose of taxation without regard to the residence of the owner has been often exer*
*
*
cised in Illinois, and sustained by the courts.
We do not understand the counsel for the appellee to dispute this
power, where the property is tangible and capable of having, so to
speak, an actual situs of its own, but he claims that if it is intangible it can not be separated from the person of its owner. It must be
borne in mind that all this property, intangible though it may be, is
within the state. That which belongs to non-residents is there by
That which belongs to residents is there by
operation of law.
reason of their residence.
All the owners have submitted themselves
to the jurisdiction of the state, and they must obey its will when kept
within the limits of constitutional power.
The question is then presented whether the general assembly, hav-
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1

ing complete jurisdiction over the person and the property, could separate a bank share from the person of the owner for the purposes of
It has never been doubted that it was a proper exercise of
taxation.
legislative power and discretion to separate the interest of a partner
in partnership property from his person for that purpose, and to cause
him to be taxed on its account at the place where the business of the
partnership was carried on. And this, too, without reference to the
character of the business or the property.
The partnership may have
been formed for the purpose of carrying on mercantile, banking, broThe property may be tangible or intankerage, or stock business.
on
the
shelf
or
due for goods sold.
debts
The interest of
gible, goods
the partner in all the property is made taxable at the place where the
business is located.
A share of bank stock may be in itself intangible, but it represents
that which is tangible.
It represents money or property invested in
the capital stock of the bank.
That capital is employed in business
bank,
the
and
the
is
business
by
very likely carried on at a place other
than the residence of some of the shareholders.
The shareholder is
in
his
the
person by
protected
government at the place where he resides ; but his property in this stock is protected at the place where
the bank transacts his business.
If he were a partner in a private
bank doing business at the same place, he might be taxed there on
account of his interest in the partnership.
It is not easy to see why,
upon the same principle, he may not be taxed there on account of his
stock in an incorporated bank.
His business is there as much in the
one case as in the other.
He requires for it the protection of the government there, and it seems reasonable that he should be compelled
to contribute there to the expenses of maintaining that government.
It certainly can not be an abuse of legislative discretion to require him
to do so.
If it is not, the general assemby can rightfully locate his
shares there for the purposes of taxation.
But it is said to be a violation of the constitutional rule of uniformity to compel the owner of a bank share to submit to taxation for this
part of his property at a place other than his residence, because other
residents are taxed for their personal property where they reside.
It
is a sufficient answer to this proposition to say that all persons owning
*
*
*
the same kind of property are taxed as he is taxed.
Reversed.
Note.

Situs of corporate stock and bonds for purposes of taxation.

(a) In the absence of provisions to the contrary, the situs of shares in
either domestic or foreign corporations is the domicile of the owner: 1852,
New Albany v. Meekin, 3 Ind. 481. 56 Am. Dec. 522, note 528; 18(55, McKeen
v. County of Northampton, 49 Pa. St. 519, 88 Am. Dec. 515; 1866, Dwight v.
Mayor, 12 Allen (Mass.) 316, 90 Am. Dec. 149; 1876, Dyer v. Osborne, 11 R.
I. 321, 23 Am. Rep. 460; 1880, Bradley v. Bauder, 36 O. S. 28, 38 Am. Rep.
547; 1880, Worth v. Ashe, 82 N. C. 420, 33 Am. Rep. 692; 1889, South Nashville St. R. Co. v. Morrow, 87 Tenn. 406, 2 L. R. A. 853; 1894, Commonwealth
v. Charlottesville, etc., Co., 90 Va. 790, 44 Am. St. Rep. 950; 1900, Greenleaf
v. Board of Revenue, 184 111. 226, 75 Am. St. Rep. 168; 1900, State v. Kidd,
Ala.
, 28 So. Rep. 480.

STATE v. TRAVELERS'

1402

INSURANCE COMPANY.

451

(b) The state, however, may provide that shares in its own corporations
owned by either residents or non-residents shall be taxed at the domicile of
the corporation, even though the non-resident owner is required to pay tax
on the same shares at his own domicile: 1876, Ottawa Glass Co. v. McCaleb,
111. 556; 1880, Bradley y. Bauder, 36 O. S. 28, 38 Am. Rep. 547; 1882,
81
American Coal Co. v. Commissioners, 59 Md. 185 ; 1884, St. Albans v. Car Co.,
57 Vt. 68; 1889, South Nash. St. R. v. Morrow, 87 Tenn. 406, 2 L. R. A. 853;
1892, Wiley v. Commissioners, 111 N. C. 397; 1896, Matter of Bronson, 150 N.
Y. 1, 55 Am. St. Rep. 632; 1898, Scandinavian Am. Bk. v. Pierce Co., 20
Wash. 155, 55 Pac. 40; compare, 1836, Union Bank v. State, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.)
490; 1886, Young v. South Tredegar, etc., Co., 85 Tenn. 189, 4 Am. St. Rep.
752.
See notes, 56 Am. Dec. 528, 62 Am. St. 458.
(c) Bonds, bills, notes, credits, etc. See, generally, note 62 Am. St. Rep. 448.
The general rule is that the situs of these is the domicile of the creditor, and
they are taxable only there: 1871, Hunter v. Supervisors, 33 Iowa 376, 11
Am. Rep. 132; 1872, State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 300;
1877, Herron v. Keeran, 59 Ind. 472, 26 Am. Rep. 87; 1888, Commonwealth v.
Am. Dredging Co., 122 Pa. St. 386, 9 Am. St. Rep. 116; 1889, South Nashville
St. R. Co. v. Morrow, 87 Tenn. 406, 2 L. R. A. 853; 1896, Matter of Bronson,
150 N. Y. 1, 55 Am. St. Rep. 632; 1896, Mackay v. San Francisco, 113 Cal.
392; 1899, Balk v. Harris, 124 N. C. 467, 70 Am. St. Rep. 606; 1900, In re
Fair's Estate, 128 Cal. 607, 61 Pac. Rep. 184; 1900, Mackay v. City and Co. of
San Fran., 128 Cal. 678, 61 Pac. Rep. 382.
But if the bonds, notes, moneys, credits, etc., are actually in the state, and
used there for business purposes, they have a situs there for the purpose of
taxation, without regard to domicile of either debtor or creditor: 1875, \Vilcox v. Ellis, 14 Kan. 588, 19 Am. Rep. 107; 1886, Finch v. County of York,
19 Neb. 50, 56 Am. Rep. 741 ; 1894, State v. Hamlin, 86 Me. 495, 41 Am. St.
Rep. 569, note 583; 1896, Matter of Houdayer, 150 N. Y. 37, 55 Am. St. Rep.
642; 1896, Matter of Whiting, 150 N. Y. 27, 55 Am. St. Rep. 640; 1897, Buck
v. Miller, 147 Ind. 586, 62 Am. St. Rep. 436, note 448 -f 1899, State v. ScottishAm. Mrg. Co., 76 Minn. 155, 78 N. W. Rep. 962; 1899, Hubbard v. Brush, 61
O. S. 252, 55 N. E. Rep. 829; 1899, New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309.
(d) Taxation of corporate indebtedness: See the following cases: 1870, Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 66 Pa. St. 73, 5 Am. Rep. 344;
1889, Commonwealth v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., 129 Pa. St. 463, 15 Am. St. Rep. 724 ;
1889, Commonwealth v. Lehigh Valley R., 129 Pa. St. 429; 1889, Commonwealth v. N. Y., etc., R., 129 Pa. St. 478; 1889, Commonwealth v. Del., etc.,
Canal Co., 123 Pa. St. 594, 2 L. R. A. 798, note; 1890, Bell's Gap R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232; 1894, N. Y., etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U. S.
628; 1895, Delaware, etc., Canal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 156 U. S. 200.

Sec. 451.

'(n) Taxation

of shares held by aliens.

STATE v. TRAVELERS' INSURANCE
1898.

COMPANY.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS OF CONNECTICUT.
Conn. Rep. 590-605, 66 Am. St. Rep. 138.

70

[Action to recover tax upon shares of non-resident shareholders.
The list of shareholders out of the state did not give the place of residence of any of them, and the omission was not waived, nor was it
1

Statement

point is given.

abridged.

Only the part of the opinion relating to the single

45

!

CONTROL BY LEGISLATION.

1403

that the rights of citizens of other states were involved.
Non-resident shareholders were taxed in a different way and at a difThe complaint was deferent rate from the resident shareholders.
murred to as violating Art. IV of , and the XlVth Amendment to, the
United States Constitution. The lower court overruled the demurrer.]
BALDWIN, J. * * * The shares held by residents are taxable
at such rates as the towns, cities and boroughs, to which they belong,
may, from time to time, see fit to impose, upon a valuation set by the
The shares held by non-residents are taxable at the
local assessors.
fixed rate of one and a half per cent, upon their market value, as determined by the state board of equalization.
It is nowhere stated upon the record that any of the non-resident
in the defendant company are citizens of the United
shareholders
Their names only are given, and
States or of any one of them.
while we may take judicial notice that these are those of persons belonging to an English speaking race, we can not assume, as a cause
for reversing the judgment rendered by the superior court, that they
The proare Americans any more than that they are Englishmen.
vision of the constitution of the United States that the citizens of each
state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in
every other must, therefore, be laid out of the case.
Regarding the shareholders in question simply as so many persons,
residing without this state, there can be no ground for claiming that
they can not be charged with the tax in controversy by reason of the
declaration in the fourteenth amendment to the constitution, that no
state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
This inhibition is only for the benefit of persons
who are physically present within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Yick Wo v. Hopstate, the protection of whose laws they invoke.
kins, 118 U. S. 356, 369. The same is true of the act of congress,
U. S. Rev. Stat., 1977, passed under the authority of the fourteenth
amendment, by which it is provided that "all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
* to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedstate * *
ings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
* *
* taxes, licenses, and
citizens, and shall be subject to like
The rights thus secured
exactions of every kind, and to no other."
are those only of persons who at the time are within the jurisdiction,
that is, within the territory or under the flag of the United States.
A state has a right to debar aliens (and, as has been stated, it does
not appear that any Americans are among the non-resident stockholders in the defendant company) from holding shares in her corporations, or to admit them to that privilege only on such terms as she
The right of association under the protection of an
may prescribe.
artificial personality, and of doing business on its credit, whether it
be obtained by a special charter or under a general incorporation law,
is a franchise granted by the state to such, and such only, as she may
deem fit to be entrusted with its exercise.
Whatever may be the law
as to citizens of other states, aliens can be excluded from membership
conceded
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in such bodies, unless they enter them on conditions which subject
their investments to such burdens of taxation as the legislature may
think it proper to impose.
Mager v. Grima, 8 How. 490, 494. * * *

Affirmed.

Sec. 452.

National taxation of state corporations.

(o)

See Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8

Galli, 94 U. S. 673, infra, p.

Sec. 453.

1529.

Legislative control

2.

(i)
" By

Wall. 533, infra, p. 1527; Casey v.

extraordinary.

1

Repeal.

(a) Power

of parliament.

the theory of the British constitution, parliament is omnipoand hence, an act of that body would undoubtedly be effectual
to the dissolution of a corporation.
It is to the honor of the British
nation, however, that this power, restrained by public opinion, rests
mainly in theory; and except in the instances of the suppression of
the order of Templars, in the time of Edward the Second, and of the
religious ho.uses in the time of Henry the Eighth, we know of no occasion on which parliament have thought proper to dissolve or confirm the arbitrary dissolution of corporate bodies.
When, in 1783, a
bill was introduced for the purpose of remodeling the charter of the
East India Company, it was opposed by Mr. Pitt and Lord Thurlow,
not only as a dangerous violation of the charter of the company, but
as a total subversion of the law and constitution of the country.
In
the nervous language of the latter, it was ' an atrocious violation of
* *
*
private property, which cut every Englishman to the bone.'
It is a happy feature in the constitution of our own government, that
the power of the legislatures of the different states resembles, in this
particular, the prerogative of the king of Great Britain, who may create, but can not dissolve, a corporation, or, without its consent, alter
or amend its charter."
Angell & Ames Corp.,
767.

tent;

Sec. 454.

(b)

Power of congress.

8

See Mormon Church v. United States
136

U. S. i, supra, p, 906.

1

See supra,

*

See supra,

408.
406, 407, 408, 409.

;

Romney v. United States,
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Same.

SINKING FUND CASES. 1
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY v. UNITED STATES.
CENTRAL PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY v. GALLATIN.
1878.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
Rep. 700-769.

99

U. S.

[Appeals from the court of claims, and from the circuit court, upon
decisions, finding, in the one case, the United States to be entitled to
retain and place in a sinking fund certain sums due the Union Pacific
Railroad Company for services rendered, and in the other that the
Central Pacific Company should pay into the sinking-fund a certain
The Union
per cent, of its net earnings before paying dividends.
Pacific Company was chartered by congress in 1862, with authority
to build a railroad from Missouri to California; for each mile built
the United States issued to the company $16,000 of subsidy bonds,
bearing six per cent, intei'est, to be a first mortgage upon the property
of the company, and to be repaid by it to the United States in thirty
During this period all amounts due to the company for servyears.
ices rendered, and five per cent, of the net earnings, to be paid after
the road was finished, should be credited upon the interest paid by
the government upon the subsidy bonds.
In 1864 the act of 1862 was amended so that the company could
issue an equal amount of its own first mortgage bonds, due in thirty
years, to be a lien prior to that of the government; it was further provided that only half of the sums due for government services should be
This act
credited toward paying the interest upon the subsidy bonds.
provided " that congress may at any time alter, amend or repeal this
In 1878 there were outstanding over $27,000,000 first mortact."
gage bonds; over $27,000,000 subsidy bonds; and more than $20,000,000 other bonds; the government had already paid over $10,000,000 interest upon the subsidy bonds, over and above all sums
The earnings of the company had
credited upon such payments.
been such that, after paying interest upon all but the government
bonds, large dividends had been paid upon the $36,000,000 capital
stock, without making any provision for paying the bonds when due.
The conditions of the Central Pacific Company were similar. Under
these circumstances the act of congress of 1878 required the net earnings of these companies to be ascertained by deducting from the gross
earnings the actual operating expenses, and the interest upon the first
mortgage bonds, but not the interest upon other debts; and required
that all sums due for transportation for the government be reserved
by the government, one-half to be credited upon interest paid, and
one-half put in a sinking-fund in the United States treasury, together
1
Statement much abridged.
Part of opinion of Waite, C. J., and all of dissenting opinions of Strong and Field, JJ., omitted. Only small part of dissenting opinion of Bradley, J., given.
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with such further sum paid annually as, with the five per cent, net
earnings and sums due for transportation, shall make twenty-five per
cent, of the net earnings, all to be properly invested, accumulated,
and held for the protection of all lienholders, to meet their claims
when due; provided, however, that when the seventy-five per cent,
of net earnings are insufficient to pay the interest upon liens prior to
that of the government, the secretary of the treasury may remit such
part of the twenty-five per cent, as may be necessaiy to meet the deIt was also provided that no dividend should be declared
ficiency.
or paid until the foregoing sinking-fund is fully provided for, and officers and shareholders who participate in declaring or receiving such
dividends in violation of these provisions shall be liable to a penalty
of $10,000 and imprisonment for one year.
The act was declared to
be an amendment of the act of 1864.]
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE : The single question presented by
the case of the Union Pacific Railroad Company is as to -the constitutionality of that part of the act of May 7, 1878, which establishes
in the treasury of the United States a sinking fund.
The validity of
*
*
*
of
the
not
the rest
act is
necessarily involved.
more
The United States can not any
than a state interfere with private rights, except for legitimate governmental purposes.
They are
not included within the constitutional
prohibition which prevents
states from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, but
equally with the states they are prohibited from depriving persons or
They can not
corporations of property without due process of law.
legislate back to themselves, without making compensation, the lands
they have given this corporation to aid in the construction of its railroad.
Neither can they by legislation compel the corporation to
discharge its obligations in respect to the subsidy bonds otherwise
than according to the terms of the contract already made in that connection.
The United States are as much bound by their contracts as
If they repudiate their obligations it is as much reare individuals.
pudiation, with all the wrong and reproach that term implies, as it
would be if the repudiator had been a state or a municipality or a citizen.
No change can be made in the title created by the grant of the
lands, or in the contract for the subsidy bonds, without the consent of
All this is indisputable.
the corporation.
of
the company in respect to the subsidy bonds is to
The contract
pay both principal and interest when the principal matures, unless the
debt is sooner discharged by the application of one-half the compensation for transportation and other services rendered for the government, and the five per cent, of net earnings as specified in the charter.
This was decided in United States v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 91
U. S. 72. The precise point to be determined now is, whether a
statute which requires a company in the management of its affairs to
set aside a portion of its current income as a sinking-fund to meet
this and other mortgage debts when they mature, deprives the company of its property without due process of law, or in any other way
improperly interferes with vested rights.
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This corporation is a creature of the United States. It is a private
corporation created for public purposes, and its property is to a large
It is, therefore, subject to legislative
extent devoted to public uses.
control so far as its business affects the public interests.
Chicago,

it,

Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155.
It is unnecessary to decide what power congress would have had
over the charter if the right of amendment had not been reserved ;
In the act of 1862,
for, as we think, that reservation had been made.
section 18, it was accompanied by an explanatory statement showing
that this had been done "the better to accomplish the object of this
act, namely, to promote the public interest and welfare by the construction of said railroad and telegraph line, and keeping the same in
working order, and to secure to the government at all times (but especially in time of war) the use and benefits of the same for postal,
military and other purposes," and by an injunction that it should be
used with "due regard for the rights of said companies."
In the act
of 1864, however, there is nothing except the simple words (section
22) "that congress may at any time alter, amend, and repeal this
act."
Taking both acts together, and giving the explanatory statement in that of 1862 all the effect it can be entitled to, we are of the
opinion that congress not only retains, but has given special notice of
its intention to retain, full and complete power to make such alterations and amendments of the charter as come within the just scope
of legislative power. That this power has a limit, no one can doubt.
All agree that it can not be used to take away property already acquired under the operation of the charter, or to deprive the corporation of the fruits actually reduced to possession of contracts lawfully
made; but, as was said by this court, through Mr. Justice Clifford,
in Miller v. The State (15 Wall. 498), "it may safely be affirmed
that the reserved power may be exercised, and to almost any extent,
to carry into effect the original purposes of the grant, or to secure the
due administration of its affairs, so as to protect the rights of stockholders and of creditors, and for the proper disposition of its assets;"
and again, in Holyoke Company v. Lyman (15 Wall. 519), "to protect the rights of the public and of the corporators, or to promote
the due administration of the affairs of the corporation."
Mr. Justice Field, also speaking for the court, was even more explicit when,
in Tomlinson v. Jessup (15 Wall. 459), he said, "the reservation
affects the entire relation between the state and the corporation, and
places under legislative control all rights, privileges, and immunities
derived by its charter directly from the state;" and again, as late as
Railroad Company v. Maine (96 U. S. 510), "by the reservation
*
*
* the state retained the power to alter it
[the charter] in all
particulars constituting the grant to the new company, formed under
of corporate rights, privileges, and immunities."
Mr. Justice
Swayne, in Shields v. Ohio (95 U. S. 324), says, by way of limitation, "The alterations must be reasonable; they must be made in
good faith, and be consistent with the object and scope of the act of incorporation. Sheer oppression and wrong can not be inflicted under
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the guise of amendment or alteration."
The rules as here laid down
are fully sustained by authority.
Further citations are unnecessary.
Giving full effect to the principles which have thus been authoritatively stated, we think it safe to say, that whatever rules congress
might have prescribed in the original charter for the government of
of its affairs, it retained the
the corporation in the administration
establish
In
to
amendment.
so doing it can not undo what
power
by
has already been done, and it can not unmake contracts that have already been made, but it may provide for what shall be done in the
future, and may direct what preparation shall be made for the due
It might originally
performance of contracts already entered into.
have prohibited the borrowing of money on mortgage, or it might
have said that no bonded debt should be created without ample provision by sinking fund to meet it at maturity.
Not having done so at
first, it can not now by direct legislation vacate mortgages already
made under the powers originally granted, nor release debts already
contracted.
A prohibition now against contracting debts will not
An amendment making it unlawful to
avoid debts already incurred.
issue bonds payable at a distant day, without at the same time establishing a fund for their ultimate redemption, will not invalidate a bond
All such legislation will be confined in its operation to
already out.
the future.
Legislative control of the administration of the affairs of a corporation may, however, very properly include regulations by which suitable provision will be secured in advance for the payment of existing
debts when they fall due.
If a state under its reserved power of
charter amendment were to provide th'at no dividends should be paid
to stockholders from current earnings until some reasonable amount
had been set apart to meet maturing obligations, we think it would
not be seriously contended that such legislation was unconstitutional,
either because it impaired the obligations of the charter contract or
deprived the corporation of its property without due process of law.
Take the case of an insurance company dividing its unearned premiums among its stockholders without laying by anything to meet losses,
would any one doubt the power of the state under its reserved right
of amendment to prohibit such dividends until a suitable fund had
been established to meet losses from outstanding risks? Clearly not,
we think, and for the obvious reason that while stockholders are entitled to receive all dividends that may legitimately be declared and
paid out of the current net income, their claims on the property of
The
the corporation are always subordinate to those of creditors.
of
fund
from
a
constitutes
the
which
its
debts
corporation
property
are to be paid, and if the officers improperly attempt to divert this
fund from its legitimate uses, justice requires that they should in some
A court of equity would do this, if called upon
way be restrained.
in an appropriate manner; and it needs no argument to show that a
legislative regulation which requires no more of the corporation than a
court would compel it to do without legislation is not unreasonable. * * *
The United States occupy toward this corporation a twofold rela-
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that of sovereign and that of creditor.
United States v. Union
Pacific Railroad Co., 98 U. S. 569. Their rights as sovereign are
not crippled because they are creditors, and their privileges as creditors are not enlarged by the charter because of their sovereignty.
They can not, as creditors, demand payment of what is due them before the time limited by the contract.
Neither can they, as sovereign
or creditors, require the company to pay the other debts it owes beBut out of regard to the rights of the subsequent
fore they mature.
lienholders and stockholders, it is not only their right, but their duty,
as sovereign to see to it that the current stockholders do not, in the
administration of the affairs of the corporation, appropriate to their
own use that which in equity belongs to others.
A legislative regulation which does no more than require them to submit to their just
contribution towards the payment of a bonded debt can not in any
sense be said to deprive them of their property without due process
of law.
The question still remains, whether the particular provision of this
statute now under consideration comes within this rule.
It establishes
a sinking fund for the payment of debts when they mature, but does
not pay the debts.
The original contracts of loan are not changed.
They remain as they were before, and are only to be met at maturity.
All that has been done is to make it the duty of the company to lay by
a portion of its current net income to meet its debts when they do fall
due.
In this way the current stockholders are prevented to some extent from depleting the treasury for their own benefit, at the expense
of those who are to come after them.
This is no more for the benefit
of the creditors than it is for the corporation itself. It tends to give
permanency to the value of the stock and bonds, and is in the direct interest of a faithful administration of affairs.
It simply comfor
the
the
time
to
do
what
being
pels
managers
they ought to do volThe
fund
to
be
created
is
not
so
much
for the security of
untarily.
the creditors as the ultimate protection of the public and the corporation,

tors.

To our minds it is a matter of no consequence that the secretary of
the treasury is made the sinking-fund agent and the treasuiy of the
United States the depository, or that the investment is to be made in
the public funds of the United States.
This does not make the de* * *
a
of
the
debt
due
the
United States.
posit
payment
Not to pursue this branch of the inquiry any further, it is sufficient
now to say that we think the legislation complained of may be sustained on the ground that it is a reasonable regulation of the administration of the affairs of the corporation, and promotive of the interests
of the public and the corporators.
It takes nothing from the corpoor
ration
the stockholders which actually belongs to them.
It opIt simply gives further assurpresses no one, and inflicts no wrong.
ance of the continued solvency and prosperity of a corporation in
which the public are so largely interested, and adds another guaranty
to the permanent and lasting value of its vast amount of securities.
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;

it

;

it

is

if

it,

The legislation is also warranted under the authority by way of
amendment to change or modify the rights, privileges, and immuniThe right of the stockholders to a divisties granted by the charter.
ion of the earnings of the corporation is a privilege derived from the
charter.
When the charter and its amendments first became laws,
and the work on the road was undertaken, it was by no means sure
No statutory rethat the enterprise would prove a financial success.
straint was then put upon the power of declaring dividends.
It was
not certain that the stock would ever find a place on the list of marketable securities, or that there would be any bonds subsequent in
lien to that of the United States which could need legislative or other
protection. Hence, all this was left unprovided for in the charter
and its amendments as originally granted, and the reservation of the
power of amendment inserted so as to enable the government to accommodate its legislation to the requirements of the public and the
Now it is
corporation as they should be developed in the future.
known that the stock of the company has found its way to the markets of the world ; that large issues of bonds have been made beyond
what was originally contemplated, and that the company has gone on
for years dividing its earnings without any regard to its increasing
debt, or to the protection of those whose rights may be endangered if
For this reason congress has
this practice is permitted to continue.
interfered, and, under its reserved power, limited the privilege of declaring dividends on current earnings, so as to confine the stockholders to what is left after suitable provision has been made for the protection of creditors and stockholders against the disastrous conse*
*
*
quences of a constantly increasing debt.
Judgment and decree affirmed.
*
*
*
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY, dissenting.
The contract between the Union and Central Pacific Railroad Companies and the
It was in
government was an executed contract, and a definite one.
effect this: that the government should loan the companies certain
moneys, and that the companies should have a certain period of time
to repay the amount, the loan resting on the security of the companies' works.
Congress, by the law in question, without any change
of circumstances, and against the protest of the companies, declares
that the money shall be paid at an earlier day, and that the contract
This is the substance and effect of the
shall be changed pro tanto.
Calling the money paid a sinking-fund makes no substantial
law
The pretense or excuse for the law is that the stipulated
difference.
Congress takes up the question, ex parte, dissecurity is not good.
cusses and decides
passes judgment, and proposes to issue executhe
tion, and to subject
companies to heavy penalties
they do not
law,
of
the
In
of
the plain English
view
the limitcomply. That
In my judgations referred to, has congress the power to do this?
ment
has not.
The law virtually deprives the companies of their
for public use without
takes
due
property without
process of law
and
as
an
exercise
by congress of the judicial
compensation
operates
of
the
government.
power
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1

I

That it is a plain and flat violation of the contract there can be no
But it is said that congress is not subject to any
reasonable doubt.
inhibition against passing laws impairing the validity of contracts.
This is true ; and the reason why the inhibition to that effect was
imposed upon the states and not upon congress evidently was, that
the power to pass bankrupt laws should be exclusively vested in congress, in order that the bankruptcy system might be uniform throughWhen the states exercised the power, they
out the United States.
often did it in such a manner as to favor their own citizens at the exIt was
pense of the citizens of other states and of foreign countries.
deemed expedient, therefore, to take the power from the states so far
as it might involve the impairing the validity of contracts.
State
bankrupt laws, since the constitution went into effect, have only been
sustained when operating prospectively upon contracts, and then only
in the absence of a national law. The inhibition referred to unIt fully explains the
doubtedly had its origin in these considerations.
fact that no such inhibition was laid upon the national legislature ;
and the absence of such an inhibition, therefore, furnishes no ground
of argument in favor of the proposition that congress may pass
arbitrary and despotic laws with regard to contracts any more than
with regard to any other subject-matter of legislation. The limitations already quoted exist in their full force, and apply to that subject
as well as to all others.
They embody the essential principles of
Charta,
are
and
Magna
especially binding upon the legislative deof
the
Under the English constitution, notgovernment.
partment
the
theoretical
withstanding
omnipotence of Parliament, such a law
in
would
not be tolerated for a moment.
one
The
as the
question
"it
that
would
cut
famous denunciation
every Englishman to the
bone," would be promptly reiterated.
It will not do .to say that the violation of the contract by the law in
In the first place it is literally a
question is not a taking of property.
the
companies to pay over to the
taking of property. It compels
government, or its agents, money to which the government is not entitled. That it will be entitled by the contract to a like amount at
Time is a part of the contract.
some future time does not matter.
To coerce a delivery of the money is to coerce without right a delivery of that which is not the property of the government but the propIt is needless to refer to the importance to
erty of the companies.
If it be alleged
the companies of the time which the contract gives.
that the security of the government requires this to be done in consequence of waste or dissipation by the companies of the mortgage security, that is a question to be decided by judicial investigation with
A prejudgment of the question by the legopportunity of defense.
islative department is a usurpation of the judicial power.
But if it were not, as it is, an actual or physical taking of property,- if it were merely the subversion of the contract and the substitution of another contract in its place, it would be a taking of propA contract is
erty within the spirit of the constitutional provisions.
property. To destroy it wholly or to destroy it partially is to take it;
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a

is

*

*

*

a

It

a

a

is

a

it

;

is

is

a a

it,

and to do this by arbitrary legislative action is to do it without due
*
*
*
process of law.
(Continuing, as to the reserved power to alter or amend):
In my judgment, the reservation is to be interpreted as placing the
state legislature back on the same platform of power and control over
the charter containing it as it would have occupied had the constitutional restriction about contracts never existed ; and I think the reservation effects nothing more.
It certainly can not be interpreted as
No legislature ever rereserving a right to violate a contract at will.
served such a right in any contract.
Legislatures often reserve the
right to terminate a continuous contract at will ; but never to violate
a contract, or change its terms without the consent of the other party.
The reserved power in question is simply that of legislation, to alter, amend, or repeal a charter
This is very different from the power to violate, or to alter the terms of a contract at will.
A reservation of power to violate a contract, or alter
or impair its obligation,
would be repugnant to the contract itself, and void. A proviso redeed, or to the enacting part of
pugnant to the granting part of
statute,
void. Interpreted as
reservation of the right to legislate,
the reserved power
sustainable on sound principles
but interpreted
as the reservation of
not
right to violate an executed contract,
sustainable.
The question then comes back to the extent of the power to legislate.
But that
restricted power,
restricted by other constitutional provisions, to which reference has already been made.
Certainly the legislature can not, in charter of incorporation, or in any
other law. reserve to itself any greater power of legislation than the
constitution itself concedes to it.
seems to me clear, therefore,
that the power reserved can not authorize a flat abrogation of the contract by congress, because, as before shown, such an abrogation
would be violation of those clauses which inhibit the taking of property without process of law and without compensation.
Note: 1885, Northern Pacific R. v. Traill Co., 115 U. S. 600; 1887, In re
Pacific R. Commission, 32 Fed. Rep. 241, 260; 1895, United States v. Stanford, 69 Fed. Rep. 25, 70 Fed. Rep. 346; 1896, United States v. Stanford, 161
U. S. 412. See note to section 473, infra.

(c)

Power of the state legislatures,
to repeal.

See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
518, supra, p. 708.

no reserve power

4
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In 1856 the Minneapolis and St. Cloud Railroad Company was incorporated by the legislature of the territory of Minnesota with authority to construct a railroad on an indicated route, and to connect
its road by branches with any other road in the territory, or to become
part owner or lessee of any railroad in said territory, and also "to connect with any railroad running in the same direction with this road
and where there may be any portion of another road which may be
used by this company."
By a subsequent act it was, in 1865, authorized " to connect with or adopt as its own any other railroad running in the same general direction with either of its main lines or
any branch roads, and which said corporation is authorized to construct; " " to consolidate the whole or any portion of its capital stock
with the capital stock or any portion thereof of any other road having
the same general direction or location, or to become merged therein
" to consolidate any portion of its road and
by way of substitution ;
property with the franchise of any other railroad company or any portion thereof ; and to consolidate the whole or any portion of its main
line or branches with the rights, powers, franchises, grants and effects
of any other railroad.
These several rights, privileges and franchises
were duly accepted by the railway company, and its road was constructed and put in operation.
In 1874 the state of Minnesota enacted that "no railroad corporation, or the lessees, purchasers or managers of any railroad corporation, shall consolidate the stock, property or franchises of such corporation with, or lease or purchase the works or franchises of, or in any
way control any other railroad corporation owning or having under
its control a parallel or competing line ; nor shall any officer of such
railroad corporation act as the officer of any other railroad corporation owning or having the control of a parallel or competing line ;
and {he question whether railroads are parallel or competing lines
shall, when demanded by the party complainant, be decided by a
jury as in other civil issues;" and in 1881 its legislature enacted that
"no railroad corporation shall consolidate with, lease or purchase, or
in any way become owner of, or control any other railroad corporation, or any stock, franchise, rights of property thereof, which owns
or controls a parallel or competing line."
In 1889 the company
its
name
to
Great
Northern
changed
Railway Company and extended
its road towards the Pacific.
The Northern Pacific Railroad being
1
Statement
ted.

is taken from the syllabus

2 VVIL. CAS.

16.

;

arguments and part of opinion omit-
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it was proposed that the Great Northern
about to be reorganized,
for the benefit of the holders of the bonds
should
guarantee,
company
to be issued by the reorganized company, the payment of the principal of, and interest upon such bonds, and as a consideration of such
guaranty, and as a compensation for the risk to the stockholders, the
reorganized company should transfer to the shareholders of the Northern company, or to a trustee for their use, one-half the capital stock
of the reorganized company ; and that the Northern Pacific should
join with the Great Northern in providing facilities for an interchange
of cars and traffic between their respective lines, and should interchange traffic with the Northern company, and operate its trains to
that end upon reasonable, fair and lawful terms under joint tariffs or
otherwise, the Northern company having the right to bill its traffic,
passengers and freight from points on its own line to points on the
Northern Pacific not reached by the Great Northern, with the further
right to make use of the terminal facilities of the Northern Pacific at
points where such facilities would be found to be convenient and
economical, jointly with that company.
A stockholder of the Great
Northern Company filed this bill against it to restrain it from carrying out such agreement.
(The bill was dismissed by the circuit court. Appeal taken.)
MR. JUSTICE BROWN:
This case turns upon the question whether
the right given by its charter to the Minneapolis and St. Cloud Railroad Company to connect with any railroad running in the same general direction, and, by subsequent amendatory act, to consolidate its
capital stock, or its property, road or franchise with those of any other
railroad, could be taken away by a subsequent act inhibiting the consolidation, lease or purchase by any railroad of the stock, property or
franchise of any parallel or competing line.
A different question
would have been presented if any such contract had been made and
carried into effect, before the act of 1874 was passed, since it might
be claimed that the rights of the parties had become vested, within
the meaning of section 17 of the original charter of the Minnesota
and St. Cioud Railroad, and as such could not be destroyed or impaired by subsequent legislation, without infringing upon that provision of the constitution inhibiting state legislation impairing the obliThe case then involves indirectly the meaning
gation of contracts.
of the words "vested rights," when used in the charter of railroads
and other similar corporations.
1. [Extent of the doctrine of the Dartmouth College decision.]
The
whole doctrine of vested rights as applied to the charters of corporations is based upon the Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat. 518, in
which the broad proposition was laid down that such charters were
contracts within the meaning of the constitution, and hence that an
act of the state legislature altering a charter in any material respect
The doctrine of this case has been
was unconstitutional
and void.
subjected to more or less criticism by the courts and the profession,
but has been reaffirmed and applied so often as to have become firmly
established as a canon of American jurisprudence.
The precise
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By the original charter from the Crown,
granted in the year 1769, twelve persons, therein named, were incor" The Trustees of Dartmouth College," and
porated by the name of
there was granted to them and their successors the usual corporate
privileges and powers, among which was authority to govern the college, and fill all vacancies which might be created in their own body.
By an act of the legislature of New Hampshire, passed in 1816, the
charter was amended, the number of trustees increased to twentyone, the appointment of the additional members vested in the executive of the state, and a board of overseers, consisting of twenty-five
persons, created with power to inspect and control the most important
The president of the senate, the speaker of the
acts of the trustees.
house of representatives of New Hampshire, and the governor and
the lieutenant-governor of Vermont, for the time being, were to be
members ex officio, and the board was to be completed by the governor and council of New Hampshire, who were also empowered to
fill all vacancies which might occur. A majority of the trustees of
the college refused to accept this amended charter and brought suit
for the corporate property, which was in possession of a person holding by authority of the acts of the legislature.
The opinion contained an exhaustive discussion of the whole subject of corporate rights and their impairment by state legislation, and
probably contributed as much as any he ever delivered to the great
The proposed legislation of
reputation of Chief Justice Marshall.
On the part of the Crown
the state was fundamental in its character.
it was expressly stipulated that the corporation thus constituted should
continue forever ; and that the number of trustees should consist of
twelve and no more.
By the act of the legislature the trustees were
increased to twenty-one, the appointment of the additional number
given to the executive of the state, and a board of overseers, twentyone out of twenty-five of whom were also appointed by the executive
of the state, was created and invested with power to inspect and con"Thus," said Mr. Chief
trol the most important acts of the trustees.
Marshall,
of
whole
the college is trans"the
governing
power
Justice
ferred from trustees, appointed according to the will of the founder,
If
expressed in the charter, to the executive of New Hampshire."
this legislation was valid, Dartmouth College, as it was originally incorporated, ceased to exist, and a new institution of learning was created, which was put completely at the mercy of the state legislature.
It was not the case of an amendment in an unimportant particular
the taking away of a non-essential feature of the charter, but a radical
and destructive change of the governing body a transfer of its power
to the executive of the state, and virtually a reincorporation upon a
wholly different basis.
cases have settled the law that, wherever property
Subsequent
rights have been acquired by virtue of a corporate charter, such
rights, so far as they are necessarv to the full and complete enjoyment of the main object of the grant, are contracts, and beyond the
reach of destructive legislation.
Even before the Dartmouth College
point decided was this:
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case was decided, it was held by this court that grants of land made
by the Crown to colonial churches were irrevocable, and that property purchased by, or devised to them, prior to the adoption of the
constitution, could not be diverted to other purposes by the states
which succeeded to the sovereign power of the colonies.
Terrett v.
Taylor,* 9 Cranch 43; Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch 292;
Society for Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464.
Indeed, the sanctity of charters vesting in grantees the title to lands
or other property has been vindicated in a large number of cases.
Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 137;
Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530; United States v. Schurz, 102 U. S.
378; Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad, 147 U. S. 165.
This court has had, perhaps, more frequent occasion to assert the
inviolability of corporate charters in cases respecting the power of
taxation than in any other, and in a long series of decisions has held
that a clause imposing certain taxes in lieu of all other taxes, or of all
taxes to which the company or stockholders therein would be subject,
is impaired by legislation raising the rate of taxation, or imposing
taxes other than those specified in the charter.
Thus in State
Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 How. 369, it was held that, where, by a
general banking law, it was provided that a certain percentage of
dividends should be set off for the use of the state, and should be in
lieu of all taxes to which the company or stockholders therein
would otherwise be subjected, this was a contract fixing permanently
the amount of taxation, and that legislation could not thereafter increase it.
In this connection it was said by Mr. Justice McLean:
"Every valuable privilege given by the charter, and which conduced
contract
to an acceptance of it and an organization under
which can not be changed by the legislature where the power to do so
not reserved in the charter.
The rate of discount, the duration of
the charter, the specific tax agreed to be paid, and other provisions
essentially connected with the franchise, and necessary to the business
of the bank, can not, without its consent, become
subject for legislative action."
To the same effect are New Jersey v. Wilson,
How. 133; Dodge v.
Cranch 164; Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court,
Black
Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly,
Wall. 143; Home of the Friendless v.
4365 McGee v. Mathis,
Rouse,
Wall. 430; Wilmington Railroad v. Reid, 13 Wall. 264;
Humphrey v. Pegues, 16 Wall. 244; Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U.
S. 679
New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U. S. 104 Asylum v. New OrIf, however, the charter contain
reservation
leans, 105 U. S. 362.
of an unlimited power to alter, amend or repeal, the legislature may
Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15
take away an immunity from taxation.

Wall. 454.
Within the same principle are grants of

an exclusive right to supply
gas or water to a municipality, or to occupy its streets for railway
New Orleans Gas Co. v. Lousiana Light Co., 115 U. S.
purposes.
New
Orleans Water Works v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674; Louis650;
ville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gas Co., 115 U. S. 683; St. Tammany
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WaterWorks v. New Orleans Water Works, 120 U. S. 64; Boston
& Lowell Railroad v. Salem & Lowell Railroad, 2 Gray i.

So, if a company be chartered with power to construct and maintain a turnpike, erect toll-gates and collect tolls, such franchise is
Turnpike Co. v. Illinois, 96 U. S. 63 ;
protected by the constitution.
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312.
If it be provided in the charter of a bank that the bills and notes
of the institution shall be received in payment of taxes or of debts
due to the state, such undertaking on the part of the state constitutes
a contract between the state and holders of the notes, which the state
is not at liberty to break, although notes issued after the repeal of the
Woodruff v.
act are not within the contract, and may be refused.
Trapnall, 10 How. 190; Paup v. Drew, 10 How. 218; Furman v.
Nichol, 8 Wall. 44; Keith v. Clark, 97 U. S. 454; Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 769; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270. And
in Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 301, where a bank was chartered
with the usual powers to receive money on deposit, discount bills of
exchange and notes, and to make loans, and in the course of its business the bank discounted and held promissory notes, and the legislature then passed a law declaring that it should not be lawful for any
bank to transfer, by indorsement or otherwise, any note, bill receivable or other evidence of debt, it was held that the statute conflicted
with the constitution and was void. It was said in this case that "a
power to dispose of its notes, as well as other property, may well be
regarded as an incident to its business as a bank to discount notes,
which are required to be in their terms assignable, as well as an incident to its right of holding them and other property, when no express
limitation is imposed upon the power to transfer them."
In each of the above cases, however, the title to property had either
become vested in the grantee by operation of law, or the exercise of
the power granted was so far necessary to the full enjoyment of the
main object of the charter that persons subscribing to the stock might
be presumed to take into consideration, and be influenced in their
subscriptions, by the fact that the corporation was endowed with those
privileges during the continuance of the charter.
2.
Such
[Limits of the doctrine of the Dartmouth College decision.]
limitations, however, upon the power of the legislature must be construed in subservience to the general rule that grants by the state are
to be construed strictly against the grantees, and that nothing will be
presumed to pass except it be expressed in clear and unambiguous
As was said by Mr. Justice Swayne in Fertilizing Co. v.
language.
" The rule of construction in this
Park,
Hyde
97 U. S. 659, 666:
class of cases is that it shall be most strongly against the corporation.
Eveiy reasonable doubt is to be resolved adversely.
Nothing is to be
taken as conceded but what is given in unmistakable terms or by an
The affirmative must be shown.
Silence
implication equally clear.
is negation, and doubt is fatal to the claim.
This doctrine is vital to
the public welfare.
It is axiomatic in the jurisprudence of this
court."
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Hence, an exclusive right to enjoy a certain franchise is never presumed, and unless the charter contain words of exclusion it is no impairment of the grant to permit another to do the same thing, although the value of the franchise to the first grantee may be wholly
This principle was laid down at an early day in the case
destroyed.
of the Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, n Pet. 420, and has
been steadily adhered to ever since.
Turnpike Company v. The
State, 3 Wall. 210; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514; PennIf, however, there be an
sylvania Railroad v. Miller, 132 U. S. 75.
exclusive provision as, for instance, in the charter of a bridge company, that it shall not be lawful for any person to erect another bridge
within a certain distance of the bridge authorized, this constitutes an
The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 51. But
inviolable contract.
even in such cases if the second charter be for a similar franchise, but
to be exercised in a substantially different manner, the exclusive right
conferred by the first charter is held not to be violated ; as, for
instance, if the first charter be for an ordinary bridge, and the second
for a railway viaduct, impossible for man or beast to cross except
in railway cars. Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., i Wall. 116.
So if the first franchise be for the sole piivilege of supplying a city
with water from a designated source, it is not impaired by a grant to
another party of the privilege to supply it with water from a different
source.
Stein v. Bienville Water Supply Co., 141 U. S. 67.
Upon a similar principle it was held in Tucker v. Ferguson, 22
Wall. 527, that a tax upon lands owned by a railway company and
not used, nor necessary, in working the road and in the exercise of its
franchise was not unlawful, though the charter had provided for a certain tax upon the railroad company, and had enacted that such tax
should be in lieu of all other taxes to be imposed within the state.
See, also, West Wisconsin Railway v. Supervisors, 93 U. S. 595.
Nor does it follow, from the fact that the contract evidenced by the
charter can not be impaired, that the power of the legislature over
such charter is wholly taken away, since statutes which operate oniy
to regulate the manner in which the franchises are to be exercised,
and which do not interfere substantially with the enjoyment of the
main object of the grant, are not open to the objection of impairing
the contract.
A familiar instance of this class of legislation is that enacted under
what is known as the police power. In virtue of this the state may
prescribe regulations contributing to the comfort, safety and health of
passengers, the protection of the public at highway crossings or elsewhere, the security of owners of adjacent property, by requiring the
track to be fenced, and such appliances to be annexed to the engines
of fire to neighboring buildings.
as shall prevent the communication
Cooley Prin. Const. Law, 321. This power, as was said by Mr.
Justice Miller in the Slaughter-house Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 62, is and
must be, from its very nature, incapable of any very exact definition
or limitation.
"Upon it depends the security of social order, the
life and health of the citizen, the comfort of existence in a thickly
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populated community, the enjoyment of private and social life, and
The following cases show to what
the beneficial use of property."
extent and for what purposes this power may be exercised:
Slaughter-house Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Fertilizing Company v. Hyde Park,
97 U. S. 659; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25; Patterson v.
Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501 ; Barbier v. Connolly, n$\J. S. 27; Charlotte, Columbia, etc., Railroad v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386; Lawton v.
Steele, 152 U. S. 133; Eagle Insurance Co. v. Ohio, 153 U. S. 446.
And so important is this power and so necessaryto the public safety
and health, that it can not be bargained away by the legislature, and
hence it has been held that charters for purposes inconsistent with a
due regard for the public health or public morals may be abrogated
in the interests of a more enlightened public opinion.
Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814; Phalen v. Virginia, 8 How. 163, 168.
In obedience to the same principle it has always been held that the
legislature may repeal laws authorizing municipal subscriptions
to
railways, though such laws were in existence at the time the railway
was chartered, and may be supposed to have influenced the promoters and stockholders of the road in undertaking its construction.
And
even if there has been a public vote in favor of such subscription,
such vote does not itself form a contract with the railway company
protected by the constitution, the court holding that until the subscription is actually made the contract is unexecuted.
Aspinwall v. Daviess County, 22 How. 364; Wadsworth v. Supervisors, 102 U. S.
534; Norton v. Brownsville, 129 U. S. 479; Concord v. Portsmouth
Savings Bank, 92 U. S. 625 ; Falconer v. Buffalo & Jamestown
Railroad, 69 N. Y. 491 ; Covington & Lexington Railroad v. Kenton
County Court, 12 B. Mon. 144; Wilson v. Polk County, 112 Mo.
126.

The contract protected

by this clause must also be founded upon a
be a mere nude pact, a bare promise to
consideration.
If
it
good
allow a certain thing to be done, it will be construed as a revocable
Thus, in Christ Church v. Philadelphia County, 24 How.
license.
the
legislature of Pennsylvania enacted that the property of
300,
Christ Church Hospital, so long as the same should continue to belong to the same hospital, should be and remain free from taxation.
In 1851 they enacted that all property then exempted from taxation,
other than that which was in the actual use and occupation of such
association, should thereafter be subject to taxation.
It was held that
the original concession of the legislature exempting the property from
taxation was spontaneous, and no service or duty or other remunerative consideration was imposed upon the corporation, and hence that
it was in the nature of a privilege or license, which might be revoked
at the pleasure of the sovereign.
In Turnpike Company v. Illinois, 96 U. S. 63, the original charter
of the company gave it the right, in consideration of building a turnpike, to erect toll-gates and exact toll for twenty-five years from the
date of the charter.
In 1861, when the term of charter had
more than half expired, the state gave the company a new and addi-
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tional privilege of using a certain bridge and dyke and of erecting a
The only consideration required was that the comtoll-gate thereon.
in repair.
them
No term was expressed for the enshould
keep
pany
no
of
the
and
conditions were imposed for resumprivileges,
joyment
ing or revoking it on the part of the state. It was held that it could
not be presumed to have been intended as a perpetual grant, since the
company itself had but a limited period of existence, and that a law
resuming possession of the bridge and dyke bv subjecting them to the
control and management of the city of East St. Louis was not a law
impairing the obligation of the contract.

In Philadelphia & Grays Ferry Co.'s Appeal, 102 Penn. St. 123,
it was also held that a supplement to a charter which merely conferred upon the corporation a new right (as an exclusive right to use and
occupy certain streets) or enlarged an old one, without imposing any
additional burden upon it, was a mere license or promise by the state,
and might be revoked at pleasure.
"It is without consideration to
support it and can not bind a subsequent legislature."
We have epitomized these cases, not because they have any decisive bearing upon the question at issue, but for the purpose of showing the general trend of opinion in this court upon the subject of cor-

porate charters and vested rights.
3. Conceding that there are no authorities directly in point (and
the diligence of counsel has failed to cite us to any), let us see how
far these principles are applicable to the case under consideration.
(After stating facts substantially as above given.) * * *
We think the proposed arrangement is a plain violation of the acts
of the state legislature passed in 1874 and 1881, prohibiting railroad
corporations from consolidating with, leasing or purchasing, or in any
other way becoming the owner of, or controlling any other railroad
corporation, or the stock, franchises or rights of property thereof,
having a parallel or competing line.
Under the broad powers conferred by the amended act of 1865, it
is probable that this arrangement might be lawfully made ; and the
question is whether an unexecuted power to make such arrangement
is a ''vested right" within the meaning of section 17 of the original
It is possible that, if this arrangement had been actually made
act.
into effect, before the acts forbidding the consolidation of
carried
and
or
competing lines had been passed, the rights of the parties
parallel
thereto would have become vested, and could not be impaired by any
But the real question before us is
subsequent act of the legislature.
consolidate with other corporaa
bare
unexecuted
to
power
whether
if
exists
which,
it
as
claimed
a
tions,
by the defendant, would
power
and
successive
to
absorb
it
gradual accretions the entire
by
authorize
so
of
is
not,
the
long as it remains unexecountiy,
railway system
of
and
to
revocation by the legislathe
control
within
cuted,
subject
ture, at least so far as it applies to parallel or competing lines.
A vested right is defined by Fearne, in his work upon Contingent
Remainders, as "an immediate fixed right of present or future enjoy" and by Chancellor Kent as "an immediate right of present
ment ;
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1

or a present fixed right of future enjoyment," 4 Kent
It is said by Mr. Justice Cooley that "rights are vested
in contradistinction to being expectant or contingent.
They are
vested when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the property of some particular person or persons as a present
interest.
They are expectant when they depend upon the conof the present condition of things until the hapexistence
tinued
of
some
future event.
They are contingent when they are
pening
come
on
an
into
existence
event or condition which may not
to
only
or
be
until
some
other event may prevent their
performed
happen
enjoyment,
Com. 202.

Principles of Const. Law 332.
vesting."
As applied to railroad corporations it may reasonably be contended
that the term extends to all rights of property acquired by executed
contracts, as well as to all such rights as are necessary to the full and
complete enjoyment of the original grant, or of property legally acquired subsequent to such grant. If, for example, the legislature
should authorize the construction of a certain railroad, and by a subsequent act should take away the power to raise funds for the
construction of the road in the usual manner by a mortgage, or the
power to purchase rolling stock or equipment, such acts might perhaps be treated as so far destructive of the original grant as to render
it valueless, although there might in neither case be an express repeal
of any of its provisions. Sala v. New Orleans, 2 Woods 188.
But where the charter authorizes the company in sweeping terms to
do certain things which are unnecessary to the main object of the
grant, and not directly and immediately within the contemplation of
the parties thereto, the power so conferred, so long as it is unexecuted, is within the control of the legislature and may be treated as a
license, and may be revoked, if a possible exercise of such power is
As applicable to
found to conflict with the interests of the public.
the case under consideration, we think it was competent for the legislature to declare that the power it had conferred upon the Minneapolis and St. Cloud Railway Company to consolidate its interest with
those of other similar corporations should not be exercised, so far as
applicable to parallel and competing lines, inasmuch as it is for the
interest of the public that there should be competition between parallel roads.
The legislature has the right to assume in this connection
that neither road would reduce its tariff to a destructive or unprofitable figure, or to a point where either road would become valueless
to its stockholders, and that the object of the act in question is to prevent such a combination between the two as would constitute a monopoly. * * *
We do not deem it necessary to express an opinion in this case
whether the legislature could wholly revoke the power it had given to
this company to extend its system by the construction or purchase of
branch lines or feeders; since the possibility of an extension of the
road, even to the Pacific coast, may have had an influence upon persons contemplating the purchase of its stock or securities, so that a
But we think
right to do this might be said to have become vested.
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it was competent for the legislature, out of due regard for the public
welfare, to declare that its charter should not be used for the purpose
of stifling competition and building up monopolies.
In short, we can
do
a
vested
to
a
not recognize
manifest wrong.
right
Reversed, Field and Brewer, JJ., dissenting.

In this case there was a reserve power to amend or repeal, but in the
Note.
subsequent case of 1896, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677, it
was held that the right to repeal or amend was of no importance, as the same
authority could be exercised under the police power, in case of an unexecuted
privilege of this kind : compare 1875, Zimmer v. State, 30 Ark. 677.

Sec. 458.
repeal.

(d)

Power of

1

GREENWOOD
1 88 1.

legislature,

v.

under reserve

FREIGHT COMPANY.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
S. Rep.

OF

power to

2

THE UNITED STATES.

105

U.

13-24.

[Appeal from circuit court. Suit by Greenwood, a stockholder in
Marginal Freight Railway Company, to prevent the Union

the

Freight Railroad Company from taking possession of the tracks and
This company was charright of way of the Marginal Company.
tered in 1867 to construct a railroad through certain streets in the city
of Boston. In 1872 the Union Company was incorporated and directed "to take the tracks or any part thereof of the Marginal Company, subject to laws relating to the taking of land by railroad
companies and the compensation to be made therefor;" this act also
repealed the charter of the Marginal Company, under the authority of
a general law of 1831, reserving the right to repeal, alter or amend
all subsequent acts of incorporation. It was complained that the repeal and turning over the tracks to another company were unconDecision below in favor of Union Company].
stitutional.
MR. JUSTICE MILLER. * * * These exercises of power in the
statute complained of are divisible into two:
1. The repeal of the charter of the Marginal Company.
2. The authority vested in the Union Company to take its track for
the use of the latter company.
It is the argument of counsel, pressed upon vis with much vigor,
that the two taken together constitute a transfer of the property of the
one corporation to the other, and with it all the corporate franchises,
rights and powers belonging to the elder corporation.
We are not insensible to the force of the argument as thus stated ;
and we think it must be conceded that, according to the unvarying
1
As to difference between revoke, repeal, alter and amend, see 1900, Wil, 46 Atl. 12.
mington City R. Co. v. Wilmington, - - Del.
2

Statement abridged.

Part of opinion omitted.
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decisions of this court, the unconditional repeal of the charter of the
Marginal Company is void under the constitution of the United States,
as impairing the obligation of the contract made by the acceptance of
the charter between the corporators of that company and the state,
unless it is made valid by that provision of the general statutes of
Massachusetts, called (he reservation clause, concerning acts of incorporation ; or unless it falls within some enactment covered by that
part of its own charter which makes it "subject to all the duties, restrictions and liabilities set forth in the general laws, which now are
or may hereafter be in force, relating to street railway corporations,
so far as they may be applicable."
The first of these reservations of legislative power over corporations is found in section 41 of chapter 68 of the general statutes of
Massachusetts, in the following language:
"Every act of incorporation passed after the eleventh day of March, in the year one thousand
eight hundred and thirty-one, shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal, at the pleasure of the legislature."
It would be difficult to supply language more comprehensive or
expressive than this.
Such an act may be amended ; that is, it may be changed by additions to its terms or by qualifications of the same.
It may be altered
What is it may be reby the same power, and it may be repealed.
It is this organic law on
pealed? It is the act of incorporation.
which the corporate existence of the company depends which may be
repealed, so that it shall cease to be a law; or the legislature may
adopt the milder course of amending the law in matters which need
amendment, or altering it when it needs substantial change.
All this
That body need give
may be done at the pleasure of the legislature.
no reason for its action in the matter.
The validity of such action
or on the soundness of the
does not depend on the necessity for
reasons which prompted it.
This expression, "the pleasure of the
not found in many of the similar
legislature,"
significant, and
statutes in other States.
This statute having been the settled law of Massachusetts, and representing her policy on an important subject for nearly fifty years before the incorporation of the Marginal Company, we can not doubt
the authority of the legislature of Massachusetts to repeal that charter.
Nor
this seriously questioned by counsel for appellant and
be assumed that
therefore,
the repealing clause of the act of
may,
alone,
stood
its
Crease v.
May
validity must be conceded.
1872,

N. E. Railroad Co. v.
23 Pick. (Mass.) 334; Erie
Pa.
St.
Casey,
287; Pennsylvania College Cases, 13 Wall. 190;
Kent Com. 306.
It
whole,
to be examined as
argued, however, that the act
and that as the earlier sections of the statute bestow upon the Union
Company the right to seize the track and other property of the Marginal Company, this repealing clause
inserted merely to aid in the
of
valuable
general purpose
property and its appurtetransferring
nant franchise from one corporation to another.
&

Babcock,

a

is

a

is

is
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Whether this is sufficient to invalidate that branch or feature of
the statute may depend somewhat upon the effect of the repealing
clause upon the rights of the Marginal Company as well as upon
other matters ; but we do not doubt the validity of the repealing
clause of that act, whatever may have been the reasons which influfor the exercise of this power
enced the legislature to enact
by
*
express terms declared to be at the pleasure of the legislature.
the effect of the repeal of the charter of
What
corporation like
this
no longer
statute
that
One obvious effect of the repeal of
exists.
Its life
at an end.
Whatever force the law may give to
entered and which were autransactions into which the corporation
can originate no new transthorized by the charter while in force,
If the coractions dependent on the power conferred by the charter.
poration be bank, with power to lend money and to issue circulating
notes,
can make no new loan nor issue any new notes designed to
circulate as monev.
If the essence of the grant of the charter be to operate railroad,
can no longer so use
and to use the streets of the city for that purpose,
the streets of the city, and no longer exercise the franchise of runrailroad in the city.
In short, whatever power
dependent
ning
solely upon the grant of the charter, and which could not be exercised
by unincorporated private persons under the general laws of the state,
abrogated by the repeal of the law which granted these special

if

;

a

rights.
Personal and real property acquired by the corporation during its
lawful existence, rights of contract, or choses in action so acquired,
and which do not in their nature depend upon the general powers
conferred by the charter, are not destroyed by such
repeal and the
courts may,
the legislature does not provide some special remedy,
enforce such rights by the means within their power.
The rights of
the shareholders of such a corporation, to their interest in its prop-

It

2

*

a

it

a

a

a

*

a

erty, are not annihilated by such
repeal, and there must remain in
*
* *
the courts the power to protect those rights.
As early as 1806, in the case of Wales v. Stetson (2 Mass. 143),
the supreme court of that state made the declaration "that the rights
legally vested in all corporations can not be controlled or destroyed
by any subsequent statute, unless a power for that purpose be re*
served to the legislature in the act of incorporation."
Mr. Justice Story, in his concurring opinion in the Dartmouth Colcharter
lege case, suggested that when the legislature was enacting
for
corporation,
provision in the statute reserving to the legislature the right to amend or repeal
must be held to be
part of the
contract itself, and the subsequent exercise of the right would be in
accordance with the contract, and could not, therefore, impair its
obligation. And he cites with approval the observations we have alMass. 143.
ready quoted from the case of Wales v. Stetson,
would seem that the states were not slow to avail themselves of
this suggestion, for while we have not time to examine their legisla-
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tion for the result, we have in one of the cases cited to us as to the
effect of a repeal (McLaren v. Pennington, i Paige (N. Y.) 102),
in which the legislature of New Jersey, when chartering a bank with
in 1824, declared by its seventeenth section
a capital of $400,000
that it should be lawful for the legislature at any time to alter, amend,
And Kent (2 Com. 307), speaking of what is
and repeal the same.
proper in such a clause, cites as an example a charter by the New
York legislature, of the date of February 25, 1822. How long the legislature of Massachusetts continued to rely on a special reservation of
this power in each charter as it was granted 'it is unnecessary to inquire, for in 1831 it enacted as a law of general application, that all
charters of corporations thereafter granted should be subject to amendment, alteration, and repeal at the pleasure of the legislature, and
such has been the law ever since.
This history of the reservation clause in acts of incorporation supports our proposition, that whatever right, franchise, or power in the
corporation depends for its existence upon the granting clauses of the
charter, is lost by its repeal.
This view is sustained by the decisions of this court and of other
courts on the same question.
Pennsylvania College Cases, supra;
Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 Wall. 454; Railroad Company v. Maine,
96 U. S. 499; Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700; Railroad Company v. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359; McLaren v. Pennington, supra;
Erie & N. E. Railroad v. Casey, supra; Miners' Bank v. United
States, i Greene (Iowa) 553; 2 Kent Com. 306, 307.
It results from this view of the subject that whatever right remained
in the Marginal Company to its rolling-stock, its horses, its harness,
its stables, the debts due to it, and the funds on hand, if any, it no
longer had the right to run its cars through the streets, or any of the
It no longer had the right to cumber these streets
streets, of Boston.
with a railroad track which it could not use, for these belonged by
law to no person of right, and were vested in defendants only by virtue of the repealed charter.
It was, therefore, in the power of the Massachusetts legislature to
grant to another corporation, as it did, the authority to operate a
street railroad through the same streets and over the same ground preWhether this action
viously occupied by the Marginal Company.
was oppressive or unjust in view of the public good, or whether the
legislature was governed by sufficient reason in thus repealing the
charter of one company and in chartering another at the same time to
perform as part of its functions the duties required of the first, is not,
as we have seen, a judicial question in this case.
It may well be supposed, if answer were required to the complainant's bill, that it was
made to appear that the Marginal Company had shown its incapacity
to fulfill the objects for which it was created, and that another corporation, embracing larger area, connecting with more freight depots
and wharves, and with more capital, could better serve the public in
the matter for which both franchises were given.
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That in creating the later corporation, whose object was to fulfill a
public use, it could authorize it to take such property of other corporations as might be necessary to that use, as well as that of individuals, can hardly admit of question.
Section 4 of the act gives this
power to the Union Company with reference to the tracks of all
street railroads in the city, and provides that in the event of an inability to agree with the owners of these tracks as to compensation,
that shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of general
To this there can be no
laws previously enacted on that subject.
valid legal objection. The property of corporations, even including
their franchises, when that is necessary, may be taken for public use
under the power of eminent domain, on making due compensation.
West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507; Central Bridge Corporation v. City of Lowell, 4 Gray (Mass.) 474 ; Boston WaterPower Co. v. Boston & Worcester Railroad Corporation, 23 Pick.
(Mass.) 360; Richmond, etc., Railroad Co. v. Louisa Railroad

Co.,

13

How. 71.

*

*

*

Affirmed.
Sec. 459.

(e)

Effect of repeal upon vested rights.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
RECEIVER.

1888.

1

v.

JOHN O'BEIEN,

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.
Rep. 1-66, s. c. 45 Hun 519; 7 Am. St. 684.

in

N. Y.

corporation or1884, the general act proganized under chapter 252
viding for the construction, maintenance and operation of street surface railroads in cities, towns and villages.
It obtained the consent
of the common council of New York City to lay its tracks, etc., in
Broadway in that city, and an order of the general term confirming
the report of commissioners, who had recommended the construction
of the road through that street, and had complied with all the conditions attached to the said consents.
It constructed and operated its
road through Broadway and issued bonds, secured by mortgages,
It also entered into traffic contracts
covering its road and franchises.
with other surface railroad companies, granting them permission to
connect with and use its tracks upon considerations and subject to
Thereafter, and while it was so
conditions specified in such contracts.
laws of 1886, was passed by
268
of
the
operating its road, chapter
York,
of
New
the legislature of the state
by which it was declared
"that the corporation called the Broadway Surface Railroad Company,
*
*
*
and purporting to have been organized as a corporation
for the purpose of constructing, maintaining and operating a surface

[The Broadway Surface Railroad Company was

a

of the laws of

1
Statement
ted.

taken from 45

Hun

523.

Arguments and part of opinion omit-
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railroad on Broadway in the city of New York, between the Battery
and Fifteenth street, be and the same is hereby annulled and dissolved and its charter is hereby repealed."
Chapter 271 of the same
for
the
of
was
sale
the
franchises of corpoproviding
passed,
year
rations which should be dissolved by the legislature, and chapter 310,
of the same year, contained provisions for the winding up of such
corporations. Under this latter act, John O'Brien was appointed the
receiver of the company upon the application of the attorney-general,
on the reading of the summons and complaint and a verified copy of
the act annulling and dissolving the company without notice to or
hearing any one on behalf of the company].
RUGER, CHIEF JUSTICE : * * *
[After holding that the rights,
and
franchises
conferred
upon the Surface Company
privileges
(though it was to exist for only 1,000 years), by the consent of the
city council, were in the nature of estates in fee, and by the policy of
the statutes of the state, were such interests as were independent of
the life of the original corporation, and were transferable by judicial
in short were property in the highest
proceedings or otherwise,
sense, proceeds] :
These rights of property having been acquired and created under
the express sanction and authority of the state, it remains to inquire
whether they were defeasible and subject to be taken away through
the exercise of any power reserved by the state to alter, amend and
repeal laws or charters.
The reservations applying to this case are claimed to be as follows:
ist. Section i, article 8, title, "Corporations, How Created" (constitution of 1846), providing that "all general laws and special acts
passed pursuant to this section may be altered from time to time or
2d. Section 8, title 3, chapter 18 of the Revised Statutes
repealed."
(7th ed.), providing that "the charter of every corporation that shall
be granted by the legislature, shall be subject to alteration, suspension and repeal in the discretion of the legislature.
Section 48,
3d.
chapter 140, laws of 1850, providing that "the legislature may at any
time annul or dissolve any incorporation formed under this act, bzit
such dissolution shall not take away or impair any remedy given
against any such corporation, its stockholders, or officers for any liability 'which shall have been previously incurred." And 4th. Chapter 282, laws of 1884, under which this corporation was organized,
giving it all the powers and privileges granted, and subject to all of
the liabilities imposed by chapter 140, laws of 1850, and the several
acts amendatory thereof, and further providing that "the legislature
may at any time alter, amend or repeal this act."
(Section 19.)
The constitution of 1846 for the first time introduced restrictions
upon the power of legislatures to grant special charters and required
that provisions for corporations, save in exceptional cases, should thereafter be made by general laws.
The obvious intent of the constitutional reservation was to remove anv doubt as to the power of the legislature to amend or repeal the laws, whether general or special,
authorized by that instrument for the formation of corporations, and
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seemed to leave the provisions of the revised statutes, in relation to
reserved power over charters, in full force and effect.
It will be observed that the constitution and the act of 1884 provides specially for the amendment and repeal of statutes alone, but
the revised statutes and the act of 1850 are addressed specially to the
subject of the annulment and repeal of charters created under such
statutes.
It seems to us that these provisions relate to different subjects, viz. :
The repeal of laws and the annulment of charters formed under such
laws, and that the power to do one does not naturally or properly include the power to do the other.
(Albany Northern R. R. Co. v.

if

agreed upon.
But even

it

a

a

a

if

is

It

it

it it,

Brownell, 24 N. Y. 345.)
Certainly the repeal of a law authorizing corporations would not
nor wonld the annulment of a
destroy organizations formed under
charter affect the law under which
was created.
Neither does
seem reasonable to suppose, while taking away the power of the legislature to create corporate bodies, the constitution intended to confer
power to destroy them, thus enabling them to accomplish indirectly
that which they were precluded from doing directly.
must be assumed that the framers of the constitution, as well as the legislature,
used the language employed by them intelligently and according to
its common and customary signification, and when they spoke of the
annulment and repeal of acts and laws alone, did not intend to embrace charters as well.
These two subjects have frequently been the
occasion of legislative action, and since the restrictions
upon the
no reason
powers of the legislature to grant special charters there
to suppose that they did not use the language employed in its literal
sense, and especially so when both subjects were immediately within
the contemplation of the lawmakers.
In considering this question, the provisions of the Revised Statutes
may be laid out of view, for
they contain any broader power than
the act of 1850, they must be deemed to have been repealed by the
The reservaprovisions of the latter act, as inconsistent therewith.
tions, therefore, which apply to this case are contained in the acts of
part of the railroad charter.
1850 and 1884, which constitute
These acts should be read and construed together, and, as thus considered, provide that the legislature may at any time alter, amend and
repeal these acts, and may also annul and dissolve charters formed
thereunder, but such dissolution shall not take away or impair any remedy against such corporation, its officers and trustees, for any liability
The contract proved between the corporation
previously incurred.
and the state was intended, in respect to
repeal of the charter, to
survive the dissolution of the corporation, and to determine the rights
of parties interested in the property, in the event of dissolution.
By
virtue of this contract the corporation secured rights subject to be
taken away under certain restrictions, and protected itself from any
consequences following
repeal of its charter, except those expressly
be conceded

that the constitutional

provisions place
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the right to repeal charters, as well as laws, beyond the power of legislatures to waive or destroy, the question still remains as to the effect
of such a repeal upon the franchises of the corporation, whether it
contemplates anything more than the extinction of the corporate life,
and consequent disability to continue business, and exercise corporate functions after that time, or has a wider scope and effect.
It may be assumed in this discussion that the authority of the legislature to repeal a charter, if it has expressed its intention to reserve
such power in its grant, constitutes a valid reservation.
Parties to a
contract may lawfully provide for its termination at the election of
either party, and it may, therefore, be conceded that the state had
authority to repeal this charter, provided no rights of property were
In speaking of the franchises of a corthereby invaded or destroyed.
poration we shall assume that none are assignable except by the
We must also be understood as
special authority of the legislature.
referring only to such franchises as are usually authorized to be transferred by statute, viz. : those requiring for their enjoyment the use of
corporeal property, such as railroad, canal, telegraph,
gas, water,
bridge and similar companies, and not to those which are in their
nature purely incorporeal and inalienable, such as the right of corporate life, the exercise of banking, trading and insurance powers, and
similar privileges. The franchises last referred to being personal in
character and dependent upon the continued existence of the donee
for their lawful exercise, necessarily expire with the extinction of corporate life, unless special provision is otherwise made. (People v. B.,
F. &C. I. R. Co., 89 N. Y. 75, 84; People v. Metz, 50 N. Y. 61.)
In the former class it has been held that at common law real estate
acquired for the use of a canal company could not be sold on execution against the corporation separate from its franchise, so as to destroy or impair the value of such franchise.
(Gue v. Tide Water
Canal Co., 24 How. (U. S.) 257), and by parity of reasoning it
must follow that the tracks of a railroad company, and the franchise
of maintaining and operating its road in a public street, are equally
inseparable, in the absence of express legislative authority providing
for their severance.
The statute of our state authorizing the sale of the franchise and
property of a railroad company on execution, seems to recognize the
indissolubility of the connection between the corporeal property, and
its incorporeal right of enjoyment.
It is also to be observed that in none of the provisions for repeal in
this state is there anything contained, which purports to confer power
to take away or destroy property or annul contracts, and the contention that the property of a dissolved corporation is forfeited, rests
wholly upon what is claimed to be the necessary consequence of the
We do not think the dissolution of a
extinction of corporate life.
It would not naturally seem to
corporation works any such effect.
have any other operation upon its contracts or property rights than
the death of a natural person upon his.
(Mumma v. Potomac Co.,
8 Pet. 281, 285.)
2 WIL. CAS.

17

1430

PEOPLE OF NEW YORK V. JOHN O'BRIEN.

459

The power to repeal the chatter of a corporation can not, upon any
legal principle, include the power to repeal what is in its nature irrepealable, or to undo what has been lawfully done under power lawfully conferred.
(Butler v. Palmer, i Hill, 324, 335.)
The authorities seem to be uniform to the effect that a reservation
of the right to repeal enables a legislature to effect a destruction of
the corporate life, and disable it from continuing its corporate business (People, ex reL, Kimball v. B. & A. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 569;
Philips v. Wickham, i Paige 590), and a reservation of the right to
alter and amend confers power to pass all needful laws for the regulation and control of the domestic affairs of a corporation, freed from
the restrictions imposed by the federal constitution upon legislation
impairing the obligation of contracts.
(Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S.
I2
3:)
US'
We think no well-considered case has gone further than this, while
in many cases such power has been expressly held to be limited to
In the language of Chief Justice Marshall in
the effect stated.
Fletcher v. Peck (6 Cranch 87, 135): "If an act be done under a
law, a succeeding legislature can not undo it. The past can not be
recalled by the most absolute power.
Conveyances have been made ;

those conveyances have vested legal estates, and if those estates may
be seized by the sovereign authority, still that they originally vested is
When, then, a law is in the
a fact, and can not cease to be a fact.
nature of a contract, when absolute rights have vested under that
contract, a repeal of the law can not divest those rights."
It would seem to be quite obvious that a power existing in the legislature by virtue of a reservation only, could not be made the foundation of an authority to do that which is expressly inhibited by the
constitution,
or afford the basis of a claim to increase jurisdiction
over the lives, liberty or property of citizens beyond the scope of express constitutional power.
Since the decision of the celebrated Trustees Dartmouth College v.
Woodward (4 Wheat. 518), the doctrine that a grant of corporate
powers by the sovereign, to an association of individuals, for public
use constitutes a contract, within the meaning of the federal constitution prohibiting state legislatures from passing laws impairing its obligations has, although sometimes criticised, been uniformly acquiesced in by the courts of the several states as the law of the land and
may be regarded as too firmly established to admit of question or dis(People v. Sturtevant, 9 N. Y. 263 ; Milhau v. Sharp, 27 N. Y.
pute.
611 ; Brooklyn Cent. R. Co. v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 32 Barb. 364.)
The intimation by Judge Story, in that case, that the rule might be
otherwise if the legislature should reserve the power of amending or repealing it led to the adoption by the legislature of the various states of
the practice of incorporating such reservations in acts of incorporation. Whatever may be the effect of such reservations it is immaterial
whether they are embraced in the act of incorporation or in general
In either case they operate
statutes or provisions of the constitution.
upon the contract according to the language of the reservation.
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(Morawetz on Corp. 464.) It is manifest, therefore, that in the absence of such reserved power legislatures have no authority to violate,
destroy or impair chartered rights and privileges, or power over corporations, except such as they possess by virtue of their legislative
authority over persons and property generally. It is obvious that this
reserved power does not, in any sense, constitute a condition of the
grant, and can not have effect as such, but is simply a power to put
an end to the contract with such effect upon the rights of the parties
(Sinking- Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700,
thereto as the law ascribes to it.
*
*
*
v.
Wall.
Tomlinson
454, 457.)
Jessup, 15
748;
(Quoting from opinions of Waite, Ch. J., and Bradley, J. , see
supra, p. 1405.)
In People v. National Trust Company (82 N. Y. 283, 287), the question was raised that a dissolved corporation was discharged from the
obligation to pay rent accruing upon a lease subsequent to its dissolution. Judge Rapallo said: "This claim is not founded upon the
allegation of any payment, release or surrender, or anything affecting
the merits of the claim, but upon the sole ground that by the dissolution of the corporation the lease was terminated and the covenant to
pay rent ceased to be obligatory. We do not regard the dissolution
as having any such effect.
Under the statutes of this state, on the
dissolution of a corporation, its assets become a trust fund for the
payment of its debts, and these include debts to mature as well as accrued indebtedness, and all engagements entered into by the corporation which have not been fully satisfied or canceled."
In Commonwealth v. Essex Company (13 Gray 239), Justice Shaw
"When, under power in a charter, rights have been acquired
said:
and become vested, no amendment or alteration of the charter can
take away the property or rights which have become vested under a
exercise of the powers granted."
(Albany R. Co. v.
legitimate
Brownell, 24 N. Y. 345.)
The case of City of Detroit v. Detroit and F. Plankroad Company (43 Mich. 140), is not only in point, but entitled to high consideration on account of the distinction as a constitutional lawyer of the
The question was
learned judge who wrote the opinion of the court.
whether the legislature had power to compel the defendant to remove its toll-gates from within the city limits after they had been lawfully placed there under the provisions of its charter. Judge Cooley
says:

"It

can not be necessary at this day to enter upon

a

discussion

in denial of the right of the government to take from either individuals or corporations any property which they may rightfully have acquired. In the most arbitrary times such an act was recognized as
pure tyranny, and it has been forbidden in England ever since Magna
Charta, and in this country always.
It is immaterial in what way
the property was lawfully acquired, whether by labor in the ordinary
avocations of life, by gift, or descent, or by making a profitable use
of a franchise granted by the state, it is enough that it has become
'
private property, and it is thus protected by the 'law of the land.'
And, finally, upon this branch of our subject, we are unable to see
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1850 does not express the rule by which
the question under discussion must be determined.
That section is
expressly made a part of the contract between the state and corporations organized thereunder, and specially provides for the effect which
an exercise of the reserved power of repeal by the state shall have
It shall not impair any remedy
upon the franchises of the company.
existing against the corporation, its directors or officers upon a liability previously incurred. This was the contract under which the dissolved corporation issued its stock, mortgaged its franchises, entered
Creditors, contractors
into traffic engagements and contracted debts.
and stockholders had a right to rely upon the promise of the state,
that the annulment of the corporate charter should hot affect the remedies existing in their favor against the corporation, and this promise
is a contract protected by the provisions of the federal constitution.
In the absence of any constitutional provisions prescribing the effect
of such repeal, it was competent for the legislature to declare what that
should be, and for the state to contract with reference to such a declaration. The right to repeal, as provided by the constitution, is fully
recognized by the act of 1850, and the effect of the exercise of the
power upon the rights of parties affected thereby is clearly defined.
We are, therefore, of opinion that the statute not only prescribes
the rule, creates the contract and regulates the rights of the parties
upon the exercise by the state of the power of repeal, but it also cor* *
rectly formulates the principle of law applicable to the situation. *
Co.,
(Commenting upon Greenwood v. Freight
105 U. S. 13,
supra, p. 1422; People v. Globe M. L. I. Co., 91 N. Y. 174; Erie,
etc., R. R. v. Casey, 26 Pa. St. 287, 301, infra, p. 1435.)
We are thus brought to the question of the right of succession to
the property of a dissolved corporation in the absence of any provision in the act of dissolution providing for such an event.
Sections 9 and 10, title 3, chapter 18, part i, Revised Statutes (pp.
132, 153, 7th ed.), seem to furnish a conclusive solution to the in" Section
quiry. They read as follows:
9. Upon the dissolution of
any corporation created or to be created, and unless other persons
shall be appointed by the legislature, or by some court of competent
authority, the directors or managers of the affairs of such corporation
at the time of its dissolution, by whatever name they may be known
in law, shall be the trustees of the creditors and stockholders of the
corporation dissolved, and shall have full power to settle the affairs of
the corporation, collect and pay the outstanding debts, and divide
among the stockholders the moneys and other property that shall remain after the payment of debts and other necessary expenses."
" Section 10. The persons so constituted trustees shall have authority
to sue for and recover the debts and property of the dissolved corporation * * * and shall be jointly and severally responsible to
the creditors and stockholders of such corporation to the extent of its
property and effects that shall come into their hands."
From these sections it would seem that upon the dissolution of this
corporation, its remaining trustees became vested with the title of its
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property, and responsible to its creditors and stockholders for the
value thereof.
By operation of law a vested right of action accrued
to all creditors and stockholders immediately on the dissolution against
such trustees for the value of all property, which did or might by the
This was a
exercise of reasonable diligence come into their hands.
once
after
it
attached
was
the
constitutional
which
beyond
liability
power of the legislature to release or discharge. (Dash v. Vankleeck,
Johns. 477.)
The evidence is undisputed that upon the dissolution, declared by
the legislature, the trustees took possession of the railroad property
and surrendered its operation to the mortgagees of such railroad. This,
in the absence of any objection on the part of creditors or stockholders, they had undoubted authority to do, and the possession of such
They unmortgagees thereafter was the possession of such trustees.
became
liable
for
the
value
of
such property to creditors
doubtedly
and stockholders by virtue of such possession, and their authority to
administer the assets of the corporation for the purpose of discharging such liability became fixed by the law existing at the time the liability was incurred. The cases in this state fully support these propositions. As was said by the chancellor in Kane v. Bloodgood (7
Johns. Ch. 90, 128): "The reasonable construction of the act is that
the trustees succeeded to all the rights and privileges of directors and
to the same means of defense."
In McLaren v. Pennington (i Paige 102), it was held, as stated in
the head note, that "where an act of incorporation is repealed, all the
property and rights of the corporation become vested in the directors
then in office, or in such persons as by law have the management of
the business of the corporation, in trust for the stockholders and creditors, unless the repealing law provides for the appointment of other
persons than the officers of the corporation as trustees."
In Heath v. Barmore (50 N. Y. 305), Judge Rapallo said: "Under the provisions of i Revised Laws 248, and i Revised Statutes
600, sections 9 and 10, upon the dissolution of a corporation, the directors or managers at that time become trustees of its property (unless some other custodian is appointed) for the purpose of paying the
debts of the corporation and dividing its property among its stockholders, and these provisions apply as well to the real estate as to the
Consequently, where lands are
personal property of corporations.
conveyed absolutely to a corporation having stockholders, no reversion or possibility of a reverter remains in the grantor."
Allen, J., in Central City Savings Bank v. Walker (66 N. Y.
428), speaking of the ownership of property and the property rights
" During the life of the corporation the body
of a corporation, said:
corporate was the legal owner, and upon the expiration of the charter
the legal title vested in the trustees in office, at the time, in trust, for
the creditors and stockholders."
There can be no valid distinction between property held in trust and
that owned by individuals in respect to the protection afforded to it by
The reason for its protection is equally strong in
the constitution.
7
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either case, and the inviolability of the title is in both cases beyond
the reach of legislative action.
(Trustees Dartmouth College v.

supra.)
It then remains for us to consider the validity of the provisions of
We are fully impressed
chapters 271 and 310 of the laws of 1886.

Woodward,

with the importance of this question, and the well-settled principles
of construction which require every statute to be so construed as to uphold its constitutionality, if that may be done by a fair and reasonable interpretation

of its language.

Another rule, equally well settled, precludes courts from inquiring
into the motives of legislatures in making laws, and to consider them
simply with reference to their legal effect upon the rights of persons
subjected to their operation.
If, however, upon such examination it is found that constitutional
rights will be invaded by the operation of the statute, it is the duty of
courts to protect them by declaring the invalidity of the statute.
Upon such examination we are of the opinion that chapter 271 of
Its provisions show a
and void.
the laws of 1886 is unconstitutional
from
the Broadway Surtake
naked and undisguised attempt to
away
its property and
creditors,
and
and
face Company,
its stockholders
of
New
York. The
benefit
thereof
the
bestow the
municipality
upon
of
held
the
consents
act attempts to preserve the validity
by the cordissolution,
its
and
directs
sale and
their
poration, notwithstanding
of
to
the
and
the
the
transfer
purchaser,
purchase-price to
payment

*
* *
the city.
The main argument presented to maintain the constitutionality of
this act, is the assertion that these consents do not constitute property
within the usual signification of that term.
We have considered that
do
and
not
with
the
claim.
In view of the fact that
question
agree
the statute expressly contemplates their sale, transfer and acquisition
by a purchaser, it would seem unnecessary to go further to prove the
fallacy of such a contention.
These remarks apply with equal force to chapter 310. *
As we have seen, the property of this corporation vested in the
persons who were its directors at the time of its dissolution.
They took
it as trustees for stockholders and creditors, and were not made parties to the action in which the receiver was appointed.
No legislation can authorize the appointment of a receiver of the property of
A. in an action against C., without violating the provisions of the constitution in relation to the taking of property without due process of
law. That the legislature might amend the provisions of the revised
statutes in relation to the devolution of property of dissolved corporations is indisputable, and if it had done so in the act of dissolution,
or previously, it would undoubtedly have prevented the vesting of the
property in trustees ; but this it did not do, and it had no authority,
by mere force of legislative enactment, to take vested property from
one individual or trustee and give it to another.
(McLaren v. Pennington, supra; Trustees Dartmouth College v. Woodward, supra.)
Complaint dismissed.
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ANDREWS and EARL,
, concur in the result upon these grounds:
(i) The annulling act is constitutional and valid, and its effect was
only to take the life of the corporation. (2) All the property of the
corporation, including its street franchises and its mortgages and valid
contracts, including what are caHed the traffic contracts with other
railway companies, survived.
(3) The act chapter 271 is unconstitutional. (4) That act and the act chapter 310 are'parts of the same
scheme adopted by the legislature for the purpose of winding up the
affairs of the corporation and disposing of and distributing its property.
The main features of the latter act are unconstitutional and void, and
thus so much of the legislative scheme has failed that there is not
enough left to save the whole act from condemnation.
(5) As the
latter act is thus wholly void, and this action is founded and depends
no warrant for its maintenance
there
and, therefore,
solely upon
the judgment should be reversed and complaint dismissed.
concur.

Judgment accordingly.
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[Bill by the railroad company to enjoin Casey from taking possession of its road, under an act of 1855 repealing and annulling the
charter, and authorizing the governor of the state to appoint
person
to take charge and custody of the railroad.
The company was charrailroad, which was duly contered in 1842, with power to build
structed and in operation, nearly $750,000 having been expended
thereon
that because of an authorized change of gauge in the tracks,
the city of Erie had revoked its license to use the streets thereof, and
had extended its line to the borough of Erie at
after an injunction
an additional expense of $50,000.
The charter provided that the use
of streets should not be obstructed, and also "
the said company
misuse or abuse any of the privileges hereby granted, the legislature
may resume the rights and privileges granted to said company."]
The Erie and North-East Railroad Company was inin 1842.
The charter was repealed at the last session of

J.

BLACK,

1

it

corporated
the legislature, and the governor was authorized to appoint some suitable person to take charge of the road which the company had built,
in good running order and repair, for the use of the puband keep
lic. The defendant was appointed under this provision of the repealing law, and he avows his intention to take possession of the road acTo obcordingly, unless prevented by the injunction of this court.
Statement

abridged.

opinion of Lowrie,
J., omitted.

Arguments, part of opinion of Black, J., concurring
of Lewis, C. J., and Woodward,

J., and dissenting opinion
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a

;
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is

it

is

is

a

a

it
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it,

If the company be
tain such an injunction is the object of this bill.
we
an
may protect it in this form of
threatened with
illegal injury,
be
If
the
defendant
justified by law, the complaint must
proceeding.
be dismissed.
What the defendant means to do is to execute the plain mandate of
the supreme law-making power of the state ; to carry into effect an
This act, if it be law at all,
act of assembly, passed in regular form.
If,
law
on
the
all
other
to
is paramount
subject, and must be obeyed.
then
wholly
however, the legislature had no pouoer to pass
as
the place
occupies on the statute
void, and we must regard
blank.
book were
statute void, and to arrest
The right of the judiciary to declare
coupled with
one which, in the opinion of all courts,
its execution
in very
be
exercised
never
to
that
except
so
grave
responsibilities
bound to presume
clear cases one department of the government
The party who wishes us to prothat another has acted rightly.
nounce
law unconstitutional takes upon himself the burden of
so.
proving, beyond all doubt, that
unconstitutional merely
It
also very well settled that no statute
not enough to prove
because
wrong in policy or principle.
or
that
to
sound
public
morality
injurious to private
contrary
rights.
Inconsistency with rules of law or principles of equity will
direct collision
not make
void. Nothing will have that effect but
between its provisions and those of the federal or state constitution.
For this proposition
have no authority or reasons to offer beyond
what are already on record in the case of Sharpless v. The City of

contract

between

It

the state and the corporators.

is

cepted,

a

a

I,

a

9

Harris 147.
Philadelphia,
The plaintiff's counsel assert that the act of 1855, under which the
defendant proposes to take the railroad into his possession, impairs
contract.
The constitution of the United States
the obligation of
section
and
that
of
10),
Pennsylvania (Art. IX, section 10),
(Art.
forbid the making of any law impairing the obligation of contracts.
An act granting corporate privileges to body of men is, when acnot

the people.

It

is

is

worth while now to try whether this doctrine will stand the test of
original principles. It sustained by everything that we are bound to
regard as authority by the decisions of all the courts in the country, by
the opinion of the legal profession and by the general acquiescence of
not denied by the defendant or his counsel, or by anyit

is

it

a

a

body else who has attempted to sustain the action of the legislature in
this case.
can not be rescinded by the act of one
Being contract,
A grant of corporate privileges
party without the consent of the other.
for specified period can not be resumed by the state within such period.
If the charter be without limitations as to time
forever irrepealable.
It does not follow from this that corporations are beyond the reach
of public control.
When the privileges they enjoy are fraudulently

a

abused, the courts may pronounce them forfeited.
In some cases,
also, the legislature, when granting the franchises, reserves to itself
the right to revoke them.
When the charter contains such
stipula-
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tion, it is as much a part of the contract as anything else that is in it.
The legislative repeal of such a charter bears no resemblance to the
They
judgment of a court against a corporation on a quo ivarranto.
proceed upon principles as different as the functions of the legislature
If the power to repeal be
are different from those of the judiciary.
reserved, its exercise is merely carrying out the contract according to
its terms ; and the state is using her own rights ; not forfeiting those

of the company.
The power to repeal is sometimes reserved absolutely, so that the

franchises of the corporation may be revoked whenever the legislature
shall think proper. It is sometimes reserved conditionally; to be exThe event may be
ercised only in case a certain event shall happen.
one which the corporators could not control, or it may be such a one
In either case
as could not occur without some default of their own.
the charter is repealable when the event happens.
In the charter now under consideration, the following clause occurs:
*'If the said company abuse or misuse any of the privileges hereby
granted, the legislature may resume the rights granted to the said company." This was a reservation of the right to repeal the charter in
If it was violated, then the repeal was not
case it should be violated.
breaking the bargain but keeping it; not impairing, but enforcing
the obligation of the contract.
The plaintiffs' counsel insist that inasmuch as the right to repeal
depended on matter of fact, the right could not be exercised until the
fact was ascertained by a judicial trial. But if this were not a misWhen the abuse of a chartake the reservation would be nugatory.
ter is judicially ascertained, the corporation will be dissolved without
the intervention of the legislature, and the court could not decide the
fact to be true without pronouncing the judgment of forfeiture.
The
legislature certainly meant to reserve something more than the right
The
to dissolve the corporation after it shall be dissolved by a court.
power to kill what is already dead is no power at all. The argument
of the plaintiffs on this point is altogether unsustained by authority.
There are several cases directly against it. In Crease v. Babcock
(23 Pick. 234), the supreme court of Massachusetts said, that when
the legislature reserved to itself the right to repeal a charter on the
happening of a certain event, they might enact the repeal whenever
the event happened ; it was not a reservation of judicial power.
To
the same effect is McLaren v. Pennington (i Paige 107) ; and in the
Miners' Bank v. The United States (i Greene 561), it was held, not
only that the fact, on which the right of repeal depended, might be
noticed by the legislature without the assistance of the judiciary, but
that its truth could never afterwards be questioned by any court.
Without intending to indorse the whole doctrine of the last-mentioned
case, we are very clear that the right to repeal vests in, and may be
exercised by, the legislature whenever the event occurs upon which
The most that can be said is, that the
they stipulated for the right.
If the corporators desire
repeal is void if it comes before the event.
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to contest the validity of the repealing act in court, they must at least
prove that the event did not occur.
This view of the subject makes it important that we should see
whether the privileges of this company were abused or misused. Did
We are obliged, as the case now
the corporators violate the charter?
For that answer
stands, to answer this question in the affirmative.
we have three reasons, either of which would be sufficient without the
In t\\ejirst place, we are bound to take an act of the assemothers.
In the absence of
bly to be constitutional until the contrary is shown.
evidence, we presume the existence of every fact on which the validity
of the law depends.
Secondly: the plaintiff's bill does not aver that
they performed their duties according to the terms of the charter ; and
this they certainly would have averred if they could safely have done
so.
Thirdly : a record of this court is referred to in the bill and produced in evidence, from which it appears that a decree was pronounced
against them for fixing their terminus at a place not authorized, and
for locating their road on streets and other highways in a manner expressly forbidden.
It is said that the repeal can be justified only if the violation of the
But the right is given to repeal not for a willful,
charter was willful.
The word -willful is not in the reservabut for any abuse or misuse.
tion, and we can not insert it by construction.
But suppose it to be
in.
Is not any positive violation of the charter, which might have
been avoided, a willful misuse and abuse of it? They were not
forced to lay out their road contrary to the plain directions of the law.
Neither can we believe it to have been a mere blunder. The difference between what they were required to do and what they did do
was too obvious and too important to be overlooked by men who
*
*
*
could read and understand English.
But we are now dealing with an act of assembly which, if it be
valid, is the paramount law of the subject to which it relates.
It
rides down and nullifies all other laws which are inconsistent with it.
Perhaps this is the very first argument that ever was made to show
that a statute was void because it conflicted with a rule of the common law.
To change the common law and repeal earlier statutes is
the main if not the only business which the legislature has to perform.
A statute may be valid, no matter how inconsistent it is with the doctrine of estoppel, unless the doctrine of estoppel be a part of the constitution, which it certainly is not.
When we are inquiring what the
can
are
do,
we
not helped a particle by being told what a
legislature
court -would do.
When we are considering whether a statute ought
to be obeyed or disregarded it is very unsatisfactory to be informed
how the law stood a hundred years before the statute was passed.
Judges and chancellors have established certain rules of proceeding
for their own guidance in the distribution of justice among suitors.
One of these rules is, that a party in certain cases shall not be permitted to aver the truth ; and this is called an estoppel.
But the legislature is not restricted by it.
The general assembly can make and
unmake all rules of practice, pleading and evidence at its pleasure,
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The power that makes the law must, in its nature and essence, be so
totally different from the power which administers the law that it is
The limitations on
most illogical to reason from one to the other.
the legislative power of the state are not to be found in the general
body of the law, but only in the constitution itself, which is the lex
legurn, or law of laws.
We must, therefore, fall back upon the constitution, to see whether
there is anything there to prohibit the legislature from passing the act
in question.
That instrument declares that no law shall be made imof contracts.
This charter was a contract ;
the
obligation
pairing
but one of its terms was, that it might be repealed if it should be
The corporators did abuse and misuse
and
abused or misused.
Did the
thus they placed themselves in the mercy of the legislature.
atonement, which they were compelled to make for their default, restore them again to the condition in which they would have remained
charter, irrepealable
they had never been guilty of it? They had
were
would
and
independent of the legislature.
obey
they
they
But they fell from that estate by disobedience, and their charter became repealable.
become irrepealable again when they were
Did
forced by this court to undo the wrong they had committed?
These corporators have suffered at the hands of the legislature nothing but what they expressly agreed to suffer in certain contingency.
That contingency has literally come to pass. Their privileges have
been abused and misused.
But they insist that the penance they were
forced to undergo ought to be accepted in place of the obedience
which they promised. That
not in the bargain
and since they
stand upon their contract, we do not see how we can give them more
than what
The legislature agreed to disarm itself
there set down.
of he repealing power on condition that the corporators would remain and abide within their charter
when they went out of
the
condition was broken. The fact that they left the path of duty
not
disproved by the other fact that they afterwards returned to it. Nor
their case at all helped by showing that they were driven back unTheir independence of legislative control
der the lash of
court.
was to be
not of guilt, followed by reconsequence of innocence

it,

a

a

a

is

is

*

*

*
pentance and restitution.
not
We think the construction we have given to this reservation
in aconly required by the established rules of interpretation, but
cordance with the most liberal intent that can be ascribed to the legislature in making it.
Men who are capable of abusing privilege
conferred on them by the special favor of the state are unworthy to
have it.
The state had right to test the prudence of her bounty by
this standard
to fix her own locus penitentice
to try the grantees of
the privilege and see whether they would behave themselves well.
She kept in her hands the short, sharp remedy of repeal, to be applied
whenever the conduct of the corporation would demonstrate that
The error was to be repaired by the same body
remedy was needed.
For
that committed
at any time after the error was ascertained.
the same offense the charter might have been forfeited on quo -war-
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ranto, but another mode of reparation was adopted for the very reason that the state did not choose to undergo the risk and embarrassShe would not have the mament, and delay of a judicial trial.
her and her rights.
She did
between
chinery of a court interposed
the
of
at
and
game
special
judges
not desire to play with lawyers
pleading. She was unwilling to go for justice to a place where esShe would retain
toppels might prevent her from asserting the truth.
from
all
but those imfree
restraints
the right of legislative repeal
would
not
the charter.
else
she
or
constitution,
grant
posed by the
it
when
such
was
to
the stipuintend
did
not
obey
If the corporators
to
was
as
well
as
wickedness
it
disobedience,
for
folly
lated penalty

it

it

it

it

a

it

it

it

it

it

is

a

it

a

it

a

a

it,

accept it.
The authority given by the act of October, 1855, to the defendant
to take possession of the railroad is asserted by the plaintiff's counsel
a taking of private property for public
to be an act of confiscation
If this be true, the injunction ought to
use without compensation.
be awarded, for no legislature can do such a thing under our constitution. When a corporation is dissolved by a repeal of its charter,
the legislature may appoint, 'or authorize the governor to appoint, a
person to take charge of its assets for the use of the creditors and
stockholders ; and this is not confiscation any more than it is confiscation to appoint an administrator to a dead man, or a committee for a
lunatic. But money, or goods, or lands, which are or were the private property of- a defunct corporation, can not be arbitrarily seized
for the use of the state without compensation paid or provided for.
This act, however, takes nothing but the road. Is that private propCertainly not. It is a public highway, solemnly devoted by
erty?
law to the public use. When the lands were taken to build it on
they were taken for public use ; otherwise they could not have been
taken at all.
It is true the plaintiffs had a right to take tolls from all
who traveled or carried freight on
according to certain rates fixed
in the charter, but that was
mere franchise
privilege derived enwas gone when the charter was retirely from the charter, and
The state may grant to
pealed.
corporation, or to an individual,
the franchise of taking tolls on any highway, opened or to be opened,
whether
be
railroad or river, canal or bridge, turnpike or common
load. When the franchise ceases by its own limitation, by forfeiture
or by repeal, the highway
thrown back on the hands of the state,
and
becomes her duty, as the sovereign guardian of the public
She may renew the franchise,
rights and interests, to take care of it.
to some other person, exercise
give
herself, or declare the highIf the railway itself was the
way open and free to all the people.
remains theirs and they
private property of the stockholders, then
without
on
charter as other people use their own run
may use
their own account
close
or open
charge what tolls they please
when they think proper disregard every interest except their own.
The repeal of charters on such terms would be courted by every railroad company in the state, for
would have no effect but to emancipate them from the control of law, and convert their limited privi-
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On this principle a corporaleges into a broad, unbounded license.
tion might be rewarded, but never punished, for misconduct. Repeal
of its charter, instead of bringing it to a shameful end, would put
"length of days in its right hand, and in its left hand riches and
honor." But it is not so. Railroads made by the authority of the
commonwealth upon land taken under her right of eminent domain,
for the commerce that
and established by her laws as thoroughfares
No corporation has
passes through her borders, are her highways.
any property in them, though corporations
may have franchises annexed to and exercisable within them.
Such a franchise the plaintiffs had, but they have it no longer.
The right to take tolls on a road is an incorporeal hereditament, which
may be granted to a corporation or to an individual, and the grantee
But what estate? The estate endures
has an estate in the franchise.
forever, if the charter be perpetual ; for years, if it be given for a limited period ; and at will, if it be repealable at the pleasure of the legislature.
This corporation, after its privileges were abused, had an
estate at will, and the commonwealth chose to demand repossession.
That terminated the estate as completely as an estate for years would
be terminated after the expiration of the term.
The grant was exhausted, the corporation lived its time out.
Its lease of life was expressly limited, at the day of its creation, to the period when the legislature should dissolve it for misconduct.
When the legislative will
was spoken, its hour had come.
Having no right to keep the franchises any longer, it would be absurd to claim compensation for taking them away. To say that the stockholders have a right to compensation for the franchises, because they are wrongfully taken, and
that they were wrongfully taken because they have a right to comIf the stockpensation, would be reasoning in a very vicious circle.
holders had a right to retain the franchises, the charter could not be
If they had no right
repealed at all, with or without compensation.
to retain them, they have no claim to compensation.
A brief recapitulation of the main points in the case may serve to
make the grounds of our judgment somewhat plainer:
I. This charter was granted with a reservation of the right to rethe franchises should be abused or misused.
peal
II. We are satisfied that, in point of fact, those franchises were
abused and misused.
III. After that event happened, the general assembly was invested
with full power to repeal the charter, and the corporators held their
franchises from the state merely as tenants at will, in the same manner as
there had been an unconditional reservation of the right to
repeal.
IV. After the interest of the corporators had been thus cut down
by their own misconduct to an estate at will, the legislature only could
enlarge the charter, so as to make
perpetual grant, or put the corporators on another term of probation.
V. The judicial proceedings against the corporation did not and
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could not disarm the legislature of its reserved right to repeal, nor
enlarge the estate of the corporation in its franchises, nor change the
terms of the original grant, for these are things which the judiciary
can not do, nor the executive either.
VI. The power of the legislature is not restricted by the rules of
pleading and evidence which the courts have adopted; and therefore
the state may act in the legislature upon a truth which she would have
been estopped to show in a court if the legislature had not interfered.
VII. The power to repeal for abuse of corporate privileges is a
different right from that of demanding a judicial sentence of forfeiture, and is reserved for the very reason that it may afford a remedy
when a quo ivarranto would not.
VIII. The charter being constitutionally repealed, the franchises
are, as a necessary consequence, resumed to the state, and the road
remains what it always was
public property.
IX. The corporators can not be entitled to compensation, for they
had no property in the road, and after their default they held the
corporate franchises at the will of the legislature, and the exertion of
that will, in the resumption of the franchise, did them no injury but
*
* *
what they agreed to submit to.
(Upon a rehearing, concerning abuse and forfeiture, Black, J. , con-

tinued) :
There is nothing profound or mystical about these words. They
The popular sense in which they
are not terms of art in the law.
To abuse is compounded of ab and
are used every day is well known.
utor ; and in strictness it signifies to injure, diminish in value, or wear
Catiline abused the patience of the
away, by using improperly.
Roman senate. A man abuses his constitution by excesses which
impair vigor. A judge abuses his office, not only by taking bribes,
but by any misconduct which detracts from its dignity and usefulness.
To abuse the freedom of the press, or the right of debate, is a phrase
from which we take a perfectly definite idea. We know very well
what is meant when it is said that legislative authority or executive
power has been abused.
Why, then, are we expected not to know
that a corporate privilege has been abused, when we see it used as a
color and a pretext for that which the law pronounces a wrong and
injury to the public? Misuse is a still simpler word. It signifies
He who would prove that any power has not
merely to use amiss.
been misused must show that it has been always used rightly, or else
not used at all.
But I admit that these words, like all others, may have different
meanings, when spoken with reference to different subjects.
Acts
which would be an abuse of one thing may be no abuse of another.
We are therefore to ascertain precisely what is abuse or misuse of
Abuse includes misuse.
corporate privileges by a company.
We
take them both together and define them thus :
Any positive act in
violation of the charter, and in derogation of public right, willfully
done or caused to be done by those appointed to manage the general
concerns of the corporation.
Let us analyze this definition.
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I. The illegal act must be positive. A mere omission, like the
failure of a bank to make its annual returns, is not enough.
Nonuse
2. A disregard
of the
is a different thing from abuse or misuse.
charter which is injurious only to private interests, and which therefore admits of private compensation, is not, I think, within the fair
meaning of the words. It must be some misconduct which infringes
upon a right reserved by the state for the benefit of the public.
3. It
must be willful; that is, not involuntary, accidental, or the conseBut I mean mistake of fact. Every man
quence of mere mistake.
is bound to know the law.
Especially are the grantees of a privilege
like this bound to know the law which limits and defines its extent.
They bargained to obey the charter, not as they and their successors
might happen to understand it, but according to its true intent and
If we could allow them to have an advantage from their
meaning.
own errors of interpretation, then every grant of corporate privileges
must be measured not by the terms of the grant itself, but by the ignoA power not large when understandingly adrance of the grantees.
ministered, might become enormous in the hands of dunces ; and the
dimensions of the same charter would dilate and contract in proportion to the degree of intelligence that each new set of directors would
So high a premium for ignorance would cause
bring to the business.
it to be feigned sometimes, when it does not exist.
The rule is a
wise one which conclusively presumes that the managers of railroad
companies, like everybody else, understand the law which prescribes
their duties.
4. It can not be said that the company has been guilty
of abuse and misuse every time a subordinate officer or agent transgresses the act of incorporation, without authority, express or imIt is not sufficient, for instance,
plied, from the board of directors.
of
own
head
his
should charge an exorbitant fare.
that a conductor
But if the directors should establish a tariff of tolls greater than the
law allows, and compel the public to pay them, this would be a manifest abuse.

The plaintiffs have set up no excuse for their misconduct, except
that they did not understand the act of incorporation.
This is wholly
in point of law.
As a matter of fact, it is more than
-inadmissible
doubtful.
The act of incorporation fixed their terminus at the borough
of Erie. They knew exactly where this was in 1842, when they got
It is hard to see how anything but willful blindness
the charter.
could make them believe that a subsequent change in the limits of the
borough, and its erection into a city, was an extension of their charBut allowing this to pass, what can be said for their obstruction
ter.
of roads and streets? They could not misread the command on that
The same clause forbids them to take down a dwellingsubject.
house, or run through a grave-yard.
They could shut their eyes as
They had the
easily on the whole as on a part of the prohibition.
There was time enough
charter six years before they struck a blow.
for deliberation and consultation.
Then they used it as a color for
the commission of public wrongs, which it expressly forbade.
They
lived in the guilt of these wrongs, and in the daily repetition of them,

1444

FLINT

&

FENTONVILLE,

ETC., ROAD V. WOODHULL.

461

for six years more, and yielded at last only to the power of an inTo say now that all this was involuntary, accidental; a
junction.

mere innocent blunder, is not a defense but an offense.
There is not the faintest resemblance between. the forfeiture and the
repeal of a charter, except that dissolution of the corporation is a conOne is a legislative, and the other a judicial act.
sequence of both.
The power of the legislature and the power of the court are based on
different foundations: are bestowed for different purposes, depend on
different principles, are exercised in different ways, and their acts are
The right of repeal (if it be revalid or void for different reasons.
of
the
the corporators have in the
a
limitation
estate
which
is
served)
franchises; forfeiture takes away the franchises, whatever may be the
The commonwealth can come into one of her
extent of the grant.
courts and claim a forfeiture only when there is no rule of law to forbid it; but a charter may be repealed without regard to the law, unless it be protected by some specific prohibition of the constitution.
The law in some cases will enable a corporation, which is arraigned
on a quo ivarranto to keep the truth away from the court, by pleading
estoppel ; but the constitution does not forbid the legislature to know
Courts, it is said, lean
and act upon the truth in any case, whatever.
against forfeitures ; and this is perhaps truer than it ought to be ; but
the legislative department of the government, when it has the control
of a corporation, must be allowed to lean as it pleases.
The annals
of jurisprudence do not show that these two things have ever been
confounded before.
Nor will it do to say that the facts and legal principles now invoked
to save this corporation are part of the contract.
The contract made
the right of repeal dependent on the fact of misuse or abuse alone.
If there was misuse or abuse, the repeal merely enforced the contract.
It is alleged that, since the contract was made and broken, certain other things have been done which puts the parties in a new relation, and forbids the enforcement of the contract.
It is unreasonable
and contradictory in terms to say that what estops a party from setting
up or claiming under a contract is, or can be, a part of the same con*
*
*
tract.
Injunction denied, Lewis, C. J., and Woodward, J., dissenting.

Sec. 461.
See
112,

Same.

Flint and Fentonville Plank Road v. Woodhull,

supra, p. 398.
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[Suit to enforce the statutory liability of shareholders in a plank
road company, incorporated in 1851 under a general incorporation
In 1853 judgment
law of 1847, and providing a statutory liability.
was obtained against the company, and no property being found this
proceeding was taken. It was maintained by the defendants that since
the general act of 1847 had been repealed, the liability of shareholdThe court below ruled otherwise.]
ers was gone.
*
* We can not concur in that position of
*
WOODWARD, J.
the defendants, which maintains that the repeal of the act of 1847 took
We should not hold that this destroyed the coraway the liability.
that
it
took
poration
away all its rights by causing it to cease as a
that its obligations, or those of its
therefore,
nor,
body corporate,
The act of 1847, with the articles
members, were blotted out.
constituted its charter;
adopted by a company organizing under
the same as
charter granted by the
and they were, in relation to
of
The
the
act
was
but
as a
general assembly.
repeal
repeal of
as
to
the
rule of future organizations, but not
This
was
repeal
past.
private corporation, and its existence could no more be taken away
by the repeal of the general law than could that of one incorporated
by private act, in which there w ere no provisions to that effect by the
The corporation still existed under that act, and
repeal of such act.
that was the law of its existence.
This would seem to be the necessary construction, upon principle,
in order to avoid an infringement upon well-established rules, in relation to private corporations and private rights but the last section of
the general incorporation act, and
chapter 43 of the code, which
which went into force July i, 1851, seems to conclude this question
intended to affect the
by providing that " nothing herein contained
interests of companies already organized further than
above exenacted that corporations already expressed." In this chapter
isting may bring themselves under the provisions of the code by
taking certain steps for that purpose and manifesting that design. But
this company did not take any steps to bring itself under the law of
continued under that of 1847, and this
the
1851, and, therefore,
*
*
law by which
to be judged.
Reversed upon other grounds.
Note.
See next case. See, also, 1899, Watson Seminary v. County Court
of Pike Co., 149 Mo. 57, 45 L. R. A. 675.
Statement abridged. Part of opinion omitted.
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Same.
WILSON

1859.

AND

v.

TESSON AND ANOTHER.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA.

12

1

Ind. Rep. 285-302.

PERKINS, J. * * * The general banking law of 1852, under
which the bank of the capital was organized, contained this provision:
".The legislature may at anytime alter or repeal this act," i R. S.,
It was in the power then of the legislature to terminate
p. 160,
32.
the existence of banks, created under said act, at its pleasure ; as it
will scarcely be denied that a repeal of the law would work such
termination.

The right to bank

as a corporation was a franchise granted by the
when the franchise was taken away the right ceased.
And if the legislature could unconditionally terminate the existence of
the banks by a repeal of the law, it could impose conditions upon
*
*
*
which they might continue to exist.
In 1855 the legislature did repeal the banking law of 1852 ; for that
body amended that law by substituting a new act covering all of the
*
*
*
ground of the act of 1852, and also much additional.
It was as if the legislature had first expressly repealed the banking
law of 1852, and then enacted the law of 1855.
On the repeal of the
act of 1852, the powers of the banks organized under it to do business
The
ceased, unless the statute provided otherwise.
as corporations
State Bank v. The State, i Blackf. 267; Ang. and Ames on Corp.,
2d ed., pp. 128, 667.
The statute did provide otherwise.
The 48th section of the act
of 1855 reads thus: " Every bank or banking association, organized
under the provisions of the general banking law of this state may, in
case it shall, immediately after the passage of this act, pay all its circulating notes in coin, upon demand, have until the first day of March,
See, also, i
1857, to wind up, or accept the provisions of this act."
R. S., p. 240, 6. * * *
The bank of the capital having failed to comply with the requirements of the act of 1855, had no power to do general banking business in its corporate
We say
capacity, after it came into force.
It is contended by the
nothing of its power as a private association.
appellees that its powers continued till a forfeiture was judicially declared.
This is not correct. In cases of corporations in whose charter no power of repeal is reserved, and a forfeiture is claimed for
misuser or non-user, the doctrine of judicially declared forfeiture apThe State v. The Vincennes University, 5 Ind. 77.
It has no
plies.
power
to
of
of
cases
a deprivation
application
by a legislative repeal,
in the exercise of an unconditional right reserved.
The officers of
the bank, in this case, then, having assumed to make a contract, in
their capacity as such, which they had no power to make, the stock* * *
holders are not liable upon it as corporators.
jn.eversea.
Reversed.

legislature

Note.

annexed to this case.
and part of opinion omitted.
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Sec. 464.

Legislative power to amend.

(2)

1

Where there is no reservation of a power to alter
offer of an amendment.
or amend,

(a)

McSHERRY, J.,
1892.
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IN

JACKSON,

GOVERNOR, ET AL. v.

WALSH.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND.
304-317, on page 316.

75

Md. Rep.

An act of assembly, amending an irrepealable charter, is void only
when it attempts to vary the contract without the consent of the other
But, like any other contract, an irrepealable charter
party thereto.
Hence a
may be altered by the agreement of both the parties to it.
legislative enactment that would without acceptance be invalid, becomes, when accepted by the corporation, perfectly valid and bindThe
ing the act and the acceptance constituting a new contract.
acceptance gives effect to that which would otherwise be inoperative.
This is true in all cases where the only ground of objection to the
statute is that it seeks to amend without previous assent an irrepealable charter.
Standing alone, such an act would be nugatory, but
coupled with an acceptance, actual or implied, it would be valid. An
act of assembly which is absolutely and unconditionally void can not
be made valid by consent.
If the legislature has transcended the
limits of its defined power, acquiescence will not aid its invalid enactment.
But an amendment of an irrepealable charter is not absolutely void it is only conditionally so. It is void provided it be not
accepted or acquiesced in.
See note,

Sec. 465.

473,

infra.

Same.

Acceptance is essential.

See Ashton v. Burbank et al. , 2 Dillon 435, supra, p. 87; Commonwealth v. Cullen, 13 Pa. St. 133, supra, p. 417; Hawthorne v.
Calef, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 10, supra, p. 752; Ireland v. The Palestine,
etc., Turnpike Co., 19 O. S. 369, supra, p. 757.
See note,

473, infra.
As to distinction between repeal, revoke, alter and amend,
Del.
, 46 Atl. Rep.
mington City R. Co. v. Wilmington,
1

see 1900,
12.

Wil-
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amendment requires unanimous con-

sent.

STEVENS

v.

THE RUTLAND AND BURLINGTON RAILROAD COMPANY. 1

IN CHANCERY, CHITTENDEN COUNTY, VERMONT.
dix, 29 Vt. Rep. 545-566.

1851.

Appen-
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In this case the R. & B. R. Company were incorporated by an act
of the legislature, passed in 1843, for the purpose of building a railroad "from some point at Burlington, thence southwardly through
the counties of Addison, Rutland, and Windsor or Windham to some
point on the west bank of Connecticut river." This road they constructed in accordance with the provisions of their charter, and the
legislature then (in 1850) passed an additional act authorizing them
to extend their road '"from their present terminus in Burlington
northwardly," etc., " to any point or points in the town of Swanton,
in the county of Franklin," which act the company voted to accept as
an amendment to their charter and were proceeding to carry out its
To this amendment, and to the acceptance of it by a mapurpose.
jority of the stockholders, and to the proposed action of the corporathe complainant, who had previously become a member
tion under
of the corporation by subscribing and paying for five shares of its
capital stock did not assent, and brought his bill in chancery to enjoin
the company from building the proposed extension.
*
The question is, can the orator, upon
BENNETT, CH.
such
state of facts, claim, at the hands of the chancellor, his injunction.
It an admitted principle that in partnerships, and joint stock associations, they can not by vote of the majority change or alter their
fundamental articles of co-partnership or association against the will
an express or implied
of the minority, however small, unless there
provision in the articles themselves that they may do it. It
equally
well settled that court of chancery will, upon the application of an
individual member of partnership, or joint stock association, restrain,
by injunction, the majority from using the funds or pledging the credit
of the partnership or association in business not warranted, and not
within the scope of their fundamental articles of agreement.
Courts
of equity treat such proceedings by
majority as a fraud upon the
other members, which they will neither sanction nor permit.
To prevent the commission of fraud, by injunction, has been one of the earliest and most appropriate heads of equity jurisdiction, as well as to
relieve against
It was upon this principle that
when committed.
Lord Eldon, when high chancellor, upon the application of humble
individual member of a company, which had been organized for the
fire and life insurance business, restrained
purpose of carrying on
a

1

Statement taken from syllabus. Part of opinion omitted.
was acquiesced in, and was not taken to
higher court.

The decision
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the company, by injunction, from embarking also in the marine insurance business; though the applicant had paid into the funds of the
company only one hundred and fifty pounds as a deposit upon fifteen
shares, and the company gotten up by the Rothschilds of England,
and composed of six or seven hundred individuals, with a capital of
See Natusch v. Irving and others ; Gow on
five millions sterling.
Part. Appendix 576. The same principle was applied to a corporation by the vice-chancellor, and by Lord Chancellor Brougham in the
case of Ware v. The Grand Junction Water Company, 2 Rus. &
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The vice-chancellor,
Mylne, 470, S. C. 13 Cond. Ch. Rep. 126.
shareholder,
of
a
restrained
the corporasingle
the
application
upon
tion, not only from embarking their funds and credit in a matter beyond the provisions of their charter, but also from applying to parliament for a change in the charter which would warrant it. The change
desired to be made in that case was, that the company might be enabled to get their supply of water by means of an aqueduct from the
river Colne instead of the river Thames, as authorized to do under
Lord Brougham, on appeal, dissolved that
their original charter.
it
is true, which restrained the company from
of
the
part
injunction,
for
an alteration of the charter in the particuto
parliament
applying
lar desired, but retained the residue of it. So in Cunliff v. The Manchester & Bolton Canal Company, 13 Cond. Equity Rep. 131, note,
the vice-chancellor restrained the corporation, upon the application of
from applying to parliament for a change in their chara shareholder,
enable
them
to convert a portion of their canal into a railway,
ter, to
from
and
applying any of the corporate funds to the proposed object.
It was well conceded, in the argument on the defense, that if the
corporation had been about to proceed to a construction of the contemplated extension without the act of 1850, it would have been a
The only question which can be open
proper case for an injunction.
to debate is, as to what shall be the effect of the act of 1850, and a
subsequent adoption of the act by the corporation, upon the individual rights of a shareholder who does not assent to its adoption.
If
no equity in this bill.
bound by
there
It is, and must be admitted, that the legislature has no constitutional
be
power, unless
reserved in the grant, to change or alter an act of incorporation without consent, and thereby cast upon the company new and additional
obligations, or take from them rights guarantied under the original
And, indeed, this the legislature have not attempted to do.
charter.
It
also equally true that
part of the law of corporations that
But
to be rethey act according to the voice of the majority.
not
membered, that this
suit in which the plaintiff seeks to protect himself in any corporate right, but in his own individual right,
growing out of the fact of his having become
corporator by his subOne
scription and its payment, to the capital stock of the company.
of an aggregate corporation may contract with the company, as well
as
third person, and the rights of the individual so contracting are
no more distinct

and independent

in the one case

than in the other.

The plaintiff, by his subscription, assumed to pay to the corporation,
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and only for the purpose specified in the charter, its amount, according to the assessments ; and there was at the same time a TRUST created, and an implied assumption on the part of the corporation to ap*
*
*
ply it to that object and none other.
It is conceded that there is a class of alterations in a charter, which
the corporation may obtain and adopt, that would not so essentially
change the contract as to absolve the corporator from his subscription,
or give him a right to complain in a court of justice, in case he had
previously paid it. Where the object of the modification or alteraand detion of the charter is auxiliary to the original object of
signed to enable the corporation to carry into execution the very purpose of the original grant, with more facility and more beneficially
than they otherwise could, the individual corporator can not comand
should apprehend
would make no difference with the
plain
corporation, in such a case, though he could show that the
rights of
charter, as amended, was less beneficial to the corporators than the
The ground upon which such amendoriginal one would have been.
deem to be his own consent.
ments bind the corporator,
When he
becomes
corporator by his signing for portion of the capital stock,
he in effect agrees to the by-laws, rules and votes of the company,
and there
an implied assent, on his part, with the corporation, that
they may apply for and adopt such amendments as are within the
scope, and designed to promote the execution, of the original purpose; and he signs, and the corporation receive his subscription, sub*
*
ject to such implied contingency.
But suppose the object of the alteration
ftmdamental change
in the original purpose, and designed to superadd to
something
which
In
beyond and aside of it; does the same principle apply?
the case of the Union Lock and Canal Company v. Towne,
N. H.
44, the company, under an act of the legislature of New Hampshire,
passed December, 1808, were incorporated for the purpose of rendering the Merrimac river navigable from Reed's Ferry to Amoskeag
Falls and in this charter the company were authorized to purchase
and hold real estate not exceeding six acres, and to exact and collect
toll for period of forty years only, at rate not averaging more than
twelve per cent, per annum on the capital stock invested.
In June,
an
additional
act
which
took off
the
legislature
23d),
passed
1809 (the
all limitation as to the rate of toll and time of its duration, and authorized the company to purchase and hold real estate not exceeding
*
*
one hundred acres.
The court, in well-considered opinion given by Judge Woodbury,
held that each of the subsequent statutes created such
fundamental
change in the original charter as to absolve the defendant from all liability for assessments made after the passage of the additional acts,
there being no evidence to show that he had ever personally assented
to them.
In the Middlesex Turnpike Corporation v. Locke,
Mass. 268, the
court held that a variation and change in the course of the turnpike
road, from that which was prescribed in the original charter, was such
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fundamental alteration as to absolve the subscribers from the payment of assessments made after the amendment to the charter, upon
*
*
*
a subscription for stock, made before.
The case of the Hartford and New Haven Railroad Company v.
Croswell, 5 Hill 383, has an important bearing upon the one before
The amendment in that case to the original charter authorized
us.
the defendant to purchase, hold, and run upon the sound, steamboats,
m connection with their railway, and gave the company, for that purpose, an increase of capital not exceeding two hundred thousand dollars.
This seems to be nothing more or less, so far as principle is
concerned, than an extension of the terminus of the road at New Haven, by steam power, on the railroad which the God of nature has
made, instead of a railroad by land, constructed by the art of man.
This amendment was accepted both by the directors of the company
and by the corporation convened for that purpose ; and yet it was
held that the alteration was fundamental, and absolved the defendant
from all liability for the assessments on his stock; there being no evidence that the defendant had personally assented to an acceptance of
*
*
*
the amendment.
The consent or assent may, however, be implied in a class of cases,
as has already been stated, where the amendment is not regarded as
fundamental, and can be brought within the scope of the original
purpose of the association ; and this is going to the very verge of the
It is difficult, and would be unwise, to
powers of the corporation.
attempt to lay down any general rules to determine in what precise
cases the assent of the corporator should be implied, and in what not.
It is sufficient for the present purpose to say, that his assent can not
be implied, in a case like the present, from a majority vote.
Courts
may differ, and doubtless will, in regard to what alterations shall be
sufficient to constitute a fundamental
But in the present
change.
case, I think, on this point there can be but one opinion.
The termini of the road, as fixed by the charter, are Burlington, and some
point on the west bank of Connecticut river, in the county of Windsor or Windham.
The capital stock is one million dollars, with a
right in the corporation to increase it to an amount sufficient to complete said road and furnish the necessary apparatus for conveyance.
The supplementary act of 1850 purports to authorize the corporation,
within three years, to construct and extend their railroad from the terminus in Burlington, to some point in Swanton, in the county of
Franklin, a distance of about thirty miles. * * *
The franchise granted to this company was territorial, and an exIt
tension of the termini necessarily is an extension of the franchise.
can not remain the same thing in substance until it can be established
Besides, the company may increase
that a part is equal to the whole.
the capital stock to such additional sum as shall be necessary to construct the extension.
The statute of 1850 is little less in effect, if anything, than an attempt to create in a summary manner, and by the way of reference,
a new corporation, and to transfer all the old corporators to it. * * *
a
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It is not necessary that the business should be changed in kind to
If this is not a change in purpose it
change the original purpose.
would not be to extend the road in one direction to Canada line, and
in the other to Massachusetts line ; and there would be no limits to the
control which the corporation might acquire over the individual corporators, and this, too, without their consent, except what arises from
the confines of legislative authority.
The change, then, in the charter being fundamental and the corporation not being able to bind the plaintiff by a majority vote, what
If he had been sued for an assessment upon his
must be the result?
stock he might have claimed that he was absolved from all liability
And is not this reasonable ?
upon the acceptance of the amendment.
Shall it be said that the legislature and the corporation have power to
embark this corporator in a speculation to which he has never consented ? If it can be done in one case it can in another.
But having
paid his funds into the corporation he has a right in chancery to compel a faithful performance of the trust by the corporation, in conformity to the original charter, and to keep them within its purview. * * *
In the case before us, it must follow, if the plaintiff is not bound
by the conjoined effect of the act of 1850, and a majority vote of the
corporation, the defendants can stand on no better ground than a voluntary association, who are about to go beyond and aside of their
original articles against the will of a minority. This, in effect, was
conceded in the argument.
There was nothing improper in the passage of the act of 1850, though upon the application of a portion of
No attempt is
the directors of the company, as stated in the bill.
made by the legislature to impair the obligation of any contract between themselves and the corporation, or to cast upon the company
There was
any new and additional burthens without their consent.
no attempt to impair any contract arising under the prior charter between the corporation and the corporator as an individual, or disturb
The act is not mandatory ; and there
any vested right in either.
that
is, in fact, an implied condition annexed to
to be accepted by all whose individual and corporate interests are to be
affected by
before
But suppose this act
shall become operative.
had been mandatory upon the corporation and the several stockholders to build this extension in the road within three years
would not
all cry out against its palpable injustice? Suppose, instead of this,
the legislature had left
optional with the corporation to accept or
reject the act of 1850, and had provided that in case of the acceptance
of the amendment by the corporation,
should bind the corporators
who dissented from it, or did not assent to
and this, too, in their individual rights; would there not be the same reason to cry out against
it? Would
stockholder into an enterprise
not, by its carrying
which he had never consented to, and change the principles of liability
between the corporation and the individual corporator from what they
were under the original compact, impair and disturb vested rights
under it?
have no hesitation in saying, that, in my opinion,
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would be beyond the pale of the constitutional authority of the legislature.

If, in

*

*

*

a case like the present, the majority can not bind the minority,
plain that there is an equity in this bill, and that the defendants
can stand in no better situation than if they had, by a vote of the company, proceeded to build the extension, and to apply the funds and
credit of the corporation to that purpose, without any additional act
of the legislature.
The case of Livingston v Lynch etal., 4 Johns.
Ch. 573, was the case of a voluntary association under the name of
the North River Steamboat Company ; and a majority, without the
consent of the minority, changed by a vote the articles of association,
and proceeded in their business according to their new articles.
The
bill was brought by the plaintiff against the majority of the company
to have the rights of the association reinstated on their former basis;
and the chancellor decreed the new articles null and void, and set up
the old articles, and enjoined all further proceedings under the new
In the case of Natusch v. Irving et al., which was also the
articles.
case of a voluntary association, an injunction was allowed to restrain
them from going into a business not within the scope of the original
articles, in pursuance of a vote of the majority. And in that case,
before the hearing, the defendant had offered to pay back all that the
orator had paid into the company, with interest from the date of payment, and also to fully indemnify him against all loss by the transactions of the company already had or thereafter to be had in the busiLord Eldon, to this
ness which was beyond their original articles.
part of the case, replies, in substance, that it is not competent for any
number of persons in a partnership (unless so provided for) formed
for specified purposes, to effect that formation by calling upon some
of their partners to receive back their capital stock and interest and
quit the concern, which, in effect, would be merely compelling them
to retire upon such terms as should be dictated to them, so as to form
a new company; and that it is the right of a partner to hold his associates to the specified purposes whilst the partnership continues, and
not to rest upon indemnities with respect to what he had not contracted to engage in ; and that a partner can not be compelled
to part
with his shares, though for double what he originally gave for them ;
and that it may be his principal reason for keeping them, to have the
*
*
partnership carried on according to the original contract.
I am not ready to suppose the directors in procuring the act of 1850
to be passed, or the corporation in accepting that act, acted in bad
faith to any of the old stockholders ; but doubtless they were governed by the most honorable motives and meant it for the best good
of all concerned, notwithstanding the allegations in the bill. The
in the bill imputing bad
case is not put at all upon the allegations
If it was it would
of
faith to the directors in obtaining the act
1850.
bill should be
that
the
to
the
of
be very material
the question
merits
this
The
that
corporation had the
answered.
ground assumed is,
for
an
funds of the original stockholders
object distinctly defined in
not
be allowed to apply them
can
the original charter, and that they
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to any other purpose whatever without the consent of the stockholders,
*
*
*
and that to do it would be a breach of trust.
Where it is clearly shown that a corporation is about to exceed its
powers and to apply their funds or credit to some object beyond their
authority, it would, if the purpose of the corporation was carried out,
constitute a breach of trust; and a court of equity can not refuse to
See, Aagar v. The Regent's Canal Comgive relief by injunction.
pany, Cooper's Eq. 77; The River Dun Navigation Company v.
North Midland Railway Company, i Railway Cases 135, 153-4. * * *
See note,
Injunction allowed, subject to further orders.
473,

infra.
Sec. 467. Same.
a majority.

SPRAGUE
1857.

v.

An immaterial amendment

can be accepted

THE ILLINOIS RIVER RAILROAD COMPANY.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF

ILLINOIS.

19

111.

by

1

Rep. *i74-*i83

[Bill by Sprague, a tax-payer, to enjoin the enforcement of a subscription of $50,000 made under authority, by Cass county, to the
stock of the railroad company, upon the ground that the company had
or were about to accept material amendments made to the charter
after the company was incorporated
and the subscription made.
Court below dismissed the bill.]
CATON, C. J. We do not think that the amendment to the charter
to the Illinois River Railroad Company, which was passed in 1854,
authorizes an essential and material departure from the purposes and
objects specified in the original charter of that company, so as to
make it a separate and distinct enterprise.
The original charter provides as follows:
"And the said company are hereby authorized and
empowered to locate and construct and finally complete a railroad
from the town of Jacksonville, in Morgan county, via Virginia, in
Cass county, to the town of Bath, Mason county, and thence by way
of Pekin, in Tazewell county, Lacon, in Marshall county, to La
Salle, in La Salle county."
The amendment of the charter of 1854
authorized the company to unite or consolidate with any other road
built, or to be built, and to make connections with such road at any
point on the route of the Illinois River Railroad, and that they should
not be required to build their road north of that point, unless a majority of the board of directors should think proper to do so.
We have nowhere met with a more satisfactory exposition of the
general principles of law, governing the respective rights of corporations and individual stockholders therein, as connected with this subject, than in the case of Banet v. The Alton & Sangamon Railroad
Company, 13 111. R. 504. In determining the question as to how far
the original purposes of a corporation may be departed from, after
1
Statement abridged.
Part of opinion omitted.
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subscriptions have been made to its stock, without violating the rights
of the stockholders individually, we must first consider with what intention, and in view of what advantages, the law must presume such
As is clearly manifest from the decision
subscriptions were made.
of the case above referred to, the conclusive presumption is that it
was with a view to the profits to be derived from the stocks thus subscribed, as an investment, and not in reference to any incidental advantages which may accrue to the stockholders by reason of the construction of the improvement, in consequence of any anticipated enhancement of any other property which the stockholder may own, or
To admit any other presumption would be, in fact, a
otherwise.
If the various collateral considfraud upon the other stockholders.
erations which may have induced the different shareholders to subin determining
scribe for the stock can be taken into consideration
in what manner the common enterprise may be carried out or executed, the common good of all must frequently be sacrificed to the parIf the various collateral
ticular good of one individual shareholder,
considerations which induced each individual, composing the corporation, to subscribe for his stock, are to control in the execution of
the enterprise or the management of the concern, it might frequently,
and probably would in almost every case, be utterly impossible to
for the reason that f-uch collateral consideracarry on or complete
tions or incidental inducements might be directly hostile to each other;
to gratify one would be to destroy the other.
No inducement or consideration, but that which
supposed to promote the common good
of all can be sanctioned by justice or presumed by the law to exist.
The presumption, then,
that each one, when he enters into the
association, agrees to do, and consents to have done, whatever may
be supposed will and
intended to make the undertaking
success,
and the investment
one.
profitable
In the commencement of an undertaking like that of
railroad, no
human sagacity can foresee every contingency which may arise, or
anticipate eveiy obstacle which may present itself, in its prosecution,
and all must know and anticipate that these contingencies or obstacles may make
necessary, for the common good, to make many and
even important changes in the original plan, and each one
presumed

a

a

it

is

it

is

it

to anticipate that such changes may become necessary, and to consent
to them, when the majority, or those entrusted with the management
of the common interest, shall deem
best (for the common good).
It will not do to say that the subscriber
only presumed to consent
to such changes or acts as are expressly authorized by the charter as
exists when he subscribes, and that he
always to be considered as
to
of
or
that charter
protesting
enlargement of the powers
any change
of the corporation, no matter how manifestly
may promote the
common good of all.
in
all
cases, preclude the
rule would,
Such
of
ever altering the charter of any corporation, without the
possibility
of all the shareholders.
consent
Then might one stupid or
express
obstinate holder of one share tie up the hands of all the rest, to their
utter ruin.
Such
proposition needs no refutation. The history of
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and the legislation of all countries in reference
to them, show that no sane man ever became a corporator with such
or intention. There must be a palpable abuse of
an understanding
power bv the majority, or governing authority, to the prejudice of
the minority or dissenting portion, before the courts would be authorIf the act is performed in good
ized to declare its exercise illegal.
faith and with the real intent to promote the best interest of the concern, even though it might tuin out disastrously, the act would be
Bad faith or fraud would vitiate such acts, as
none the less legal.
well in these as in other cases. It is true that the original purpose or
object of the corporation may not be entirely changed, or abandoned,
such as a railroad abandoned for a canal,
and a new one undertaken
or line of steamboats, or, possibly, one railroad route abandoned,
direction and which could have no affinNand another, in an opposite
ity to or connection with the first, adopted ; but we know of no instance where the mere limitation or enlargement of the original plan
or purpose has been held not to be within the implied powers of the
The great extent of this implied
majority or controlling authority.
power, conferred by each shareholder upon the majority or controlling
authority of the corporation, or the nature of his implied agreement
on this subject when he becomes a member of the corporation, may
be familiarly illustrated by the history of railroad corporations from
their first, beginning to the present time, both in this country and in
Take, for instance, the great New York Central Railroad.
Europe.
That was originally constructed and for many years operated by some
seven or eight separate and distinct corporations.
Subsequently an
act of the legislature was passed, authorizing them all to consolidate,
so that all should constitute but one company, owning and operating
as one road all the different sections and branches formerly owned
and operated by them separately ; and this was done without the
unanimous consent of all the stockholders of all the original corporations; to have required that, would have rendered the consolidation
an impossibilit}', no matter how manifestly the proposed measure
might have been for the common good of all ; so many stockholders
with the intention of being
would have been found opposing
bought up to give a consent which, in reality, their own interest demanded that they should give voluntarily, that nothing could ever
have been done.
lamentable truth, that the history of human
It
affairs shows that such
human nature, as exemplified by too many.
The ever-ready answer is, "May not do with my own as will?"
Let us now see how this consolidation affected the individual stockholders of the separate original corporations.
Take, for instance,
one who subscribed stock for the construction of the road between
When he made that subscription he only
Albany and Schenectady.
expressly consented to become
part owner of that small section of
road, some sixteen miles long; and had he been asked, instead of becoming part owner in that small enterprise, where his relative interest might be so considerable
that his influence in its management
might be sensibly felt, to become a part owner in that gigantic corporaa
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he might very likely, and in all probability would,
tion as we now see
have refused to engage in it.
And yet, having subscribed under these
circumstances, all his subsequent remonstrances could prove of no avail,
for the interest of the
when the majority of his associates thought
whole to enter into the consolidation. Indeed the original stock, for
which alone he subscribed, was taken from him, or rather destroyed,
and he was compelled to take, in lieu thereof, stock in another company, to which he never subscribed or consented to be connected
with. And this new company exhibits purposes and objects so much
more extended than the old, that
hardly proper even to call them
*
*
of the same general character.
But
may be objected that this course of legislation and action,
however uniform and long continued, can not acquire the force of
law, or rather of constitutional construction, and that
constitutional
this question involves the sacred right of individuals to possess, manage and enjoy their own as they may think best, as well as the right
of contract, express or implied, upon entering into these associations.
On the contrary, we think they are of the highest authority, in both
Such long-continued and uniform acquiescence in
points of view.
the exercise of this power, by those interested in the stocks of these
corporations, and by the profession, shows the undoubted understandrightful and necessary exercise of power; and
ing of all, that this
he
bold man indeed, who, supposing that he has been favored with
some glimmer of constitutional
light which has never been vouchsafed to any other, shall hold that this has all been but
usurpation
*
*
*
of power, and
ruthless trampling upon individual rights.
No rational man, upon becoming member of a corporation, can
to be changed, and
suppose that for him the course of legislation
the mode of managing corporate concerns
to be subverted.
He
must expect that his interest will be managed in the same way that
and
all others, under like circumstances, have always been managed
He
to this he must be presumed to consent and agree at the time.
must be held to consent that the charter of the corporation may be
amended, by enlarging or limiting its powers, or by modifying, limiting or extending its objects and purposes, in the same manner and
to the same extent that other corporate charters have previously been
and that such amendment of the charter may be accepted,
changed;
by the express vote of a majority of the stockholders in interest, or of
direct vote
the directors or managers of the corporation, either by
or by acting under
or by any other mode of adoption known to the
unneclaw. This seems to us so perfectly manifest that we deem
essary to enlarge upon it.
By applying these principles to the case before us, we see there was
nothing in the amendment of the charter passed in 1854, the acceptance of which by the corporation could in the least violate any of the
*
* *
rights of any of the subscribers to the stock.

Affirmed.
See note,
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CITY OF DETROIT
IN THE

to

454, supra, p. 754.

General limits of legislative
Same.
Sec. 469.
the reserved power to amend.

1880.

power

v.

SUPREME

DETROIT
COURT

&

authority under

HOWELL PLANK ROAD CO. 1

OF

MICHIGAN.

43

Mich. Rep.

140-149.
1848 the road company was incorporated to build a road from
The act of 1848 proDetroit to Howell, which was duly completed.
at
time
that
the
alter,
amend or repeal
vided
legislature "may
any

[In

In 1879 the legislature provided that no
this act" after thirty years.
without
shall,
road
the consent of the local authoricompany
plank
or
maintain
a
within
the present or future limits of
ties, keep
toll-gate
or
for any portion of its road
or
shall
collect
toll
village,
any city
limits,
remove
and
the
same beyond the city limits
such
shall
within
after
notice
from
the
within sixty days
city to do so.]
COOLEY, J. A mandamus is applied for in this case to compel
the respondent to remove beyond the city limits a toll-gate located on
Grand River street. The questions the application presents are
questions of statutory construction and of constitutional law. * * *
The toll-gate of the respondent on Grand River street is within
the existing corporate limits of the city of Detroit, and the city authorities notified the respondent to discontinue and remove the same
more than sixty davs before this proceeding was instituted.
The respondent denies the validity of the act of 1879, and refuses to conform to it. It is admitted that but for the act of 1879 respondent
might lawfully maintain the gate where it is, the city having been extended to embrace it since the gate was located.
Chope v. Detroit
& Howell P! R. Co., 37 Mich. 195.
The effect of this legislation, if valid, would be to take from respondent about two miles and a half of the road upon which it now
collects toll.
It is not pretended that this is done by reason of any
forfeiture done or suffered by the respondent, and, if it were, a judiFlint, etc., Plank Road Co. v.
cial finding would be necessary.
Woodhull, 25 Mich. 99. Nor is it claimed that the act of 1879 was
It would probably be conceded that
passed as a regulation of police.
it goes quite beyond the competency of an act of mere regulation,
and that it must be sustained, if at all, as an act passed in the exercise of that complete power to amend and repeal, which was reserved
1

Statement abridged.

Part of opinion omitted.
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in passing both the general act of 1848 and the charter of respondent.
The city relies upon it as an exercise of that power, and not otherwise. * * *
There are cases in which amendments to charters having some resemblance to thi have been sustained, but it is in general easy to distinguish them.
Many of these are cited in the brief for the relator.
Commissioners v. Holyoke Co., 104 Mass. 446, in which a company
having a dam across the Connecticut river was required to construct a
fish-way, was a case involving a mere police regulation for the preservation of rights of others in the fishery above and below. All the
following cases involved the same principle: Commonwealth v. Eastern R. Co., 103 Mass. 254, where a railroad company was required
to build a station-house and stop its trains at a certain locality; Albany, etc., R. Co. v. Brownell, 24 N. Y. 345, in which it was held competent to require a railroad company to permit and provide for the
crossing of its track by highways; Roxbury v. Boston R. Co., 6
Cush. 424, in which a like question was involved ; English v. New
Haven, etc., Co., 32 Conn. 240, in which a bridge, made necessary
for the convenience of a railroad company, and used by the company
and the public, was required to be made wider by the company;
Worcester v. Norwich, etc., R. Co., 109 Mass. 103, in which the
railroads coming into a city were required to unite in a common passenger station at a point to be determined by commissioners ; Meadow Dam Co. v. Gray, 30 Me. 547, in which a company incorporated
to build a dam across a river was required to construct a lock for purposes of navigation ; and there are many others of the same sort.
Cases involving only the right to change the methods or the extent of
taxation may be dismissed altogether from consideration, as this right
must always exist when there is no express

contract

to the contrary.

East Saginaw Salt M'f'g Co. v. East Saginaw, 13 Wall. 373. So
may cases involving only the question of the liability of corporations
to the control of the general police laws of the state. Beer Company
v. Massachustts, 97 U. S. 25 ; Fertilizing Company v. Hyde Park, 97
U. S. 659.
But there is no well-considered case in which it has been held that
a legislature, under its power to amend a charter, might take from
the corporation any of its substantial property or property rights.
In
some cases the power has been denied where the interest involved
seemed insignificant.
The case of Albany, etc., R. Co. v. BrowneH,
N.
Y.
is
an
illustration.
It was there decided that although
345,
24
the legislature might require railroad companies to suffer highways to
cross their tracks, they could not subject the lands which the companies had acquired for other purposes to the same burden, except in
The decision was in
connection with provision for compensation.
accord with that in Commonwealth v. Essex Co., 13 Gray 239, 253,
in which, while the power to alter, amend or repeal the coporate
franchises was sustained, it was at the same time declared that "no
amendment or alteration of the charter can take away the property or
rights v/hich have become vested under a legitimate exercise of the
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The same doctrine is clearly asserted and affirmed
in Railroad Company v. Maine, 96 U. S. 499, and is assumed to be
unquestionable in the several opinions delivered in the Sinking-Fund
Cases, 99 U. S. 700.
But for the provision in the constitution of the United States which
forbids impairing the obligation of contracts, the power to amend and
repeal corporate charters would be ample without being expressly reThe reservation of the right leaves the state where any sovserved.
be if unrestrained by express constitutional limitations,
would
ereignty
It might, thereand with the powers which it would then possess.
fore, do what it would be admissible for any constitutional government to do when not thus restrained, but it could not do what would
And it can not be
be inconsistent with constitutional principles.
a
this
to
enter
discussion
in
denial of the right
at
upon
day
necessary
of the government to take from either individuals or corporations any
In the most arbiproperty which they may rightfully have acquired.
powers granted."

trary times such an act was recognized as pure tyranny, and it has been
forbidden in England ever since Magnet Charta, and in this country
It is immaterial in what way the property was lawfully acalways.
quired ; whether by labor in the ordinary avocations of life, by gift or
descent, or by making profitable use of a franchise granted by the
state ; it is enough that it has become private property, and it is then
Even municipal corporations,
protected by the "law of the land."
though their charters are in no sense contracts, are protected by the
constitution in the property they rightfully acquire for local purposes,
Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cr. 43 ;
and the state can not despoil them of it.
Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cr. 292; State v. Haben, 22 Wis. 629; People v.
Common Council, 28 Mich. 228.
We have said nothing of those cases in which charters have been
amended by limiting the tolls that may be taken, as it is conceded by
relator that that is not what has been attempted in this case. It was
a part of the original contract that the tolls should not be reduced
by the state until the annual returns should realize to the stockholders ten per centum annually on their investment, and it is not claimed
What the state claims a right to do
that that limit has been reached.
is to deprive the respondent of the privilege any longer to take tolls
for travel and traffic on two miles and a half of its road. If it may
do this in respect to one part of the road, it may in respect to any
other part.
If it may exclude the respondent from Detroit it may
from Howell also, or from any township on the line, and a single section of a statute may annihilate the property of respondent altogether.
A statute which could have this effect would not be a statute to amend
franchises, but a statute to confiscate property ; it would not be a statute of regulation, but of spoliation. * * *
Mandamus denied.
See note,

473,

infra.
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(Va.)
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Power of the majority to accept an amendSame.
ment under the reserved power of the state to amend,
May

Sec. 471.

accept.

BUFFALO AND N. Y. CITY R. CO. v. DUDLEY. 1
1856.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.
33 6 ~35 6 -

14

N. Y. Rep.

[Appeal from judgment in favor of the railroad company upon a
suit to recover the amount subscribed by Dudley to the capital stock of
The company was incorporated in 1845 with a capital
plaintiff.
stock of $750,000, and authority to build a railroad from HornellsThe right to alter or repeal was reserved
ville to Attica, sixty miles.
After the subscription was made the legislature
to the legislature.
authorized the company to change its name, increase its capital stock
to $1,500,000, and extend its road to Buffalo, thirty-one miles farther;
all of which was accepted by the directors.
Calls were duly made
but the defendant refused to pay on the ground that the changes were
detrimental to his interests and made without his consent.]
T. A. JOHNSON, J. * * * The subscription having been valid,
so as to give a right of action, in case of non-payment,
to the corof
the
alteration
the
charter
did
and
the
extension
of the
poration,
road subsequently absolve the defendant from his liability upon such
subscription? This question is, I think, entirely settled by the decision of this court in the case of Schenectady and Saratoga Plank Road
The right to alter was reCompany v. Thatcher (i Kern. 102).
served in the charter, and the subscription must be taken to have been
made subject to having such additional powers conferred as the legisThe change is not fundalature might deem essential and expedient.
The new powers conferred are identical in kind with those
mental.
originally given.
They are enlarged merely, the general objects and
of
the
corporation remaining still the same. It may be adpurposes
mitted that, under this reserved power to alter and repeal, the legislature would have no right to change the fundamental character of the
corporation and convert it into a different legal being, for instance, a
banking corporation, without absolving those who did not choose to
be bound.
But this they have not attempted to do.
The additional
1

Statement
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powers are of the same character, and have been regularly acquired
from the legitimate source of power, and if they have been fairly exercised, the defendant, although the change may have operated to his
pecuniary disadvantage, is still bound by his undertaking. It is no
breach of the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant. * * *
*
*
*
SELDEN,
The point made by the defendant upon the
alteration of the plaintiff's charter, changing the name of the corporation and authorizing the extension of its road from Attica to Buffalo, must, I think, be considered as sufficiently answered by the decision of this court in the case of The Schenectady and Saratoga
Plank Road Company v. Thatcher (i Kern. 102.) The power reserved to the legislature in the original act of incorporation, to alter or
It is, indeed, enrepeal the act, is as broad in this case as in that.
tirely unlimited. Under the rule established in that case, no mere addition to or alteration of the charter, however great, would operate to
To
discharge a stockholder from his obligation to the corporation.
work such a discharge the charter must be repealed, or the legislation
must be such as virtually to subvert the corporation itself; or, at least,
*
*
*
to destroy its identity.

J.

Affirmed.
See note,
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Same.
v.

OLD COLONY AND FALL RIVER RAILROAD COMPANY.

IN THE SUPREME

JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
Allen (Mass.) Rep. 230-248.

1

5

Bill in equity brought by the plaintiff, a minor, by John S. Brayton, his guardian, to restrain the defendants, a railroad corporation
established under the law of this commonwealth, and the directors
thereof, from proceeding to act under St. 1861, ch. 156, authorizing
them to extend their railroad to the line of the state of Rhode Island,
or under St. 1862, c. 149, authorizing their union with the Newport
and Fall River Railroad Company.
BIGELOW, C. J. * * * The case for the plaintiff muinly rests
on the single proposition of law, that a corporation established by the
legislature of this commonwealth by acts which, under St. 1830, ch.
81, are subject to alteration, amendment or repeal, at the pleasure of
the legislature, can not engage in any new enterprise or enter upon
any new undertaking, in addition to that contemplated by and embraced in the original* charter of the company, against the consent of
any one of its stockholders, although such new enterprise or undertaking is of the same kind with that for which the corporation was
originally established, and is authorized, sanctioned and adopted by
an express legislative grant, and by a vote of the majority of the stockholders duly ascertained according to law.
'Statement abridged.

Arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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[After stating that no question arises here between the legislature
and corporation, or upon an executory contract entered into with the
corporation, as an agreement to subscribe for stock and to become a
member of a corporate body created or to be established for certain
distinct and designated objects.]
We suppose it may be stated as an indisputable proposition, that
every person who becomes a member of a corporation aggregate, by
purchasing and holding shares, agrees, by necessary implication, that
he will be bound by all acts and proceedings, within the scope of the
powers and authority conferred by the charter, which shall be adopted or sanctioned by a vote of the majority of the corporation, duly
taken and ascertained according to law.
This is the unavoidable result of the fundamental principle that the majority of the stockholders
can regulate and control the lawful exercise of the powers conferred
on a corporation by its charter.
A holder of shares in an incorporated body, so far as his individual rights and interests may be involved in the doings of the corporation, acting within the legitimate
sphere of its corporate power, has no other legal control over them
than that which he can exercise by his single vote in the meetings of
the company.
To this extent he has parted with his personal right or
privilege to regulate the disposition of that portion of his property
which he has invested in the capital stock of the corporation, and surrendered it to the will of a majority of his fellow corporators.
The
jus disponendi is vested in them so long as they keep within the line
of the general purpose and object for which the corporation was established, although their action may be against the will of a minority,
It can not, therefore, be justly said that the contract,
however large.
express or implied, between the corporation and the stockholders is
infringed or impaired by any act or proceeding of the former which
is authorized by a majority, and which comes within the terms of the
original statute creating and establishing their franchise, and conferring on them capacity to exercise control over the rights and property
of their members.
On the contrary, the fair and reasonable implication resulting from the legal relation of the stockholder and the corporation is, that the majority may do any act, either coming within
the scope of the corporate authority, or which is consistent with the
terms and conditions of the original charter, without and even against
the consent of an individual member.
Such being the nature of the contract which subsists between the
corporation and each of its members, we have only to inquire, in the
present case, whether it has been in any respect violated by the present defendants.
The answer to this inquiry will be found in the interpretation which is put on that clause of the general laws of this
commonwealth already cited, by which a right is reserved to the legislature to amend, alter or repeal any act of incorporation which has
been established by its authority since the enactment of that provision
in the statute of 1830.
Whatever may be the extent of the authority
which is thereby retained by the legislature to modify or change the
charters of corporations without or against their consent, there would
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to doubt that, with the concurrence of the corin
the mode pointed out by law, the legislature
manifested
poration
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alteration
make
any
may
act
of incorporation, and not foreign to the
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original
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objects
purposes
which
to
accomplish,
may seem to be expedient or necessary.
signed
No breach of contract would be thereby occasioned.
Such actionaccordance
be
in
with
the
on
which
terms
the grant of
would
precise
made.
In
a
no
franchise
was
contract is
the
creating
corporation
made by the legislature with the individual members or stockholders,
any further than they are represented by the artificial body which the
act of incorporation calls into being.
They have no other rights exor
of
exist
out
the
which
constitution of the body corgrow
cept those
are
members.
To
of
which
this only can we look, in
they
porate,
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Such a position might be asserted
an absence of
more
there
was
clause in the
with
plausibility,
for
an
of
alteration in its terms.
incorporation providing
original act
maintained
be
that there was
In such case
might perhaps
strong
remain
inviolate,
the
charter should
and that the
implication that
holders of shares invested their property in the corporation relying
and the legislature that the
contract entered into between
upon
remain
of
the
act
should
But
creating
unchanged.
provisions
difficult to see how such construction can be put on contract which
shall be subject to amendment
contains an express stipulation that
be
asked
such amendment or alteraIf
whom
and alteration.
by
obvious:
be
the
answer
made,
tion
to
by the parties to the conon
hand
and
the corporation on the
the
one
tract, the legislature
intention
other
former
its
the
by means of
expressing
legislative
vote of the majority of the
act, and the latter assenting thereto by
stockholders, according to the provisions of its charter.
It
nothing
more than the ordinary case of
one
that
of
the
stipulation
parties to
contract may vary its terms with the assent of the other contracting
In such case, all persons claiming derivative rights or interparty.
ests under the original contract, with notice of its terms, would be
bound by the amendment or alteration to which the parties should
*
*
agree.
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The infirmity of the argument in behalf of the plaintiff is, that it
admits that an amendment may be legal and valid as to the corporation, if they assent to it by a vote of the majority, while at the same
time it sets it aside as against the stockholder who refuses to sanction
it, on the ground that as to him it is illegal and void. But we can not
see how the amendment can be said to be legal and illegal uno et eodem
flatu. If it is valid as to the corporation, for the reason that they
have accepted and approved it according to the provisions of their
charter, it would seem that it must also be binding on the stockholder,
who has agreed that his rights and interests in the corporation shall be
regulated and controlled by a vote of a majority, acting in conformity to the original constitution of the corporation, and within the scope
of its corporate powers.
The real contract into which the stockholder enters with the corporation is, that he agrees to become a member of an artificial body which is created and has its existence by virtue of a contract with the legislature, which may be amended or
changed with the consent of the company, ascertained and declared
in the mode pointed out by law. Having, by virtue of the relation
which subsists between himself and the corporation as a holder of
shares, assented to the terms of the original act of incorporation, he
can not be heard to say that he will not be bound by a vote of the
majority of the stockholders accepting an amendment or alterations
of the charter made in pursuance of an express authority reserved to
the legislature, and which by such acceptance has become binding on
the corporation.
Such we understand to be the result of the adjudicated cases.
In Crease v. Babcock, 23 Pick. 342, it was expressly
decided that corporators,
by accepting a charter, directly agree to
adopt the provision reserving to the legislature the right to amend,
alter or repeal the act of incorporation as a constituent part of their
contract; and it has often been decided, under similar provisions in
the statutes of other states, that amendments or changes, either
abridging the corporate authority or enlarging and extending it so as
to embrace new enterprises and to incur additional burdens and liabilities, when duly adopted by the corporation, are valid and binding
on a dissenting minority, as well as on those corporators by whose
Buffalo,
votes the amending act has been accepted and approved.
etc., Railroad v. Dudley, 4 Keman 336, 348, 354 ; Northern Railroad
v. Miller, 10 Barb. 260; Meadow Dam Co. v. Gray, 30 Maine 547;
Oldtown, etc., Railroad v. Veazie, 39 Maine 580; Banet v. Alton,
etc., Railroad, 13 Illinois 504.
It was urged, as a grave objection against the doctrine above stated,
that it puts the minority of the stockholders of a corporation entirely
within the control of the legislature and a majority of the stockholders, and that there would be no limit or restraint placed on the exermight be diverted to purcise of the power, so that corporations
poses and objects wholly foreign to those for which they were originally established, and stockholders might be made to participate
against their will in undertakings which they never contemplated and
which they deemed inexpedient or ruinous. If this be so, it is a con-
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sequence of which no stockholder can reasonably complain, because
it is a result which flows from the contract into which he has volunBut we are not prepared to admit the soundness of
tarily entered.
A restraint or limit on the power of the legislature to
the objection.
alter or amend a charter, even with the consent of the corporation,
may perhaps be found in the doctrine recognized in some of the
English cases, that the enlargement of corporate powers shall not be
extended so as to authorize enterprises or operations different in their
nature and kind from those comprehended within the terms of the
original charter, but shall be confined to purposes and objects ejusdem
generis with those for which the corporation was primarily granted.
See Ware v. Grand Junction Water Works, 2 Russ. & Mylne 470 ;
Ffooks v. Southwestern Railway, i Sm. & Gif. 142. But however
this may be, no such question arises in the present case, inasmuch
as the additional acts, the validity of which is called into controversy by the plaintiff, do not empower the defendants to engage in
any undertaking essentially different in kind from that which was embraced in the original acts by which their corporate existence under
their present name was authorized and established.
So far as any argument against the right of the legislature to amend
or alter the charters of corporations under our statutes is drawn from
the peril to which it exposes the property and interests of dissenting
minorities of stockholders, we can not deem it of any practical weight
or importance.
The good faith of the legislature and the self-interest
of the majority will ordinarily be a sufficient protection against any
wanton or oppressive use of their power.
Against any dishonest or
fraudulent abuses of
sufficient remedy can always be had in the
courts of justice.
It may be well to add, in order to avoid misapprehension, that we
do not intend to say that the legislature have any power to change or
matemodify an act of incorporation in such
way as to affect in
rial particular
contract which they have entered into with
third
Such an exercise of legislative power would be unconstituperson.
tional and invalid, because
would impair the obligation of con*
*
tract.
dismissed.
473,

infra.

Same. Majority can not accept
against the protest of the minority.

Sec. 473.

v.

THE HACKENSACK AND NEW YORK RAILROAD
COMPANY.

1867.

1

ZABRISKIE

material amendment

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY.
Eq. (3 C. E. Green) Rep. 178-194.
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See note,
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[Application by plaintiff, the holder of 930 shares of the stock of
for an injunction to restrain
from extending its

defendant company,

Arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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road and executing a certain mortgage authorized by an act of the
The company was incorporated in 1856 (the
legislature of 1861.
or
amend
being reserved), to build a railroad five
to
alter
power
miles long, with a capital stock of $200,000, and with the privilege
of mortgaging its property to the extent of $50,000. The act of
1861 authorized an extension of twelve miles, an increase of stock to
any amount necessary, and the issue of bonds to the extent of $250,The corporation by the directors and a majority of the shareooo.
holders accepted these authorized amendments, and commenced the
extensions contemplated.]
*
* *
The extension authorTHE CHANCELLOR (ZABRISKIE).
ized by the act of 1861 is a radical change in the object of this corporation; it is an enterprise entirely different from that in the charter.
That was to construct and operate a railroad from Hackensack to the
Paterson railroad, at Boiling Spring, an easy and almost direct route
to New York ; it was from a thriving village, the county town of Bergen county, over a level country, and only five miles in length, as
The extension would be about
shown by the return of its location.
in
an
uneven
twelve miles
length, through
country, mostly, if not
no
with
village, except the very small one at
wholly, agricultural;
on
its
route
and
it runs into the state of New York
New Bridge,
;
some distance, and terminates at a point on that part of the Erie railway which the company have abandoned for regular traffic, and on
which few trains are run. It is an entirely different enterprise.
The question here is, can this company, either with or without the
consent of a majority in interest, of its stockholders, compel the complainant to embark capital subscribed for the first enterprise, in this
new one, entirely different.
Since the Dartmouth College case, in the Supreme Court of the
United States, the doctrine has been considered firmly established,
and been confirmed by repeated decisions, both in that court and the
state courts, that a charter, granted by the legislature to a corporation, is a contract between the state and the corporators, and that
the state can pass no act to take away or impair any of the franThe company, or artificial person
chises or privileges granted by it.
thus created, and its property, is subject to all general laws and police regulations made by the legislature after such grant, in the same
manner as natural persons and their property are ; provided they are
not such as to take away or impair any of the franchises plainly granted by the charter.
This doctrine did not prevent the legislature from
conferring new privileges upon any corporation, to be accepted at its
own election.
It is also settled, upon the principles of the common law, in this
state, and most of the states of the Union, that when a number of persons associate themselves as partners, for a business and time specified in the agreement between them, or become members of a corporation for definite purposes and objects specified in their charter,
which in such case is their contract, and for a time settled by
that
the objects and business of the partnership or corporation can not be
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changed, or abandoned, or sold out, within the time specified, without the consent of all the partners or corporators ; one partner or corporator, however small his interest, can prevent it. And this is so,
although by law a majority in either case can control or manage the
business against the will and interest of the minority, so long as it is
within the scope of the partnership or charter.
This rule is founded on principle, the great principle of protecting every man and his property by contracts entered into, a guiding
principle in all right legislation, and incorporated into the constitution
of the United States, and of almost every state in the union. And
the rule is not changed because the new business or enterprise proposed is allowed by law, or has been made lawful since the association
was formed.
The leading case on this subject is that of Natusch v. Irving, decided by Lord Eldon, in 1824.
It is not contained in the regular reports, but may be found in the appendix to Gow on Partnership (3d
ed.) 576, or in Lindley on Partnership, p. 511. There, a partnership was formed for life insurance, and after it was entered into, an
act of parliament made it lawful for such a firm to enter upon the
business of marine insurance, which was prohibited to them before.
A majority of the partners determined to embark in the business of
marine insurance, thus made lawful.
Lord Eldon held them barred
by the contract of co-partnership, unless every partner agreed to alter
In England, the same doctrine is applied to corporations rigidly,
it.
and is acknowledged in all cases on the subject.
And although, from
the omnipotent power of parliament, restrained by no written constitution, they hold that the contract can be changed by act of parliament, yet the English court of chancery will enjoin the directors or
the corporation, on application of a single stockholder, from using
the common funds to apply to parliament for a change.
The doctrine of Natusch v. Irving was adopted in New York by
Chancellor Kent, in the case of Livingston v. Lynch, 4 Johns. C. R.
573, and in this state, by the decision of Parker, master, sitting to advise the chancellor, in Kean v. Johnson, i Stockt. 401, and has been
recognized and adopted in almost all the states of the Union.
The opinion of Chancellor Bennet, in Stevens v. The Rutland and
Burlington R. Co., 29 Vt. 545 (also found in I Am. Law Reg. 154),
contains a very able exposition and application of it.
It will also be
found in Ang. & Ames on Corp., sections 3913 and sections 536-9;
Lindley on Part., 515; Pierce on Railways, 78; Hart. & N. H. R.
Co. v. Crosswell, 5 Hill 383; Troy and Rutland R. Co. v. Kerr, 17
Barb. 581; Macedon Plank Road Co. v. Lapham, 18 Barb. 312;
Buff., Corn. & N. Y. R. Co. v. Pottle, 23 Barb. 21 ; Banet v. The
Alton and Sangamon R. Co., 13 111. 504; Graham v. Birkenhead

R. Co.,

2 McN. & G.,
156.
After the effect of the rule established in the Dartmouth College

case began to be felt in the states, it was found that by the numerous
acts of incorporation, freely and perhaps necessarily granted, great in-

conveniences

resulted,

and that provisions incautiously inserted, too
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much restricted the power of future legislatures; and that the laws,
which experience showed were necessary to govern corporations in
And the legislathe exercise of their powers, could not be passed.
ture of many states, by degrees and successively, adopted the practice of inserting in acts granting franchises, that they might alter,
modify, or repeal the act ; and also, by general law, provided that all
acts of incorporation, thereafter passed, should be subject to such alteration and repeal.

The provision is contained in the general act of this state, passed
in 1846 (Nix Dig. 152, section 6), that such charters should be subject to alteration, suspension, and repeal, in the discretion of the legislature.
This and all similar special and general provisions were infor
tended
the purpose specified ; to give to the legislature the clear
right, at their pleasure, to alter or repeal the acts of incorpoi'ation.
The state, without this, could have done it with the assent of the corThev could give them property ; they could add to their
porators.
But they could not take away any power,
powers or privileges.
privilege, or franchise, conferred by the act, nor compel them to exercise any new power or franchise conferred.
Besides this general law of the state, the charter of the defendants
contains this provision, that "the legislature may, at any time, alter,
modify, or repeal the same."
The object and purpose of these provisions are so plain, and so
plainly expressed in the words, that it seems strange that any doubt
could be raised concerning it. It was a reservation to the state, for
The
the benefit of the public, to be exercised by the state only.
state was making what had been decided to be a contract, and it reserved the power of change, by altering, modifying, or repealing the
contract.
Neither the words nor the circumstances, nor apparent objects for which this provision was made, can, by any fair construction,
extend it to giving a power to one part of the corporators as against
the other, which they did not have before.
It was to avoid the rule in the Dartmouth College case, not that in
Natusch v. Irving, that the change was made.
The words limit the
power to that object.
On general principles, and the settled rules of construction, I
would hold this to be the effect, and only effect, of the provision in
the general act and in the charter of the defendants, without any
hesitation, were it not for a series of decisions by most respectable
courts, which hold that this provision obviates the effect of the rule
in Natusch v. Irving, and Kean v. Johnson, and enables a majority of
the corporators in all charters subject to a like provision, to change,
by legislative permission, and within certain limits, the object and
purpose of the corporation.
They hold that the contract between
associate corporators, that they will confine their business to life insurance, is changed by legislative permission to engage in marine insurance, or a contract to join in constructing a raiiroajd from New
York to Newark, can be changed to one from New York to Elizabeth
The reasoning is founded on the fact that the
by legislative consent.
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subscription for the stock, which is the contract, was made, as in this
case, under a charter which authorizes a road from the Paterson rond
to Hackensack, and authorizes the legislature to alter and modify the
And from this they infer that it is a contract to join in building
act.
any road that the legislature may, by such alteration, authorize the
company to build; and that such authority, or additional privilege,
may be accepted by a majority of the corporators.
So far as the alteration is made by the legislature, in a way to be
compulsory on the corporation, this is correct; as, if they should require the company to build a double track, or widen the draws in a
bridge, or exact less fare or toll ; these would be within the contract,
or would be annexed to it as a condition, and every stockholder
would take his stock subject to the contingency of such alteration.
But if the change in the act is simply offering the corporation the
privilege of entering upon another and a different enterprise, it is not
within the condition to the subscription. The only construction to
be given is, that the legislature may alter, not that the stockholders
The case of Natusch v. Irving was demay, as between each other.
The act of parliament had given the
cided upon this very ground.
company the power to embark in marine insurance, but the consent
The plain object of the
of all the parties was still held necessary.
reservation in this case was to give the legislature, not a bare majority
of the stockholders, power.
This view of the case is so clear upon principle that I feel constrained to be guided by
although the weight of the decisions in
*
* *
other states
against it.
[After reviewing many cases from Maine, New York, Massachusetts, Illinois and Missouri, including Buffalo, etc., Co. v. Dudley, 14
N. Y. 336, supra, p. 1461, and Durfee v. Old Colony, etc., R.,
Allen 230, supra, p. 1462.]
But the principle on which they are decided
wrong, and
once conceded that
majority of the corporators may, by authority
from the legislature, change the object of the enterprise in small
no principle of law by which they can be restrained in
things, there
little larger, or in the character of the whole work.
The same
any
did those
principle will lead the courts of Illinois and Missouri, as
in New York, to allow radical changes, and must,
consistently apcharter for
railroad to be used for banking or insurplied, allow
ance business, or for
canal, theater, brewery, or beer saloon.
There
no other alternative to the proposition, that while the
power reserved authorizes the legislature, within certain limits, to
make such alterations as they choose to impose,
gives no authority,
when the legislature does not impose them, for the majority to adopt
such alterations or enter upon such enterprises as are allowed by the
legislature.
Again, the power of the legislature has its limits. It can repeal or
can alter or modify it;
can take away the
suspend the charter;
charter; but
can not impose
new one, and oblige the stockholders
to accept it.
It can alter or modify the old one but power to alter
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or modify anything can never be held to imply a power to substitute
a thing entirely different.
It is not the meaning of the words in their
usually received sense. Power to alter a mansion-house would never
be construed to mean a power to tear down all but the back kitchen
and front piazza, and build one three times as large in its place.
In
anything altered, something must be preserved to keep up its identity;
and a matter of the same kind, wholly or chiefly new, substituted for
another, is not an alteration ; it is a change.
In some cases there might be room for doubts, but in this case there
can be no hesitation in saying that a railroad of seventeen miles from
the Paterson road to Nanent, is a change and substitution of one work
for another, and not an alteration of the road to Hackensack.
They
are substantially two different enterprises.
Again, the power is to alter or modify the act, and the true construction of this I hold to be, an alteration of something contained in
or granted by the act. Any of the franchises granted may be altered ;
the right to take land by condemnation, the right to take tolls or fare,
or the amount to be taken.
But the legislature had no right to impose upon the company any other duty, or anything involving any
other duty, than that attending the building a railroad from the Paterson road to Hackensack; anything in the manner of doing that they
had a right to change.
They could not oblige it to dam and drain all
the meadows along the Hackensack, or to construct a canal, or to
build a road from Hoboken to Newark, nor could they oblige it to
extend its road to Nanent.
They could as well oblige it to run to
We must keep in mind that by the decisions in New
the Pacific.
Jersey the company need not accept the alterations ; they are bound
by them without acceptance if within the power reserved.
By a wider construction of this power any of the main lines of railroad running through the state, incorporated since 1846, or by an act
which has in it the power of alteration, may be compelled to build
and run a branch to any village or place near that route that the legislature may direct.
It must be held that the power to alter and modify
does not give power to make any substantial additions to the work.
Again, the act of iS6i does not, in fact, alter or modify the act of
That act, and every power
1856 in any one thing embraced in it.
and franchise granted by
and any duty
imposed, remains the same.
And the defendants can now go on under
the supprecisely as
The company
authorized to conplement had not been passed.
If
or
struct another road
builds
not compelled to do it.
does not, its old charter remains with all its franchises and privileges
assumes them.
intact, and no new burthens imposed, except so far as
in no sense of the word an alteration of the charter.
This
would
be as absurd to say that an owner had altered his house, who had
built larger one on an adjoining' lot.
And until the legislature have
made
valid alteration of the charter, the rights of each stockholder
he can prevent all the others from
are as held in Kean v. Johnson
changing or abandoning the work.
The supplement of 1861
a perfectly valid and constitutional act.
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is a grant of privileges that the legislature have a right to grant, as
they could grant to this corporation the right to conduct banking or
insurance business, or to run a ferry across the North river ; but the
company is restrained, by the law of corporations and partnerships,
from expending the money or using the credit of the corporation in
*
*
*
such enterprises, unless every shareholder consents.
Injunction allowed.
Note.

Amendment of corporate charters under the reserved power to

alter or amend,
In
1. In general:

the absence of a reserved power to amend, the state may
nor annul the
tender, but can not require the acceptance of, an amendment,
charter for non-acceptance: 1819, Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, supra, p. 708 ; but to make an amendment effective, when
so tendered, there must be an acceptance (see cases supra,
465) ; and if duly
accepted it then becomes a part of the corporate charter (1892, Jackson v.
1447; 1829, Ehrenzeller v. Union Canal Co., 1
Walsh, 75 Md. 304, supra,
Rawle (Pa.) 181; 1898, Phinney v. Trustees, etc., 88 Md. 633, 42 Atl. 58).
A material amendment requires the acceptance of all the members if there is
no reserved power to amend: 1851, Stevens v. Rutland & B. R., 29 Vt. 545,
1448; but an immaterial amendment, perhaps, could be accepted by
supra,
As to
a majority of the members:
1857, Sprague v. Illinois R., 19 111. 173.
what is material, and what is not, courts differ greatly.
Under a reserved power to amend the state has the right to tender a proper
amendment, and require its acceptance, or a cessation of business for non-acceptance by quo warranto proceedings: 1872, Yeaton v. Bank of Old Dominion, 21
Grattan (Ya.) 593, supra, 750; the difficulty here is to determine what is a
proper amendment.

Mr. Justice Clifford, in 1872, Holyoke v. Lyman, 15 Wall. 500, on 519, says,
regard to the extent of the reserved power to amend:
"Vested rights, it
is conceded, can not be destroyed or impaired under such a reserved power,

in

but it is clear that the power may be exercised, and to almost any extent, to carry
into effect the original purposes of the grant, and to protect the rights of the public and of the corporators, or to promote the due administration of the affairs of
the corporation."
In the earlier case of 1872, Miller v. State, 15 Wall. 478, on
498, he uses substantially the same language, but says, also, "such a reservation, it is held, will not warrant the legislature in passing laws to change the
control of an institution from one religious sect to another, or to divert the
fund of the donors to any new use inconsistent with the intent and purpose of
the charter, or compel subscribers to the stock, whose subscription is conditional, to waive any of the conditions of the contract:" citing, 1869, State v.
Adams, 44 Mo. 570; 1867, Zabriskie v. Railroad Co.; 3 C. E. Green (18 N.
Eq.) 178, supra, p. 1466; 1855, Oldtown & L. R. Co. v. Veazie, 39 Me. 571, on
581 ; 1854, Sage v. Dillard, 15 B. Mon. 340, on 357.
Of the extent of the reserved power, Chancellor Zabriskie, in Zabriskie
v. Hackensack R. Co., 18 N.
Eq. 178, supra, p. 1470, says:
"The power to
alter or modify anything can never be held to imply a power to substitute a
thing entirely different. It is not the meaning of the words in their usually
Power to alter a mansion-house would never be construed to
received sense.
mean a power to tear down all but the back kitchen and front piazza, and
build one three times as large in its place. In anything altered, something
must be preserved to keep up its identity; and a matter of the same kind
wholly or chiefly new, substituted for another, is not an alteration; it is a
change;" this was said concerning an amendment authorizing the extension
of a jive-mile railroad, twelve miles farther.
In a somewhat similar way, Mr. Justice Swayne, in 1877, Shields v. Ohio,
95 IT. S. 319, on 324, says:
"The power of alteration and amendment is not
without limit. The alterations must be reasonable; they must be made in
good faith, and be consistent with the scope and object of the act of incorpora-
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tion. Sheer oppression and wrong can not be inflicted under the guise of
amendment or alteration. Beyond the sphere of the reserved powers, Ihe
vested rights of property of corporations, in such cases, are surrounded by
the same sanctions and are as inviolable as in other cases," and then held
that a change in the prescribed rate of fare that a corporation was allowed to
He cites Miller v. N. Y. &
charge was within the reserved power to amend.
E. R. Co., 21 Barb. (N. Y.) 513, holding that a railroad company could not be
required to construct a crossing at its own expense, if of no special benefit
to it, a view that has since been abandoned: 1894, N. Y. & N. E. R. Co. v.
Bristol, 151 U. S. 556.
Mr. Justice Gray, in 1900, Looker v. Maynard, 179 II. S. 56, adv. sh. Nov.
"The effect of such a provision,
15, 1900, p. 21, on 23, thus states the rule:
subject to which a charter is accepted, is, at least, to reserve to the legislature
ichich
the power to make any alteration or amendment of a charter subject to
icill not defeat or substantially impair the object of the grant, and which the legislature may deem necessary to carry into effect the purpose of the grant, or to protect the rights of the public or of the corporation, its stockholders, or creditors, or
to promote the due administration of its affairs," and held an amendment valid
authorizing cumulative voting, and affirming, 1897, Attorney-Gen'l v. Looker, 111 Mich. 506 (where the cases are collected).
Upon the other hand, Mr. Justice Brewer, in 1900, Stearns v. Minnesota,
179 U. S. 223, adv. sh. Jan.
"That the power of
1901, p. 73, on 79, says:
amendment has its limitations, or rather that an amendment may not be
wholly as to the right of the state, and absolutely ignoring the right of the
other party, has been adjudged by this court in Louisville Water Co. v. Clark,
143 U. S. 1/36 L. ed. 55, 12 Sup. Ct. 346.
In that case was held that while
under a statute the water company had been exempted from taxation on condition that
supplied water free to the city of Louisville, an act withdrawing
that exemption from taxation, although silent as to the corresponding obligation of the water company, must be construed as releasing
from an obligation based upon such exemption. So
may well be said in the case before
us, that a contractual exemption of the property of the railroad company in
whole, upon consideration of
certain payment, can not be changed by the
state so as to continue the obligation in full, and at the same time deny to the
company, either in whole or in part, the exemption conferred by the contract." In the subsequent case of 1900, Duluth
R. R. Co. v. St. Louis,
1901, p. 124, on 125, involving the same ques179 U. S. 302, Adv. Sh. Jan.
tion, Mr. Justice White says such an alteration or amendment
void because
enforced, not only to
is "a mere arbitrary exercise of power, giving rise,
denial of the equal protection of the laws, but to a deprivation of property
without due process of law."
The question, however,
further complicated as to the matter of acceptance.
Although, under the reserved power, the state, within the limits above
mentioned, may tender, and require the acceptance of material amendment,
or cessation of business, independent of the assent of the corporation (1872,
Yeaton v. Bank, 21 Grattan 593, supra, p. 750; 1871, Mayor of Worcester v.
Norwich, 109 Mass. 103) yet in order to make the amendment part of the
essential. Perhaps all cases agree that
corporate constitution an acceptance
an
acquiescence and continuing to act after the amending act is passed
acceptance (Commonwealth v. Cullen, 13 P. St. 133, supra, p. 417 Bank of U.
S. v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64, supra, p. 854) most cases further agree that an
immaterial, beneficial amendment may be accepted by the majority so as to
there
reserved power to amend (Taggart v. Railroad
bind the minority,
Company, 24 Md. 563, change of name Banet v. Railway Co., 13 111. 504,
slight change in location of railroad).
material the courts do not agree as to
BuHf the proposed amendment
whether a majority may accept so as to bind the minority or not; neither do
they agree as to what is a material amendment. One line of authorities holds
that, under the reserved power of the state to amend, whoever becomes a
member of such corporation impliedly consents to be governed in this particular by the judgment of the majority as to whether proposed amendment
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shall be accepted, or whether the corporation shall quit business rather than
accept.
(See 1862, Durfee v. Old Colony R. Co., 5 Allen (Mass.) 230, supra,
p. 1462.)

Another line of authorities holds otherwise, that each person when he becomes a member of a corporation, where the state reserves the right to amend,
does not impliedly agree to submit the question of acceptance to the majority,
but only agrees to exercise his own judgment as to whether the amendment
should be accepted or not, and if he believes it should not be accepted, he
can prevent its acceptance (Zabriskie v. Hackensack R. Co., 18 N.
Eq. 178;
1899, Alexander v. Atlanta & W. P. R. Co., 108 Ga. 151, 33S.E. Rep. 866; 1S99,
In re Election of Directors of Newark L. Assn., 64 N. L. 217, 43 Atl. Rep. 435 1.
have found no case that has gone so far as to hold that a single member can
prevent the acceptance of a material amendment (but one which the state
under its reserve power within the limits above pointed out, could require
either to be accepted, or a cessation of business), so as to require a cessation
of business, if all the other members wished to continue. Mr. Beach, Private
Corporations, section 42, forcibly says: "Neither a mandatory statute, nor a
vote of the directors, nor of a majority of the stockholders can compel a dissenting stockholder to accept a material alteration of the terms of the contract in
view of which he intrusted his funds to the corporate management," citing,
1852, Winter v. Muscogee R. Co., 11 Ga. 438, holding a dissenting subscriber
In states holding this doctrine, the dissenting shareholder can
is released.
enjoin the acceptance of an amendment that is beyond the ppwer of the Btate
to'insist upon: 1855, Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331, supra, p. 88; 18(31,
Owen v. Purdy, 12 O. St. 73; 1868, Monsey v. Ind. R. Co., 4 Biss. 78; or if
within the po\> or of the state, and material, and the member has not paid his
subscription, he can refuse to do so: 1813, Hartford &N. H. R. Co. v. Cross well,
5 Hill (N. Y. ) 383; Clearwater v. Meredith, 1 Wall. 25, supra, p. 984;
Ashton v. Burbank, 2 Dillon, 435, supra, p. 87; but if he has paid for his
stock, and the amendment is material and within the power of the state to
make, then it seems there is no logical escape from the conclusion that a single
dissenting member can require the cessation and winding up of the corporate
business against the wish of every other member, rather than acceptance
of an amendment obnoxious, even though beneficial, to him. To meet this
difficulty, it has been held that the dissenting shareholder must yield to the
control by the majority if they offer to purchase his shares at the full market
price: 1858, Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R. Co., 30 Pa. St. 42, 72 Am. Dec.
685; such a view, however, even though expressly authorized by statute after
one becomes a member, would seem to allow the forcible taking of a man's
property without due process of law, and be wholly unjustifiable unless the
Corporation exercised such functions as would authorize the taking of private
property for a public use by way of eminent domain. This doctrine, however,
has not met with favor, in the courts, although some of the states provide
by legislation for such cases, or expressly provide that a certain majority may
One who becomes a member after such a
accept material amendments.
statutory provision ought to have no ground of complaint.

J.

J.

I

Illustrations:
Amendments under following circumstances have been held valid :
changing the number or method of selection : 1871, N. H.
(a) Directors
6 D. R. Co. v. Chapman, 38 Conn. 56; 1872, Miller v. New York, 15 Wall.
478; 1883, Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U. S. 466; 1892, Jackson v
Walsh, 75 Md, 304. Contra, 1899, In re Election of Directors, 64 N. J. L.217,
43 Atl. Rep. 435.
See infra, Voting.
(b) Gas companies, may add to their business electric light business: 1896,
State v. Taylor, 55 O. St. 61 ; 1898, Pickard v. Hughey, 58 O. St. 577.
And a city can revoke an exclusive franchise to furnish gas to the city, and
build a plant of its own: 1890, State v. Hamilton. 47 O. St. 52; 1892, Hamilton G. L. Co. v. Hamilton, 146 U. S. 258. Compare, 1899, Danvile v. Danville W. Co., 178 111. 299, 69 Am. St. Rep. 304.
(c) Incorporation fees, may be changed, even as to parties authorized to in2.
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corporate under foreclosure proceedings had before the change : 1893, People
v. Cook, 148 U. S. 397.
(d) Mill companies, may be required to construct fish ways through dams
authorized, or provide locks for navigation purposes : 1849, South Bay Meadow Dam Co. v. Gray, 30 Me. 547 ; 1870, Inland Fisheries v. Holyoke Water
Co., 104 Mass. 446; 1872, Holyoke Co. v. Lyman, 15 Wall. 500. Compare,
1859, Commonwealth v. Essex Co., 13 Gray (Mass.) 239.
may be changed: 1856, Buffalo R. Co. v. Dudley, 14 N. Y. 336;
(e) Name
1857, Hyatt v. McMahon, 25 Barb. 457 ; 1898, Phinney v. Sheppard, 88 Md.
633.

(f) Bailroads may be required to change crossings, grades, levels, surfaces, or stations at their own cost: 1850, City of Roxburv v. Boston, etc., R.
Co., 6 Cush. 424; 1862, Fitchburg R. Co. v. Grand Junc.'R., 4 Allen (Mass.)
198; 1862, Albany, etc., R. Co. v. Brownell, 24 N. Y. 345; 1869, Commonwealth v. Eastern R., 103 Mass. 254; 1871, Mayor of Worcester v. Norwich R.
Co., 109 Mass. 103; 1889, Montclair v. N. Y., etc., R., 45 N.
Eq. 436; 1894,
N. Y. & N. E. R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556.
Or change location, before construction of line: 1890, Macon, etc., R. Co.
v. Gibson, 85 Ga. 1; 21 Am. St. Rep. 135; 1900, Adirondack R. Co. v. New
York, 176 U. S. 335; compare, 1852, Winter v. Muscogee R. Co., 11 Ga. 438.
etc., Plank R. v. Thatcher, 11 N.
Or extend the line: 1854, Schenectady,
Y. 102; 1856, Buffalo R. Co. v. Dudley, 14 N. Y. 336 (from 60 to 90 miles) ;
1858, Illinois Riv. R. v. Zimmer, 20 111. 654; 1879, Cross v. Peach Bottom R.
Co., 90 Pa. St. 392. But contra, 1867, Zabriskie v. R. Co., 18 N.
Eq. 178

J.

J.

(supra).
Or require employes to be paid in full when discharged, or at certain
times: 1892, State v. Brown, 18 R. I. 16, 17 L. R. A. 856; 1894, Leep v. Railway Co., 58 Ark. 407, 41 Am. St. Rep. 109, 23 L. R. A. 264; 1897, St. Louis,
etc., R. Co. v. Paul, 64 Ark. 83, 62 Am. St. Rep. 154, 37 L. R. A. 504. Contra,
1893, Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 111. 66, 37 Am. St. Rep. 206.
Or pay for surveying lands granted: 1885, Northern Pacific R. v. Thraill
Co., 115 U. S. 600.
Or provide a sinking fund : 1878, Sinking- Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, supra,

p. 1406.
(g) Bales, of ^wasi-public corporations may be changed, or the method of
fixing them: 1872, Parker v. Railroad Co., 109 Mass. 506; 1877, Shields v.
Ohio, 95 U. S. 319; 1884, Spring Valley W. W. v. Schottler, 110 U. S. 347;
1888, Buffalo, etc., R. Co. v. Buffalo, 111 N. Y. 132, 2 L. R. A. 384; 1896,
Winchester, etc., R. Co. v. Croxton, 98 Ky. 739, 33 L. R. A. 177; 1897, Smith
v. Railway Co., 114 Mich. 460; 1899, Danville v. Danville W. Co., 178111. 299,
69 Am. St. Rep. 304.
But railroad companies, under the reserved power to amend charters, can
not be required to furnish mileage tickets, good on all roads: 1893, AttorneyGeneral v. Old Colony R., 160 Mass. 62 ; nor, after the state has fixed a maximum rate for the state, can companies be required to furnish 1,000-mile tickets for $20 to a man and his family : 1899, L. S. & M. S. R. Co. v. Smith. 173

U.

S. 684.

Stoc k, increase: 1854, Schnectady, etc., Plank Road v. Thatcher, 11
102; 1856, Buffalo, etc., R. Co. v. Dudley, 14 N. Y. 336; 1873, Covington v. Covington & C. B. Co., 10 Bush (Ky.) 69; or redaction: 1854, Troy &
Rutland R. v. Kerr, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 588; or issuing preferred: 1863, Rutland & B. R. v. Thrall, 35 Vt. 536.
(i) Stockholders, liability may be increased: 1857, Hyatt v. McMahon, 25
Barb. (N. Y.) 457; 1860, In re Lee & Co.'s Bank, 21 N. Y. 9; 1861, Sherman
v. Smith, 1 Black (U. S.) 587; 1862, Bailey v. Hollister, 26 N. Y. 112; 1869,
Gardner v. Insurance Co., 9 R. 1. 194 ; 1896, McGowan v. McDonald, 111 Cal.
57, 52 Am. St. Rep. 149 ; 1900, Williams v. Nail, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1526, 55 S. W.
Rep. 706; cf. 1883, Consol. Assn. v. Lord, 35 La. Ann. 425.
method of imposing maybe changed: 1889, Mayor, etc., v.
(j) Taxation
Twenty-third St., etc., 113 N. Y. 311 ; or exemptions may be withdrawn : 1890,
Wagner's Institute's Appeal, 132 Pa. 612, 19 Atl. 297; 1891, Louisville Water

N.

(h)
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Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 1; 1900, Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223, adv.
Bh. Jan. 15, 1901, p. 73; 1900, Duluth & I. R. Co. v. St. Louis, 179 U. 8. 302,
adv. sh. Jan. 15, 1901, p. 124.
(k) Voting cumulative voting may be allowed: 1891, Cross v. Railway
Co., 35 W. Va. 174; 1897, Attorney-General v. Looker, 111 Mich. 498 (Collecting Cases, p. 507) ; 1900, Looker v. Maynard, 179 U. S. 46, adv. sh. Nov.
But see, contra: 1876, Hays v. Commonwealth, 82 Pa. St. 518 ;
15, 1900, p. 21.
1884, Orr v. Bracken, 81 Ky. 593; 1899, In re Election of Directors, etc., 64

N.

J. L.

217, 43

Atl.

435.

Miscellaneous:
See, also, 1828, McLaren v. Pennington, 1 Paige Ch.
(N. Y.) 102; 1855, Mass. Gen. Hosp. v. State Mut. L. A. Co., 4 Gray (Mass.)
227 ; 1866, Taggart v. Western R. Co., 24 Md. 563 ; 1871, Pennsylvania College
Cases, 13 Wall. 191; 1875, Ross v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 77 111. 127; 1892,
Miller v. Insurance Co., 92 Tenn. 167; 1893, Virginia Devel. Co. v. Crozer
Iron Co., 90 Va. 126, 44 Am. St. Rep. 893; 1900, Wilmington City R. Co. v.
(1)

Del. Ch.
, 46 Atl. Rep. 12.
Wilmington,
Under reserved power to amend, the following amendments have been held
1859, Commonwealth v. Essex Bank, 13 Gray (Mass.) 239 (requirinvalid:
ing a fish way through a dam to be enlarged after full damages done to the
rights of fishing had been paid) ; 1867, Zabriskie v. Hackensack R., 18 N. J.
Eq. 178 (extending a five-mile railroad to 17 miles) ; 1875, Lothrop v. Stedman,
42 Conn. 583 (preventing distribution of assets among those entitled); 1878,
Ashuelot R. Co. v. Elliot, 58 N. H. 451 (taking away the right to redeem a
mortgage) ; 1880, City of Detroit v. Detroit & H. P. R. Co., 43 Mich. 140 frequiring the abandonment of two miles of toll-paying road) ; 1883, Consol.
Assn. v. Lord, 35 La. Ann. 425 (changing shareholder's liability without his
but as to this see supra (i) ) ; 1884, Orr v. Bracken, 81 Ky. 593 (allowconsent
ing cumulative voting but see supra (k) ) ; 1893, Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 111. 66, 37 Am. St. Rep. 206 (requiring railroads to pay employes at
but see supra (f) ) ; 1894, Leep v. Railway Co., 58 Ark. 407, 41
specified times
Am. St. Rep. 109, 23 L. R. A. 264 (forbidding corporations from contracting) ;
1900, Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223, adv. sh. January 15, 1901, p. 21 (repealing or changing a tax exemption, but continuing the obligation of the
company, which was the consideration for the exemption).
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Status of National Corporation within the States.

COMMONWEALTH
1881.

THE STATE AND NATIONAL CORPORATIONS.

v.

TEXAS AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY.

IN THE SUPREME

MR. JUSTICE STERRETT:

OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Rep. 90-101.

COURT

98

Pa. St.

The i6th section of the revenue act of
no
that
foreign corporation, except foreign inprovides
7,
1879,
June
surance companies, etc., shall have an office in this commonwealth
for the use of its officers, stockholders, agents or employes, without
first having obtained from the auditor-general a license to do so ; for
which license every such corporation shall pay "annually one-fourth
of a mill on each dollar of the capital stock which said company is
*
" Provided, That no license shall be
* *
authorized to have."
necessary for any corporation paying a tax under any previous section
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of this act, or whose capital stock, or a majority thereof, is owned or
controlled by a corporation of this state which does pay a tax under
*
any previous section of this act."
It is admitted that the defendant company was incorporated by act
of congress for the purpose of constructing and operating a railroad
from a point in the state of Texas to San Diego, California, with an
authorized capital, not exceeding $50,000,000, less than one-sixth of
which was issued, and that the company has not invested or used its
capital in this commonwealth, except in the purchase of rails and
other railroad materials and supplies; but, during the year ending
July i, 1880, it kept and maintained for the use of its officers, stockholders, agents and employes in the transaction of their business, an
office in the city of Philadelphia, without having obtained a license
from the auditor-general. The company having thus failed to procure a license, the auditor-general and state treasurer, in pursuance of
the provisions of the act, settled an account against it for $12,500,
From this settlement an apwith interest from October 21, 1880.
peal was taken by the company, and the court of common pleas, in a
clear and able opinion, held that it was not liable, for the reasons that
it is not a foreign corporation, within the meaning of the act, and
that nearly all its capital stock actually issued was held and controlled
by the California and Texas Construction Company, a corporation of
this state, which was liable to pay, and did pay, a tax under a previous section of the act, and hence the defendant was within the proThese are controlling points
tection of the proviso above quoted.
in the case, and if either of them be correct the judgment must be
affirmed.
The general government, in its relation to that of the several states,
can not be considered a foreign government in the ordinary acceptaWithin the sphere of its delegated powers its aution of that term.
thority extends over all the states of which it is composed, and to that
extent it may be said to be identified with the government of each.
Hence, a corporation created by the government of the United States
can not with propriety be called a foreign corporation.
It is contended, however, that in a more comprehensive sense all corporations
not created directly by state authority may be classed as foreign, in
contradistinction to those of exclusively state origin ; and that such
was intended to be the meaning of the word "foreign," as used in the
This might be so if there was anything in the act itself indicaact.
On
tive of an intent to use the word in that sense ; but there is not.
the contrary, in the fifth section, which imposes a tax on limited partnerships, etc., they are described as "partnerships organized under or
pursuant to the laws of this state, or of any other state or territory, or
of the United States, or under the laws of any foreign state, kingdom
thus clearly showing that when the legislature inor government;"
tended to tax associations created by the general government they
The same distincused apt words of desciiption for that purpose.
tion is observed in other portions of the act, especially in the sixth
'The construction adopted by the 'learned president of the
section.
2 WIL. CAS.

20
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common pleas is so fully sustained, on principle as well as authority,
that it is unnecessary to add anything to what is so well said in his
*
*
*
opinion.

Affirmed.
Note.
See:
1819, McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; 1824, Osborn v.
Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738 ; 1869, National Bank v. Commonwealth,
9 Wall. 353; 1869, Crocker v. Marine National Bank, 101 Mass. 240, 3 Am.
Rep. 336; 1873, Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri, 18 Wall. 400; 1875,
Farmers' & M. Bank v. Bearing, 91 U. S. 29; 1876, First Nat'l Bank v. Hubbard, 49 Vt. 1, 24 Am. Rep. 97; 1878, Bletz v. Columbia National Bank, 87
Pa. St. 87, 30 Am. Rep. 343; 1880, Robinson v. National Bank of Newberne,
81 N. Y. 385, 37 Am. Rep. 508; 1881, Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460,
</ra,p.!397; 1881, Rosenblatt v. Johnston, 104 U. S. 462; 1887, California v.
Pacific R. Co., 127 U. S. 1 ; 1894, Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.
S. 525, supra, section 65, note, p. 324; 1899, Daggs v. Phoenix National Bank,
177 U. S. 549; 1899, Beckham v. Hague, 44 App. Div. (N. Y.) 146.
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Same.

MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY ix CALIFORNIA
COMPANY. 1
1887.

v.

PACIFIC RAILROAD

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
Rep.

i,

on 40-42.

127

U. S.

[The State Board of Equalization, in assessing the property of the
Central Pacific Railroad in the state of California, included all the
franchises of the company exercised in the state.
The company was
incorporated in California with power to build and operate a railroad
from the Pacific ocean to the east line of the state, and there connect
with a proposed line to the Missouri river; this proposed line was
soon afterward authorized to be built from the Missouri river to the
Pacific ocean, by the Union Pacific Company, incorporated by conAfterward, in
gress, and given various franchises and privileges.
order to facilitate the construction of the through road, congress authorized the Central Company to build part of the line, beginning at
the Pacific ocean and extend eastward until it met the line of the
Union Company, and conferred upon the former all the rights and
The through line was completed, by the
privileges of the latter.
Union Company from the Missouri river westward, and by the Central Company from the Pacific ocean eastward, to Ogden, Utah,
After holding the rights and privileges
where connection was made.
conferred by congress upon the Central Company were within its
constitutional power, the opinion continues:]
Assuming, then, that the Central Pacific Railroad Company has
received the important franchises referred to by grant of the United
States, the question arises whether they are legitimate subjects of taxation by the state.
They were granted to the company for national
1

Statement

point given.

abridged

;

and only that part of opinion relating to the one
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It seems very clear that the
purposes and to subserve national ends.
take
them
neither
can
state of California
away, nor destroy nor
onerous
burdens.
them
nor
Can it tax
by
cripple
abridge them,
outside
visible
of
the comtax
property
It may undoubtedly
them?
is
a
different
the
state.
But may
That
thing.
within
pany, situated
are
the
of
the
States?
In our
United
which
grant
it tax franchises
a
franchise?
the
is
Under
not.
What
English law
judgment it can
or
branch
of
"a
the king's
it
as
royal privilege,
Blackstone defines
of
a
2
Bl.
in
the
hands
Com. 37.
subject."
prerogative, subsisting
of
which
the
form
it
assumes
under
Generalized, and divested
special
traditions,
b?sed
on
feudal
a
franchise
is a
a monarchical government
concern,
of
which
ought not to be
public
right, privilege or power
their
mere
will
and
pleasure, but
exercised by private individuals at
should be reserved for public control and administration, either by
the government directly, or by public agents, acting under such conditions and regulations as the government may impose in the public
Such rights and powers must
interest, and for the public security.
They are always educed by the
exist under every form of society.
laws and customs of the community. Under our system, their existence and disposal are under the control of the legislative department
of the government, and they can not be assumed or exercised without
No private person can establish a public highlegislative authority.
way, or a public ferry, or railroad, or charge tolls for the use of the
These
same, without authority from the legislature, direct or derived.
No private person can take another's property, even
are franchises.
for a public use, without such authority ; which is the same as to say,
that the right of eminent domain can only be exercised by virtue of a
This is a franchise.
No persons can make themlegislative grant.
selves a body corporate and politic without legislative authority.
The list might be continued inCorporate capacity is a franchise.

is

it,

definitely.
In view of this description of the nature of a franchise, how can it
be possible that a franchise granted by congress can be subject to taxation by a state without the consent of congress ? Taxation is a burden, and may be laid so heavily as to destroy the thing taxed, or renAs Chief Justice Marshall said in McCulloch v.
der it valueless.
Maryland, "the power to tax involves the power to destroy." Recollecting the fundamental principle that the constitution, laws and
treaties of the United States are the supreme law of the land, it seems
to us almost absurd to contend that a power given to a person or corporation by the United States may be subject to taxation by a state. The
power conferred emanates from, and is a portion of, the power of the
To tax
not only derogatoiy to the
government that confers it.
dignity, but subversive of the powers of the government, and repug-

9

4

is

It
unnecessary to cite cases on
nant to its paramount sovereignty.
The principles laid down by this court in McCulloch v.
this subject.
Wheat. 316; Osborn v. The Bank of the United States,
Maryland,
Wheat. 738; and Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, and in numerous cases since which have followed in their lead, abundantly sus-
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tain the views we have expressed.
It may be added that these views
are not in conflict with the decisions of this court in Thomson v.
Pacific Railroad, 9 Wall. 579, and Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18
Wall. 5. As explained in the opinion of the court in the latter case,
the tax there was upon the property of the company, and not upon its
18 Wall. 35, 37.
franchises or operations.
The taxation of a corporate franchise merely as such, unless pursuant to a stipulation in the original charter of the company, is the
exercise of an authority somewhat arbitrary in its character.
It has
no limitation but the discretion of the taxing power.
The value of
the franchise is not measured like that of property, but may be ten
thousand or ten hundred thousand dollars, as the legislature may
choose.
Or, without any valuation of the franchise at all, the tax may
be arbitrarily laid.
It is not an idle objection, therefore, made by the
company against the tax imposed in the present cases.
See, 1896, Central Pac. R. Co. v. California, 162 TJ. S. 91. Also note
Note.
preceding case, and 1894, Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525,
65, and note, pp. 324, 1388.
supra,
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ARTICLE I.
Sec. 476.

(I

)

THE STATE AND FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.
RIGHTS OF FOREIGN

.

CORPORATIONS.

Protection of its property.

See Manchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Herriott, 91 Fed. Rep. 711,
p. 1498; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, infra, p. 2036.

infra r

Note.
1896, United States v. N. W. Ex. Co., 164 U. S. 686 ; 1898, Hammond
Beef, etc., Co. v. Best, 91 Me. 431, 42 L. R. A. 528; 1898, Bergner & Engel B.
Co. v. Dreyfus, 172 Mass. 154, 70 Am. St. Rep. 251 ; 1899, Orient Ins. Co. v.
Daggs, 172 U. S. 557 ; 1899, Johnson v. Goodyear Min. Co., 127 Cal. 4, 47 L.
R. A. 338; 1900, Blake v. McClung, 176 U. S. 59, infra, p. 2045.

Sec. 477.
(2) To do business out of the state creating it.
trine of comity.

BANK OF AUGUSTA
1839.

Doc-

EARLE. 1

v.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
(38 U. S.) 519-606.

13

Pet.

Error to Circuit Court for southern district of Alabama.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY :

to the court arise upon

a case

*

*

*

The questions presented
stated in the circuit court in the follow-

1
Arguments, part of opinion of Taney, C.
ley, J., dissenting, omitted.

J.,

and all of opinion of McKin-
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"The defendant defends this action upon the following
ing words:
facts, that are admitted by the plaintiffs : that plaintiffs are a corporation incorporated by an act of the legislature of the state of Georgia,
and have powers usually conferred upon banking institutions, such as
That the bill sued on was made
to purchase bills of exchange, etc.
and indorsed, for the purpose of being discounted by Thomas
McGran, the agent of said bank, who had funds of the plaintiffs in
his hands, for the purpose of purchasing bills, which funds were derived from bills and notes discounted in Georgia by said plaintiffs,
and payable in Mobile; and the said McGran, agent as aforesaid, did
so discount and purchase the said bill sued on, in the city of Mobile,
state aforesaid, for the benefit of said bank, and with their funds, and
If the court shall say, that
to remit said funds to the said plaintiffs.
the facts constitute a defense to this action, judgment will be given
for the defendant, otherwise for plaintiffs, for the amount of the bill,
damages, interest and costs; either party to have the right of appeal
or writ of error to the supreme court, upon this statement of facts,
and the judgment thereon."
Upon this statement of facts the court gave judgment for the defendant, being of opinion that a bank incorporated by the laws of
Georgia, with a power, among other things, to purchase bills of exchange, could not lawfully exercise that power in the state of Alabama; and that the contract for this bill was, therefore, void, and did
*
*
*
not bind the parties to the payment of the money.
It may be safely assumed that a corporation can make no contracts
and do no acts, either "within or -without the state which creates it,
except such as are authorized by its charter ; and those acts must also
be done by such officers or agents, and in such manner as the charter
authorizes. And if the law creating a corporation does not, by the
true construction of the words used in the charter, give it the right to
exercise its powers beyond the limits of the state, all contracts made
t>y it in other states would be void.
The charter of the bank of Augusta authorizes it, in general terms,
to deal in bills of exchange;
and consequently, gives it the power to
purchase foreign bills as well as inland ; in other words, to purchase
bills payable in another state. The power thus given clothed the corporation with the right to make contracts out of the state, in so far as
Georgia could confer it. For whenever it purchased a foreign bill,
and forwarded it to an agent to present for acceptance, if it was honored by the drawee, the contract of acceptance was necessarily made
in another state ; and the general power to purchase bills, without
any restriction as to place, by its fair and natural import authorized
the bank to make such purchases, wherever it was found most convenient and profitable to the institution, and also to employ suitable
The purchase of the bill in question was,
agents for that purpose.
therefore, the exercise of one of the powers which the bank possessed
under its charter, and was sanctioned by the law of Georgia creating
the corporation, so far as that state could authorize a corporation to
exercise its power beyond the limits of its own jurisdiction.

1482

BANK OF AUGUSTA V. EARLE.

477

But it has been urged in the argument that, notwithstanding the
powers thus conferred by the terms of the charter, a corporation, from
the very nature of its being, can have no authority to contract out of
the limits of the state ; that the laws of a state can have no extraterritorial operation ; and that, as a corporation is the mere creature
of a law of the state, it can have no existence beyond the limits in
which that law operates ; and that it must necessarily be incapable of
It is very true that a corporamaking a contract in another place.
tion can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the soverIt exists only in contemplation of law,
eignty by -which it is created.
and by force of the law ; and -where that law ceases to operate, and
is no longer obligatory, the corporation can have no existence. It
must dwell in the place of its creation, and can not migrate to another sovereignty.
But although it must live and have its being in
that state only, yet it does not by any means follow that its existence
there will not be recognized in other places; and its residence in one
state creates no insuperable objection to its power of contracting in
another.
It is, indeed, a mere artificial being, invisible and intangible ; yet it is a person, for certain purposes, in contemplation of law,
and has been recognized as such by the decisions of this court.
It
was so held in the case of the United States v. Amedy, n Wheat.
412, and in Beaston v. Farmers' Bank of Delaware, 12 Pet. 125.
Now, natural persons, through the intervention of agents, are continually making contracts in countries in which they do not reside ; and
where they are not personally present when the contract is made ; and
And
nobody has ever doubted the validity of these agreements.
what greater objection can there be to the capacity of an artificial
person, by its agents, to make a contract, within the scope of its limited powers, in a sovereignty in which it does not reside, provided
such contracts are permitted to be made by them by the laws of the
place.
The corporation must, no doubt, show that the law of its creation
Yet, as
gave it authority to make such contracts through such agents.
in the case of a natural person, it is not necessary that it should
actually exist in the sovereignty in -which the contract is made. It
is sufficient that its existence as an artificial person, in the state of
its creation, is acknowledged and recognized by the law of the nation
where the dealing takes place; and that it is permitted by the laws of
that place to exercise there the powers with which it is endowed.
Every power, however, of the description of which we are speaking, which a corporation exercises in another state, depends for its
validity upon the laws of the sovereignty in which it is exercised;
and a corporation can make no valid contract without their sanction,
And this brings us to the question which has
express or implied.
been so elaborately discussed; whether, by the comity of nations,
and between these states, the corporations of one state are permitted
to make contracts in another.
It is needless to enumerate here the
instances in which, by the general practice of civilized countries,
the laws of one will, by the comity of nations, be recognized and
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executed in another, where the rights of individuals are concerned.
The cases of contracts made in a foreign country are familiar examples; and courts of justice have always expounded and executed them,
according to the laws of the place in which they were made, provided
the law was not repugnant to the laws or policy of their own country.
The comity thus extended to other nations is no impeachment of
It is the voluntary act of the nation by which it is
sovereignty.
offered; and is inadmissible, when contrary to its policy, or prejuBut it contributes so largely to promote justice
dicial to its interests.
between individuals, and to produce a friendly intercourse between
the sovereignties to which they belong, that courts of justice have
continually acted upon it as a part of the voluntary law of nations.
It is truly said in Story's Conflict of Laws, 37, that, in the silence
of any positive rule, affirming or denying or restraining the operation
of foreign laws, courts of justice presume the tacit adoption of them
by their own government, unless they are repugnant to its policy, or
It is not the comity of the courts, but the
prejudicial to its interests.
comity of the nation, which is administered and ascertained in the
same way, and guided by the same reasoning by which all other principles of municipal law are ascertained and guided.
Adopting, as we do, the principle here stated, we proceed to inquire, whether, by the comity of nations, foreign corporations are
permitted to make contracts within their jurisdiction, and we can perceive no sufficient reason for excluding them, when they are not conIt
trary to the known policy of the state or injurious to its interests.
is nothing more than the admission of the existence of an artificial person, created by the law of another state, and clothed with the power
of making certain contracts; it is but the usual comity of recognizing
In England, from which we have received
the law of another state.
our general principles of jurisprudence, no doubt appears to have been
entertained of the right of a foreign corporation to sue in its courts,
since the case of Henriquez v. Dutch West India Company, decided
in 1729. 2 Ld. Raym. 1532.
And it is a matter of history, which
this court is bound to notice, that corporations, created in this country, have been in the open practice, for many years past, of making
contracts in England, of various kinds, and to very large amounts;
and we have never seen a doubt suggested there of the validity of
It is impossible to imagthese contracts by any court or any jurist.
ine that any court in the United States would refuse to execute a contract by which an American corporation had borrowed money in
England ; yet if the contracts of corporations made out of the state in
which tney are created, are void, even contracts of that description
could not be enforced.
It has, however, been supposed that the rules of comity between
foreign nations do not apply to the states of this Union ; that they extend to one another no other rights than those .which are given by the
constitution of the United States, and that the courts of the general
government are not at liberty to presume, in the absence of all legislation on the subject, that a state has adopted the comity of nations
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towards the other states, as a part of its jurisprudence ; or that it acknowledges any rights but those which are secured by the constitution
of the United States. The court think otherwise. The intimate union
of these states as members of the same great political family; the deep
and vital interests which bind them so closely together should lead us,
in the absence of proof to the contrary, to presume a greater degree
of comity and friendship and kindness toward one another than we
should be authorized to presume between foreign nations.
And when
doubt
must
the
or
without
interest
occasionally
happen)
policy of
(as
any state requires it to restrict the rule, it has but to declare its will
and the legal presumption is at once at an end. But until this is done,
upon what grounds could this court refuse to administer the law of
international comity between these states? They are sovereign states,
and the history of the past and the events which are daily occurring
furnish the strongest evidence that they have adopted toward each
other the laws of comity in their fullest extent.
Money is frequently
borrowed in one state by a corporation created in another.
The numerous banks established by different states are in the constant habit
of contracting and dealing with one another.
Agencies for corporations engaged in the business of insurance and of banking have been
established in other states, and suffered to make contracts without any
These usages of comobjection on the part of the state authorities.
merce and trade have been so general and public, and have been practiced for so long a period of time and so generally acquiesced in by
the states that the court can not overlook them when a question like
The silence of the state
the one before us is under consideration.
authorities while these events are passing before them, shows their assent to the ordinary laws of comity, which permit a corporation to
make contracts in another state.
But we are not left to infer it merely
from the general usages of trade and the silent acquiescence of the
states.
It appears from the cases cited in the argument, which it is
unnecessary to recapitulate in this opinion, that it has been decided
in many of the state courts, we believe in all of them where the question has arisen, that a corporation of one state may sue in the courts
of another.
If it may sue why may it not make a contract? The
right to sue is one of the powers which it derives from its charter. If
the courts of another country take notice of its existence as a corporation, so far as to allow it to maintain a suit and permit it to exercise
that power, why should not its existence be recognized for other purto exercise another power
poses, and the corporation permitted
where
which is given to it by the same law and the same sovereignty
the-last mentioned power does not come in conflict with the interest or
policy of the state ? There is certainly nothing in the nature and character of a corporation which could justly lead to such a distinction,
and which should extend to it the comity of suit and refuse to it the comIf it is allowed to sue it would, of course, be permitity of contract.
ted to compromise, if it thought proper, with its debtor; to give him
time ; to accept something else in satisfaction ; to give him a release ;
and to employ an attorney for itself to conduct the suit.
These are
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all matters of contract, and yet are so intimately connected with the
right to sue, that the latter could not be effectually exercised if the
*
*
*
former were denied.
But it can not be necessary to pursue the argument further. We
think it is well settled that by the law of comity among nations a corporation created by one sovereignty is permitted to make contracts in
another, and to sue in its courts, and that the same law of comity
prevails among the several sovereignties of this union. The public,
and well-known and long-continued usages of trade ; the general acquiescence of the states; the particular legislation of some of them,
as well as the legislation of congress, all concur in proving the truth
of this proposition.
But we have already said that this comity is presumed from the
silent acquiescence of the state. Whenever a state sufficiently indicates that contracts which derive their validity from its comity are repugnant to its policy, or are considered as injurious to its interests,
the presumption in favor of its adoption can no longer be made. * * *
The question then recurs : Does the policy of Alabama deny to
the corporations of other states the ordinary comity between nations,
or does it permit such a corporation to make those contracts which
from their nature and subject-matter,
are consistent with its policy,
In making such contracts, a corand are allowed to individuals?
poration, no doubt, exercises its corporate franchise. But it must do
this whenever it acts as a corporation, for its existence is a franchise.
Now, it has been held in the courts of Alabama itself, 2 Stew. 147, that
the corporations of another state may sue in its courts ; and the decision is put directly on the ground of national comity. The state, therefore, has not merely acquiesced by silence, but her judicial tribunals
have declared the adoption of the law of international comity, in the
case of a suit.
We have already shown that the comity of suit brings
with it the comity of contract; and where the one is expressly
adopted by its courts, the other must also be presumed, according to
* *
*
the usages of nations, unless the contrary can be shown.
Reversed.
Compare: 1884, Gloucester, Ferry Co. v. Penn., 114 U. S. 205; 1887,
Note.
Steamship Co. v. Penn., 122 U. S. 326; 1887, Stockton v. B. & N. Y. E. Co.,
32 Fed. Rep. 9; 1890, Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47.
In the case of Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, on p. 57, Mr. Justice
Braldey stated the right of foreign corporations to do business within any
state in language that seems to imply a much broader right than has generally
been supposed to exist under the rule in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, supraj
the following is the statement: "If a partnership firm of individuals should
undertake to carry on the business of interstate commerce between Kentucky
and other states, it would not be within the province of the state legislature
to exact conditions on which they should carry on their business, nor to require them to take out a license therefor. To carry on interstate commerce
is not a franchise or a privilege granted by the state ; it is a right which every
citizen of the United States is entitled to exercise under the constitution and
laws of the United States ; and the accession of mere corporate facilities, as
a matter of convenience in carrying on their business, can not have the effect
of depriving them of such right, unless congress should see fit to interpose
some contrary regulation on the subject."
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city and county, gen-

Action by Frances E. Demarest, an infant, by her guardian, etc.,
against Hugh J. Grant, James A. Flack, Alfred de Cordova, Frank
Hardy, and Gabriel Case, composing the America's Winter Carnival
Company, for damages alleged to be due to negligence in the operAt the trial the complaint was dismissed,
ation of a toboggan slide.
and plaintiff's exceptions were ordered to be heard in the first instance
the exceptions, and ordered
at the general term, which overruled
From the judgment plaintiff appealed.
judgment for defendants.
Code W. Va., ch. 54, section 10, provides that, "when a certificate
of incorporation shall be issued by the secretary of state pursuant to
this chapter, the corporators named in the agreement recited therein,
and who have signed the same, and their successors and assigns,
shall, from the date of the said certificate until the time designated in
the said agreement for the expiration thereof, unless sooner dissolved
according to the law, be a corporation by the name and for the purposes therein specified."
The plaintiff alleged in her complaint that the defendants were a
joint stock company doing business in New York city under the name
The defendand style of "America's Winter Carnival Company."
ants, by answer, denied that they were a joint stock company, and
also all allegations of negligence, either on their own part or on that
of any of their employes.
The evidence tending to show even a prima facie liability on the part of the defendants is of the most meager
character.
We will assume, however, that the plaintiff proved
enough to call upon the defendants for an answer to her cause of action. This answer was, in brief, that the defendants were nothing
but individual members of and stockholders in an incorporated company which had hired the grounds, owned the toboggans, and operated the slides : and that whatever liability there was, if any, in favor
of the plaintiff, was borne by the incorporated company, and not by
To prove this defense the counthe individual stockholders therein.
sel for defendants offered in evidence a certificate of incorporation of
the company, under the laws of West Virginia, and at the same time
The certificate and the code were obthe code of West Virginia.
jected to by the. plaintiff's counsel ; the ground of objection to the
certificate being that it was incompetent, immaterial, and, illegal, and
raised the question of the validity of the incorporation itself, and of its
sufficiency as a defense.
*
*
PECKHAM, J. *
[After giving the details of the West
1
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;
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for the jury to pass

upon, proceeds:]
The agreement which was signed by the corporators in this case,
and duly acknowledged and presented to the secretary of state of
West Virginia, showed that the corporators were residents of New
York, and that the principal office of the corporation was to be in
New York ; and the inference was a fair one that the principal business of the corporation was also to be conducted in New York. The
secretary of state, to whom the papers for the organization of the
corporation were presented, was compelled to pass upon and decide
the question whether they conformed to the laws of West Virginia,
before he received or filed them, or gave the certificate of incorporation. He did pass upon the question and did thereupon issue the
certificate of incorporation under the great seal of the state, and atSo far as the laws of West Virginia
tested by his official signature.
the
it
is
that
are concerned,
plain
corporators thereupon became a
corporation, and in that state the certificate was, by the laws thereof,
There was no fraud
evidence of the existence of such corporation.
or evasion of the law of West Virginia in thus becoming incorporated.
The references to her laws above made show conclusively
that the formation of corporations thus composed, and for the purpose
of doing their principal business outside the limits of that state, was
This corporation was beyond all quescontemplated in those laws.
tion legally incorporated, and entitled to recognition, in the state of
West Virginia. Unless, therefore, it can be said that the acts of our
citizens in procuring an incorporation under the laws of West Virginia for the purpose of doing business here were, as matter of law,
a fraud and an evasion of our own laws, and hence in conflict or inconsistent with our domestic policy, such foreign corporation is entitled
Merrick v. Van
to recognition and protection in our own tribunals.
Santvoord, 34 N. Y. 208. It is urged that such acts are thus inconsistent and in conflict with our policy, because citizens of our own
state are in that way enabled to evade our own laws relative to home
corporations, and to avoid personal liability by incorporating under
the laws of foreign states, which may be more favorable to members
I think, when this claim is examined in the
than are our own laws.
light of our own legislation, it will be seen that there is no substantial
basis for it to rest upon.
An examination of our laws shows that it
is, and for many years has been, the policy of this state to enlarge
the facilities for the formation of corporations.
General laws are on
our statute-book for the formation of corporations of almost every
conceivable kind, and under some one of them a corporation of the
kind mentioned in this case could readily be formed. The freedom
from personal liability would be as great, and could be as easily atThe
tained, under our own as under the laws of West Virginia.
security of the creditor would not be substantially greater in the case
of the domestic than in that of the foreign corporation. In the latter
the creditor has the remedy by attachment, and he can obtain about
as easy access to its property as if it were domestic instead of for-
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There is really nothing to evade by incorporating under a
foreign law. No harmful results flow to a creditor or to the community here by such incorporation. Where the corporation formed
under another jurisdiction comes here to do business of a kind which
we permit to be done by corporations, and where our laws provide
for incorporating individuals for the purpose of doing that business,
it is difficult to see how the terms " evasion" and "fraud " can be
properly applied to acts of our citizens whereby they obtain incorporation in another state. When they come to our state to do business,
they must conform to our laws relating to foreign corporations, and
comply with the terms laid down by us as conditions of allowing them
In the case of many kinds of corporations
to transact business here.
such conditions have already been imposed by our laws; and, if there
be any kind where none is imposed, it is conclusive evidence that up
to this time the legislature has not thought it conducive to the true inI do not intimate
terests of the state and its citizens to impose them.
that it is necessary for a state to expressly, by statute, exclude foreign
The policy of the
corporations from acting within its jurisdiction.
state may exclude them, and that policy may be clearly established by
I find none such in
a reference to the general legislation of a state.
* *
*
the laws of this state.
[Citing and commenting on Montgomery v. Forbes, 148 Mass.
249, 19 N. E. Rep. 342, and Hill v. Beach, 12 N. J. Eq. 31.]
We recognize corporations formed by the citizens of a foreign state
under its laws for the purpose of doing business, among other places,
in our own state. Where is the essential difference between such a
corporation and one legally incorporated under such foreign state for
the same purpose, but the members of which are citizens of our ow r n
state?
Whose rights are jeopardized more in the case where the
members of the corporation are our own citizens than where they are
citizens of a foreign state?
What enlightened policy is violated by
the recognition of the foreign corporation composed of residents of
this state which would not also and equally suffer by the recognition
And yet, beyond all cavil,
thereof when composed of non-residents?
our policy is to recognize the latter.
The truth is, foreign corporations are not properly to be regarded with suspicion, nor should unnecessary restraints be imposed upon their doing business in our midst.
They carry no black flag, and the policy of all civilized nations is to
It seems to me that every reagrant them recognition in their courts.
son which urges upon us the recognition of foreign corporations organized with power to do business in our state, and composed of citizens of the foreign state, is equally potent when the foreign corporation is composed of our own citizens.
It has always been supposed
that a state should at least deal as liberally with its own citizens as
with those of foreign states. If, therefore, we permit foreign citizens
to come within our limits in the form of a foreign corporation organized with power to do business here, and recognized by us, why should
we not permit our own citizens to avail themselves of the like privilege ? If we impose terms and conditions upon foreign corporations,
eign.
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doing business here, those same terms and conditions still
and equally apply to a foreign corporation when composed of our
own citizens.
Why should they not be placed at least upon an equalthe
with
foreign citizen? * * * [Distinguishing Railway,
ity
etc., Co. v. Board, 6 Kan. 245, and Empire Mills v. Alston Grocery
Co., 15 S. W. Rep. 200, 505.] The result is that the complaint
was properly dismissed, and the judgment to that effect should be
All concur.
affirmed, with costs.
as such,

In the last few years it has become usual for the great "incorporated
Note.
trusts," organized under the New Jersey, Delaware, or West Virginia laws,
to state their capacity to do corporate business away from the state of their
incorporation in language broad enough to enable them to do business anywhere " in heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or in the waters under the
earth," although they are duly warned by a higher law not to make unto
themselves any graven image or likeness of anything that is found therein.
Accord: 1853, Trowbridge v. Scudder, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 83; 1866, Merrick
v. Van Santvoord, 34 N. Y. 208; 1878, National Bank v. Hall, 35 O. St. 158;
1879, Central R. Co. v. Penn. R. Co., 31 N. J. Eq. 475, 485 (citizens of other
states can incorporate in New Jersey to build a railroad in New Jersey) ;
1880, Humphreys v. Mooney, 5 Colo. 282, on 292; 1892, Wright v. Lee, 2 So.
Dak. 595, 604; 1893, Missouri, etc., Co. v. Reinhard, 114 Mo. 218, supra, p.844;
1894, Lancaster v. Amsterdam Imp. Co., 140 N. Y. 576, 24 L. R. A. 322,
note; 1894, Oakdale, etc., Co. v. Garst, 18 R. I. 484, 49 Am. St. Rep. 784;
Contra:
1900, State v. Topeka Water Co., 61 Kan. 547, 60 Pac. Rep. 337.
1858, Hill v. Beach, 12 N. J. Eq. 31; 1870, Land Grant, etc., R. Co. v. Coffey
Co., 6 Kan. 245; 1873, Booth v. Wonderly, 36 N. J. L. 250; 1889, Montgomery v. Forbes, 148 Mass. 249, supra, p. 594; 1891, Empire Mills v. Alston Grocery, 4 Will. (Tex. App. Civ. Cas.) 346, 12 L. R. A. 366 ; 1895, Taylor v. Branham, 35 Fla. 297, 48 Am. St. Rep. 249, note 254; 1901, Pinney v. Nelson, 182
U.

S. 144.

Sec. 479.

sue in State Courts,

(3)

To

(a)

Generally.

The Silver Lake Bank v. North, 4 Johns. Ch. 370, supra,
p. 1092; Garratt Ford Co. v. Vermont M'f'g Co., 20 R. I. 187,
supra, p. 1093 ; Taber v. Interstate Building & L. Assn., 91 Tex. 92,
See:

supra, p.

1095.

Foreign corporations can not be excluded from suing in the state
Note.
1893, Cone Export and
courts upon transactions of interstate commerce:
Com. Co. v. Poole, 41 S. C. 70, 24 L. R. A. 289, note ; 1897, Miller v. Goodman, 91 Tex. 41 ; 1899, Pasteur Vaccine Co. v. Burkey, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 232,
54 S. W. Rep. 804; 1899, Gale Manufacturing Co. v. Finkelstein, 22 Tex. Civ.
App. 241, 54 S. W. Rep. 619; 1900, Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177
U. S. 28.
Power to acquire property by eminent domain: 1894, New York & N. H.
R. R. Co. v. Welsh, 143 N. Y. 411, 42 Am. St. Rep. 734; 1894, Myers v. McGavrock, 39 Neb. 843, 42 Am. St. Rep. 627; 1900, San Antonio & Ark., etc.,
Ry. Co. v. Southwestern Tel., etc., Co., 93 Tex. 313, 77 Am. St. Rep. 884.
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M'F'O CO. V. DU BOIS.

To sue non-residents.

NATIONAL TELEPHONE MANUFACTURING COMPANY
1896.

480

v.

DU BOIS. 1

IN THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
Mass. Rep. 117-119, 52 Am. St. Rep. 503.

165

MORTON, J. The plaintiff in this case is a New Hampshire corporation with a place of business in Boston, whose claim had not
been reduced to judgment, and does not relate to a contract made in
The claim is for labor, materials, and disbursements perthis state.
The prinformed, furnished, and made in the state of Pennsylvania.
cipal defendant is a resident of Pennsylvania, with no property here
except his interest as partner in a firm whose property, assets, books,
vouchers, papers, and accounts are all, with some few exceptions, in
Du Bois, in the state of Pennsylvania, where its business chiefly is
carried on, and where one of the other two partners lives with the
The service is by publication.
principal defendant.
The courts of equity in this state are not opened to the plaintiff as
Smith v. Mutual
matter of strict right, but as matter of comity.
Life Ins. Co., 14 Allen 336, 339. And if it appears that complete justice can not be done here, or that the amount involved is small and the
defendant will be subjected to great and unnecessary expense and in-

convenience, and that the investigation required will be surrounded, if
conducted here, with many and great if not insuperable difficulties,
which will all be avoided without especial hardships to the plaintiff if
suit is brought against the defendant in the state where he lives and
where the alleged debt was contracted, and where personal service
can be made on him, we think that our courts should decline to take
Post and Co. v. Toledo, Cincinnati and St Louis Railjurisdiction.
road, 144 Mass. 341 ; Pierce v. Equitable Assurance Society, 145
Mass. 56; Bank of North America v. Rindge, 154 Mass. 203.
All of these circumstances are found in this case. The amount of
*
*
*
the claim is $72.75.
There has been no personal service in this proceeding.
According
to the agreed facts, it is manifest that the principal defendant will be
subjected to great and unnecessaiy expense if compelled to come here,
and that the investigation required to ascertain his interest will be surwhich will all be avoided without any aprounded with difficulties,
parent hardship to the plaintiff if it brings its suit in Pennsylvania.
* Bill dismissed.
* *
See, notes, 52 Am. St. Rep. 505; 95 Am. Dec. 537.
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CORPORATION.

To exclude, general rule.
v.

CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
Re P- 535-544-

1

94

U. S.

[Appeal from decree of circuit court, perpetually enjoining the
secretary of state, Doyle, from revoking a license issued in Wisconsin. The company was organized in Connecticut, and, prior to the
Wisconsin act of 1870, had established agencies and done business in
After the passage of the act of 1870, the company comWisconsin.
plied with the provisions of that act, which required it to appoint an
attorney on whom process could be served in Wisconsin, and agreed
that it would not remove a suit arising in that state to the federal
courts, whereupon the secretary of state issued a license to do busiAfter the decision of Insurance Co. v. Morse, the
ness in the state.
company removed a suit to the federal courts, whereupon the secretary of state, under authority of an act of the legislature, threatened
and was about to revoke the license to do business within the state,
to the irreparable damage of the company.
Upon demurrer, decree
as above, from which Doyle appealed.]
MR. JUSTICE HUNT: The case of Insurance Company v. Morse,
20 Wall. 445, is the basis of the bill of complaint in the present suit.
We have carefully reviewed our decision in that case, and are satisfied with it. In that case an agreement not to remove any suit brought
against it in the state courts of Wisconsin into the federal courts had
been made by the company, in compliance with the Wisconsin statute
of 1870.
The company, nevertheless, did take all the steps required
the
United States statute of 1789 to remove its suit with Morse
by
from the state court into the federal courts.
Disregarding that action
of
the supreme court
Wisconsin allowed the action in the state court
to proceed to judgment against the company, as if no transfer had
been made.
When the judgment thus obtained was brought into this
It was
court, we held it to be illegally obtained, and reversed it.
held, first, upon the general principles of law, that although an individual may lawfully omit to exercise his right to transfer a particular
case from the state courts to the federal courts, and may do this as
often as he thinks fit in each recurring case, he can not bind himself
in advance by an agreement which may be specifically enforced thus
to forfeit his rights.
This was upon the principle that every man is
entitled to resort to all the courts of the country to invoke the protection which all the laws and all the courts may afford him, and that he
can not barter away his life, his freedom, or his constitutional rights.
1
Statement abridged.
Arguments arid part of opinion omitted.; also, dissenting opinion of Bradley, J. (Swayne and Miller, JJ., concurring), omitted.
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As to the effect of the statutory requirement

of the agreement, the
of
the
case
as
in
is
these words:
reported,
opinion
" On this branch of the case the conclusion is this:
" i st. The constitution of the United States secures to citizens of
another state than that in which suit is brought an absolute right to remove their cases into the federal court, upon compliance with the
terms of the act of 1789.
" 2d. The statute of Wisconsin is an obstruction to this right, is
repugnant to the constitution of the United States and the laws in pursuance thereof, and is illegal and void.
" 3d. The agreement of the insurance company derives no support
from an unconstitutional statute, and is void, as it would be had no
such statute been passed."
The opinion of a court must always be read in connection with the
Thus, the second conclusion above refacts upon which it is based.
cited, that the statute of Wisconsin is repugnant to the constitution of
the United States and is illegal and void, must be understood as
spoken of the provision of the statute under review ; to wit, that portion thereof requiring a stipulation not to transfer causes to the courts
The decision was upon that portion of the
of the United States.
statute only, and other portions thereof, when they are presented,
must be judged of upon their merits.
We have not decided that the state of Wisconsin had not the power
to impose terms and conditions as preliminary to the right of an insurance company to appoint agents, keep offices, and issue policies in
that state.
On the contrary, the case of Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall.
at page 458

1 68,

where it is held that such conditions

may be imposed,

was cited

*
*
*
with approval in Insurance Co. v. Morse.
Neither did Insurance Co. v. Morse, supra, undertake to decide
what are the powers of the state of Wisconsin, in revoking a license
previously granted to an insurance company, for what causes or upon
No such queswhat grounds its action in that respect may be based.
tion arose upon the facts, or was argued by counsel, or referred to in
the opinion of the court.
The case now before us does present that point, and with distinctness.

The complainant alleges that a license had been granted to the Continental Insurance Company, upon its executing an agreement that it
would not remove any suit against it from the tribunal of the state to
the federal courts; that in the case of Drake it did, on the tenth day
of March, 1875, transfer his suit from the Winnebago circuit of the
state to the circuit court of the United States ; that Drake thereupon
demanded that the defendant, who is secretary of state of Wisconsin,
should revoke and annul its license, in accordance with the provisions
of the act of 1872; that it is insisted that he has power to do so
summarily, without notice or trial ; that the complainant is fearful
that he will do so, and that it will be done simply and only for the
reason that the complainant transferred to the federal court the case
of Drake, as above set forth.
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The cases of Bank of Augusta v. Earle, Ducat v. Chicago, Paul v.

Virginia, and Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, establish the prin-

ciple that a state may impose upon a foreign corporation, as a condition of coming into or doing business within its territory, any terms,
conditions and restrictions it may think proper, that are not repugThe point is
nant to the constitution or laws of the United States.
elaborated at great length by Chief Justice Taney in the case first
named, and by Mr. Justice Field in the case last named.
The correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a necesA mere license by a state is
sary consequence of the main power.
Rector v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300; People v.
always revocable.
Roper, 35 N. Y. 629; People v. Commissioners, 47 N. Y. 501. The
power to revoke can only be restrained, if at all, by an explicit contract upon good consideration to that effect.
Humphrey v. Pegues,
16 Wall. 244; Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 Wall. 454.
A license to a foreign corporation to enter a state does not involve
a permanent right to remain.
Subject to the laws and constitution of
the United States, full power and control over its territories, its
citizens, and its business, belong to the state.
If the state has the power to do an act, its intention or the reason
by which it is influenced in doing it can not be inquired into. Thus,
the pleading before us alleges that the permission of the Continental
Insurance Company, to transact its business in Wisconsin, is about to
be revoked, for the reason that it removed the case of Drake from
the state to the federal courts.
If the act of an individual is within the terms of the law, whatever
may be the reason which governs him, or whatever may be the result,
The acts of a state are subject to still less
it can not be impeached.
inquiry, either as to the act itself or as to the reason for it. The state
of Wisconsin, except so far as its connection with the constitution and
laws of the United States alters its position, is a sovereign state, possessing all the powers of the most absolute government in the world.
The argument that the revocation in question is made for an unreason can not be sustained.
The suggestion conconstitutional
founds an act with an emotion or a mental proceeding, which is not
An
the subject of inquiry in determining the validity of a statute.
unconstitutional reason or intention is an impracticable suggestion,
which can not be applied to the affairs of life. If the act done by the
state is legal, is not in violation of the constitution or laws of the
United States, it is quite out of the power of any court to inquire
what was the intention of those who enacted the law. * * *
The statute of Wisconsin declares that if a foreign insurance company shall remove any case from its state court into the federal courts,
contrary to the provisions of the act of ,1870, it shall be the duty of
the secretary of state immediately to cancel its license to do business
within the state. If the state has the power to cancel the license, it has
the power to judge of the cases in which the cancellation shall be
It has the power to determine for what causes and in what
made.
manner the revocation shall be made.
2 WIL. CAS.

21
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It

is said that we thus indirectly sanction what we condemn when
presented directly ; to wit, that we enable the state of Wisconsin to

enforce an agreement to abstain from the federal courts.
This is an
"inexact statement." The effect of our decision in this respect is
that the state may compel the foreign company to abstain from the
federal courts, or to cease to do business in the state.
It gives the
the
This
because
the
is
has
option.
justifiable,
complainant
company
no constitutional right to do business in that state ; that state has authority at anytime to declare that it shall not transact business there.
This is the whole point of the case, and, without reference to the injustice, the prejudice, or the wrong that is alleged to exist, must deNo right of the complainant under the laws or
termine the question.
constitution of the United States, by its exclusion from the state, is
There is
infringed, and this is what the state now accomplishes.
nothing, therefore, that will justify the interference cf this court.

Reversed.

Note: See, 1857, Shelby v. Hoffman, 7 Oh. St. 450; 1869, Hobbs v. Manhattan Ins. Co., 56 Me. 417, 96 Am. Dec. 472; 1870, Morton v. Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 105 Mass. 141, 7 Am. Rep. 505; 1870, People v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 21
Mich. 577, 4 Am. Rep. 504; 1872, W. U. Tel. Co. v. Dickinson, 40 Ind. 444, 13
Am. Rep. 295; 1872, N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Best, 23 Oh. St. 105; 1874, The
Home Ins. Co. v. Davis, 29 Mich. 238; 1874, Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall.
445; 1875, Railway Pass. Assn. v. Pierce, 27 Oh. St. 155; 1875, Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. Doyle, 6 Biss. 461 ; 1876, State v. Doyle, 40 Wis. 175; 1886, Goodwill v.. Kriechbaum (Barron v. Burnside), 70 Iowa 362 ; 1887, Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186; 1889, Rece v. N. N. &. M. V. Co., 32 W. Va. 164; 1890,
Texas v. Worsham, 76 Tex. 556; 1892, Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, 146
U. S. 202; 1894, Martin v. B. & O. R. Co., 151 U. S. 673, 684; 1895, Commonwealth v. East Tenn. C. Co., 97 Ky. 238; 1898, Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co.
v. Louisville T. Co., 174 U. S. 552, 563.

Sec. 483.

THE PEOPLE
1883.

Same,

(2)
v.

retaliatory laws.

THE FIRE ASSOCIATION OF PHILADELPHIA. 1

IN THE COURT

OF

APPEALS

1311-328, 44

OF

NEW YORK.

Am. Rep. 380.

92

N. Y. Rep.

[Appeal from judgment of general term of the supreme court in
favor of the defendant, in a suit wherein the people claimed the association should pay a tax of three per cent, of its gross premiums
within the state. The question involved the constitutionality of the
New York retaliatory law of 1875.]
FINCH, J. The legislation of the state relating to foreign insurance companies is challenged on this appeal as a violation of constiThe act of 1875 (chapter 60) in substance provides
tutional right.
that an insurance corporation of another state, seeking to do business
Statement abridged ; arguments and part of opinion omitted. This decision
was affirmed by the supreme court of the U. S. Phil. Fire Assn. v. New
York, 119 U. S. 110.
1
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here, shall pay to the superintendent of the insurance department for
taxes, fines, penalties, certificates of authority, license fees and otherwise, an amount equal to that imposed by the state of its origin upon
of this state seeking to do business there, when such
companies
The evident purpose of
amount charged is greater than our own.
the act is to treat the corporations of another state seeking to transact
business here precisely as such other state should treat our own corpoIt rests upon the idea that the
rations seeking to do business there.
comity due from one state to another is not required to be more than
equal and reciprocal,' and what is wholly a matter of privilege may be
granted or withheld upon conditions.
This legislation is assailed, first, upon the ground that it is an unlawful delegation of the legislative power, and the general term have
so held upon the authority of Barto v. Himrod (8 N. Y. 483).
We
do not think that case at all decisive of this.
What was there denominated the school law came from the hands of the legislature, not as a
Whether it should be a law or not was
law, but as a proposition.
The legislature
precisely the question submitted to the popular vote.
proposed the law, but left it to the people to enact. * * *
This court held that the legislature, under the constitution, could
not so delegate its power, but was bound to determine for itself the
But nothing
expediency of the measure, and either enact or reject it.
in that decision denied to the legislature the right to pass a law whose
operation might depend upon, or be affected by, a future contingency.
The opinions expressly conceded the existence of such power. It was
not denied that a valid statute may be passed to take effect upon the
And this was
happening of some future event, certain or uncertain.
said as to the character of such event, viz. : "The event or change of
circumstances on which a law may be made to take effect must be such
as, in the judgment of the legislature, affects the expediency of the law ;
an event on which the expediency of the law in the judgment of the lawmakers depends.
On this question of expediency the legislature must
exercise its own judgment definitively and finally."
The statute before us fully answers this description.
It came from the hands of the
legislature a complete and perfect law, having at once a binding force
of its own, and dependent upon no additional consent or action for its
The question of expediency involved in it was
vitality and existence.
not delegated to any other tribunal, but settled definitively and finally
It determined, as a conclusion proper and
by the legislature itself.
expedient, that foreign insurance companies, as the price of admission to our territory, should pay in taxes, license fees and the like
precisely what the states which created them should impose upon our
companies in excess of our usual rates as the price of admission to the
foreign territory. That was the whole question involved. Nothing
else in the proposed law remained to be settled as expedient or otherwise, and that question the legislature determined for itself, upon its
own reasons and its sole responsibility. Neither the law nor its exIt remained
pediency depended upon the legislation of another state.
the law and its expediency was the same, whether other states legis-
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If they did, the contingency arose which the law stood
lated or not.
ready to meet; if they did not, it remained none the less the law, alThis court has steadthough no fact occurred to set it in operation.
ily declined to push the doctrine of Barto v. Himrod beyond the point
*
*
*
which it decided.
(After holding that the tax or fine was not left to the legislative
discretion of another state, and if it was, it would not be invalid.)
A second objection to the constitutionality of the act is founded
upon article 14 of the federal constitution, and especially upon its
final clause, which commands that no state shall " deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The argument here takes a wide range and touches upon questions of supreme
and vital importance as to the relations of the states to each other,
and of each to the United States.
Corporations are claimed to be
"persons" within the meaning and protection of the clause referred
to ; its force and operation is carried beyond the limit indicated by
the emergency from which it sprang ; and it is asserted to forbid unequal taxation and condemn such legislation as that under consideration. But we think these grave questions are not before us, and the
clause relied upon has no application to the rights of the defendant.
It is a corporation, organized and existing under the laws of Pennsylvania; a creature of those laws, and beyond their jurisdiction, carrying its corporate life and existence only by sufferance and upon an
It could not come within our jurisdiction,
express or implied consent.
or transact business within our territory, except by our permission,
either express or implied.
The right of a state to exclude foreign
corporations is perfectly settled and not open to debate.
(Paul v.
Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 586; Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566; Co. of San Mateo
v. S. P. R. Co., 13 Fed. Rep. 722, Field,
Out of comity between the states has grown a right founded upon implied consent.
Where a state does not forbid, or its public policy, as evidenced by
its statutes, is not infringed, a foreign corporation may transact business within its boundaries and be entitled to the protection of its laws.
But this right is still founded upon consent which is implied from
comity and the absence of prohibition. But a state may prohibit. * * *
The situation, then, is this : The state, having the power to exclude
foreign corporations, determines to do so unless they will submit to
certain conditions.
It meets the applicant on the border, forbidding
admission, as it has a right to do, except on condition that it will fulfill all of the requirements of our statutes relating to foreign corporations, one of which is the very law here assailed.
When the corporation comes in it agrees to the conditions.
They become binding
The tax or license fee charged by the act of 1865 is
by its assent.
one of these conditions.
It is imposed as the price of permission to
come within the jurisdiction, and not as a tax upon one already within
the jurisdiction.
The fourteenth amendment, therefore, has no apIt can apply to foreign insurance companies only after they
plication.
have performed the conditions upon which they are entitled to admis-
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Any other view of the case involves this absurdity: that the
foreign company may agree to pay the tax charged by the act of 1865
so as to get within our jurisdiction, and then refuse to pay it while insisting upon the right to remain. It can not agree to conditions as the
price of admission, and after having been admitted turn around and
Even if the conditions were unconstitutional, which
dispute them.
can not be said of the terms of the act of 1865, considered as conditions, the foreign company could waive the objection (Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511; Sherman v. McKeon, 38 N. Y. 266; Phyfe v.
Eimer, 45 N. Y. 102) ; and does do so when it accepts the conditions
by coming in under them, and is estopped from raising the question.
(Vose v. Cockcroft, 44 N. Y. 415.) Even where the condition was
a violation of the federal constitution and the supreme court of the
United States so declared, they refused to prevent the state from excluding the offending company and revoking its license.
(Doyle v.
Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535.)
The constitutional difference between the rights of non-resident
individuals and foreign corporations is fundamental and apparent.
The citizen of another state has a constitutional right to come within
our jurisdiction.
The charter of the nation has secured him that
right, and we can not exclude him nor clog his rights with conditions,
unless in exceptional cases under the police power.
But foreign corporations, artificial beings, the product of a law not our own, have no
constitutional right to pass their own borders and come into ours.
The federal constitution has neither granted nor secured any such
right. We may exclude absolutely, and in that power is involved the
Until they are
right to admit upon such conditions as we please.
within our jurisdiction, the final clause of article 14, by its own terms,
does not apply.
While they stand at the door bargaining for the
right to come within, they may decline to come, but can not question
our conditions if they do.
How, then, is the legislation vicious which
proposes to treat them precisely as their own state treats our corporations similarly situated ? Is exact equality unfair?
Must comity
become magnanimity or injustice?
If we owe courtesy to sister
states, do we not also owe protection to our own corporations, formed
and fostered under our law ? Is it vicious to insist for them upon
These questions our legislature
precise equality of treatment?
The inquiry was within the just range of their discretion.
answered.
This court, at least, is bound to assume, and finds no difficulty in assuming, that they answered it wisely and justly.
Reversed.
sion.

Retaliatory laws: 1879, Goldsmith v. Home Ins. Co., 62 Ga. 379;
Clark & Murrell v. Port of Mobile, 67 Ala. 217; 1883, The Phoenix Ins.
Co. v. Welch, 29 Kan. 672; 1883, Ohio v. Moore, 39 Ohio St. 486; 1886, Philadelphia Fire Assn. v. New York, 119 U. S. 110; 1887, State, ex rel. N. E. M.
L. Ins.Co.,v. Reinmnnd, 45 Ohio St. 214; 1888, State of Minnesota v. Fidelity
& Gas. Ins. Co., 39 Minn. 538; 1888, State v. Insurance Co. of North America, 115 Ind. 257; 1889, State v. The Fidelity & Casualty Co., 77 Iowa 648;
1889, Germania Ins. Co. v. Swigert, 128 111. 237, 4 L. R. A. 473; 1890, Stntp of
Ohio v. West. U. M. Life, etc., Soc., 47 Ohio St. 167, 8 L. R. A. 129; 1891, TalNote.

1880,
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bott v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 74 Md. 536, 13 L. R. A. 584; 1892, State of
Ohio v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 49 Ohio St. 440, 34 Am. St. Rep. 573, 16 L. R.
A. 611, supra, p. 406; 1894, People v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 153 111. 25, 26 L.
R. A. 295 ; 1894, State v. Ackerman, 51 Ohio'St. 163, 24 L. R. A. 298, note; 1899,
Cravens v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 148 Mo. 583, 71 Am. St. Rep. 628.

Sec. 484.

(3)

Same,

discrimination.

MANCHESTER FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY
1899.

v.

HERRIOTT. 1

IN THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT
OF IOWA.
91 Fed. Rep. 711720.

The bill in this case is filed on behalf of
SHIRAS, District Judge.
some thirty-two fire insurance companies doing business in the state
of Iowa, but incorporated under the laws of Great Britain and other
states foreign to the United States, the ultimate purpose of the bill
being to test the constitutionality of section 1333 of the code of Iowa,
which, in substance, provides that all insurance companies incorporated under the laws of a state or nation other than the United States
shall, at the time of making the annual statements as required by law,
pay into the state treasuiy 3^ per cent, of the gross amount of premiums received for business done in the state of Iowa during the preceding year ; that all insurance companies incorporated under the
laws of a sister state of the Union shall pay into the treasury 2% per
cent, of the gross amount of premiums received during the preceding
year; and that all insurance companies incorporated under the laws
of the state of Iowa, not including county, mutual, and fraternal beneficiary associations, shall pay into the treasury one per cent, of the
gross amount received from premiums and assessments after deducting amounts paid for losses and premiums returned ; it being further
provided that upon payment of the proper sums duplicate receipts
therefor should be issued, one of which must be filed with the auditor
of state, who is then authorized to issue the annual certificate requisite to enable the company to continue in business during the coming
year.

In the bill filed it is averred that the complainant companies, more
than fifteen years ago, were admitted into the state of Iowa for the purpose of transacting the business of insurance, and that they then fully
complied with all the provisions and requirements of the laws of Iowa
necessary to secure their lawful admission into and recognition by the
state, and that they have since complied each year with the requirement
of the state laws, and have each year had issued to them the certificate
It is
showing their authorization to continue in business in Iowa.
further averred that in reliance upon this action on part of the state
the complainants have expended large sums of money in establishing
agencies, in securing offices, in advertising, and in providing the ma1

Statement

abridged,

and part of opinion omitted.
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terials necessary to conduct their business in Iowa, and that they have
entered into many contracts of insurance with the citizens of Iowa,
which are now in force, and have expended large amounts in meeting the obligations arising in Iowa in connection with the business
It is
which they were authorized by the state to undertake in Iowa.
further charged in the bill that up to the year 1897 no discrimination
in the burden of taxation had been made between foreign and domestic corporations engaged in the business of insurance in the state
of Iowa, but that in that year the legislature enacted the existing code
of Iowa, which contains the section already cited, imposing upon foreign
companies a heavier and unequal burden of taxation as compared
with corporations created under the laws of Iowa, and as compared
with companies created under the laws of the states of the Union other
than Iowa; and it is averred in the bill that the provisions of this section are in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution
of the United States, of the provisions of the civil rights act, and of
article 8, section 2, of the constitution of the state of Iowa, which
provides that " the property of all corporations for pecuniary profit
* * *
shall be subject to taxation the same as that of individuals."
demurred,
in
that
the
one
defendants
suit
was
effect
against
(The
the state, and also that there was no cause of complaint, but that
After disposing of the first
the state legislation was constitutional.
the
court
:
proceeds )
point,
On behalf of complainants it is admitted that a state has the right
to wholly exclude foreign corporations other than those engaged in
interstate commerce or in carrying on the business of the United
States from admission into the state, and it may prescribe the condition upon which such companies may enter the state; but it is claimed
that if foreign companies are admitted into the state, and permitted to engage in business therein, the state is then debarred from
imposing further conditions on the right to continue in business, and
in the exercise of the right of taxation it can not impose any burden
upon the corporation other or more onerous than is imposed on domestic corporations engaged in the like business ; that when a foreign
corporation is admitted within a state, and engages in business therein,
having fully complied with the requirements and conditions then imposed by the law of the state, it comes within the protection of the
fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution, and of the provisions of the civil rights act; and. having thus become entitled to the
equal protection of the laws of the state and of the United States, it
can not rightfully be subjected to a burden of taxation greater than that
imposed upon like domestic corporations, and that, therefore, the
provisions of section 1333 are invalid and void, because thereby
corporations created under the laws of foreign countries are discriminated against as compared with corporations created under the laws
of states other than Iowa, as well as when compared with corporations created under the laws of Iowa.
In support of the contention
of complainants, counsel have submitted a very full and elaborate
brief, citing at length from numerous decisions, and have supported
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the same by an able oral argument, which, if space and time permitted, ought, perhaps, to receive a more extended discussion than can
now be accorded ; but, as I understand the decisions of the supreme
court of the United States, the pivotal questions involved in the case
There can be no doubt upon the
have been settled by that court.
proposition that if a foreign corporation is admitted into a state, and
lawfully engages in business therein, its property and rights within
such state are entitled to the equal protection of the law, the same as
those of a like domestic corporation ; but that is not the point at issue
in this case.
The provisions of section 1333 of the code do not affect the propThey
erty of the companies, nor impose any lien or burden thereon.
impose a burden upon the right of the companies to continue in the
This burden is
business within the state after the ist of March next.
in form and in substance a tax, but it is not a tax imposed upon the
It is a burden in the form of a
tangible property of the companies.
tax, imposed as a condition upon the right of the companies to conIt can not be denied that the state has the
tinue in business in Iowa.
right to prescribe the terms, conditions, and burdens subject to which
a foreign corporation can obtain the right of admission into the state,
and it is beyond question that, so long as the provisions of section
1333 remain in force, no foreign corporation can secure the privilege
of admission into the state, except upon a compliance with its reBut it is said that, after a foreign corporation has once
quirements.
rightfully entered the state, and engaged in business therein, no additional burden or restrictions can be imposed as a condition to the
exercise of the right to continue in business.
The power and right of
the state to exclude foreign corporations,
not engaged in interstate
commerce, or in the furtherance of the business of the United States,
from entering the state, includes the right to preclude such foreign
corporations from continuing in business, and also includes the right
to impose conditions upon such continuances.
When a foreign corporation has been admitted into a state, and has, in connection with
the business it was authorized to carry on, accumulated property, or
entered into contracts, such property and contract rights are under the
protection of the law, but the right to invoke protection for such acquired property does not confer upon the corporation the right to insist that it shall be permitted to enter into further contracts, or acquire other property, contrary to the expressed will of the state embodied in an act of the legislature.
The privilege of continuing in the business of insurance within the
state, in the case of the complainant companies, is derived from the
legislation of the state, and it is for the legislature to determine, from
time to time, upon what terms, and subject to what conditions, such
*
* *
privilege will be continued to the companies.
(Citing Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall.
410, and quoting from syllabus to Pembina Silver Min. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, to the effect that:)
"The only limitation upon this power of the state to exclude a for-
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eign corporation from doing business within its limits, or hiring offices
for that purpose, or to exact conditions for allowing the corporation
to do business or hire offices there, arises where the corporation is in
the employ of the federal government, or where its business is strictly

foreign." * * *
(Quoting from Doyle v. Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535, to the effect that:)

commerce,

"A

interstate or

to a foreign corporation to enter a state does not involve
right to remain."
An examination of the statutes of the state of Iowa shows that for
years it has been incumbent upon all foreign insurance companies to
obtain a renewal in each year of their license to continue in business
in the state, and, unless such license in the form of a certificate was
issued, the company had no right to continue the transaction of insurThe ground of complaint in the present inance within the state.
the
state
has
stance is that
imposed certain conditions as a prerequiof
license
a
site to the issuance
enabling the companies to continue in
business during the coming year, and these conditions are complained
of as onerous, and as making a discrimination between the license tax
exacted from corporations created under the laws of other nations, as
In Pembina
compared with domestic or sister state corporations.
Con. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 8
Sup. Ct. 737, it is expressly held that " the state is not prohibited
from discriminating in the privileges it may grant to foreign corporations as a condition of their doing business or hiring offices within its
limits"; and if it be true as it undoubtedly is that the state may
impose such conditions as it deems best upon the privilege of obtaining a license to do business in the state during the coming year, the
courts can not release the companies from the obligation to perform
the conditions, if they wish to continue in business during the coming
If the conditions imposed are onerous, discriminatory, or othyear.
erwise inexpedient, relief must come from the legislature, and not
from the courts.
The argument for complainants is largely based
upon the thought that, when foreign corporations are once admitted
within the state, they are entitled, under the provisions of the state
and federal constitutions, to insist that they shall be subjected to the
same burdens of taxation as may be imposed upon similar corporations engaged in the like business.
If the license tax provided for in
section 1333 was a tax upon property, real or personal, owned by the
companies within the state, there would be much force in the argument; but that is not the fact.
This license tax is the condition imposed by the state upon the privilege of engaging or continuing in
business within the state.
It is optional with the companies whether
they will subject themselves to the burden or not, but they can not
enjoy the privilege of continuing in business in the state, except upon
compliance with the terms which the state has seen fit to impose as a
In the adoption of section
condition to the exercise of the privilege.
was
not
the
state
to
right
its
exercising
subject property or per1333
sons within the state to a proper burden of taxation, in which event it
would have been subject to the provisions of the state constitution relicense

a permanent
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quiring equality in the burdens imposed ; but the state was exercising
its undoubted right to prescribe the terms upon which foreign corporations may be allowed to continue in the business of insurance within the state, and, as the right to impose terms is possessed by the
state, it is not for the courts to question the expediency or justice of
*
*
*
the conditions enacted by the state.
Demurrer sustained.
Note. Discrimination against corporations.
(a) Domestic corporations are persons in the state, within the provisions of
the fourteenth amendment, forbidding the states from depriving persons of
property without due process of the law, or denying any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. See K. Tax Cases, 13 Fed. Rep.
448.
722, supra,
7, p. 36, and note, par. 10, supra, p. 56; also note, supra,
(b) Foreign corporations that have obtained the state's consent to do business in a state, and have thereby acquired property, or property rights, are
also persons, within the provisions of the fourteenth amendment.
476,
Supra,
and note.
(c) This, however, does not prevent the state from classifying either domestic or foreign corporations, for taxation or regulation under the police
powers, and applying different rules to the various classes, when the classifi1887,
cation and rules are not merely arbitrary but have a reasonable basis.
Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68; 1888, Missouri Pac. R. v. Mackey, 127 TJ. S.
205 ; 1888, Walston v. Nevin, 128 U. S. 578 ; 1890, Bells Gap, etc., Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232; 1892, Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 TJ. S. 339;
1893, Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657; 1894, Columbia So. R. Co. v. Wright,
151 U. S. 470; 1894, Marchant v. Penn. R., 153 U. S. 380; 1897, St. Louis
& S. F. R. v. Matthews, 165 U. S. 1; 1897, Gulf Col., etc., R. v. Ellis, 165
U. S. 150.
(d) And as to foreign corporations the state can discriminate in any way
it sees fit, in regard to the privilege to enter, or continue in, the state and do
business therein, that does not deprive them of their property, or interfere
with interstate or foreign commerce, or commerce with the Indian tribes, or
does not burden them as an agency of the United States government.
1870,
Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410; 1886, Philadelphia Fire Association v. New
York, 119 U. S. 1 10, 120; 1888, Pembina Consol. M. & M. Co. v. Pennsylvania,
125 U. S. 181; 1898, Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 TJ. S. 557; 1899, Scottish
TJ. & Natl. Ins. Co. v. Herriott, 109 Iowa 606, 80 N. W. Rep. 665, 77 Am. St.
Rep. 548 ; 1900, Hawley v. Kurd, 72 Vt. 122, 82 Am. St. Rep. 922, 52 L. R. A.
195, 47 Atl. 401; 1901, Blue Jacket Consol. C. Co. v. Scherr,
W. Va.
, 40
S.

E.

514.

Compare, 1899, Johnson v. Goodyear Mining Co., 127 Cal. 4, 47
See notes,
10, 476, supra, and
733, infra.
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See Telegraph Company v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, supra, p. 1397 >
Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western U. Tel. Co., $6\J. S. i, supra,
p. 326.
Note.

As to railroads,

see

next note.
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MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS (MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD CONCURRING),
IN COOPER MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. FERGUSON. 1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UN i TED STATES.
Rep. 727-737, on 736-7.

1885.

1131!. S.

it

a

8

it

it

a

a

is

is

is

;

a

is

a

it,

[Suit by the company to recover damages for breach of a contract,
whereby Ferguson agreed to purchase of the company, an Ohio corThe contract was made in Colorado,
poration, a steam engine.
whose constitution provided that no foreign corporation should "do
any business in this state without having one or more known places
of business and an authorized agent or agents in the same upon whom
process may be served ;" the statutes provided that foreign corporations before doing any business in the state should file with the secretary of state, and in the county recorder's office, a certificate stating
the place of business and the name of an agent for service of summons.
The corporation at the time of making the contract, or bringing the suit, had not complied with these provisions, and the defendant so pleaded.
Upon demurrer to these pleas, the circuit court overruled the demurrer and gave judgment for defendant ; this is the error
claimed.]
Whatever power may be conceded to a state, to prescribe conditions on which foreign corporations may transact business within its
limits, it can not be admitted to extend so far as to prohibit or regulate commerce among the states; for that would be to invade the jurisdiction which, by the terms of the constitution of the United States, is
conferred exclusively upon congress.
In the present case, the construction claimed for the constitution ot
Colorado, and the statute of that state passed in execution of
can
not be extended to prevent the plaintiff in error,
corporation of
another state, from transacting any business in Colorado, which, of
commerce.
The transaction in question was clearly of that
itself,
It was the making of contract in Colorado to manufactcharacter.
ure certain machinery in Ohio, to be there delivered for transportation to the purchasers in Colorado.
and to
That was commerce
to regulate commerce between
prohibit it, except upon conditions,
Colorado and Ohio, which
within the exclusive province of conIt
gress.
quite competent, no doubt, for Colorado to prohibit
foreign corporation from acquiring domicile in that state, and to profrom carrying on within that state its business of manufacturhibit
from selling in Colorado,
But
can not prohibit
ing machinery.
by contracts made there, its machinery manufactured elsewhere, for
that would be to regulate commerce among the states.
In Paul v. Virginia,
Wall. 168, the issuing of
policy of in;

1

Statement abridged
arguments and opinion of the court by Mr. Justice
Woods (the result being concurred in by Matthews and Blatchford, JJ., for
reasons here given) omitted.
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surance was expressly held not to be a transaction of commerce, and,
therefore, not excluded from the control of state laws ; and the decision in that case is predicated upon that distinction. It is, therefore,
not inconsistent with these views.

Reversed.
Note.
Interstate or foreign commerce.
Commerce in its broad sense means " interchange of goods,
(a) Definitions
merchandise, or property of any kind ; trade, traffic ; used more especially of
trade on a large scale carried on by transportation of merchandise between
Century
different countries, or bet ween different parts of the same country."

Dictionary.

"

it is interCommerce undoubtedly is traffic, but it is something more,
Marshall, C. J., in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1.
" Commerce is a term of the largest import. It comprehends intercourse for
the purposes of trade in any and all its forms, including transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities between the citizens of one country
and the citizens or subjects of other countries, and between the citizens of
different states." Field, J., in Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275.
"Commerce with foreign countries and among the states, strictly considered,
consists in intercourse and traffic, including in these terms navigation, and
the transportation and transit of persons and property, as well as the purField, J., in County of Mochase, sale, and exchange of commodities."
bile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691 ; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.
S. 196 on 204.
Mr. Justice Lamar, in McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104, quotes approv"It
ingly Pomeroy's Constl. Law, p. 376, where it is said of commerce:
of
includes the fact of intercourse and traffic, and the subject-matter
intercourse and traffic. The fact of intercourse and traffic, again, embraces all the means, instruments, and places by and in which intercourse and traffic are carried on, and further still, comprehends the acts
of carrying them on at these places, and by and with these means. The subject-matter of intercourse or traffic may be either things, goods, chattels, mercourse."

chandise or persons."
Webster defines commerce as "the exchange of merchandise on a large
scale between different places or communities;" this embraces two distinct
ideas, exchange, either by barter or sale, and transportation.
(b) Manufacturing, growing, or making things, even though the intention is
to sell them in other states, is not interstate commerce, or commerce of any
kind : 1894, U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 ; 1899, Fox v. State, 89 Md.
381, 72 Am. St. Rep. 193.
But making things to order, upon sales previously made, and to be shipped
from one state into another, is a transaction of interstate commerce : 1885,
Cooper v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727; 1894, Milan, etc., Co. v. Gorten, 93 Tenn.
590, 26 L. R. A. 135; 1897, State v. Scott, 98 Tenn. 254; 1898, Talbutt v. State,
39 Tex. Grim. Rep. 64, 73 Am. St. Rep. 903.
(c) The fact of intercourse includes purchases and sales of goods that are to
be sent across state lines.

Sales: The negotiation of the sale of goods which are in other states,
"To tax the sale
whether by solicitor or by sample, is interstate commerce.
of such goods, or the offer to sell them, before they are brought into the state,
is * * * clearly a tax on interstate commerce:" 1885, Cooper v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727, supra, p. 1503; 1887, Robbins v. Shelby Taxing Dist., 120
U. S. 489, 59 Am. Rep. 267; 1887, Corson v. Maryland, 120 U. S. 502; 1889,
McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104; 1891, Tredway v. Riley, 32 Neb. 495, 29
Am. St. Rep. 447; 1891, City of Bloomington v Bourland, 137111.534, 31 Am.
St. Rep. 382; 1892, Gunn V. White Sew. Mach. Co., 57 Ark. 24, 38 Am. St.
Rep. 223; 1892, Cook v. Rome Brick Co., 98 Ala. 409; 1893, Kindel v. Beck,
etc., Co., 19 Colo. 310, 24 L. R. A. 311, note; 1894, Milan, etc., Co. v. Gorten, 93 Tenn. 590, 26 L. R. A. 135; 1896, Toledo Com. Co. v. Glen Mfg. Co.,
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Ohio St. 217; 1897, State v. Scott, 98 Tenn. 254; 1897, Miller v. Goodman,
Tex. Civ. App. 244, 7 Am. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 177; 1898, Talbutt v. State,
Tex. Or. Rep. 64, 73 Am. St. Rep. 903; 1898, Mearshon v. Pottsville Lumber Co., 187 Pa. St. 12, 67 Am. St. Rep. 560. Compare, 1886, State v. Long,
95 N. C. 582, 59 Am. Rep. 263; 1897, Allen v. Jones Buggy Co., 91 Tex. 22, 6
Am. &E. C. C. (N. S.)670.
Purchases:
Contracts for the purchase of goods between citizens of different states, made in either state, is a transaction of interstate commerce : 1890,
Colorado I. W. Co. v. Sierra Grande, etc., Co., 15 Colo. 499; 1890, Ware v.
Hamilton Brown, etc., 92 Ala. 145; 1897, McNaughton v. McGirl, 20 Mont.
124, 63 Am. St. Rep. 610.
(d) The fact of intercourse also includes communication between persons,
the transmission of intelligence, the transit of persons, or the transportation
of persons or property, either actual or contemplated, in completion of a commercial transaction, and when across state lines constitute interstate or for1876, Council Bluffs v. Kansas City R., 45 Iowa 338, 24 Am.
eign commerce:
Rep. 773; 1887, Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326; 1893, Kendel
v. Beck & Pauli Lith. Co., 19 Colo. 310, 24 L. R. A. 311, note.
transmission of intelligence by such instrumenTelegraph and telephone,
talities, across state lines, is interstate intercourse: 1877, Pensacola Tel. Co.
v. W. U. Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1, supra; 1881, Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S.
460; 1887, W.U. Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U. S. 347; 1888, Leloupv. Mobile,
127 U. S. 640; 1889, W. U. Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 132 U. S. 472; 1891, Matter of
Penna. Tel. Co., 48 N. J. Eq. 91, 27 Am. St. Rep. 462; 1894, Postal Tel. & Cable Co. v. Charleston, 153 U. S. 692.
Transit or transportation of persons is interstate intercourse when it crosses
state lines : 1867, Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 ; 1875, Henderson v. Mayor,
92 U. S. 259: 1877, Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485; 1882, -People v. Compagnie
Generale, 107 U. S. 59 ; 1884, Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S.
55
15
39

196.

Express business, crossing state lines, is interstate commerce:
1891, Commonwealth v. Smith, 92 Ky. 38, 36 Am. St. Rep. 578; 1891, Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47.
Transportation of either persons or property across state lines is interstate
intercourse : 1872, State Freight Tax Cases, 15 Wall. 232 ; 1872, Osborne v.
Mobile, 16 Wall. 479; 1876, Council Bluffs v. Kan. City, etc., R., 45 Iowa 338,
24 Am. Rep. 773; 1877, Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465; 1885, Pickard v.
Pullman So. Car Co., 117 U. S. 34; 1886, Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Illinois, 118
II. S. 557; 1887, Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230; 1887, Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326; 1889, State v. Indiana, etc., Co., 120
Ind. 575 (piping oil or gas) ; 1898, Kelly v. Rhoads, 7 Wyo. 237, 75 Am. St.
Rep. 904 (driving cattle).
But it has been said that traffic passing out of, and back into, a state is not
interstate commerce:
1892, Lehigh Valley R. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 192.
(e) Commencement of this intercourse.
Such communication, transit or transportation begins, as a matter of interstate commerce, when the message, person, or commodity actually commences to move on its final journey, that is to be continuous until it crosses
the state line, and continues till it reaches its destination ; if it is to be
transmitted by some one engaged in transmitting such things, interstate
intercourse begins when the thing is delivered to the carrier, to be by him
transmitted or forwarded across state lines, and continues until the carriers
engaged have completed the transportation to the place of delivery. It is interstate commerce "when they begin to move from one state to another the
moment in which they begin their final movement on their journey out of
the state." It is not interstate commerce "until actually started in course of
transportation to the state of their destination, or delivered to the common
carrier for that purpose ; the carrying of them to and depositing them at a
depot for the purpose of transportation is no part of that transportation."
1870, The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557 ; 1886, Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517 ; 1886,
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Turpin v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 504; 1891, Bennett v. Am. Ex. Co., 83 Me. 236,
23 Am. St. Rep. 774.
(f) Termination of tins intercourse: The intercourse continues until the
person reaches his destination, or until the carrier has completed its functions
by delivery at the place of delivery; and in the case of commodities shipped
or transported in packages, until the package is broken, or used by the importer, or sold, in its original form, if imported for sale, by him:
1827
Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 ; 1867, Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 ; 1871 ,
Carrier v. Gordon, 21 Ohio St. 605; 1884, Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196; 1884, Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622; 1885, Pickard v.
Pullman So. Car Co., 117 U, S. 34; 1888, Pittsburgh & So. Coal Co. v. Bates,
40 La. Ann. 226, 8 Am. St. Rep. 519 ; 1888, Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R., 125 U.
S. 465; 1890, State v. Winters, 44 Kan. 723; 1890, Keith v. State, 91 Ala. 1;
1890, Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; 1890, Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U. S. 161;
1891, State v. Intox. Liq., etc., 83 Me. 158; 1896, Meyers v. County Commissioners, 83 Md. 385, 55 Am. St. Rep. 349; 1899, Fox" v. State, 89 Md. 381, 73
Am. St. Rep. 193.
But the sale of goods in the original package, by one who purchases from
the importer, is not interstate commerce: 1868, Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall.
Compare, 1899, Hancock v. State,
123 ; 1868, Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall. 148.
89 Md. 725.
(g) What is an original package ? This has been a troublesome question,
but the rule as usually stated is : An original package is "such form and size
of package as is used by producers or shippers for the purpose of securing
both convenience in handling and security in transportation of merchandise
" : 1893, Combetween dealers in the ordinary course of actual commerce
monwealth v. Schollenberger, 156 Pa. St. 201, 36 Am. St. Rep. 32, 22 L. R. A.
155 ; "the bundles as they are put up for transportation, not the single article
within the case, box or bale in which they are shipped" : 1894, State v. Parsons, 124 Mo. 436, 46 Am. St. Rep. 457 ; bottles in a sealed paper box, and these
shipped in a wooden box, the latter is the original package: 1894, Haley v.
State, 42 Neb. 556, 47 Am. St. Rep. 718 ; cigarettes in paper box containing ten
cigarettes sealed and stamped according to the revenue law, and these small
boxes shipped in a box or basket, the box or basket is the original package:
1898, McGregor v. Cone, 104 Iowa 465, 65 Am. St. Rep. 522, 39 L. R. A. 484;
1898, Austin v. State, 101 Tenn. 563, 70 Am. St. Rep. 703 ; 1900, Austin v. TenContra, the paper boxes containing ten cigarettes is
nessee, 179 U. S. 343.
the original package : 1897, State v. Goetze, 43 W. Va. 495, 64 Am. St. Rep. 871,
and the dissenting opinions of the chief justice and Justices Brewer, Shiras,
and Peckham, in Austin v. Tenn., 179 U. S. 343. Mr. Justice Brown, in delivering the opinion of the court in this case, said: "The real question in
this case is whether the size of the package in which the importation is actually made is to govern, or the size of the package in which bonafide transactions are carried on between the manufacturer and the wholesale dealer re*
*
siding in different states. We hold to the latter view.
Without
_
original
is
the
srze
of
an
proper
what
undertaking to determine
package in
each case, evidently the doctrine has no application where the manufacturer
puts up the package with the express intent of evading the laws of another
state, and is enabled to carry out his purpose by the facile agency of an express company, and the connivance of his consignee." This case cites and
fully reviews the previous cases.
1827, Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; 1890, State v.
See further:
Chapman, 1 S. Dak. 414, 10 L. R. A/432; 1892, Wasserboehr v. Boulier, 84
Me. 165,30 Am. St. Rep. 344; 1894, State v. Board of Assessors, 46 La. Ann.
145, 49 Am. St. Rep. 318; 1894, Commonwealth v. Paul, 170 Pa. St. 284, 50
Am. St. Rep. 776, 30 L. R. A. 396; 1897, Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania
171 U. S. 1 ; 1899, May v. New Orleans, 178 U. S. 496; 1899, Fox v. State, 89
Md. 381, 73 Am. St. Rep. 193.
It is frequently
(h) Corporations organized to engage in interstate commerce.
stated that a state can not exclude a corporation organized to engage in interstate or foreign commerce ; this, perhaps, is true if the state corporation has
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been directly or expressly made an instrument of the national government,
or expressly authorized by it, to carry on interstate commerce ; but if not so,
any state can exclude the corporation from coming into the state without its
consent, and establishing a place of business there for anything etee than interstate business ; it is interference with interstate commerce that is forbidden to the states, and not interference with corporations that are only authorized by other states to enter and do business in the state objecting.
The state creating the corporation has control over it, but not over its interstate commerce ; the national government has control over its interstate commerce, but not over the corporation itself otherwise; a foreign state where it
seeks to do business has the right to exclude the corporation, but not its interstate commerce.
1876, Holbert v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. R., 45 Iowa 23 ; 1881,
Chapman v. Pittsburgh S. R. Co., 18 W. Va. 184; 1894, Postal Tel. Co. v.
Charleston, 153 U. S. 692; 1901, Cargill Co. v. State of Minn., 180 U. S. 452.
But see Stockton v. B. & N. Y. R. Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 9.
(i) Railroads, etc. The U. S. Rev. Statutes provide (section 5258) "that
every railroad company in the United States, whose road is operated by steam,
is hereby authorized to carry upon and over its road, passengers and freight,
troops and mail, on their way from any state to another state, and to connect
with roads of other states so as to form continuous lines for the transportation of the same to the place of destination,"
but this shall not "be construed to authorize any railroad company to build any new road or connection with any other road without authority from the state in which such railroad or connection may be proposed.
And congress may at any time alter,
amend or repeal this section."
1873, Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 19 Wall. 584 ;
1876, Holbert v. St. Louis, K., etc., R., 45 Iowa 23; 1881, Chapman v. Pittsburgh & S. R. Co., 18 W. Va. 184; 1884, Hardy v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 32
Kans. 698; 1888, Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 125 U. S. 465; 1892,
Norfolk & W. R. Co., v. Commonwealth, 88 Va. 95; 1895, In re Debs, 158 U.
S. 564; 1896, Union Pac. R. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 163 U.S. 564; 1896,
Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299; 1896, Illinois Cent. R. v. Illinois, 163
U. S. 142 ; 1897, Gladson v. Minn., 166 U. S. 427 ; 1897, New York, N. H., etc.,
R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628; 1900, Wisconsin, M. &. P. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287.
Compare Stockton v. B. & N. Y. R. Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 9,
et seq.
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HOOPER
1894.

v.

CALIFORNIA.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
Rep. 648-664.

155

U. S.

[Hooper was convicted in the California courts of

a misdemeanor
statute of that state making it such an offense "for a
person in that state to procure insurance for a resident in the state,
from an insurance company not incorporated under its laws," and
which had not filed certain bonds required. Hooper, the agent in
California, had, through a New York firm, and upon application of
the insured residing in California, procured for him marine insurance
on an ocean steamer, from an insurance company incorporated in Mas-

for violating

a

1
Statement abridged; part of opinion of White, J., and all of dissenting
opinion of Harlan, J. (Brewer and Jackson concurring), omitted.
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sachusetts, and which had not complied with the laws of California
Error was alleged upon the
relative to doing business therein.
ground that the California statute violated rights under the interstate
commerce clause and the fourteenth amendment to the United States

constitution.]
MR. JUSTICE WHITE. The principle that the right of a foreign
corporation to engage in business within a state other than that of its
creation, depends solely upon the will of such other state, has been
long settled, and many phases of its application have been illustrated
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet.
by the decisions of this court.
519; Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 18 How. 404; Society for
Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594; Provident Institution v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 611; Hamilton Co. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 632;
Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 ; Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410 ; State
Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284; Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5 ; Delaware Railroad Tax Case, 18 Wall. 206; State
Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575 ; Philadelphia & Southern Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326; California v. Central Pacific R. Co., 127 U. S. i ; Home Insurance Co. v. New York, 134
U. S. 594; Maine v. Grand Trunk Railway, 142 U. S. 217; Ashley
v. Ryan, 153 U. S. 436, 445.
Whilst there are exceptions to this rule, they embrace only cases
where a corporation created by one state rests its right to enter another
and to engage in business therein upon the federal nature of its busiAs, for instance, where it has derived its being from an act of
ness.
congress, and has become a lawful agency for the performance of
governmental or gzsasi-govern mental functions, or where it is necessarily an instrumentality of interstate commerce, or its business constitutes such commerce, and is, therefore, solely within the paramount
In these cases, the exceptional business is
authority of congress.
The reasons upon
protected against interference by state authority.
which the exceptions to the general rule are based have been often
explained. Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460; Gloucester
Ferry Co. V.Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 205, 211; Phila. Steamship
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 342; McCall v. California, 136
U. S. 104, no; Norfolk & Western Railroad v. Pennsylvania, 136
U. S. 114, 118; Pickard v. Pullman Southern Car Co., 117 U.S.
34; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640; Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S.
129; Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141; Crutcher v. Ken-

tucky,

141

In the

U. S. 47.

last cited the precedents were fully reviewed, and the
governing reasons of the law upon the subject were clearly elucidated.
The contention here is that, inasmuch as the contract was one for
marine insurance, it was a matter of interstate commerce, and as such
beyond the reach of state authority and included among the exceptions to the general rule.
This proposition involves an erroneous
That the busiconception of what constitutes interstate commerce.
ness of insurance does not generically appertain to such commerce
case
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has been settled since the case of Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168. See,
also, Phila. Fire Association v. New York, 119 U. S. no, and
*
* *
authorities there cited.
In Crutcherv. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, the court, in applying the exception to the general rule, held that the state of Kentucky was without
power to prevent a corporation engaged in interstate commerce from
entering that state and carrying on its business therein, and also pointed out the distinction between the making of contracts of insurance
and interstate commerce, or the necessary instrumentalities thereof, as
" The case is entirely different from that of foreign corpofollows:
rations seeking to do a business which does not belong to the regulatThe insurance business, for example, can
ing power of congress.
not be carried on in a state by a foreign corporation without complying with all the conditions imposed by the legislation of that state.
So with regard to manufacturing corporations, and all other corporations whose business is of a local and domestic nature, vhich would
include express companies whose business is confined to points and
The cases to this effect are numerplaces wholly within the state.
ous." Page 59. * * *
The contract of inThe business of insurance is not commerce.
The making of such
surance is not an instrumentality of commerce.
intercourse, and in this
a contract is a mere incident of commercial
respect there is no difference whatever between insurance against fire
and insurance against "the perils of the sea."
The state of California has the power to exclude foreign insurance
companies altogether from her territory, whether they were formed
for the purpose of doing a fire or a marine business.
She has the
power, if she allows any such companies to enter her confines, to
And, as
determine the conditions on which the entry shall be made.
a necessary consequence of her possession of these powers, she has
the right to enforce any conditions imposed by her laws as preliminary to the transaction of business within her confines by a foreign
corporation whether the business is to be carried on through officers
or through ordinaiy agents of the company, and she has also the
further right to prohibit a citizen from contracting within her jurisdiction with any foreign company which has not acquired the privilege
of engaging in business therein, either in his own behalf or through
an agent empowered to that end.
The power to exclude embraces
the power to regulate, to enact and enforce all legislation in regard to
things done within the territory of the state which may be directly or
incidentally requisite in order to render the enforcement of the conceded power efficaciousjto the fullest extent, subject always, of course, to
the paramount authority of the constitution of the United States. * * *
(After holding that the facts showed that the agent had procured
the insurance within the state, within the meaning of the statute,

proceeds;)
It is said that the
One more contention remains to be noticed.
right of a citizen to contract for insurance for himself is guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment, and that, therefore, he can not be de2
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prived by the state of the capacity to so contract through an agent.
The fourteenth amendment, however, does not guarantee the citizen
the right to make within his state, either directly or indirectly, a contract, the making whereof is constitutionally forbidden by the state.
The proposition that, because a citizen might make such a contract
for himself beyond the confines of his state, therefore he might authorize an agent to violate in his behalf the laws of his state, within
her own limits, involves a clear non sequitur, and ignores the vital
distinction between acts done within and acts done beyond a state's
jurisdiction.
Judgment affirmed.
See, 1868, Paul v. Virginia, 8 "Wall. (U. S.) 168; 1893, Cone Export,
Note.
etc., Co. v. Poole, 41 S. C. 70, 24 L. R. A. 289; 1894, Ashley v. Ryan, 153 U.
Temple Co., 105 Mich. 400, 55 Am. St. Rep. 457 ; 1896,
Daggs v. Orient Ins. Co., 136 Mo. 382, 58 Am. St. Rep. 638; 1896, Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U. S.579; 1898, Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Fricke, 99 Wis. 364, 41
L. R. A. 557 ; 1898, Sandall v. Atlantic M. L. Ins. Co., 24 S. C. 53, 31 S. E.
Rep. 230; 1899, Manchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Herriott, 91 Fed. (C. C.) 711.
supra, p. 1498; 1899, Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557; 1899, Cravens v,
N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 148 Mo. 583,71 Am. St. Rep. 628; 1900, Waters-Pierce Oil
Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 28; 1901, John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Warren,
181 U. S. 73.
S. 436 ; 1895, Seamans v.
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1

WEST VIRGINIA.

566-573.

[Action by the Tie Company, an Ohio corporation, upon a conA special plea
tract for the purchase of ties made in West Virginia.
in abatement alleged that the corporation had not complied with the
West Virginia statute before doing business in the state. A demurrer, which was sustained in the lower court, raised the question of
the effect of the statute.]
SNYDER, President. * * * Among other provisions the said
statute declares, in substance, that any corporation, created by the
laws of any state or foreign country, "may, unless it be otherwise expressly provided, hold property and transact business in this state,
upon complying with the requirements of this section, and not otherwise." It then requires such corporation to file a copy of its charter
with the secretary of state, and file in each county in which it does
business a certificate of the secretary of state that it has so filed such
copy of its charter in his office; and it further provides, that "Every
such corporation, which shall do business in this state, without having
complied with the provisions of this section, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not less than
$500 and not more than $1,000 for each month its failui'e so to comply shall continue."
1
Statement abridged ; part of opinion omitted.
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In the absence of any statute limiting the right of a ccrporation to do
so, it may, unless contrary to the public policy of the state, hold property and do business without as well as within the state or county by
which it was created.
Ang. & Ames on Corp.,
372-376; Field on
Corp., 363. This statute, being not only in derogation of common law,
but penal in its character, must be construed strictly.
There is certainly no public policy of this state which is contravened by permitting corporations such as the plaintiff here to do business in the state,
because the statute expressly authorizes them to do so upon compliance with its requirements.
The evident purpose of these requirements of the statute is to protect parties dealing with foreign corporations from imposition, and to secure convenient means of obtaining
jurisdiction in the local courts of the state, and information such as
will facilitate the service of process upon such corporations.
It is
clearly not the primary purpose of the legislature, in passing such
statutes, to render the contracts and dealings of such corporations,
which have not complied with these requirements, void and unenforcible. Hence the decided weight of authority is, that where the
legislature has not expressly declared that this result shall follow from
a failure to comply with the statute, the courts ought not to imply such
a result, unless this be necessary in order to attain the primary object
for which the statute was enacted.
Upon this ground it has been held
that a contract made by a foreign corporation before it has complied
with the statutory prerequisites to the right to do business will not, on
that account, be held absolutely void, unless the statute expressly so
declares ; and if the statute imposes a penalty upon the corporation for
failing to comply with such prerequisites, such penalty will be deemed
exclusive of any others.
Columbus Ins. Co. v. Walsh, 18 Mo. 229;
Union, etc., Ins. Co. v. McMillen, 24 Ohio St. 67 ; Ehrman v. Teutonia Ins. Co., i McCrary 123 ; Clay Fire Ins. Co. v. Huron Salt Co.,
31 Mich. 346; Hartford, etc., Co. v. Mathews, 102 Mass. 221; 2
Morawetz on Corp.,
665.
We are aware that the courts of Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and
In Vermont
perhaps in some other states, hold a different doctrine.
and Oregon it has been held that a non-compliance with the precedent conditions of the statutes of those states by foreign corporations
rendered their contracts void.
But it will be observed that these statfor
utes imposed no penalty
the failure to comply with their provisions ; and it is principally upon this ground that the contracts are held
void, because otherwise the statute might be evaded with impunity.
"The genThus in Bank v. Page, 6 Ore. 431, 436, the court says:
The
void.
eral rule is that a contract in violation of law is
only exfor
the proception to the rule is that when a law imposes a penalty
no
intended
and
hibited act,
it clearly appears that the legislature
law,
of
the
a
conto
violation
more than
impose the penalty for the
It is evidently the
tract made in violation of the statute is not void."
the court to hold
in
influenced
the statute that
want of such penalty
be
the
the contract void.
And such seems to
ground of the decisions
in Indiana and other states.
v. Caldwell, 54 Ind.
etc.,
Co.
Mowing,
Md.
273; Lester v. Howard Bank, 33
558.
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The authorities on this question are reviewed in 2 Morawetz on
Corp., sections 662666, and that author announces as his conclusion
therefrom, that "Unless it appear affirmatively that the legislature intended to render the forbidden act or contract absolutely void in legal
contemplation, it will not be so held," citing Nat. Bank v. Mathews,
98 U. S. 621, 627.
Let us apply these principles to our statute. The first provision is
that the foreign corporation may do business in this state " upon comIt
plying with the requirements of this section, and not otherwise."
next declares, that such corporation so complying shall have the same
rights and privileges and be subject to the same liabilities as domestic
And it finally imposes a penalty upon such corporacorporations.
tion for its failure to comply with the regulations of the statute.
There is here no express declaration that the failure to comply shall
Nor does it
render the contracts of the corporation absolutely void.
the
so
intended.
that
But
it is exlegislature
affirmatively appear
a
failure
declared,
and
that
to
with
the
comply
regupressly provided
And this imposition of
lations prescribed shall be punished by fine.
a penalty, as we have seen, in the absence of any express declaration
to the contrary, must be held to be exclusive of all other penalties.
That such was the purpose of the legislature in enacting this statute
is manifest from the provision therein in respect to railroad corporaIt prescribes additional regulations for such companies, and
tions.
declares that unless they are complied with such companies shall not
The whole section shows no
maintain any action or suit in this state.
more favor than other
railroad
with
to
treat
corporations
purpose
if
hold
of
all other corporations
we
the
contracts
corporations, yet
to
railroad
void,
while
companies the right
only denying
absolutely
to sue in our courts, the effect would be to discriminate in favor of
the latter.
Upon the whole, I am of opinion that the court did not
*
*
err in sustaining the demurrer to said second special plea. *
Affirmed.
Effect of failing to comply with statute:
(1) When there is a penalty:
(a) The contract is void: 1831, Pennington v. Townsend, 7 Wend. 276;
1841, New Hope Del. B., etc., Co. v. Poughkeepsie S. Co., 25 Wend. 648; 1860,
.(Etna Insurance Co. v. Harvev, 11 Wis. 394; 1869, Ford v. Buckeye, etc., Co.,
6 Bush (Ky.) 133, 99 Am. Dec". 663; 1870, Cincinnati Mut. H. Assoc. v. Rossnthal, 55 111. 85, 8 Arn. Rep. 626; 1876, Stewart v. Northampton, etc., Co., 38
N.
L. 436; 1879, Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Bales, 92 Pa. St. 352; 1881,
American Ins. Co. v. Smith, 73 Mo. 368; 1888, Dudley v. Collier, 87 Ala. 431
(reviews cases) ; 1890, Boulden v. Estey Organ Co., 92 Ala. 182; 1891, Dundee
M. & T. Inv. Co. v. Nixon, 95 Ala. 318; 1893, Gary-Lombard Lumber Co. v.
Thomas, 92 Tenn. 587; 1895, Seamans v. Temple Co., 105 Mich. 400, 55 Am.
St. Rep. 457.
(b) Contracts are not void: 1853, Clark v. Middleton, 19 Mo. 53; 1859,
Merrill v. Mclntire, 13 Gray 157, 165; 1873, The Manistee, 5 Biss. 381; 1877,
Manhattan Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 32 Ohio St. 388; 1881, King v. National M. & E.
Co., 4 Mont. 1 ; 1889. Fritts v. Palmer, 132 U. S. 282; 1890, Toledo Tie & L,
Co. v. Thomas, 33 W. Va. 566, supra; 1894, Edison Gen. El. Co. v. Canada,
etc., Co., 8 Wash. 370, 24 L. R. A. 315; 1895, State, etc., Ins. Assn. v. Brinkley, etc., Co., 61 Ark. 1, 54 Am. St. Rep. 191 ; 1896, Pioneer Sav. & L. Co. v.
Cannon, 96 Tenn. 599, 54 Am. St. Rep. 858; 1898, Turcott v. Railroad, 101
Tenn. 102, 70 Am. St. Rep. 661; 1899, Security Sav. & L. Assn. v. Elbert, 153
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N. E. Rep. 753 ; 1899, Sullivan v. Sheehan, 89 Fed. Rep. 247 ;
Wolff Dryer Co. v. Bigler, 192 Pa. St. 466.
(a) Contract is void or voidable : 1866,
(2) When there is no penalty:
The Pres., etc., Bank of Louisville v. Young, 37 Mo. 398; 1873, Franklin Ins.
Co. v. Louisville, etc., Co., 9 Bush (Ky.) 590; 1874, In re Comstock, 3 Sawy.
218; 1877, Bank of British Col. v. Page, 6 Ore. 431 ; 1879, Am. Ins. Co. v.
Stoy, 41 Mich. 385, on 401 ; 1883, Lycoming F. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 55 Vt.526;
1885, Hackeny & Benov. Leary, 12 Ore. 40; 1887, Barbor v. Boehm, 21 Neb.
450; 1889, Am. L. & T. Co. v. East & W. R. Co., 37 Fed. Rep. 242.
fb,) Contract is not void : 1889, Farrior v. New Eng. Mfg. Co., 88 Ala. 275,
infra, p. 1515 and cases there cited.
198, 54

1899,

Sec. 489.
statutes

(8)

What is "doing business"

FLORSHEIM BROS. DRY GOODS CO. v. LESTER.
1892.

of such

in violation

?

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS.
124, 46 Am. St. Rep. 162.

60

1

Ark. Rep.

120

mortgage given by Lester in Arkansas upon
land in that state to secure the payment of $1,600 due to the Dry
Goods Company, a Louisiana corporation, for goods sold in LouisThe constitution and laws of Arkansas
iana to Lester upon credit.
provided that no foreign " corporation shall do any business in this
state" without a known place of business and an authorized agent in
the same upon whom process may be served, and which, before " it
shall begin to carry on business in the state," shall be designated by
filing a " certificate with the secretary of state." The defense made
was the non-compliance with these provisions. A demurrer to this
defense was overruled.]
HUGHES, J. The only question in this case is whether the taking
of a single mortgage in this state, by a foreign corporation, for a pastdue indebtedness for goods sold in the foreign state, the domicile of
the foreign corporation, is doing business in this state, within the
meaning of the constitution and the act of the general assembly above
There can be no doubt that the sale and shipment of the
quoted.
It does not matter, then, how many
goods was interstate commerce.
sales and shipments there might have been; they could not be prohibThere is no evidence that more than one mortited by the statute.
Was the taking of
gage was taken by the appellant in this state.
this mortgage doing any business prohibited by the laws of this stnte
to be done by a foreign corporation before complying with the provisions of the constitution and statute referred to? If so, the mortgage can not be enforced in the courts of this state ; for, if a single
act of business be done by a foreign corporation in this state, within
the meaning of these provisions of the law, it is as much within the
prohibition contained in them as any number of acts of business would
be.
But we are of opinion that the taking of a single mortgage to
secure a past-due debt, with no intention apparent to transact other
business of the kind in the state, is not doing business within the
meaning of the constitution or the statute.

[Suit to foreclose

1

Statement

a

abridged, arguments and small part of opinion omitted.
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division of authorities on this question.
But we think
of the question is presented in Cooper Manufacturing
view
the better
" ReasonCo. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727, in which the court said:
and
of
the
constitution
statute
construed,
Colorado forbid, not
ably
the doing of a single act of business in the state, but the carrying on
of business by a foreign corporation without the filing of the certificate and the appointment of an agent, as required by the statute.
The constitution requires the foreign corporation to have one or more
known places of business in the state before doing any business therein. This implies a purpose at least to do more than one act of busiFor a corporation that has done but a single act of business, and
ness.
purposes to do no more, can not have one or more known places of
To have known places of business, it must be
business in the state.
on
or
The statute passed to
intending to carry on business.
carrying
of
the
the
into
constitution
effect
makes this plain, for
provision
carry
the certificate which it requires to be filed by a foreign corporation
must designate the principal place in the state-where the business of
The meaning of the phrase,
the corporation -is to be carried on.
' to
on,'
when
to
In Worcesbusiness, is well settled.
applied
carry
' To
ter's Dictionary, the definition is:
prosecute, to help forward,
*
*
*
The obvious
to continue, as to carry on business,' etc.
of
the
constitution and the statute is that no
construction, therefore,
shall
foreign corporation
begin any business in the state, with the
of
or
pursuing
carrying it on, until it has filed a certificate
purpose
the
designating
principal place where the business of the corporation
be
carried
on in the state, and naming an authorized agent, reis to
at
such
siding
principal place of business, on whom process may be
To
served.
require such a certificate as a prerequisite to the doing
of a single act of business, when there was no purpose to do any
other business, or have a place of business in this state, would be un*
*
*
reasonable and incongruous."
There

is a

Re-versed.
See next case.

What is doing business in the state.
In Commonwealth v. Long, 1 Pa. Co. Ct. 190, McPherson, J.,
Tests:
" whether the acts done were part of the necessary work for
says the test is
effecting the object for which the association was created." Or, as said in
Beard v. Publishing Co., 71 Ala. 60: " There must be a doing of some of the
works, or an exercise of some of the functions, for which the corporation was
Note.

(a)

created."
1881, Beard v. Union Am. Pub. Co., 71 Ala. 60 (solicit(b) Illustrations:
ing and receiving subscriptions to a foreign newspaper is not exercising corporate franchise in the state); 1885, Commonwealth v. Long, 1 Pa. Co. Ct.
Rep. 190 (mailing letters and circulars by an agent, soliciting insurance, is
doing business in the state) ; 1885, Cooper v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727, supra
(filling an order and setting up machinery is not doing business in the state) ;
1894, Milan, etc., Co. v. Gorten, 93 Tenn. 590, 26 L. R. A. 135 (same) ; 1889,
Christian v. Am. F. L. & Mtg. Co., 89 Ala. 198 (suing is not doing business
in the state) ; 1890, Ginn v. N. E. Mtg. Co., 92 Ala. 135; 1891, Dundee Mtg.,
etc., Co. v. Nixon, 95 Ala. 318; 1895, State v. Bristol Sav. Bk., 108 Ala. 3, 54
Am. St. Rep. 141 (making a loan and taking a note or mortgage by a lonn
company is doing business in the state) ; 1895, Commercial Bank v. Sherman,
28 Ore. 573, 52 Am. St. Rep. 811 (purchase of a note is not) ; 1895, Bamberger
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y. Schoolfield, 160 U. S. 149, on 167 (sending a note into a state for collection
is not doing business there).
See, also, 1888, Kilgore v. Smith, 122 Pa. St. 48; 1889, Commonwealth v.
Am. Bell Tel. Co., 129 Pa. St. 217; 1891, State v. Ray, 109 N. C. 736, 14 L. R.
A. 529; 1892, Penna. Co. v. Bauerle, 143 111. 459; 1899, Delaware & H. Canal
281, 45 L. R. A. 538.
Co. v. Mahlenbrock, 63 N.

J.

Sec. 490.

Same.

FARRIOR
1889.

v.

SEW ENGLAND MORTGAGE SECURITY CO. 1

IN THE SUPREME

COURT OF ALABAMA.
275-280.

88

Ala.

Rep.

[Bill by the security company, a Massachusetts corporation, to foreclose a mortgage upon land in Alabama belonging to Farrior, given
The defendant
there to secure the payment of a note for $5,500.00.
demurred upon the ground that the bill did not show that at the time
the note and mortgage were executed the company had a resident
agent and a known place of business within the state, the constitution of which, section 4, article XIV, provided that "no foreign corporation shall do any business in this state, without having at least
one known place of business, and an authorized agent or agents
therein."
Overruling the demurrer is the error assigned.]
SOMERVILLE, J. * * * The bill alleges that the complainant
corporation, "under its charter and laws of incorporation, had full
power and authority" to loan the money and take the mortgage in
In engaging in such a transaction, the complainant was
controversy.
in the exercise of its chief corporate function, as imported by its very
The prohibition of the constituname, and as admitted by the bill.
tion is against "doing any business in this state," without compliance
The doing of a single act of business,
with the conditions specified.
if it be in the exercise of a corporate function, is as much prohibited
as the doing of a hundred such acts ; and it is just as much opposed to
the policy of the constitution, which is to protect our citizens against
the fraud and imposition of insolvent and unreliable corporations, and
to place them in an attitude to be reached by legal process from our
courts, in the event of any existing necessity to bring suit against them
to vindicate a legal right, or to contest the validity of any contract
made by or with them.
The phrase, "doing any business," is more
comprehensive in meaning than the carrying on or engaging in business generally, which involves the idea of continuance, or the repetition of like acts. All the adjudged cases, so far as we have examined, in and out of this state, assume this to be true, except the case
of Cooper Man. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727; 2 Morawetz on
There it was
Corp. (2d ed.), sections 661-665, and cases cited.
said, that a clause in the constitution of Colorado, like the one here
under consideration, was not to be construed to prohibit a single act,
but only " the carrying on of business" by a foreign corporation.
The act there done was the making of a contract in Colorado, to
Statement abridged, part of opinion omitted.
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manufacture certain machinery in Ohio, to be delivered in the latter
The promise
state for transportation to the purchasers in the former.
was a mere agreement to deliver goods in another state, and possibly
Beard v.
was not the unlawful exercise of a corporate function.
Union & Amer. Pub. Co., 71 Ala. 60. However that may be, we
do not concur in the construction given, in which, also, two of the
judges of the court rendering the decision, it seems, did not agree.
Their concurrence in the judgment was placed solely on the ground
that the prohibition contained in the Colorado constitution, when directed against a sale of that character, would be an attempted regulation of commerce between the states, and on this account void for repugnancy to the federal constitution. * * *

Reversed.

Note.

Sec.

See note to preceding case.
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THE PENNSYLVANIA COMPANY FOR INSURANCE
v. BAUERLE. 1
1892.

IN THE SUPREME

OF ILLINOIS.

COURT

143

111.

Rep. 459-

480.

[Bill in equity for specific performance of a contract of sale of land
by the insurance company (a Pennsylvania corporation) trustee, and
the executors of one S., deceased, to whom the decedent devised
Section
certain land in Illinois, with power of sale, against Bauerle.
26 of the corporation law (i Starr & C., ch. 32, par. 32) and the laws
relating to trust companies provided that foreign corporations of this
kind doing business in the state must first deposit $200,000 in stock
and bonds specified and secure a certificate of authority from the
and it should not be lawful for any such
auditor of public accounts,
company to accept such trust before doing so. The company had not
complied with these provisions when the deed tendered by it to
A demurrer to the bill was sustained by the
Bauerle was executed.
lower court.]
MR. JUSTICE BAKER.

*

*

*

In Female Academy v. Sullivan,
"As the
375, this court, referring to said section 26, says:
section reads, foreign corporations ' doing business in this state,' it is
said this corporation is not embraced therein, as it is not doing busiReceiving lands in this state by devise, and the asness in this state.
sertion in the state of ownership over them, we regard as a sufficient
doing of business in this state to bring appellant within the purview
So here, receiving the land adof this language of the section."
joining Chicago by devise, with power to sell and dispose of the same,
and with power to lease it and to collect the rents and profits therefrom, and the assertion in this state of the ownership of said land,
116

1

111.

Statement

is given.

abridged ; only that part of opinion relating to the single point
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.and assuming to sell and convey it, and bringing suits in the courts of
this state in respect to said land and such alleged ownership, and for

the enforcement of contracts in regard to the same, must be held to
be doing business in this state, within the purview of said section. * * *

Affirmed.
A corporation

can not hold land in another state unless that state
consents: 1840, Runyan v. Coster, 14 Pet. 122; 1872, Thompson v. Waters,
25 Mich. 214, 12 Am. Rep. 243; 1873, Carroll v. E. St. Louis, 67 111. 568, 16
Am. Rep. 632; 1874, U. S., etc., Co. v. Lee, 73 111'. 142, 24 Am. Rep. 236; 1879,
Cowell v. Colorado, etc., Co., 100 U. S. 55 ; 1883, Diamond, etc., Co. v. Powers,
51 Mich. 145; 1886, Commonwealth v. N. Y. & L. E. R., 114 Pa. St. 340; 1890,
Commonwealth v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R., 132 Pa. St. 591, 7 L. R. A. 634 ; 1894,
Lancaster v. Amsterdam, etc., Co., 140 N. Y. 576, 24 L. R. A. 322, with note.
Note.

Sec. 492.
(9) Statutes discriminating
porations as creditors.

against non-resident cor-

McClung, 172 U. S. 239, infra, p. 2036; Blake v.
U. S. 59, infra, p. 2045.

See Blake v.

McClung,

176

ARTICLE III.
Sec. 493.

(

VISITORIAL POWER OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.
Forfeiture of charter.

I )

See State of Connecticut, etc., v. Curtis,

p. 258.

Sec. 494.

Conn. 374, supra,

To oust from the state.

(2)

DICKINSON, J.,

35

IN

STATE, Ex

REL.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL,

ITY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY.

1888.

IN THE SUPREME

COURT
538, 41 N.

OF MINNESOTA.

W. Rep.

108.

39

1

v.

FIDEL-

Minn. Rep.

This is a proceeding upon information in the nature of quo warranto
to try the right of the above-named respondent, a corporation of the
state of New York, to carry on within this state the business of insurance against these three classes of risks, viz. : injury or death of
persons caused by accident, breach of trust by persons holding places
of public or private trust, and the breakage of plate-glass.
The
case is presented for decision upon the relator's demurrer to the
1
Only that part of opinion relating to ouster, and to review of the license
of the insurance commissioner, is given.
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It is contended on the part of the reanswer of 'the respondent.
We
spondent that this is not an appropriate method of procedure.
A state has the power of a sovereign to prohibit
hold the contrary.
foreign corporations from exercising their franchises, carrying on their
ordinary corporate business, within its borders; and when, in defiance
of such prohibition, and contrary to our law, a foreign corporation
does assume to exercise corporate franchises in a manner affecting the
public interests, quo ivarranto will lie for the purposes of determining
the right in question, and of applying a remedy, although it is true
that the courts of a state have no power to affect by their judgments
We can restrain the
the corporate existence of foreign corporations.
exercise, within our own jurisdiction, of corporate franchises inconsistent with our own sovereignty, whether the corporation whose acts
State v. Railroad Co., 25 Vt.
are in question be domestic or foreign.
And
see
v.
211.
It is said on the
Wend.
College,
People
433.
5
part of the respondent that we ought not to entertain the proceeding
of the question whether it should be
because the determination
licensed and admitted to transact its business in this state is committed by law to a branch of the executive department of the state, and
control
that the judicial department of the state has no constitutional
In this the counsel for
over the action of the executive department.
respondent fail to distinguish between the authority of the judicial
department to control the action of executive officers, and the power
and duty of the courts to determine, in causes before them, the rights
of parties, although the legal propriety and effect of the action of executive state officers may necessarily be thus brought in question. We
have assumed, without so deciding, that the insurance commissioner,
in respect to the discharge of his duties, is exempt from judicial
control.
The insurance commissioner, in granting certificates or licenses to
foreign corporations to do business here, acts in a ministerial capacity.
His determination and action are not judicial and final. If our statute, to be hereafter recited, prohibits foreign corporations, under certain circumstances, to do business in this state, the authority or license
of the commissioner in disregard of that statute would be unavailing.

(Discussion as to the meaning and extent of the Minnesota retaliaholding that, unless
tory law, and the effect of the New York laws,
it clearly appeared that these would exclude Minnesota companies
from doing business in New York, the New York Company would
not be ousted from doing business in Minnesota,
is omitted.)
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In general, there

is no visitorial
eign corporations,
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power over for-

THE NORTH STATE COPPER AND GOLD MINING CO. v. FIELD. 1
1885.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND.

iS'-'S

6-

64

Md. Rep.

[Application by Field,

a citizen of Maryland, for mandamus to restockholder in the Mining Company, a South Carolina corporation having an office and transacting business in Maryland.
Field 's stock was forfeited by the directors for non-payment of an
assessment made by them upon each stockholder, which assessment
Field alleged to be illegal and void. The defense of the corporation
was that the courts of Maryland had no jurisdiction over it in a mat-

instate him as

a

ter of thrs kind.
appeal taken.]

A

*

*

demurrer

to this defense was sustained

*

and an

The act of 1868, chapter 471, section 209,
provides that "Any corporation not chartered by the laws of this state,
which shall transact business therein, shall be deemed to hold and exercise franchises within this state, and shall be liable to suit in any
of the courts of this state, on any dealings or transactions therein."
And in a subsequent section the law provides:
"Suits may be brought in any court of this state, or before a justice
of the peace> against any corporation not incorporated under its laws,
but deemed to hold and exercise franchises therein, or against any
joint stock company or association doing business in this state, for
any cause of action ; and by a plaintiff, not a resident of this state,
when the cause of action has arisen, or the subject of the action shall
be situated in this state."
The object of our statute, and of similar statutes passed by other
states, is to provide for the collection of debts due from foreign corporations to our own citizens, and to enforce contracts made here by
foreign corporations through its agents, and to protect our citizens
from frauds or wrong, whether the wrongdoer be foreign or domestic.
But it was not the intent of our statute to give our courts jurisdiction over the internal affairs of a foreign corporation.
Our courts
possess no visitorial power over them, and can enforce no forfeiture'
of charter for violation of law, or removal of officers for misconduct;
nor can they exercise authority over the corporate functions, the bylaws, nor the relations between the corporation and its members,
These
arising out of, and depending upon, the law of its creation.
powers belong only to the state which created the corporation.
In the case of Wilkins v. Thorne, 60 Md. 253, this court said:
" This is clearly a controversy relating to the internal management
of the corporation, and the validity of the acts of those who claim to
be, and indeed are admitted to be, de facto, its officers and stockSTONE,

1

J.

Statement

abridged, and small part of opinion omitted
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holders. Now, if this were a Maryland corporation, there could be
no question as to the jurisdiction of a Maryland court over the subject, but such is not the case. The corporation was created by the
laws of another state ; and it seems to us that all such controversies
must be determined by the courts of the state by which the corporation was created."
Thome's Case was a controversy between bona jide stockholders of
a corporation on the one side, and those claiming to be stockholders,
and the president

and directors on the other

;

and such a controversy

was said by this court to be a controversy about the internal management of the corporation.
It may not be in all cases easy to draw a clear line of distinction
between the acts of a corporation relating to its internal management
But we apprehend the distinction to be
and those which do not.
That where the act complained of affects the complainant
this:
solely in his capacity as a member of the corporation, whether it be
as stockholder, director, president, or other officer, and is the act of
the corporation, whether acting in stockholders' meeting, or through
its agents, the board of directors, that then such action is the management of the internal affairs of the corporation, and in case of a forWhere, howeign corporation, our courts will not take jurisdiction.
ever, the act of the foreign corporation complained of affects the complainant's individual rights only, then our courts will take jurisdiction
whenever the cause of action arises here.
The controversy in the case before us arises entirely out of the inIt is the complaint
ternal management of the affairs of the company.
of a stockholder, that he has been deprived of his rights as a stockHis comholder by the illegal action of the board of directors.
plaint is that he is still a stockholder, and a member of the corpora-

tion, and entitled to his vote at the stockholders' meeting, etc., but
that these rights have been withheld from him by the action of the
directors, and he seeks to be reinstated as a member of a foreign
He seeks this through
corporation by the action of a Maryland court.
the extraordinary remedy of a mandamus, to compel the board of
directors to place on their books his name as a stockholder, and thus
to restore him to all the rights of a member of the corporation, which
the directors say he had forfeited.
In Howell v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co.. 51 Barbour
378, the supreme court of New York refused to restrain the company
from paying a stock dividend, upon the ground that the company had
no authority to declare such a dividend, for the reason that the courts
of one state would not undertake to regulate the internal affairs of a
foreign corporation, and refused to investigate the question whether
the dividend was rightfully or wrongfully declared.
The case of Stafford & Co. v. American Mills Co., 13 Rhode
Island 310, was a petition to appoint a receiver for a New York corIt was shown that two out of the three
poration in Rhode Island
stockholders who constituted the corporation resided in Rhode Island,
and that much the larger part of the corporate property was located
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in Rhode Island.
The corporation entered an appearance, and subBut the court dismissed the
mitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
petition, and refused to entertain jurisdiction, because such jurisdiction was not conferred by their statute.
Redmond v. Enfield Manufacturing Company, 13 Abbott's Practice Reports (N. S.) 332, was a case where a stockholder attempted
to compel a foreign corporation to divide the assets among the stockholders, and the court said:
"To attempt, by a judgment of this court, to compel a foreign corporation to distribute its assets among the stockholders, because some
of the directors were resident here, or because some of the funds were
within the jurisdiction of the court, would be assuming a power which
the court ought not to exercise, and rendering a judgment which could
not be enforced against the company in the place of its existence."
Being of opinion that the legislature did not contemplate or intend,
by the passing of the statute we have quoted, to give to our courts
jurisdiction and power to regulate the merely internal affairs of a foreign corporation, and as our courts clearly possess no such power unless conferred upon them by statute, we must reverse the order ap*
*
*
pealed from, and dismiss the petition.

Reversed.

Note.
Accord: 1867, Smith v. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 14 Allen (Mass.) 336; 1883,
Kansas & E. R. Const. Co. v. Topeka, etc., 135 Mass. 34; 1883, Wilkins v.
Thome, 60 Md. 253; 1889, Moore v. Mining Co., 104 N. C. 534, 10 S. E. Rep.
679; 1892, Kimball v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 157 Mass. 7, 34 Am. St. Rep.
250; 1893, In re Estate of Prime, 136 N. Y. 347, 18 L. R. A. 713; 1893, Republican M. S. M. v. Brown, 58 Fed. (C. C. A.) 645, 24 L. R. A. 776, note;
1894, Guilford v. W* U. Tel. Co., 59 Minn. 332, infra, p. 1521; 1896, National
Tel., etc., Co. v. DuBois, 165 Mass. 117, 52 Am. St. Rep. 503; 1897, Madden
v. Light Co., 181 Pa. St. 617, 38 L. R. A. 638; 1899, Clark v. Mut. Res. F. L.
A., 14 App. D. C. 154, 43 L. R. A. 390; 1899, Condon v. Mut. Res. F. L. A.,
89 Md. 99, 73 Am. St. Rep. 169, 42 Atl. Rep. 944; 1899, Taylor v. Mut. Res.
F. L. A., 97 Va. 60, 33 S. E. Rep. 385; 1899, Howard v. Mut. Res. F. L. A.,
125 N. C. 49, 45 L. R. A. 853, 34 S. E. Rep. 199.

Sec. 496.

Same,

GUILFORD
1894.

v.

(b) To compel

issue of certificate of stock.

WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY.

IN THE SUPREME

COURT OF MINNESOTA.
332-347, 50 Am. St. Rep. 407.

59

1

Minn. Rep.

[Appeal by Guilford from decision of lower court denying the relief sought.
The action was brought to have the plaintiff adjudged the
owner of certain shares of the stock of the defendant company, and to
compel the company to issue to him new certificates therefor in place
of the originals, which were alleged to have been lost for more than
1

Statement

abridged, arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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twelve years, and, if the defendant refuses to issue the same, that plaintiff have judgment against it for the value of the stock.
It is not questioned but that plaintiff, a citizen of this state, is the owner of the
The certificates are alleged to have been lost.
The defendstock.
ant has always been willing to issue to plaintiff new certificates on
condition that he first execute to it a bond with two sureties in double
the amount of the value of the stock (over $35,000) to indemnify it
against the original certificates in case they should turn up in the
This condition the plaintiff has been unable
hands of a third party.
The defendant is a corporation organized under the
to comply with.
laws of the state of New York, where its principal place of business
is located, and where all its general officers reside, and where all its
The only business transacted by it
stock and other books are kept.
in this state is the maintenance of telegraph lines and the transmission
of telegrams, for which purpose exclusively it has local agents here.J
MITCHELL, J. * * * The defendant, both in its answer and
on the argument, makes its point (not raised on the appeal in the
former action) that the courts of this state have no jurisdiction of the
subject-matter of the action, because it pertains solely to the management of the internal affairs of a foreign corporation.
The doctrine
is well settled that courts will not exercise visitorial powers over
foreign corporations, or interfere with the management of their internal affairs.
Such matters must be settled by the courts of the
This view rests upon a broader and
state creating the corporation.
deeper foundation than the mere want of jurisdiction in the ordinary
It involves the extent of the authority of the state
sense of that word.
(from which its courts derive all their powers) over, foreign corporaThe only difficulty is in drawing the line of demarkation
tions.
between matters which do and those which do not pertain to the manTo entertain an
agement of the internal affairs of a corporation.
action to dissolve a corporation; to determine the validity of its
organization; to determine which of two rival organizations is the
legal one, or who of rival claimants are its legal officers ; to restrain
it from declaring a dividend, or to compel it to make one; to restrain it
from issuing its bonds, or from making an additional issue of stock,
would clearly all be the exercise of visitorial powers over the corporation, or an interference with the management of its internal affairs. * * *
(Citing and commenting on Smith v. Insurance Co., 14 Allen 336,
and Mining Co. v. Field, 64 Md. 151, supra, p. 1519-) There is no
controversy as to the right of the plaintiff to a certificate as evidence
of his title.
The only dispute is over the terms or conditions upon
certificate
We do not see how the grantwhich that
shall be issued.
in
of
relief
the exercise of visitorial
is,
sense,
such
ing
any proper
the
an
with
or
interference
management of the internal affairs
powers,
of the defendant.
Statements are sometimes found to the effect that
whei'e the act of the corporation complained of affects a person solely
in his capacity as a member of the corporation, or where the rights
of a person grow solely out of his membership in the corporation, and
not out of some external transaction, the subject relates to the manage-
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ment of the internal affairs of the corporation, over which the courts
Such general stateof. another state should not assume jurisdiction.
ments must always be construed in connection with the particular facts
Moreover, such statements are
of the cases in which they are used.
not strictly correct as abstract propositions in the broad and unqualified sense in which they are sometimes understood.
We think there
are cases, and that this is one of them, where, although the rights of
in the corporation, yet, as the
a party grow out of his membership
matter affects only his individual rights under the contract by which
the stock was issued, therefore an enforcement of those rights will not
be an interference
with the internal management of the corporate
affairs within the meaning of the rule.
If upon principles of law or comity foreign corporations are allowed
to do business and maintain suits in another state, the general rule
should be that they are liable to be sued in the same jurisdiction .
Their rights and liabilities in that regard ought to be reciprocal. If
we recognize their existence for one purpose, we ought also for the
If our courts admit and vindicate their rights, justice requires
other.
that we also enforce their liabilities, and that, before we send our
own citizens to a foreign jurisdiction for redress, it should be very clear
that the subject of the action is beyond the limits of the power or
If a citizen of
sovereignty of the state over the foreign corporation.
this state held a certificate of stock in a foreign corporation, which
was alleged to have been illegally issued, or to have for some cause
become forfeited, we do not think there would be any doubt but that
our courts would entertain a suit by the corporation to compel its surrender and cancellation.
If so, why ought not a citizen of the state be
allowed to maintain an action to compel the issue to him, as evidence
of his title, of a new certificate in place of one that has been lost or
It is urged that if the courts of this state entertain jurisdestroyed?
diction of such a case they may impose different conditions upon the
issue of the certificate from those that might be imposed by the courts
of New York or of other states under the same state of facts.
This
must be conceded.
It is one of the necessary imperfections in the
administration of justice that courts of different, and even of the same,
jurisdictions will differ as to the law applicable to the same state of
facts.
But it was never heard that this of itself was any reason why
a court should not exercise jurisdiction.
It is also contended that the
courts of this state ought not to entertain the action because they have
no means to enforce their decree bv compelling the issue of a certificate.
It is undoubtedly true that courts will not entertain an action
where it is apparent that if a judgment was rendered they would be
wholly unable to enforce it. But the mere fact that they may be unable to compel specific performance in a particular way is no reason
If the defendant should rewhy the suit should not be entertained.
fuse to issue certificates in accordance with the judgment, it would be
entirely competent for the court, in accordance with the prayer of the
Our concomplaint, to render judgment for the value of the stock.
*
*
*
clusion is that the action can be maintained.

IRWIN
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(After holding that certificates of stock were not negotiable, that

they were only evidence of title, and were not a representation that
any one but the one to whom they were issued was the owner, and
that if they should be found in the hands of another claimant, he
would be estopped by laches in not claiming dividends for twelve
the cause was remanded to court below to give judgment for
years,

plaintiff )
Note.

See note to preceding case.

Same,

Sec. 497.
See

J.,

in Richardson v. Swift,

7

Houst.

137,

infra,

p. 1653.

See note to section 495, siipra.

See. 498.

(4)

HENRY E. IRWIN
1897.

To compel inspection of books.

In Matter of Rappleye, 43 App. Div. 84, infra, p. 1651;

Houston,
Note.

(c)

Receivers in state courts.
v.

THE GRANITE STATE PROVIDENT ASSOCIATION. 1

IN THE COURT

OF

CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY.

Eq. 244-251.

56

N.

J.

a New Hampshire corporation, sold shares and
states,
in
made loans
including New Jersey, Irwin being one of
many
In 1896 the company became insolvNew
shareholders.
the
Jersey
ent, and one Taggert was appointed assignee in New Hampshire.
Irwin filed his bill in New Jersey alleging the insolvency and appointment of an assignee in New Hampshire, and asked for a receivone Gray being appointed.
er,
Upon petition, Taggert was aftera
defendant,
made
filed
and
his bill, alleging that as assignee
ward
he was entitled to all the assets in New Jersey, asked that he be substituted for Gray as receiver, and that the latter be required to follow
the directions of Taggert and pay over to him all sums collected.]
REED, V. C. Assuming that Mr. Taggert, at this stage of the
suit, is in a position to question the appointment of the New Jersey
receiver, I am of the opinion that there is no substance in the objecThe insistence made on this behalf
that all right in
tions raised.
the assets of the insolvent corporation passed to him by force of his
This propappointment as assignee in the state of New Hampshire.
osition undoubtedly states the general rule.
The right to collect personal assets everywhere passed to the receiver, but the exercise of that
right beyond the limits of the state of his appointment
by virtue of
Statement

abridged

;

1

is

is,

[The Association,

part of opinion omitted.
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the comity which may be extended to him by the court of the state in
This comity will not be extended where
which the right is asserted.
the rights of the citizens of the state are likely to be prejudiced or
where it would be in contravention of the policy of the state.
Hurd
v. Elizabeth, 12 Vr. i ; National Trust Co. v. Miller, 6 Stew. Eq.
155; Sobernheimer v. Wheeler, 18 Stew. Eq. 614.
In view of this admitted rule it follows, I think, that whenever application is here made for an appointment of a receiver for a foreign
corporation which is already in the hands of a receiver at the place of
its domicile, the court in which the application is made can do one of
the three things ; first, it can refuse to appoint a receiver here and let
the domiciliary receiver bring suit in this state to collect all the debts
of the insolvent corporation within its limits; second, it can appoint
the domiciliary receiver as ancillary receiver; third, it can appoint
some one other than the domiciliary receiver.
In this instance the latter course was adopted.
The receivership in
this state is, however, but ancillary to the receivership in New Hampshire and constitutes a mere agency to collect assets here and forward
them to the original receiver, unless it appears that creditors or stockholders in this state are asserting a special right in the local assets, which
right should be settled by the courts here. Whether a receiver at all
should be appointed in this state depends upon the volume of business
and the kind of business which the foreign corporation was here transacting, and whether, if a receiver is appointed here, the appointee
should be Mr. Taggert or another depends upon several considerations, the main one being whether the interest of New Jersey parties
would be likely to antagonize in any respect the interest of the general shareholders and creditors.
One prayer only in the cross-bill need be referred to to justify the
appointment not only of a receiver in this state, but a receiver other
This prayer is that the New Jersey rethan the domiciliary officer.
ceiver be directed to pay over the proceeds of the money collected by
him to the New Hampshire assignee, to be distributed by him according to the laws of New Hampshire.
Now, a part of the money to be collected is the sum of $30,000
deposited by the association with the secretary of state for the benefit
of the creditors in this state.
This condition of affairs, therefore, raised a question of importance,
namely, whether this part of the assets at least should not be retained
in this state to answer the purpose for which it was deposited.
The existence of this question, however it may be decided, is sufficient to show the propriety of a separate receiver in this state. * * *
(After holding that the New Jersey receiver should not be required
to sue in the name of, or conform to the directions of, the New Hampshire assignee, proceeds:)
The important question discussed upon the hearing is raised by another prayer and the facts upon which it is based, namely, that Mr.
Gray be directed to collect all debts and pay over all proceeds to Mr.
Taggert, to be distributed according to the laws of New Hampshire.
2 WIT,. CAS.

23
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That, as a rule, the prayer states correctly the duty of the ancillary
receiver is not controverted by the counsel of the New Jersey officer.
It is now admitted, and has never been denied, that the general assets
of the association should be distributed by the home assignee.
But
there is a part of the assets in this state regarding which it is doubtful
whether this general rule applies. This portion consists of the mortgages deposited with the secretary of state as a condition precedent to
the association obtaining a certificate of authority to do business in
This deposit is of securities amounting to $30,000, and is
this state.
made under the provisions of section 3 of the act of 1890.
Gen.
Stat., p. 3250. The language of the statute is that the securities
shall be held by the secretary of state in trust for the benefit of the
*
*
*
creditors of such corporation within this state.
(After holding that shareholders would be creditors within the
meaning of the statute, as to any distributive share after the debts
were paid proceeds:)
The deposit of the fund in this state does not, in my judgment,
change in the least the proportion to which New Jersey shareholders
All the assets here are to be taken into account as
will be entitled.
a part of the fund to be distributed ; but the right to control the fund
deposited in this state for the purpose of securing the payment to
shareholdei's in this state of their proportion of the assets to be distributed, resides in this court.
Whether such fund is to be turned
over to the domiciliary receiver or is to be retained here, or whether
a part is to be so turned over and the remainder retained, will depend
All this court can reasonably exact is that its
upon circumstances.
citizens shall not be driven into the court of another state to obtain
their distributive shares and that the payment of such shares shall be
secured, so far as the amount received from the securities deposited
*
* *
will furnish security.
The New Jersey officer will at once proceed to collect the amount
of those securities.
When they are all, or substantially all, collected,
the New Hampshire assignee may file a petition, showing the amount
of assets, as nearly as possible, the amount and character of his bond,
and then this court will make an order, either that the assets in this
state be paid over to Mr. Taggert, upon his giving bond in this state
to pay to the. New Jersey shareholders their distributive shares, or
possibly upon the security of his original bond, taken together with
the assumption that the court of New Hampshire will see that the
shareholders everywhere are paid ; or the order may be that sufficient
assets may be retained here to be distributed through the hands of the
receiver in this state, but according to the proportion fixed by the
The receipts of any coldecree of the court of New Hampshire.
lections by Mr. Gray, other than those thus deposited, will, after
deducting expenses, be paid over at once.
Receivers in state courts may be appointed for foreign corporations
Note.
doing business there, and having property there ; but if the corporation has
no property, or no place of business, or no officers within the state, then a
1893, Gilman v. Hudson R. B. & 8. Mfg.
receiver can not be appointed:
Co., 84 Wis. 60, 23 L. R. A. 52, note; 1894, Holbrook v. Ford, 153 111. 633, 46
Am. St. Rep. 917; 1899, Stockley v. Thomas, 89 Md. 663, 43 Atl. Rep. 766.
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v.

FENNO. 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
(75 U.

S.)

8

Wall.

Rep. 533-556.

*

a

a

a

it,

*

a

it

a

it,

[On certificate of division for the circuit court for Maine. The
bank was chartered by the state of Maine with authority to issue bank
notes for circulation ; it was in no way the financial agent of the state.
In 1866 (14 Stat. at L. 146) congress enacted "that every national
banking association, state bank, or state banking association, shall
pay a tax of ten per centum on the amount of notes of any person,
" after
state bank, or state banking association, used for circulation
August i, 1866. The bank refused to pay the tax imposed upon
notes so issued by
upon the ground that the tax was unconstitutional as being direct tax not apportioned as required by the constitution, and also because
franchise granted by the
impaired
state.]
THE CHIEF JUSTICE (CHASE). *
(After holding the tax
was not
direct tax.)
franchise granted by a
Is
then,
tax on
state, which congress, upon any principle exempting the reserved
powers of the states from impairment by taxation, must be held to
have no authority to lay and collect?

it

is

it

is

a

;

a

it

a

It

We do not say that there may not be such tax.
may be admitted that the reserved rights of the states, such as the right to pass
laws, to give effect to laws through executive action, to administer
justice through the courts, and to employ all necessary agencies for
legitimate purposes of state government, are not proper subjects of
the taxing power of congress.
But
can not be admitted that franfor
chises granted by
state are necessarily exempt from taxation
franchises are property, often very valuable and productive property;
and when not conferred for the purpose of giving effect to some
reserved power of
state, seem to be as properly objects of taxation
as any other property.
But in the case before us the object of taxation
not the franchise
of the bank, but property created, or contracts made and issued under
the franchise, or power to issue bank bills.
A railroad company, in
the exercise of its corporate franchises, issues freight receipts, bills of
lading and passenger tickets; and
can not be doubted that the
to the state as the
as
organization of railroads
important
quite
But
will hardly be questioned that these
organization of banks.
contracts of the company are objects of taxation within the powers of
a

1

DissentOnly the part of the opinion relating to the single point given.
single paring opinion of Nelson, J. (Davis, J., concurring) omitted, except
agraph.
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congress, and not exempted by any relation to the state which granted
And it seems difficult to distinguish the
the charter of the railroad.
taxation of notes issued for circulation from the taxation of these railBoth descriptions of contracts are means of profit
road contracts.
to the corporations which issue them ; and both, as we think, may
properly be made contributory to the public revenue.
It is insisted, however, that the tax in the case before us is excessive, and so excessive as to indicate a purpose on the part of congress
to destroy the franchise of the bank, and is, therefore, beyond the
constitutional power of congress.
The first answer to this is that the judicial can not prescribe to the
legislative departments of the government limitations upon the exercise of its acknowledged powers.
The power to tax may be exercised
but
the
responsibility of the legislature is
oppressively upon persons,
not to the courts, but to the people by whom its members are elected.
So if a particular tax bears heavily upon a corporation, or a class of
corporations, it can not, for that reason only, be pronounced contrary
to the constitution.
But there is another answer which vindicates equally the wisdom
and the power of congress.
It can not be doubted that under the constitution the power to provide a circulation of coin is given to congress.
And it is settled by
the uniform practice of the government and by repeated decisions,
that congress may constitutionally authorize the emission of bills of
credit.
It is not important here to decide whether the quality of legal
in
tender,
payment of debts, can be constitutionally imparted to these
bills ; it is enough to say, that there can be no question of the power
of the government to emit them; to make them receivable in payment of debts to itself; to fit them for use by those who see fit to use
them in all the transactions of commerce ; to provide for their redemption ; to make them a currency, uniform in value and description, and convenient and useful for circulation.
These powers, until
occasionally
were
exercised.
and
recently,
only partially
Lately,
however, they have been called into full activity, and congress has
undertaken to supply a currency for the entire country.
The methods adopted for the supply of this currency were briefly
It now consists of coin,
explained in the first part of this opinion.
of United States notes, and of the notes of the national banks.
Both
of
credit,
be
described
as
bills
of
for
notes
descriptions
properly
may
both are furnished by the government ; both are issued upon the
credit of the government ; and the government is responsible
for
the redemption of both; primarily, as to the first description,
and
When
immediately upon default of the bank, as to the second.
these bills shall be made convertible into coin, at the will of the
holder, this currency will, perhaps, satisfy the wants of the community, in respect to a circulating medium, as perfectly as any mixed
currency that can be devised.
Having thus, in the exercise of undisputed constitutional powers,
undertaken to provide a currency for the whole country, it can not be
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questioned that congress may, constitutionally, secure the benefit of
To this end, congress has
it to the people by appropriate legislation.
denied the quality of legal tender to foreign coins, and has provided by law against the imposition of counterfeit and base coin on
the community.
To the same end, congress may restrain, by suitable
enactments, the circulation as money of any notes not issued under
Without this power, indeed, its attempts to secure
its own authority.
a sound and uniform currency for the country must be futile.
Viewed in this light, as well as in the other light of a duty on contracts or property, we can not doubt the constitutionality of the tax
under consideration.
*
*
* It is true that the
MR. JUSTICE NELSON (dissenting).
present decision strikes only at the power to create banks, but no person can fail to see that the principle involved affects the power to
create any other description of corporations, such as railroads, turnpikes, manufacturing companies, and others.
Note.
See, also, 1879, National Bank v. United States, 101 U. S. 1 ; 1895,
Pollock v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 157 U. S. 429, 158 U. S. 601; 1899, Nicol v.
Ames, 173 U. S. 509.
See next case.

2.
Reorganization
Sec. 500.
corporation.

of state corporation

CASEY v. GALLI.
1876.

as a national

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
Rep. (4 Otto) 673-681.

94

U. S.

[Action at law by the receiver of the New Orleans Banking Association against Galli, a subject of Italy, and its vice-consul at PhilaAmong
delphia, to enforce the individual liability of a shareholder.
other questions raised, one was, " whether a state bank could, by authority of congress, change its organization into that of a national
banking association without any authority given by the state law in
its charter or otherwise to make the change."]
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE. * * * No authority from the state was
The opnecessary to enable the bank so to change its organization.
tion to do that was given by the forty-fourth section of the banking
The power there conferred was amact of congress.
13 Stat. 112.
and
its
can
not
be
doubted.
The act is silent as to any
validity
ple,
assent or permission by the state.
It was as competent for congress
to authorize the transmutation as to create such institutions originally.
1
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PETITIONER.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
545-5 6 5-

140

U. S.

[Application for writ of habeas corpus to U. S. circuit of Kansas,
by Rahrer, who claimed to be unlawfully restrained of his liberty by
the sheriff of Shawnee county, Kansas. Rahrer, as the agent of wholesale liquor dealers in Kansas City, Missouri, sold in Topeka, Kansas,
in the original packages, shipped to him by the dealers in Kansas
City, certain kegs of beer and bottles of whisky, contrary to the constitution and laws of Kansas, making it a misdemeanor to make
such sales without a license, and contrary to the "Wilson act" of
congress (1890, 26 St. 313, ch. 728) providing that all such liquors
"transported into any state or territory, or remaining therein for use,
consumption, sale, or storage therein, shall upon arrival in such state,
etc., be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such state,

etc., to the same extent and in the same manner as though produced
in such state," etc. The circuit court discharged the petitioner and an
appeal was taken.]
The power of the state to impose
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER.
restraints and burdens upon persons and property in conservation and
promotion of public health, good order and prosperity, is a power
originally and always belonging to the states, not surrendered by
them to the general government nor directly restrained by the constitution of the United States, and essentially exclusive.
And this court has uniformly recognized state legislation, legitimately for police purposes, as not in the sense of the constitution necessarily infringing upon any right which has been confided expressly
or by implication to the national government.
The fourteenth amendment, in forbidding a state to make or enforce any law abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States, or to deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, or to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, did not invest, and did not
attempt to invest, congress with power to legislate upon subjects
which are within the domain of state legislation.
As observed by Mr. Justice Bradley, delivering the opinion of the
court in the Civil Rights cases, 109 U. S. 3, 13, the legislation under
that amendment can not "properly cover the whole domain of rights
appertaining to life, liberty and property, defining them and providing for their vindication. That would be to establish a code of municipal law regulative of all private rights between man and man in
It would be to make congress take the place of the state legsociety.
It is absurd to affirm that, because
islatures and to supersede them.
1 Statement

abridged,

arguments

and part of opinion omitted.
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the rights of life, liberty and property (which include all civil rights
that men have) are by the amendment sought to be protected against
invasion on the part of the state without due process of law, congress
may therefore provide due process of law for their vindication in
every case ; and that, because the denial by a state to any persons, of
the equal protection of the laws, is prohibited by the amendment,
therefore congress may establish laws for their equal protection."
In short, it is not to be doubted that the power to make the ordinary
regulations of police remains with the individual states, and can not
be assumed by the national government, and that in this respect it is
Barbier v. Connot interfered with by the fourteenth amendment.
nolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31.
The power of congress to regulate commerce among the several
states, when the subjects of that power are national in their nature, is
also exclusive.
The constitution does not provide that interstate
commerce shall be free, but, by the grant of this exclusive power to
regulate it, it was left free except as congress might impose restraint.
Therefore, it has been determined that the failure of congress to exercise this exclusive power in any case is an expression of its will that
the subject shall be free from restrictions or impositions upon it by the
Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489.
several states.
And if a law passed by a state in the exercise of its acknowledged
powers comes into conflict with that will, the congress and the state
can not occupy the position of equal opposing sovereignties, because
the constitution declares its supremacy and that of the laws passed in
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat, i, 210.
That
pursuance thereof.
which is not supreme must yield to that which is supreme.
Brown
v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 448.
"Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic," said Chief Justice Marshall,
' ; but it is
It describes the commersomething more ; it is intercourse.
cial intercourse between nations and parts of nations in all its branches,
and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse."
Unquestionably, fermented, distilled or other intoxicating liquors or
liquids are subjects of commercial intercourse, exchange, barter and
traffic, between nation and nation, between state and state, like any
other commodity in which a right of traffic exists, and are so recognized by the usages of the commercial world, the laws of congress
and the decisions of courts.
Nevertheless, it has been often held
that state legislation which prohibits the manufacture of spirituous,
malt, vinous, fermented or other intoxicating liquors within the limits
of a state, to be there sold or bartered for general use as a beverage, does
not necessarily infringe any right, privilege or immunity secured by
the constitution of the United States or by the amendments thereto.
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, and cases cited. "These cases,"
in the language of the opinion in Mugler v. Kansas (page 569), "rest
upon the acknowledged right of the states of the Union to control
their purely internal affairs, and, in so doing, to protect the health,
morals, and safety of their people by regulations that do not interfere
or
with the execution of the powers of the general government,
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The
violate rights secured by the constitution of the United States.
in
was
said
v.
such
as
Gibbons
establish
regulations,
Ogden,
to
power
Wheat, i, 203, reaches everything within the territory of a state not
9
But it was not thought in
surrendered to the national government."
record
the
case
that
presented any question of the invalidity of
that
because
laws
state
repugnant to the power to regulate commerce
is upon the theory of such repugnancy that the
It
the
states.
among
case before us arises and involves the distinction which exists between
the commercial power and the police power, which, "though quite
distinguishable when they do not approach each other, may yet, like
the intervening colors between white and black, approach so nearly
as colors perplex the vision in markas to perplex the understanding,
*
*
*
12 Wheat. 441.
them."
between
distinction
the
ing
and
declared
that
or
now
has
liquors
imported
spoken,
Congress
in
shall,
state,
a
fall
within
the
of
arrival
doupon
category
liquids
Is the law open to constitutional
mestic articles of a similar nature.
objection ?

By the first clause of section 10 of article i of the constitution,
certain powers are enumerated which the states are forbidden to exercise in any event; and by clauses two and three, certain others,
As to those
which may be exercised with the consent of congress.
in the first class, congress can not relieve from the positive restriction
As to those in the second, their exercise may be authorimposed.
ized ; and they include the collection of the revenue from imposts
and duties on imports and exports, by state enactments, subject to
the revision and control of congress; and a tonnage duty, to the exaction of which only the consent of congress is required.
Beyond
this, congress is not empowered to enable the state to go in this
direction. Nor can congress transfer legislative powers to a state nor
sanction a state law in violation of the constitution ; and if it can
adopt a state law as its own, it must be one that it would be competent for it to enact itself, and not a law passed in the exercise of the
police power. Cooley v. Port Wardens of Philadelphia, 12 How.
299; Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610, 623; United States v. Dewitt, 9
Wall. 41.
It does not admit of argument that congress can neither delegate
This being so, it is
its own powers nor enlarge those of a state.

urged that the act of congress can not be sustained as a regulation of
commerce, because the constitution, in the matter of interstate commerce, operates ex proprio vigore as a restraint upon the power of
congress to so regulate it as to bring any of its subjects within the
* *
*
grasp of the police power of the state.
We do not concur in this view. In surrendering their own power
over external commerce the states did not secure absolute freedom in
such commerce, but only the protection from encroachment afforded
by confiding its regulation exclusively to congress.
By the adoption of the constitution the ability of the several states
to act upon the matter solely in accordance with their own will was
extinguished, and the legislative will of the general government sub-
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*

is

a

it,

stituted.
No affirmative guaranty was thereby given to any state of
the right to demand, as between it and the others, what it could not
have obtained before ; while the object was undoubtedly sought to be
attained of preventing commercial regulations partial in their character or contrary to the common interests.
And the magnificent growth
and prosperity of the country attest the success which has attended
the accomplishment of that object.
But this furnishes no support to
the position that congress could not, in the exercise of the discretion
concluding that the common interests did not require
reposed in
entire freedom in the traffic in ardent spirits, enact the law in question. In so doing congress has not attempted to delegate the power
to regulate commerce, or to exercise any power reserved to the states,
or to grant
power not possessed by the states, or to adopt state laws.
It has taken its own course and made its own regulation, applying to
these subjects of interstate commerce one common rule, whose uninot affected by variations in state laws in dealing with such
formity
*
*
property.
is

it

*

*

it
is

a

if

is

is

The power to regulate
solely in the general government, and
an essential part of that regulation to prescribe the regular means for
accomplishing the introduction and incorporation of articles into and
12 Wheat. 448.
with the mass of property in the counti'y or state.
chooses
to provide that
No reason
congress
perceived why,
certain designated subjects of interstate commerce shall be governed
rule which divests them of that character at an earlier period of
by
time than would otherwise be the case,
not within its competency
*
to do so.
it

it

it

a

a

a

a

is

not the case of
This
law enacted in the unauthorized exercise of
a power exclusively confided to congress, but of
law which
was
for
the
to
but
could
state
which
not operate upon
competent
pass,
articles occupying
certain situation until the passage of the act of
That act in terms removed the obstacle, and we perceive
congress.
no adequate ground for adjudging that
re-enactment of the state law
before
was required
could have the effect upon imported which
had always had upon domestic property.
Jurisdiction attached, not in virtue of the law of congress, but because the effect of the latter was to place the property where jurisdiction could attach.
The decree is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity -with this opinion.
Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Gray and Mr. Justice Brewer concurred in the judgment of reversal, but not in all the reasoning of the
opinion of the court.

;

;

It seems that congress may either grant to the states in some particNote.
ulars regulative power over interstate commerce, or may make effective legislation of the states that would otherwise be ineffective as regulations of interstate commerce, and in this way give the states power to exclude such foreign
corporations engaged in such commerce, as the state has as to corporations
not engaged in such commerce:
1855, Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co.,
1877, Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485
18 How. 421
1890, Leisy v. Hardin, 135
IT. S. 100; 1896, Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58; 1897, Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S.
412; 1898, People v. Hawkins, 157 N. Y. 1; 1898, Vance v. Vandercook, 170
U. S. 438.
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Interstate commerce commission.
IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
CINCINNATI, N. O. & T. P. CO.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER
v.

1897.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
U. S. Rep. 479-511, on 505-507.

167

to the powers of the interstate commerce commission.]
these considerations
First, the
presented:
power to prescribe a tariff of rates for carriage by common carrier is
a legislative and not an administrative or judicial function, and, having
respect to the large amount of property invested in railroads, the
various companies engaged therein, the thousands of miles of road,
and the millions of tons of freight carried, the varying and diverse
conditions attaching to such carriage is a power of supreme delicacy
Second, that congress has transferred
and importance.
such a
power to any administrative body is not to be presumed or implied
from any doubtful and uncertain language.
The words and phrases
efficacious to make such a delegation of power are well understood
and have been frequently used, and if congress had intended to grant
such a power to the interstate commerce commission it can not be
doubted that it would have used language open to no misconstruction,
Third, incorporating into a statute the common
but clear and direct.
law obligation resting upon the carrier to make all its charges reasonable and just, and directing the commission to execute and enforce
the provisions of the act, does not by implication carry to the commission or invest it with the power to exercise the legislative function
of prescribing rates which shall control in the future. Fourth, beyond the inference which irresistibly follows from the omission to
grant in express terms to the commission this power of fixing rates, is
the clear language of section 6, recognizing the right of the carrier
to establish rates, to increase or reduce them, and prescribing the
conditions upon which such increase or reduction may be made, and
requiring, as the only conditions of its action, first, publication, and
The grant to
second, the filing of the tariff with the commission.
the commission of the power to prescribe the form of the schedules,
and to direct the place and manner of publication of joint rates, thus
specifying the scope and limit of its functions in this respect, strengththat the power to prescribe rates or fix any tariff
ens the conclusion
for the future is not among the powers granted to the commission.
These considerations convince us that under the interstate commerce act the commission has no power to prescribe the tariff of rates
which shall control in the future, and, therefore, can not invoke a
judgment in mandamus from the courts to enforce any such tariff by
it prescribed.
But has the commission no functions to perform in respect to the
matter of rates; no power to make any inquiry in respect thereto?
Unquestionably it has, and most important duties in respect to this

[As
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NATIONAL

503

GOVT. AND STATE CORPORATIONS.

1

53

5

matter.
It is charged with the general duty of inquiring as to the management of the business of railroad companies, and to keep itself informed as to the manner in which the same is conducted, and has the
right to compel complete and full information as to the manner in
which such carriers are transacting their business.
And with this
knowledge it is charged with the duty of seeing that there is no violation of the long- and short-haul clause ; that there is no discrimination
between individual shippers, and that nothing is done by rebate or
any other device to give preference to one as against another; that
no undue preferences are given to one place or places or individual
or class of individuals, but that in all things that equality of right,
which is the great purpose of the interstate commerce act, shall be
secured to all shippers.
It must also see that that publicity, which is
Holdrequired by section 6, is observed by the railroad companies.
ing the railroad companies to strict compliance with all these statutory
provisions and enforcing obedience to all these provisions tends, as
observed by Commissioner Cooley in In re Chicago, St. Paul & Kansas City Railway, 2 Int. Com. Com. Rep. 231, 261, to both reasonableness and equality of rate, as contemplated by the interstate commerce act.
See, 1886, Wabash, St. L. & P. R. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557; 1892,
Note.
Interstate Com. Com. v. B. & O. R., 145 U. S. 263; 1894, Interstate Com.
Com. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447 ; 1896, Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 ; 1897,
Interstate Com. Com. v. Ala. M. R., 168 U. S. 144.
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S. Rep. 211-248.
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For statement
[Appeal from decision of circuit court of appeals.
of facts, see supra, p. 967.]
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM. * * * Assuming, for the purpose of the
argument, that the contract in question herein does directly and substantially operate as a restraint upon and as a regulation of interstate
commerce, it is yet insisted by the appellants at the threshold of the
inquiry that by the true construction of the constitution, the power of
congress to regulate interstate commerce is limited to its protection
from acts of interference by state legislation or by means of regulations made under the authority of the state by some political subdivision thereof, including also congressional power over common carriers, elevator, gas and water companies, for reasons stated to be
peculiar to such carriers and companies, but that it does not include
1

Arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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the general power to interfere with or prohibit private contracts
between citizens, even though such contracts have interstate commerce
for their object, and result in a direct and substantial obstruction to or
regulation of that commerce.
This argument is founded upon the assertion that the reason for
vesting in congress the power to regulate commerce was to insure
uniformity of regulation against conflicting and discriminating state
legislation ; and the further assertion that the constitution guarantees
liberty of private contract to the citizens at least upon commercial
subjects, and to that extent the guaranty operates as a limitation on
*
*
*
the power of congress to regulate commerce.
(Quoting from the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232, 275; Railroad
Co. v. Richmond, 19 Wall. 584, 589.) It is undoubtedly true that
among the reasons, if not the strongest reason, for placing the power
in congress to regulate interstate commerce, was that which is stated
in the extracts from the opinions of the court in the cases above cited.
The reasons which may have caused the framers of the constitution
to repose the power to regulate interstate commere in congress do not,
however, affect or limit the extent of the power itself.
In Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat, i, the power was declared to be
complete in itself, and to acknowledge no limitations other than are
prescribed by the constitution.
Under this grant of power to congress, that body, in our judgment,
may enact such legislation as shall declare void and prohibit the performance of any contract between individuals or corporations where
the natural and direct effect of such a contract will be, when carried
out, to directly, and not as a mere incident to other and innocent purposes, regulate to any substantial extent interstate commerce.
(And
when we speak of interstate we also include in our meaning foreign
commerce.) We do not assent to the correctness of the proposition
that the constitutional
guaranty of liberty to the individual to enter
into private contracts limits the power of congress and prevents it
from legislating upon the subject of contracts of the class mentioned.
The power to regulate interstate commerce is, as stated by Chief
Justice Marshall, full and complete in congress, and there is no
limitation in the grant of the power which excludes private contracts
of the nature in question from the jurisdiction of that body. Nor is
any such limitation contained in that other clause of the constitution
which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law. It has been held that the word
" liberty," as used in the constitution, was not to be confined to the
mere liberty of person, but included, among others, a right to enter
into certain classes of contracts for the purpose of enabling the citizen to carry on his business.
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578;
United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 505, 572. But
it has never been, and in our opinion ought not to be, held that the
word included the right of an individual to enter into private contracts upon all subjects, no matter what their nature and wholly
(among other things) of the fact that they would, if
irrespective
performed, result in the regulation of interstate commerce and in the
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violation of

an act of congress upon that subject.
The provision in
the constitution does not, as we believe, exclude congress from legislating with regard to contracts of the above nature while in the exercise of its constitutional right to regulate commerce among the states.
On the contrary, we think the provision regarding the liberty of the
citizen is, to some extent, limited by the commerce clause of the
constitution, and that the power of congress to regulate interstate
commerce comprises the right to enact a law prohibiting the citizen
from entering into those private contracts which directly and substantially, and not merely indirectly, remotely, incidentally and collaterally, regulate to a greater or less degree commerce among the
*
*
*
states.

In the Debs case,

158 U. S. .564, it was said by Mr. Justice Brewer,
for
the
court:
"It is curious to note the fact that in a large
speaking
of
the
cases
in
to interstate commerce brought to this
respect
proportion
court the question presented was of the validity of state legislation in
its bearing upon interstate commerce, and the uniform course of decision has been to declare that it is not within the competency of a
state to legislate in such a manner as to obstruct interstate commerce.
a state, with its recognized
power of sovereignty, is impotent to

If

obstruct interstate commerce, can it be that any mere voluntary association of individuals within the limits of that state has a power which
the state itself does not possess?"
What sound reason can be given why congress should have the
power to interfere in the case of the state, and yet have none in the
case of the individual ?
Commerce is the important subject of consideration, and anything which directly obstructs and thus regulates
that commerce which is carried on among the states, whether it is
state legislation or private contracts between individuals or corporations, should be subject to the power of congress in the regulation of
* * *
that commerce.
is,
indeed, urged that to include private contracts of this descripIt
tion within the grant of this power to congress is to take from the
states their own power over the subject, and to interfere with the liberty of the individual in a manner and to an extent never contemplated bv the framers of the constitution, and not fairly justified by
If congress has not the power
any language used in that instrument.
to legislate upon the subject of contracts of the kind mentioned, because the constitutional provision as to the liberty of the citizen limits, to that extent, its power to regulate interstate commerce, then it
would seem to follow that the several states have that power although
such contracts relate to interstate commerce, and, more or less, reguIf neither congress nor the state legislatures have such power,
late it.
then we are brought to the somewhat extraordinary position that there
is no authority, state or national, which can legislate upon the subject
of or prohibit such contracts.
This can not be the case. * *
We conclude that the plain language of the grant to congress of
power to regulate commerce among the several states includes power
to legislate upon the subject of those contracts in respect to interstate
or foreign commerce which directly affect and regulate that commerce,
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and we can find no reasonable ground for asserting that the constitutional
provision as to the liberty of the individual limits the extent of that
We therefore think the appelpower as claimed by the appellants.
lants have failed in their contention upon this branch of the subject.
We are thus brought to the question whether the contract or combination proved in this case is one which is either a direct restraint
or a regulation of commerce among the several states or with foreign
It is objected on the part of
nations contrary to the act of congress.
the appellants

that even

if it affected interstate commerce the contract

or combination was only a reasonable restraint upon a ruinous competition among themselves, and was formed only for the purpose of
protecting the parties thereto in securing prices for their product that
were fair and reasonable to themselves and the public.
It is further
objected that the agreement does not come within the act because it
is not one which amounts to a regulation of interstate commerce, as
it has no direct bearing upon or relation to that commerce, but that
on the contrary the case herein involves the same principles which were
under consideration in United States v. E. C. Knight Company, 156
U. S. i, and, in accordance with that decision, the bill should be
dismissed.

Referring to the first of these objections to the maintenance of this
proceeding, we are of opinion that the agreement or combination was
not one which simply secured for its members fair and reasonable
prices for the article dealt in by them.
(After recounting the facts.)
The facts 1 thus set forth show conclusively that the effect of the
combination was to enhance prices beyond a sum which was reasonable, and therefore the first objection above set forth need not be further noticed.
We are also of opinion that the direct effect of the agreement or
combination is to regulate intei'state commerce, and the case is therefore not covered by that of United States v. E. C. Knight Company,
It was there held that although the American Sugar Refinsupra.
ing Company, by means of the combination referred to, had obtained
a practical monopoly of the business of manufacturing sugar, yet the
act of congress did not touch the case, because the combination only
related to manufacture and not to commerce among the states or with
The plain distinction between manufacture and
foreign nations.
commerce

was pointed out, and it was observed

that a contract

or

combination which directly related to manufacture only was not
brought within the purview of the act, although as an indirect and incidental result of such combination commerce among the states might

*
*
*
be thereafter somewhat affected.
The direct purpose of the combination in the Knight case was the
There was no combination or
control of the manufacture of sugar.
agreement, in terms, regarding the future disposition of the manufactured article ; nothing looking to a transaction in the nature of
The probable intention on the part of the maninterstate commerce.
ufacturer of the sugar to thereafter dispose of it by sending it to some
1

See supra, p. 967.
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mai'ket in another state, was held to be immaterial and not to alter
The various cases which had been
the character of the combination.
decided in this court relating to the subject of interstate commerce,
and to the difference between that and the manufacture of commodities, and also the police power of the states as affected by the commerce clause of the constitution, were adverted to, and the case was
decided upon the principle that a combination simply to control manufacture was not a violation of the act of congress, because such a
contract or combination did not directly control or affect interstate
commerce, but that contracts for the sale and transportation to other
states of specific articles were proper subjects for regulation because
they did form part of such commerce.
We think the case now before us involves contracts of the nature
last above mentioned, not incidentally or collaterally, but as a direct
and immediate result of the combination engaged in by the defendants.
While no particular contract regarding the furnishing of pipe, and
the price for which it should be furnished was in the contemplation
of the parties to the combination at the time of its formation, yet it
was their intention, as it was the purpose of the combination, to directly and by means of such combination increase the price for which
all contracts for the delivery of pipe within the territory above described should be made, and the latter result was to be achieved by
abolishing all competition between the parties to the combination.
The direct and immediate result of the combination was therefore
necessarily a restraint upon interstate commerce in respect of articles
manufactured by any of the parties to it to be transported beyond the
state in which they were made.
The defendants by reason of this
combination and agreement could only send their goods out of the
state in which they were manufactured
for sale and delivery in another state, upon the terms and pursuant to the provisions of such
combination. As pertinently asked by the court below, was not this
*
*
*
a direct restraint upon interstate commerce in those goods?
As has frequently been said, interstate commerce consists of intercourse and traffic between the citizens or inhabitants of different states,
and includes not only the transportation of persons and property and
the navigation of public waters for that purpose, but also the purchase, sale and exchange of commodities.
Gloucester Ferry Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196-203; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. I, 20.
If, therefore, an agreement or combination directly restrains not alone
the manufacture, but the purchase, sale or exchange of the manufactured commodity among the several states, it is brought within the
The power to regulate such commerce,
provisions of the statute.
that is, the power to prescribe the rules by which it shall be governed,
is vested in congress, and when congress has enacted a statute such
as the one in question, any agreement or combination which directly
operates, not alone upon the manufacture, but upon the sale, transportation and delivery of an article of interstate commerce, by preventing or restricting its sale, etc., thereby regulates interstate com-
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merce to that extent, and to the same extent trenches upon the power
of the national legislature and violates the statute. We think it plain
* *
*
that this contract or combination affects that result.
In regard to such of these defendants as might reside and carry on
business in the same state where the pipe provided for in any particular contract was to be delivered, the sale, transportation and delivery
of the pipe by them under that contract would be a transaction wholly
within the state, and the statute would not be applicable to them in
that case.
They might make any combination they chose with reference to the proposed contract, although it should happen that some
non-resident of the state eventually obtained it.
The fact that the proposal called for the delivery of pipe in the
same state where some of the defendants resided and carried on their
business would be sufficient, so far as the act of congress is concerned,
to permit those defendants to combine as they might choose, in regard
to the proposed contract for the delivery of the pipe, and that right
would not be affected by the fact that the contract might be subsequently awarded to some one outside the state as the lowest bidder.
In brief, their right to combine in regard to a proposal for pipe
deliverable in their own state could not be reached by the federal power
derived from the commerce clause in the constitution.
To the extent that the present decree includes in its scope the enjoining of defendants thus situated from combining in regard to
contracts for selling pipe in their own state, it is modified, and limited
to that portion of the combination or agreement which is interstate in
its character.
As thus modified, the decree is

Affirmed.
See report of this case in circuit court of appeals, supra, p. 967. 1891,
etc., Co., 46 Fed. Rep. 432 ; 1892, Bishop v. American
Preservers Co. , 51 Fed. Rep. 272 ; 1892, U. S. v. Greenhut, 51 Fed. Rep. 205, 213 ;
1892, U. S. v. Nelson, 52 Fed. Rep. 646; 1893, Blindell v. Hagan, 54 Fed. Rep.
40; 1893, TJ. S. v. Patter.3on, 55 Fed. Rep. 605; 1893, U. S. v. Workingmen's
Amal. Council, 54 Fed. Rep. 994; 1893, Waterhouse v. Comer, 55 Fed. Rep.
149 ; 1893, Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co. v. Howard, etc., Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 851 ;
1894, U. S. v. Debs, 64 Fed. Rep. 724; 1895, U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.
S. 1 ; 1895, American Soda Fountain Co. v. Green. 69 Fed. Rep. 333 ; 1897, In re
Grice, 79 Fed. Rep. 627; 1897, U. S. v. Trans-Mo. Frt. Assn., 166 U. S. 290;
1898, U. S. v. Coal Dealers' Assn., 85 Fed. Rep. 252 ; 1898, U. S. v. Joint Traffic
Assn., 171 U. S. 505; 1898. Hopkins v. U.S., 171 U. S. 578; 1898, Anderson v.
U. S., 171 U. S. 604; 1898, Indiana Express Co. v.U.S. Express Co., 88 Fed.
Rep. 659; 1899, Lowry v. Tile, Mantel, etc., Assn., 98 Fed. Rep. 817; 1900,
Dickerman v. Northern Trust Co., 176 U. S. 181 ; 1900, City of Atlanta v.
Chattanooga Foundry, etc., 101 Fed. Rep. 900; 1900, Gibbs v. McNeeley, 102
Fed. Rep. 594 ; 1900, U. S. v. Chesapeake & O. Fuel Co., 105 Fed. Rep. 93.

Note.
U. S. v.
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EAPIER,

PETITIONER.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
S. Rep.

143

U.

110-135.

[Application for leave to file petitions lor writ of habeas corpus to
be delivered from arrest for violating the anti-lottery act (1890, 26
St. 465, ch. 908), providing that " no letter, postal card or circular
concerning any lottery, * * * no list of drawings, * * *
* * *
and no lottery ticket shall be carried in the mail, etc.,
and any person who shall knowingly deposit anything to be conveyed
*
* *
in violation of this" act shall, upon conviction, be fined or
imprisoned, etc.]
*
* *
These are applications
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER.
for discharge by writ of habeas corpus from arrest for alleged violations of an act of congress, approved September 19, 1890, entitled
"An act to amend certain sections of the revised statutes relating to
26 Stat. 465, ch. 908.
lotteries, and for other purposes."
The question for determination relates to the constitutionality of
In Ex
section 3894 of the Revised Statutes as amended by that act.
held
in
S.
it
was
that
the
vested
U.
power
727,
parte Jackson, 96
congress to establish post-offices and post-roads embraced the regulation of the entire postal system of the country, and that under it congress may designate what may be carried in the mail and what excluded ; that in excluding various articles from the mails the object of
congress is not to interfere with the freedom of the press or with any
other rights of the people, but to refuse the facilities for the distribution of matter deemed injurious by congress to the public morals;
and that the transportation in any other way of matters excluded from
the mails would not be forbidden.
Unless we are prepared to over*
*
*
rule that decision, it is decisive of the question before us.
The states before the Union was formed could establish post-offices
and in doing so could bring into play the police
and post-roads,
in
the
protection of their citizens from the use of the means so
power
for
provided
purposes supposed to exert a demoralizing influence
the
people. When the power to establish post-offices and postupon
roads was surrendered to the congress it was as a complete power,
and the grant carried with it the right to exercise all the powers which
made that power effective.
It is not necessary that congress should
have the power to deal with crime or immorality within the states in
order to maintain that it possesses the power to forbid the use of the
*
* *
mails in aid of the perpetration of crime or immorality.
We can not regard the right to operate a lottery as a fundamental
right infringed by the legislation in question ; nor are we able to see
that congress can be held, in its enactment, to have abridged the
The circulation of newspapers is not profreedom of the press.
1

Statement abridged.
24
2 WIL. CAS.

Elaborate arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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hibited, but the government declines itself to become an agent in the
circulation of printed matter which it regards as injurious to the people. The freedom of communication is not abridged within the
intent and meaning of the constitutional provision unless congress is
absolutely destitute of any discretion as to what shall or shall not be
carried in the mails, and compelled arbitrarily to assist in the dissemination of matters condemned by its judgment, through the governmental agencies which it controls.
That power may be abused
furnishes no ground for a denial of its existence, if government is to
be maintained at all.
In short, we do not find sufficient grounds in the arguments of
counsel, able and exhaustive as they have been, to induce us to change
the views already expressed in the case to which we have referred.
We adhere to the conclusion therein announced.
The -writs of habeas corpus prayed for ivill therefore be denied,
and the rules hereinbefore entered discharged.

Sec. 505.

SHINNEY

1899.

/.
v.

Receivers in the United States courts.
NORTH AMERICAN SAVINGS, LOAN AND BUILDING
COMPANY ET AL.

IN THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT, DISTRICT OF UTAH.
97 Fed. Rep. 9-12.

The plaintiff brought this suit in a
MARSHALL, District Judge.
American
state court against the North
Savings, Loan and Building
Graves,
its receiver, heretofore
Company, a corporation, Edward B.
appointed by this court, and the Norwich Union Fire Insurance ComThe object of this suit is to have an account taken of the sum
pany.
due by plaintiff on a note and mortgage made to the first defendant,
and to recover from the insurance company the amount of a policy
of insurance on a house, a part of the mortgaged property, and heretofore destroyed by fire, less, however, the sum found due the firstThe insurance
named defendant and its receiver on such accounting.
and
is
on
the policy,
willing to pay the
company admits its liability
be
as
The redetermined
entitled thereto.
same to whomsoever may
into
The
this court.
ceiver removed the suit
plaintiff now moves to
remand on the following grounds:
(i) That the suit of A. V. Mclntosh against the North American Savings, Loan and Building Company, in which suit said receiver was appointed, did not give this
court jurisdiction to appoint a receiver; (2) that, even if jurisdiction
to appoint a receiver existed, it could not be exercised for the purpose
of an appointment ancillary to a primary administration in a state
court of another state ; (3) that the proceedings for the appointment
of a receiver of the assets of the North American Savings, Loan and
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a state
court of Minnesota, and hence could not be removed to a federal
court ; (4) that the value of the matter in dispute in the present case
These objections will be condoes not exceed the sum of $2,000.
sidered in the order named.
I. The case of Mclntosh against the North American Savings,
Loan and Building Company was instituted in a state court, and a
receiver of the assets of the defendant within the state of Utah was
appointed by that court in advance of an appearance by the defendant.
The defendant, a foreign corporation, thereafter removed it
into this court.
Subsequently the receiver so appointed resigned,
and the defendant Edward B. Graves was permitted to file a petition
in that suit, in which it was alleged that he had been appointed the receiver of the North American Savings, Loan and Building Company
by a state court of Minnesota, in a suit then pending, and prior to the
institution of any proceedings in Utah ; that the corporation had been
organized under the laws of Minnesota, and had its general offices
there ; that in said suit the insolvency of the corporation and the necessity for a receiver was shown; that he had duly qualified as such
receiver; and he prayed that he might be appointed by this court
receiver of the assets of said corporation within Utah, and that, such
receivership be ancillary to the primary administration of the state
court of Minnesota.
Thereupon said Graves was appointed as receiver by this court, and he duly qualified as such.
In his motion to
remand, the plaintiff, Shinney, attacks collaterally the jurisdiction of
the court in the case of Mclntosh against the North American SavHe was not a party to that suit,
ings, Loan and Building Company.
nor is this proceeding appropriate for the correction of any error
therein.
The propriety of the original appointment of a receiver, or
of the appointment of defendant Graves as ancillary receiver, is not
material here, if jurisdiction to make the appointment existed.
That
a general power exists to appoint a receiver of the assets of a foreign
corporation within the jurisdiction of the court appointing is well settled. Williams v. Hintermeister, 26 Fed. Rep. 889; Murray v.
Vanderbilt, 39 Barb. 140; Trust Co. v. Miller, 33 N.
Eq. 155; 5
And the case of Buswell v. Order
6860, 6861.
Thomp. Corp.,
of Iron Hall, 161 Mass. 224, 36 N. E. Rep. 1065, is a precedent for
the appointment here made.
Jurisdiction of the person is unquestioned.
The corporation was regularly served with process, appeared, and answered the complaint, and has never objected to the
The appointment of a receiver was a part of the relief
jurisdiction.
expressly sought in the suit, and there was an attempt to state a cause
of action therefor.
If, for the purposes of the argument, it were admitted that the complaint did not state a good cause of action, or
affirmatively showed that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief
An appointment on such a
prayed, the jurisdiction would still exist.
bill would be erroneous, but in no sense void. The action of the
court being properly invoked, its determination would not be void for
want of jurisdiction, so long as it was within the issues tendered.

J.
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Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254-269, n Sup. Ct. 773; Moore
v. Martin, 38 Cal. 428; Ricketts v. Spraker, 77 Ind. 371; In re
Latta, 43 Kan. 533, 23 Pac. Rep. 655; Young v. Lorain, n 111.
61.
624; Van Fleet Col. Attack,
2. It is admitted that, when a receiver is once appointed by a
federal court, other federal courts, through comity, will usually appoint the same person as receiver of the assets within their jurisdiction ; but it is argued that, where the appointment is first made by a
state court, federal courts are without power to act, in conformity
No reason for such a distinction is
with the principle of comity.
is
of
The
state
court
co-ordinate jurisdiction in such
apparent.
As bematters with the federal court sitting in the same locality.
tween the parties, its determination of the insolvency of the corporation and of the need for a receiver is just as conclusive as if had in
a federal court.
The need for a uniform administration of the assets
of an insolvent corporation inheres in the principles of equity, and
does not vary with the forum first invoked.
It is no unusual thing
for a federal court to appoint an ancillary receiver of assets within its
jurisdiction in aid of a primary appointment by a state court of
another state.
Sands v. E. S. Greeley & Co., 31 C. C. A. 424, 88
Fed. Rep. 130.
In Rust v. Water-works Co., 17 C. C. A. 16-20, 70 Fed. Rep.
129133, the circuit court of appeals of the eighth circuit, said:
" It goes without saying that the court below (United States Circuit
Court for the district of Colorado) had the power, upon the presentation to it of the decree of the court of chancery of the state of New
Jersey appointing the plaintiff in error the receiver of the property of
this insolvent corporation, and the trustee for ifcj creditors and stockholders, to appoint him receiver and trustee, with the same powers,
in the district of Colorado, and to authorize him to sue for and to
defend suits against the water-works company in that district in the
name of the corporation or in his own name."
The plaintiff's contention is without merit.
3. The third objection confounds the nature of a suit for ancillary
It is in no sense a continuation of, or an incident to,
receivership.
A judgment
the suit in which the primary receiver was appointed.
receiver
bind
assets
the
does
not
against
beyond the jurisancillary
diction of the court appointing him. Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.
S. 254,
Sup. Ct. 773; Johnson v. Powers, 139 U. S. 156, n Sup.
Ct. 525. "Where a receiver, administrator, or other custodian of
an estate is appointed
by the courts of one state, the courts of that
state reserve to themselves full and exclusive jurisdiction over the
assets of the estate, within the limits of the state."
Reynolds v.
" It rests in the discretion of the court appointing
Stockton, supra.
the receiver whether the assets within its jurisdiction shall be distributed under its own direction, or shall be transmitted to the primary
receiver.
U. S. v. Coxe, 18 How. 105." Sands v. E. S. Greeley
& Co., 31 C. C. A. 424-426, 88 Fed. 130-133.
The two proceedThe need for a uniform and equitable
ings are entirely independent.
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of the court of

"ancillary jurisdiction" to transmit them to the court of

so-called

Evidently, to insure equality among creditors,
some one court must determine their rights, although the assets may
Among co-ordinate courts,
be scattered through many jurisdictions.
the court of primary jurisdiction is selected for this purpose,
not
because of any paramount jurisdiction inhering in
but because of
the necessity of making some selection, and of the difficulty of
formulating any principle of selection other than that of the first
in time.
true that the matter in dispute in this action does not ex4.
would therefore not be removceed in value the sum of $2,000, and
able to this court, except that in suit pending here the defendant Graves
has been appointed receiver of the assets of the North American Savsued as such receiver,
ings, Loan and Building Company, that he
to determine his right to assets claimed
and the object of the suit
For the purposes of jurisdiction, this suit must
by him as receiver.
be considered as ancillary to the suit pending in this court, in which he
was appointed receiver, and, as such, cognizable here, irrespective of
White v. Ewing,
citizenship of parties or of amount in controversy.
159 U. S. 36, 15 Sup. Ct. 1018; State of Washington v. Northern
Pac. R. Co., 75 Fed. 333; Carpenter v. Railroad Co., 75 Fed. 850;
is

is

a

it

is

It

it,

primary jurisdiction.

81

The motion to remand

is

Sullivan v. Barnard,

Fed. 886; Bausman v. Denny,
denied.

73

Fed. 69.

;

;

;

;

&

;

&

Note: See, 1886, Peperv. Fordyce, 119 U. S. 469; 1889, In re Farmers' L.
T. Co., 129 U. S. 206 1885, Chicot Co. v. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 529 1893, Empire
Coal, etc., Co. v. Empire Coal
M. Co., 150 U. S. 159; 1893, U. S. Trust Co.
v. Wabash R. Co., 150 U. S. 287 1895, White v. Ewing, 159 U. S. 36 1900,
Hutchinson v. Am. Palace Car Co., 104 Fed. Rep. 182 1900, Hale v. Tyler, 104
Fed. Rep. 757.
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THE RELATION OF THE CORPORATION TO ITS PROMOTERS,
OFFICERS, SHAREHOLDERS, CREDITORS AND OTHERS.
SUBDIVISION
See. 506.
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THE CORPORATION AND ITS PROMOTERS.

Definitions and functions of promoters.

See, supra, ch. 4, p. 374.
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duties of promoters.

CHANDLER v. BACON.
1887.

IN THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT, DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

30 Fed. Rep. 538-541.

J.

These cases were heard on exceptions to the master's
COLT,
The master found that the defendants Bacon and Caduc
report.
were promoters of the National Color Printing Company; that, as
such promoters, they negotiated an agreement between the owners of
certain patents and the National Color Printing Company to be
formed, by which, among other things, they were to receive two-sixteenths, or 3,750 shares, of the capital stock of the new company,
less 625 shares, which they were to assign to Robert A. Piper; that
the defendants offered to the public an option to take the. stock in the
new company, disclosing the fact of the purchase of the patents, and
that a portion of the stock in the company was to be issued to the former owners of the patents in part payment therefor, but not informing the persons who subscribed for the stock that they were to have
The master further finds
stock on any different terms or conditions.
that, at the time the agreement was signed, an understanding was arrived at between the defendants and the officers of the United States
Label, Card and Tag Company, the owners of the patents purchased,
that the defendant Bacon should be president of the new company,
and the defendant Caduc treasurer, and that, pursuant to this agreement, these officers were elected ; that the defendants obtained for
themselves these positions, and the control of the books of the new
company; that they placed a large amount of stock at the uniform
price of seven dollars a share ; and that, under the agreement, they
obtained 3,125 shares of stock, without paying anything into the treasury of the company, as all other persons did who subscribed for the
stock upon the solicitation of the defendants, or upon the solicitation
1
Inasmuch as the topics touched upon in the following chapters are more
fully developed in the cases given (or those preceding), and the doctrines relating thereto are easily accessible in all the text-books, only few references
to late cases will be hereafter given.
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of other persons whom the defendants had interested in said company.
The master further finds that the defendants were partners, and that
they should pay the receiver at the rate of seven dollars per share for
each of the 3,125 shares of stock received by them, with interest from
September 23, 1880, amounting to the total sum of $28,794.78, less
$17,289.55, the amount the master finds, in cause No. 1,790, the deThe defendants object to
fendant Caduc advanced to the company.
the finding of the master that they received 3,125 shares to their own
use, without payment of seven dollars per share, because they say
that he disregards the fact that said shares had been fully paid for,
and that the Color Printing Company had received full value therefor, and that the United States Circuit Court of New Jersey had decreed that these shares were fully paid and properly issued.
It appears that Judge Nixon, upon an application by the present receiver,
held that these shares in question were full-paid stock for the property
purchased, and therefore not liable to assessment, but he also subsequently said that no decision was made as to the validity of the issue
of this stock to these defendants, and it was his intention simply to
instruct

the receiver not to assess this stock.
is not whether these shares are to be
considered as full-paid stock, but whether these defendants, as promoters of the new company, could take them without consideration,
while other stockholders paid seven dollars per share. Clearly, they
could not lawfully do this.
As promoters of the new company, they
a
relation
towards it similar to that of agent to a
fiduciary
occupied
in these negotiations to derive any
and
had
no
right
principal,
they
over
other
without
a full and fair disclosure of
stockholders
advantage
the transactions, and any secret profits so made they must refund to
the company.
That this may have been done without any fraudulent
intent, or that the price paid for the patents was fair and reasonable,
The law forbids them, from their
can not relieve these defendants.
to
derive
benefit
over other stockholders, and
position,
any
secretly
makes them accountable to the company for any profit so derived.
Bagnall v. Carlton, 6 Ch. Div. 371; Whaley. etc., Co. v. Green, 5
Q. B. Div. 109; New Sombrero Phosphate Co. v. Erlanger, 5 Ch.
Div. 73; Emma Silver Min. Co. v. Grant, n Ch. Div. 918; Densmore Oil Co. v. Densmore, 64 Pa. St. 43; McElhenny's Appeal, 61
Pa. St. 188; Simons v. Vulcan Oil, etc., Co., 61 Pa. St. 202;
Emery v. Parrott, 107 Mass. 95 ; Getty v. Devlin, 54 N. Y. 403.
The finding of the master that the defendants should pay seven
dollars a share is objected to as without warrant of law, and it is
contended that the defendants are only liable to account for the shares
I
themselves, or for the profit, if any, they have made upon them.
have
would
the
whether
think
they
company had a right to elect
the shares transferred back to them; or, (2) if the shares had been
sold, that these defendants should turn over the entire profit made by
"Although you may
the sale; or, (3) that the company may say:
no
shares,
have derived
yet you deprived us of
profit by selling the
therefore pay us the
must
placing them with other persons, and you

The question before us now

(i)

HEBGEN V. KOEFFLER.

1548

508

sum we have lost by reason of our being deprived of the right of
Carling's Case, i Ch.
placing these shares with other persons."
Div. 115^ 126, 127; McKay's Case, 2 Ch. Div. i; De Ruvigne's
Case, 5 Ch. Div. 306; Nant-y-glo, etc., Co. v. Grave, 12 Ch. Div.
The last measure of damages has been adopted by the master
738.
in this case.
It is in proof that a large amount of the stock of the company was placed at a uniform price of seven dollars a share, and the
defendants are called upon to account for their stock at this price.
can see no error in this finding of the master.
As to the third exception, the master properly said that there was
no evidence that the defendant Bacon, upon request of the plaintiff,
delivered up to him, before the proceedings, 750 of the shares in
question, and that, therefore, Bacon must be charged as found.
The remaining exception is to the master's finding that the defendants were partners, and as such are jointly and severally liable to the
complainant. These, defendants signed the secret agreement as parties
of second part, and they were acting in concert to promote a common
purpose for their common benefit, and consequently they were jointly
and severally liable to account to the complainant. When the conduct of parties operates as a fraud or deceit upon third persons,
whatever their private intention, the relation of partnership may be
said to exist as to such third persons.
Story Partn., section 49;
Emery v. Parrott, 107 Mass. 95.
Excerptions overruled.

I

Note. See note, suvra, p. 375.
1887, St. Louis, Ft. Scott, etc., R. Co. v.
Tiernan, 37 Kan. 606, supra, p. 375; 1889, Pittsburgh M. Co. v. Spooner,
74 Wis. 307; 1896, Woodbury Heights v. Loudenslager, 55 N. J. Eq. 78, and
compare this with, 1898, Loudenslager v. Woodbury Heights Co., 56 N. J. Eq.
411, 41 Atl. Rep. 1115, and, 1899, Woodbury Heights L. Co. v. Loudenslager,
58 N. J. 556, 43 Atl. Rep. 671 ; 1899, Lagunas Nitrate Co. v. Lagunas Nitrate
Syndicate, 68 L. J. Ch. 699, 81 L. T. (N. S.) 334, 48 Weekly Rep. 74; 1900,
Hayward v. Leeson, 176 Mass. 310, 49 L. R. A. 725.
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AND OTHERS,
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RESPONDENTS, v.

COURT

OF

KOEFFLER,
WISCONSIN.

APPELLANT.

97

1

Wis. Rep.

The action was to rescind a sale of
[Appeal from circuit court.
real estate on the ground of fraud, and to recover of the promoters of
a corporation profits alleged to have been fraudulently made by them.
The decision was for plaintiff upon findings made.]
MARSHALL, J. There is no controversy but that the judgment appealed from is sustained by the findings of fact and conclusions of law.
1

Statement,

except as given in the opinion, omitted.
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Questions of law are discussed in the briefs of counsel but not reached
in the consideration of the case, unless some of the findings of fact,
The findings, as
to which reference will be made, are first disturbed.
they stand, are to the effect that defendant Hugo Koeffler, at an expense of $6,000, obtained the right to purchase of Van Eimeren a
tract of land for $31,000, payable $600 down, $13,400 January 2,
1893, and the balance January 2, 1898, with interest; that he then
associated with him defendant Preusser in a scheme to form a corporation to take the land for $55,000 and to divide the profits of the transaction between himself and Preusser, two-thirds to the former and onethird to the latter; that pursuant to such scheme they prepared a subscription paper so worded as not to disclose the true ownership of the
land, but to induce signers to believe that it belonged to Van Eimeren,
and to bind them to join in forming a corporation to purchase such
land for $55,000, payable $25,000 down, $13,000 January 2, 1895,
and $17,000 January 2, 1898, with annual interest; that in order to
induce signers not in the scheme to believe that the promoters purposed becoming stockholders on the same basis as others who joined in
the apparently mutual enterprise, they each signed for $10,000 of the
stock, and one Fernekes, who was employed to assist in obtaining
subscriptions, signed for $3,000, to make it appear that he was going
in with others, while such subscription was in fact for Koeffler; that
the whole stock of $55,000 was subscribed and the corporation was
thereupon organized ; that Koeffler and Preusser procured themselves
to be elected as directors and managing officers, and the sale of the
real estate to the corporation to be consummated, ostensibly by Van
Eimeren, for $55,00, but really for $31,000, the promoters taking
the difference over the cost to them for profits of the deal, without
the other stockholders having any idea but that the purchase was
made of Van Eimeren for the full sum of $55,000.
It needs no discussion of the subject to show that such facts make
a clear case for relief against the promoters, either in equity, by or
for the benefit of the corporation, to rescind the sale and recover the
consideration paid for the property, or in any one of the several other
Pittsburg Mining Co. v.
ways that might have been adopted.
Spooner, 74 Wis. 307 ; Fountain Spring Park Co. v. Roberts, 92
Wis. 345 ; Franey v. Warner, 96 Wis. 222. The last case cited was
very recently decided by this court and the subject there fully discussed and the law stated in substance that, " if a person invites
others to join him in the purchase of property at a given price, falsely
representing that the purchase is to be made of a third person and
that all are to share equally in the cost and equally in the benefits of
the enterprise, and such others join with such person on the faith of
such representations, and the purchase be made accordingly, each of
the bena fide purchasers paying his proportion of the money, and
such person acquires secretly a profit to himself by reason of having
obtained the property after the making of the mutual agreement at a
less sum than the price made to his associates, or by reason of having
acquired the property himself at a less price before the sale, it is a fraud

RICHARDSON ET AL. V. GRAHAM ET AL.

1550

509

upon such others, and each may, by restoring such person to his original
situation, rescind the transaction and recover his money in an action
at law, or he may offer to rescind, and, by keeping such offer good,
sue in equity for a rescission of the contract and for a recovery of his
money, or, without restoring, he or all similarly interested joining,
may sue in equity to charge such person as trustee of the profits
fraudulently retained by him, and for an accounting; or each may
sue such person at law for damages for the fraud to the extent of the
enhanced value he paid by reason thereof.
A person so circumstanced stands in a relation of trust and confidence to all his bona
fide associates, and holds all the profits secretly made for the common
benefit of all engaged in the common enterprise, in proportion to their
respective interests ; and such is the case whether the purchase be made
by such person before or after the agreement for the mutual enterprise."

Affirmed.
See note to preceding case.
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The entire controversy in this case grows out of the fact that Graham purchased the ten acres of land in the proceeding mentioned, or
obtained an option thereon at six thousand dollars, and, having it at
that price, proposed to get up a joint stock company, and sell it to
them at eight thousand five hundred dollars.
This he had a perfect
right to do if he could get the company after it was organized to acIt could not concern the company or any of its
cept it at that price.
stockholders what the property originally cost Graham, if they were
and did agree to take
at eight thousand five hunwilling to take
dred dollars.
After
was ascertained by some of the stockholders
that the property cost Graham only six thousand dollars, they seemed
to think he ought to have sold
to the company at the same price.
The option, however, was Graham's property, and he had right to
for all he could obtain for it. Can we say that Graham desell
ceived the subscribers for stock in this company as to the price he exCertainly not, when the
pected the company to pay for the property
evidence shows that at the head of the subscription list appeared the
following statement in writing: "The real estate contemplated to be
situated in Pleasants
operated by the oil company when formed
county, West Virginia, containing ten acres,- and generally described
as part of the T.
hold the
Cook estate at Vaucluse, for which
option, and agree to sell all my rights therein to said company, for
eight thousand five hundred dollars, when said company
organized"
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So that
dated October n, 1890, and signed, "A. B. Graham."
every subscriber who took stock had an opportunity to read the above
statement when he signed the subscription list if he desired, and, if
he signed without reading, he had no one to blame but himself.
-

Sec. 510.

Liability of the corporation upon promoters' contracts.
McARTHUB

1892.

v.

TIMES PRINTING COMPANY.

IN THE SUPREME

COURT OF MINNESOTA.
319-322, 31 Am. St. Rep. 653.

48

Minn. Rep.

J.

The complaint alleges that about October- 1,
MITCHELL,
the defendant contracted with plaintiff for his services as ad'vertising
solicitor for one year; that in April, 1890, it discharged him in violaThe action is to recover damages for the breach
tion of the contract.
The answer sets up two defenses:
of the contract.
That plaintiff's employment was not for any stated time, but only from week to
week; (2) that he was discharged for good cause. Upon the trial
there was evidence reasonably tending to prove that in September,
1889, one C. A. Nimocks and others were engaged as promoters in
procuring the organization of the defendant company to publish a
newspaper; that, about September 12, Nimocks, as such promoter,
made a contract with plaintiff, in behalf of the contemplated
company, for his services as advertising solicitor for the period of one
the date at which it was expected
year from and after October i,
that the company would be organized; that the corporation was not,
in fact, organized until October 16, but that the publication of the
paper was commenced by the promoters October i, at which date
plaintiff, in pursuance of his arrangement with Nimocks, entered upon
the discharge of his duties as advertising solicitor for the paper; that
after the organization of the company he continued in its employment
in the same capacity until discharged, the following April ; that defendant's board of directors never took any formal action with reference to the contract made in its behalf by Nimocks, but all of the
stockholders, directors, and officers of the corporation knew of this
contract at the time of its organization, or were informed of it soon
but, on the
afterwards, and none of them objected to or repudiated
contrary, retained plaintiff in the employment of the company without any other or new contract as to his services.
There
a line of cases which hold that where
contract
made
in behalf of, and for the benefit of,,
projected corporation, the corparty to the conporation, after its organization, can not become
Abbott v. Hapgood,
tract, either by adoption or ratification of it.
150 Mass. 248, 22 N. E. Rep. 907; Beach Corp., section 198. This,
however, seems to be more
question of name than of substance;
that is, whether the liability of the corporation, in such cases,
to be
is

is

a

a

a

a
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it,
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placed on the grounds of its adoption of the contract of its promoters,
or upon some other ground, such as equitable estoppel.
This court,
in accordance with what we deem sound reason, as well as the weight
of authority, has held that, while a corporation is not bound by engagements made on its behalf by its promoters, before its organization, it may, after its organization, make such engagements its own
And this it may do precisely as it might make similar
contracts.
original contracts ; formal action of its board of directors being necessary only where it would be necessary in the case of a similar origThat it is not requisite that such adoption or acceptinal contract.
ance be expressed, but it maybe inferred from acts or acquiescence on
part of the corporation, or its authorized agents, as any similar origiBattelle v. Northwestern Cement and
nal contract might be shown.
See,
Concrete Pavement Co., 37 Minn. 89, 33 N. W. Rep. 327.
The right of the corporate agents to
also, Mor. Corp., section 548.
adopt an agreement originally made by promoters depends upon the
Of
purposes of the corporation and the nature of the agreement.
course, the agreement must be one which the corporation itself could
make, and one which the usual agents of the company have express
That the contract in this case was of
or implied authority to make.
that kind is very clear; and the acts and acquiescence of the corporate officers, after the organization of the company, fully justified the
jury in finding that it had adopted it as its own.
The defendant, however, claims that the contract was void under
the statute of frauds, because, '"by its terms not to be performed within one year from the making thereof," which counsel assumes to be
the date of the agreement between plaintiff and the
September 12,
This proceeds upon the erroneous theory that the act of
promoter.
the corporation, in such cases, is a ratification, which relates back to
the date of the contract with the promoter, nnder the familiar maxim
that "a subsequent ratification has a retroactive effect, and is equivalent to a prior command."
But the liability of the corporation, under such circumstances, does not rest upon any principle of the law
of agency, but upon the immediate and voluntary act of the comAlthough the acts of a corporation with reference to the
pany.
contracts made by promoters in its behalf before its organization are
frequently loosley termed " ratification," yet a ratification properly
so called, implies an existing person, on whose behalf the contract
There can not, in law, be a
might have been made at the time.
could
not have been made binding on
ratification of a contract which
made,
time
it
was
because
the ratifier was not then
the ratifier at the
Co.,
re
16 Ch. Div. 128;
in existence.
In
Empress Engineering
H.
B.
R.
Co.,
N.
&
L.
R. 9 C. P. 505;
Melhado v. Porto Alegre,
2
is
P.
What
called
Kellner v. Baxter, L. R.
C.
"adoption,"
185.
in such cases, is, in legal effect, the making of a contract of the date
of the adoption, and not as of some former date. The contract in
The trial
this case was, therefore, not within the statute of frauds.
court fairly submitted to the jury all the issues of fact in this case,
accompanied by instructions as to the law which were exactly in the
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line of the views we have expressed ; and the evidence justified the
verdict.
The point is made that the plaintiff should have alleged that the
contract was made with Nimocks, and subsequently adopted by the
defendant.
If we are correct in what we have said as to the legal
effect of the adoption by the corporation of a contract made by a
promoter in its behalf before its organization, the plaintiff properly
pleaded the contract as having been made with the defendant.
But
we do not find that the evidence was objected to on the ground of a
The assignments of error
variance between it and the complaint.
are very numerous, but what has been already said covers all that are
entitled to any special notice.

Order affirmed.

See, 1874, "Western Screw Co. v. Cousley, 72 111. 531 ; 1900, Chase v.
Note.
Redfield Creamery Co., 12 S. D. 529, 81 N. W. Rep. 951; 1900, Hayward v.
Leeson, 176 Mass. 310, 49 L. R. A. 725.

Sec. 511.
tract.

Liability of promoters to parties with whom they con-

WEATHERFORD M. W.
1894.

& N.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
S.

J.

W.

W. R. CO.

OF

TEXAS.

v.

GRANGER.
86

1

Texas 350, 24

795.

GAINES,
This suit was brought by the defendant in error
against the plaintiff in error to recover upon open account for services
rendered.
The plaintiff in the trial court obtained a judgment which
was affirmed by the court of civil appeals.
This writ of error is sued
out for the purpose of reversing that judgment.
The plaintiff in error, the defendant in the trial court, is a corporation organized under
the general law of the state for the purpose of constructing and operThe defendant in error, the plaintiff in the trial
ating a railroad.
*
*
*
court, is a practicing attorney at law.
The trial judge, as conclusions of fact, found, in substance, that
some kind of a company was formed to build the railroad from
Weatherford to Mineral Wells ; that Anderson was the "principal
" that
mover in said scheme, and was so recognized by all parties;
he employed plaintiff to assist him in procuring a bonus and in otherwise advancing the enterprise, and that the plaintiff rendered service under said employment both before and after the articles of the
company were filed ; that the bonus was raised, and was, after its inThe court of civil appeals
corporation, accepted by said company.
1

Part of opinion omitted.
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adopt the findings of the trial judge, and add additional findings as
" The charter of the defendant company was signed and
follows:
acknowledged about June i, 1889, and was filed in the office of the
The bonus or subsidy was
secretary of state at Austin July 2, 1889.
of
the
charter.
The record would
not secured until after the riling
so
trial
and
in
court,
have justified the
justifies us,
finding, as we do,
the fact to be that in availing itself of the subsidy secured the comUnpany knew of the services of the plaintiff in raising the bonus."
der the statute the corporation came into existence when its articles of
incorporation were filed in the office of the secretary of state. Revised Statutes, articles 4104, 4105.
Although the trial court found
for
sued
were rendered in part before
which plaintiff
that the services
of
the
in
after
the
articles, their value was assessed as
filing
and
part
and
at
an entirety
judgment was rendered for the whole amount.
$500,
error.
We are of opinion that, under the circumIn this there was
of
case
as
shown
this
stances
by the evidence, the defendant corporabe
held
liable
the
to
tion can not
plaintiff for any services rendered by
him before it was brought into legal existence.
Upon the question as to the liability of a corporation growing out of
contracts made on its behalf by its promoters there is considerable
diversity and some conflict of opinion. But there are some propositions affecting this question upon which the authorities seem to be in
substantial accord.
The promoter, though he purport to act on behalf of the projected
corporation, and not for himself, can not be treated as agent, because
the nominal principal is not then in existence ; and hence, where there is
nothing more than a contract by a promoter, in which he undertakes to
bind the future corporation, it is generally conceded that it can not be
enforced.
Kelner v. Baxter, L. R. 2 C. P. 174; Melhado v. Rail-

way Co., L. R. 9 C. P. 503.
The promoters themselves are liable upon the contract, unless the
person with whom they engage agrees to look to some other fund for
The statute, howKerridge v. Hesse, 9 Car. & P. 200.
payment.
authorizes
the
ever, which
incorporation, may provide that the corshall
formed,
when
pay the necessary expenses of promoting
poration,
In
such
a
case,
the scheme.
though the right of action is dependent
the
contract,
the
liability is created by the statute. In re Rothupon
Co.,
Law
T. (N. S.) 219. It is now held in England
etc.,
erham,
50
of association bind the company to pay the
the
articles
that, although
of
its
promotion, a third party can not avail himself of such
expenses
In re
a provision so as to maintain an action against the company.
Rotherham, etc., Co., supra', Eley v. Assurance Co., 34 Law T. (N.

S.)

190.

It is also generally held that contracts by promoters, made on behalf

of the corporation within the scope of its general authority, may be
Some of the courts say
adopted by the latter after its organization.
be
ratification
a principal existing
ratified,
but
presupposes
they may
at the time of the agent's action, and it seems to us, therefore, that
McArthur v. Printthe term is not applicable in its technical sense.
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(Minn.), 51 N. W. 216; Spiller v. Skating Rink Co.,
Div. 368.
With the exception of the law courts of England, the rule is also
a contract be made on behalf of a
veiy generally recognized that
corporation by its promoters, and the corporation, after its organization, ivith a knowledge of the facts, accept its benefits, it must take it
'with its burdens; and, if the other party has performed the stipulaing Co.

if

tion binding upon him, it may be enforced as against the corporation.
Spiller v. Skating Rink Co., supra; Touche v. Warehousing Co., 6
Ch. App. 671. But as to the application of the rule last announced
the courts differ in opinion.
A leading case upon this subject is Edwards v. Railway Co., i Mylne & C. 650. There the promoters of
the railway company had entered into a contract with the trustees of
a turnpike company, in which the latter agreed to withdraw their opposition to an act of parliament for the incorporation of the railway
company, in consideration of an agreement by the promoters to insert
certain clauses in the act as to the nature of the necessary constructions at the crossing of the railway and the turnpike road, and the
opposition was withdrawn, but the clauses were not inserted ; and it
was held that the railway company should be enjoined from constructing the crossing in a manner different from that specified in the
The
clauses which had been agreed upon and had been omitted,
correctness of the ruling in this case was seriously questioned in the
house of lords in Preston v. Railway Co., 5 H. L. Cas. 605, and in
Railway Co. v. Magistrates of Helensburg, 2 Macq. 391, 2 Jur. (N.
S.) 695. We presume the doubt as to this case arises from the fact
that the only benefit accepted by the defendant company was the exercise of the powers conferred upon it by the act of parliament.
When the promoters of a railway company have agreed with a
landed proprietor, through whose estates the road is projected to run,
to take the requisite quantity of his land at a stipulated price, and
after the corporation is formed it takes the land, it is certainly equitable
that the company should be made to pay the agreed compensation ;
and the doctrine is recognized in many English equity cases.
StanCo.,
v.
Co.,
v.
Railway
Railway
ley
15
3 Mylne & C. 773; Gooday
Eng. Law& Eq. 596; Preston v. Railway Co., 7Eng. Law&Eq. 124;
Edwards v. Railway Co., i Mylne & C. 650. The same rule has
been announced also in many American cases.
Railway Co. v.
Bank, 21 Neb.
Ark.
Nat.
Perry, 37
164; Paxton Cattle Co. v. First
621, 33 N. W. 271 ; Manufacturing Co. v. Small, 40 Md. 395; Bommer v. Spring, etc., Co., 81 N. Y. 468; Battelle v. Pavement Co.,
37 Minn. 89, 33 N. W. 327; McArthur v. Printing Co., supra.
Having exercised rights and enjoyed benefits secured to it by the
terms of a contract made by its promoters in its behalf, a corporation
"
should be held estopped to deny its validity.
Again, when the promoters of a corporation have made a contract
in its behalf, to be performed after it is organized, it may be deemed
a continuing offer on part of the other party to the agreement, unless
withdrawn by him, and may be accepted and adopted by the" corpora-
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tion after such organization ; and the exercise of any right inconsistent with the non-existence of such contract might be deemed conclusive evidence of such adoption.
But there are some cases which
Low v. Railroad Co., 45 N. H. 370, was a case
go a step further.
of a Vermont corporation sued in New Hampshire upon a contract
made in the former state.
After a chai'ter had been granted, but before an organization had been effected, a public meeting was held to
promote the enterprise, at which, it is to be presumed from the opinion,
the corporators were present or were represented.
A proposition was
made that the plaintiff should be employed, and paid to visit various
towns and cities to interest capital in the projected scheme, and to solicit
The plaintiff accepted the offer and perand procure subscriptions.
formed the services ; and it was held that the corporation was liable. The
court determined that the question of liability depended upon the law of
Vermont as announced in the case of Hallv. Rail way Co., 28 Vt. 401.
But they were also inclined strongly to think that upon general principles the company, by accepting subscriptions, which were procured by
the plaintiff, bound itself to pay for his services.
They also seem to
recognize the doctrine that after a charter has been granted a majority
of the corporators have the power to make contracts necessary to
perfect the organization, which may be binding upon the company
when formed.
But they also lay stress upon the fact that the charter
of the defendant corporation provided that " the expenses of all surveys and examinations, as also of the perliminary surveys already
made and making, and all manner of incidental expenses relating
In Hallv. Railway Co.,
thereto, shall be paid by said corporation."
supra, a corporator was held entitled to recover for necessary services
in organizing the company, although there was no express promise by
Unless the charter of the company
any one that he should be paid.
provided for the payment of such expenses, this decision, we think,
is unsupported by authority.
It is generally held that, in the absence of such provision in the act of
incorporation, in case of a special charter, or in the general law, or in
the articles of incorporation under a general law, no implied promise
can be imputed to a corporation to pay for the services of a corporator
A contract
or promoter before the corporation comes into existence.
made by promoters maybe adopted by a coi'poration, expressly or impliedly, by exercising rights under it ; but otherwise it is not binding
Kelner v. Baxter, supra; Melhadov. Railupon such corporations.
way Co., supra; Railway Co. v. Ketchum, 27 Conn. 170; Kerridge
v.Hesse, 9 Car. & P. 200; Munsonv. Railroad Co., 103 N. Y. 58,8
N. E. 355 ; Morrison v. Mining Co., 52 Cal. 306; Gent v. Insurance
Co., 107 111. 652; Railway Co. v. Sage, 65 111. 328; Manufacturing
Co. v. Cousley, 72 111. 531 ; Buffington v. Bardon, 80 Wis. 635, 50 N.
W. 776. See, also, Railway Co. v. Magistrates of Helensburg, 2
Macq. 391, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 695; Tift v. Bank, 141 Pa. St. 550, 21

Atl. 660.
Now, when it

is said that when a corporation accepts the benefit of
made
a contract
by its promoters it takes it cum onere, it is important

PROMOTERS AND THIRD PARTIES.

5H

1557

2

it

WIL. CAS.

25

it

is

it

a

a

is

is

it

is

is

a

a

is

?

I

I

a

it,

I

?

is

"It

is

it

;

if

it

is

is

is

a

a

if it

it

a

it,
it

There is, so far as this matto understand distinctly what is meant.
ter is concerned, a radical difference between a pi-omise made on
behalf of the future corporation in the contract itself, the benefits of
which the corporation has accepted, and the promise in a previous
contract to pay for services in procuring the latter to be made.
This
Here a proposiis well illustrated by the facts of the present case.
tion was made upon behalf of the company, by its promoters, that if
would build its road
a bonus should be subscribed and paid to
between certain points, and would carry coal at
certain stipulated
rate. By accepting the bonus, the company became bound to fulfill the
That was the burden which took with
stipulations of that contract.
also appears that one of the
But
the benefit of the agreement.
that
he would assist in procuring
the
plaintiff
promoters promised
subscribers to the bonus the company would pay him for his services.
This was no part of the contract the benefits of which were taken by
The benefits of
contract are the advantages which
the defendant.
result to either party from
performance by the other, and in like
A more accurate
manner its buixJens are such as its terms impose.
of
of
nature
the
demand
manner
to say that
stating the
plaintiff's
the defendant has accepted the benefit of the plaintiff's services, and
should pay for them.
It
true in one sense that the company has
of
had the benefit
plaintiff's services, and
equally true that
the services had been rendered under
would have had that benefit
an employment by the subscribers to the bonus
and yet in the latter
could not be claimed that the company would be liable for
case
such services unless payment for them by the company were made
one of the terms of the contract between the company and the subIn re Rotherham, etc., Co., 50 Law T. (N. S.) 219, in the
scribers.
said
used:
opinion of one of the justices, this language
that Mr. Peace has an equity against the company because the comIf
What does that mean
pany had the benefit of his labor.
order coat and receive
get the benefit of the labor of the cloth
manufacturer, but does any one dream that am under any liability
to him
mere fallacy to say that because
It
person gets the
benefit of work done by somebody else he
liable to pay the person
There
more doubt as to the plaintiff's right
who did the work."
to recover for his legal services in advising as to the articles of
incorporation, and in correcting and preparing this paper. Such
services are usually necessary, and
would seem that the corporation
should pay for them.
Such payment
frequently provided for in the
act of incorporation or in the articles when the incorporation is
the case, persons who
effected under
When such
general law.
liability
take stock in the company are chargeable with notice that
for this purpose has already been created, and
proper for the
corporation to discharge it. But, in the absence of such provision in
the statute or in the articles,
may be unjust to shareholders to charge
the corporation with liabilities of which they had no actual knowledge
We therefore hold with some
at the time they accepted the shares.
hesitation that claims for the necessary expenses of the organization
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under our statute should not be excepted from the general rule applicable to contracts made before the corporation has come into legal
existence.
Applying the rules we have announced to the case before us, it is
apparent that the plaintiff has recovered, in part at least, for services
for which the defendant was not bound to pay.
He made his contract before the company had a legal existence as a corporation, with
a single promoter ; and it is a matter of no moment that the promoter
was the general manager of the project, and became the owner of the
majority of the stock upon its organization. There were other stockThe law requires that there should be ten at least. Rev.
holders.
St., article 4099.
The evidence does not disclose that his contract with
Anderson was actually known to any other person, nor do we see any
other circumstance from which knowledge should necessarily be inferred.
Since Anderson had no power to bind the future corporation,
but could bind himself, the inference from his assisting Anderson
would be that he was acting gratuitously, or that Anderson had agreed
Anderson was interested in shifting his contract upon
to pay him.
the company, and it may be doubted whether, although he became a
The
director, notice to him could be deemed notice to the company.
court of civil appeals find, however, that the company had notice.
Waiving the question of the right of the court to supplement the
finding of the trial judge under such evidence, and the further question whether there be any evidence to support this conclusion, it
follows from what we have already said that the question of the
The plaintiff's concompany's knowledge does not affect the case.
tract with Anderson, though made by latter on behalf of the company,
was not a lien, incumbrance, or burden upon the contract between
the subscribers to the bonus and the defendant, and it incurred no
liability on the former contract by accepting the benefit of the latter.
The evidence was sufficient to sustain a recovery by the plaintiff for
the value of his services rendered after the corporation was created ;
but the court below failed to find separately the reasonable worth of
Therefore the entire judgment must be reversed.
such services.

Reversed.

Sec. 512. Liability of corporation to promoter for expenses
curred in promoting corporation.
See Marchand v. Loan Association,

26
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La. Ann. 389, supra, p.
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THE CORPORATION

AND ITS MEMBERS OR SHAREHOLDERS.

ARTICLE I.

RIGHTS OF THE CORPORATION.

I. To corporate existence,
Sec. 513.
deny corporate existence.

estoppel of members

to

See Foster v. Moulton, 35 Minn 458, supra, p. 646; Canfield v.
Gregory, 66 Conn. 9, supra, p. 647 ; McCarthy v. Lavasche, 89 111.
270, supra, pp. 253, 650.

To issue preferred stock, or increase
Sec. 514. 2.
the capital stock.

78 N. Y. 159, supra, p. 790;
S.
U.
(18 Wall.) 233, supra, pp. 442,
85
Droitwich Salt Co. v. Curzon, L. R. 3 Exch. 35, supra, p. 764.

See Kent v. Quicksilver

Railway Co. v. Allerton,
763

;

Sec. 515.

3-

(a)

Min. Co.,

To

enforce contracts of subscription.
General relation of shareholders to the corporation, to other shareholders, and to creditors;

subscription

induced by fraud.

0. W. UPTON, ASSIGNEE, ETC., v.
1874.

or decrease

ANDREW ENGLEHART. 1

IN THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT, DISTRICT OF IOWA.
3 Dillon's Rep. 496-511.

[Suit by Upton, assignee in bankruptcy of an insurance company,
against Englehart to collect an alleged unpaid subscription to the capital stock of the company. The answer alleged that the company
was chartered in Illinois, and sent its agent to Iowa to procure its
stock to be taken.
It is alleged that this agent made false and fraudulent representations of a material character to induce defendant to
.agree to become a shareholder; viz.: " that $20 per share would be
full payment for the stock, and that the remaining 80 per cent, was
'non-assessable;' " and such was defendant's written agreement with
the company, the certificate received being marked "non-assessable,"
The answer also
though not otherwise indicating it was fully paid.
stated that defendant's purchase of the stock was induced by these
fraudulent representations, and that "he long ago repudiated the same
This answer was
by refusing to pay any more" of the installments.
demurred to.]
1

Statement

abridged.

Part only of the opinion given.
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DILLON, Circuit Judge.
Whoever becomes a stockholder in an
First, to the
incorporated company sustains a three-fold relation :
Second, to the other stockartificial person called the corporation.
holders in the same company, or in other words, his associates or
partners, who by force of statute are clothed with corporate capacity.
And third, to the creditors of the corporation. It is essential to bear
these several relations in mind in determining the questions here preThe capital is supplied by the shareholders, who alone parsented.
ticipate in the gains or pecuniary advantages which may accrue from
The shareholders are the
the carrying on of the corporate enterprise.
real parties in interest ; the incorporating statute empowering them to
contract and be contracted with through the medium of a corporate
*
*
*
representative.
First,
And here the plea may be considered in a double aspect:
does it set forth a sufficient answer if the action were one by the comSecond,
pany before insolvency to enforce payment for the stock?
does if set forth a sufficient answer to such an action when brought in
the interest of creditors of the company after it has failed?
Assuming that the statements in the plea are true, it appears that
the defendant was induced to agree to become a shareholder by false
and deceptive statements of the agent, and even of the company itself,
The effect of
as shown by the character of the certificate it issued.
fraud practiced to induce a contract to subscribe to stock or purchase
shares is, as respects the company and the person deceived, the same
as in other contracts, with the modifications arising from the peculiar
nature of the transaction as to repudiating or rescinding the contract,
which will be adverted to further along.
Speaking of contracts to
become a shareholder, induced by the fraud of the company or its
" Contracts of this description between
agents, Lord Romilly says:
an individual and a company, so far as misrepresentation or suppression of truth is concerned, are to be treated like contracts between
If one man makes false statement which misany two individuals.
leads another, the way in which that is to be treated affords the
example for the way in which a contract is to be treated where a company makes a false statement which misleads an individual." Directors, etc., of Central Railway of Venezuela v. Kisch, Law Rep. 2
H. L. 99, 125, 1867 ; Smith's Case, L. Rep. 2 Ch. App. 604, 609. * * *
The fraudulent representation or concealment must, of course,
relate to material facts, but if it does, and has induced a person using
reasonable caution and judgment to enter into a contract to purchase
shares, it is ordinarily no answer to his claim to be relieved of the
contract that by more vigilance he might have discovered the decepThis point is expressly adjudged by the house of lords in the
tion.
Directors, etc., of the Central Railway Co. of Venezuela v. Kisch,
Law Rep. a H. L. 99, 1867. * * *
Considering that the transaction between the defendant and the
company's agent set up in the plea took place in a state different from
that in which the company was organized, and that its charter was on
file in the auditor's office in Illinois, it is our opinion that it would be

THE CORPORATION AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS.

5 15

1561

possible for the agent of the company to make fraudulent representations concerning the laws of Illinois and the charter of the company,
and that if he did represent that, by those laws and the charter, eighty
per cent, of the stock was "non-assessable," and the defendant relied upon this, he is entitled, in the absence of laches and acquiescence, as against the company, to resist payment of this eighty per
In this connection, it may be mentioned that it is the duty of
cent.
a person who has been frauduently drawn into the purchase of shares
to take prompt measures on discovering the fraud to repudiate or reAnd the reason for this is two-fold:
i. Because
scind the contract.
his remaining in the company may mislead others into becoming
members of it upon the credit of his name, when otherwise they
would not do so. 2. Because it may likewise induce others to deal
Directors, etc., v.
with it and give credit to it for the same reason.
Co.,
L.
R.
2
Exch.
&
Kisch, supra; Bwlch-y-Plwm
326; Ashley's

L. R.

Scholey v. Central Railway Co. of Venezuela (bill
against company), L. R. 9 Eq. 267, note,
In the case last cited the Lord
decided by Lord Chancellor Cairns.
"He
certainly thought that the court would be
Chancellor said:
in
a
most careful to see,
company going on and trading, in which the
and
others varied from day to day, that a perrights of shareholders
of
of this kind, and
son coming to complain
misrepresentations
voidable
came
within
the
contract,
shortest limit of
coming to avoid a
in
a
It
such
case."
results from the
time which was fairly possible
if
this were an action by the company
foregoing considerations that
for calls, or a suit by the defendant against the company to rescind
the contract for the purchase of stock, and the facts were as set out
in the answer, the law would be with the present defendant, provided
it appeared that he had been guilty of no laches in discovering the
How the
fraud, and thereupon promptly repudiated the contract.
contract may be repudiated or disaffirmed, see Bwlch-y-Plwm & Co.
(sufficiency of plea), L. R. 2 Exch. 324; Ashley's Case, L. R. 9
Eq. 263 ; McNiell's Case, L. R. 10 Eq. 503 ; observations of Lord
Chancellor Hatherley in Smith's Case, L. R. 4 H. L. 64, on p. 73 ;
Lord Westbury in S. C., p. 77, 78; Lord Cairns, in S. C.,p. 70, S.
C. below, L. R. 2 Ch. App. 604; Oakes v. Turquand, supra, and
Case,

9

Eq.

262

;

by shareholders

a

if

is

is,

cases cited, infra.
It remains to consider how far the foregoing principles are modified
when the company has failed or become bankrupt and the rights of
As recreditors, in addition to those of shareholders, are involved.
spects creditors, "the stockholders are special partners, incorporated
to carry on the business of the company, and the stock subscribed and
secured by the several stockholders or partners constitutes the capital
or fund publicly pledged to all who deal with them," and the stockholders are debtors to the company for their unpaid stock.
Ogilvie
v. Knox Ins. Co., 22 How. 380, 387.
correct view of the
Assuming this to be, as it unquestionably
relation of stockholders to the company and to the public, the arguhe was induced by
made on behalf of the defendant, that
ment
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the fraud of the company to agree to purchase its stock, he does not
thereby become a stockholder, because an agreement obtained by
fraud is void, and the person so injured has a right to repudiate it and
treat it as utterly invalid from the beginning, as regards the company,
and that the company's creditors have in this respect no higher right
than the company itself.
.In other words, if the company has no
right to collect the subscription or purchase-money for the shares, its
creditors, who are not creditors of the subscriber to the stock or the
shareholder, must claim through it and can stand on no better ground,
and the right of the assignee in bankruptcy, as the representative of
creditors, is simply the right to collect the assets of the company, and
if the person claimed to be a stockholder is not, by reason of fraud,
entitled to be held as such by the company, this answers any possible
But the proposition is not a
right of the assignee to a recovery.
sound one, that the right of a person who has been drawn into the
purchase of stock by the fraud of a company or its agents to relief is
as great against creditors as it would be against the company.
If the
contest is with the company, it is essentially one with the alleged
shareholder's own partners or associates, and if their corporate representative or its agents have practiced a fraud upon him, he is entitled
But if a person has accepted a certificate of stock
to relief against it.
and becomes, to all external appearance, a stockholder, persons may
have become creditors of the company on the faith of his membership,
and in law are presumed to do so, and as they can not know the manner in which he was induced to become a stockholder, there is ground
to maintain that as to them the manner is immaterial.
Upon consideration of the adjudged cases, and upon principle, our
judgment is that a contract to purchase shares induced by fraudulent
representations or concealment is not void, but only voidable, which
means, as the house of lords has decided, that it is valid until disaffirmed, and not that it is void until affirmed.
Oakes v. Turquand,
supra; Reese, etc., Mining Co. v. Smith, L. R. 4 H. L. 64; S.

L. R.

2 Ch. App. 604.
it will be seen, gives to the purchaser of shares,
though his purchase was induced by fraud, the right to hold on to
them if it should be profitable to do so ; and as the rights of creditors
may become involved, who can ordinarily know nothing of the fraud
practiced upon the shareholder, the law as a condition of relief to the
latter requires that he shall be guilty of no laches is discovering the
fraud and in repudiating the purchase.
Speaking of this subject, Lord Romilly, in Ashley's Case, above
" The leading
cited, after referring to the course of decision, says:
in
all
these
cases
is
this
:
A
man
must
not play fast and
principle
loose ; he must not say ' I will abide by the company if successful,
and I will leave the company if it fails;' and therefore when a misrepresentation is made of which any one of the shareholders has
notice, and can take advantage to avoid his contract with the company,
it is his duty to determine at once whether he will depart from the

C.

case

below,

This doctrine,
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L. R. 9 Eq. 262,
company or whether he will remain a member."
*
* *
268; McNiell's Case, L. R. 10 Eq. 503, 1870.
The plea is defective in that it does not show that the defendant
made use of reasonable diligence to make himself acquainted with
the matters of fact in respect of which the fraud is claimed, nor when
or how he repudiated the contract, nor whether he offered to surrender
the certificate of stock promptly on discovering the fraud.
For these reasons the demurrer to the second special defense or plea
is sustained.
Demurrer sustained.
Love,

J.,

concurred.

Note.
As to
supra, 539.

liability

to creditors, see Martin

v. South

Salem

Land Co.,

Sec. 516. Same,
(b) Assumpsit, misrepresentations, release,
of
amount
of stock, subscription of the whole amount.
change
HUGHES

1870.

v.

THE ANTIETAM MANUFACTURING COMPANY OF
WASHINGTON

COUNTY.

1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND.

34

Md. Rep.

316-332.

Statement

abridged

;

1

if

*

if

;

it,

[Action of assumpsit by the company against Hughes to recover
certain unpaid installments alleged to be due on a subscription to the
The court below found for the company ; the errors ascapital stock.
signed by the appellant were certain charges to the jury at the request
of the company, and the failure to charge as requested by appellant.
Of the former, among others, the court charged that if the jury found
that calls for payment were made as stated, " of which the defendant
had notice, or of which notices directed to the defendant were left in
his postoffice, and the defendant had refused to pay the same," plaintiff could recover; and among the latter Hughes asked that if the jury
found that at any time after he had signed the subscription paper
which stated the amount of capital stock to be $50,000, it had been
changed without his knowledge to $150,000, and he had never assented
to
he could not be held
the
the court changed this by saying
change had been made "after same was acknowledged by the defendant," then he would not be liable. The third charge, which the court
refused to give, asked that
the jury should find that defendant was
induced to subscribe by representations that "at least six per cent, interest upon said capital wbuld be paid by rents from the Emmert prop* *
and should
erty, to be bought by the plaintiff the first year,
further find the said property was so bought but not rented, but forthwith changed and improved at great expense,"* then the company could
The eighth charge, which also was refused, asked that
not recover.
only part of opinion given.
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there had been other subscribers to the stock who had been released
without his consent, he could not be held upon his subscription.]
*
*
* But conceding the validity of the subROBINSON, J.
scription, it is contended that an action of assumpsit will not lie,
because it does not contain an express promise to pay, and that the
only remedy against the delinquent subscriber is by a forfeiture and
It may be true that an express
sale of the stock under the 45th section.
promise in so many words may not be found in the subscription, but
it was made for & given number of shares and at a fixed money value,
and when construed in connection with the law under which the company was to be organized, we are very far from admitting it does not
amount to an express promise to pay for the shares in the manner and
The purpose of the appellant
upon the conditions therein prescribed.
and his co-subscribers in signing the articles of association and subscribing for a given number of shares, was to organize a company
and furnish capital sufficient to carry on the manufacturing business,
from the successful prosecution of which they expected to realize a
To this end property was to be
profit on the money thus invested.
purchased, materials bought, labor performed, and debts incurred,
and these could only be done, and accomplished by the payment of
the stock subscribed.
Forfeiture and sale of the shares might
faii to realize the means necessary to effect these objects, and particularly -if the prospects of success were not so flattering after the
If, thereorganization as the more hopeful projectors anticipated.
fore, no action will lie to enforce the payment of the subscriptions,
not only must the object and purposes for which the company was
organized fail, but the capital stock of those who have promptly paid,
relying upon the good faith of their co-subscribers, must also prove
an entire loss.
It has been held, it is true, in Massachusetts and
New Hampshire, that the only remedy against the delinquent subscriber is by forfeiture and sale of the stock ; but in reviewing these
decisions, Mr. Redfield says : ' ' They arose under charters in which the
capital stock and number of shares were not fixed, and he admits it
to be firmly established in this country and in England that where the
stock of the company is defined and divided into a certain number of
for shares, whether it contains an express
shares, a subscription
promise to pay or not, is regarded as an agreement on the part of the
subscriber to pay for the same according to the terms and provisions
of the charter, and that the remedy by forfeiture and sale is cumui Redfield on Railways 163.
The many cases
lative merely."
referred to by the author fully sustain this general rule, and in one of
them, the Hartford and New Haven R. R. Co. v. Kennedy, 12 Conn.
500, where the decisions in Massachusetts relied on by the appellant
" The act of becoming a stockwere ably reviewed, the court say:
holder pursuant to the provisions of this charter, is one from which
the law raises a promise to pay the installments legally assessed and
The common law furnishes a remedy for a violation
demandable.
The subsequent enof this engagement by an action of assumpsit.
actment authorizing the directors to sell the stock is affirmative in its
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terms.
It does not expressly or by implication take away the previous
which
the common law has provided.
No words are used
remedy
indicative of an intention to deprive the corporation of their previous
no necessity is perceived why they should be deexisting remedy
prived of it and every consideration arising from public policy or
connected with good faith and common honesty demands that this
*
* *
remedy should continue in full force."
We find no error in the rejection of the appellant's third prayer.
In order to avoid the contract of subscription it must appear to have
been made upon the faith of false representations
of the agent, in
a
matter
material
to
the
value
and
to
success
regard
offact,
of the enmere
the
rents
of
The
statement
that
the
Emmert
terprise.
property
would pay six per cent, on the capital stock for the first year, and
then the company could determine whether to build or not, etc., must
be regarded as the mere expression of opinion in regard to the success of the undertaking, upon which the appellant had .no right to
rely. In all probability he was as competent to judge of the success
or profits to be realized as the agent, and contracts thus deliberately
made, and upon the faith of which others may have acted, are not to
be avoided because of the flattering prospects held out by parties so-

liciting subscriptions.
The appellant's eighth prayer was also properly rejected.
This
was a joint undertaking, and the consideration of the contract of subscription was the right to share the profits arising therefrom. Under
such circumstances a subscriber could neither withdraw nor be released from his subscription without the consent of all the co-subscribers, and the fact that the directors or managers undertook to
release certain parties can not operate in any manner to discharge the
appellant from his obligation.
The statute under which the appellee was organized confers no
such power on the directory, and the exercise of it can not affect, one
way or the other, the liability of the subscribers who may have been
thus released.
We think, however, the court erred in the modification of the apThe change of the capital stock from fifty
pellant's second prayer.
thousand to one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, after his subscription, and without his assent or subsequent acquiescence, discharged
him from all liability on account of the same, and the mere acknowledgment by him of the certificate before the justice of the peace, if,
at the time, he was ignorant of the change or alteration thus made,
can not be construed as a new contract on his part, nor estop him
from relying on this defense in a suit by the appellee
the party by
whom the change was made.
We think, also, the court erred in regard to the notice prescribed
by section 49 .of article 26. It has been decided, we are aware, in
one or two states, under statutes similar in many respects to the one
under which the appellee was organized, that notice of the calls or
assessments is only necessary to the forfeiture and sale of the stock;
but in referring to these cases, Redfield says:
"They are contrary to
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the general course of decisions upon the point, and somewhat at varii Redfield on Railways
ance with the idea of a call or assessment."
is
because
note.
To
that
it
the subscribers,
unnecessary,
say
147,
who may be living in different parts of the county, and perhaps the
state, are presumed in law to know all that is done by the directory,
seems to us to be raising a presumption against the truth itself.
But
apart from these views, we think the forty-ninth section, in express
It says the directors, trustterms, provides that notice shall be given.
ees or managers "may call in and demand from the stockholders respectively, all sums of money by them subscribed, at such times,"
How demand ? It certainly was not the intention of the legisetc.
lature that it should be made for the first time through a suit, without
giving the subscriber an opportunity to pay the installment thus assessed.
Nor was such a -construction put upon the statute by the appellee, for we find that written notice was mailed to the appellant.
The forty-ninth section, however, requires that there should be a ^personal demand" or "notice published, nearest to the place where the
business of the corporation shall be carried on."
Constructive notice
by the mail is not a personal notice, although in some cases, by exHere, howpress statutory provision, it is sufficient to bind parties.
ever, the manner of giving notice is prescribed by the law under
which the calls are made, and it was the plain duty of the directors to
have complied strictly with its requirements in this respect.
They
had no right to dispense with the mode and manner of notice thus
prescribed, and where, by positive law, personal notice is required, a
written notice through the mail is not a compliance with the statute.
There is another objection which, so far as the record discloses, is
fatal to the right of the appellee to recover in this suit.
The capital
stock of the company, and the number of shares, and their par value
per share, are fixed in the recorded certificate, and there is no provision, either in the articles of association, or the subscription itself, or
the general law under which the appellee was organized, authorizing
the directors to make calls or assessments before the whole capital
stock is taken.
We take the general rule to be, that where the capital stock and the number of shares are fixed in the articles of association or recorded certificate, no valid assessments or calls can be made
against a subscriber until all the shares are taken, unless there be a
provision to that effect either in the certificate or general law under
which the company is organized, and for the reason that the success
of the enterprise, and the profits to be realized therefrom, may depend
Cabot
entirely upon having the full amount of the capital taken up.
and West Springfield Bridge Co. v. Chapin et a/., 6 Gushing 50;
Contoocook Valley Railroad v. Barker, 32 N. H. 370; Fox v. Clifton, 6 Bing. 776; Wontner v. Shairp, 4 Man., Grang. & Scott, 404;
Pitchford v. Davis, 5 Meeson & Welsby, 2 ; Norwich & Lowestoft
The auComp. v. Theobald, i Moo. & Mai. 151, and i Red. 176.
thor says:
"And where the charter of a railway company requires
their stock to consist of not less than a given number of shares, assessments can not be made before the required number is taken."
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This point was not relied on in the argument, and we do not rest our

a

it

it,

decision upon
for although the record shows only about one-third
of the stock was taken,
may appear by proof not before us that the
whole capital stock was subscribed.
Being of opinion that the court erred in the modification of the appellant's second prayer, and also in granting the appellee's first
prayer, so far as regards the notice of the assessments or calls, the
new trial awarded.
judgment will be reversed, and
Judgment reversed, and neiv trial aivarded.
Note.
As to limitation of actions upon subscription contracts, see,
Crofoot v.Thatcher, 19 Utah 212, 75 Am. St. Eep. 725.

Same.

o

Forfeiture for non-payment.

(c)

THE HERKIMER MANUFACTURING AND HYDRAULIC

v.

1849.

IN THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS.

COMPANY.

1

330-35

1

SMALL

2

Sec. 517,

1899,

N. Y. Rep.

-

[Action of assumpsit in the supreme court by the Herkimer Com-

a
7

is

a

a

a

;

5

a
5

it

pany against Small on his subscription for twenty-one shares of $100
each to the capital stock of the company.
The charter made
the duty
of the directors "to call upon the stockholders for payment of their subscriptions at such times and in such proportions as they should see fit,
under penalty of forfeiture to the company of their shares and all
previous payments made thereon, giving notice (as provided) of such
call." Small subscribed and the corporation was organized; April,
per cent, call payable in sixty days, and another of per cent,
1834,
in July
payable in ninety days were made
per cent, call payable in
cent,
August, and in October
call was made, 13 percent,
73 per
payable November 10, and 10 per cent on the first of each of the following six months.
Suit was brought in December to collect the 40
cent,
call of the
then due and unpaid.
per
In March, 1835,
balance of the subscription
10 per cent.
was made, payable May 15,
and Small neglecting to pay, the directors, in June, 1836, passed
resolution forfeiting the stock for this call.
Small pleaded this resolution and forfeiture in bar of the suit in assumpsit, alleging that the
shares were worth more than the amount due with interest; the company demurred to this plea, and the supreme court sustained the
demurrer.
This
the error assigned.]
1

Statement abridged; arguments, opinion of Gardiner, J., concurring with
Hoyt, J., and dissenting opinion of Jewett, C. J. (Bronson, J., concurring),
and part of opinion of Hoyt, J., omitted.
Ruggles, Cad y, Strong and Shankland, JJ., concurred.
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HOYT, J. The supreme court of this state, by a series of decisions,
commencing with the case of Goshen Turnpike Company v. Hurtin
(9 John. 217), has uniformly held that the mere provision in the
charter of incorporated companies, similar to the one in this case, allowing the forfeiture of the stock and previous payments, does not
deprive the company of their common-law remedy, by action, to recover from the stockholder the amount of his subscription. (14 John.
238.) In this case they have gone further, and held that although the
company exercised the right conferred by the statute and forfeited the
stock, they may still recover in an action upon the subscription, unless
the value of the stock was equal to the amount due upon the subscription.
They liken this case to that of a mortgage, and say, that when
the mortgagee takes the thing pledged and sells
or finally converts
to his own use, he
paid so much only towards his debt as the
thing sold for, or was worth, at the time of the conversion, and cite
Cowen 380,
Cowen 346,4 Wend. 381, n Wend. 106; and when
the equity of redemption
released, or
strict foreclosure resorted
to in any form, then so much
paid as the value of the thing mort-

a

if

I

it

a

i

I

it

is

a

is

a

a

a

a

a

a

a

if

is

is

a

it

I

is

I

it

a

a

if

is

gaged, at the time when the title became absolute in the mortThis
no doubt the true rule in the case of
gagee, amounts to.
the company are to be
mortgage of real or personal estate, and
deemed
mortgagee of the stock, and both parties entitled to the
think
would be decisive in
rights of mortgagor and mortgagee,
favor of the plaintiff.
But do not think this
to be regarded in the light of
mortgage.
foreclosure and sale of property mortgaged,
Upon
bring more
than the debt the mortgagor
entitled to the surplus.
But no provision
made for the company's refunding the surplus in this case.
And
the company after forfeiture should sell the stock for
sum
beyond the amount unpaid thereon at the time of forfeiture, the defendant could not recover such surplus.
Again, in all cases of
mortgage, the mortgagor has in equity
right of redemption until
strict foreclosure, or
foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged property.
But no such remedy exists for the redemption of stock forfeited under
the provisions of
statute like the one in question.
Judge Story
(Eq. Juris., section 1325) says that courts of equity in cases of noncompliance by stockholders with the terms of payment of their
installments of stock at the times prescribed, by which
forfeiture of
their shares
incurred under the by-laws of the institution, have
refused to interfere, by granting relief against such forfeiture.
And
such was the ruling of the court of chancery in England, in Sparks
v. The Liverpool Water-Works
Company (13 Ves. 428). When
penalty or forfeiture
imposed by statute upon the doing or omission
of a certain act, courts of equity will not interfere to mitigate the
would be in contravention of the
penalty or forfeiture incurred, for
direct expression of the legislative will.
(Story Eq. Juris., section
can not see how this can upon principle be
Strange 447.)
1326;
On the contrary,
regarded as
has, think, more of the
mortgage.
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properties of a conditional sale, when the absolute title does not pass
until payment in full.
Where a party subscribes for stock he takes it upon, and subject to,
that the corporation may, if he
the condition imposed by statute
omits to pay the installments as they are called for and become due,
It is then left optional
forfeit the stock and all previous payments.
with the corporation whether they will prosecute on the subscription,
The corporation may
or forfeit the stock and previous payments.
doubtless take whichever remedy they elect.
But if they elect to forfeit and take back their stock, it seems to me they should not be permitted also to sue and collect the price agreed to be paid, or any part
In that case they take back the whole consideration for the
thereof.
subscriber's promise, with the right to retain whatever may have been
paid. It would, after that, be inequitable and unjust to permit them
And it can make no difference
to retain the stock and still prosecute.
that the installments for which the suit is brought became due before
The statute simply authorizes a forthe forfeiture was declared.
feiture of the stock and all previous payments made thereon ; but
does not declare that the party shall also forfeit the amount of pay*
*
*
ments which may have become due and remain unpaid.
I think, as I have before stated, that this case is more analogous to
a contract for the purchase and sale of property, where the vendor
reserves the right, on default of payment at the time stipulated, to rescind the sale or forfeit the contract and previous payments.
Suppose
a person agrees to sell personal property ; one-third of the purchasemoney is paid down, and the purchaser agrees to pay the remainder
by installments, and if he fails to make either of the payments at the
time stipulated, that he will forfeit the property purchased and all
previous payments thereon ; and upon such default the vendor repossesses himself of the property and takes advantage of the forfeiture.
It could hardly be pretended that he could still maintain an action for
the price agreed to be paid.
I do not see how such a case can be
I think
distinguished in principle from the one under consideration.
the principles decided in Winter v. Livingston (13 John. 54) are
equally applicable to this case.

Reversed.

Same,

Sec. 518.
BTJDD
1887.

v.

(d)

Calls, how made;

forfeiture.

MULTNOMAH STREET RAILWAY COMPANY ET

AL.

IN THE SUPREME
15

COURT OF OREGON.
15 Ore. 413-420,
Pac. 659, 3 Am. St. Rep. 169.

[Appeal from circuit court. Upon a trial which was had before
the court without a jury the following facts were found :]
That the defendant railway company was organized in 1882,

(i)

1
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and that D. E. Budd thereafter subscribed for one hundred shares
of the capital stock of said corporation, of the nominal par value of

$10,000.
(2) That E. J. Jeffrey, W. A. Scoggin, and D. E. Budd were
duly elected directors of said corporation, and duly qualified as such
directors.

(3) That

of the board of directors held on the fourth
day of April, 1883, all were present, and it was then and there voted
Jeffrey and Scoggin, yes, and Budd, no that an assessment of
one hundred per centum be levied on all the stock of the corporation, said assessment to be paid by the twenty-fifth of April, 1883.
(4) That on the fifteenth day of April, 1883, a proper written
notice, duly issued, was served on Budd, calling a meeting of said
corporation, to be held on the twenty-sixth day of April, 1883, for
the purpose of disposing of Budd's stock for delinquent assessment.
(5) That on that day a meeting of said directors was held, at
It was voted by
which Jeffrey and Scoggin alone were present.
resolution, and ordered, that " whereas, D. E. Budd has failed to pay
any part of the one hundred shares of the capital stock held by him,
according to the resolutions of the fourth day of April, 1883, that
at a meeting

his assessment is declared delinquent, and that the secretary be
directed to sell said one hundred shares of stock, or so much as shall
be necessary to satisfy such assessment, after giving thirty days'
notice as required by law.
(6) That notice of the sale of said stock was duly published, and
on the thirteenth day of May, 1883, said stock of D. E. Budd was
offered for sale and was purchased by A. N. and E. A. King, who
were the highest bidders for the same, for the sum of $10,200, of
which amount $10,000 was applied in payment of the subscription
and assessment of said Budd.
(7) That the value of said stock, over and above such assessment,
was $200.
(8) That after said sale said stock was transferred on the books of
said corporation to the names of A. N. and E. A. King, and said D.
E. Budd was no longer recognized by said board of directors of said
corporation as a stockholder therein.
The court found that the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the
defendants the sum of $200 and costs.
STRAHAN, J. * * * On this appeal several questions of law
have been discussed, which we will now consider.
i. Assessment of stock. It is claimed that the "call" or assessment of 100 per cent, on the stock of the defendant corporation was
unlawful and unauthorized, for the reason that the resolution adopted
by the directors does not show that it was made for any corporate
purpose ; nor does it show that any demand of the business of the
This call
company required that the subscriptions should be paid.
appears to have been made by the board of directors of the defendant corporation, at which all were present, and there can be no question but what they had the power to make it.
If the statute were

5l8

THE CORPORATION AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS.

1571

entirely silent as to who should exercise the corporate power of
making calls on stock, that power would devolve upon the directors.
But the statute contains ample proCook Stock & S., section 109.
visions covering this subject.
Section 3225, Hill's Code, pro"* * * From the first meeting
vides:
of the directors, the
powers vested in the corporation are exercised by them, or by their
officers or agents, under their direction, except as otherwise provided
in this chapter."
It is not provided in said chapter that this particular power is vested elsewhere ; therefore there can be no question but
what it is one of the ' ' powers' ' which is to be exercised by the directors.
And such, it is believed, is the effect of the intimation of this court in
Willamette F. Co. v. Stannus, 4 Ore. 261 ; nor is there anything in
the other objections taken as to the form of the call.
All that is
really necessary is that there should be some act or resolution which
evinces or shows a clear official intent to render due and payable a
part of all the unpaid subscription. Cook Stock & S., section 115.
So, also, the necessity of the call is not open to question by the stockholders.
The determination of that question is for the board of directors.
Insurance Co. v. Floyd, 74 Mo. 286; Judah v. Insurance
Co., 4 Ind. 333.
2. Sale for non-payment of assessment.
Counsel for the appellant have argued that the proceedings which were taken by the
defendant corporation, upon the failure of Budd to pay the call upon
his shares of stock, were entirely irregular and unauthorized by law,
and in this we are inclined to think they are correct.
A corporation
has no inherent power to forfeit or sell the shares of stock owned by
That is not a common-law remedy, and can
delinquent stockholders.
only be exercised when it is expressly conferred by some statute.
Westcott v. Mining Co., 23 Mich. 145; Cook Stock & S., section
But it is claimed, on the other hand, that the statute has con123.
ferred the power exercised in this case, and counsel cite section 3221,
subd. 6, Hill's Code.
That section contains a particular enumeration of the powers conferred on all corporations
organized
under said act.
By subdivision 6 they are empowered "to make bylaws not inconsistent with any existing law for the sale of any portion
of its stock for delinquent or unpaid assessments due thereon, which
sale may be made without judgment or execution ; provided, that no
such sale shall be made without thirty days' notice of time and place
of sale, in some newspaper in circulation in the neighborhood of such
company, for the transfer of its stock, for the management of its
This section
property, and for the general regulation of its affairs."
confers the power, but it also prescribes the manner in which it shall
be exercised.
It must be by a " by-law not inconsistent with any exIn such a case, if the corporation determines to proceed
isting law."
by a sale of the stock for unpaid assessments, instead of by action to
recover the money, it must have such a by-law as the statute prescribes, and compliance with such by-laws must be made to affirmaBut it is claimed that the corporation defendant
tively appear.
enacted a by-law for this particular case, and that the same appears
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in finding number 5.
That resolution is in no sense a by-law.
It is
directed especially against the interests of a single stockholder.
How
many others may be delinquent does not appear; possibly none in this
particular instance.
But that does not affect the principle.
If a majority of a board of
directors of a private corporation may in any case pass such a resoin every case. The majority
lution, and enforce
they may do
need not enforce the payment of calls, only in particular instances, to
be designated by resolution.
As was said in People v. Throop, 12 Wend. 183: " The resolunot entitled to the name of a 'by-law;'
tion entered by the directors
mere direction to the officers to exclude
director of the bank
from the enjoyment of his rights.
It aimed at single individual,
not a general regulation affecting the directors at large or the stockholders."
think that any by-law enacted under this section of the
code, to be reasonable, ought to be general
that is,
ought to affect
every delinquent subscriber, and all delinquent stock, alike, and
ought not to be directed against the stock or interests of
particular
* *
These are essential requisites to valid by-law.
stockholder.
The sale of the plaintiff's stock by virtue of the resolution set out
in the fifth finding was clearly illegal and without authority.
The ap3. The measure of damages remains to be considered.
the sale was illegal, he
entitled to recover
pellant contends that,
in this form of action the full amount bid for the stock, without any
In this
regard whatever to the fact that he had paid nothing for it.
class of cases the authorities do not seem quite uniform as to the
Perproper measure of damages in case of wrongful conversion.
haps the better rule is, the value of the stock at the time of the conS., section 581.
version, or reasonable time thereafter. Cook Stock
* * In this case these
But this general rule
subject to exceptions.
shares were incumbered by an assessment equal to their par value
that is, the purchase-price of those shares for which the plaintiff was
indebted to the defendant corporation. That sum must, in any event,
be paid to the defendant
the shares would bring
upon the market.
The findings show that they did bring that sum, and $200 more, and
that of the proceeds of the sale $10,000 were applied in satisfaction
of plaintiff's debt to the defendant corporation. What effect these
proceedings had upon the plaintiff's right to the stock in question we
not involved here.
All
can not now consider, because the question
that, under these findings, the sale of the
that we now decide
plaintiff's stock was irregular and unauthorized, and that the court
below did not err as to the measure of damages under the peculiar
facts of this case.
Thayer, J., concurred.
Note.

Thatcher,

As to limitation of actions upon subscriptions,
19 Utah 212, 75 Am. St. Rep. 725.

see, 1899,

Crofoot v.
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Notice of calls.

THE CINCINNATI AND FORT WAYNE RAILROAD
COMPANY.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA,.

16

Ind. Rep. 275-283.

[Suit by the company on an alleged subscription to the capital
stock to the amount of $1,500.]
PERKINS, J. * * * The board of directors of the company,
on June 21, 1853, passed and entered on its records the following resolution :
"Resolved, That the stockholders in the Cincinnati and Fort
Wayne Railroad Company are hereby required to pay an installment
of ten per cent, every thirty days, on all cash subscriptions, until the
whole subscriptions are paid ; and that due notice thereof be given,
It was offered in evidence
signed by the president and secretary."
on the trial, and objected to by the appellant for the following reasons, stated at the time:
1.
That it was too vague, indefinite and uncertain to bind the defendant.

a

if.

2. That it did not fix a time when payment of the installments of
stock should commence, nor did it fix a definite time when any installment should be paid.
3. That it required the installments of stock to be paid in installments of ten per cent, every thirty days.
The court overruled the objections and let the resolution be read to
the jury.
We think the resolution was admissible, to show a call for
payment of an installment in thirty days from date, and every thirty
The appellee claims to be incorporated under the
days afterward.
general railroad law of May n, 1852, the eighth section of which, I
R. S. 412, provides that the directors may call in and demand from,
the stockholders any sums of money by them subscribed, in such payments or installments as the directors shall deem proper, under penalty of forfeiture of the stock subscribed,
payment be not made by
the stockholder " within thirty days after personal demand, or notice
requiring such payment, shall have been made in each county through
which such road shall be laid out, in which a newspaper shall be published: Provided, that subscriptions shall not be required to be paid,
month."
except in equal installments of not more than ten per cent,

Only part of opinion relating to the one point given.
2

1

is

WIL. CAS.

26

is

it

is

2

is

It
contended that the word month, here, must be taken to mean
R. S. 339
calendar month, under the rule prescribed by the code,
calendar
mean
shall
which
month
Dig.
the
word
that
748),
(Ind.
month, unless otherwise expressed.
We think
sufficiently expressed otherwise in the above cited section of the railroad law; the
word month, in the proviso,
used to express the same time as the
words thirty days, in the body of the section.
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CO. V. BURNHAM.
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Where the charter requires notice as a condition precedent to suits
for installments of stock, and there is no waiver of the condition, notice, as required by the charter, must be given. Ind. Dig., sections
The general railroad law above quoted does
73, 74, 75, page 321.
require notice, or a personal demand, thirty days before a proceeding
to forfeit the stock, but not before suit to recover installments.
Smith
v. Indiana, etc., Company, 12 Ind. 61 ; Johnson v. The Crawfordsville, etc., Company, u Ind. 280. The subscribers must take notice
of the acts of the directors as to calls.

To constitute legal notice under the charter, one and the same notice, fixing the same time for payment, must have been published in
in each of the counties, in which one was published,
a newspaper
through which the line of the road extended.

Sec. 520.

Same,

(f)

Calls must operate equally.

THE GREAT WESTERN TELEGRAPH COMPANY,
BURNHAM ET AL., APPELLANTS.'
1891.

IN THE SUPREME

COURT

OF

WISCONSIN.

RESPONDENT,

79

v.

Wis. Rep.

47-53-

[Action brought by the telegraph company to collect a call of 35
per cent, upon stock subscriptions made and unpaid by Burnham. This
call was ordered by an Illinois court, which was then in control of the
company through a receiver appointed in a suit by the corporate
The collection was resisted upon the ground, among
creditors.
others, that it operated unequally upon shareholders, and was thereit

it,

fore invalid.]
COLE, C. J. * * * We will further assume that the Illinois
all the
court of equity in the suit before
having also before
evidence as to the organization of the corporation, the validity of the
stock subscriptions, and the liabilities of the corporation, could decree
or make a call on the unpaid subscriptions to the stock, in the same
manner and with like effect as though the directors of the corporation

Statement

given.

abridged

;

1

It

is

a

themselves had ordered the assessment, as they were authorized to do
by the contract of subscription. But we fully agree with the appellants' counsel that any call or assessment made upon the shares must
be uniform, and in ratable amounts, and that any call or assessment
which requires some shareholders to pay
higher rate than other
We have referred
shareholders
unjust, and should not be enforced.
to the averment of the complaint which states that some of the stockholders have paid $10, or forty percent., on each share of stock held
by them, while many of the stockholders have never paid more than
requires no argument to
fifty cents, or two per cent., on a share.
only the part of opinion relating to the one point is
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show that such a call or assessment on the stock is grossly unequal
and unjust. We think Mr. Morawetz states the correct rule on this
subject in the following language:
"Justice between the shareholders of a corporation requires that all the shareholders should contribute in respect to their shares at the same time, and in ratable
amounts.
A call requiring some shareholders to pay in more than
But, if some shareholders have
others would, therefore, be invalid.
more
contributed
than
others,
it would be not only the right
already
but the duty of the directors to make calls upon the other shareholders
in such amounts as to equalize the contributions of all."
Mor. Priv.
See, also, Pike v. B. & C. S. L. R. Co.,
Corp. (3d ed.), section 154.
68 Me. 445.
Cook on Stock and Stockholders (3d. ed., section 114)
*
*
*
call
must be made on all alike, or it will be
says:
void. The courts will not allow the directors of a company so to
proceed as to require some stockholders to pay calls, and not to
And this accords with common
require others to do the same."
sense, and all notions of equity and fairness.
Order of circuit court overruling demurrer to complaint reversed.

"A

-r

Sec. 521.

Same,

(g) Calls must

be uniform.

RUSE v. BROMBERG.
1889.

IN THE SUPREME

1

COURT OF- ALABAMA.
619-630.

88

Ala. Rep.

by Bromberg as assignee of all the property of two insolvent
corporations against Ruse and his wife and their grantees to set aside,
as fraudulent, certain conveyances alleged to have been made by them
without valuable consideration, when Ruse was largely indebted to
the said corporations
for unpaid sums due on stock subscriptions
which were evidenced by notes given therefor and on other accounts ;
the defendants below answered denying the right of the company to
attack these proceedings until a certain indebtedness is established
against them, which is not and can not be done except by regular
proceedings against the stockholders, so that the court may call for
such an assessment as may be necessary to settle all outstanding
claims.
After the cause had been submitted, they asked to amend
this answer, so as to deny any right to attack the proceedings, until a
fixed indebtedness is established against them or Ruse, by a judgment
in a common-law court, and upon which execution had been returned
*'no property found;" this was denied and decreed for complainants.
The ruling and decree are the errors assigned.]
CLOPTON, J. * * * The amendment further controverts the
right of complainant to proceed to subject property alienated by the

[Bill

1
Statement abridged. Arguments omitted.
lating to the one point is given.

Only the part of opinion re-

MOSES

V.

TOMPKINS.

$22

debtor to the payment of notes given for the unpaid capital stock
subscribed for, or purchased by him, until by proper proceedings
against all the shareholders the amount of the outstanding liabilities
of the corporation is ascertained, the pro rata proportion of each asWhen the liability is upon a subsessed, and a call therefor made.
scription to the capital stock, and the charter or contract of subscription provides that the shares shall be paid in as required by the board
of directors, the general rule is that the stockholder's liability does
not mature, and he can not be sued by the company until a call is
If the charter and contract of subscription are silent as to the
made.
time of payment, a call or assessment is an implied condition preceThe rule is otherwise when, by the prodent to a matured liability.
visions of the charter or of the contract, the subscription is payable at
In such case, the liability
specified times and in specified amounts.
matures, and the subscriber is bound to pay, in all events, on the day
i Morawetz on Corp., section 144 ;
stated; a call is not requisite,
Cook on Stock., section 106. The grantor in two of the conveyances
attacked gave notes for the unpaid capital stock of the companies,
Without regard to a call or assessment upon
payable on demand.
all, the shareholders, the company could have instituted, at any time
after the dates of the respective notes, a suit at law upon the notes,
or have filed a bill to subject to their payment property fraudulently
Comconveyed by the debtor ; such suit being a sufficient demand.
plainant, as assignee appointed by the board of directors, is clothed
with all the rights and powers of the board essential to make the
corporate assets available, and for this purpose may maintain any suit,
at law or in equity, which the corporation could have brought.
Chamberlain v. Bromberg, 83 Ala. 576; Wooldridge v. Holmes, 78

Ala. 568.

The disallowance of the proposed amendment does not affect the
propriety of the decree, so far as the questions raised thereby are concerned.

Reversed on other grounds.

Sec.

522.

Same.

>(h)

Calls must be made by legal directors.

MOSES v. TOMPKINS.
1887.

IN THE SUPREME

COURT

1

OF ALABAMA.

84

Ala.

Rep.

613-623.

[Bills by shareholders (appellees) to enjoin appellants, who claim
to be directors of a street railway company, from selling the stock of
complainants for payments of assessments and calls thereon, upon
the ground that the directors who had made the calls were not legally
1 Statement
omitted.

abridged.

Argument and part of opinion upon other points

$
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elected.
The statute provided that only shareholders owning ten
shares of stock should be directors ; three of the five directors sold
out, and so were disqualified ; the other two directors, without authority, elected three other shareholders directors, and the board as thus
constituted made the calls, and were about to forfeit the stock for

non-payment.]

*
*
*
In order that an assessment and call for
CLOPTON,
the payment of subscriptions to the capital stock of a corporation
may be legal and enforcible, it must, ordinarily, be made by the
corporate authorities, in whom the power is vested by the charter or
In Garden G. U. Q. Min. Co. v.
by-laws, or by the general" laws.
McLister, i L. R. App. Cas. 39, a bill was filed to declare invalid
of calls made by directors
a forfeiture of stock for the non-payment
The question of the validity
alleged to have been illegally elected.
of the forfeiture ultimately depended on the validity of the election of
the persons who, assuming to be directors, declared complainants'
shares forfeited for non-payment of a call made by them.
The bill
was sustained ; the declaration of the forfeiture declared invalid ; and
it was held that there must be properly appointed directors to make a
call, and to declare a forfeiture of shares for non-payment. It has
also been held in other cases, that the illegality of the election of the
persons who, as directors, make a call, may be set up in resistance to
a suit for its recovery.
People's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wescott, 14 Gray
mischief, multiplicity of suits, the
To
irreparable
prevent
440.
destruction and impairment of the pecuniary rights of the stockholders, equity will interfere, at the instance of a stockholder, and
restrain the sale of his stock for the payment of a call made by
The validity of the election of
illegally elected or appointed directors.
defendants as directors arises collaterally and incidentally, and the duty
to inquire into and decide the question is necessarily involved. * * *
It is further insisted, that though the persons appointed to fill the
vacancies were not legally elected, they are actually holding and exercising the powers and functions of the office, and are directors de
facto; and inasmuch as the power to make assessments and calls is
vested in the board of directors, a call made by directors de facto can
To constitute
not be collaterally called in question by a stockholder.
an officer de facto, there must be a color of election or appointment,
or an exercise of the functions of the office under such circumstances
]
and for such length of time without interference, as to justify the presumption of a due election or appointment.
Gary v. State, 76 Ala.
The
mere
of
the
office is in itself insufexercise
of
the
functions
78.
ficient. The bills allege only two official acts of the defendants as
directors, and it may well be doubted whether the allegations make a
prima facie case of directors de facto. The facts set up in the answers, on which this claim is rested by the defendants, can not be
But
considered on a motion to dissolve the temporary injunction.
consider
to
the
of
a
this
we
shall
right
question,
passing
proceed
stockholder to set up the illegality of the election, though the persons
may have become directors de facto, in resistance to an assessment

J.

MOSES
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We are cognizant that
and call on subscriptions to the capital stock.
some courts of the highest authority have held that the power of persons to act in behalf of the corporation, who have become directors
de facto, can not be collaterally questioned by a stockholder, without
a judgment of ouster against them in a direct proceeding for that purAn analysis of the cases would show, we think, that in a mapose.
jority of them the election was not illegal and void, but irregular and
voidable, because of ineligibility, or other cause, or if originally illegal, that the shareholder assailing its validity had affirmatively acquiThe doctrine of the validity of the
esced in their acts as directors.
The offiacts of officers de facto rests on public policy and justice.
cial dealings of directors de facto with third persons are sustained as
rightful and valid, on the ground of continuous acquiescence by the
corporation, and suffering them to hold themselves out as having such
authority, thereby inducing others to deal with them in such capacity.
The theory of the doctrine of officers de facto, and the principles
sustaining the validity of their official acts, are that, though wrongfully in office, yet exercising power and functions appertaining to such
office, justice and necessity require, for the protection and preservation
of the rights and interests of third persons, that their acts, within the
The stockscope of official authority and duty, shall be sustained.
holders are not third persons in their relation to the corporation.
If
persons undertake to exercise the functions and discharge the duties
of directors in opposition to the will of a majority of the stockholders,
they are mere usurpers, and their acts can not be deemed valid,
Otherwise, the wrongful
when invoked for their own protection.
assumption of official authority and its exercise would operate to constitute the usurpers, as between themselves and the corporation and
shareholders, a board invested with the power to transact its business
and administer its affairs.
In such case, the necessity and justice of
the rule as to the validity of the acts of directors de facto do not
exist, and the rule itself is inapplicable.
The acts of officers de facto
are only valid when third persons have rights and interests to be protected.
By the terms of their contract an assessment or call, made
directors
duly appointed, is essential to create a liability on the
by
The validity of the acts of directors de facto and
stockholders.
their authority may be called in question by a stockholder whenever
such acts are destructive or affect his property rights, or impose a
liability on him as such, and the rights of third persons do not intervene.
Thorington v. Gould, 59 Ala. 461 ; People's Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Wescott, 14 Gray 440.
Injunction allowed.
Note.
76

See, 1899, New England

Am. St. Rep.

771.

Fire Insurance Co. v. Haynes,

71

Vt.

306,
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Assessments beyond full payment of amount sub-

ENTERPRISE DITCH
1899.
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CO. ET AL. v.

MOFFITT ET

AL. 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEBRASKA. 58 Neb. 642, 76
Am. St. 122, 45 L. R. A. 647, 79 N. W. Rep. 560-561.

i

2

1

4

J.

i

&

5

I.

;

a

a

*

J.

a

if

it,

[Suit by Moffitt and others to enjoin the sale of their shares of fully
paid stock in the ditch company, by that company, because of certain
The corporation was
assessments made upon the stock and not paid.
organized in 1889 to distribute water for irrigating purposes; the
trustees were authorized to make such by-laws "as they shall deem
proper and expedient for the management" of the corporate business.
It was also provided in the by-laws that the board should at its first
quarterly meeting make an estimate of the total cost of maintenance,
and "levy an assessment for such an amount, subject to the call of
the board of directors, from time to time, as the same shall be
needed," and provided for sale after certain notices, for non-payIn January, 1894, a special levy of $6.50 per share, and in
ment.
November, 1894, an additional levy of $1.50 per share, were made
for the purpose of enlarging the canal; in April, 1895, another levy
of $4.50 per share for that year was made.
These assessments were
not paid by the plaintiffs, and the company proceeded to advertise
the delinquent shares for sale.
Shortly before the last assessment, a
law was passed to the effect that such a company as the Enterprise
Ditch Company should be termed a mutual irrigation company, and
any by-laws made either before or after this act, and not inconsistent
with
shall be lawful, and providing that such company could assess
the shares of stock for the purpose of defraying the necessary running
lien on the stock, and
expenses, and making such an assessment
not paid in sixty days the stock should be sold to pay the assessment.
Injunction was allowed by the court below.]
*
*
HARRISON, C.
(As to the condition before the law
of 1895.)
There was no statutory authority to assess stock of which
the amount had been fully paid, neither did the articles of incorporation confer any express power so to do.
In the absence of authorization by either, the directors could not enact
by-law by which provision was made for such assessments, and especially not to be
enforced by
sale or practical forfeiture of stock.
Association v.
Connell, 55 Neb. 396, 75 N. W. Rep. 837 De Laine Co. v. Mason,
R.
Beach Priv. Corp., section 590;
Cook Stock,
463;
Stockh.
Corp. Law, sections 241, 242;
Thomp. Corp., sections
1037, 1038; Rosenback v. Bank, 53 Barb. 495; In re Long Island
R. Co., 19 Wend. 37; State v. Morristown Fire Assn., 23 N.
Law
Neb. 382.
195; Williams v. Lowe,
Statement

much abridged, part of opinion omitted.
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(As to effect o:! law of 1895.) The paid share or shares of stock
were the personal property of any individual owner, and a contract
which embodied the articles of incorporation and the pertinent laws
of the state existed, to which the shareholder was a party. Without
a discussion or notice of some other branches of the argument and
subject, it must be said that the legislature could not so change these
accrued, contractual, and property rights as to allow an assessment
against the paid-up stock, and its forfeiture or sale for the non-payment.
This would involve too violent an invasion of property and
i Cook Stock, Stockh. & Corp. Law, section 492 ;
contract rights,
Co.
v. Sheldon, 44 Neb. 279, 62 N. W. Rep. 480;
Manufacturing
of
v.
Detroit
Detroit
and Howell Plank Road Co. (Mich.), 5 N.
City
W. Rep. 279; i Beach Priv. Corp., sections 40, 41 ; i Cook Stock,
Stockh. & Corp. Law. section 50.
It follows that the decree will be affirmed.
Note.

Minn.

See note, 76 Am. St. Rep. 126;
Am. St. Hep. 344.

1898,

Duluth Club v. Macdonald,

74

254, 73

Sec. 524.

5-

Right to reserve

a

lien upon shares.

See Child v. Hudson's Bay Co., 2 P. Wms. 207, supra, p. 1161 ;
Brinkerhoff-Farris Trust, etc., Co. v. Home Lumber Co., 118 Mo.
447, supra, p. 1162.
Note.
1899, Stafford v. Produce, etc., Banking Co., 61 Ohio St. 160, 76 Am.
St. Rep. 371.

Sec. 525.
See The

Re P-

373

6.

Right to regulate transfers.

Victor G. Bloede Co. v. Bloede, 84 Md.
supra, p. 1159; and infra,
558-9.

129, 57

Am. St.

Sec. 526.
7. Right to carry on the corporate enterprise through
its proper representatives.
See Metropolitan Elevated R. Co. v. Manhattan R. Co., 1 1 Daly
373,
supra, p. 694; Smith v. Hurd, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 371, infra, p.
Note.

1706.
See, 1899, Colorado Springs Co. v. Am. Pub. Co., 97 Fed. Rep. 843.

Sec. 527.

8.

Right to accept amendments.

See Buffalo & N. Y. C. R. Co. v.
Dudley, 14 N. Y. 336, supra,
p. 1461 ; Durfee v. Old Colony, etc., R. Co.,
Allen
230
supra, p. 1462; Zabnskie v. Hackensack, etc., 5R., 18 N(Mass.)
' T ' Ea 178
supra, p. 1466.

J
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Sec. 528.

9-

I $8 I

Right to dissolve itself.

See The Merchants' Bank v. Heard, 37 Ga. 401, supra, p. 877;
Merchants' and Planters' Line v. Waganer, 71 Ala. 581, supra, p.
880; Slee v. Bloom, 19 Johns. 456, supra, p. 881.

ARTICLE II.
Sec. 529.

RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS.

I. Who are shareholders.
(a) Certificate; subscription;
PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK

1891.

payment.
v.

EATON.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
Rep. 227-234.

141

U. S.

[Action to recover from the bank an amount paid in as a subscription to an increase of its stock.
The bank was organized with a capital stock of $500,000, and on September 13, iSSi, it was resolved to
increase the stock to $1,000,000, each shareholder to have the right
to take, at par, his pro rata share.
Miss Eaton then owned forty
shares (equal to $4,000), and on September 28 took and paid for
All the shareholders did not avail
forty shares of the new stock.
themselves of their privilege, and only $461,300 of the $500,000
were taken and paid in.
At request of directors, and with sanction
of a large majority of shareholders, and the approval of the comptroller of the currency, the increase was limited to the amount taken,
and certificates were prepared and delivered to such as called for
them ; Miss Eaton never called for hers, though it was made out, and
she was registered as an owner without her knowledge.
At a meeting of shareholders, and under lawful authority, it was voted, in January, 1882, to assess the shareholders 100 per cent. Miss Eaton, on
the day of, but before, the meeting, claiming she had never consented
to the reduction of the increase of stock from $500,000 to $461,300,
demanded repayment of the sum of $4,000.
This being refused, she
sued, and got judgment in the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts.
The bank sued out this writ of error.]
*
*
*
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY.
The court also assumed that
the filling of the whole $500,000 of stock was a condition on which
the obligation of the subscribers to the new stock to take the same depended. The latter point was fully considered by us in the case of
Aspinwall v. Butler, 133 U. S. 595, and we held that the filling of
the said $500,000 of additional stock was not a condition of the liability of the subscribers to the new stock, but that the association
always retained the power of reducing the amount of stock, with the
It is unnecessary for us
approval of the comptroller of the currency.
1
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The defendant in error was just as
to discuss that question again.
much bound by her subscription to the new stock as if the whole
The only question to be
$500,000 had been subscribed and paid in.
considered, therefore, is whether the fact that the defendant in error
did not call for and take her certificate of stock made any difference
We can not see how it could make
as to her status as a stockholder.
Her actually going or sending to the bank
the slightest difference.
and electing to take her share of the new stock, and paying for it in
cash, and receiving a receipt for the same in the form above set forth,
are acts which are fully equivalent to a subscription to the stock in
She then became
writing, and the payment of the money therefor.
She was properly entered as such on the stock book
a stockholder.
of the company, and her certificate of stock was made out ready for
It was her certificate.
She could
her when she should call for it.
been
had
it
refused.
Whether she called
have compelled its delivery
for it or not was a matter of no consequence whatever in reference to
her rights and duties.
The case is not like that of a deed for lands, which has no force,
In that
and is not a deed, and passes no estate, until it is delivered.
But with capital stock it
case everything
depends on the delivery.
is different.
Without express regulation to the contrary, a person
becomes a stockholder by subscribing for stock, paying the amount to
the company or its proper officer, and being entered on the stock
book as a stockholder.
He may take out a certificate or not, as he
of
sees fit.
Millions
dollars of capital stock are held without any
or,
if
certificate ;
certificates are made out, without there ever being
A certificate is authentic evidence of title to stock; but it
delivered.
is not the stock itself, nor is it necessary to the existence of the stock.
It certifies to a fact which exists independently of itself. And an
actual subscription is not necessary.
There may be a virtual subdeducible
from
the
acts and conduct of the party.
scription,
Reversed.

Same,
(b)
increase of stock.

Sec. 530.

Certificate

and

payment,

in

case

THE BALTIMORE CITY PASSENGER RAILWAY COMPANY
A. HAMBLETON. 1
1893.

IN THE COURT

OF

APPEALS
34I-35

OF

MARYLAND.

77

v.

of

JOHN

Md. Rep.

2-

[Bill by Hambleton to compel the railway company to transfer on
its books, and issue to him certificates for eighty-five shares of stock.
The company had been duly authorized to increase its capital stock,
and had done so by doubling it ; each shareholder was to have the
1
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privilege of subscribing pro rata, and paying the par value thereof
"when the directors shall call for the same."
Miss Hollins was the
owner of eighty-five shares at that time, and subscribed for eighty-five
shares of the new stock and caused her name to be placed in the subscription book. She subsequently died, and her executor sold the
original eighty-five shares to Hambleton, who claimed that by reason
of this purchase he became the owner of the eighty five-shares of new
stock subscribed for by Miss Hollins, and was entitled to have the

a

a a

a

is

a

a

it

a

if

;

a

a

a

if

a

a

a

is

is

a

;

*

*

J.

it,

new shares transferred to him on the books, and a certificate issued to
him, subject to the right of the company to demand payment of the
par value. The company refused to recognize this claim, and he
sued to enforce
prayed for and obtained decree to that effect.
From this decree an appeal was taken.]
*
McSHERRY,
It will be observed that the shares in
of
are
not
the
original stock of the company
controversy
part
they
are some of the new or additional stock, and the distinction between
these two classes
between original or formative stock and subscriptions for new stock, which
corporation after its organization has
been authorized to issue
important in its bearing on the decision
of the principal question involved in this cause. There
substantial difference between an increase of capital and
filling up of one
and required.
Scott,
both authorized
Curry v.
54 Pa. St. 276.
the
formative
the
When
stock precedes
creation of the
subscription to
body corporate which will ultimately issue the certificates^ there is, of
necessity, at the time such subscriptions are entered into, no corporation in existence with which
contract could be made.
The subscribers, as
consequence, and for the very purpose of effecting an
organization, become stockholders by the mere act of subscribing,
there are no conditions precedent prescribed, and they are thereby invested with the privileges and subjected to the liabilities incident to
The subscribers, in the absence of any statutory rethat relation.
strictions, acquire by such
subscription an interest in the body corright to participate in its organization. They all stand
porate and
failure of
upon the same footing, incurring the risks and hazards of
the enterprise or sharing its profits in proportion to their interests
and
to give vitality to the artificial entity they must become stockholders
no other method be proimmediately upon becoming subscribers,
vided in the charter.
But the same reasons do not apply, and the
same conditions do not obtain, in the case of new or additional stock
authorized to be issued by an existing and completely organized corporation. A subscription to such new stock does not necessarily of
itself make the subscriber
stockholder, because, generally speaking,
mere contract between the subscriber and the corporation.
If
stockby mere subscription for new stock the subscriber becomes
holder, he at once becomes clothed with all the rights of
stockholder, and without the payment of dollar he would be at liberty to
vote his stock, and entitled to claim dividends upon it.
As between
shareholders of the same class there can be no discrimination, and
profits set aside, for dividends must be evenly divided amongst the
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Harstockholders according to the amount of stock each one owns.
Hence
R.
Cases
the
Eq.
Co.,
L.
rison v. Mexican Railway
19
358.
or
controlled
mere
submolded
be
by
might
policy of a corporation
scribers, who have paid nothing upon their subscriptions, to the prejudice or loss of the full-paid shareholders, whose money, contributed
Part of the
in the beginning, had actually developed the enterprise.
rest
would
be
stock
the
which
and
be
then
upon
full-paid
would
stock
latter
would
all
advanthe
the
and
been
possess
had
yet
paid
nothing
tages, privileges and incidents which belong to the former, and might
be so managed as to render the paid-up stock wholly or partially valWhilst it has been held that stockholders who have partially
ueless.
but have not been called upon to pay up their stock in full,
for,
paid
are entitled, when dividends have been declared, to participate therein equally with shareholders whose stock has been entirely paid for,
Oakbank Oil Co. v. Crum, L. R. 8 App. Cases 65, still a mere subscriber for stock can claim no such right.
To constitute a subscriber for new stock a stockholder, something
more than a mere subscription is requisite
payment is necessary.
The subscription is but the contract ; payment, when called by the
company and when made by the subscriber, constitutes him a shareholder whether a certificate has been issued or not. Fulgam v.
Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 44 Ga. 597 ; Terwilliger v. G. W. Tel.
Co. et al., 59 111. 249; Johnson v. Albany & Susq. R. Co., 54 N. Y.
416; Jay Gould v. To\vn of Oneonta, 71 N. Y. 298; Pacific Nat.
*
*
*
Bank v. Eaton, 141 U. S. 227.
(After reviewing cases.) The sale by Miss Hollins' executor of
the eighty-five shares of old stock carried with it as an incident the
right which the testatrix had previously acquired by virtue of her subscription, to purchase eighty-five shares of the new stock, and the
appellee has under the transfer made to him precisely that right and
none other.
The terms upon which the subscription was made by
Miss Hollins are binding upon the appellee as they were upon her.
Payment of the par value in money, at the times and in the installments to be named by the directors, must be made before the title
will pass. The subscriber binds himself to pay when requested, and
the company in turn undertakes upon receiving payment to enter him
as a stockholder on its books.
Until this is done the contract is executory, and neither the subscriber nor his assignee is a stockholder,
and consequently neither is entitled to a certificate of slock or to any
other instrument indicating that he is the owner of the shares.
The
obligation he assumes to pay for the stock enures under section 64,
article 23 of the code, to the benefit of creditors of the corporation,
but does not give him a beneficial interest in the body corporate as an
owner of its stock until the stock has been paid for. * * *
The decree of the court below directed an injunction to issue as
prayed, but for the reasons we have given, that decree was erroneous,
and must be reversed.
And as Mr. Hambleton will not be entitled to
any certificate until he becomes a stockholder as to these new shares,
none of the relief sought under the bill can be granted, and the bill
will, therefore, have to be dismissed.
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collateral security.

BANK OF NEW ENGLAND ET

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA.

AL. 1

70

Minn. Rep.

398-403.

[In a suit by the state to have a receiver of the bank appointed,
one Hanson was allowed to intervene on behalf of himself and the
other creditors, for the purpose of enforcing the statutory liability of
F. Calhoun being alleged to be one. July i, 1892,
shareholders,
one Blethen, president of the bank, asked a loan of $4,500 from
Calhoun, and offered to give him as security a certificate of stock of
the bank of $5,000 par value.
Calhoun made the loan, Blethen
executed a note for $4,500, and on September 14, 1892, delivered a
stock certificate, dated July 2, 1892, for $5,000; this certificate was
in fact, part of an authorized increase of the stock of the company,
Nothough never subscribed for or known to be such by Calhoun.
vember 23, 1892, the note was paid, the certificate of stock returned
and canceled.
The bank suspended payment June 26, 1893, and
made an assignment July 6, 1893.]
BUCK, J. * * * Under these facts, the court found, as a conclusion of law, that Calhoun became and was a stockholder, and
liable as such, and the only question presented is whether, upon these
facts, he was a stockholder within the meaning of the statute.
G. S. 1894, section 2501, in part, reads as follows:
" The stockholders in each bank shall be individually liable in an
amount equal to double the amount of stock owned by them for all
the debts of such bank, and such individual liability shall continue
for one year after any transfer or sale of stock by any stockholder or

J.

stockholders."

Within the time fixed by the statute imposing this liability upon

1

it

if

is

a

it,

a

is

a

a

if

is

if,

stockholders,
there were fifty shares of the stock in the defendant
bank standing in Calhoun's name upon the books of the bank; and
during such time, he was the actual owner thereof, he was liable
for the debts of the bank, under the terms of the statute above
he relieved from this
the bank was then insolvent.
Nor
quoted,
stockholder because he held the certificate of stock in
liability as
debt.
question as collateral security for
Thomp. Liab. Stockh.,
section 223, citing numerous authorities to sustain this position, says:
" The reason why the courts so hold, briefly, that man can not
become the legal owner of stock, receive dividends, vote at elections,
without
and enjoy all other rights appertaining to the ownership of
shouldering the liabilities attaching to such position. Another good
that he will not be suffered to hold himself out to the public
reason
Besides,
as the owner of stock, and afterwards deny that relation.
creditors were compelled to look beyond the legal title, they could
would embarrass them in
never know against whom to proceed, and
Statement

abridged.
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the pursuit of their rights to compel them to inquire into equities
which might exist between the stockholder and some third person.
See, also, Pullman v. Upton, 96 U. S. 328; National Bank v. Case,

U. S. 628."
Even if these things were not done by Calhoun, he had the rights
appertaining to the ownership of the stock, and the right, as a stockholder, to demand or accept the benefits should impose upon him
That he accepted the stock, and
the duty of shouldering the burdens.
It not a question of whether he paid for
used
unquestioned.
issued in his own name, with the intent to bethe stock, and had
come stockholder in the bank, but whether the liability did not accrue
stockwhen he permitted himself to be held out to the public as
so to
holder, by accepting the stock in his own name, and allowing
Parties dealing with corstand upon the books of the corporation.
right to assume that one representing himself to the
porations have
world as stockholder in such corporation, by permitting his name to
stand on its books as such, must take the responsibilities of the situaa

a

it

a

a

it

is

it,
is

99

tion.

Affirmed.

Sec. 532.

Same,

(d)

Corporate books

as

evidence of member-

CAREY
1897.

v.

WILLIAMS.

IN THE U. S. CIRCUIT COURT
79

OF

1

ship.

APPEALS, SECOND CIRCUIT.

Fed. Rep. 906-913.

1

*

a

is

a

is

*

is

a

a

a

[Error by plaintiff below to review judgment in favor of defendant, on verdict directed by the court, in
suit to recover assessments against defendant as alleged holder of two hundred and fifty
shares of stock in an express company.
The plaintiff sought to prove
that the defendant was
shareholder "by entries in the books of the
company showing the transfer of two hundred and fifty shares of
stock from the company to the defendant November i, 1865, and his
the first November
payment of two calls thereon for $1,250 each,
i, 1865, and the second March 9, 1866." The judge ruled that this
and an alleged admission in an affidavit in
certain suit between the
company and another party were insufficient to authorize the submission of the issue to the jury.
This
the error assigned.]
*
WALLACE, Circuit Judge.
(After holding there was no
admission in the affidavit.)
We are thus brought to the important
question in the case, which
whether the entries contained in the corporate books of the company afforded prima facie evidence that the
defendant was
The relation of corporation and stockstockholder.
holder
contractual one, and can only be created with the consent,
Statement abridged.
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The assent is evidenced when
express or implied, of both parties.
the name of the stockholder appears as such upon the books of the
company; as to the corporation, by its act in placing his name there,
and, as to the stockholder, by his knowledge and acquiescence in the
It is not enough that he appears to be a stockholder upon the
act.
books, and when this occurs without his sanction he incurs no liability
as such.
It is an elementary rule of the law of evidence that a party can not
make evidence in his own favor, of a contract, by his own statements
of its existence or its terms.
or declarations
They are evidence
Accordingly it has uniformly been
against him, but not for him.
held that entries in the books of a copartnership, in the nature of declarations showing who are the persons that compose the firm, are not
evidence in behalf of the partners, as against a third person, for the
There is no reapurpose of showing that the latter was a member.
son why a different rule should be applied to the entries in the books
or records of a corporation which tend to charge a party with the responsibilities of a stockholder.
Corporations are not exempt from
the ordinary rules of evidence, and there is no stronger presumption
of honesty, or regularity or accuracy as to their books or records than
there is in the case of natural persons.
Prior to the case of Turnbull v. Payson, 95 U. S. 418, in which
Mr. Justice Clifford made an observation to the contrary, there was
no respectable authority for the proposition that, without the aid of
some statute changing the ordinary rule of evidence, the appearance
of the name of a person on the books of a corporation as a stockholder, without other evidence, created a presumption, as against him, of
his ownership of the stock.
The only reported decision in which it
had been so declared was the nisi prius case of Hoagland v. Bell, 36
Barb. 57. The opinion consisted merely of the statement that the
appearance of the defendant's name on the stock-book as a shareholder was prima facie evidence that he was so, and the burden was
then thrown on him to disprove that he was a stockholder.
No reasons were assigned, no authority was cited, and there was no discussion of the question upon principle.
It may be that the statute under
which the corporation was organized dispensed with the ordinary
proof by a provision, which has occasionally been adopted, giving to
such an entry upon the books of the corporation the force of evidence.
No subsequent decisions by the courts of New York have adopted
that decision, and, as will be seen, it is irreconcilable with their later
decisions.
Turnbull v. Payson was an action to recover an assessment upon a
stockholder, and the plaintiff offered to prove that the defendant was
a stockholder
by the books of the corporation, in which the name
of the defendant was entered as the owner of fifty shares ; (2) by the
stock-book of the company, with a duplicate of the stock certificate
issued to the defendant, showing that he was the owner of the same
number of shares; (3) by testimony that the certificate was sent to
the agents of the company to be delivered to the defendant when he

(i)
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20 per cent, of the shares, and .that he made the required payment ; and (4) by a receipt, signed by the defendant, showing that
The
the company paid the defendant a dividend upon his stock.
court decided that the exceptions to the evidence thus offered were
not tenable, and Mr. Justice Clifford said :
" Taken as a whole, it is clear that the evidence offered was amply
sufficient to warrant the jury in finding that the defendant was a stockholder, as alleged."
He then made this observation :
" Where the name of an individual appears on the stock-book of a
corporation as a stockholder, the prima facie presumption is that he is
the owner of the stock, in a case where there is nothing to rebut that
presumption ; and, in an action against him as a stockholder, the
burden of proving that he is not a stockholder, or of rebutting that
presumption, is cast upon the defendant."
He cited as authorities for the observation, Hoaglandv. Bell, supra;
Plank Road Co. v. Rice, 7 Barb. 162; Turnpike Road v. Van Ness,
2 Cranch C. C. 451, Fed. Cas. No. 11,986;
Mudgett v. Horrell, 33
Collins,
Cal. 25; Coffin v.
17 Me. 440; Merrill v. Walker, 24 Me.
None of the citations support the proposition, except the case
237.
of Hoagland v. Bell, which has been referred to.
(Reviewing cases, and criticising the statement from Turnbull v.
Payson as obiter, except as applied to the particular facts of that

paid

case.)

The books and records of corporations, when properly kept, are
evidence of the acts and proceedings of the corporate body, but can
not be used to establish claims or rights of the corporation against
third persons, unless pursuant to the sanction of some statute.
Ang.
& A. Corp., section 679. And they are not evidence against a stockholder in respect to a contract entered into by him with the corporation, notwithstanding he has access to them, because as to such a contract, he is regarded, not as a stockholder, but as a stranger.
Hill v.
Works
2
Co.,
WaterNev. & M. 573; Haynes v. Brown, 36 N. H.
In Wharton on Evidence
545 ; Hager v. Cleveland, 36 Md. 476.
662,
it is said that, in suits by a corporation against
(3d ed.), section
its members, its books can not be used as " proving in behalf of the
corporation self-serving entries."
Such is the rule recognized by the
of
the
of
New
courts
York.
adjudications
(Citing and commenting on Bridge Company v. Lewis, 63 Barb,
Rudd v. Robinson, 126
113.)
The true ground upon which the books of a corporation, showing
who are shareholders, are admissible in evidence, is that they are the
best evidence of the assent of the corporation to the contract of memUntil that^assent is proved, the contract is not complete,
bership.
and no person who has bought shares of stock can he subjected to the
liability of a stockholder.
When it appears that a person has subscribed for or purchased shares, has voted upon them, has received
dividends upon them, or in any other way has consented to occupy
the relation of a stockholder, the contract of membership on his

in;
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part is shown ; and the stock books become competent evidence, because they show that the corporation has likewise consented.
We approve the language of a recent commentator, which is ai

follows

:

"On principle,

the-books and records of the corporation are not
evidence
to prove that the defendant is a stockholder ; for
competent
is
that one party to an alleged contract can not
the general rule
of
the contract by his own private memoranda or
prove the existence
of this principle ought to be enough
statement
mere
records.
The
without argument."
of
its
correctness
to convince one
Thomp.
Corp., section 1924.

Affirmed,

Note.

Accord:

1900, Sigua
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Nat. Ex. & T. Co. v. Morris, 15 App. D. (D. C.) 262;
v. Greene, 104 Fed. (C. C. A. N. Y.) 854.

1899,

Iron Co.

Same.

JOHN GLENN,
1887.

TRUSTEE, v. M.

M. ORR. 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA.
Re P- 4 I 3~4 l6 -

96

N. C.

{Action to recover an unpaid balance due from an alleged subIt
scription to the capital stock of an insolvent express company.
became necessary to prove the organization of this company, and that
To do this
the appellee was the subscriber to ten shares of its stock.
the records of the corporation embracing what purported to be the
proceedings in the organization under the charter, and to show that
appellee had subscribed, had paid $50 at one time on account, that
the balance had been paid, and that he was a stockholder, were
offered in evidence.
Upon objection, these records were held not to
This ruling is the error assigned.]
be admissible to prove these facts.
MERRIMON, J. * * * It was admitted on the trial, that the
books and records offered in evidence, were those of the National
Express and Transportation Company, and it must be taken from
such admission, as there is no suggestion to the contrary, that the proceedings entered in them, and the orders and statements therein made,
are regular, and made by the proper clerk, secretary or agent of the
to make them.
It must so
company, or some person authorized
appear, before

such records

and books

can be received as evidence

for any purpose.
The records and books thus identified were evidence
certainly
prima facie evidence of the organization and existence of the
They purport to set forth the proceedings of the organizacompany.
tion, a list of the names of the stockholders, the number of shares of
stock owned by each, when he subscribed for the same, the sum o
1
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money paid by each for his stock, and the sums due therefor remaining unpaid, and an account of its business transactions.
In Turnpike Company v. McCarson, i D. & B. 306, Chief Justice
" The case does not state the contents of the subscripRuffin said:
tion and corporation books that were produced, and therefore we can
We suppose them to
not say positively of what they were evidence.
charter
the
as no deviation is
as
acts
prescribed,
such
be entries of
when
documents,
identified,
were not only
those
so,
If
specified.
of
the
evidence
and
organization
existence of
evidence, but complete
in
so
rule
is
stated
The
&
Ang.
Ames
on Corp.,
the corporation."
so,
also,
and
Co.
v.
Turnpike
M'Kean,
10
sections 513, 514, 679;
,4
R.,
Rand.
Co.
Turnpike
578; Owings
(Va.)
Johns. 154; Gray's
v. Speed, 5 Wheat. 420.
The books of the corporation offered in evidence, including the
stock-book, purported to contain, as we have seen, a list of all its
stockholders, the number of shares of stock owned by each, the sum
of money paid, and the balance still due from each on account of his
stock, and the name of the appellee appears as a stockholder, and
his account is stated, showing a balance due from him for his stock.
These books were competent evidence to prove that the appellee
was a stockholder, and the state of his account as such, in respect to
his stock.
It was so decided in the similar case of Turnbull v. Payson, 95 U. S. 418, in which the court say: " Where the name of an
individual appears as a stockholder, the prima facie presumption is
that he is the owner of the stock, in a case where there is nothing to
rebut the presumption ; and, in an action against him as a stockholder, the burden of proving that he is not a stockholder, or of rebutting
that presumption, is cast upon the defendant."
See, also, Hamilton,
etc.. Plankroad Co. v. Rice, 7 Barb. 157; Coffin v. Collins, 17 Me.
440 ; Whitman v. The Granite Church, 24 Me. 236 ; Wood v. Railroad Co., 32 Ga. 273; Hoagland v. Bell, 36 Barb. 57; Morawetz on
Pr. Corp., section 270.
The rule of evidence underlying this and similar decisions seems
to be founded in convenience, and to rest upon the further ground
that corporations in this country are the creatures of statute, with prescribed rights and powers, subject, to an important extent, to public
control and supervision, and are therefore presumed to exercise their
powers as allowed and required by law, and to keep their records
properly and truly. Such presumption may, of course, be rebutted
This rule might in possible cases work
by any competent evidence.
injury to a party, but this is not probable, and though objected to on
this ground, it has the less weight, as generally every litigant has the
right to testify in his own behalf. Turnpike v. M'Kean, supra; Owings v. Speed, supra.
Re-versed.
Note.

1896, Holland v. Duluth Iron
480, note 486 ; also note 3 Am. St.

Accord:

Am. St. Rep.

M. & D. Co., 65 Minn.
Rep. 832, 859, 866.

324, 60
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Sec. 534.

(2)
(a)

Right to vote.
Residence, proxy, and number of votes.

COMMONWEALTH, EX REL., v. J. J. DETWILER ET AL. 1
COMMONWEALTH, EX REL., v. C. L. HEMMINGWAY ET AL.
1890.

IN THE SUPREME

COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Rep. 614-638, 7 L. R. A. 357.

131

Pa. St.

[Quo tuarranto to test the validity of election of directors of the
Fanners' and Mechanics' Institute, incorporated in 1856, under laws
of 1840 and 1854, providing that "when any number of persons,
citizens of this common-wealth, are associated" for purposes named
In the first case all of the relators were
they may be incorporated.
residents of New Jersey, citizens of the United States and stockIn the first case the
holders ; in the second case one was an alien.
questions were whether persons not citizens of the state could vote,
or could be a director, whether a shareholder could vote by proxy, or
whether each member was entitled to only one vote, or one vote for
each share held.
At the meeting fourteen shareholders were present,
five of whom voted for relators and nine for respondents ; proxies of
six others were held by one of the five and voted for relators.
So
that of the individual shareholders actually present (without reference
to shares) a majority voted for respondents ; and of those present in
A majority of
person and by proxy, a majority voted for relators.
the stock voted by those actually present was for respondents ; and a
majority of that present in person and by proxy was for the relators.
In the second case the question whether an alien, not a citizen of the
United States, was raised.
Upon these questions,
REEDER, J., in the common pleas court, held:
(Must memberbe
restricted
citizens
of
the
state
to
Corporations are of two
ship
?)
kinds : those in which the members have a personal right which can
not be transmitted by sale, bequest, or inheritance, and those in which
the members have a right of property.
In the former, the right being merely personal and one which terminates by death or removal,
and which can not be made the subject of sale, such as beneficial, literary and religious associations, the restriction of membership to citizens of the state or to those of a certain class, is in contravention of
no constitutional
provision, and such membership can therefore be
restricted, limited and restrained.
But it is not so with corporations
which are in the nature of trading corporations, or where there may
be profits to be divided, or where the membership by its organic law
carries with it such a right of property as may be sold, bequeathed or
inherited.
To the latter class this company belongs.
The charter declares " That we, citizens of the United States."
By its terms there was no limitation, other than that, to membership.
Provision was made in the charter for the division of all excess of in1
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come as dividends upon the stock, as well as the division of the prop* *
*
erty at the dissolution of the corporation.
The second section of article IV of the constitution of the United
" The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all
States provides:
* * *
privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several states."
" The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of the citi* *
They may all be comprehended
zens of the several states ? *
Protection by the government,
under the following general heads:
the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and pos*
*
* To take, hold and dispose
sess property of every kind.
Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash.
of property, either real or personal."
C. C. 380-1. " The complainants contend that the seven or thirteen
persons mentioned in the law, who are to join in the articles of association, must be citizens of this state, and that the legislature did not
*
*
* The legislaintend to confer the privileges upon others.
ture has not attempted to make any discrimination in the law against
The term it uses is 'persons.'
Citizens of
citizens of other states.
other states are, by virtue of the constitution of the United States declaring that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several states, entitled to all the
privileges to which citizens of this state are entitled under the law."

Central R. of N. J. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 31 N. J. Eq. 486. To
hold, therefore, that no one could hold shares of stock in the Farmers'
and Mechanics' Institute by purchase, inheritance or bequest, except
citizens of the state of Pennsylvania, would be in contravention of
the express provisions of the constitution of the United States. * * *
(After holding that relators were legally qualified to be directors.)
Had the stockholders of this company a right to vote by proxy?
The charter contains no provision directly authorizing the casting of
votes by proxy, but we find in it the following provision:
"The
mode of conducting elections and for filling vacancies by death or
resignation, and the duties of the officers, shall be provided for by
resolutions and by-laws."
In the by-laws we find the following:
"Article i, section 12. In all elections members shall be entitled to
one vote for every share of stock held by them respectively, which
" The evidence discloses
may be voted either in person or by proxy.
that 339 of the votes cast for the relators were cast by proxy.
If
these votes are illegal then judgment must be entered for the respondents.

The right to vote by proxy is not

a

common-law right.

The

authority to so vote must be conferred by proper provision somewhere.
In this corporation the charter confers the power to provide for the
mode of conducting elections by by-laws, and we also find a by-law
authorizing votes to be cast by proxy.
The
Is this sufficient?
charter confers upon the company the right to regulate the mode of
conducting elections ; the company passed, in pursuance of this
authority, the by-law authorizing voting by proxy.
This by-law was
certainly within the provision of the charter authorizing the regulation
of the mode of conducting elections.
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In Cook on Stockholders, section 610, the author says:
"When
the charter is silent, the right to vote by proxy may in the absence of
statutory provision be conferred by a by-law." Chancellor Walworth
" The right of voting by proxy is not a general right, and the
says:
*
*
*
party who claims it must show a special authority for
might be delegated in some cases by the byand
possible that
laws of
corporation, where express authority was given to make
Phillips v. Wickham,
by-laws regulating the manner of voting."
Am. Dec.
Paige 590. In the case of State v. Tudor,
Day 329
corporation to vote by
162), the sole authority of the members of
The court held such by-law conferred the
by-law.
proxy was in
right. In Morawetz on Corporations, section 486, the writer says
"That the right of voting by proxy may be conferred through
bylaw adopted by the majority, appears to be reasonably well settled."
That the right of voting by proxy may be conferred by by-law seems
inferentially to have been recognized by the supreme court of this
state in the case of Commonwealth v. Bringhurst, 103 Pa. 134.
" As the relators cannot point to any
Chief Justice Mercur says:
language in the charter expressly giving a right to vote by proxy, and
not authorized by any by-law, they have no foundation on which
as
In view of these authorities,
conceive
to
to rest their claim.'.'
be lawful for the members of the Farmers' and Mechanics' Institute,
under their by-laws, to vote by proxy, and that the votes so cast at the
election on January u, 1887, were legal votes entitled to be counted
for the persons for whom they were cast.
Had each stockholder right to cast vote for each share of stock
or was each member entitled to one vote and only one,
held by him
regardless of the number of shares of stock he held
Under the act of October 13. 1840, among the enumeration of pow"And shall be authorized and
ers conferred, we find this provision:
empowered, and they are hereby authorized and empowered, to make
rules, by-laws and ordinances and do everything useful for the good
government and support of said corporations respectively; provided,
also, that the said by-laws, rules and ordinances, or any of them, be
not repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States, to
the constitution and laws of this commonwealth, or to the instrument
upon which the said corporations respectively are as aforesaid formed
In the charter of this corporation we find the proand established."
*
*
* shall be
vision that "the mode of conducting elections
provided for by resolution or by-laws." In the by-laws we find:
"Article
section 12. In all elections members shall be entitled to
one vote for every share of stock held by them respectively," etc.
A by-law not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the
United States, or the constitution and laws of Pennsylvania, or \vith
the charter,
In Morawetz on Corporations,
valid, lawful by-law.
seems that at common law each
section 476, the author says:
But there are good reaentitled to cast but one vote.
shareholder
sons for holding that this rule has no application to ordinary joint
In Cook on Stock
stock business corporations of the present day."
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"At common
and Stockholders, section 608, we find the following:
law, in public or municipal corporations, each elector has one vote
This rule has been applied to stockholders in a priand only one.
vate corporation, and it has been held that such a shareholder has
but one vote, although he be the owner of many shares of the capital
Almost universally, however, the charter of a company, or a
stock.
statute, or a constitutional provision, gives to each share of stock one
vote at every corporate meeting, and at the present day it is probable that no court, even in the absence of such provision, would uphold a rule which disregards in the matter of voting the number of
shares which the shareholder holds in the corporation."
If this provision in regard to stock voting had been incorporated in
the charter, there could be no doubt that it would confer upon the
stockholders the right to cast one vote for each share of stock held by
Vide Commonwealth v. Bringhurst, 103 Pa. 134. The charthem.
ter, however, contains the provision that the method of conducting
the elections shall be provided for by the by-laws, and this by-law is
Is not
adopted by the company in accordance with this authority.
this as binding upon the stockholders of the corporation as if it were
embodied in the charter itself ?
(In first case, judgment for relators. In the second case, Peter
Robinson is not eligible to serve as a director for the reason he is not
a citizen of the United States.
Appeals taken.)
MR. JUSTICE WILLIAMS (in the supreme court, in the first case).
* * * The second and third questions must be answered in the affirmaThe non-resident stockholder takes his shares with all the rights
tive.
and privileges which pertain to them in the hands of a citizen, and he
may vote upon them, and, where no other qualification than ownership of stock is required of the directors, he may become a director.
We put the right of the stockholder, not so much on the provision of
the constitution of the United States, which was discussed with so
much learning by the judge of the court below, as upon the nature of
the stock as a personal chattel, and the right of an alien friend at the
common law to deal in personal goods, embark in trade, loan money,
sue and be sued for the collection of debts, and the protection of his
person and personal estate.
The fourth and fifth questions relate to the right of a stockholder
to cast more than one vote, if he owns more than one share of stock,
and his right to vote by proxy.
A corporation is a voluntary association of persons engaged in a common enterprise.
When the methods
of voting are not fixed by general law, the corporators may make the
law for themselves, subject to the qualification that such laws and
regulations as they make shall not conflict with the laws of the state
or of the United States.
The general law did not touch either of the
questions now raised, and for that reason the corporators or stockholders took them up, and made a law for themselves, covering both
subjects.
They have provided that stockholders shall have one vote
for each share held by them up to ten shares, and they have fixed the
proportion which his votes shall bear to his shares above that number.
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This is a reasonable regulation ; it is uniform in its operation ; it conflicts with no law, and it is binding on all the shareholders.
The
same thing may be said in regard to voting by proxy.
It was competent for the members of this association to consider what was most
convenient for themselves, and best calculated to secure the votes of
all the shareholders at the annual elections.
They had the power to
refuse to receive votes unless offered by the voters in person, but,
upon consideration, they decided that votes might be cast by proxy.
This also was a reasonable regulation, uniform in its application,
works no wrong to any shareholder, and conflicts with no law of the
commonwealth. It is therefore a valid and binding law, made by the
shareholders for their own government.
*
*
*
the second case, as to the right of the
For

.(In

alien.)

a

*

a

a

is

is

a

*

it,

it,

the reasons given in Detwiler v. Commonwealth, supra, we think
he may become a stockholder.
The stock being personal property,
An alien could at comhe may acquire it by gift or purchase.
mon law buy personal goods, and sell them, and, except in the case
of an alien enemy, there was no restriction upon trade with aliens.
If he can acquire the stock, he can acquire with it all the rights and
privileges which its ownership confers, among which is the right to
have a voice in the control of the enterprise, and the selection of those
who are to conduct its affairs.
He may therefore vote in the same
manner, and with the same effect, as any other stockholder may do.
Why may he not become a director? The office is not a political
If it was, he would, of course, be ineligible to
one.
and disqualified for voting for any one else to fill
of
his
because
want of citi*
zenship.
The learned judge who tried this case in the court below thought
that the right of the citizens of New Jersey to become stockholders,
to vote, and to hold office in this association, rested on the constitution of the United States, and, logically enough, held that one who
director;
citizen of the United States could not become
was not
but we think the right of all persons, not alien enemies, to buy and
hold, use and enjoy, personal property, whether corporate stocks or
articles of merchandise,
older than the constitution, and that citinot necessary to its exercise.
Even as
zenship of the United States
to real estate, the distinction between
resident alien friend and
citizen has disappeared in Pennsylvania and nearly every other state
in the Union.
The words of our act of 1807 are: "It shall and may
be lawful for any alien or aliens, actually resident within this commonwealth, and not being the subject or subjects of some sovereign
state or power which is, or shall be at the time or times of such purchase or purchases, at war with the United States of America, to purchase lands, tenements, and hereditaments within this commonwealth,
and to have and to hold the same in fee-simple, or for any lesser
estate, as fully, to all intents and purposes, as any natural-born citizen
or citizens may or can do."
(In first case, judgment affirmed; in second, reversed.)
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Note. 1. Proxy voting.
As to right to vote by proxy: See, 1834, Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N. J. L. 222,
27 Am. Dec. 33; 1883, Commonwealth v. Bringhurst, 103 Pa. St. 134, 49 Am.
Rep. 119; 1895, Market St. R. Co. v. Hellman, 109 Cal. 571.
Irrevocable proxies: All attempts to create irrevocable proxies, at least if not
coupled with an interest, have been held to be ineffective, and may be
See, 1889, Vanderbilt v. Bennett, 6 Pa. Co.Ct. 193; 1891, Cone v.
revoked.
Russell, etc., 48 N. J. Eq. 208; 1897, Schmidt v. Mitchell, 101 Ky. 570, 72 Am.
St. Rep. 427. See, also, note, 50 Am. St. Rep. 130.
Compare, 1895, Hey v. Dolphin, 92 Hun (N. Y.) 230.
See, 1895, Proctor Coal Co. et al. v. Findlay et al., 98
2. Number of votes:
Ky. 405, 33 S. W. Rep. 188; Harvard L. R. 1888, p. 156.
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BJORNGAARD
1892.

IN THE SUPREME

Personal interest of shareholder.
v.

GOODHUE COUNTY BANK. 1

COURT

OF

MINNESOTA.

49

Minn. Rep.

483-488.
GILFILLAN, C. J. The defendant bank is a banking corporation.
The defendants, Sheldon, Perkins, Featherstone, Brooks, Boxrud and
William and Frederick Busch, and the plaintiff Hoyt, were at the
The director
times hereinafter mentioned, and now are, its directors.
defendants were and are stockholders, owning a large majority of the
The plaintiffs are stockholders.
The defendant stockholders
stock.
owned a lot and building.
At a directors' meeting on July 7, 1890,
all the directors being present, it was resolved, all the directors except Hoyt, who protested, voting in the affirmative, that the corporation purchase at a price specified said lot and building, and on July
the owners executed a conveyance to the bank.
The action is
brought to set aside the transaction, and to prevent the funds of the
bank being used to complete the purchase, and also to prevent a ratification by the stockholders, a meeting of whom had heen called for
the purpose, or, rather, to prevent such a ratification by the votes of
There is no doubt that, within the rule in Rothwell
defendants.
v. Robinson, 39 Minn, i, 38 N. W. Rep. 772, the plaintiffs may bring
such an action without first applying to the corporate authorities to
bring it. The directoi's against whom complaint is made are not
only a majority of the directors, but they own a majority of the
stock, so that any application either to the board of directors or to the
body of stockholders to bring the action would be equivalent to
asking the alleged wrongdoers to bring suit in the name of the corThe law does hot require of the minorporation against themselves.
ity stockholders to do so absurd a thing as a condition of seeking
relief against the wrongful acts of the directors and majority stockholders.
The court below decided the case in favor of the defend-
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ants on the proposition that although the act of the board of directors
was voidable, it was not ultra vires, and was capable of ratification;
and where a majority of the stockholders have power to ratify the
We see
unauthorized act of the directors, courts will not interfere.
that the corporano reason to think this purchase was ultra vires,
tion had not power to make it. And, that being so, it may be conceded that the board of directors had authority to make a purchase for
And it is undoubtedly true that where a corporathe corporation.
tion has power to do a certain thing, though the authority to do it is
not in the directors, the stockholders may ratify their act if they asBut this transaction is not
sume to do it on behalf of the corporation.
voidable because ultra vires, because there was no authority in the directors to purchase ; but it is voidable under the rule that one having
authority from another to purchase or sell for him can not purchase
from nor sell to himself. To do so is in law a fraud. The rule is
The party
absolute, and the matter of fraud in fact is immaterial.
for whom the purchase or sale is made need not allege nor prove
fraud or injury but may disaffirm without taking any risk. The rule
is inflexible, in order to prevent fraud on the part of one holding a
fiduciary relation, by making it impossible for him to profit by
thus removing temptation from his way.
This court has steadily adin Baldwin v. Alhered to and applied the rule since
first enunciated
in
all
of
cases
the kind the principal
Minn. 25 (Gil. n). But
lison,
may, with full knowledge of the facts, ratify what has been done.
The act of the defendant directors was
violation of this rule, and
the purchase was not binding on the corporation until ratified.
The
therefore presented, under the allegation and relief asked
question
in the complaint, had the defendants
right to vote as stockholders at the
stockholders' meeting called for the purpose upon the question of ratification
While stockholders in corporation owe the duty of good faith
to each other in the management of the affairs of the corporation, they do
not stand to each other in
fiduciary relation within the rule we have
stated.
They are not trustees nor agents for each other in the matter
of voting upon any proposition that may come before
meeting of the
In voting, each must be guided by his own judgment
stockholders.
as to what
for the best interest of the corporation. The fact that
he may have
personal interest, separate from the others or from that
of the corporation in the matter to be voted upon, does not affect his
not to be understood that the majority stockIt
right to vote.
holders may use their power of voting for the purpose of defrauding
the minority.
It was said in Gamble v. Queens Co. Water Co., 123
N. Y. 91, 25 N. E. Rep. 201, in which the right of stockholder in
case to vote was affirmed:
"In such cases may be stated
such
that the action of the majority of the shareholders may be subjected
to the scrutiny of
court of equity at the suit of the minority shareAnd in Beatty v. Transportation Co., L. R. 12 App.
holders."
was said, in effect,
Cas. 589, in which the same thing was held,
that in such case the ratification must not be brought about by unfair
or improper means, nor be illegal or fraudulent or oppressive towards
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A rule excluding stockholders
those shareholders who oppose it.
because
they might be personally intervote
to
merely
from the right
to the interests of the other
contrary
way,
in
a
particular
ested to vote
The rule
stockholders, would be likely to lead to great confusion.
to
secure
the
exercise
of
sufficient
is
cited
cases
two
in
the
down
laid
to
others.
owes
the
one
stockholder
faith
which
the good
Judgment affirmed.

1877, Fender v. Lushington, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 70; 1887,
Accord:
Beatty v. N. W. Trans. Co., L. R. 12 App. Cas. 589, 12 Can. Sup. Ct. 598, 11
Ont. App. 205, 6 Ont. 300.
Compare, 1870, Gamble v. Water Co., 123 N. Y. 91 ; 1876, Guernsey v. Cook,
120 Mass. 501 ; 1896, Gage v. Fisher, 5 N. Dak. 297, 31 L. R. A. 557.

Note.

Sec. 536.

Same.

(c)

Pledger and pledgee.

HOPPIN ET
1870.

AL. v.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

BUFFUM ET

OF

AL. 1

RHODE ISLAND.

9

R. I. Rep.

^Information in nature of quo -warranto to test the validity of the
election of respondents as directors of the P. & N. Y. Steamship

Company.]
POTTER, J. In this case the material facts are, that a certain number of shares in the corporation, owned by Edward P. Taft and Cyrus Taft, were pledged to Earl P. Mason as security for debts due to
himself and others; but neither the ownership nor the pledge appeared on the books of the corporation, where the stock had, from
the formation of the corporation, stood in the name of " Eai'l P. MaThe certificate was so issued, and he had always voted
son, ti'ustee."
thereon, without objection, until the meeting of June 9, 1870, and
voted upon them at that meeting, no objection having been made until
while the votes were being counted, or, as some of the affidavits say,
It is not disputed that the votes so thrown
after they were counted.

It is claimed, on one side,
decided the election made on that day.
that the person who then made the protest stated that said Mason
This is denied, on the other side.
held the stock as security only.
A person who pledges stock has the right to vote upon it until the
Case of Jacob Barker,
title of the pledgee to the stock is perfected.
had
on
If Taft
the books as owner, and the
6 Wend. 509.
appeared
Mr.
Taft's right to vote on the stock
books had shown the pledge,
The
could not have been disputed.
object of the stock-book, and of
be
of
recorded
transfers
stock
to
requiring
by the corporation, is for
the protection of the corporation, to enable it to know who are its
members who are entitled to dividends ; and for no purpose is it
more important than to enable it to know who are entitled to vote in
1
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case of an election.
This doctrine is recognized by many authorities
Gilbert v. Manufacturing
expressly, and by many others impliedly.
Iron Co.,
Wend. 627; Bank of Utica v. Smalley, 2 Cow. 770,
778; Kirtright v. Bank of Buffalo, 22 Wend. 348, 362; Fisher v.
Essex Bank, 5 Gray 373, 380; Hoagland v. Bell, 36 Barb. 57, 58.
And we think that in a case of a dispute as to a right to vote, the
books of the corporation are the prima facie evidence ; at any rate,
the corporation can not be required to decide a disputed right.
Of
course, if the pledger and pledgee, or the trustee and cestui que trust,
agree that either shall represent the stock, or if the facts are admitted,
that might be sufficient.
Upon any other rule, it could never be
known who were entitled to vote, until the courts had decided the
The corporation or its officers would have to decide it for
dispute.
the time, and it would leave the election in uncertainty.
If the real owner wishes to have his name, or the true state of facts,
appear on the books, he has his remedy in equity to compel a proper
transfer, or to compel the pledgee to give a proxy, as was done in the
case of Vowell v. Thomson, 3 Cranch C. C. 428.
But when the
real owner or pledger acquiesces for years in the control of the stock
by the record owner, and without any attempt to inform the corporation of the true state of facts until a contested election occurs, and
then, not until the votes are being counted or have been counted, we
do not think he presents a proper case to justify a court of equity in
See State v.
interfering with the result of the election as declared.
Lehre, 7 Rich. (Law) 234, 256, 325. In the present case the stock
stood in the name of Earl P. Mason, trustee.
The books did not
disclose the nature of the trust.
If any other person was the equitable owner of the stock, and entitled to have it transferred to him, he
should, if his right was disputed, assert it in season, and take the
proper measures to enforce it. But if the trust was of such a nature
that the trustee has the control and management of the property, and
is to exercise his discretion concerning
then he
the proper person
to represent and vote upon it.
And the corporation can not be review to decide
quired to examine into the nature of the trust, with
as to the right to vote.
Judgment for respondents.
a

is

it,

ii

Note: 1893, Commonwealth v. Dalzell, 152 Pa. St. 217, 34 Am. St. Rep.
640; 1898, National Bank v. Allen, 90 Fed. Rep. (C. C. A.) 545.
Compare,
1887, State v. Smith, 15 Ore. 98; 1900, Wentworth Co. v. French, 176 Mass.
N. E. Rep. 789.
Bondholders can not be authorized to vote
111. 354, 46 Am. St. Rep. 340.

:

442, 57

1895,

Durkee v. People,
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1892.
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HESTONVILLE M.

IN THE SUPREME

&

F. PASS. R. R. CO. ET

OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Rep. 70-85.

COURT

149

AL.

Pa. St.

[Bill in equity praying for a master to preside at the annual meeting of the railroad company, alleging former acts of fraud and alleging probable grounds for believing the next election would be accomThe master was appointed by the
panied by fraud and violence.
lower court, and at the election there was much contention as to voting 6,900 shares belonging to the estate of Charles Lafferty, deceased.]

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE PAXSON.

*

*

*

The master has found
from which we condense the following:
The
will of Charles Lafferty, deceased, provides that the executors and
The present executors and
trustees shall always be three in number.
trustees are Charles H. Lafferty, Rose E. Lafferty and F. J. Corco" I do hereby
ran.
By a codicil to his will he provides as follows:
authorize and direct that all the stock held by me in the Race and
Vine streets, Arch street, and Hestonville, Mantua & Fairmount Passenger R. Company, shall be voted at all elections of said companies as my son, Charles Lafferty, shall direct and appoint, and my
executors are directed to give a proxy or authority to vote said stock
as he may desire to vote the same."
The other two executors refused to give Charles H. Lafferty the proxy mentioned in the codicft,
and protested, as before stated, against his right to so vote the stock.
The judges of election announced that, unless otherwise instructed by
the master, they would receive the ballot tendered by Charles H. LafIf this ballot should be received
ferty, and count it as he requested.
and counted as desired by him, it would elect the Lafferty ticket.
The master sustained the objection to this ballot, and directed the
which was accordingly done.
judges of election to reject
The master has given abundant reasons for his ruling.
The principle may be briefly stated thus
At corporate election, each vote
cast and counted must be so cast in person or by proxy.
This
the
law of the corporation, and the stock can not be voted in any other
is

a

:

it,

the facts elaborately,

way.

a

a

is

a

The codicil to Mr.* Lafferty's will was not
proxy, and could not
be treated as such as to objecting owners or stockholders.
A proxy
an authority or power to do
certain thing; in this case a power to
vote stock.
Such power can only be given by the owner. It can not,
of course, be given by
dead man.
Charles Lafferty no longer
owns this stock for the reason that his ownership terminated with
his death.
It then passed, by his will, to the executors and
trustees before named, in trust for certain beneficiaries.
The executors were entitled to vote this stock, because they held the legal title
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If we concede that one executor could
owners.
vote the stock, in the absence of objection by his co-executors, it is
clear that he could not vote it against such objection.
It is true, the
codicil to the will directs two of his executors to give a proxy to
Charles H. Lafferty, for the purpose of enabling him to vote his stock,
but they did not give such proxy, nor does it appear that any attempt
was made to enforce the provisions of the codicil by any legal proWe are not called upon to say whether the dissenting
ceeding.
executors could have been compelled to give the other executor a
proxy. In point of fact, they did not give one, and, under the law
of the corporation, the stock could not be voted.
The testator could
not, by a codicil to his will, affect the rights of other corporators.
The codicil, so far as the corporation was concerned, had no legal
effect.
What has been said in regard to Charles H. Lafferty' s right applies,
with equal force, to the attempt of the other two executors to vote the
The right of voting stock is inseparable
stock against his objection.
from the right of ownership. The one follows as a sequence from
the other, and the right to vote can not be separated from the ownerIt follows, logically,
ship, without the consent of the legal owner.
that one joint-owner of stock can not vote it against the protest and
objection of his co-owner.
It is not needed, for the purposes of this case, that we should
speculate as to the right of a man to control, from his grave, the
No such question is legitielection of directors of a corporation.
It will be time enough to decide this
mately raised by this record.
grave question when it arises.
The decree affirmed, and the appeal dismissed, at the costs of the
appellants.
for the beneficial
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AMERICAN RAILWAY-FROG COMPANY
1869.

v.

HAVEN ET

AL. 1

IN THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

101

Mass. Rep. 398408.

[Petition for mandrmus by the company to declare certain officers
elected and commanding the delivery of the books of the corporation.
It was shown that after the corporation was organized and the stock
issued, different shareholders transferred four hundred shares to Aaron
Clark, treasurer, "to hold for the benefit of the corporation." At the
election in controversy persons holding a majority of shares exclusive
of these four hundred, elected officers, who instituted this suit; the
old secretary and treasurer refused to deliver the books or recognize
the validity of the election.]
1
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AMES, J. * * * The case finds that the capital stock was divided into two thousand shares, all of which were properly issued to
and that some time afterwards four hundred
the original stockholders;
of these shares were transferred by some of the stockholders to Aaron
N. Clark "to hold for the benefit of the corporation." If these transfers had been made directly to the corporation, without the intervention of a trustee, it would hardly be contended that it would thereby
A corporation
become entitled to vote at a meeting of stockholders.
can not literally be one of its own stockholders in the full sense of
Such a transfer might not operate as a mere surrender or
that term.
It would not diminish the
cancellation of stock, unless so intended.
amount of the capital, nor necessarily reduce the number of shares.
The corporation might, perhaps, receive such a transfer, and hold the
for the purpose of reissue to new subscribers
stock so conveyed to
or purchasers.
By the terms of the transfer, Clark holds " for the
This
benefit of the corporation," and of course subject to its order.
makes
the extent of his trust.
necesNothing in the nature of
no
There
sary that he should vote, as the holder of those shares.
apparent reason why he, not being beneficially or practically the
owner of them, should be endowed with the privilege of controlling
four hundred votes according to his own judgment or pleasure, espetaken into consideration that the corporation for
cially when
which he holds them has no right of voting in any event. It
easy
to see that any such privilege would not only be unreasonable and unfair, but might lead to great abuses. The position of these shares, in
our judgment,
the same, to all intents and purposes, so far as the
concerned, as
right of voting upon them
they were held directly
by the corporation itself; and, until they are sold and transferred by
its authority, the right of voting upon them
Ex parte
suspended.
Holmes,
Cowen 426; Ex parte Willcocks,
folCowen 402.
lows, then, that at the annual meeting in question, the votes on these
four hundred shares ought not to have been received or counted
that
the whole number of competent and legal votes was fifteen hundred
and thirty-three, and no more
that Cuntz and his five associates received
clear majority of these votes
and that they were duly elected
to the offices claimed for them respectively in the petition.
Peremptory mandamus to issue.
t

&

;

Note.
Compare, 1889, Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Woods, 88 Ala. 630, 16 Am.
St. Rep. 81 1890, Mack v. De Bardeleben
Co., 90 Ala. 396.
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IN THE SUPREME
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Cumulative voting.
v.

THE COMMONWEALTH.
COURT

1

OF PENNSYLVANIA.

104

Pa. St.

Rep. 150-156.
[ >uo ivarranto requiring Pierce and his associates to show by what
authority they exercised the office of directors of the Sharpsville RailNo irregularity as to the calling or holding the elecroad Company.

tion was charged ; but when the votes were to be counted it appeared
that all of those for the four relators had been cumulated, and were
folded up and indorsed with the name of the voter, and the number of
Prior to the counting no one had claimed the right to
shares voted.
cumulate his vote, and the judges of election refused to count them,
The lower court instructed the
and declared respondents elected.
jury that the relators had the right to do this in the case of railroad
Verdict for relators, and
companies and without first giving notice.
of
ouster
who
against
respondents,
allege error in the
judgment
charge of the court.]
About the correctness of the ruling of the learned
GORDON, J.
below, in this case, we have no doubt. It seems
of
the
court
judge
to have been admitted, in the outstart of this trial, that the election
of the 8th of January, 1883, was properly called, was held at the
proper time, and was conducted in an orderly and regular manner.
Nor is there any doubt but that the relators received the highest number of votes cast for directors at that election.
It is said, however,
that this result was brought about by the cumulation of the votes of
the relators upon four out of the six candidates proposed for election.
But this they certainly had a right to do, or we fail correctly to read
" In all elections for directors or managers
the constitution of 1874:
of a corporation, each member or shareholder may cast the whole
number of his votes for one candidate, or distribute them upon two
or more candidates, as he may prefer."
Article 16, section 4. This
section to us seems very plain and unambiguous.
If there are six
directors to be elected, the single shareholder has six votes, and, contrary to the old rule, he may cast those six votes for a single one of the
candidates, or he may distribute them to two or more of such candidates as he may think proper.
He may cast two ballots for each of
of
the
three
proposed directors, three for two, or two for one, and
for
four others, or finally, he may cast one vote for each
one each
Now, as this Sharpsville Railroad Company
of the six candidates.
was incorporated since the adoption of the new constitution, it is necessarily subjected thereto, and must be governed by its provisions.
But the provision above cited vested in the relators, as stockholders,
the absolute right to vote as they did, and if, as a consequence of the
exercise of such right, their candidates had the highest number of
Statement abridged,

arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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votes cast at that election, they are the rightful directors of the corporation. But it is said this provision is but directory, and it can
not go into effect without some legislative action directing the manner
To this proposition we can not assent. There is no
of its exercise.
alteration required in the mode of conducting corporate elections;
each company continues to use that method prescribed by its charter,
and the constitutional right is one that belongs solely and exclusively
He may exercise it or not as to him
to the individual shareholder.
he
does so exercise such right or not,
but
whether
seem
proper,
may
the ordinary manner of conducting the corporate election is in noLegislative action is, therefore, uncalled for;
wise interfered with.
it would be useless to alter the present mode of election, and with the
right itself the general assembly can not meddle.
(After holding that a railroad was a private corporation, to which
the constitutional provision applied, and prior notice of intention to
cumulate votes was not necessary, the judgment was affirmed.)
See, 1883, State v. Greer, 78 Mo. 188 ; 1885, Wright v. Cent. Cal. , etc.,
Cal. 532; 1891, Cross v. Railway Co., 35 W. Va. 174; 1900, Schwartz
v. State, 61 Ohio St. 497 ; 1900, Looker v. Maynard, 179 U. S. 46, affirming
Attorney-General v. Looker, 111 Mich. 498.
Note.

Co.,

67
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HARVEY

C^
1896.

Same,
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(g)

Voting trusts.

LINVILLE IMPROVEMENT COMPANY.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA.
118 N. C.
Am.
L.
R.
A.
St.
Rep.
749,
32
54
265.

Rep. 693-700,

an injunction against the company and M.,
to have a pool agreement and an issue of bonds set aside,
in order that he might complete purchases of the majority of the capital
stock of the company and obtain control thereof.
The company was
in the hands of a receiver, and while so, a number of shareholders,
including H., W. and K., in order to extricate the company, pay its
debts, and enable it to resume operations, entered into a "pool" to
place their stock in the hands of M., D. and L., in trust for five years,
to borrow money and pay off debts of the company, and pledge the
stock to secure the payment of the money borrowed, with power to
vote the stock at all meetings, as should be determined by the majorThe trustees did borrow $9,000 and pledged the
ity of owners.
stock, including that of H., W. and K., which Harvey claimed to have
purchased after the pool was entered into.
At a meeting held soon
afterwood, in which the stock was voted by the owners, and not under control of the pool, it was voted to issue $60,000 first mortgage

[Action by Harvey for

D. and

1

L.,

Statement abridged.
The pool agreement is set out in full
report, page 696, and shows the form of such contracts.

in

the original
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bonds, in order to pay the debts and get the property released from
the receivership.
Harvey had an option upon enough of the shares
him
control of the company, if the pool agreement
of stock to give
be
broken.
The
could
injunction was denied below, and Harvey ap-

pealed.]
CLARK,

J.

At

common law stockholders could not vote by proxy.
Law 222, and other cases cited in Cook
Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N.
This
is now otherwise, but it is still held
on Stocks, section 610.
that each stockholder, whether by himself or by proxy, must be free
to cast his vote for what he deems for the best interest of the corporation, the other stockholders being entitled to the benefit of such free
exercise of his judgment by each ; and hence, any combination or device by which any number of stockholders shall combine to place the
voting of their shares in the irrevocable power of another is held conEq. 208. Various
Cone v. Russell, 48 N.
trary to public policy.
devices have been resorted to for the purpose of so tying up the stock
that no one of the parties to the "pool" or combination can break the
"Irrevocable" proxies to vote the stock have been given
agreement.
to a designated party who acted as trustee or agent, but the courts held
such proxies not irrevocable, and that they might be revoked at any
Cook, supra, sections 610, 622 ; Woodruff v. Dubuque, 30
time.
Fed. Rep. ^91 ; Vanderbilt v. Bennett, 6 Pa. Co. Ct. 193.
Another plan was to place the stock of the various parties in the
hands of trustees, with power to transfer the stock to themselves and
to hold and vote the same, trustees' certificates being issued to the
various parties, specifying the amount of stock so deposited by them
and their interest in the pool, but the courts held that any holder of a
trustee's certificate might at any time demand back his part of the
stock.
Woodruff v. Dubuque, supra, and other cases cited in Cook,
supra, section 622. Another device was that the parties contracted
together not to sell their stock for a specified time or only to a purchaser acceptable to them all.
It was held that notwithstanding such
contract any one of the parties might sell his stock to any one he
Fisher v. Bush, 35 Hun 641 ; Williams v.
pleased and at any time.
Montgomery, 68 Hun 416. Another plan was to restrict by a by-law
the right to transfer stock, but this was held illegal.
Morgan v.
Struthers, 131 U. S. 246, and other cases cited in Cook, supra, section 332. A provision that a purchaser of a certificate of stock who
sold in violation of the agreement should be entitled to the dividends,
but should receive no right to vote, was likewise held invalid.
Harper v. Raymond, 3 Bosw. (N. Y.) 29.
Numerous decisions affirm the correctness of the above rulings,
which are based upon the illegality, because against public policy, of
permitting large blocks of stock to be irrevocably tied up for the purpose of being voted in solido for the interest of a clique or section of
the stockholders, and not according to the judgment of each individual stockholder for the benefit of the entire corporation. There
are some few decisions trenching more or less upon the principles
above stated, but we deem them contrary to sound principle of public
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In short, all agreements and devices
policy, and hence not authority.
by which stockholders surrender their voting powers are invalid.
Corporations, section 6604. The power to vote is in5 Thompson
herently annexed to and inseparable from the real ownership of each
share, and can only be delegated by proxy with power of revocation.
The "pooling" arrangement, admitted to have been entered into by
the majority of stockholders in the present case, is contrary to public
policy and voidable (Woodruff v. Dubuque, supra}, and the plaintiff,
assignee of certain of the trustees' certificates, is entitled to have his
name entered as the owner and holder of the shares of stock repre-

sented by said trustees' certificates, and to have said shares issued to
him, should the facts be found in accordance with his allegation, and
to have the defendant restrained till the hearing from voting or controlling in any way the stock purchased by the plaintiff, or in anywise
interfering with plaintiff's right to vote, control or dispose of said
stock.

Error.

1900, Kreissl v. Distilling Co.,
Note. Accord:
Also, article, 64 Alb.
See next case and note.
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Same.
AL. v. SAN

FRANCISCO
COMPANY

&

NORTH PACIFIC

RAILWAY

ET AL. 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA (IN BANK).
115
Cal. Rep. 584-610, "56 Am. St. 119, 35 L. R. A. 309, 6 A. & E.
C. C. (N. S.) 205.

1897.

an election of the railway company, February 25, 1896, votes
offered by one Smith, in whose name certain shares stood on the
books, were rejected, in consequence of which certain parties were
declared elected directors in place of others who would have been
In
elected had the votes of Smith been received as offered by him.
f
D.,
es
tate
of
deceased,
was
the
owner
thousand
tne
forty-two
1893
shares of the company, which in the settlement of the estate were
ordered to be sold; Smith, Foster and Markham, prior to the sale,
entered into an agreement for the purchase of the stock as an entirety,
and proposed to enter into another agreement, if the purchase should
be made, whereby the shares should for the term of five years be voted
as a unit in the election of directors ; at the sale their bid was accepted,
the stock purchased, and one-third (except five thousand shares left
in trust for another purpose), was transferred upon the books to each
of these parties.
Smith drew up the agreement for voting the stock
as contemplated, and this was duly executed, it being " mutually
agreed between said Foster, Markham and Smith that they will, during
'Statement abridged; part of the opinion of Harrison,
senting opinion of Beatty, C. J., omitted.

J.,

and all of dis-
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said period, retain the power to vote said shares in one body; and
that the vote which shall be cast by said shares, whether for directors
or for any other purpose, shall be determined by ballot between them
or their survivors."
It was to last five years, apply to their vendees
as well as themselves, and was "for the purpose of keeping control
of the road in the interest of themselves, and of all persons who shall
Before the election, at a
buy any portion of the stock from them."
conference of the parties, it was determined by the vote of Foster
and Markham that these shares should be voted for certain persons as
directors; at this meeting Smith gave notice that he did not recognize
the validity of the agreement, and would not be bound by it ; and at
the election of directors offered to vote upon his part of the stock; but
this was rejected, and the whole forty-two thousand shares were voted
as Foster and Markham directed ; Smith protested, and brought suit
to have the election set aside ; the lower court gave judgment in favor
of Smith, mainly on the ground that the agreement did not amount to
a proxy "which gave any authority to any other person to cast the
Motion for new trial was overruled.]
vote of Mr. Smith."
*
*
*
HARRISON, J.
(After passing upon another question,
and also holding that the agreement "to determine" by ballot between
them the vote which "shall be cast," by necessary implication gave a
power to cast the ballot in accordance with this determination, proThe instrument executed between the parties must, thereceeds:)
fore, be held to be a proxy, and to authorize the vote of the forty-two
thousand shares of stock to be cast in accordance with the determination of the majority of the parties thereto, and, if it was made upon a
consideration sufficient to bind the parties to its enforcement, it must
be regarded as still operative.
One of the inducements for the purchase of the stock, and under which the parties entered into the agreement, was that the shares should be voted in one body, and held for
five years as a unit.
It is immaterial that the voting agreement was
not reduced to writing and executed until after the bid had been made
for the stock.
It was so executed before the parties thereto had completed the purchase and become the owners of the stock by paying the
purchase-price. Nor is the validity of the agreement or the effect of
its terms different by reason of different certificates having been issued
in the names of the several parties to the transaction, rather than in
the name of one of them.
The agreement between them was with
reference to the forty-two thousand shares of stock, and that it should
be voted as a unit, and the purpose of the agreement was the economical management of the road, and to prevent irresponsible persons
from getting control. It was within the power of the parties to contract in reference to this property as fully as with regard to any other
property. They were at liberty to make as a condition of their purchase that its management should be held by either of them, or by a
majority of the three, and the terms of the agreement for such purchase could not be repudiated by either after the purchase had been
made.
It may be assumed that neither of the parties would have entered into the transaction, or agreed upon the purchase of the stock,
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except upon these conditions, and it must be held that each contributed his money to the purchase of the stock upon the promise made
There was thus a sufficient consideration for
to him by the others.
It was in the nathe agreement granting the right to vote the stock.
ture of a power coupled with an interest, and, being given for a valuable consideration, could not be revoked at the pleasure of either.

Hey v. Dolphin, 92 Hun 230.
Although the court, in excluding this evidence, assumed that the
instrument was valid, counsel for respondents have presented an argument in support of their further objection thereto, that the instrument
is invalid by reason of being against public policy, and it therefore
becomes necessary to consider this objection, inasmuch as the action
of the court, rather than its reason for so acting, is to be reviewed ;
for, if the instrument is invalid, the refusal of the court to allow any
effect to be gained from its exercise was proper.
"Public policy" is a term of vague and uncertain meaning, which
it pertains to the law-making power to define, and courts are apt to
encroach upon the domain of that branch of the government if they
characterize a transaction as invalid because it is contrary to public
policy, unless the transaction contravenes some positive statute or
Sir George Jessel, as master of
some well-established rule of law.
Wood,
L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 605, that public
the rolls, said, in Besant v.
"
a
matter of individual opinion, because
to a great extent
policy is
what one man or one judge might think against public policy, another
might think altogether excellent public policy;" and in another case
(Printing, etc., Co. v. Sampson, L. R. 19 Eq. 465), the same jurist
said: " If there is one thing which more than another public policy
requires, it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall
have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts, when
entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred, and shall be
It is not in violation of any rule or
enforced by courts of justice."
of
law
for
stockholders, who own a majority of the stock in
principle
cause
to
its affairs to be managed in such way as they
a corporation,
think
best
calculated
to further the ends of the corporation, and
may
for this purpose, to appoint one or more proxies who shall vote in
Nor is it against public
such a way as will carry out their plan.
or
for
two
more
stockholders
to
agree upon a course of corpopolicy
rate action, or upon the officers whom they will elect, and they may
do this either by themselves, or through their proxies, or they may
unite in the appointment of a single proxy to effect their purpose.
Any plan of procedure they may agree upon implies a previous comparison of views, and there is nothing illegal in an agreement to be
bound by the will of the majority as to the means by which the result
shall be reached.
If they are in accord as to the ultimate purpose, it
is but reasonable that the will of the majority should prevail as to the
mode by which it may be accomplished.
It would not be an illegal agreement if articles of a partnership
should provide that stock in a corporation owned by the partnership,
though standing in the individual names of the partners, should be

THE CORPORATION AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS.

54 1

1609

it,

voted by one of its members, and it is no more against public policy
for such an agreement to be entered into between stockholders whose
interests in the stock are separate than where their interests are joint.
Viewed from considerations of public policy merely, it is immaterial
whether such an agreement is made by the members of an existing
partnership, which owns the shares, or in pursuance of an agreement
by two or more persons to form a partnership for their purchase, or
to purchase them for their joint account, or as one of the terms of an
agreement for their purchase, by persons who contemplate no relation
to each other further than that of owning stock in the same corporation. Such agreement would, in any case, be outside of the corporation and disconnected with the interest of every other stockholder,
Whether such an
and, in either case, the same rules would control.
agreement is illegal, so that any action or vote under it can be set
aside, or is of such a character that it will not be enforced, will depend upon the object with which it is made, or the acts that are done
and will be governed by other rules of law.
Mr. Beach, in
under
"The owners of
his treatise on Corporations, section 304, says:

is

a

a

it

it
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if

;

;
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a

is
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shares may enter into agreements as between themselves to elect the
officers of the company, and to manage its affairs as they or
maheld that agreements of that
jority of them shall determine, and
character are not illegal nor void as against public policy; for, as was
said by the court in
leading case, their interests are identical with
The authority thus
the interests of the minority of shareholders."
referred to
Faulds v. Yates, 57 111. 416, n Am. Rep. 24. In that
case Faulds was the owner of a majority of the shares of stock in a
corporation, and entered into an agreement with the defendants in the
mine, and for the purnature of
partnership for the working of
chase by the defendants from him of two-thirds of his stock.
It was
provided in the agreement between them that they would elect the
directors of the company that they would determine among themselves as to the officers and management of the company
and that,
they could not agree, they would ballot among themselves for the
directors and officers, and that the majority should rule, and their vote
be cast as
In an action for disunit so as to control the election.
solution and accounting of their partnership,
was contended that
this portion of the agreement was void as against public policy, and
was invalid for the reason that
was in conflict with the interests of
the other stockholders.
The court, however, held otherwise, using
the following language: " There was nothing unlawful in it. There
was nothing which necessarily affected the rights and interests of the
Three persons owning a majority of the stock had the unminority.
questioned right to combine, and thus secure the board of directors
If one man owned majority
and the management of the property.
of the stock, he surely had the right to select the agents for its honest

certificate,

and

it

a

management."
In Hey v. Dolphin, 92 Hun 230, the parties were jointly interested
in certain shares of stock which had been issued to them in single

was agreed between them that the stock should not
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be sold, or in any manner disposed of, or the certificates surrendered,
for a period of ten years, without their joint consent in writing, but
should remain as first issued, "for the purpose of enabling the said
parties of the first part to prevent the control and management of the
company from passing over to persons who might be less qualified or
less disposed to make the business of the said company a success and
its stock valuable."
By the same agreement Dolphin was appointed
a proxy to vote the whole of said shares at all elections, and the proxy
was made irrevocable for ten years unless sooner revoked by joint
In an action brought for the purpose of having the agreeconsent.
ment declared void, and that there be issued to the plaintiff certificates for one-half of the shares, the court held that the agreement was
not void or against public policy, saying: " The object and purpose
of the arrangement, as stated in the contract, is not of itself vicious, but
rather the contrary.
This is not a case where, as in some of the cases
cited by the respondent, there is a combination of stockholders for the
special benefit of some party, or where the power to cast the vote is
in a party having no beneficial interest.
The arrangement purported
to be for the benefit of all the stockholders, and the attorney was one
of the parties beneficially interested.
It will hardly be claimed that
a majority of stockholders may not combine to control an election of
directors."
See, also, Havemeyerv. Havemeyer, n Jones & S. (43
N. Y. S.) 506; Brown v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 5 Blatchf. 525.
Incases of "voting trusts," where the owners of stock transfer
the shares to trustees, with authority to vote at election according to
the direction of a majority of those holding trust certificates, and
the only consideration for such transfer and agreement is the mutual
promises of the several stockholders, it has been held that any stockholder may revoke his agreement and withdraw his stock at will ; and
it is also held that stockholders, who become such after an agreement
of this nature is entered into, are not bound by its terms, but will
hold their shares freed from the limitations of the agreement. Fisher
v. Bush, 35 Hun 641; Woodruff v. Dubuque, etc., Co., 30 Fed.
Rep. 91 ; Brown v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 5 Blatchf. 525; Griffith
v. Jewett, 15 Week. Law Bull. 419.
In Moses v. Scott, 84 Ala. 608,
certain stockholders had formed a voting trust, and placed their stock
in the hands of four trustees, with power to vote the stock as
a unit at all meetings, as three of them should think best, or, if
they failed to agree, as three-fourths of the stock represented should
determine, and had agreed not to sell their stock so pooled for three
There was no consideration for this agreement other than the
years.
mutual promise of the several stockholders; and, while the court refused to enforce the agreement concerning the sale, upon the ground
that it was in restraint of the free alienation of property, it said : |'We
can not say there is anything jber se illegal in an agreement entered
into by and between certain stockholders in a joint stock company by
which they promise to vote together as a unit in all matters pertaining
to the government of the corporation.
Each member has the clear
right to cast his ballot as he pleases, wisely or unwisely, and no other
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stockholder can control his conduct or gainsay his discretion, and it
can make no difference if several stockholders uniformly vote together,
or so vote in obedience to a prior agreement that they will do so.
The vote, when cast, is but the expressed wish of the stockholder, or
at least must be so regarded, and no other stockholder can be supTo hold otherwise would greatly
posed to be injured thereby.
abridge the voter's right to cast his ballot as he pleased."
The agreement in question can not be regarded as illegal by reason
of being in restraint of trade.
The rule invalidating contracts in restraint of trade does not include every contract of an individual by
which his right to dispose of his property is limited or restrained.
Section 1673 of the Civil Code makes void every contract by which
one is restrained from "exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business," except in certain instances.
But this is far different from a
contract limiting his right to dispose of a particular piece of property,
As the owner of property has the
except upon certain conditions.
right to withhold it from sale, he can also, at the time of its sale, impose conditions upon its use without violating any rule of public policy, and there is nothing inconsistent with public policy for two or
more persons, who contemplate purchasing certain property, to agree
with each other, as a condition of the purchase, that neither will dispose of his share within a limited period, or for less than a fixed sum,
or except upon certain limitations.
They have the same right to contract with reference to the terms under which they will hold or dispose of the property after it shall have been purchased, as they have
to agree upon any' other terms upon which the purchase shall be
made, and they no more violate a rule of public policy in making
such agreement a consideration of their purchase than would two or
more partners who should purchase property for partnership purposes,
and agree that it should not be disposed of unless their vendee would
assent to certain conditions regarding its use.
These terms enter into,
and form a part of, the consideration for the agreement to purchase,
and are as binding and enforcible as any other terms of the agreement.
New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148; Hodge
v. Sloan, 107 N. Y. 244, i Am. St. Rep. 816; Williams v. Montgomery, 148 N. Y. 519; Matthews v. Associated Press, etc., 136 N.
Y- 333, 32 Am. St. Rep. 741. The contract in Fisher v. Bush, 35
Hun 641, was held to be invalid for want of any other consideration
than the mutual promise of the parties; but it was said in that case:
" If these parties and their associates were the promoters of this corporation, then, doubtless, they could have entered into a valid agreement regulating a sale of the same, and requiring the owners to hold
them from market for a reasonable and definite period of time, and
thus forbidding a sale by either of his interests to one against whom
his associates might have a reasonable objection.
Moffatt v. FarquA stiphar, 7 Ch. Div. 591 ; reported in 23 Moak Eng. Rep. 731.
ulation of that character would not be illegal as against public policy,
as it would be simply a provision assented to by all that the newcomer
into the business transaction should be with the approval of the other

joint owners."
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Neither is it illegal or against public policy to separate the voting
power of the stock from its ownership. The statute authorizes the
stockholder to vote by proxy; and it was held in People's Bank v.
Superior Court, 104 Cal. 649, 43 Am. St. Rep. 147, that a by-law
restricting the selection of proxies to stockholders was invalid ; that
the statute places no limitation upon the right of selection, and that a
stockholder may appoint as his proxy one who is an entire stranger
The right to appear by proxy implies of itself
to the corporation.
that the voting power may be separated from the ownership of the
stock, and, unless the authority of the proxy is limited by the terms of
his appointment, he is necessarily required to use his own discretion in
Being the agent of the stockholder, he is reany vote that he gives.
in behalf of his principal ; but he is
to
exercise
this
discretion
quired
discretion
as to the means by which his printo
use
his
own
at liberty
The cases in which it has
be
best
subserved.
cipal's interest will
himself of the voting
said
stockholder
could
not
divest
been
that the
be
of
it
should
not
his stock, and that
separated from the ownpower
which
either the sufficiency
of
the
were
cases
involved
stock,
ership
of the agreement by which the voting power was transferred, or the
validity of the purpose for which the power was to be exercised.
The proxy must exercise a discretion of the same nature as that which
the stockholder
is authorized to exercise, and an authority to do
otherwise would be invalid ; but the authority to exercise a discretion
differs from an authority to perform a particular act.
Under an apwithout
words
of
limitation
the
act
pointment
against the
proxy may
interests of the stockholder, or even against the 'interests of the corporation, and the corporation, as well as the stockholder, will be
bound by his act as fully as if the stockholder had acted in person,
while, if the authority had been directed in terms to that act, it might
have been invalid.
The distinction is that between an unlawful exercise of a lawful power and the attempt to authorize the exercise of
an unlawful power.
The question has been presented in cases of
voting trusts, but an examination of these cases will show that the
question has arisen either when the authority was expressly given to
carry out some illegal purpose, or when, having been given without
any consideration, though purporting to be for a definite term, subsequent owners of the stock have sought to revoke it before the expiration of the term:
Shepaug Voting Trust Cases, 60 Conn. 553, sometimes reported under the name of Bostwick v. Chapman ; White v.
52 N. J. Eq. 178.
We have been cited to no instance where the purpose of

Thomas Inflatable Tire Co.,

a

proxy

given upon a sufficient consideration was lawful, and the person by
whom the proxy was created continued to be the owner of the stock,
in which the agreement has been held invalid.
The stockholder can
not separate the voting power from his stock by selling his right to
vote for a consideration personal to himself alone, any more than he
could agree for the same consideration to cast the vote himself, and
an agreement with others to appoint a proxy upon the same considerations would be equally invalid.
In Cone v. Russell, 48 N. J. Eq.
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208, an agreement by the purchaser of stock to give to other stockholders his irrevocable proxy for the purpose of securing and maintaining the control of the company was held invalid, for the reason
that it was one of the terms of the agreement that the directors, to be
elected under its provisions, should employ the one giving the proxy
Such an agreement was "held
at a fixed salary during its existence.
to operate as an inducement to elect directors who would not act disinterestedly for the benefit of all of the stockholders, but rather to
promote the interest of the parties to the agreement alone, and was
The court, however,
therefore void, as being against public policy.
" This conclusion does not reach so far as to necessarily forsaid:
bid all pooling or combining of stock, where the object is to carry
out a particular policy with the view to promote the best interests of
It was upon this principle that the agreements
all the stockholders."
in Hafer v. New York, etc., R. Co., 14 Week. Law Bull. 68;
Guernsey v. Cook, 120 Mass. 501 ; and Fennessy v. Ross, 5 N. Y.
The same principle
Sup. Ct. App. Div. 342, were held invalid.
was declared in Gage v. Fisher, 5 N. Dak. 297. In Mobile, etc., R.
Co. v. Nicholas, 98 Ala. 92, the court held that there was nothing
illegal or contrary to public policy in separating the voting power of
" Where a proxy is duly conthe stock from its ownership, saying:
stituted, and the power of the appointment is without limitation, the
vote cast by the proxy binds the stockholder, whether exercised in
behalf of his interest or not, to the same extent as if the vote had
been cast by the stockholder in person.
The invalidity of acts of this
character by a proxy, rightly understood, is not made to rest upon
the ground that there has been a separation of the voting power from
the stockholders, but because of the unlawful purpose for which the
proxy was appointed, or the unlawful end attempted to be effected
by the exercise of the voting power."

Reversed.

C.

Van Fleet, McFarland, and Henshaw,

J.,

JJ.,

concurred;

Beatty,

dissented.

Accord: 1900, Chapman v. Bates,
N. J.
, 47 Atl. Rep. 638, 13
C. C. (N. S.) 319.
See notes 56 Am. St. Rep. 138, 153, and 6 Am. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 229-233.
By act of April 16, 1901 (ch. 355, section 20, amending ch. 35 of the General
"A
Corporation Law), New York has provided for voting trusts as follows:
stockholder may, by agreement in writing, transfer his stock to any person
or persons for the purpose of vesting in him or them the right to vote thereon
for a time not exceeding five years, upon terms and conditions stated, pursuant to which such person or persons shall act; every other stockholder, upon
his request therefor may, by a like agreement in writing also transfer his
stock to the same person or persons and thereupon may participate in the
terms, conditions and privileges of such agreement; the certificates of stock
therefor
so transferred shall be surrendered and canceled and certificates
issued to such transferee or transferees in which it shall appear that they are
issued pursuant to such agreement, and in the entry of such transferee or
transferees as owners of such stoctf in the proper books of said corporation
that fact shall also be noted and thereupon he or they may vote upon the
stock so transferred during the time in such agreement specified ; a duplicate
of every such agreement shall be filed in the office of the corporation where
its principal business is transacted and be open to the inspection of any stockholder, daily, during business hours.
No member of a corporation shall sell
his vote or issue a proxy to vote to any person for any sum of money or any
thing of value."
Note.

Am.

&E.
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Sec. 542.

3.

(a)

Right to dividends,
Definition.

MOBILE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY
1894.

542

IN THE SUPREME

COURT

v.

TENNESSEE.

OF THE UNITED STATES.

S. Rep. 486-509.

1

153

U.

In 1848 the state of
the supreme court of Tennessee.
railroad
without
the
chartered
reserving the
company,
Tennessee
which
that
the capital
or
the
charter,
provided
to
amend
repeal
right
stock of the corporation should forever be exempt from taxation, the
road with all its fixtures and appurtenances should be exempt from
taxation for twentv-five years from its completion, and " no tax shall
ever be laid on said road or its fixtures which will reduce the dividends
After the twenty-five years' exemption had
below eight per cent."
assessed against the property of the comcertain
taxes
were
expired
be in excess of the rightful amount, beto
which
were
alleged
pany,
cause the company had not earned dividends to the extent of eight
The supreme court adjudged the exemption to be vague
per cent.
and uncertain and held the taxes to be valid, and this (among other
things) is the error assigned.]
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON. * * * This last ground on which the
court rested its judgment is manifestly unsound, for the clause in
question, that " no tax shall ever be laid on said road or its fixtures
which will reduce the dividends below eight percent.," is clearly not
so incapable of any reasonable construction
as to be void.
On the
The only matter incontrary, its terms are plain and unambiguous.
volving construction or interpretation is the meaning to be attached
to the term "dividend."
It admits of no question that the word
"dividend" mentioned therein has reference to dividends on the
capital stock of the company held and owned by its shareholders.
The term " dividend," in its technical as well as in its ordinary acceptation, means that portion of its profits which the corporation, by
its directory, sets apart for ratable division among its shareholders.
Lockhart v. Van Alstyne, 31 Michigan 76; Boone on Corporations,
section 125.
In the present case it appears that the maximum capital stock authorized by the charter was $10,000,000, and that the stock actually
issued by the company, at various times during the construction of
the road, and outstanding,
amounted to the sum of $5,320,600,
which, together with the company's bonded indebtedness, fairly represented the cost of building and completing the road.
The amount
of stock being fixed, it was a matter of mere calculation as to when
the profits from net earnings would be sufficient to meet the designated dividend.
[Error to

1
Statement abridged.
Only that part "of the opinion relating to the single
point is given.
Opinion of Fuller, C. J. (Gray, Brewer and Shiras, JJ., concurring), dissenting upon the ground that exemption violated the constitution
of Tennessee, is omitted.

54 2

THE CORPORATION AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS.

1615

Again, dividends can be rightfully paid only out of profits.

Corporations are liable to be enjoined by shareholders or creditors from
making a. distribution, in dividends, of capital. Taylor on Corpora-

tions, section 565, and authorities cited.
The term "profits," out of which dividends alone can properly be
declared, denotes what remains after defraying every expense, including loans falling due, as well as the interest on such loans.
Correy
v. Londonderry Railway Co., 29 Beav. 263.
The net earnings of corporations out of which profits are distributable in dividends are thus defined in St. John v. Erie Railway Co.,
10 Blatchford 279:
"Net earnings are properly the gross receipts
less the expenses of operating the road to earn such receipts.
Interest on debts is paid out of what thus remains
that is, out of the net
earnings.
Many other liabilities are paid out of the net earnings.
When all liabilities are paid, either out of the gross receipts or out
of the net earnings, the remainder is the profit of the shareholders,
to go toward dividends, which, in that way, are paid out of the net
This case was affirmed by this court, 22 Wall. 136.
earnings."
In New York, Lake Erie and Western Railroad v. Nickals, 1191!.
S. 296, 308, the same general rule that shareholders are entitled only
to dividends out of the net earnings derived from the operations of
the company is reaffirmed;
It must be assumed that the legislature of Tennessee used the term
"dividends," in the exemption clause under consideration, in the general sense indicated, and had reference to that portion of the net earrA
ings of the company which legitimately constituted profits and could
be rightfully apportioned or distributed among shareholders.
There
is no difficulty in ascertaining the amount of such profits in any year,
and the stock actually issued being fixed, it is hard to understand how
it could be held that the exemption clause was void and unenforcible
The law regards that as certain which is capafor want of certainty.
ble of being ascertained and definitely fixed.
The state can not complain that no method has been provided for ascertaining the amount
of profits applicable to the payment of the designated dividends.
That is a matter purely of administration, which does not touch in
any way the validity of the contract embodied in the exemption clause.
It is stated on behalf of the defendants in error that the company
earned for the years in question profits more than sufficient to pay
eight per cent, dividends, if the interest on its bonded indebtedness
This point was not passed
was not chargeable against the earnings.
upon by the court below, and, if the fact be as stated, it could not
avail the defendants in error, for the payment of the annually accruing interest on the bonded debt of the railroad company was a proper
charge against the net earnings, to be paid before dividends could be
Mr. Justice Bradley, in Union Pacific Railroad v.
declared thereon.
United States, 99 U. S. 402, 422, declared that interest on the bonded
indebtedness of the company, like other current expenses, was payable out of the net earnings before dividends could be distributed to
the stockholders.
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*

a

Reversed.

Note.

clay,

191

See, 1900, Larwill v. Burke,
Pa. St. 594, 45 L. R. A. 392.

19

Ohio C. C. 513;

1899, Rose v.

Bar-

Sec. 543.
(b) Out of what, dividends may be declared; provision for payment of permanent debts.
OF BELFAST.

1885.

1

BELFAST AND MOOSEHEAD LAKE RAILROAD COMPANY
IN THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE.

77

v.

CITY

Me. Rep.

445-457-

a

a

if

a

6

a

[The railroad company was incorporated in 1867, the charter auAt the
thorizing the issuing of preferred and non-preferred stock.
organization, and before subscriptions were received,
by-law provided that dividends on preferred stock shall first be made semiannually from the net earnings, not exceeding
percent, per annum,
after which,,
like per cent,
dividend up to
surplus remain,

Statement abridged

;

a

if

shall be made on the non-preferred stock,
and
any surplus should
then remain,
pro rata dividend should be made on all the stock.
1

5

it

it,

In Belfast and Moosehead Lake Railway v. Belfast, 77 Maine 445,
it was directly adjudged that the interest on the bonded debt is payable out of the net earnings before dividends can properly be declared.
In Corry v. Londonderry and Enniskillen Railway, 29 Beav. 263,
272, 274, Sir John Romilly, Master of the Rolls, in discussing this
subject, while admitting that the funded indebtedness of a corporation was not properly payable out of profits before there could be
a division thereof, held that any and all debts which had been incurred, and which were due from the company and ought to have been
paid, and would have been paid at the time had the corporation possessed the necessary funds for that purpose, constituted proper deductions from the earnings before the profits properly distributable could
be ascertained.
The further claim is made in the brief, although not insisted upon
in argument, that if the earnings of the company were insufficient
upon which to declare a dividend, the exemption clause had no operIn other
ation, because there would be no reduction of dividends.
words, that the property of the company was taxable during all the
This suggestion is
years that it could not declare any dividends.
wanting in plausibility and needs no further consideration, for if the
exemption clause has any meaning, purpose, or validity whatever,
this theory would utterly destroy
as the company would be taxable
when
made no profits, and get the benefit of the exemption only
*
*
-*when profits to
certain amount were realized.

arguments

and part of opinion omitted.
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The original policy was to build the road altogether from the subscription to the stock, amounting to $648,10x3 paid in full, without borThis being found to be impracticable, without the
rowing money.
dissent of any one, in 1870 a bonded indebtedness to the amount of
$150,00x3, to run twenty years, with interest payable semi-annually,
was created and secured by mortgage; also the sum of $101,900 was
borrowed of the city of Belfast, the principal stockholder, for which
the company's note was given, payable with annual interest in 1885;
and in addition a miscellaneous floating debt of about $150,000 more
In 1870 the company leased its road for fifty years
was incurred.
to the Maine Central R. Co., at an annual rental of $36,000, payable half yearly.
By means of this rental, at {he time this suit was
in
the
1882,
company had paid off all the floating debt,
pending
but owed the city of Belfast $87,900, and its $150,000 bonds maturing in 1890, and had a sinking fund of $26,033, an(^ would have
$10,863 remaining after paying interest then due upon the note and
bonds.
A dispute arose between the two classes of stockholders as to
whether the preferred stockholders were entitled to any dividend out
of this $10,863, and this bill was filed to determine this question.]
PETERS, C. J. * * * Upon these facts, affected somewhat by
other incidental facts which will appear, the position is taken, by the
counsel for the city, that the preferred stockholders, as between themselves and the common stockholders, are not entitled to any dividends
until the entire indebtedness of the company is paid ; that, inasmuch
as the subscriptions to both classes of stock were made when the declared policy of the corporation was not to create a corporate debt,
with the then full expectation by all parties, that none would be created, and inasmuch as the debts were unavoidably incurred for the
common benefit of all stockholders, the burden of removing the debts
should be borne by all the shares alike, and not fall exclusively upon
The city contends that the favored class were to
the common stock.
be preferred stockholders only upon the condition that there should be
no debts ; that there was an implied contract to that effect ; or, if not
a contract, that such a result is demanded by a natural and necessary
equity which flows from the relation of the parties.
We think such a position is not tenable, as a claim, either in law
The subscribers must have known, if they reflected at all
or equity.
about
that corporate indebtedness might become necessary in spite
In fact, the twelfth by-law
of the strongest pledges to the contrary.
said that the holders of
implies that debts might be incurred. It
the preferred stock favored a bonded debt.
But
was not upon
All
any condition that they should surrender any right thereby.
stockholders favored it.
There was no voice against it. If A has
the second mortgage on
vessel, taking their securithe first and
disties at the same time, anticipating no disaster to the vessel, and
aster comes, requiring
bottomry bond upon the property, the paynot
burden common to the two mortgages.
ment of such bond
The illustration may not be inapt.
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The main question of the case is whether, in November, 1882, the
financial condition of the company was such that the preferred stockholder was then legally entitled to a dividend.
No such claim could have been made upon the ground that he is a
creditor of the company; he is not such. Preferred stockholders,
That is the common doctrine of the
ordinarily, are not creditors.
Chaffee v. Railroad, 55 Vt. no, and numerous cases
authorities.

cited.
It was not intended in the present instance to guarantee a dividend.
If a dividend is prevented in any one year by a deficit of earnings, it
A six
can not be made up .from the earnings of succeeding years.
per centum dividend is not assured by the contract of subscription.
It may be less. The implication of the by-law is clear that there is
to be no surplus of profits to be carried from one year to another.
The net earnings are to be wholly distributed each year. The
It
language of the by-law is really the language of the general law.
promises dividends whenever there are net earnings from which to
make them.
The difficulty is in deciding what should be considered as net
earnings ; that is, net earnings such as are applicable to dividends. In
a general sense, net earnings are the gross receipts less the expenses
of operating the road to earn such receipts.
But several kinds of
charges must first come out of net earnings before dividends are deThe creditor comes in for consideration before the stockclared.
holder. The property of a corporation is a trust fund pledged for
Therefore, if there is a bonded, funded,
the payment of its debts.
permanent or standing debt, the interest on it must be reckoned out
of net earnings.
If there is a floating debt, which is not wise and
prudent to place in the form of a funded debt, or to postpone for
later payment, that should also be paid.
If the financial situation
of the company is such as to render it expedient to commence or continue the scheme of a sinking fund for the extinguishment of the company's indebtedness some day or other, an annual contribution out of
the net earnings for that purpose would be reasonable.
These deductions made from the net earnings, the balance will be the profits
of the company distributable among stockholders.
In Pierce on
Railroads, 125, it is said: " The dividends on preferred stock are payable only out of net earnings which are applicable to the payment of
dividends, and the interest on the bonded or other interest-bearing
debt, even though contracted after the issue of the preferred stock, and
the rent upon leases made after the issue thereof, shall be first paid."
The definition of net earnings above given is supported by the authorities.
Chaffee v. Railroad, supra, and cases cited; Taft v.
Railroad, 8 R. I. 310; St. John v. Erie Railway Co., 10 Blatchf.
271, s. c. 22 Wall. 136; Union Pacific R. v. United States, 99 U. S.
402.
But it does not necessarily follow that debts should be first wholly
paid before a declaration of dividends, merely because they are of a
floating character.
It may be that it would be reasonable and proper
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Nor does it follow that
to convert such liabilities into a funded debt.
all of the income of a road may not be needed for the payment of its
funded or standing debt.
All depends upon the financial resources
and abilities of the corporation and the prospects of its road.
Where
it can be safely done, considering the interests of the company's
creditors and of all persons concerned, the general practice of railroads has been to include with expenses chargeable to capital those
which are incurred in the original construction of the road. And the
The idea is that
courts have admitted the reasonableness of the rule.
the capital paid in and the capital borrowed unitedly produce the earnThe
ings, and that a share of the same should be accorded to each.
distinction between expenses for construction and ordinary expenses is
maintained in the leading cases. See cases supra; Corry v. Railroad
Co., 29 Beav. 263; Bouch v. Railroad Co., L. R. 4 Ex. Div. 133;
Mills v. Northern R. Co., L. R. 5. Ch. App. 621 ; Pierce Railroad
In the case last cited (Mills v. Railroad
125, and cases in notes.
C.,
Lord
L.
said:
"Mr. Dickinson started a very
Hatherly,
Co.)
curious theory, which, I apprehend,
never found its way into any
mercantile arrangement
that there never can be any available income,
or any profit, so long as there is any debt remaining unpaid. If that
be so, I suppose there is hardly a railway in the kingdom which could
The whole scheme
pay any dividends at all to their stockholders.
of railway arrangements, as I understand them, has always been this,
that the companies are authorized to raise part of their capital by
shares, and to raise further capital by means of borrowing to the
amount of one-third of the whole capital."
In the case before us the company has no ordinary expenses beyond
a small sum necessary to support its organization.
What sum, then,
shall be taken from its earnings to be paid to, or be set aside for, its
creditors ? One side says, all its earnings ; and the other side says,
set aside annually a sum which with accumulations will insure the
payment of all the corporate indebtedness by 1920, the date of the
end of the lease.
As a general rule, the officers of a corporation are the sole judges
as to the propriety of declaring dividends, and the courts will not interfere with a proper exercise of their discretion.
The company usuYet,
establishes
for
its
financial
itself.
when the right to
ally
policy
a dividend is clear, and there are funds from which it can properly be
made, a court of equity will interfere to compel the company to declare it.
Directors are not allowed to use their power illegally, wanor
Also Williston v. Railroad
See cases supra.
tonly
oppressively.
Co., 13 Allen 400; Boardman v. Railroad, 84 N. Y. 157; Jermain
v. Railroad, 91 N. Y. 483.
In the present case we are by all the
invited
to
parties
accept jurisdiction ; the facts are agreed ; and all
technicalities are waived. We may adopt such a standard of judgment, in determining the question, as we think would and should regulate the exercise of the sound discretion of directors, acting in good
faith, in deciding the same question.
Barnard v. Railroad, 7 Allen
512, 521.
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Two facts are very much relied upon by the preferred stockholders

One is an amendment to the eighteenth
favoring their contention.
the
in July, 1879, which is this: "The
corporation
by-law, passed by
words 'net earnings,' as used in this section (by-laws), shall be construed to mean all the surplus remaining after the payment of the
necessary incidental charges and expenses, the interest on the mortgage and funded debt, and such provision for payment of the maturing obligations of the corporation as in the judgment of the directors
may be necessary ; and for this latter purpose, the directors shall establish a sinking fund, to be maintained in such form and manner as
they may deem for the best interest and safety of the corporation."
This in 1883 was repealed.
The other fact is, that when the subscribers for preferred stock, not
including the city of Belfast, paid their subscriptions, not being under
strict legal obligation to do so, they were induced to make the
six per
payment by the corporation securing to them semi-annual
cent, dividends, and the final payment of their stock, by means of
bonds with coupons, covered by a second mortgage on the road
which bonds and coupons were taken as collateral to the stock and
as

dividends.

This mortgage was, however,

afterwards

canceled

for

prudential reasons and with the consent of all parties interested.
The counsel for the city contends that those proceedings, afterwards annulled, are to have no more effect upon the present question
than if never existing.
We do not concur in that position fully. We
think, as admissions, as expressions of a policy inaugurated and for a
long time acted upon by the company, they serve to impress upon the
claim of the preferred stockholders at least an appearance of equity.
After a full consideration of all the evidence and theories presented
to us, we incline to the conclusion that the directors would be justified
in refusing to make any further dividends until enough money has
been accumulated, from the rent and the sinking fund, to pay the note
to the city of Belfast.
When the company receives from its lessee
the rent due in May, 1885, it will have money enough with which to
pay the note, and a few thousands more.
There are quite significant reasons for drawing a line at the point
indicated.
The note may well be considered as given for temporary
The company really has
purposes in anticipation of rents receivable.
no credit which would enable it to renew the note, inasmuch as its
outstanding mortgage covers all its property.
It looks as if the note
represents a sort of forced loan from the city, and as given for
money that could not have been obtained from any other source, the
city borrowing it for the purpose of loaning it, being induced to do
so on account of her immense interests involved as a shareholder.
She now asks for her money, being unwilling to renew the note,
and she is entitled to its payment.
The corporation would find it
difficult to borrow it elsewhere.
It would look like borrowing money
to pay dividends.
There are much more forcible reasons for the corporation to hold
its moneyed resources in reserve until the note to the city is paid than
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there are for afterwards continuing the same policy until the debt of
The two debts stand upon a differ$150,000, due in 1890, is paid.
The
is
a
bonded
ent footing.
latter
mortgage debt, no part of
which is due, and which undoubtedly can be wholly or partially
It fairly represents a part of the
renewed when it becomes due.
The company has thirty-five
original cost of constructing the road.
It
years or more of assured rent with which it can pay the amount.
has no other debt, after paying the note to the city, present or prosIt has evidently regarded that amount as a permanent or
pective.
To renew the mortgage or a
standing interest-bearing indebtedness.
becomes due, we think would be regarded, in
when
portion of
a mercantile sense, as a. reasonable, safe and conservative calculation.
The preferred stockholders were to -have semi-annual dividends,
earned.
They should have them,
they can be declared without the
least peril to the company or any of its creditors.
Belfast herself owns
all the preferred stock but about $100,000, there being over $380,000
of
in all. We think that, after the note
paid, the directors may
well make some reasonable provision for the final extinguishment of
the mortgage debt by reserving therefor
portion of the rent to be
received under the lease, and divide the balance among stockholders.
A scheme could be perfected by an expert in such matters, by
which there may be yearly contribution to
sinking fund, which,
with its accumulations, will discharge all the indebtedness within a
reasonable time before the lease expires, and pay more or less dividends in the meantime; or, before or by the year 1890,
new bond
could be put upon the market,
certain portion to be paid annually,
such portion to be designated by lot, or in some other way which
might accomplish the same end as effectually.
We need not be minute in any details, inasmuch as our observations in this respect are not intended as anything more than illustration or argument.
The bill commits to us power over only the sum
of $10,863, which came from payment of rent in November, 1882,
and that sum, as already indicated, may properly be applied by the
company upon its debt.
Under the circumstances of the case, no costs to be recovered by
any party.
Decree according to the opinion.
Walton, Virgin, Libbey, Foster and Haskell,
concurred.
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See, 1866, Taft v. H. P.
Note.
F. R. Co., R. 310; 1869, In re Mercantile Trading Co., Stringer's Case, L. R. Ch. App. 475; 1874, St. John v. Erie
R. Co., 22 Wall. (U. S.) 136; 1875, Lockhart v. Van Alstyne, 31 Mich. 76;
1881, Boardman v. L. S.
M. S. R. Co., 84 N. Y. 157; 1882, Chaffee v. Rutland R. Co., 55 Vt. 110; 1882, Guinness v. Land Corp., 22 Ch. D. 349; 1899,
Burden v. Burden, 159 N. Y. 287; 1899, In re Nat'l Bank, 68 L. J. Ch. 634, 81
L. T. R. (N. S.) 363; 1900, Moxham v. Grant, 69 L. J. Q. B. 97, 81 L. T. R.
(N. S.) 431.
It said directors must set aside fund to replace depreciation of property
before
dividend
declared (Davison v. Gillies, L. R. 16 Ch. Div. 347,
and also for cost of repairs, and for constant wear and tear, etc.
note)
denied
(Whittaker v. Amwell Nat'l Bank, 52 N. J. Eq. 400); but this
conceded
(Bolton v. Natal Co., 65 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 786) and an exception
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to exist in the case of mining and other companies, the profits from which are
made by using up the property owned (Excelsior, etc., Co. v. Pierce, 90 Cal.
131). If creditors' rights are not affected, and no shareholders dissent, the
corporate capital may be distributed (People v. Barker, 141 N. Y. 251); but
stockholders to whom all the assets of the corporation have been distributed
can be compelled to refund, when necessary to pay creditors (1898, Grant v.

Southern Contract Co.,

Sec. 544.
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(c) Stock dividends.

RESPONDENT, v.

THE WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH

COMPANY,

IN THE COURT

OF

ETC.,

APPELLANT.!

APPEALS OF NEW YORK.

93

N. Y. Rep.

162-196.

The direct[Appeal from order of general term of supreme court.
ors of defendant, the W. U. T. Co., entered into a contract with two
other telegraph companies, each operating lines nearly parallel, but
extending to places not reached by the lines of either of the other companies, by which contract said defendant agreed to purchase and the
other companies to convey to it all their property, rights, privileges
The capital stock of the W. U. T. Co. was at that
and franchises.
It was agreed that it should take steps to increase
time $41,073,410.
its capital to $80,000,000, the addition to be used as follows:
$15,in
526,590 as a dividend to its then stockholders, and $23,400,000
The agreepayment for the property and interests so transferred.
ment was approved at a meeting of the stockholders of the W. U. T.
Co., and the increase of its capital stock duly authorized, as prescribed
by the acts providing for the incorporation of telegraph companies.
(Chapter 265, laws of 1848, as amended by chapter 98, laws of 1851 ;
chapter 471, laws of 1853; chapter 425, laws of 1862; chapter 568,
^n an ac ti n brought
laws of 1870; chapter 319, laws of 1875.)
by
a stockholder to test the validity, and restrain the carrying out, of
said agreement, it was found that the value of the property, rights
and interests purchased was equal to the par value of the stock to be
paid therefor, and that the W. U. T. Co. owned and possessed, at
the time, over and above its then capital, property equal in value to
the amount of the stock dividend ; that the object of the agreement
was to extend and perfect the telegraph systems established by the
companies, and no fraud or collusion was found.]
EARL, J. * * * The stock dividend was claimed to be in
violation of chapter 18, part i, title 4, section 2 of the Revised Statutes,
which provides as follows:
"It shall not be lawful for the directors
or managers of any incorporated company in this state to make dividends excepting from the surplus profits arising from the business of
such corporation ; and it shall not be lawful for the directors of any
1
Statement taken from syllabus.
other points omitted.
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544

THE CORPORATION AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS.

1623

such company to divide, withdraw, or in any way pay to the stockholders, or any of them, any part of the capital stock of such
company, or to reduce the said capital stock, without the consent of
the legislature ; and it shall not be lawful for the directors of such company to discount or receive any note or other evidence of debt in payment of any installment actually called in and required to be paid, or any
part thereof due or to become due on any stock in the said company;
nor shall it be lawful for such directors to receive or discount any note
or other evidence of debt with the intent of enabling any stockholder
in such company to withdraw any part of the money paid in by him
on his stock; and in case of any violation of the provisions of this
section the directors, under whose administration the same may happen, except those who may have caused their dissent therefrom to be
entered at large on the minutes of the said directors at the time, or
were not present when the same did happen, shall, in their individual
and private capacities, jointly and severally, be liable to the said corporation and to the creditors thereof, in the event of its dissolution,
to the full amount of the capital stock of the said company, so
divided, withdrawn, paid out, or reduced, and to the full amount of
the notes or other evidences of debt so taken or discounted in payment of any stock, and to the full amount of any notes or evidences
of debts so discounted with the intent aforesaid, with legal interest
on the said respective sums from the time such liability accrued ; and
no statute of limitation shall be a bar to any suit at law or in equity
against such directors for any sums for which they are made liable by
this section : Provided, This section shall not be construed to prevent a
division and distribution of the capital stock of such company which
shall remain after the payment of all its debts, upon the dissolution of
such company, or the expiration of its charter."
This dividend was condemned by the general term of the superior
court as a violation of that section.
Our attention has been called to
no other law forbidding or condemning a stock dividend, and in their
allegations against it the counsel for the plaintiff rely mainly upon
that section.
After reading the numerous opinions that have been
submitted to us, and giving careful attention to all that has been said
upon the subject, we are unable to perceive that that section has any
The section
bearing whatever upon the question we are to determine.
was taken from the act, chapter 325 of the laws of 1825, which was entitled, "An act to prevent fraudulent bankruptcies of incorporated
companies, to facilitate proceedings against them, and for other purIt was not part of the original revision, but was incorporated
poses."
into the Revised Statutes by chapter 20 of the laws of 1828.
A
careful reading of the section shows that it has reference only to the
property capital of a corporation, and not to its share capital. The
first clause prohibits dividends of property except from surplus
It is further provided that the directors of any corporation
profits.
shall not divide, withdraw or in any way pay to the stockholders, or
any of them, any part of the capital stock of such company, or to
reduce the capital stock without the consent of the legislature. Thes.e
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it,

provisions are intended to prevent the division, distribution, withdrawal and reduction of the property of a corporation below the
sum limited in its charter or articles of association for its capital, but
The purpose was to prenot to prevent its increase above that sum.
vent the depletion of the property of the corporation, thereby endanAll the other provisions of the section show
gering its solvency.
Careful provision was made
very clearly that such was the intention.
that the whole amount of capital stock should be paid in, and hence
there was a prohibition against receiving a note or other evidence of
debt in payment of any installment actually called in and required to
be paid ; and in case the directors violated any of the provisions of
the section they were made individually liable to the corporation and
to its creditors, in the event of its dissolution, to the full amount of the
capital stock of the company so divided, withdrawn or reduced.
All these provisions show that it was the purpose of the legislature,
by means of them, to create a property capital for the corporation,
and then to keep that intact so as to secure the solvency of the corpoThe "capital stock" in
ration and its responsibility to its creditors.
this section does not mean share stock, but it means the property of
the corporation contributed by its stockholders or otherwise obtained
While the term "capital
to the extent required by its charter.
by
loose and indefinite sense, in this secstock"
frequently used in

it

;

is

it

a a

a

is

is

if

it
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a
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is
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a

a
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if
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(3

it

In
means that and no more.
tion and in legal phrase generally
Zabr. 195), Green, Ch.
State v. Morristown Fire Association
not universaid: " The phrase 'capital stock'
very generally,
sally, used to designate the amount of capital to be contributed for the
The amount thus contributed constitutes
purposes of the corporation.
the 'capital stock' of the company."
In Burrall v. Bushwick R. Co.
(75 N. Y. 21 1), Folger, J., defined "capital stock" as "that money
or property which
put in a single corporate fund by those who by
subscription therefor become members of
corporate body." In
Sandf. Ch. 280), Vice-ChanBarry v. Merchants' Exchange Co.
" The capital stock of corporation
like
cellor Sandford said:
of
or
that
copartnership
joint-stock company, the amount which the
By loss
partners or associates put in as their stake in the concern."
or misfortune, or misconduct of the managing officers of
corporation, its capital stock may be reduced below the amount limited by
its charter; but whatever property
has up to that limit must be restock.
as
its
When
its property exceeds that limit,
capital
garded
then the excess
Such
surplus.
surplus belongs to the corporation
of
its
and,
and
in
portion
property,
general sense, may be reof
its
as
but
in
not
garded
capital,
portion
strictly legal sense
of
and
its
portion
capital,
always regarded as surplus profits.
The very section we are considering contemplates that there may be
a surplus, and that such surplus may be divided. . The surplus may
be in cash, and then
may be divided in cash
may be in properthe property
so situated that a division thereof among the
ty, and
stockholders
dividend in property may be declared,
practicable,
and that may be distributed among stockholders.
All such dividends
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diminish and deplete the property of the corporation, and that section
was designed to prevent dividends of property which tended to de
plete the assets of the company below the sum limited in its chartei
as the amount of it c capital stock.
But stock dividends never diminish or interfere with the property of a corporation, and hence are not
After a stock dividend a corpowithin the purview of that section.
ration has just as much property as it had before.
It is just as solvent and just as capable of meeting all demands upon it.
After such
a dividend the aggregate of the stockholders own no more interest in
the corporation than before.
The whole number of shares before the
stock dividend represented the whole property of the corporation, and
after the dividend they represent that and no more.
A stock dividend
does not distribute property, but simply dilutes the- shares as they existed before ; and hence that section in no way prevented or related to
a stock dividend.
Such a dividend could be declared by a corporation without violating its letter, its spirit or its purpose.
It is, therefore, clear that the directors of the Western Union Telegraph Company did not violate that section by the stock dividend which they declared ; and if that dividend was illegal it must be because it was condemned by some other statute, or by some general principle of law or
by public policy.
Our attention has been called to no statute, and we know of none
in this state, which prohibits a corporation from making a stock dividend.
The legislatures in some of the states have, we believe,
passed laws prohibiting such dividends, but in this state no such law
has been enacted.
There is no public policy which, in all cases, condemns such dividends.
Shares having been legally brought into existence may be
distributed among the stockholders of a company.
By such distribution no harm is done to any person, provided the dividend is
not a mere inflation of the stock of the company, with no corresponding values to answer to the stock distributed. It may be that a distribution of stock gratuitously to the stockholders of a company based
upon no values, a mere inflation, or, to use a phrase much in vogue,
a watering of stock, would be condemned by the law.
But when
stock has been lawfully created and is held by a corporation, which it
has a right to issue for value, then a stock dividend may be made,
provided that the stock always represents property. It is conceded
that the directors of the Western Union Telegraph Company could
have issued this stock for money to be paid into its treasury.
It
could have issued it for property to be received by it for the purposes
of its legitimate business.
But here it is found that over and above
its capital it possessed property actually worth upwards of $15,000,ooo, and we know of no law that is violated, and no public policy that
is invaded by issuing to the stockholders
stock to represent that
amount of property rather than in any mode to divide it up and disIf it can issue stock in payment of property
tribute it among them.
to be obtained by it as part of its capital for its legitimate uses, why
may it not issue stock to its stockholders in payment for property in
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effect purchased of them and added to its permanent capital, and
which they relinquish the right to have divided? So long as every
dollar of stock issued by a corporation is represented by a dollar
of property, no harm can result to individuals or the public from disHere there was no fraud, no
tributing the stock to the stockholders.
conspiracy, no unlawful combination, and we are bound, under the
findings of the 'court at special term, to assume that all this was done
in good faith; and we know of no principle of law, no public policy,
and no statute that condemns a stock dividend under such circumstances.
(Howell v. The Chicago and North Western R. Co., 51
Barb. 378; Jones v. Terre Haute and Richmond R. Co., 57 N. Y.
196; Kenton Furnace, etc., Co. v. McAlpin, 5 Fed. Rep. 743; Attorney-General v. State Bank, t D. & B. Eq. Cas. (N. C.) 545 ; Minot
v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 ; Rand v. Hubbell, 115 Mass. 471 ; Brown v.
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Co., 49 Pa. St. 270; Commonwealth
v. Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago R. Co., 74 Pa. St. 83;
Terry v. Eagle Lock Co., 47 Conn. 141 ; Barton's Trust, L. R., 5
Eq. Cas. 239; Mills v. Northern R. of B. A. Co., L. R., 5 Ch. App.
621 ; Pierce on the Law of Railroads (2d ed.), 123.)
It is true that this dividend largely increases the capital stock of the
That can
company, but that is not against the policy of our laws.
not be against the policy of the law which the law expressly permits.
There is no limit to the capital which business corporations in this
state may have, and there is no limit in the law beyond which they
All that can be required in any case is
may not increase their capital.
that there shall be an actual capital in property representing the
Indeed, so far as the solvency and
amount of share capital issued.
responsibility of a corporation is concerned, they are increased by a
stock dividend where it has a surplus of property to correspond to the
In such case the surplus property is seamount of shares issued.
cured and impounded for the benefit of the creditors of the corporation and for the public, so that thereafter it can never be legally
divided, withdrawn or dissipated in any way.
But if it can be conceived that this was a dividend of property
within the meaning of the section of the Revised Statutes above set
out, then what property did it divide ? Not any portion of the capital
After subtracting the diviof the company; that remained intact.
dend there remained to the company the full amount of its prior capSuch is
ital stock, to wit: Property to the value of $41,073,410.
the finding of the trial court, and that can not here be disputed. The
company had made surplus earnings which it could have divided, but
instead of dividing them it had invested them in property to facilitate
and enlarge its business; and such property was found to be worth
That sum constituted its surplus.
It was commingled
$15,526,590.
with the other property of the company and used for corporate purBut it was not beyond the reach of the dividend-making
poses.
power of the directors.
They could reclaim it for division among the
stockholders, and, if practicable, convert it into cash for that purpose.
They could borrow money on the faith of it and divide that. They
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could issue to the stockholders certificates of indebtedness, redeemable
in the future, representing their respective interests in such surplus,
thus, in effect, borrowing the same of the stockholders.
Desiring to
use the surplus and add it to the permanent capital of the company, and
having lawfully created shares of stock, they could issue to the stockholders such shares to represent their respective

interests in such sur-

plus. In doing these things no law would be violated, the capital
would be kept intact, and no stockholders or creditors would have
All this, however, depends upon the
any legal right to complain.
finding of the trial court that the surplus is equal to the dividend.
That rinding is not open to criticism here. It was not disturbed at
the general term and therefore concludes us.
When a corporation has a surplus, whether a dividend shall be
made, and if made, how much it shall be, and when and where it
shall be payable, rests in the fair and honest discretion of the directors
uncontrollable by the courts.
(Brown v. Monmouthshire Ry. & C.
Co., 4 Eng. L. & Eq. 113; Rex v. Bank of England, 2 Barn. &
Aid. 620; Jackson's Admrs. v. Newark Plankroad Co., 31 N.
Law 277; Ely v. Sprague, Clark's Ch. 351.) There is no statute
which requires dividends in telegraph companies or in companies
generally to be made in cash. Whether they shall be made in cash
or property must also rest in the discretion of the directors.
There is
no rule of law or reason founded upon public policy which condemns
a property dividend.
The directors could convert the property into
cash before a dividend and divide that.
So the stockholders can take
the property divided to them and sell
and thus realize the cash.
Within the domain of law
can make no material difference which
If, however,
course
dividend be made payable in cash,
pursued.
or payable generally, the corporation becomes
debtor, and must dissuch
debt, as
bound to discharge all its other debts, in
charge
lawful currency.
It
true that
stockholder can not be compelled
to receive property divided to him.
So he can not be compelled to
take
In case of his refusal to take cash dividend,
cash dividend.
the corporation may retain
for him until he shall demand it. In
case he shall refuse to take
property dividend, the corporation may
retain
for his benefit.
and hold
in trust for him, or possibly sell
If such case shall ever arise, the courts will find some way to disSo this plaintiff can not be compelled to accept the stock
pose of it.
divided to him, and thus incur the possible liability which
may imIn case of his refusal the corporastockholder.
pose upon him as
tion will find some way to deal with the stock which the law will
sanction, but which need not now be pointed out.
We have no occasion to scrutinize the motives of the defendants.
The trial judge refused to find the alleged fraud and conspiracy, and
his finding concludes us.
have also
In his opinion he said:
found that the other allegations of fraud and conspiracy made in the
complaint against the defendants and others were not proved on the
trial. One of the very able counsel for the plaintiff, in his argument
at the elose of the trial in this case, said that he was not going to
a
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lament the fact that he had failed to show such combination, that he
had not been able to prove certain things by the defendants ;" and the
opinion of the court at the general term is to the same effect : "The
complaint, among other things, charges that the corporate action complained of was the result of a fraudulent conspiracy on the part of
the individual defendants, but the allegations in that respect were not
sustained by the proof at the trial, nor has there been an argument
made in their support upon the present appeal."
We are, therefore, of opinion, upon the facts found at special
term, that the stock dividend was authorized by law and, therefore,

valid.
Reversed.

Sec. 545.
(d) What is a severance
the other corporate funds.
HUNT
1899.

v.

of

the dividend

fund

from

O'SHEA.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.
600, 45 Atl. Rep. 480.

Appeal from probate court, Belknap county.

69

N. H.

Proceedings by

P. Hunt, receiver, against Dennis O'Shea, assignee of

the

N.

insolvent

The probate court allowed
estate of the Laconia Car Company.
plaintiff's claim, but denied his motion to order it paid in full, and
plaintiff appeals, and also brings assumpsit for the same cause of action. Appeal dismissed, and judgment for defendant in the action
at law.
The plaintiff is the receiver of the People's Fire Insurance Company, and, as such, on July i, 1894, was the holder of 150 shares of
the capital stock of the Laconia Car Company as collateral for a note
which has not been paid. The car company, before that time, had
legally declared a dividend payable on that date, which, on this particular stock, has not been paid. January 25, 1897, proceedings were
instituted upon which the car company were decreed insolvent debtThe plaintors, and the defendant was appointed as their assignee.
iff's claim for this dividend was allowed in the probate court, but that
court denied his motion to order it paid in full.
YOUNG, J. This court has no original jurisdiction of claims against
i), so the action
the estate of an insolvent debtor (Pub. St., ch. 201,
of assumpsit must be dismissed, for the defendant has no money in
his hands which equitably belongs to the plaintiff.
Simply declaring
Lowne v. Insurance Co., 6
a dividend does not create a trust fund.
Paige 482. To create such a fund, some specific sum of money must
be set apart for the purpose of paying the dividend. Until this is done,
to its stockholders in respect to divithe relation of the corporation
dends is that of debtor and creditor.
King v. Railroad Co., 29 N.
82;
Law
i
section
Mor.
Priv.
No sum of money
Corp.,
J.
445.
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having been set apart to pay this dividend, and the claim not being
one of those named in section 32, ch. 201, Pub. St., the appeal should
be dismissed, and judgment entered for the defendant in the action at
law. All concurred.
See, 1860, King v. Paterson & H. R., 29 N. J. L. 82; 1893, Ford v.
Note.
Eastharnpton R. T. Co., 158 Mass. 84, 35 Am. St. Rep. 462 (vote declaring a
dividend may be rescinded before it is made public) ; 1896, Dennis v. Joslin
Mfg. Co., 19 R. I. 666, 61 Am. St. Rep. 805 (parol evidence is not admissible
to show that a corporation voted a dividend as an offset to moneys withdrawn
by shareholders) ; 1900, Price v. Morning Star Mining Co., 83 Mo. App. 470
(until the dividend is set apart it remains corporate property and the right
thereto passes with the stock).

Sec. 546.

Same.

LE ROY
1836.

THE GLOBE INSURANCE COMPANY ET

AL. 1

IN THE VICE CHANCELLOR'S COURT, NEW YORK.
Ch. (N. Y.) *657-6;4.

2

v.

Edw.

[Bill in equity by plaintiff upon behalf of himself and other shareholders similarly situated.]
The directors of the Globe Insurance Company passed a resolution
on the tenth of November, 1836, declaratory of a dividend ; and on
the thirtieth day of the same month such dividend was carried, on
the books of the company, to profit and loss, leaving the capital entire, and a further surplus to the credit of the company for profits
then earned and not divided.
Public notice was given (in the newspapers of the eleventh of November) that this dividend would be paid
on and after the first of December.
Checks on one of the banks
These checks
were prepared and filled up with each party's dividend.
were all dated the first of December, signed by the president and
made payable to the order of the secretary of the company, and were
placed in the hands of the latter to be indorsed by him and delivered
over to the stockholders as they should call.
About four-fifths of
these checks had been called for.
The great fire rendered the insurance company insolvent, and its affairs fell into the hands of receivers
under the act. A stockholder, who was entitled to participate in this
dividend, came, after the fire, for his check, and it was refused him.
Question, whether the dividend for him had been so far set apart as
to give him a right to it notwithstanding the insolvency of the company and the passing of their affairs into receiver's hands or whether it
fell back into the general property of the company.
THE VICE-CHANCELLOR (McCoux). This case does not necessarily call for a decision of the question whether, as between the stockholders of an insolvent insurance company and the creditors, the former are entitled to all the surplus which remained with the company
undivided at the time of its disaster, over and above the entire capital.
1
Statement as given in the syllabus
another point omitted.

;
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and part of opinion upon

1630

LE ROY V. THE GLOBE INSURANCE COMPANY.

546

Although there is here such a surplus of upwards of forty-one thousand dollars, besides the dividend, amounting to thirty-five thousand
dollars, which was declared on the tenth day of November and made
payable on and after the first day of December, yet the complainants,
in their bill, only claim to have their parts or portions of this dividend, which they have not received, now paid over to them out of the
funds in the hands of the receivers, instead of leaving the money there
to be applied as assets of the company in discharge of its debts.
The complainants assert their right to the money upon the ground
of its having become theirs by an express appropriation., and setting
apart so much out of the company's earnings for the stockholders,
from the general mass of the company's
and thereby distinguished
funds ; and I am convinced that enough has been done to produce
this separation in the' view of a court of equity., and to confer upon
this amount the character of a trust fund which could not afterwards
be diverted to other objects.
The investigation of the affairs of the company, and the ascertainment of a clear surplus to warrant a dividend ; declaring that dividend by a resolution of the board of directors ; fixing the period for
its payment ; giving publicity to it ; carrying the amount on the books
of the company to the debit of profit and loss ; apportioning the
same among the stockholders, by filling up and signing checks upon
the bank where the funds were deposited for the purpose of being
delivered to each stockholder when called for these are all acts
which the company, by its officers, might lawfully perform. These
acts became binding upon the company in its corporate capacity and
gave to the stockholders individually rights which the directors and
If, for
officers of the company could not afterwards take from them.
instance, they had refused, after the first day of December, to deliver out the checks or make payment of the dividends, and no
insolvency had intervened, it appears to me there would have been
no difficulty in the remedy by mandamus in favor of all the stockholders, or by action at the suit of individuals from whom the payment was withheld.
Neither, I apprehend, could there be any valid objection to a bill
in equity for the purpose of obtaining possession of the checks or the
fund in the bank upon which they were drawn, upon the footing of its
being a trust fund which the officers of the company were bound to
distribute after the first day of December, and over which they had
no other control.
That the officers of the company considered the
money which was deposited to its credit in the bank appropriated to
meet the checks, is evidenced by the fact that they went on delivering
out checks to such of the stockholders as called for them, until the
seventeenth of December, when the disastrous fire had occurred ; and
they would have delivered checks to these complainants in like manner, if they had called 'to receive them.
It makes no difference, in
my judgment, that the money was not told out and specifically set
apart in the bank to meet these checks, or that a separate fund was
not created for the purpose, or that the money intended to meet them
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still formed

to the credit of the
a part of the general mass standing
company on the books of the bank; for this court can, nevertheless,
lay hold of the mass, an'd separate so much as may be necessary to
accomplish what v/as intended, and which accident alone prevented
at the time.
Up to the moment of the prostration of the company
the intention remained, oa the part of those who were charged with
the management of its affairs, to continue the appropriation and consummate the payment of the dividends, which had been nearly comIt was a matter no longer executory in the view of the parpleted.
ties; and so far as it remained unexecuted this court will now perform it.
The intention must be fulfilled, and for this purpose a court
of equity will consider, not merely the sums which were paid out in
dividends, but the whole thirty-five thousand dollars, as actually appropriated and set apart for distribution among the stockholders from
and after the first day of December, and regard it as a trust fund to
which the stockholders had acquired vested rights not in their corporate capacity, but as individuals to whom the money legally and
equitably belonged, distinct from their other interests in the funds
and effects of the company.
Having acquired this right, as between them and the corporation,
the assignment or transfer to the receivers could not take it away.
'The receivers do not stand in the light of purchasers for valuable consideration without notice; and under such circumstances as exist here,
are bound by the trust:
Adair v. Shaw, i Sch. & Lef. (Irish Ch.)
on
262; Wood v. Dumrrier, 3 Mason's R. 308, 312.
243,
The act of the eighteenth of January, one thousand eight hundred
and thirty-six, under which the receivers were appointed, vests in
them all the property and effects of the corporation; but, like any
other assignment by operation of law, such as in bankruptcy, or
under our insolvent acts, it does not pass trust property, but only such
as the bankrupt or insolvent held or was possessed of or entitled to
*
*
*
for his own benefit.
Decree for plaintiff.
See preceding
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v.THE LAKE SHORE AND MICHIGAN SOUTHRAILWAY COMPANY, APPELLANT.'

RESPONDENT,
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OF

NEW YORK.

91

N. Y. Rep.

[Action to compel defendant to declare and pay dividends of ten
per cent, per annum from June, 1857, to February, 1863, upon
shares owned by the plaintiff, the certificates for which read as follows:
1
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"The Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company
This is to .certify that
B. Jermain
guaranteed ten per cent, stock.
is entitled to forty shares of $100 each, in the guaranteed capital
stock of the late Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana Railroad
Said stock is entitled to
Company, denominated construction stock.
dividends at the rate of ten per cent, per annum, payable semiannually in New York on the first days of June and December in
each year, out of the net earnings of the said company ; and is also entitled to share pro rata with the other stock of the company in any
excess of earnings over ten per cent, per annum, and the payment of
The said stock is transdividends as aforesaid is hereby guaranteed.
ferable only on the books of the said company in their office in the
citv of New York, by the said stockholder in person or by his attorney,
In witness whereof the said comon the surrender of this certificate.
pany have caused this certificate to be signed by their president and
treasurer, and countersigned by the registrar at New York this I2th
H. F. CLARK, President.
day of December, 1870.

J.

"

JAMES H. BANKER, Treasurer."
Plaintiff became owner of these shares December 12, 1870, but
how, or from whom, did not appear, though his ownership was not
No dividends on the preferred stock had been paid prior,
disputed.
to July i, 1863, but after that such dividends were regularly declared
and paid by the company ; afterward a large surplus of earnings was
accumulated, and instead of paying arrears of dividends upon the preferred stock, dividends were declared and paid out of this surplus on
Plaintiff claims he is entitled to have these arrearthe common stock.
ages of dividends on preferred stock declared and paid.]
EARL, J. * * * We are thus brought to the sole question of
law involved upon this appeal, which is, whether treating the plaintiff
as the assignee of forty shares of the guaranteed
stock on the I2th
day of December, 1870, he obtained the right to payment of the
dividends which he seeks to enforce in this action.
A person who subscribed for and received the guaranteed stock in
in the company, neither was he
1857 was not simply a stockholder
simply a contractor with the company holding a contract which entitled him to payments of the guaranteed dividends, but he was both
and one holding such a guaranty, and the guaranty
a stockholder
related to and was an incident of the stock and passed with it to any
The certificate which evidenced his ownership
assignee of the stock.
of the stock also evidenced the guaranty of dividends, and the guaranty was to the person holding the stock.
The certificate issued to the plaintiff was not itself the stock, but
The stock had been in existence from the
only the evidence thereof.
time it was issued in 1857? owned, if it had been from time to time
A share of stock
transferred, by the successive transferees thereof.
represents the interest which the shareholder has in the capital and net
The interest is of an abstract nature,
earnings of the corporation.
that is, the shareholder can not by any act of his, nor ordinarily by any
He can take, and is entitled
act of the law, reduce it to possession.
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to take, the surplus profits when a dividend has been declared by the
proper officers of the corporation, and upon dissolution of the corporation he can take his share of the assets thereof left for distribuThe corporation represents
tion, pro rata, among the shareholders.
the whole body of the shareholders, and to
before
dividend has
been declared, belong, in solido, all the assets in which the shareWhen a dividend has once been
holders, as such, are interested.
declared out of net earnings, the amount of such dividend
no
longer part of the assets of the company, but
apportioned or set
They receive credit for the dividends and
apart for the shareholders.
the corporation simply holds them as their trustee.
Therefore, before
a dividend has been declared,
share of stock represents the whole
interest which the shareholder has in the corporation, and when he
transfers his stock he transfers his entire interest, and dividends subsequently declared, without reference to the source from which or the
time during which the funds divided were acquired by the corporation,
necessarily belong to the holder of the stock at the time of the
declaration. But when the dividend has once been declared and
credited to the shareholder, the amount thereof has been separated
assets of the corporation and been appropriated to his use.
no longer an inthen no longer represented by his stock, and
cident thereof; and hence when he transfers his stock he does not
transfer his dividend, which remains subject to his control.
But the claim on the part of the appellant is, that inasmuch as
these guaranteed dividends were payable in 1864, long before the
transfer of any stock to this plaintiff, they are to be treated as dividends then declared, and therefore payable to the person who then
held the stock; that in 1864, by reason of the existence of net
earnings sufficient to make the guaranteed dividends, the right to
such dividends became vested in those then holding the guaranteed
stock
that the net earnings then on hand representing the amount
due for the guaranteed dividends were no longer
part of the capital or assets of the corporation, and that the right to them ceased to
be an incident of the stock.
This reasoning does not satisfy us.
These net earnings were in no way set apart or appropriated for the
benefit of the holders of the guaranteed stock.
They were not even
held by the company.
The right of the guaranteed shareholders was
repudiated and denied, and the net earnings were otherwise approThey were no more legally appropriated to the payment of
priated.
in law
the guaranteed dividends than the property of
debtor
debts
which
he
refuses
to
of
to
the
recogappropriated
payment
nize. The dividends, therefore, remained payable upon the stock to
the holders of the stock. It matters not that payment could have been
enforced by the holder of this stock; he did not then enforce
and
did not receive payment.
He did not, so far as appears in the case,
in any way separate his right to dividends from the stock as an inciremained like interest payable upon any obligation
dent thereto.
which had not been paid, but which was due. An assignment of
is

is
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it,
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a

a

;
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the obligation in such a case carries with it the right to receive the
over-due interest, the interest being an incident of the obligation.
Interest after it becomes due may be assigned to one person, and
the principal obligation may be assigned to another, as the owner of
this stock could have assigned these guaranteed dividends to one perbut until he did so, or did some act to
son and the stock to another;
separate the guaranteed dividends from the stock, a sale or assignment of the stock carried with it a right to the dividends, as an inciThis conclusion is sustained by many analogies in the
dent thereto.
law, is believed to be in accordance with the common understanding
and practice in such cases, and is, we think, quite fully sustained by
the opinion in Boardman v. The Lake Shore and Michigan Southern
Railway Co.i In that case the plaintiff did not become the owner of
his stock until 1862, and yet he was held entitled to recover the guaranteed dividends from 1856 until 1863, without any other assignment
to him except the assignment of the stock from the persons who held
it from 1857 down to the date of the assignment to him. We do not
think it is a material circumstance distinguishing that case from this,
that there the plaintiff became the owner prior to 1864, whereas in
this case the plaintiff became the owner after 1864.
In each case the
dividend was payable by virtue of the guaranty.
It is true that in the
prior case there was no dividend due or enforcible at the time the
plaintiff took his stock, whereas there was a dividend due and enforcible at the time this plaintiff took his stock.
But in both cases the
dividend is due by virtue of the contract, a contract connected with,
and parcel of, the contract which entitles the holder to his stock.
In
" Conceding that the right of
the Boardman case, Miller, J., said:
the plaintiffs depends upon a contract, that contract is connected with,
relates to, and constitutes an integral part of, the plaintiffs' rights as
a stockholder.
It can not be separated from the rights accruing by
virtue of the stock which the plaintiffs hold ; and being thus a part
and parcel of the same, it passes with the transfer as one of the inciA sale or asdents, and as composing an essential element thereof.
signment of the stock transferred, by operation of law. all benefits to
be derived from the same and all profits, income or dividends or
right to dividends by contract which formed a constituent, valuable
When the contingency hapand inseparable portion of the stock.
pened, specified in the contract, the right to dividends became fixed
and existed independent of any act of the corporation or its officers.
It became absolute and perfect in the stockholder, without a declaration to that effect, and passed as an incident of the stock upon the

transfer."
Again, "we think it can not be maintained, upon any sound principle, that the contract for the payment of dividends continues to each
stockholder only during the time he holds the stock and accrues only
to his benefit during that period, and that a separate and distinct
assignment of the dividends was essential in order to confer title upon
the owner."
The case of Manning v. The Quicksilver Mining Co.
Hun
a case precisely in point.
There the owner of certain
is
(24
360)
1

84

N.

Y.

157.
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preferred shares of stock in a mining company, after having sold the
same and delivered the certificates thereof to one person, assigned to
another all his right, title and interest in and to the interest due upon
the assigned shares of stock which he had previously owned.
By
the terms of the certificates interest was guaranteed to be paid annually, but out of the net earnings of each year, providing so much
in the year preceding had been earned.
It did not appear that there
had been any separation of this interest from the other assets of the
company, or that any of the earnings of the company had been assigned to the payment of the interest, and it was held that the right
to recover the interest was merely an incident to the shares themselves, and depended upon the title thereto, and that the assignee of
the interest could not maintain an action to recover the interest or
compel the company to account therefor.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the decision of the general
term is right, and should be affirmed, and judgment absolute ordered
against the defendant with costs.
All concur, except Andrews and Rapallo,
taking no part.
Order affirmed and judgment accordingly.

JJ.,

Note.

See next case.
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Option contracts.
BRIGHT

1875.

IN THE SUPREME
277,

v.

LORD ET

AL.

COURT OF INDIANA.
19 Am. Rep. 732.

51

Ind. Rep. 272-

BIDDLE, C. J. The facts averred in the appellant's complaint are
follows :
That on ist day of April, 1873, the appellant entered into a provisional contract with John M. Lord, John Lord, and Charles M. Lord,
by which they agreed to sell to the appellant five hundred and twenty
snares of the capital stock of the Indianapolis Rolling Mill Company,
of fifty dollars each, for the sum of thirteen thousand dollars, at the
option of the appellant, to be by him taken at any time on or before
the i8th day of June, 1873, to be paid for on delivery; that before
the expiration of said option, on the i4th day of June, 1873, the said
Lords, for the consideration of one hundred dollars, to them paid by
appellant, extended the time of said provisional contract for thirty
days, within which time the appellant paid the Lords thirteen thousand
dollars, and received the stock, which, on the i6th day of July, 1873,
was duly transferred to him on the books of the rolling mill company;
that the appellant purchased the stock without the reservation of any
dividends or earnings, and with all the benefits and interests that pertain to the same; that on the 3d of July, 1873, the board of directors
of the rolling mill company declared a dividend on the capital stock
of the company of five per cent., to be paid on the ist day of August
ensuing, amounting, on the stock, etc., purchased by the appellant, to
as
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thirteen hundred dollars, which the appellant claims ; that the company was about to pay the said thirteen hundred dollars to the Lords,
who also claimed the amount.
Prayer to restrain the company from
paying the thirteen hundred dollars to the Lords, to decree the amount
to the appellant, and for general relief.
The rolling mill company was served with process but made de-

fault.
Interlocutory proceedings
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were had after complaint and before answer, but as no question is raised upon them they are not stated.
The case was submitted
The Lords answered by a general denial.
to the court for trial, which resulted in a finding for the defendants.
Motion for a new trial overruled.
Exception.
Appeal to the general term, where the judgment was affirmed, from which an appeal
was taken to this court.
The only error assigned here is in affirming the judgment at the
The evidence is before us, and we think it fairly
general term.
proves the allegations in the complaint.
Was the appellant entitled to the dividend declared while it was
optional with him to purchase or refuse the stock, and before the purchase was completed ? This is the sole question in the case.
Where a stockholder in a railroad assigned and transferred his stock
after -two years' interest had accrued, which, by a resolution of the
company, was payable annually, and had been carried to the account
of the stockholder, it was held that the interest did not pass by the
assignment of the stock; the court stating the rule to be, that " the
so long as
reinterest follows the principal, as an incident to
mains an incident; but when
separated and set apart from the
principal by actual payment, or by being carried, when due, to the
credit of the owner of the principal in his account with the debtor,
and this in pursuance of
provision in the contract creating and deso separated and disjoined from the
fining the principal debt,
principal as to cease to be an incident to, and does not follow it."
The City of Ohio v. The Cleveland, etc., R. Co.,
Ohio St. 489.
And in the case of Jones v. The Terre Haute and Richmond R. Co.,
resolution of the board
was held, that " where, by
29 Barb. 353,
of directors,
dividend
made to the persons then holding stock,
without any discrimination, out of the surplus earnings of the corpofuture day, all who are stockration for
given period, payable at
deholders on the books of the company, at the time the dividend
This case seems to us as being
clared, are entitled to share therein."
remarkably similar to the one before us. It has also been held that
the purchaser of
share of stock in
corporation has the right to receive all future dividends, from whatever source the profits may
member of the corporation until
arise, provided he remain
dividend
made.
March v. The Eastern R. Co., 43 N. H. 515.
The same rule was recently held in England.
The testatrix was
owner of certain shares in the South Australian Banking Company.
On the yth day of June, 1865, dividends were declared by the com-
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pany, payable on the I5th of July, 1865, and on the i5th of January,
1866.
On the 3ist of December [1865], the testatrix died, having
made her will, devising the stock, in 1863.
The question arose as to whether the dividend due on the I5th of
January, 1866, passed to the devisee, or belonged to her residuary
estate.
Sir W. Page Wood, V. C., said: " As soon as the dividend was
declared, although payment, for convenience of the company, was
postponed until the following January, from that moment the testatrix became entitled to
although she could not have then recovered
and
would have passed to her legatee had she specifically beDe Gendre v. Kent,
Equity Cases, 283.
queathed it."
was held that
In an American case, still later,
dividend belongs
to the owner of the stock, at the time the dividend
actually declared, and that dividends made to the stockholders after the death of
a testator belong to the widow who owns the stock, but
made
before, although payable afterwards, they will pass by the devise.
Barb. 397.
Brundage v. Brundage,
In support of this general principle, see. also, In re Foote, 22 Pick.
Edwards Ch. 379; Phelps v. Farmers' and
299; Clapp v. Astor,
'
Mechanics' Bank, 26 Conn. 269; Hyatt v. Allen, 56 N. Y. 553.
From the authorities and upon principle, we think, the rule may be
deduced, that whoever owns the stock in a corporation at the time a
dividend
declared owns the dividend also
and
sale of the stock
afterwards will not carry the dividend with
though
may not be
The same rule governs in the
paid, or payable, until after the sale.
sale of bonds or other securities, where the interest
payable at
stated periods, as upon coupon bonds
but when the interest
accrudue on the bond or other security at
ing from day to day, whatever
the time
The reason of the distinction
sold, will pass with it.
divisible and
is, that when the interest accrues from day to day,
at
time
the
but
when
interest
payable at stated
payable
any
no
of
due
the
arrives
and in the earnuntil
period
part
periods,
or
of
to
know
what
amount
due
stocks,
ings
profits
impossible
until the dividend
declared.
In the case before us, Bright did not become the owner of the
stock until the i6th day of July, 1873.
was opUp to that time
tional with him to purchase
or refuse it.
The Lords would have
had no remedy
Bright had refused the stock, and Bright would
have suffered no loss, except the consideration he had paid for the
The dividend had been
option, and incurred no liability whatever.
declared on the 3d day of July, 1873, and the amount fixed by which
became the property of the Lords at that time, although not payable until the ist day of August ensuing; and there
nothing in the
inform
facts at the
to
us
knew
all
these
but what Bright
complaint
time he completed the purchase of the stock.
At least, ordinary
he did
business diligence would have informed him of the facts,
not actually know them, and then he could have purchased the stock,
as
then stood, or not, at his option.
As he has not averred in his
WIL. CAS.
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complaint that he did not know these facts, and could not have ascertained them by ordinary business diligence, he must be held to
have known them, and to have made his purchase accordingly.
The judgment is affirmed.
Note.
Compare, 1835, Harris v. Stevens, 7 N. H. 454 ; 1871, Currie v. "White,
45 N. Y. 822; 1878, Black v. Hornersham, L. R.4 Exch. Div. 24.

( f ) Rights of life tenant and remainder-man to div-
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THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.
Rep. 179-198, 39 L. R. A. 230.

154

N. Y.

a construction of the will of Caroline Cuyof the trustees with respect to their duties thereMrs. Cuyler died in 1888, and her will, duly probated, after
under.
various specific devises, left the rest of her property, to be divided
into Jiree parts, to her executors in trust for each of her three grandsons, such part of the income thereof as the trustees should deem
proper for their support to be paid till they came of age ; after that
the whole income of each part to be paid to each till he arrived at the
age of thirty-five years, when the whole of each part was to be paid
to each respectively ; but if either one died before he was thirty-five
years old, his share should be paid to his descendants, if any, and if
Among the
not, then to remain in trust for the surviving brothers.
property constituting the trust were 254 shares of stock in the Western Union Telegraph Company, upon which, in 1892, a ten per cent,
stock dividend was declared from the surplus earnings of the comOne of the trustees claimed this dividend should be treated as
pany.
income and be paid to the grandsons as such ; the other, that it was
capital, and should be held to be part of the estate, to be held in trust
for the descendants or survivors of the brothers, the cestuis que trust,
in case one should die before reaching the age of thirty-five years.
The court below held the stock dividend to be income, instead of a
part of the fund to be held in trust.]

[Amicable suit to obtain

ler, and

a

direction

O'BRIEN,

J.

*

*

*

In discussing these questions it will be
to consider the grandchildren, before reaching the
age of thirty-five, as life tenants, and after arriving at that age as
remainder-men, although such a classification may not be strictly accurate.
The case is obviously governed by the same rules and principles that prevail in the determination of legal questions between the
owner of an estate for life and the owner of an estate in the same
property in remainder, and the analogy is so perfect that we may
adopt it in order to avoid confusion of terms and to bring the discussion within the language of the authorities cited, and which are con*
*
*
ceded to have more or less application to the case.
1
Statement abridged.
Part of opinion relating to proper method of applying income and premiums upon United States bonds, and arguments, omitted.
more convenient
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With respect to the stock dividends upon the stock of the Western

Telegraph Company, embraced in the trust, it is important to
For the purposes of the case the
notice the finding of the referee.
parties stipulated, and the referee found, that in the fall of 1892 the
Western Union Telegraph Company, by a capitalization of accumulated earnings made and retained in its hands, from time to time,
increased its capital stock from $86,200,000 to $100,000,000, and
predicated thereon made a stock dividend of ten per cent, to its stockholders, under which the plaintiffs received in December of that year
from the corporation a certificate for twenty-five and four-tenths
additional shares of stock, making, with the 254 shares previously
held by them, 279 4-10 shares.
There is doubtless much stronger and more weighty authority to
support the contention of the appellant with respect to this question
than the one just considered.
We shall not attempt any extended or
critical analysis of the numerous cases in which the question whether
such a dividend is to be treated as capital or income has been disIt would enlarge the scope of the discussion
cussed and decided.
beyond all reasonable limits, and in the end answer no useful purIt is quite sufficient to say that they are in hopeless conflict,
pose.
though, as it seems to us, the general trend of the more recent ones,
as well as the weight of argument and reason, sustain the decision in
With respect to this question the appeal is sought to be
this case.
sustained, first, by a class of cases in England founded upon Brander
v. Brander (4 Vesey 800), and followed by Irving v. Houstoun (4
Paton Sch. Ap. (Cr. S. & P.) 521) ; Paris v. Paris (10 Vesey 185),
and In re Barton (L. R., 5 Equity Cases 238).
Apart from the evident inclination of the judicial mind at that day
in that country to favor entails, perpetuities and accumulations
of
property, it can hardly be said that these cases were well considered.
Lord Chancellor Eldon admitted this in Paris v. Paris (supra), where
" I confess I do not think I can safely rest upon any dishe said:
tinction between this case and those that have been determined.
I
have had great difficulty in stating the principle that led to them.
But in the case from Scotland great inquiry was made as to the length
to which practice had carried the decisions here and at the rolls ;
and, as it appeared that it had gone to great length, the house of
lords did not think it proper to disturb them."
Then proceeding to
notice the argument now made in this case, that there is a distinction
between stock and cash dividends, he disposed of that contention
with a homely but expressive remark. He said:
"As to the distinction between stock and money, that is too thin; and if the law is,
that this extraordinary profit, if given in the shape of stock, shall be
considered capital, it must be capital if given as money.'"
The rule as thus established in England was followed in Massachusetts, more as one of convenience than of justice, in a line of cases that
are not quite consistent with each other.
(Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass.
101 ; Daland v. Williams, 101 Mass. 571 ; Leland v. Hayden, 102
Mass. 542 ; Heard v. Eldredge, 109 Mass. 258 ; Rand v. Hubbell,
Union
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The rule was
152 Mass. 58.)
115 Mass. 461; Davis v. Jackson,
adopted there mainly upon the authority of the early English cases to
which reference has been made.
The supreme court of the United States laid down the same rule
in Gibbons v. Mahon (136 U. S. 549), evidently following the docMr. Justice Gray, who
trine of the English and Massachusetts cases.
delivered the opinion, was a member of the supreme court of MassaIt can not be
chusetts when the rule was established in that state.
doubted that these cases are authority in support of the appellant's
contention, and yet, notwithstanding the exalted character of the
courts from which they proceed, they are not binding upon us, except
We
in so far as they appear to be founded upon reason and justice.
have recently had occasion to declare the extent to which we are bound
by the decisions of even such a great tribunal as the supreme court
of the United States, and the weight to be given to its judgments upon
such questions of general law as we are now considering.
(Bath
Moreover, it is by no
Gas Light Co. v. Claffy, 151 N. Y. 24.)
means clear that the decision in this case is in conflict with the case
The rule for the determination of
of Gibbons v. Mahon {supra).
the question whether stock dividends were to be treated as income or
an apportionment of capital, was stated by the learned justice in the
"When a distribution of earnings is made by a
following language:
corporation among its stockholders, the question whether such distribution is an apportionment of additional stock representing capital, or
a division of profits and income, depends upon the substance and intent of the action of the corporation as manifested by its vote or res-

olution."
In this case the resolution recites that the earnings of the corpora-
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tion had been withheld from the shareholders for almost ten years;
that they had accumulated, and that it was the intention of the directors
to disin taking such action, and the shareholders in consenting to
tribute such accumulated earnings to the shareholders in the form of
It was, therefore, the substance
stock certificates instead of money.
and intent of the corporate action to distribute earnings rather than
apportion additional capital. There was, in fact, no additional capthe money or property
The capital of
ital added.
corporation
The Western Union Telegraph
has after deducting its debts.
that
Company had no more property after passing this resolution than
had before, and hence no more capital. When the resolution was
had, indeed, more capital stock outstanding, as reprecarried out
sented by certificates, but not
single dollar had been added to its
did not
It had nothing after passing the resolution that
capital.
have before.
So that, within the rule stated by the learned justice,
what the shareholder got in this case represented income and was
will be
income.
When the substance of the transaction
analyzed
seen that what the corporation really did was to issue to the shareholders its own obligations in the form of stock certificates against
the accumulated earnings which
had on hand, and these certificates
a
market
value
could
having
readily be converted into money by the
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So that the transaction was, in substance, a distribushareholders.
tion of profits.
In Riggs v. Cragg (89 N. Y. 479, 487) it was said by Chief Judge
Andrews: " The right to stock dividends, as between tenant for life
and remainder-man, has not been considered by the court of last resort
in this state. The decisions upon the subject in other states and in
England are conflicting, and it will be the duty of this court, when
occasion arises, to seek to settle the question upon principle, and establish a practical rule for the guidance of trustees and others, which
shall be just and equitable as between the beneficiaries of the two esThis statement, with respect to the attitude of this court
tates."
the
But since this utterance
question, was doubtless correct.
upon
was made, cases have been decided in this court which it will be
found exceedingly difficult to reconcile with the doctrine of the early
English cases and those of Massachusetts.
(In re Kernochan, 104
N. Y. 618; In re Gerry, 103 N. Y. 445, 451 ; Monson v. N. Y. Sec.
and Tr. Co., 140 N. Y. 498; In re Dewey, 153 N. Y. 63.)
In so far as this court has touched the question at all since the decision in Riggs v. Cragg, nothing certainly can be found in the cases
The question had, howto sustain the contention of the appellant.
in
the
been
court,
ever,
upon full consideration,
passed upon
supreme
of
the
and
and the doctrine
those of Massachusetts had
English cases
Clarkson,
been repudiated.
v.
18 Barb. 646;
Riggs v.
(Clarkson
26
Barb.
Hun 90; Simpson v. Moore, 30
Cragg,
637; Goldsmith v.

Swift,

25 Hun 201.)
The same may be said with respect to the action of the supreme
court of Pennsylvania, where it has been held that a stock dividend
(Earp's Aprepresented income, and belonged to the life tenant.
peal, 28 Pa. St. 368; Moss' Appeal, 83 Pa. St. 264.) In the latter
case it was said:
"Where a corporation having actually made
profits, proceeds to distribute such profits amongst the stockholders,
the tenant for life would be entitled to receive them, and this without regard to the form of the transaction.
Equity, which disregards
form and grasps the substance, would award the thing distributed,
whether stocks or moneys, to whomsoever was entitled to the profits."
The same rule was declared in New Jersey and New Hampshire.
(Van Doren v. Olden, 19 N. J. Eq. 176; Lord v. Brooks, 52 N. H.
72.) There are other cases in these states to the same effect, but it
is not necessary to refer to them.
It is sufficient to say that in all of
them the court refused to follow what is called the English and Massachusetts doctrine, for reasons that are stated at length, and which
seem to be of great if not convincing force.
There are three very recent cases where the whole question has
been carefully examined and the leading authorities critically reviewed
by the highest courts in other states. These cases are Hite v. Hite, 93
Ky. 257 (1892) ; Thomas v. Gregg, 78 Md. 545 (1894) ; Pritchett v.
Nashville Trust Co., 96Tenn. 472 (1896).
In each of these cases the
court was entirely unembarrassed by any previous impressions or decisions. The question was new, and from the conflict of authority in other
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judgment and discrimination,
It was held in
proceeded to determine the question upon principle.
each case that stock dividends, such as the one now under consideration, represented income, and in justice and equity properly belonged
to the life tenant.
The reasoning of these cases seems to us far more cogent and persuasive than anything to be found in the cases which favor the contrary rule, that a stock dividend, such as was made to the trustees in
this case, is an apportionment of capital and not income.
It is impossible to read the English cases without being impressed with the
statement of the judges, so often repeated, that they found great difficulty in formulating any principle upon which the decisions rested.
An attempt to give a reason for the rule was made in one of the more
recent cases, but without much success.
(Sproule v. Bouch, L. R.,
It
was
all
summed
Ch.
Div.
up in the end by the
635,
29
638-653.)
court in a single sentence:
"What the company says is income shall
be income, and what it says is capital shall be capital."
This is but
another way of saying that whether accumulated earnings belong to
the life tenant or the remainder-man
depends upon the action of the
corporation, and that the property rights of such parties under the
will are governed by the mere form of capitalization ; that the majority of a board of directors may give them to one or the other at their
will. While such a rule might have the merit of simplicity and convenience, it ought not to determine the property rights of parties interested in the corporate property.
That a testamentary provision of this character, for the benefit of
feoth the life tenant and the remainder-man,
who are generally the
nearest and dearest objects of the testator's bounty, can in this way be
voted up or down, increased or diminished, as the corporation may
elect, and that such action precludes the courts from looking into the
real nature and substance of the transaction, and adjusting the rights
of the parties according to justice and equity, is a proposition that can
The mere adoption by the corporation of a resolunot be accepted.
tion can not change accumulated earnings into capital, as between
the life tenant and the remainder-man.
When questions arise under a will between parties standing in such
relations to each other, with respect to the right to accumulated earnings upon capital stock, the courts must determine the questions for
themselves, according to the nature and substance of the thing which
the corporation has assumed to transfer from the one to the other, and
For all corporate
they are not concluded by mere names or forms.
purposes the corporation may doubtless convert earnings into capital,
when such power is conferred by its charter, but when a question
arises between life tenants and remainder-men concerning the ownership of the earnings thus converted the action of the corporation will
not conclude the courts.
The decision of the learned referee in awarding the stock dividend
to the life tenants as earnings or income, and in refusing to charge
them with the prerriium upon the bonds, or that part of it that has dis-
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appeared by the lapse of time, is equitable and just, and, we think,
is supported by reason and authority.
The judgment should, therefore, be affirmed, with costs to all
parties payable out of the income of the fund.
All concur.
Judgment affirmed.
Note. The following cases are the principal ones upon the various views concerning the rights of the life tenant and remainder-man respectively: 1857,
Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. St. .388: 1868, Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101; 1890, Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549; 1891, Smith's Estate, 140 Pa. St. 344; 1892,
Spooner v. Phillips, 62 Conn. 62, 16 L. R. A. 461, note; 1892, Bite's Devisees
v. Kite's Executors, 93 Ky. 257, 40 Am. St. Rep. 189, 19 L. R. A. 173; 1894,
Thomas et al. v. Gregg, 78 Md. 545; 1896, Pritchett v. Nashville Trust Co.,
96Tenn. 472, 33 L. R. A. 856; 1897, Lysaghtv. Lysaght, 77 L. T. Rep. (N. S.)
637, 9 Am. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 697, note; 1901, Quinn v. Safe Deposit Co.,
Md.
, 53 L. R. A. 169.
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ment of dividends.
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shareholders for withholding

JACKSON'S ADMINISTRATORS

v.

THE NEWARK PLANKROAD

COMPANY.
1865.

IN THE SUPREME

1

OF NEW JERSEY.
277-281

COURT

pay-

31

N. J. Law

THE CHIEF JUSTICE (BEASLEY). This is an action of assumpsit.
The first two counts of the declaration are special, and, in substance,
are identical ; the gravamen of each consisting of the following circumstances, viz., that the plaintiff's intestate was the owner of certain
shares of the capital stock of the defendants, for which he held certificates; that thereby he became a stockholder in said corporation,
and entitled to all the rights of a shareholder and to a participation
in the profits of said corporation, and to his share and full proportion
of all profits made by said corporation, and of the dividends thereof
declared or made among the shareholders;
and that in consideration
thereof the said corporation thereby promised said intestate that he
should be entitled to all the rights of a shareholder therein, and that
he should receive a share of the profits made by the said corporation,
and of the dividends thereof declared among the shareholders, in proportion to the number of shares so held by him. The breach assigned
is, that the defendants having made large profits, to wit, five per
centum on each share of their capital stock, declared a dividend
thereof to each of their shareholders, except to the plaintiff's intestate.
As the demurrer admits these facts it would seem to follow, as an
inevitable conclusion, that the plaintiffs have a cause of action against
the defendants, and that the only question to be considered is, whether
1

Small part of opinion omitted.
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it is enforcible in th ! s present form of proceeding. The suit appears
to be one of the first impression, but this circumstance is of no importance if it be founded in correct legal principles.
The theory upon which the plaintiff's case rests appears to be this:
A person holding, as owner, the stock of a corporation, becomes
thereby entitled to a proportionate share in the profits of the company,
and that, consequently, a duty is imposed, by law, on the body corporate, to distribute all dividends which, from time to time, may be
declared, ratably on all its capital stock; and from this duty, it is
said, springs the implied promise stated in the declaration.
I am unable to perceive any flaw in this statement of principles, or
in the deduction which is made from them.
It is clearly, as a general thing, the duty of the corporation to give to each stockholder an
equable share of such dividends as are declared, and it has been an
established doctrine of the courts that most of the duties imposed upon
corporations by law raise implied promises which will sustain, when
broken, the action of assumpsit. A long line of well-considered decisions rest upon this foundation.
It is not deemed necessary to refer
to them in detail ; a number of the most important will be found collected in Angell & Ames on Corporations, 384.
The class of adjudications which bears the closest analogy in principle to the case now considered, is that which relates to the remedy
on the refusal of the corporation to transfer stock at the request of the
owner. As long ago as the time of Lord Mansfield, it was decided
that a special action of assumpsit was the remedy for such breach of
Rex v. Bank of England, Doug. R. 525, and the same rule
duty.
has been repeatedly sanctioned and enforced by the courts of this
Shipley v. Mechanics' Bank, 10 Johns. 484 ; Angell &
country.
Ames on Corp., chapter XVI. And upon like grounds in Gray v.
The Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 364, it was held by the supreme court of
Massachusetts, that a special action on the case would lie against an
incorporated company for a refusal to permit one of its stockholders
to subscribe for a fair proportion of certain new stock, which had
been issued by the corporation, with a view to increase its capital.
It will be perceived that in each of these cases the promise sued on
was implied from the legal duty due from the corporation to the stockholder, growing out of the mere relationship between them. It is one
of the obligations of a corporation, inherent in its essential nature, to
permit, at the request of the holder, a transfer of its stock; and as
this is an obligation not due to the member at large, but exclusively
owing to the individual stockholder, it was properly held that the law,
upon its ordinary principles, implied an agreement on the part of the
But the right to transcompany to discharge such specific obligation.
fer stock is no more an incident to its ownership than is the right to
dividends upon it ; and the duty of the company, in making a distribution of profits, to appropriate a quota to each share of stock, is,
in all respects, as definite and specific as is the duty to allow a transfer of stock on a sale.
In neither case does the act to be done rest in
the discretion of the company, and in both of them the duty is due,
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not to the members in general, but to each separate stockholder.
It
is not perceived how these two classes of cases are to be discriminated.
If a suable promise can be deduced from the absolute and specific
duty to allow stock to be transferred, so must the same result follow
from the absolute and specific duty to set off, when dividends are
It appears
declared to each share of stock, its distributive allotment.
to me that the general rule, distinguishing between that class of duties which give rise to actionable promises by implication and those
which do not, maybe thus stated: that in all cases in which the
duty is definite and due to the individual, such promise will be implied ; but that, on the other hand, when such duties are indefinite
or are due to the members in their collective capacity, no such promThus, as an illustration, the duty to declare a
ise can be inferred.
dividend, where profits are in hand, is one of the indefinite and general character alluded to, it is, to a certain extent,- discretionary m
its nature, and it is due, in no sense, to any particular member, but
to the community of members, and hence there is no promise for its
But
performance to be drawn in favor of the separate shareholder.
after a dividend is declared, the right to the profits becomes individualized, and the duty to distribute, in certain proportions, which, so
far from being arbitraiy, are mere matters of arithmetical calculation, becomes attached as a right to each member distributively ; and
* *
*
from these incidents arises the promise by implication.

Judgment for plaintiff.

See, 1819, King v. Governor, etc., Co., 2 Barn. & A. 620 ; 1875, Beers v.
Bridgeport S. Co., 42 Conn. 17; 1891, McNab v. McNab& H. Mfg. Co., 62 Hun
18; 1896, Re Severn & W. & S. B. R. Co., 74 L. T. (N. S.) 219; 1897, Winchester & L. T. Co. v. Wickliffe, 100 Ky. 531, 66 Am. St. Rep. 356.
The power to declare dividends resides in the directors, and so long as they
act in good faith in furthering the interests of the company the courts will not
control their discretion by compelling them to declare dividends; but where
their acts amount to a misapplication of funds, or they fraudulently withhold
funds properly distributable as dividends, the courts will interfere upon an
application by shareholders. 1866, Pratt v. Pratt, 33 Conn. 446; 1881, Boardman v. R. Co., 84 N. Y. 157; 1886, N. Y., L. E. & W. v. Nickals, 119 U. S.
296 ; 1887, Hazeltine v. R. Co., 79 Me. 411 ; 1890, Hunter v. Roberts, 83 Mich.
63; 1892, Fougeray v. Cord, 50 N. J. Eq. 185; 1893, McLean v. Plate Glass
Co., 159 Pa. St. 112; 1899, Burden v. Burden, 159 N. Y. 287; 1899, Earle v.
Burland, 27 Ont. App. 540; 1901, Morey v. Fish Bros. Wagon Co., 108 Wis.
520, 84 N. W. Rep. 862.
Note.

Sec. 551.

Right to inspect books,
(a) In general.
4.

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON ON THE RELATION OP M. WEINBERG, RESPONDENT, v. PACIFIC BREWING AND MALTING COMPANY ET AL.,
APPELLANTS.

1899.

a

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT
451-465, 47

OF

WASHINGTON.

L. R. A.

21

Wash. Rep.

208.

On August 10, 1898, the respondent applied to the court below for
writ of mandamus to compel the appellants to permit her to inspect
1

Statement abridged, and part of opinion omitted.
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the account books of the corporation.
As a cause for the issuance of
the writ, she alleged :
" That retator, as such stockholder, has for some time been desirous
of learning the true condition of the affairs of said company, and of
the management of its business, and of the value and nature of relator's interest and property therein as such stockholder, and of the
manner and skill and fidelity with which relator's interests as stockholder, as aforesaid, are and have been attended to and protected,
and to that end has sought to inspect and examine at proper and
convenient times, and without interruption or embarrassment to said
or transaction 'of the business
company, or to the management,
thereof, the books of account of said corporation, and has requested
access and opporand demanded of said respondents permission,
tunity to so examine said books of account, but said respondents and
each of them have always refused and still refuse relator such permission, access and opportunity."
[An alternative writ was issued to allow the inspection or show
cause why peremptory writ should not issue.
Appellants moved to
quash this on the ground that the prosecution should not be in the
name of the state, as it had no interest in the matter; this was overA demurrer was then interposed on the ground that the facts
rul-ed.
were insufficient to give a cause of action ; this was overruled, and
upon trial judgment and order for peremptory writ was given to the
Appeal from the judgment and orders was taken.]
respondent.
FULLERTON, J. (after holding that mandamus in the name of the
*
*
* Another question
state was a proper form of proceeding).
is, has the respondent shown facts sufficient to authorize the court to
The stockholders of a corpodirect that a writ of mandamus issue?
ration have, at common law, for a proper purpose, and at seasonable
times, a right to inspect any or all books and records of the corporation. While this right is universally recognized, the courts disagree
as to what is a proper purpose, or, rather, as to what facts are sufficient to warrant the court in directing by mandamus permission to inspect, where the stockholder has been refused such by the officers of
In the early case of Rex v. Master and Wardens of
the corporation.
the Merchant Tailors' Company, 2 Barn. & Adol. 115, this question
received consideration by the court of King's Bench in England, on
which the several judges expressed opinions. The rule to show cause
why a writ of mandamus should not issue was obtained upon the affidavits of certain liverymen and freemen of the company, who alleged,
among other things, that the attention of the deponents had for a considerable time been called to the affairs of the company by reports,
which they believed to be well founded, that the revenues of the comthrough malpractices on the part of those
pany were misemployed
members who had the management of the company's affairs ; that the
fine for admitting freemen to the livery had been recently twice raised,
without any corresponding increase, as deponents were informed and
believed, in the pensions and charitable disbursements of the company; that a lavish expense had taken place, unsanctioned by the ma-
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jority of the members of the company

that a clei'k of the company
;
had, as deponents had heard and believed, misappropriated funds of
the company to a large amount, but that no accounts or information
had been laid before the freemen by which they could learn the
amount of such defalcation, nor could they ascertain, unless aNowed
to look at their charters, by-laws, books, muniments, and documents,
whether such their common funds were properly applied and accounted for or not ; that they had no other wish in desiring the inspection
of the books than to see, on behalf of a body of the members, by
whom they were authorized, how their joint funds were disbursed,
and that the legal rights and privileges of the members were enjoyed
On motion to discharge the rule, the
agreeably to their charters.
judges were unanimous in the opinion that no sufficient cause was
It was held that beshown to warrant the court in issuing the writ.
fore the writ could issue some distinct cause or purpose affecting the
applicant personally must be shown, and that a desire to examine the
books for the purpose of ascertaining whether the company's affairs
were being properly managed was not sufficient cause.
Passing upon
the motion, Littledale, J., said:
" The master and wardens, who have the care of the documents in
question, are bound to produce them if a proper occasion is made out,
in a matter affecting the members of the corporation.
But I think
the members have no right on speculative grounds to call for an examination of the books and muniments, in order to see if by possibility the company's affairs may be better administered than they
If they have any complaint to make, some
think they are at present.
suit should be instituted, some definite matter charged; and then the
question will arise whether or not the court will grant a mandamus."
Taunton, J., said:
"There is no express rule that to warrant an
application to inspect corporation documents there must actually have
been a suit instituted ; but it is necessary that there should be some
particular matter in dispute, between members, or between the corporation and individuals in it; there must be some controversy, some
specific purpose in respect to which the examination becomes neces-

sary."

" I am far from saying that there may not be
Patteson, J., said:
particular instances in which a corporator may apply for a mandamus
to inspect documents, or some of them, of the kind here mentioned,
if he can show a specific ground of application, and that the granting
of it is necessary to prevent his suffering injury, or to enable him to
But he must state a definite object ; and here
perform his duties.
that is not done."
The principle announced in this case has been followed by some of
the courts of this country, in so far, at least, as to hold that the mere
benefit of knowledge to be derived from the books as to the proper
conduct of the business is not a sufficient cause for the issuance of the
writ to compel the corporate officers to grant an inspection, but that
something more must be shown ; as that a controversy is depending,
or that some question or interest is involved with reference to which
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the contents of the books maybe applicable.
Of this class of cases,
rel.
Hatch, v. Lake Shore
the following are illustrative:
ex
People,
Walker,
Hun
i
M.
R.
v.
Co.,
&
S.
; People
9 Mich. 328; Commonwealth v. Phoenix Iron Co., 105 Pa. St.,
51 Am. Rep. 184;
16
Co.,
American
Screw
R.
I.
Atl.
v.
Rep. 61.
Lyon
472, 17
The -injustice of the rule, when applied in all its strictness, has been
so keenly felt that in England, and in many of the United States, the
right of inspection of corporate books is now guaranteed to the stockholders by statute, and such statutes seem to be generally held not to
in, but declaratory of, the common law.
The tendbe innovations
of
a stockalso,
the
modern
is
towards
that
decisions,
holding
ency
holder, as such, has a right to inspect the books and other documents
of the corporation, where his sole object is to inform himself as to the
manner in which the business of the corporation is being conducted.
In State, ex rel. Doyle, v. Laughlin, 53 Mo. App. 542, the facts were
that the relator was a stockholder in a banking corporation, and as
such stockholder requested of the directors and officers of the bank
the privilege of examining the books of the bank for the sole purpose
of acquainting himself with the condition of its affairs, and how the
bank was being managed.
On the request being refused, he brought
The
mandamus to compel the officers to allow such inspection.
court said :
"The right of a stockholder to examine and inspect all the books
and records of a corporation at all seasonable times and to be thereby
informed of the condition of the corporation and its property is a
common-law right. * * * It is quite obvious, therefore, that the
relator has a clear right to examine the books of the bank in question.
And though the relator in his application for the alternative writ took
the precaution to state the purposes for which he sought to exercise
the right of inspection, this, upon principle, we think, was unnecessary.
If the right of inspection of corporate books exists, whether under
the statute or at common law, the purpose of the exercise of the right
is immaterial.
State ex rel. v. Sportsman's Park, 29 Mo. App. 326.
Because the right may be made the subject of abuse does not
The manner in which it may be exercised
prove that it does not exist.
be
Such
well
night
regulated by the by-laws of the corporation.
be
reasonable.
The
could
course,
would,
of
have
to
right
regulations
not be regulated out of existence/'
In State, ex rel. Bourdette, v. New Orleans Gaslight Co., 49 La.
Ann. 1556, 22 So. Rep. 815, the court said:
"No better way of safeguarding the interests of the public can,
perhaps, be devised, or one that may be so easily and readily applied, as the right to the frequent, sudden and speedy examination of
the books of corporations in the stock or shares of which investors
The recognition of this fact atand speculators are invited to trade.
tests alike the wisdom and purpose of the framers of the constitution.
The question here presented was virtually passed upon in Legendre
v. Brewing Association, 45 La. Ann. 669, 12 So. Rep. 837. and adSee, also,
versely to the pretensions of defendant corporation herein.

ii

in,
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State, ex rel. Martin, v. Bienville Oil Works Co., 28 La. Ann. 204;
In the United States the
Cockburn v. Union Bank, 13 La. Ann. 289.
prevailing doctrine appears to be that the individual shareholders in a
corporation have the same right as the members of an ordinary partnership to examine their company's books, although they have no
power to interfere with the management.
(Morawetz Priv. Corp.,
section 473.)
This doctrine obtains with all the more force in this
state by reason of its recognition in the constitution itself.
In Lewis v. Brainerd, 53 Vt. 519, an action brought under a statute to recover a penalty fixed by the statute for refusing to permit a
stockholder to examine the books, the court, on affirming a judgment
recovered for such refusal, said:
"The shareholders in a corporation hold the franchise, and are the
owners of the corporate property; and as such owners they have the
right, at common law, to examine and inspect all the books and records of the corporation, at all seasonable times; and to be, thereby,
informed of the condition of the corporation and its property. Our
statute provides the method of securing and enforcing such rights.
The statute is remedial ; it was enacted to secure rights and suppress
fraud and wrong ; and should be so construed and enforced as effectually to carry out the purpose of the legislature, and remedy the evil
sought to be prevented."
In Huylar v. Cragin Cattle Co., 40 N. J. Eq. 392, 2 Atl. Rep.
274, it is said:
"Stockholders are entitled to inspect the books of the company for
* *
* And they are entitled to
proper purposes at proper times.
such inspection, though their only object is to ascertain whether their
affairs have been properly conducted by the directors or managers.
To say that they have
Such a right is necessary to their protection.
the right, but that it can be enforced only when they have ascertained,
in some way without the books, that their affairs have been mismanaged, or that their interests are in danger, is practically to deny the
right in the majority of cases. Oftentimes frauds are discoverable
The
only by examination of the books by an expert accountant.
books are not the private property of the directors or managers, but
are the records of their transactions as trustees for the stockholders."
See, further, Cockburn v. Union Bank, 13 La. Ann. 289; State, ex
rel. Martin, v. Bienville Oil Works Co., 28 La. Ann. 204; Ranger v.
Champion Cotton-Press Co., 51 Fed. Rep. 61, 62; Deaderick v.
Wilson, 8 Baxt. 108; Boone, Banking, section 235; Cook, Stock &
Stockholders (3d. ed.), section 511; Thompson, Corporations, section 4406 et seq,
In section 4418, the author in the last work cited quotes from the
English cases announcing the rule that the right to inspect the books
of a corporation will not be enforced unless there is a defined, distinct
dispute, and adds:
" It should be carefully added, however, that this theory has gained
no considerable footing in America, nor is it based upon any foundation of sense.
Subject to the convenience of the others, or of the
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agency which acts for all, it is the right of every proprietor to
know how the business in which he has embarked his money is being
common

Nor can this
carried on, whether there is any dispute about it or not.
principle have any application where the right is given by statute."
In section 4407 the same author says: " In corporate management
or mismanagement, no more frequent or more aggravated species of
outrage exists than the refusal of those in possession of the corporate
books to disclose to the stockholders the written evidences of their
stewardship ; and in many cases nothing short of severe pecuniary
forfeitures, followed by imprisonment as for crime, will afford an adequate protection to minority stockholders."
Corporations, owing to the ease with which they can be formed
under the liberal provisions of the statute, and affording, as they do,
a limited liability for investors, have become a favorite means for the
combination of capital, and are now engaged in almost every variety
In fact, they have largely superseded
and character of business.
behind
Not having
them the personal responsibility
partnerships.
or
that of those who may have invested
and fortunes of the promoters,
in their capital stock, the interests of the public at large require, and
especially that part of the public dealing with them, that the courts
adopt the rule which will most largely conduce to honesty in their
We believe that these interests will be better protected
management.
by holding that a stockholder of a corporation has the right, at reasonable times, to inspect and examine the books and records of such
corporation, so long as his purpose is to inform himself as to the manner and fidelity with which the corporate affairs are being conducted
and his examination is made in the interests of the corporation.
Nor
will it be presumed, when such request is made, that the purpose of
the inspection is other than in the interest of the corporation ; and,
when it is charged to be otherwise, the burden should be on the officers refusing such request, or the corporation, to establish it.
The
argument that, under this rule, the managers of a rival concern may
acquire stock in the corporation and use the privilege for the purpose
of benefiting the rival concern, to the detriment of the corporation, is
not more forceful than the other that, under the restricted rule, a
combination can be made by persons holding the majority of the
stock, by which the corporation is managed for their own interests, to
the exclusion and detriment of the minority holders and injury to the
public dealing with it.
It is contended that the writ should have been refused because it is
not shown that the demand for an inspection was made during business hours, or at the place of business of the corporation, or that
the person making the demand was the agent of the respondent, or
had any lawful right to represent her in the transaction.
These obforce
had
more
the
come
with
refusal
would
to
jections
permit an
in
of
officer
on
the
of
the
books
been
the
based
charge
inspection
part
some
one
of
these
But
the
or
all
refusal
was
made
upon
grounds.
upon the broad ground that the respondent, as such shareholder, had
no right to inspect the books of the company at any time or for any
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purpose, and the main dispute in the court below seems to have
The evidence, also, upon
been as to the existence of this right.
these points is contradictory, and, as the court found the facts in favor
of the respondent, we do not feel disposed to disturb its findings.
The judgment is affirmed.
concur.
Gordon, C. J., and Reavis and Dunbar,

JJ.,

Note.
See the following cases upon the subject of inspecting corporate
books: 1893, Legendre v. N. O. Brewing Co., 45 La. Ann. 669, 40 Am. St.
Rep. 243, note; 1895, Ellsworth v. Dorwart.,95 Iowa 108, 58 Am. St. Rep. 427,
note; 1897, Stone v. Kellogg, 165 111. 192, 56 Am. St. Rep. 240; 1898, Weihenmayer v. Bitner, 88 Md. 325, 42 Atl. Rep. 245; 1898, McElree v. Darlington,
187 Pa. St. 593, 67 Am. St. Rep. 592; 1899, State v. Citizens' Bank, 51 La.
Ann. 426, 25 So. Rep. 318; 1899, In re Steinway, 159 N. Y. 250, 45 L. R. A.
461 ; 1900, Fuller v. Hollander,
N. J.
, 47 Atl. Rep. 646 ; 1900, Cincinnati
Volksblatt Co. v. Hoffmeister, 62 Ohio St. 189, 56 N. E. Rep. 1033.
Although mandamus is the usual remedy (1899, In re Steinway, 159 JJ. Y.
250, 45 L. R. A. 461 ; 1900, Fuller v. Hollander,
N. J.
, 47 Atl. Rep. 646),
an action for damages will lie against the officers for refusal to permit examination (1893, Legendre v. N. O. Brewing Co., 45 La. Ann. 669, 40 Am. St.
Rep. 243, note ; 1900, Bourdette v. Sieward, 52 La. Ann. 1333, 27 So. Rep. 724) .
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(b)

In case of foreign corporations

THE MATTER OP THE PETITION OF R APPLE
SPECTION OF THE BOOKS AND RECORDS OF THE

IN

PANY,
1899.

RESPONDENT.

;

general

YE, 'APPELLANT, FOR AN INFARMERS' FEED COM-

1

IN THE APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
NEW YORK.
43 App. Div. Rep. (N. Y.) 84-87.

(Appeal from order of special term denying an application for

mandamus

to inspect books.)
BARRETT, J. * * * The respondent is a foreign corporation,
organized under the laws of New Jersey, and the appellant is one of
its stockholders.
It will be observed that the application for an inIt has,
spection is not made in an action, either at law or in equity.
in fact, no relation to any cause of action which the appellant individually may have against the foreign corporation. The applicant
simply asserts what he deems to be his right as a member of the corporation ; and he seeks to enforce that right by a writ of mandamus.
Jurisdiction has not been conferred upon the courts of this state to
We undoubtedly
grant such a writ in enforcement of such a right.
have such jurisdiction, both at common law and by statute, in the
case of a domestic corporation (Matter of Steinway, .159 N. Y. 250) ;
but none as to foreign corporations.
Our statute upon the subject
relates exclusively to domestic corporations (The Stock Corporation
Law, Laws of 1892, chapter 688, section 29), while our commonlaw jurisdiction is limited to that formerly possessed by the court of
1

Part of opinion omitted.
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That jurisdicking's bench in England.
(Steinway Case, supra}.
tion did not extend to foreign corporations.
Mandamus was originally
issued by the king to his subject ordering the performance of some
Later, mandamus, though still a prerogative writ, was
specified act.
issued in the king's name from the court of king's bench and directed
to persons and corporations within the king's dominions.
In modern
times the writ has been somewhat assimilated to ordinary remedies,
but even as such it is still limited to the enforcement, as against persons or corporations within the king's dominions, of some duty prescribed by the law of the realm.
The common-law jurisdiction here
is limited in like manner.
The member's right to inspect the books
of a foreign corporation depends upon the law of that corporation's
being, and can only be enforced by the courts of its legal existence.
The foreign corporation as a legal entity is not here, although its
officers, property and books may be found here; and its duty in the
premises is not prescribed by the law of this state.
Our special jurisdiction over foreign corporations is conferred and
In an action against a foreign corporation propregulated by statute.
erly instituted under our law, the ordinary remedies of discovery and
In such an
inspection of books and papers are doubtless applicable.
action, too, production of the books within our jurisdiction can be
But
compelled by subpena duces tecum or authorized judicial order.
that is an entirely different affair from a proceeding by mandamus
which has no other purpose, and looks to no other relief, save that of
In
granting to the stockholder his membership right of inspection.
such an independent proceeding he substantially asks our courts to
interfere in the internal management of the affairs of the foreign cora request which has been refused in all the cases to which
poration
*
*
*
our attention has been called.
(Citing and commenting on Howell v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co.,
51 Barb. 378; North State Copper & G. M. Co. v. Field, 64 Md.
Madden v. Electric L. Co., 181 Pa. St. 617;
;
151, supra, p.
Republican M. S. M. v. Brown, 58 Fed. Rep. 644; Wilkins v.
Thorne, 60 Md. 253.)
The applicant here is not without redress.
He may apply to the
courts of New Jersey.
It has been there held that where a corporation of that state does business and keeps its books outside of the
state, it will be compelled to bring the books in for inspection of
members.
(Huyler v. Cragin Cattle Co., 40 N. J. Eq. 392.) It
can not, therefore, be said that our want of jurisdiction here leads to
entire failure of justice.
But, whatever inconvenience may result
from our inability to grant a mandamus in such cases as this, we
think it quite clear, both upon principle and authority, that the inability exists, and consequently the order appealed from was right
and should be affirmed, with costs.
Van Brunt, P. J., Rumsey, Ingraham and McLaughlin,
concurred.
Order affirmed, with costs.

JJ.,

Note.

See, 1900,

Fuller v. Hollander & Co.,

N.

J.

, 47

Atl. Rep.

646.
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RICHARDSON

v. SWIFT.

COURT OF DELAWARE.

Rep. 137-176, on 152-3.

7

1

Houst.

(Del.)

[Application for mandamus against the custodian of the books in
Delaware, to compel the inspection of the books there of a foreign
corporation doing business in the state. It was strenuously contended
that such a writ for such a purpose could be allowed only by the state
creating the corporation.]
If that be so, then it is manifest, whatever may be the legal right of
the relator to the inspection and copies of the books and papers in
question, that he is wholly without any specific remedy in law to
enforce it here or elsewhere; because it is equally certain, whether we
consider it a proceeding in rent or in personam, or as partaking of the
nature of both, as the writ is to be specifically executed when issued,

a

a

is it

it

a it

is

a

I

a

if

it

it

is

it,

and both the custos and the books and papers are in this state, that
they could not be reached by such a writ from any court in the state
of Connecticut.
And although that state may have the power, which
this has not, to forfeit or revoke the charter of the corporation, and
the relator would still be left without his
that should be done by
specific remedy in the case, either there or here.
Although our constitution declares that "the style in all process
and public acts- shall be the state of Delaware," and the writ
on the complaint of the relaissued and prosecuted in the name of
in such
tor, the jurisdiction and authority of this court to issue
case,
even
this company were
domestic, instead of
foreign, corporation, would not emanate or result from the act of incorporation or the
by-laws of the company, but from that higher jurisdiction and authority which, as have before said, the constitution and the laws of the
state have conferred upon the court in such
case and over the writ
of mandamus and all other well-known writs at common law within
the limits of the state.
And we may therefore admit the correctness
of the definition of the writ cited by the counsel for the defendant
from Mr. Potter's work on corporations, volume 2, section 634:
" That the writ issues by command of the sovereign power, and in
the name of the state, and
directed to some subordinate court, judicature or body within the jurisdiction of the court from which
issues, and
requires the performance by the body to whom
directed of
specific act, as being the legal duty of the office, character or situation," without impairing in any degree whatever the
truth and soundness of this proposition.
J

This case in the superior court, with the elaborate opinions of Houston,
and Comegys, C. J., and AVooten, J., dissenting, and the opinions in the
Houst. (Del.) pp. 338court of error and appeals (Swift v. Richardson,
370, 40 Am. St. Rep. 127, note), Saulsbury, chancellor, affirming (Grubb, J.,
dissenting), the decision of the superior court, gives very fully the history
of mandamus and the state's power of control over foreign corporations.
2

7

J.,

WIL. CAS.

31

BLOEDE

1654

CO. V.

BLOEDE.

$$4

Mandamus
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was incorporated

?
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'Well, now, if such be the general and fundamental principles of the
law applicable to such a case, and the president of this corporation is
residing in this state and city, and where it is now carrying on to
some extent its corporate business, and has the books and papers of it
in question in its possession and custody now in this state and within
the jurisdiction of this court, and refuses to allow the relator to inspect and take copies of them for the purpose demanded of him, I
am not able to perceive, after all the consideration which I have been
able to give to the case, any good and valid reason for holding that the
case is not within the jurisdiction of the court, or that it ought not,
under all the facts and circumstances alleged and not disputed in
to
award the writ, as prayed in the petition of the relator.
The right of
the relator to the inspection and copies which he demands being right
founded on the common law of the state by virtue of his being
stockholder in this corporation, and the res, or books and papers, as
well as the corporate custos of them, being within the jurisdiction of
this court, and the same principle of the common law which confers
on
that upon the former, imposes the duty on the latter to grant
what principle of law or reason can be said that the case
nevertheless not within the jurisdiction of the court, because the company was
not incorporated under
law of this state, but under a law of the
state of Connecticut, although that right and that duty exists in both
states by
law broader and more general than the act under which
*

*

to issue.
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Note.
See same case, 1886, Swift v. Richardson,
Houst. (Del.) 338, 40
Am. St. Rep. 127, note, and the case immediately preceding.
Also, 1902,
T. Co., 106 La.
31 So. 172.
State v. North Am. Land

The right to transfer shares of stock,

(a) Basis

of the right.

See Bloede Co. v. Bloede, 84

Md.

129,

supra, p.

1159.

,

9,

--

N. E. 934.
As to the implied warranties arising from the sale of stock, see,
Clure v. Central Trust Co., 165 N. Y. 108, 53 L. R. A. 153, note.

,

;

I.

I.

See, 1895, Ireland v. Globe Milling Co., 19 R.
Note.
180, 61 Am. St. Rep.
756; 1897, McNulta v.Com. Belt. Bk., 164 111. 427,56 Am. St. Rep. 203; 1898,
79 Am. St. Rep. 769, 41 Atl. Rep.
Ireland v. Globe Milling Co., 21 R.
Tenn. Ch. Ap.
52 S. W.
258; 1899, Herring v. Raskin Co-op. Assn.,
See, also, monographic note upon restriction of the right to transRep. 327.
fer shares, 57 Am. St. Rep. 379-396 'also, 1902, Barrett v. King,
Mass.
63

1900,

Mc-
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as to transfer; nature
how transferred ; refusal of corporation to
remedy of holder at law and in equity ; liability of
tion on old and new certificates ; who is owner ;
transferee; theft, fraud, etc.

(b) General doctrine
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of certifitransfer ;
corporabona fide

v. THE EUREKA BRICK MACHINE MANUFACTURING COMPANY, APPELLANT. 1

RESPONDENT,

IN THE ST. Louis COURT OF APPEALS.

43

Mo. App. Rep.

84-110.

[Action by Keller to compel the company to issue to him a new
certificate of stock for 100 shares of $100 each, in place of the original certificate, alleged to have been lost, and without the word "duplicate," or other words to indicate they we*e issued in place of othThe certificates had originally been issued to
ers still outstanding.
Keller, who had pledged them as security.
There was a conflict of
testimony as to whether they were indorsed in blank or not; when
The
the pledge had expired, they could not be found for redelivery.
company offered to issue a new certificate, marked "duplicate," and
*' issued in lieu of numbers
45, 46, 47 and 48, claimed to have been
lost and unindorsed," upon Keller giving an indemnity bond of $20,ooo.
The court below ordered the company to issue the certificate
without such words.]
*
*
* What, then, is a stock certificate?
THOMPSON,
It is
a solemn and continuing affirmation by the corporation that the person, to whom it was issued, is entitled to all the rights and subject to
all the liabilities of stockholder in the company in respect of the number of shares named, and that the company will respect his rights,
and the rights of any one to whom he may transfer such shares, by
refusing to admit any new transferee to the rights of a shareholder
While it is not, in a
except upon surrendering of the certificate.
strict sense, a negotiable instrument, yet it partakes to a great extent
of the qualities of a negotiable security.
Upon being indorsed by
the original holder therein named, by signing a blank power of attorney, authorizing the person therein named to cause it to be transferred
on the books of the corporation, it passes from hand to hand by deWhen it falls into the
livery, very much as does a negotiable bond.
hands of one, who buys not for speculation, but for investment, and
who wishes to be admitted to the rights of a stockholder, he inserts a
name in the blank power of attorney, and the person so empowered
demands of the corporation the right to transfer it on the books of the
company to the present holder. If this demand is refused, the holder
First, an action against the corporation for damhas two remedies:
McAllister v. Kuhn, 96 U. S.
ages for the conversion of his shares.
c.
i
s.
Utah
Bank
v. Lanier, ir Wall. (U. S.)
(affirming
275);
87

J.

1

Statement

of Rombauer,

; part of opinion of Thompson, J., and all of opinions
concurring, and of Biggs, J., dissenting, omitted.

abridged
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; Holbrook v. Zinc Co., 57 N. Y. 616 ; Payne v. Elliott,
54 CaL
339, s. c. 35 Am. Rep. 80; Ayres v. French, 41 Conn. 142; Boylan
v. Huguet, 8 Nev. 345; Bond v. Ii'on Co., 99 Mass. 505 ; Freeman
v. Harwood, 49 Me. 195; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Sewell, 35 Md.
Sec238, s. c. 6 Am. Rep. 402; Pratt v. Railroad, 126 Mass. 443.
ond, a suit in equity to compel the corporation to issue a new certificate to him and to admit him to the rights of a shareholder.
Cushman v. Mfg. Co., 76 N. Y. 365, s. c. 32 Am. Rep. 315 ; Iron R. Co.
v. Fink, 41 Ohio St. 321 ; Chew v. Bank, 14 Md. 299; St. Romes
v. Press Co., 127 U. S. 614; Tel. Co. v. Davenport, 97 U. S. 369.
Both of these remedies necessarily proceed on the ground that the
holder of the certificate is entitled to be admitted by the corporation
to the rights of a shareholder, and that the corporation denies this
right. The second remedy also proceeds upon the well-known principle that, in the eye of a court of equity, a corporation is a trustee
for its shareholders for the purpose of protecting their rights as such.
Let us next inquire, with special reference to the facts of this case,
what is the liability of the corporation where it issues a certificate of
stock, which by its terms is transferable only on the books of the company, and then, on the representation of the person to whom it was
originally issued that it has been lost or destroyed, issues to him another certificate, and he negotiates the latter to an innocent taker.
It
incurs the risk of a double liability in respect of the same shares.
There are two adjudications on this point. In Greenleaf v. Ludingand
ton, 15 Wis. 558, the holder of a stock certificate assigned
then presented to the company an affidavit that he had lost it, and
new negogave bond of indemnity and procured from the company
Thereafter the holder of the original certificate demanded
tiable one.
of the company
transfer of the title on its books to him, which the
It was held that he could maintain an action
company refused.
So, in Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v.
against the company for damages.
Robbins, 35 Ohio St. 483, certain shares were transferred by the perbona fide purchaser in the usual way
son named in the certificate to
of signing the blank power of attorney indorsed on the certificate.
third party new certificates, on
Afterwards the company issued to
the supposition that the originals had been lost by the original holder.
must make good the damages to the bona fide
It was held that
transferee.
These cases, in what they hold, are consistent with the theory advanced by the court of appeals of New York in the celebrated
Schuyler fraud cases, and no doubt held by other courts, that, in the
case of an attempted double transfer of the same shares, the bona
fide taker, to whom they are first transferred on the books of the
In
the shareholder.
company in the regular way, gets the title and
was said by Davis,
the second of these cases
"Where the
stock of a corporation
by the terms of its charter or by-laws transferable only on its books, the purchaser, who receives
certificate with
power of attorney, gets the entire title, legal and equitable, as between
himself and his seller, with all the rights the latter possessed but, as

J.:

;

a

is

it

is

it

a

a

a

a

it,
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himself and the corporation, he acquires only an equitable
title, which they are bound to recognize and permit to be ripened into
a legal title, when he presents himself, before any effective transfer
on the books has been made, to do the acts required by the charter or
Until those acts be done, he is
by-laws in order to make a transfer.
not a stockholder, and has no claim to act as such ; but possesses, as
between himself and the corporation, by virtue of the certificate and
power, the right to make himself, or whomsoever he chooses, a stockThe stock not having passed by
holder by the prescribed transfer.
the delivery of the certificate and power of attorney, the legal title
remains in the seller, so far as affects the company and subsequent
bona fide purchasers who take by transfer duly made on the books.
And, hence, a buyer, in good faith, of the person in whose name the
stock stands on the books, who takes a transfer in conformity to the
charter or by-laws, permitted to be made by the authorized officer of
the corporation, becomes vested with a complete title to the stock,
and cuts off all the rights and equities of the holder of the certificate
What other rights and equities he may possess, is
to the stock itself.
another question ; but if the transferee has taken in good faith and for
value, the stock is gone beyond his reach and beyond recall by the
corporation. The non-production and surrender of the certificate at
the time of the transfer is not fatal to the title of the transferee.
It
is only essential to the safety of the corporation, and may be waived
The company has the means of knowing
by it at its own peril.
whether a certificate of particular stock is outstanding or not, and the
power to compel its return and cancellation, before any transfer is
made; and a buyer, where the transfer is permitted by the corporation to be made on its books by one to whose credit the stock is standing, has a right to presume that no certificate has issued, or, if one
has, that his vendor has duly suiTendered it for cancellation."
This reasoning contains the further suggestion, that to compel a
corporation to issue a second original certificate in the place of one
alleged to have been lost might put it in the hands of third persons to
prejudice the rights of the public by imposing upon them as purchasBoth can not be good. The
ers one or the other of these certificates.
certificate is only the symbol, it is not the stock.
There may be two
certificates in respect of the same shares, but there can not be two sets
of the same shares held in full ownership by two different persons, or
If one certificate is good so as to confer the rights of
by one person.
a shareholder upon its owner, the other is void, except as giving an
action for damages against the corporation.
This is obvious when it
is considered that the shares of the corporation can only be increased
in the manner pointed out by its charter or governing statute, and not
Upon this ground it
by the misprisions of its ministerial officers.
has been held that, if all the shares which the company is empowbetween

ered to issue have been issued, and if other shares, are thereafter
issued, such excessive issue of shares is void, and does not even
make their holders liable to creditors of the company.
Scovill v.
If, then, a corporation
Thayer, 105 U. S. 143, 148, and cases cited.
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can be compelled, on proof satisfactory to a court of equity and a
bond of indemnity being given, to issue other original certificates in
place of certificates claimed to have been lost, it may place in the
hands of third parties the means of defrauding the public by conveying to them certificates of shares which do not give to them the rights
of shareholders, but which only give to them the right to maintain a
lawsuit against the company.
It is not necessary, for the purpose of this decision, for us to express an opinion, as to which of the certificate-holders, in such a case,
would be entitled to the rights of stockholders as against the company.
That question could only properly arise for determination in the contingency named, and we ought not to express an opinion upon it in
this case, especially as no parties directly interested in determining it
It is sufficient for the purposes of this case for
are before the court.
us to say that there are opposing theories on the subject.
The New
York doctrine, as shown by the language above quoted, is that the
one whose transfer is first regularly made on the books of the corpoBut, on the other hand, the supreme
ration is the real stockholder.
court of Illinois has held, in Hall v. Road Co., 70 111. 673, that, if the
secretary of a corporation issues new certificates of stock to one claiming to have purchased existing shares therein, without taking up and
canceling the original, the new certificates will be invalid. Under
this theory it is possible (though we do not so decide) that, if relief
were granted in this case, as demanded by the plaintiff, a bona jide
purchaser of the new certificates would get no rights as a shareholder,,
but only an action for damages against the corporation.
Assuming
that such a result is possible, it follows that any person to whom a
certificate of corporate stock is offered for sale, which has been issued
in lieu of another certificate still outstanding, has a right to know that
fact.
Upon what principle, then, shall a court of equity oblige a corporation to issue, in such a case as this, a new certificate concealing
that fact? The concealment of such a fact by the holder from a purchaser might be such a fraudulent concealment as would avoid the
sale.
Can a court of equity make itself a party to such a fraudulent
concealment?
It may be conceded, for the purposes of this case, that, where certificates of stock pass out of the hands of the original owner by theft,
fraud, or even by accident, without negligence, a bona Jide transferee,
into whose hands they may subsequently come, will get no title which
he can assert against the true owner, and none which he can oblige
Biddle v. Bayard, 13 Pa. St. 150; Sherthe corporation to recognize.
wood v. Meadow Valley, etc., Co., 50 Cal. 412. But, where he
signs a blank indorsement of transfer, with an irrevocable power of
attorney on the back of the certificate, and delivers it so signed to a
third person, he not only voluntarily puts such third person in possession of the usual symbol of his property, but he also confers on him
evidence of title, so that he may pass a good title to others, as against
the original owner, to an innocent purchaser, although he has, in
making the transfer to the innocent purchaser, proceeded in fraud o
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the original owner and exceeded the authority actually conferred.
McNeil v. Bank, 46 N. Y. 325, s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 341 ; Merchants'
Bank v. Livingston, 74 N. Y. 223; Mt. Holly, etc., Co. v. Ferree,
Assuming
17 N. J. Eq. 117; Walker v. Railroad, 47 Mich. 338.
the soundness of these decisions, it follows that in this case the plaintiff, having voluntarily delivered the certificates to the bank cashier,
indorsed in blank, as the cashier thinks, if the latter should transfer
them to a third person for safe keeping, and that third person should
wrongfully transfer them to an innocent taker, the plaintiff could not
assert a title to them as against such innocent taker.
If he could not
assert a title to them as against an innocent purchaser, it would be on
the ground that he had parted -with his title to the latter; and, if he
had parted with his title to the latter, it is not easv to see how he
could subsequently transfer a good title to another by means of a new
certificate issued by the corporation.
But as against the corporation the rights of the second purchaser,
he being an innocent purchaser, would be at least such that he could
maintain an action against the corporation for damages for refusing
to transfer the shares to him on its books
and this wholly without
reference to the rights of the preceding purchaser as against the corporation. This was ruled by the supreme court of the United States
in Bank v. Lanier, 1 1 Wall. 369, 377, where certain bona fide purchasers of national bank shares sued the bank for damages for refusMr. Justice Davis,
ing to transfer the shares to them on their books.
" The power
in giving the opinion of the court, said:
to transfer
their stock is one of the most valuable franchises conferred by conWithout this power it can readily
gress upon banking associations.
be seen the value of the stock would be greatly lessened ; and, obviously, whatever contributes to make the shares of stock a safe mode
of investment, and easily convertible, tends to enhance their value.
It is no less to the interest of the shareholder than the public, that the
certificate representing his stock should be in a form to secure public
confidence ; for without this he could not negotiate it to any advanIt is in obedience to this requirement that stock certificates of
tage.
all kinds have been constructed in a way to invite the confidence of
business men, so that they have become the basis of commercial
transactions in all the large cities of the country, and are sold in open
market the same as other securities.
Although neither in form nor
character negotiable
to it as nearly as
paper, they approximate
practicable. If we assume that the certificates in question are not
different from those in general use by corporations, and the assumption is a safe one, it is easy to see why investments of this character
are sought after and relied upon.
No better form could be adopted
to assure the purchaser that he can buy with safety.
He is told, under
the seal of the corporation, that the shareholder is entitled to so much
stock, which can be transferred on the books of the corporation in
person or by attorney, when the certificates are surrendered, but not
otherwise.
This is a notification to all persons interested to know,
that whoever in good faith buys the stock, and produces to the corpo-
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ration the certificates, regularly assigned with power to transfer, is
entitled to have the stock transferred to him.
And the notification
goes further, for it assures the holder that the corporation will not
transfer the stock to anyone not in possession of the certificates."
Without pursuing this line of inquiry further, we are clear that the
company can not be involved in the double liability, which might follow from having two original certificates for the same shares outstanding, in the absence of any statute, by-law or conventional obligation
putting such a liability on
by the mere fact that one of its shareholders has, through his fault or misfortune, lost his original certifiIf second certificate,
cate, although suitable indemnity
given.
issued,
conveying no information on its face that
duplicate,
and
dounegotiated to an innocent taker,
may find itself under
ble liability in respect of the same shares.
It may find that has isliable in
sued and received pay for one hundred shares, and that
respect of two hundred.
By this act
may impair the value of the
shares of every other stockholder in the company.
can
Besides,
be required to do this in favor of one shareholder who has been so
careless or unfortunate as to lose his certificates,
may be required
to do so for all.
In this way
may incur double liabilities, which
may not mature for years, in respect of the same shares, against which
holds bonds of indemnity which may be good to-day and worthless
to-morrow.
Suppose that the new certificates have been negotiated
to innocent takers, and in the meantime the bond of indemnity has
become worthless
by what means can the corporation proceed to get
new and sufficient bond?
These suggestions show the difficulty in the way of granting the relief claimed by the plaintiff in this case.
(Reviewing several
*
cases.)
We are, therefore, of opinion that the decree of the circuit court
We think that the most that can be required of the
must be reversed.
defendant
to issue to plaintiff duplicate certificates in lieu of the ones
this
all that
which have been lost.
W"e are also of opinion that,
required of the company, a bond of indemnity in the sum of
We direct
$1,000, signed by two solvent sureties will be sufficient.
decree rethe plaintiff shall so move, to enter
the circuit court,
bond, to
such
quiring the defendant, on the plaintiff giving to
issue to him stock certificates in lieu of those which have been lost,
bearing the same numbers, but containing the word " duplicate,"
written in red ink or conspicuously printed across their face and also
the following words, " Issued in pursuance of the decree of the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, state of Missouri, in the case of
Henry Keller v. Eureka Brick Machine Co., being case numbered
81,263, on ^ docket of that court, in lieu of other certificates found
by the court to have been accidentally lost and not negotiated by said
Keller." It
so ordered.
Judge Rombauer concurs; Judge Biggs
dissents.
a

Note.
See notes to following cases.
As to the implied warranties arising upon
v. Central Trust Co., 165 N. Y. 108, 53 L. R.

sale of stock, see, 1900, McClure
153 and note.

A.
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(c) General limit on the right to transfer;
for purpose of evading liability.

.
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transfers

NATIONAL BANK v. CASE: 1
1878.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
Rep. 628-635.

99

U. S.

[Action by Case, receiver of the Crescent City National Bank,

against

the stockholders

thereof,

to enforce

their

statutory liability.

Among the defendants against whom a decree was rendered was the
The facts as to its ownership were: In
Germania National Bank.
P.,
it
loaned
to
M.
&
Co.
$14,000, upon a pledge by the bor1872

rowers of 100 shares of stock in the Crescent bank, with power to
sell the stock upon non-pavment ; a power was also given to the cashier
the shares to the Germania bank.
to transfer
Default having
occurred, the shares were transferi'ed to the Germania bank, and immediately afterward transferred by the bank to Waldo, one of its clerks,
that he should re-transfer it at their rethere being an understanding
It
admitted
that
was
quest.
part of the reason for so doing was that
in case of insolvency the bank would be liable as a shareholder if the
stock was registered in its name.]
*
*
* Such being the facts of the case,
MR. JUSTICE STRONG.
there can be no serious controversy respecting the principles of law
It is thoroughly established that one to whom
applicable to them.
been
transferred in pledge or as collateral security for money
stock has
and
who
loaned,
appears on the books of the corporation as the owner
of the stock, is liable as a stockholder for the benefit of creditors.
We so held in Pullman v. Upton (96 U. S. 328) ; and like decisions
abound in the English courts, and in numerous American cases, to
some of which we refer:
Adderly v. Storm, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 624;
Rosevelt v. Brown, n N. Y. 148; Holyoke Bank v. Burnham, n
Cush. (Mass.) 183; Magruder v. Colston, 44 Md. 349; Crease v.
Babcock, 10 Mete. (Mass.) 525; Wheelock v. Kost, 77 111. 296; U.
S. Trust Co. v. U. S. Fire Ins. Co., 18 N. Y. 199; Hale v. Walker,
For this several reasons are given.
One is, that he is
31 Iowa 344.
estopped from denying his liability by voluntarily holding himself out
to the public as the owner of the stock, and his denial of ownership is
inconsistent with the representations he has made ; another is, that by
taking the legal title he has released the former owner; and a third is,
that after having taken the apparent ownership and thus become entitled to receive dividends, vote at elections, and enjoy all the privileges
of ownership, it would be inequitable to allow him to refuse the reThis subject is well treated in Mr,
sponsibilities of a stockholder.
Thompson's recently published work on "The Liability of Stockholders," where may be found not only a full collection of authorities,
Vide ch. 13.
but a careful analysis of what the authorities contain.
When, therefore, the stock was transferred to the Germania bank,
1
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it continued to be held merely as a collateral security, the
bank became subject to the liabilities of a stockholder,
and the
At that instant
liability accrued the instant the transfer was made.
We have, then,
the liability of Phelps, McCullough & Co. ceased.
only to inquire whether the bank succeeded in throwing off that liability by its transfer to its clerk, Waldo. It certainly did not thereby
It is not every transfer that
divest itself of its substantial ownership.
While it is
releases a stockholder from his responsibility as such.
true that shareholders of the stock of a corporation generally have a
right to transfer their shares, and thus disconnect themselves from the
is equally
corporation and from any responsibility on account of
A transfer for the mere
true that there are some limits to this right.
purpose of avoiding his liability to the company or its creditors is
fraudulent and void, and he remains still liable. The English cases,
it,
it

though

a

is

a

if,

if

is

is

it

if

is

called) "out

it

is

it

give effect to such transfers,
they are made (as
and out;" that is, completely, so as to divest the
But even in them
held
transferrer of all interest in the stock.
the transfer
that
merely colorable, or, as sometimes coarsely dein fact, the transferee
mere tool or nomisham,
nominated,
nee of the transferrer, so that, as between themselves, there has been noadmitted,

;

&

J.

3

is

i

J.

&

I

5

;

9

9

real transfer, "but in the event of the company becoming prosperous
the transferrer would become interested in the profits, the transfer will
be held for nought, and the transferrer will be put upon the list of contributories."
Williams's Case, Law Rep. Eq. 225, note, where the
transfer was, as in the present case, made to a clerk of the transferrer
without consideration
Eq. 223 Kintrea's
Payne's Case, Law Rep.
Case, Law Rep.
Ch. 95. See, also, Lindley on Partnership (2d
ed.), p. 1352; Chinnock's Case,
Johns. (Eng.) Ch. 714; Hyam's
De G., F.
De G., F.
Case,
75; Budd's Case,
297.
even more stringent.
Mr. Thompson
The American doctrine
thus, and he
states
supported by the adjudicated cases:
transfer of shares in
failing corporation, made by the transferrer
shareholder, to
with the purpose of escaping his liability as
person who, from any cause,
incapable of responding in respect to such
void as to the creditors of the company and as to other
liability,
shareholders, although as between the transferrer and the transferee
Nathan v. Whitlock,
was out and out."
Paige (N. Y.) 152;
McClaren v. Franciscus, 43 Mo. 452; Marcy v. Clark, 17 Mass.
330; Johnson v. Laflin, by Dillon, J., Dill. 65, Cent. Law Jour. 124.
The case in hand does not need the application of so rigorous a
doctrine.
While the evidence establishes that the Crescent City was
in
failing condition when the transfer to Waldo was made, and
leaves no reasonable doubt that the Germania bank knew
and made
The
the transfer to escape responsibility,
establishes much more.
transfer was not an out-and-out transfer.
The stock remained the
when
Waldo was bound to re-transfer
property of the transferrer.
requested, and all the privileges and possible benefits of ownership
continued to belong to the bank.
No case holds that such transfer
relieves the transferrer from his liability as
We are,
stockholder.
a

a

a

it

it

it

a

5

6

9

it

is

is

a

a

it

is

"A

THE CORPORATION AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS.

557

1663

therefore, compelled to rule that the decree of the circuit court against
the Germania bank was correct.
Its case, no doubt, is a hard one ;
but it is not in our power to give relief, without a sacrifice of the wellestablished rules of law and equity both in this country and in England. * * *

Affirmed.
Accord: 1838, Nathan v. Whitlock, 3 Edw. Ch. 215; 1895, Coleman
v. Howe, 154 111. 458, 471, 45 Am. St. Rep. 133 ; 1896, Burt v. Real Estate Ex.,
175 Pa. St. 619, 52 Am. St. Rep. 858; 1898, Sprague v. National Bank, 172 111.
149, 64 Am. St. Rep. 17; 1900, Wick Natl. Bk. v. Union Natl. Bk., 62 Ohio
St. 446, 57 N. E. Rep. 320; 1900, Ward v. Joslin, 100 Fed. Rep. (C. C. N. H.)
Note.

676.

The English rule is otherwise : 1859, De Pass's Case, 4 DeG. & J. 544 ; 1880,
Chynoweth's Case, L. R. 15 Ch. D. 13; 1883, In re Taurine Co., L. R. 25 Ch.
D. 118. See Cook Corp., sections 263-266.

Sec. 557.

(d)

Fraud, forgery, etc.

See East Birmingham L. Co. v. Dennis, 85 Ala. 565, supra, p.
807; Keller v. Eureka Brick Machine, etc., Co., 43 Mo. App. 84,
supra, p. 1655 ; McNeil v. Tenth Natl. Bk. , 46 N. Y. 325, infra,
p. 1674.
Note See, 1721, Monk v. Graham, 8 Mod. 9; 1722, Hilyard & South Sea
Co. v. Keate, 2 P. Wms. 76; 1765, Ashby v. Blackwell, etc., Bank, Ambler
503; 1879, Simm v. Anglo-Am. Tel. Co., 5 Q. B. Div. 188; 1879, Machinists'
Bank v. Field, 126 Mass. 345; 1883, Boston & Alb. R. v. Richardson, 135
Mass. 473; 1889, Allen v. So. Boston R., 150 Mass. 200; 1900, Phil. Natl. Bk.
v. Smith, 195 Pa. St. 38, 45 Atl. Rep. 655.

Sec. 558.
(e)
theories
(

i)

Registration of transfers upon corporate books
as to the necessity of.
Not necessary; attaching creditors of seller.

BROADWAY BANK
1860.

v.

McELRATH

Er* AL.

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY.
Eq. Rep. 24-31.

13

N.

J.

THE CHANCELLOR (GREEN). The property which forms the subject of controversy consists of fifty shares of the capital stock of the
Trenton Iron Company, of the par value of one hundred dollars
each, standing on the books of the company in the name of McElOn the 2d of June, 1854, the certificate of the stock,
rath.
for the transfer
accompanied by a power of attorney irrevocable
thereof, was delivered to the Broadway Bank, as collateral security on
a loan of four thousand dollars, obtained by McElrath from the bank,

1
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The loan was made upon
upon his individual note, at four months.
the agreement of McElrath to deposit the stock as a collateral security for the repayment of the loan, including as well the original
The note was renewed, and the accrunote as all renewals thereof.
ing interest paid, from time to time, until the 22d of November, 1857,
when the last renewal was made.
On the 24th of August, 1857, the Hunterdon County Bank sued
out of the supreme court of this state a writ of attachment against
the estate of the said McElrath, as a non-resident debtor, by virtue of
which the stock in question was attached as the property of McElrath.
Judgment having been rendered in favor of the plaintiff in attachment, and also in favor of sundry applying creditors,
the
auditors in attachment were proceeding to make sale of the stock
in question, to satisfy those judgments, when they were restrained
insist
by an injunction issuing in this cause. The complainants
that they have an equitable lien upon the stock for the payment
of the debt for which it was hypothecated as security.
The defendants claim that they have acquired a valid title to the stock at law and
in equity by virtue of the attachment.
The stock, irrespective of the complainants, was, undoubtedly,
under the provisions of the statute, the subject of attachment.
The
judgment at law has established the claims of the plaintiff and the
The validity of the proceedings
applying creditors in attachment.
The defendant's
under the attachment, is not drawn in question.
right to the property is unquestioned, except so far as it conflicts with
the prior rights of the complainants.
By the fifth section of the charter of the Trenton Iron Company,
approved February 16, 1847 (Pamph. Laws 61), it is enacted that
"the capital stock of the said corporation shall be deemed personal
estate, and be transferable upon the books of the said corporation;"
and by the ninth section of the charter it is further enacted " that
books of transfer of stock shall be kept, and shall be evidence of the
ownership of said stock in all elections and other matters submitted
to the decision of the stockholders of the said corporation."
Independent of the provisions of the charter, the stock of an incorporated company is deemed personal estate, and may be transferred
Anby a certificate of stock, accompanied by a power of transfer.
gell & Ames on Corp., section 564.
And where it is provided, by the charter or by-laws, that the stock
shall be transferred only upon the books of the corporation, there is a
decided weight of authority in support of the position that a bona
fide transfer, by delivery of the certificate, is, nevertheless, valid as
between vendor and vendee, that the equitable title passes by such
transfer, and that the claim of the vendee is good, in equity, against
the claim of an execution or attaching creditor of the vendor.
Such
provision, whether by charter or by-law, is regarded as designed to
protect the interests of the corporation, and as applying solely to the
relation between the corporation and its stockholders.
Its only office
is held to be equivalent to that of the provision contained in the ninth
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section of the charter of the Trenton Iron Company, viz., "to afford
evidence of the ownership of the stock, in all elections and other
matters submitted to the decision of the corporation," including all
questions as to the ownership of the stock as between the corporation
and its members.
Angell & Ames on Corp., 354; Bank of Utica v.
Wend.
Smalley, 2 Cowen 770; Gilbert v. Manchester Iron Co.,
627; Kortright v. Buffalo Commercial Bank, 20 Wend. 91; same
case in error, 22 Wend. 348;
Quiner v. Marblehead Insurance Co.,
10 Mass. 476; Union Bank of Georgetown v. Laird, 2 Wheat. 390;
3 Howard 513; Stebbins v. Phoenix Fire Insurance Co., 3 Paige 350,
3 Binney 394; Grant v. Mechanics' Bank, 15 Serg. & R. 140; Bank

n

of Kentucky v. Schuylkill Bank, i Parsons (Pa.) Sel. Cas. 180, 247;
United States v. Cutts, I Sumner 133.
There is not an entire uniformity of authority upon the question
whether a transfer or pledge of stock as collateral security without a
transfer upon the books of the company, as required by the charter,
will protect the holder against the claims of an attaching creditor,
though the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the right of

the assignee.
It is the well-settled rule in New York, where this contract was
made, and where the contracting parties had their domicile at the
time of the contract, and the pledge of the stock by McElrath to the
bank.
It was so expressly decided in this state long prior to the date of
that contract.
Rogers et al. v. Stevens, 4 Halst. Ch. 167.
So far as judicial determination could settle the question, it was
settled prior to the pledge of this stock, both in the state where the
contracting parties had their domicile and in the state where the corporation whose stock was transferred was chartered and transacted its
The parties to the contract may fairly have relied upon the
business.
law, as thus settled, for the protection of their rights.
It is of the
utmost importance that questions so extensively and vitally affecting
the rights of the business community should be regarded as settled by
judicial decision, and not liable to be disturbed, except for the most
Upon the faith of decisions already made upon this
cogent reasons.
very point, contracts have doubtless been entered into and securities
taken to a very large amount.
Whatever might be my conclusion as
to the true construction of the statute, were the question now for the
first time agitated, it would be alike unwise and unjust to overturn or
impair rights acquired upon the faith of recognized legal principles.
I think it clear, moreover, whatever might be the strict legal interpretation of the provision in question, that the legislature never
designed it to impair the validity of a transfer of stock, as between
It was not intended to introduce a new mode
the parties making it.
of acquiring title to stocks, much less to operate as a registry law, by
furnishing conclusive evidence to the public of the ownership of the
property. If such had been the design, it might have been expected
that the legislature would have required that the books of transfer
should be at all times open to public inspection, and the record, not

1
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merely, but in all cases, made evidence of

Nor does sound policy require such construction to be given to the
The pledge of stocks as collateral security has become a prevaact.
an advantageous mode of
lent, and to the borrower, especially,
In manufacturing companies especially, where the
effecting loans.
business of the company is carried on by the stockholder, and where
his capital is mainly or exclusively vested in the stock, and employed
in the active operations of business, the pledge of stocks affords
the most ready and advantageous mode of effecting loans for the deTo require a transfer of the stocks to the lender
mands of business.
as security for the loan against the right of attaching or execution
creditors will at once destroy the value of the security, or compel the
borrower to divest himself of his character as corporator to forfeit
his control of the business of the corporation, of his right to dividends, and of all his other rights as a stockholder in the corporation.
Why should the owner of stocks be deprived of the privilege of
mortgaging or pledging his stock for the security of a loan without
stripping himself of all -his rights of ownership more than the owner
of any other property ?
The objection is, that it will open the door to fraud and deprive an
execution or attaching creditor of the means of ascertaining the real
It is worthy of notice that this clause requirownership of the stock.
ing a transfer of stock on the books of the company was inserted in
nunferous charters long before the stock was made the subject of execution. But the objection, as applied to a transfer of stock, is of less
weight than against a chattel mortgage, the chattel remaining in the
hands of the mortgagor, which is held to be a valid security.
Runyon v. Groshon, i Beasley 86.
The transfer book is not the only evidence of the ownership of
The certificate, which has always been deemed ^rima facie
stock.
evidence of ownership, is the only evidence in possession of the
owner, and where there 'has been no transfer, is the only recognized
evidence of title.
It is urged that the contract for the pledge of this stock was executory merely; that it does not purport to transfer the ownership of
the shares, but simply gives an authority to transfer upon failing to
pay the debt ; and hence it is further argued that the stock can not be
held as a pledge because that requires a transfer of possession.
The
It was fully
contract between the parties was in no sense executory.
The absolute
executed according to the intention of the parties.
ownership of the stock, it is true, was not transferred, nor was it inThe spirit and design of the contract was that
tended it should be.
the legal ownership of the stock should continue in McElrath ; that
he should remain a member of the corporation, with the right to receive the dividends upon the stock, to vote at all elections, and with
all other rights pertaining to him as a stockholder and member of the
and that the bank should hold the stock as collateral
company,
security for the payment of the loan, with the absolute and irrevoca-
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See note at end of next case.
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ble right of transferring the legal ownership upon failure to pay the
debt.
The same objection existed in many of the reported cases
where the right of the party holding the certificate of stock as evidence of his claim was sustained against the claims of attaching or
execution creditors.
3 Binney 394; 4 Halst. Ch. 167.
Such a certificate annexed to or accompanying a blank power of
attorney, we can not doubt, not only according to the understanding
of men in business, but upon well-settled principles of law, passes
by delivery an equitable title to a bona fide purchaser; nor can such
purchaser be justly prevented from converting his equitable into a
legal title by filling up and exercising the power, whenever he is entitled to do so by the nature and terms of the contract under which
When the stock is sold absothe certificates were delivered to him.
lutely his right then to perfect his title is immediate ; when it is
hypothecated, the right accrues when the debt meant to be secured
becomes due and remains unpaid.
Per Ackley, C. J., in Fatman v.
Lobach, i Duer 354, 361.
It is obvious, moreover, that so far as regards the legal ownership
of the stock, if the transfer upon the books of the company alone can
constitute legal ownership, that the contract of sale is as fully executed
by delivering the certificate, with the power of immediate transfer on
the books of the company, as by a formal assignment accompanying
the certificate.
The holder of a certificate of shares of stock, accompanied by an
irrevocable power of attorney to transfer them, is the apparent owner,
and when he is the holder for value without notice his title can not be
impeached. Leavitt v. Fisher, 4 Duer i.
Aside from the general principles by which, I think, the case must
be controlled, it is worthy of notice that the charter of the company,
the stock of which is here the subject of controversy, is somewhat variant from many of those which have formed the subject of adjudication. In the case of Fisher v. The Essex Bank, 5 Gray 373, the act
of incorporation declared that the stock of the bank should be transferable only at its banking-house and on its books. The court say
" carries an implication as strong as negative
that the word " only
words could make
that the transfer should be in no other mode.
made
was not to prescribe one mode, leaving others unaffected
that mode exclusive.
The charter of the Trenton Iron Company contains no such exclusive language.
declares merely that the stock
shall be transferable on the books of the company, and further provides that the books of transfer shall be evidence of ownership, as beIf the transfer on the books
tween the company and its stockholders.
was designed to be the only evidence of ownership, the latter provision would seem to be unnecessary.
The right of the bank
in no wise prejudiced by the fact that they
as
creditors
under the attachment, and presented
applying
appeared
their claim to the auditors.
not questioned, and they are entiThe bona fides of their claim
tled to the stock in question clear of the lien of the attachment.
Decree accordingly.
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ESSEX BANK. 1

IN THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
Gray (Mass.) Rep. 373-383.

5

[Action by Fisher to recover damages for the bank's refusal to
The shares stood in
transfer forty shares of its stock to plaintiff.
the name of one Bingham, from whom the plaintiff purchased them
February 26, 1852, -receiving the certificate therefor, duly assigned
with a power of attorney in blank to have them transferred upon the
books of the bank.
April 13, Fisher wrote the president of the bank
that he had the forty shares, with power of attorney from Bingham,
and which he was authorized to sell, and asked his assistance, saying
Bingham was absent for a few days, but would probably be home by
the time an answer was received, and saying the stock would then be
forwarded, if the price was satisfactory.
May 10, an attorney of the
plaintiffs presented to the bank the certificates with the power of attorney, and demanded a transfer ; the bank refused, because the shares
had been attached as the property of Bingham. After all the evidence
was in, by agreement, a verdict j>ro forma for plaintiff was taken,
and the case reported to the whole court.]
SHAW, C. J. * * * Shares in incorporated companies, such as
banks, insurance companies, bridges, turnpikes and railroads, have
long been considered in this commonwealth as property of a definite
and important character, with many of the qualities of visible, tangible, personal property, and having a value, and as capable of
appreciation as vessels, or merchandise, or other personal chattels.
But it is not visible or tangible, and therefore not like merchandise,
capable of passing by manual delivery.
A nearer analogy, perhaps, is that of a chose in action, capable,
like this, of being assigned in equity, by a delivery over of the certificate, which is the assignor's muniment of title, with an assignment
duly executed, transferring to the assignee all the assignor's right, title
And yet it is not like the assignment of a chose in acand interest.
tion, which is the transfer of the assignor's interest in a debt, and
vests in the assignee an equitable right to collect the debt in the name
of the assignor.
The right is, sti'ictly speaking, a right to participate, in a certain
proportion, in the immunities and benefits of the corporation; to vote
in the choice of their officers, and the management of their concerns;
to share in the dividends of profits, and to receive an aliquot part of
the proceeds of the capital, on winding up and terminating the active
Again: when a transfer
existence and operations of the corporation.
is rightfully made and completed, it vests a right in the transferee,
1
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not merely to act in the place of the vendor and in his name, but substitutes him, in all respects, as the legal and only holder of the shares
transferred, to the same extent to which they were before held by the
The title, therefore, by which such interest is held, is strictly
vendor.
a legal title ; it is created and defined by law ; its benefits are secured
by law ; it is transferable by operation of law, and may be attached
on mesne process and seized on execution, and sold by legal authority
to satisfy the debts of the owner.
Before any method was established by positive law, how, by what
mode, or by what precise and definite act, such property should be
considered as ceasing to be the property of the seller and becoming
the property of the purchaser, courts of justice might well resort to
the common law modes of transferring similar incorporeal interests,
and hold that a delivery of the only muniment of title held by the
owner, with the execution and delivery of an assignment of his interest, by indorsement on the certificate or otherwise, should by analogy
be held to be a valid transfer, and, when notified to the bank, should
be considered as having taken effect at the date of such delivery.
But whatever common law rules courts may have felt bound to
adopt, in the absence of any express rule of law, in determining what
act constitutes the actual transfer of shares, the point of time at
which the one alienates and the other acquires a legal title to such
shares, we can perceive no room to doubt that, where it is so reguIn the present case there is such an
lated, such law must govern.
in
of
the
act
itself. The bank is of
incorporation
provision
express
Sts., 1851, ch. 269.
recent origin, the act was passed in 1851.
Like
most other modern acts of incorporation, the act, after creating the
corporation, giving it a name, fixing its location and limiting its capital stock, defines its powers and duties by reference to other acts on
But section 3 is a special provision to this effect: "The
the subject.
stock of said bank shall be tranferable only at its banking house and
on its books."
By the law of this commonwealth, acts of incorporation are deemed public acts.
Rev. Sts., ch. 2, section 3. Like other
public acts of legislation, their provisions constitute laws, by which
all courts and magistrates, all citizens and subjects are bound.
But it was strongly urged, in the learned argument for the plaintiffs in this case, that this provision in the charter can have no greater
force and effect than a by-law of the corporation in the same terms,
and does not make a transfer on the books of the bank necessary to
There is something in one New York case which
pass the title.
countenances this suggestion ; but perhaps it originated in the peculiar
If the corporation are fully
provisions of the New York statutes.
authorized to make by-laws, regulating the transfer, there would seem
to be some ground for holding that they would be binding upon those
holding or seeking to hold shares in the same corporation. If a bylaw would have the same effect, then it is unnecessaiy to make the
distinction between a by-law binding upon corporators, and all those
claiming to stand in relation of corporators, and a general law of the
2
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commonwealth
But if there be such a
binding on all its subjects.
then
here
is
a
law
of
the
commonwealth
distinction,
binding upon all.
But the argument goes further, and insists that the transfer at the
bank is not essential to transfer the property to a bona fide purchaser,
but is merely a regulation for the convenience and protection of the

bank.

We can see no ground upon which thus to restrict the plain provision of the statute. If we may judge of the intended operation of an
act of legislation from the useful and beneficial purposes it may tend
to promote, we should construe it as having a much broader and more
We are to take it in connection with all other
comprehensive scope.
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existing laws.
As a great amount of property is held in Massachusetts in the
shares of corporations, it is of importance that the title be easily and
certainly ascertained, that the mode of acquiring and alienating it be
fixed and known, and that it may at any time be made available, by
process of law, for the debts of the owner.
In no wav can these objects be so well effected as by a transfer at
The law might have provided that the bearer of the certhe bank.
tificate should be deemed the holder, so that it might pass from hand
to hand by mere manual delivery.
But this would be attended with
almost inextricable difficulty.
It would be impossible for officers and
co-proprietors to know who their associates were, and at every meeting nothing could be done till those present should produce their certificates, and thus show who were entitled to vote ; and even then,
The shares
certificates might change owners during the meeting.
could never be attached ; for the officer could have no means to obtain possession of the certificate from a reluctant debtor adversely
interested; and, without
the shares might pass the next day to
without
notice.
purchaser
2. The certificate, in the form now given, may show who
the
owner
at
the
but
certificate
issue,
date
of
this
its
legal
outstanding
may
have been loaned, pledged, assigned in equity, which
now contended would, as between the parties, be
good and valid transfer.
It can not therefore be known, by the books of the bank, who proprietor at any one time.
obviously an object of great importance, that this large
3. It
amount of property should be attachable and liable to be sold on execution.
This has long been the policy of the state by earlier
statutes, ultimately embraced in the Rev. Sts. ch. 90, section 36; ch.
The certificate being in the hands of the
et seq.
97, sections
debtor, or some other person on his account, and his interest being
adverse to that of the attaching creditor, the officer could seldom,
ever, take possession of
chattel.
as of
It therefore provided that
the attachment may be effected by leaving written notice at the bank;
and, on
made the duty of the bank and its
sale on execution,
officers, on notice and request, to give the purchaser
new certificate.
This of necessity supersedes the outstanding certificate to the former
holder.
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All these objects are most effectually accomplished by making the
transfer at the bank the decisive act of passing the property, the
I do not stop to ask precisely
legal transferable, attachable interest.
what particular act would constitute such a transfer; whether it must
be actually entered on the books, or whether the delivery of the certificate by the holder ready to transfer, or with a written transfer executed, so that nothing remains but the mere executive act. of the
In either case it would show who is at any time
clerk, is sufficient.
the actual owner by the books, and inform a creditor, or other person
having occasion to know and right to inquire. It is necessary to fix
some act, and some point of time, at which the property changes and
vests in the vendee; and it will tend to the security of all parties concerned to make that turning point consist in an act which, whilst it
may be easily proved, does at the same time give notoriety to the
transfer.
It would seem to us to be going beyond the rules of just
exposition, to hold that a plain provision of statute law, calculated to
promote the security of important legal rights of parties in important
particulars, should be construed to be a regulation made for the conThe clause itself is too clear to
venience and protection of banks.
admit of doubt:
"Shall be transferable only," that is, capable of
being transferred ; the largest and broadest term to express alienation
on one part and acquisition on the other; and the word "only" carries an implication as strong as negative words could make
that is,
in no other mode.
was not to prescribe one mode, leaving others
it

a

It

a

4

a

it

2

is

;

unaffected
made that mode exclusive.
Nor
this position without high authority to support it.
In Union
Bank v. Laird, Wheat. 390,
was held by the supreme court of the
United States that, where shares were, by the act of incorporation,
made transferable on the books, no person could acquire
legal title
in any other mode.
The early Massachusetts cases cited for the plaintiffs, such as Dix
v. Cobb,
Mass. 508, were mere equitable assignments of choses in
action, and held valid as equitable assignments.
Quiner v. Marblehead Social Ins. Co., 10 Mass. 476, was the case
of
new corporation, the full amount not paid in, no certificates to
proprietors issued, but certain installments had been paid in by subThe act of incorporascribers, for which receipts had been given.
tion provided that no transfer should be valid till the stock was all
was held that an assignment of these certificates, with
paid in.
power to complete the payment in the name of the assignor, was
Besides, there does not appear to have
good assignment in equity.
been any clause in the charter or by-law directing how shares should
be transferred when the company should be organized and in opera-

tion.

a

a

a

8

In the case of Sargent v. Franklin Ins. Co.,
Pick. 90, the old certificate, together with an executed assignment of the shares, was tendered to the secretary of the company at their office in business hours,
with
new certifipower of attorney to transfer on the books, and
cate was demanded.
This was full compliance with the by-law on
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it was the duty of the company then to
the part of the purchasers;
enter the assignment, and they could not set up their own wrongful
act in refusing to enter the transfer, and an attempt to attach the
shares themselves, in their own defense.
The reasoning of the court
may have gone further in stating the grounds, but these were amply
sufficient to warrant the adjudication.
The case of Sergent v. Essex Marine Railway, 9 Pick. 202, is
much nearer the present case, and, so far as the requirement that the
transfer be made at the bank rests on a mere by-law, is in point. The
by-law required that all transfers be made in a book, in a specific
The court consider this
form, and transferable only on the books.
by-law, requiring a transfer in a particular form on the books of the
bank, as an arrangement of the corporation for their own convenience.
But they add : "Neither the act of incorporation, nor any other statute,
requires that an assignment shall be recorded in order to give it validity." 9 Pick. 205. This seems to carry a clear implication that if
any provision of law, binding on all persons as such, had required it
to be recorded, it must be entered in the books, or delivered to the
proper officer for record, to give it validity.
We are aware that several of the New York cases cited in the argument are decisions contrary to the rule we now adopt.
But it is to be
remarked that, in the case of Commercial Bank of Buffalo v. Kortright, 22 Wend. 348, before the court of errors, the chancellor and a
respectable minority of the members of the court dissented on this
point, and were of opinion that, when the charter contains a provision
that no transfer shall be valid unless registered in the books, an unregistered transfer does not convey a legal title, but an equitable interest only, subject to all prior equities.
And we think the authority of the case in New York is more than
counterbalanced by the decisions of several of the neighboring states.
In Vermont, the court says: " We entertain no reasonable doubt
that the mode of transfer of stock pointed out in the charter is the
only mode which the public are bound to regard as conveying the
title. All persons, unaffected with notice to the contrary, are at
liberty to act upon the faith of the title being where it appears upon
the books of the corporation to be."
Sabin v. Bank of Woodstock,
21

Vt. 353.
In Connecticut, there are several

cases precisely in point.
The
question of actual transfer is considered to be a question of legal
title ; and in all transfers under such charter and by-law, the change
of title is held to take place when the instrument of transfer is received for record by the clerk, and the transfer bears date from that
time.
Oxford Turnpike Co. v. Bunnel, 6 Conn. 552.
In the present case, it is insisted that the plaintiffs presented the
certificate, with a transfer from Bingham, and demanded a transfer
before the sale on execution.
This is true ; but the attachment on
mesne process was made before any such notice given and demand
made by the plaintiffs ; and the title of the attaching creditor relates
back to the time of attachment.
We are of opinion, therefore, that
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Plaintiffs nonsuit.

The cases are in conflict as to the necessity of having transfers regisNote.
tered upon the corporate books in order to pass the title to the shares of stock.
Perhaps the general rules can be stated: (1) The corporation, when it has
no knowledge to the contrary, can rely upon its records in paying dividends,
etc. (2) Creditors can rely upon the corporate records and hold those whose
names there appear to anv shareholder's liability.
(3) A3 between seller and
purchaser alone, the delivery of the certificate properly indorsed, without
registration on the corporate books, passes the title. (4) As to attaching
creditors of the seller, delivery of certificate properly indorsed (by one line
of authority), is sufficient to give the purchaser, before registration, a better
title than the attaching creditor; another line of authorities holds the contrary. (5) A shareholder whose certificate has been lost without negligence,
or has been stolen, is not divested of his title, even though it was indorsed in
blank, and a bonafide purchaser obtains registration in his. name on the corporate books.
(6) It is the duty of the corporation and of the purchaser
generally to see that the old certificate is surrendered when a new one is
issued in place of an old one.
(7) If the corporation issues a new one without the old being surrendered, it becomes liable upon both outstanding certificates to good faith holders thereof. (8) A purchaser who does not exercise reasonable care to see that the old certificate is surrendered, when the
transfer is made to him upon the corporate books, is not a bonafide purchaser
as against the rightful holder of the certificate of stock ; but (9) it seems
that where each of two purchasers is in every respect a bonafide purchaser,
the one who relies upon the register, and in good faith gets the transfer made
to him upon the books of the company, gets a better title than the. bona
fide holder of the certificate alone; and (10) when the owner of shares
places them in the hands of others in such way as to apparently clothe them
with full power to transfer the same as their own and they do so to a bona
fide purchaser, he gets a good title which the original owner is estopped to

question.
The following cases, under various circumstances, and for different purposes, have held that registration upon the corporate books is essential:
1818, Marlborough Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 2 Conn. 579; 1839, Coleman v. Spencer,
5 Blackf. 197; 1845, Black v. Zacharie, 3 How. 483; 1861, Pinkerton v. Railroad Co., 42 N. H. 424; 1885, Lippitt v. Am. Wood Paper Co., 15 R. I. 141;
1887, Fort Madison Lumber Co. v. Batavian Bank, 71 la. 270; 1898, McFall
v. Buckeye Grangers, etc., Co., 122 Cal. 468, 68 Am. St. Rep. 47 ; 1898, Sprague
v. National Bank, 172 111. 149, 64 Am. St. Rep. 17; 1898, Russell v. Easterbrook, 71 Conn. 50, 40 Atl. Rep. 905; 1898, Parker v. Carolina Sav. Bank,
53 S. C. 583, 31 S. E. Rep. 673; 1900, Giesen v. London & N. W., etc., Co.,
102 Fed. Rep. 584; 1900, Perkins v. Lyons, 111 la. 192, 82 N. W. Rep. 486.
The following hold that registration upon the corporate books is not essential
to the transfer:
1845, St. Louis Ins. Co. v. Goodfellow, 9 Mo. 149 ; 1850, Biddle
v. Bayard, 13 Pa. St. 150; 1875, Sherwood v. Meadow Valley, etc., Co., 50 Cal.
412; 1880, Boston Music Hall Assn.v. Cory, 129 Mass. 435; 1881, Continental
Nat'l Bank v. Eliot Nat'l Bank, 7 Fed. Rep. 369; 1892, Gemmell v. Davis, 75
Md. 546 ; 32 Am. St. Rep. 412 ; 1892. Lund v. Wheaton R. Co., 50 Minn. 36 ; 1895,
Allen v. Stewart, 7 Del. Ch. 287,44 Atl. Rep. 786; 1895, Hotchkiss & U. Co. v.
Union National Bank, 37 U. S. App. 86; 1896, Spreckles v. Nevada Bank, 113
Cal. 272, 54 Am. St. Rep. 348 ; 1896, Meredith Village Sav. Bank v. Marshall, 68
N. H. 417, 44 Atl. Rep. 526 ; 1899, Bates-Farley Sav. Bank v. Dismukes, 107 Ga.
212, 33 S. E. Rep. 175; 1899, Masury v. Ark. Natl. Bank, 93 Fed. Rep. (C. C.
A. Ark.) 603; 1900, Batesville Tel. Co. v. Myer, etc., Co., 68 Ark. 115, 56 S.
W. Rep. 784 ; 1900, State v. Whited & Wheless, 104 La. 125, 28 So. Rep. 922.
Attachment of shares:
See, 1858, Evans v. Monot, 4 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 227; 1883,
(a) Where:
Plimpton v. Bigelow, 93 N. Y. 592, supra, p. 811 ; 1886, Winslow v. Fletcher, 53
Conn. 390, 13 Am. & E. C. C. 39 ; 1892, Armour & Co. v. St. L., etc., Co., 113 Mo.
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20 S. W. Rep. 690 ; 1893, Smith v. Downey, 8 Ind. App. 179, 52 Am. St.
Rep. 467, note 474; 1895, Ireland v. Globe Milling Co., 19 R. I. 180, 61 Am.
St. Rep. 756, 29 L. R. A. 429; 1900, Simpson v. Jersey City, etc., Co., 165 N.
Y. 193, 58 N. E. Rep. 896.
(b) How:
Attaching creditor of seller who properly notifies corporation before transfer is registered gets better title to the shares than the purchasing certificateholder: 1860, Skowhegan Bank v. Cutler, 49 Me. 315; 1861, Pinkerton v.
Railroad Co., 42 N-. H. 424; 1877, Chesapeake & O. R. v. Paine, 29 Gratt.
(Va.) 502; 1882, Shenandoah V. R. v. Griflith, 76 Va. 913; 1885, Lippitt v.
Am. Wood Paper Co., 15 R. I. 141; 1887, Fort Madison L. Co. v. Batavian
Bank, 71 Iowa 270; 1890, Conway v. John, 14 Colo. 30, 23 Pac. Rep. 170;
v. St. Louis, etc., R., 108 Mo. 588, 18 S. W. Rep. 286; 1900,
1891, Wilson
Fahrney v. Kelly, 102 Fed. Rep. (C. C. Ark.) 403.
Contra: Transferee gets better title without registration:
1860, Broadway
Bank v. McElrath, 13 N. J. Eq. 24, supra, p. 1663; 1873, Smith v. Am. Coal
Co., 7 Lans. (N. Y.) 317; 1880, Boston Music Hall Assn. v. Cory, 129 Mass.
435; 1880, Eby v. Guest, 94 Pa. St. 160; 1881, Continental Natl. Bk. v. Eliot,
etc., Bk., 7 Fed. Rep. 369; 1888, Telford, etc., Tp. Co. v. Gerhab (Pa.), 13 Atl.
Rep. 90; 1892, Doty v. First Nat'l Bk., 3 N. Dak. 9, 53 N. W. Rep. 77; 1892,
Lund v. Wheaton, 50 Minn. 36, 52 N. W. Rep. 268; 1892, Cooper v. Griffin,
66 L. T. Rep. 660; 1893, Kern v. Day, 45 La. 71, 12 So. Rep. 6.
12,
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Fraudulent transfer by pledgee.
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OF

APPEALS.

46

N. Y. Rep.

[Action to compel a surrender of shares of stock. Plaintiff was the
owner of 134 shares of stock in the First National Bank of St. Johnsville, the certificate of which he had indorsed with a blank assignment
and power of attorney to transfer, duly signed, and purporting to be
for value received, and which he had delivered to G. B. & D., his
stock brokers, to secure any balance of account, then about $3,000.
These brokers, without the authority or knowledge of the plaintiff,
pledged these shares to the Tenth National Bank, along with other
securities, to secure an advance of $45,135; after the other securities
were sold, there was left a balance of $15,219 of the advance unpaid.
Court below gave judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant appealed.]
RAPALLO, J. The pledge of the plaintiff's shares by his brokers,
for a larger sum than the amount of their lien thereon, was a clear
violation of their duty, and excess of their actual power. And if the
effect of the transaction was merely to transfer to the appellant,
through Fred. Butterfield, Jacobs & Co., the title or interest of Goodyear Brothers and Durant in the shares, the judgment appealed from
was right.
It must be conceded, that as a general rule, applicable to property
other than negotiable securities, the vendor or pledger can convey no
But this is a truism predicable of
greater right or title than he has.
1

Statement abridged, arguments

and part of opinion omitted.
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a simple transfer from one party to another where no other element
intervenes.
It does not interfere with the well-established principle,
that where the true owner holds out another, or allows him to appear,
as the owner of, or as having full power or disposition over, the property, and innocent third parties are thus led into dealing with such
Their rights in such cases
apparent owner, they will be protected.
do not depend upon the actual title or authority of the party with
whom they deal directly, but are derived from the act of the real
owner, which precludes him from disputing, as against them, the existence of the title or power which, through negligence or mistaken
confidence, he caused or allowed to appear to be vested in the party
making the conveyance.
Pickering v. Busk, 15 East 38; Gregg v.
Wells, 10 Adol. & El. 90; Saltus v. Everett, 20 Wend. 267, 284;
Mowrey v. Walsh, 8 Cow. 238; Root v. French, 13 Wend. 570.
The true point of inquiry in this case is, whether the plaintiff did
confer upon his brokers such an apparent title to, or power of disposition over, the shares in question, as will thus estop him from asserting his own title, as against parties who took bona jide through the
brokers.
Simply intrusting the possession of a chattel to another as depositary, pledgee or other bailee, or even under a conditional executory
contract of sale, is clearly insufficient to preclude the real owner from
reclaiming his property, in case of an unauthorized disposition of it
Ballard v. Burgett, 40 N. Y. R.
by the person so intrusted.
" The mere possession of chattels, by whatever means acquired, 314.
there be no other evidence of property or authority to sell from the
true owner, will not enable the possessor to give a good title." Per
Denio, J. , in Covill v. Hill, 4 Denio 323.
But if the owner intrusts to another, not merely the possession of
the property, but also written evidence, over his own signature, of
title thereto, and of an unconditional power of disposition over it, the
case is vastly different.
There can be no occasion for the delivery of
such documents, unless it is intended that they shall be used, either
If
at the pleasure of the depositary, or under contingencies to arise.
the conditions upon which this apparent right of control is to be exercised are not expressed on the face of the instrument, but remain in
confidence between the owner and the depositary, the case can not be
distinguished in principle from that of an agent who receives secret
instructions qualifying or restricting an apparently absolute power.
In the present case, the plaintiff delivered to and left with his brokers,
the certificate of the shares, having indorsed thereon the form of an
assignment, expressed to be made "for value received," and an irrevocable power to make all necessary transfers.
The name of the
transferee and attorney, and the date were left blank.
This document
was signed by the plaintiff, and its effect must be now considered.
It is said in some English cases, that blank assignments of shares
in corporations are irregular and invalid ; but that opinion is expressed
in cases where the shares could only be transferred by deed under

if
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seal, duly attested, and is placed upon the ground that a deed can not
be executed in blank.
Without referring to the American doctrine on that subject, it is
It
sufficient to say that no such formality was requisite in this case.
was only necessary to a valid transfer as between the parties, that the
The common practice
assignment and power should be in writing.
of passing the title to stock by delivery of the certificate with blank
assignment and power has been repeatedly shown and sanctioned in
Such was established to
cases which have come before our courts.
be the common practice in the city of New York, in the case of The
New York and New Haven Railroad Company v. Schuyler, 34 N.
Y. 30, and the rights of parties claiming under such instruments were
fully recognized in that case. And in the case of Kortright v. The
Commercial Bank of Buffalo, 20 Wend. 91, and 22 Wend. 348, the
same usage was established as existing in New York and other states,
and it was expressly held that even in the absence of such usage a
blank transfer on the back of the certificate, to which the holder has
affixed his name, is a good assignment ; and that a party to whom it
is delivered is authorized to fill it up, by writing a transfer and power
of attorney over the signature.
It has also been settled, by repeated adjudications, that as between
the parties, the delivery of the certificate, with assignment and power
indorsed, passes the entire title, legal and equitable, in the shares,
notwithstanding that, by the terms of the charter or by-laws of the
corporation, the stock is declared to be transferable only on its books ;
that such provisions are intended solely for the protection of the corporation, and can be waived or asserted at its pleasure, and that no
effect is given to them except for the protection of the corporation ;
that they do not incapacitate the shareholder from parting with his interest, and that his assignment, not on the books, passes the entire
legal title to the stock, subject only to such liens or claims as the corand excepting the right of voting at elecporation may have upon
tions, etc.
Angell and Ames on Corporations, 8th ed., section 354;
Bank of Utica v. Smalley,
Cow. 770; Gilbert v. Manchester Co.,
n Wend. 627; Kortright v. Commercial Bank of Buffalo, 22 Wend.
N. Y. and N. H. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30.
348, 362
In the case of Kortright v. Com. Bank, Chancellor Walworth, in
dissenting opinion, strenuously maintained, in conformity with his
Paige 356, that
previous decision in Stebbins v. Phoenix Ins. Co.,
by transfer not on the books, the transferee acquired only an equitable
right to or lien on the shares and that, having but an equitable
right or lien, he took subject to all prior equities which existed in
favor of any other person from whom such assignment was obtained.
22 Wend. 352, 353, 355But his view was overruled by the majority
of the court.
The action was at law in assumpsit, brought by the
holder of the certificate and power, for
refusal to permit him to
make
transfer on the books, and the question of his legal title was
The judgment therein must therenecessarily involved in the case.
fore be regarded as
direct adjudication that, as between the parties,
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the legal title to the shares will pass by delivery of the certificate and
power. See 20 Wend. 362.
This was reasserted in this court in the New Haven Railroad Case,
34 N. Y. 80, notwithstanding what was said in the Mechanics' Bank

Case,

13

N. Y.

625.

his transfer, the holder of the certificate
and power fails to obtain the right to vote, and may lose his stock by
fraudulent transfer on the books of the company, by the registered
holder, to a bona fide purchaser (34 N. Y. 80) ; but in this respect
he is in a condition analogous to that of the holder of an unrecorded
deed of land, and possesses a no less perfect title as against the assignAnd he would have an action against the corporaor and others.
tion, for allowing such a transfer in violation of his rights.
(34 N.
Y. 80.) He also takes the risk of the collection of dividends by his
assignor, or of any lien the corporation may have on the shares. But
in other respects his title is complete.
The holder of such a certificate and power, possesses all the external indicia of title to the stock, and an apparently unlimited power
of disposition over it. He does not appear to have, as is said in some
of the authorities cited, concerning the assignee of a chose in action,
a mere equitable interest, which is said to be notice to all persons
dealing with him that they take subject to all equities, latent or otherwise, of third parties; but, apparently, the legal title and the means
of transferring such title in the most effectual manner.
Such, then, being the nature and effect of the documents with which
the plaintiff intrusted his brokers, what position does he occupy toward persons who, in reliance upon those documents, have in good
faith advanced money to the brokers or their assigns on a pledge of
the shares?
When he asserts his title, and claims, as against them,
that he could not be deprived of his property without his consent, can
not he be truly answered that, by leaving the certificate in the hands of
his brokers, accompanied by an instrument bearing his own signature,
which purported to be executed for a consideration and to convey the
title away from him, and to empower the bearer of it irrevocably to
dispose of the stock, he in fact " substituted his trust in the honesty
of his brokers for the control which the law gave him over his own
property," and that the consequences of a betrayal of that trust,
should fall upon him who reposed
rather than upon innocent strangers, from whom the bix>kers were thereby enabled to obtain their
money
These principles in substance were applied in the case of Kortright
v. The Commercial Bank.
But
sought to distinguish that case
from this; and
argued, that there the certificate was intrusted to an
for
agent, with authority from his principal to borrow money upon
the benefit of his principal, and that he simply exceeded his authority
by borrowing more than he was authorized to borrow, and absconding with the excess. * * *
The principles of agency are, however, applicable to this case.
In disposing of pledge, the pledgee acts under
power from the
a

a

it

it

is

it
is

?

it,

By omitting to register
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The distinction between a lien and a pledge is said to be,
that a mere lien can not be enforced by sale by the act of the party,
but that a pledge is a lien with a power of sale superadded.
Story on
Bailments, yth ed. , 311, note 2 ; Wasson v. Smith, 2 B. & Aid. 439.
The pledgee in selling, is bound to protect the interests of the pledgor,
and, as to the surplus, represents the pledgor exclusively.
Now, for
what purpose was the apparent ownership and power of disposition
of this stock vested in the brokers ? Surely for the purpose of enabling them, effectually and summarily, to execute this power under
If the power was absolute on its face, or if the
certain conditions.
whole legal title was by the instrument apparently vested in the
pledgee, and the condition was secret, wherein does the case differ in
principle from one of ordinary agency?
I am at a loss to conceive on what principle it can be claimed, that
an apparent naked authority is more effectual to bind the party giving
than an apparent ownership as well as authority.
In the case of Jarvis v. Rogers, 13 Mass. 105, the shares were transThe shareholder indorsed
ferable by indorsement of the certificates.
debt.
The debtor's friend,
his certificates and pledged them for
and
his
with
the
and took up the
funds,
his
debt
paid
authority,
by
certificates, and the debtor allowed them to remain thus indorsed, in
This friend afterward
his hands, but not for any specific purpose.
for
debt
to
advanced thereon in
them
his
own
who
pledged
party
It was decided that the latter could hold them against
good faith.
the true owner.
The court after distinguishing the case from one of mere bailment,
says that after the plaintiff had put his name on the back of the certificates, and allowed them to go into the market with that transferable
did not lie in the mouth of him who offered
quality about them,
them to the world in that shape to deny the effect of his own words
and actions.
This decision was adhered to, and repeated in Jarvis v. Rogers, 15
Mass. 389, and recognizes substantially the same doctrine as Kortright v. The Commercial Bank, omitting the element of excess by
an agent, of authority actually given, which
supposed to have
governed that case.
case precisely in point, and
Fatman v. Loback,
Duer 354,
see no ground upon which the conclusions of the learned court in
The case of McCready v.
that case can be successfully assailed.
cited as overruling Fatman v. Loback,
Rumsey, Duer 574, which
The question in Duer was between the assignee
has no such effect.
was held that the lien of the
of the shares and the corporation, and
corporation on the stock for unpaid subscription was protected where
the transfer was not made on the books,
position fully recognized
have cited.
Moreover in the case
in this opinion, and in the cases
in
Duer, the general act under which the corporation was formed,
provided that transferees of shares should take subject to the liabilities of prior shareholders.
In the cases of Ex parte Swan,
C. B. N. S. 400; Swan v. The
a

7

6

I

a
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North British Australasian Co., 7 Hurl. & Nor. 603, and Swan v.
The North British Australasian Co., 2 Hurl. & Coltman 175, some of
these questions receive a most elaborate discussion, and there was a
strong array of judicial opinions sustaining the validity of transfers of
stock, unauthorized in point of fact on the ground that by mere negligence, and unintentionally, the true owner had enabled another to deliver an apparently valid title to the stock, and thus deceive third
parties.
In that case, the plaintiff had intrusted to a broker ten deeds of
transfer, executed in blank, for the purpose of transferring certain
shares.
The broker used only eight of them for the purpose intended,
and feloniously filled up and used the others as transfers of other
shares, belonging to the same party, forged the name of a subscribing
witness, and stole the certificates of the shares from the plaintiff's
box, of which the plaintiff kept the key.
He then sold the shares to
bona fide purchasers.
He was convicted of the larceny.
In a contest by the owner to get back the shares, the common
bench was, after two arguments, equally divided upon the question
whether the owner was not estopped from reclaiming the shares, by
reason of his negligence in intrusting the blank transfers to the
broker, though they were intended for other shares. The case was
taken to the court of exchequer, and that court was equally divided
It was then taken to the exchequer chamupon the same question.
ber, where it was finally disposed of, principally on the ground, that
to estop the owner, his negligence must be the proximate cause of the
deceit.
That here it was too remote, as the blank deeds of transfer
were intended for other shares, and the broker had to commit forgery
to make them available, and a separate felony to obtain possession of
the certificates.
In the case at bar none of these difficulties exist. The assignment
and power were intended for these identical shares ; they, as well as
the certificate,
were voluntarily intrusted by the plaintiff to the
brokers, and the latter were thus invested with the apparent ownership and right of disposal, not merely by the negligence of the true
owner, but by his voluntary act, and for the very purpose of attesting
to the world their title and power, in case the contingency should
arise, in which, according to the understanding between them and the
plaintiff, they would be justified in resorting to the stock for their
*
*
*
own indemnity.
My conclusion is that the Tenth National Bank must, on the facts
found, be deemed to have advanced bona fide on the credit of the
shares, and of the assignment and power executed by the plaintiff,
and is entitled to hold the stock for the full amount so advanced, and
remaining unpaid, after exhausting the other securities received for the
*
*
*
same advance.
The judgment of the general term, and that entered on the report
of the referee, should be modified, so as to allow the plaintiff to redeem, on payment of the balance due to the Tenth National Bank,
on its advance of June 19, 1868, and the costs of the action.
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All concur except Allen and Folger,
Judgment modified.

JJ.,

See, 1899, Brittan v. Oakland Bank,
Note.
Watch Case Mfg. Co. v. Daugherty, 62 Ohio St.
Westinghouse v. German Natl. Bk., 196 Pa. St.
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EARL, J. This is an action to foreclose a pledge of certain shares
of stock in the Adams Express Company.
Some time prior to January, 1875, the defendant, Livingston, being
the owner of 100 shares of such stock, delivered the certificate thereof
to the defendant, Barrett, to secure a loan from him of about $3,000.
In January, 1875, Barrett took the certificate of stock to one Watson,
the resident manager of the plaintiff, in the city of New York, and
told him he wanted to get a loan of $8,000 from the plaintiff, upon
the stock represented by the certificate, for one of his clients, who did
not wish to sell the stock, but would rather hold it.
The certificate
was then in the name of Livingston, but there was no indorsement
nor power of attorney attached to it.
Watson informed Barupon
rett that
he would bring
proper power of attorney attached to the
certificate, he would make the loan.
Thereafter Barrett, by representing that he ought to have the instrument to secure his loan of
the $3,000, procured Livingston to sign a printed blank transfer and
irrevocable power of attorney to make
transfer of such certificate.
Barrett then again took the certificate of stock and the power of attorney signed by Livingston, filled up, except the name of the transferee
and attorney, to Watson, and delivered them to him, and received a
check for $8,000, payable to his order, on which he drew the money.
He subsequently, in the same way, borrowed, upon the security of the
stock, as he represented for his client, $1,000 more.
He afterwards
and
absconded, and never paid any of the money to Livingston
he was not authorized by Livingston to borrow
or pledge the stock.
It has thus far been decided in this case that the plaintiff
entitled to
the stock for the security of the loan made by
and the decisions
have been based upon the authority of McNeil v. Bank, and other
similar cases.
It was held in those cases that a blank transfer of
certificate of
stock, with irrevocable power of attorney to transfer, signed by the
Arguments omitted.
46 N. Y. 325, supra, p.
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person who appears by the certificate to be the owner, like that used
in this case, confers upon the holder of this certificate and power of
attorney the apparently legal and equitable title to the stock, and that
a bonajide purchaser of such stock from such holder can hold the
stock against the real owner, who is estopped from asserting his title.
The principles upon which those cases rest are fully set forth in the
case of McNeil v. Bank, and need no further elucidation here.
In
such cases the apparent owner, in his dealings with persons, relying
in good faith upon the appearances, is the real owner, and may sell
or pledge the stock and deal with it in all respects just as the real
owner could. But in that case and the other similar cases the holder
claimed to be just what the appearance indicated
the real owner
and to deal with the stock as such.
But this case is distinguishable from those. Barrett did not claim
to be the owner of the stock.
He represented that it belonged to his
been
and
that
have
client,
must
understood to mean Livingston,
by
name
in
certificate
whose
the
as the owner of the stock ; and
appeared
he represented that he wanted a loan for his client.
He had no auin
him,
to
make
loan
for
he
had
fact,
the
and
thority,
nothing to show
he
had
no
such authority.
He was clothed with
. that
apparent authorsuqh apparent
such
of
no
loan. The power
ity to make
attorney gave
There was nothing in that showing any connection with a
authority.
All the
loan, and that added nothing to his apparent authority.
plaintiff had then, when it made the loan, was the naked assertion of
Barrett that he was acting for Livingston ; and upon that assertion it
relied at its own risk. It could not hold Livingston for the loan ; and
this being so, what right had it to take and hold Livingston's stock?
Knowing that the stock did not belong to Barrett, it could not take it
It, at most, had information that Baras security for a loan to him.
rett could only pledge the stock for a loan to Livingston ; and if he
was not authorized to make the loan, he was not authorized to make
At the very most, the appearances indicated that Barrett
the pledge.
was authorized to pledge the stock for an authorized loan, but not for
a loan which he was not authorized to make.
In such a case, the doctrine of estoppel does not apply. Livingston did not hold Barrett out as authorized to borrow money for him ;
He did
and hence he is not estopped from denying such authority.
not hold him out as authorized to pledge his stock for such a loan ;
and hence he is not estopped from disputing the pledge.
If Barrett had gone to the plaintiff with the certificate a,nd power
of attorney, claiming to own the stock, he could have pledged it for
a loan to himself or any other person.
If he had been authorized by
Livingston to borrow the money, he could probably have pledged the
stock in his possession to secure it.
And he could have taken the
certificate and power of attorney and gone into the market, claiming
to act as the agent of the plaintiff, and have sold the stock and given
The possession of the certificate and full power of ata good title.
But a
torney would have given him the apparent authority to sell.

1
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is not a power to pledge to secure money borrowed. An
to
sell
is not agent to pledge.
agent
(Story on Agency,
78; HenE.
D.
Banito
v.
2
Bosw.
Smith, 71 ;
Mosquera,
ry v. Marvin, 3
401.)
It may be that Barrett transferred to the plaintiff all the interest he
had in the stock as pledgee of Livingston ; and whatever that was
may be protected upon another trial.
Judgment reversed.

power to sell

Sec. 562.
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Fraudulent transfer in breach of trust.
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GAS LIGHT COMPANY.
OF ALABAMA.

544-55 i-

89

1

Ala. Rep.

[Bill of interpleader by the bank to compel the administrator of
the estate of D. C. Schanck, and Mrs. Mary E. Winter to contest between themselves the ownership of certain shares of stock, with the
accrued dividends claimed by both.]
*
* *
The uncontroverted facts are : On March
CLOPTON, J.
on
there
books of the Montgomery Gas Light
stood
the
30, 1871,
shares
of
its
capital stock in the name of "J. S.
Company, thirty
On that day J. S. Winter,
Winter, trustee, for Mary E. Winter."
trustee, assigned the thirty shares to J. Gindrat Winter, which transfer was registered on the books of the company.
On August 21,
for
in
certificates
the
five
shares
being
part of the
controversy,
1871,
issued
the
to
were
Winter,
Gindrat
shares,
who,
by
company
thirty
on the 25th day of the same month, delivered them to J. S. Winter,
indorsing on each a power of attorney, authorizing him to transfer,
set over, and assign on the books of the company the shares to such
person or persons, and for such consideration, as he may elect, with
full power to appoint one or more persons with like powers and authority to make and effect the transfer of the shares. On August 26,
1871, J. S. Winter, by instrument in writing, assigned and transferred the certificates of shares, with all dividends, to D. S. Schanck to
secure the payment of three notes, amounting in the aggregate to $500,
his individual debt, with irrevocable power of attorney to Schanck to
surrender the stock and have the same issued to him in his own name.
It appears from the pleadings and evidence that the stock was the
It is insisted that the transstatutory separate estate of Mrs. Winter.
fer to J. Gindrat Winter is void, for the reason that under the statutes
then in force no valid sale or conveyance of the separate estate of a
married woman could be made other than by an instrument in writing,
executed by her husband and herself jointly, attested by two witnesses, or acknowledged as provided by law.
It will be admitted
that J. S. Winter, holding the stock as trustee for his wife, and as her
statutory separate estate, had no right or authority to sell and transfer

J.
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or to pledge it for his individual debt ; also that J. Gindrat Winter
having notice of the trust, both of them are responsible to the cestui
The
que trust for the unauthorized use and disposition of the stock.
insistance of counsel would be sustained if the question involved only
Gindrat Winter or his transferee with
the validity of the transfer to
notice.
But the question presented by the record reaches beyond this,
and is, when a certificate of the stock is accompanied by a power of
attorney indorsed thereon, by the person in whose name it is issued,
authorizing the attorney to transfer it to any person, and for such consideration as he may elect, will the title of a purchaser for value,
without notice of any intervening equity, be protected ? The general
rule is that when the legal title and apparent unlimited power of disposition is vested in a person, the rights of a purchaser from him, for
a valuable consideration, without notice of a secret trust upon which
The purchaser, in such case,
the property is held, are unaffected.
acquii'es an equity equal in dignity to the outstanding equity of which
This principle is applicable to the sale and transfer
he has no notice.
of certificates of stock.
It has accordingly been held that a power
of attorney on a certificate of stock, authorizing its transfer to any
person, renders the stock transferable by delivery, and if the holder
of such certificate is shown to be a purchaser for value, without notice
of an outstanding equity from the person to whom it was issued, or
his transferee, his title as such owner can not be impeached.
This
principle, so far as we have discovered, is uniformly sustained by the
*
*
*
authorities.
The rule is that as between two equities merely the prior equity
will prevail ; hence in order to give the purchaser precedence, unless
under exceptional circumstances, the legal estate must be annexed to
his equity.
It is contended that the purchaser of a certificate of stock
obtains the legal title only by a registry of the transfer on the corporate books, and that the transfer to Schanck not having been registered, the equity of Mrs. Winter is superior.
By an examination of
the cases in which it has been expressed that a transfer on the books
of the corporation is essential to pass the legal title, it will be seen
that the expression was used in reference to the construction and purpose of the statute, making the stock of the corporation transferable
on the books, and to protection against creditors and subsequent purIn Union Nat'l Bank v. Hartwell, 1 we said that to this end,
chasers.
and for this purpose, the transfer must be made in the mode prescribed
by the statute ; and while a transfer on the books is essential to pass the
legal title, and operate as notice, a purchaser of the stock, though no
registry is made on the books, may acquire such right thereto as a court
And in
of equity will enforce and compel its transfer on the books.
2
Campbell v. Iron Co., speaking of the transfer of a certificate of
in proper
stock without registration on the books, it is said:
form, and otherwise unobjectionable, such a conveyance is good and
valid between the parties, although it may be void as against bona
fide creditors, or subsequent purchasers without notice, and although
* 83
1 84
Ala. 351.
Ala. 379.
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as against the corporation itself it may convey an equitable title, conferring no right to vote, draw dividends, or other like incidents of ownBerney Nat'l Bank v. Pinckard, 87 Ala. 577. What title
ership."
The regpasses, as between the parties, is a different question.
istry on the books of the company of J. Gindrat Winter, as the
owner, and the issue of new certificates in his name, vested the
legal title in him, and clothed him with all the indicia of ownerAs between him and
ship and the apparent right of disposition.
Schanck, his transfer passed to the latter the title he possessed, and
armed the latter with power to compel a transfer on the corporate
books, and his representative demanded, October 5, 1886, the transWhether, in such case, the title of Schanck will
fer to be registered.
be upheld against intervening equities arose and was expressly decided in Dodds v. Hills; 1 in which case Smith, at the time he took the

transfer, had no notice that Hills held the stock in trust, but received
It is said: "Although it is
notice before he sent it for registration.
true that, as between him and the company, Smith did not become
the owner until after registration, nothing but his own act was necesHis position was
sary to make him complete master of the shares.
like that of a person to whom an estate is conveyed, to become legally vested on the performance of some condition, such as the making
of a demand, or the like ; and in such a case notice of a trust would
not prevent the subsequent performance or effect of this condition."
And in Cook Stock and Stockholders, 325, the author, after allud"In this country a different
ing to the rule in England, remarks:
rule prevails, and it is accepted and assumed as elementary that a bona
fide purchaser for value, of stock belonging to a trust estate, and sold
in breach of trust, is nevertheless protected in the purchase, although
he has not registered the transfer on the corporate books."
The
2
case of East Birmingham Land Co. v. Dennis does not militate
against this view. In that case, on the principle that a certificate
of stock, indorsed in blank by the person to whom it was issued, is
not a negotiable instrument, which may be regarded as well settled, it was held that, such certificate having been lost or stolen from
the owner without fault on his part, his right to it is superior to
that of any other person who may acquire it by purchase for value
from any other holder.
It will be observed that the finder or thief
had no apparent right or claim ; no color of title.
The blank in the
power of attorney was not filled in. The transferrer was not possessed of the legal title, or any indicia of ownership, or the apparent
Schanck derived title to himself directly from
power of disposition.
The cases are not parallel. By
the last registered stockholder.
S. Winter's transfer to J. Gindrat Winter, causing it to be registered,
and by the issue of new certificates in his name by the company, the
transferrer to Schanck was vested with the legal title, regular on its
face, without any indications to awaken suspicion.
He acquired the
title which his transferrer had, but no better, except that it was disa legal title sufficient to his protection against
charged from the trust,
1
2
2 Hem. & Mill. 424.
85 Ala. 565.

J.
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In Mills v. Townsend 1 it is said that "while a
prior latent equities.
transfer of shares by an assignment of the certificates can be effective
only between the parties to the assignment, it has been held, in accordance with the usages of trade, that the indorsement of the certificates
invests the assignee with the legal title to the interest so assigned as
It was ruled that a bona
against all persons except the corporation."
mesne
conveyances, starting from a trustee
fide purchaser, through
While certifiwho sells the stock in breach of a trust, is protected.
in blank,
of
when
indorsed
are
not
instruments,
cates
stock
negotiable
from
intended
hand
hand
to
to
are,
nevertheless,
by delivpass
they
of
and,
looks
to
the
the
certificates,
The
genuineness
purchaser
ery.
on
means
their
he
without
of
is
face,
the indicia
ownership appearing
If the purchaser were required
to ascertain the rights of his vendor.
to look beyond the last registry on the books of the corporation to ascertain whether there are any equities, or whether the stock was held
in trust, facility in disposing of them would be greatly obstructed, if
Hence, a purchaser for value from the party who is
not destroyed.
stockholder, and to whom new certificates have
the last-registered
been issued without notice, is not affected by the rights of holders
back of the registry. Cook Stock and Stockholders,
369, 443.
There is no pretense that Schanck had any notice of Mrs. Winter's
equity, and in the instrument assigning the certificates to him, J. S.
Winter covenants and agrees that he is the lawful owner and holder
of the stock, and has just right and authority to sell and dispose of the
The company is estopped to deny Schanck's right and title,
same.
and to his equity a legal title was annexed sufficient to give him precedence over the equity of Mrs. Winter, of which he had no notice,
and which was back of the registry to J. Gindrat Winter. Mandlebaum v. North Am. Min. Co., 4 Mich. 465.
Affirmed.
Sec. 563. Same.
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SALISBURY MILLS. 1

IN THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
Mass. Rep. 138-153.

125

[Tort brought by Loring, successor of one Rogers, as trustee for
Mrs. Mountford, for an illegal issuing of certificates of stock by the
corporation.]
GRAY, C. J. * * * When the holder of a certificate of shares in a
corporation is the absolute owner, his assignment and delivery thereof
will pass the title to the assignee ; and the latter, upon surrendering the
Stone v.
former certificate, may obtain a new one in his own name.
Sts.,
10,
St.
60,
ch.
Hackett, 12 Gray 227, Gen.
13;
9,
1870, ch.
of
face
the
old certhe
If
26.
the
22, 23,
holder appears, upon
224,
has
no
that
notice
owner,
absolute
and
the
corporation
tificate, to be the
1

109
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115.
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the fact is otherwise, it may safely issue a new certificate to the
assignee, which, if taken in good faith and for a valuable consideration, will vest a perfect title in him. Salisbury Mills v. Townsend, 109
Mass. 115; Pratt v. Taunton Copper Co., 123 Mass. no. But, for the
protection of the rights of the lawful owner of the shares, the corporation is bound to use reasonable care in the issue of certificates ; if, by the
form of the certificate or otherwise, the corporation has notice that
the present holder is not the absolute owner, but holds the shares by
such a title that he may not have authority to transfer them, the corporation is not obliged, without evidence of such authority, to issue a
certificate to his assignee ; and if, without making any inquiry, it does
issue a new certificate, and the rightful owner is injured by its negligent and wrongful act, the corporation is liable to him without proof
of fraud or collusion. All the authorities affirm such liability where
the corporation has notice that the present holder is a trustee and of
the name of his cestui que trust, and issues the new certificate without
making any inquiry whether his trust authorizes him to make a transfer. Lowry v. Commercial and Farmers' Bank, Taney 310; Bayard
v. Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank, 52 Pa. St. 232 ; Atkinson v. Atkinson, 8 Allen 15 ; Shaw v. Spencer, 100 Mass. 382 ; Fisher v.
Brown, 104 Mass. 259; Duncan v. Jaudon, 15 Wall. 165.
The cases of transfer of stock by the Bank of England, 1 cited by the
learned counsel for the defendant, depended, as was pointed out by
Chief Justice Taney, in Lowry v. Commercial and Farmers' Bank,
upon the peculiar provisions of acts of parliament. Taney 335. The
case of Duncan v. Luntley, 2 Mac. & Gord. 30, s. c. 2 Hall & Twells
78, was decided upon the ground that the bill alleged that the act of the
And the latest English
officers was unauthorized by the company.
case upon the subject goes quite as far as any of the American authorities in protecting equitable rights in shares held in trust. Shropshire Union Railways v. The Queen, L. R. 7 H. L. 496.
Upon the evidence, there can be no doubt that the defendant corporation had notice that all the shares in question were held by Rogers
in trust for Mrs. Mountford.
At the organization of the corporation,
Rogers subscribed for one hundred and fifty shares, and took out a
" Be it known that George H. Rogers, truscertificate in this form :
tee for Mrs. E. B. Mountford, is proprietor of one hundred and fifty
shares in the capital stock of the Salisbury Mills, which shares are
transferable by an instrument in writing, to be recorded by the clerk
of the company; and when such transfer shall have been recorded,
and this certificate surrendered to the treasurer of the company, a new
In 1858 Rogers subscribed
certificate or certificates shall be issued."
successively for eighty and for twenty more shares, and took the certificates therefor in the name of "George H. Rogers, trustee," without
But in 1859, upon the corporation innaming his cestui que trust.
creasing its capital stock by one-half, Rogers, then holding, as we have
1
Hartga v. Bank of England, 3 Ves. 55;
Ves. 665, 669; Pearson v. Bank of England,
England, 2 Bing. 393, 407.

2

Bank of England v. Parsons, 5
Cox Ch. 175; Davis v. Bank of
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seen, certificates for two hundred and fifty shares, namely, one hundred
and fifty as trustee for Mrs. Mountford, and the additional one hundred
as trustee simply, took the proportion of the new stock, to which he was
entitled on the whole two hundred and fifty shares, in a single certificate
for one hundred and twenty-five shares, as "trustee for Mrs. E. B.
Mountford," thereby clearly signifying that he held all the old shares
as well as the new, being three hundred and seventy-five shares in all,
in trust for her. In 1862, Rogers sold the twenty shares subscribed
for in 1858, and accounted to Mrs. Mountford for the proceeds thereof,
and the remaining three hundred and fifty-five shares continued to be
In 1863, under a vote of the corheld by him upon the same trust.
its
capital stock by one-third, and allowing
poration further increasing
of
each stockholder
record to take his pro rata proportion, Rogers
took a certificate for one hundred and eighteen shares (being one-third
of three hundred and fifty-five, excluding fractions) in the name of
"George H. Rogers, trustee." He then held four hundred and
seventy-three shares, the whole of which and of the dividends accruing thereon were credited on the books of the corporation in one
account to "George H. Rogers, trustee," and the dividends, as they
were paid, were receipted for by him in one receipt upon those books.
The corporation, thus having distinct notice that Rogers held all
these shares as trustee for Mrs. Mountford, was bound, upon the principles already stated, when he afterwards undertook to transfer the
shares, to inquire whether the terms of the trust authorized him so
to do.
By the indenture of trust, the trustee was authorized to sell, invest
and reinvest the trust property, only upon first obtaining the written
approbation of Mrs. Mountford, the cestui que trust, if at the time
within the United States; and it appears that she was within the
United States at the times of all the sales and transfers complained of.
The invalidity of these sales and transfers is not affected by Mrs.
Mountford's knowledge of and assent to the sale of the twenty shares
by Rogers in 1862, nor by her written assent to his sale of other
property, nor by her request (which is not shown to have been acted
on by him or known to the defendant) to pledge some of her shares
The letters of her husin the defendant corporation for her benefit.
band, not proved to have been authorized by her, can not affect her
As Rogers, by the terms of the trust, had no authority to
rights.
pay the income to Mrs. Mountford, except as it accrued and not by
way of anticipation, he had no right to sell the trust property to reimburse himself for advances to her, and her settlement with his
executor of a claim for such advances is no bar to this suit.
The transfers complained of having been made by the defendant
corporation without due inqury into the authority of Rogers to make
them, and being invalid against the cestui que trust, and the new
trustee appointed in the place of Rogers not being able, as we have
already held, for technical reasons, to maintain an action at law
against the corporation, he is clearly entitled to maintain this bill in
equity. Ashton v. Atlantic Bank, 3 Allen 217.
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Rogers and the corporation both contributed to the wrong done,
and the proof of the claim against the estate of Rogers, one of the
wrong-doers, was no affirmance of the validity of his acts, and is no
bar to a suit against the corporation, the other wrong-doer, except to
the extent of the satisfaction received by the dividends out of the esElliott v. Hayden, 104 Mass. 180.
tate of Rogers.
The result is, that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for,
and the form of the decree must be settled before a single judge.
Decree for the plaintiff.
Note.

See, 1872, Sprague

bury v. Ehlen, 72 Md. 206,
L. R. 15 App. Cas. 267.
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[Proceedings to escheat, as the property of one McNaughton, deceased, certain bonds and railroad stocks in the possession of appellee,
Mrs. Crompton, administratrix of his estate, but which she claimed to
have been given to her.
Testimony offered showed that at the death
of McNaughton, a certain box containing the bonds and stocks was in
the custody of Mrs. Crompton ; that it had been given to her by
McNaughton in the June before his death ; that he said at the time,
"Take
will be of some use to you after die " she took
went
to her again, and told her to
out, and when she came back, he gave
would be of some use to her; "it will be of some use
put
away,
am gone."
to you when
She put
was taken from
away, and
her bureau drawer the Thanksgiving day after McNaughton's death.]
*
MR. JUSTICE McCoLLUM.
A gift needs no consideration to support
valuable one
yet in the present case there was
acknowledged by the donor, and impelling him to the action which
For twenty-one years he lived in the
the subject of this controversyfamily of the donee as boarder, and had his washing and mending
He was in poor
done there, and for these he promised to pay her.
health the last four years of his life, and required and received from
her and her children considerate care and attention.
He often manifested grateful appreciation of these services, and expressed
purIn execution of this purpose,
pose to make compensation for them.
he delivered to her the box containing the government bond and the
certificates of 1'ailroad stock.
apparent from the evidence that
he intended to make an absolute gift of these securities to her, and
invested
that he supposed the delivery, and the words accompanying
Statement abridged.

Arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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There reher with the exclusive control and ownership of them.
mains for consideration the question whether the failure to make a
formal written transfer of the securities to the donee, will defeat the
purpo.se of the donor and give them to the commonwealth as an
escheat.
It is now settled that a valid gift of non-negotiable securities may
be made by delivery of them to the donee without assignment or inThis principle has been applied to notes,
dorsement in writing.
In
and
stock
bonds,
deposit certificates, and life insurance policies.
Tucker,
Binn.
v.
Pa.
v.
Wells
Licey, 7
Pennsylvania,
3
366 ; Licey
251, and Madeira's App., 17 W. N. 202, are illustrations of and rest
and
has distinct recognition and approval in other delivupon
In Walsh's App., 122 Pa. 177, we refused
erances of this court.
to
to extend
depositor's bank-book, but acknowledged " that, -in
of
the case
notes and other instruments payable to' order,
delivery
present absolute gift would invest
accompanied by words importing
The bank-book was rethe donee with the ownership of the fund."
book
as
of
as
on
the
same
footing
original entries, and the
garded
as
of
the
donee
mere delivery
to
insufficient to pass any title to the
"
But
a subcertificate of deposit
accounts appearing upon it.
the
fund
describes, as -in case
sisting chose in action, and represents
of notes, bonds, and other securities, so that delivery of
as
gift
constitutes an equitable assignment of the money for which
calls."
Basket v. Hassell, 107 U. S. 602. In the case last cited, Mr. Justice
Matthews, after an exhaustive examination of the authorities, said:
*' The
made clear by this review of the decisions on
point which
chose in
the subject, as- to the nature and effect of
delivery of
action, is, as we think, that the instrument or document must be the
evidence of
subsisting obligation, and be delivered to the donee so
as to vest him with an equitable title to the fund
represents and to
divest the donor of all present control and dominion over
absolutely and irrevocably, in case of a gift inter vivos, but upon the
gift mortis causa."
recognized conditions subsequent, in case of
The shares of stock are choses in action, and the certificates evidence of the title to them:
Slaymaker v. Bank, 10 Pa. 373.
T
W hy may not
delivery of the certificates, coupled with words of
absolute and present gift, invest the donee with an equitable title to the
A
volunteer can not successfully assail
stock, which the donor or
stockholder may clothe another with the complete equitable title to
his stock without compliance with the forms printed by the corporation
United States v. Vaughan, Binn. 394 Commonwealth v. WatWh. 117; Building Assn. v. Sendmeyer, 50 Pa. 67; Finmough,
ney's App., 59 Pa. 398 Water-Pipe Co. v. Kitchenman, 108 Pa. 630.
As the gift in question was supported by valuable consideration,
and the instruments which represented the ownership of the donor in
the subject-matter of the gift were delivered to the donee, we think
she has
title to the securities which can not be destroyed in
proceeding by the commonwealth to escheat them.
affirmed.

Note.
See next case, and, 1891, Matthews v. Hoagland, 48 N.
1899, Coffey v. Coffey, 179 111. 283.

J.
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Same.

PENNINGTON,

1830.

EXECUTOR.

ADM*R OP PATTERSON, v.

IN THE COURT

OF

GITTING'S

APPEALS OF MARYLAND.
Rep. 208-219.

EXECUTOR.
2

1

Gill &

J.

BUCHANAN, C. J. The bill was filed to compel the defendant, the executor of James Gittings, to transfer to the original complainant, Ann
Patterson, daughter of the testator, seventy-five shares of stock of the
Commercial and Farmers' Bank of Baltimore; a certificate of which,
it alleges, was given and delivered to her by the testator, who, it is
stated, indorsed his name on the back of the certificate in her presence, and at the same time informed her that he gave her the stock.
The answer admits the name of the testator, indorsed upon the certificate to be in his handwriting, but denies that he gave or intended
to give the certificate of stock to Ann Patterson, as alleged, and puts
the complainant on proof of the allegation, and denies also the delivery of the certificate as stated. * * *
The alleged gift seems to have been intended as a donatio inter
vivos; but whether a donatio inter vivos or donatio mortis causa
Such a gift can not be by mere parol. The
makes no difference.
rule of law in either case is, that a delivery of the thing intended
This is adto be given, is essential to the perfection of the gift.
As to donations inter vzvos, it
mitted ; indeed, it can not be denied.
has never been doubted that delivery of the thing intended to be
given is indispensable ; and the same principle is now equally well
The delivery must be
settled in relation to donations mortis causa.
according to the manner in which the particular thing is susceptible of
being delivered ; and that which is not capable of being delivered is
There must be a parting by the donor
not the subject of a donation.
with the legal power and dominion over it. If he retains the dominion, if there remains to him a locus penitentice (which must be the
case 4 when he retains the possession, and what is done is merely by
parol), there can not be a perfect and legal donation, and that which
is not a good and valid gift in law can not be made good in equity.
Proceeding upon this principle, the relief sought in Mary Tate v..
Hilbert, and Jane Tate v. Hilbert, 2 Vesey Jr. 112, was refused
where a man, a short time before his death, gave one a check on his
banker, which was not presented before his death, and to the other a
They were strong
promissory note, both of them being his relations.
cases, particularly that of the check, which, if it had been presented
before the death of the deceased, would have been paid, the banker
having sufficient funds in his hands.
But the money, the thing that was intended to be given, not having
been delivered, they were not good and available donations in law ;
the promissory note and the check being only evidences of contract,
1

Part of opinion omitted.

l6gi

THE CORPORATION AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS.

565

a

a

a

a

a

2

is

It

it,

a

;

a

a

it
is

a

;

a

is

2

a

a

;

a

is

a

it,

they did not transfer the possession of the money, nor invest the persons to whom they were respectively given with the legal dominion
over
which continued in the deceased until his death, when the
A promissory note delivered as
property vested in the executors.
donation,
not
vested gift of the money, but only
promise or enno
to
and
stronger
gagement
imposes
obligations, nor affords a
give
better ground of action, than
to
deliver
gift.
promise
any chattel as
Such intended donations can not be enforced on the consideration of
blood, which has been insisted on in this case, and was probably a
leading motive with the defendant's testator in the cases referred to,
in
Vesey Jr. 112, Mary Tate and Jane Tate being stated to have
been his relations.
The consideration of natural love and affection
sufficient in
deed but
consideration, as
mere executory contract, that requires
promissory note, can not be supported on the consideration of blood,
or natural love and affection; there must be something more
a valuable consideration
or
not good and can not be enforced at law,
And being void at law
but may be broken at the will of the party.
for want of
consideration,
sufficient
chancery can not sustain and
enforce it.
The cases of Mary Tate and Jane Tate v. Hilbert, have
been mentioned as striking cases, in which the lord chancellor manifested
strong desire, more than once expressed, to grant the relief
desire not foreign from us, so far as sitting here we are
prayed
but we are, as he then was, restrained by
permitted to entertain
the settled and stubborn rules of law.
The case of Ward v. Turner,
bill to compel
was
transfer
Vesey Sr. 431,
just this case.
of South Sea annuities, the receipt for which had been delivered to
the complainant's testator by one Flog, saying,
give you, Mosely,
these papers, which are receipts for South Sea annuities, and will
serve you after
am dead."
It was argued for the complainant that
the delivery of these receipts, with the strong words of gift accompawas as much as could be done towards giving the annuities,
nying
mere transfer in the books.
was held that the annuiBut
except
ties being the thing intended to be given,
delivery of the annuities
was indispensably necessary to make
that the degood donation
livery of the receipts was not sufficient, and that such donation could
not be made without
transfer, or something equivalent, that being
the only mode in which stock or annuities are susceptible of being dea
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It
alsupposed that this case differs from that, because, as
leged, that James Gittings, at the time of delivering the certificate of
stock to his daughter, indorsed his name upon the back of
(which
does not appear to have been done by Flog, when he delivered the
contended, gave her authority
receipts for the annuities), which,
to write over
full assignment or power of attorney, which would
enable her to go to the bank and cause
transfer of the stock to be
made to her on the books.
not perceived that this makes
But
any difference, nor
necessary to inquire whether that indorsement
never was executed.
It apdid,
gave any such authority;
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pears upon the face of the certificate itself that the stock was transferable at the bank only, and it is admitted that the indorsement,
whether in blank or in full, did not and could not operate to transfer
the stock; and it was the stock and not the certificate that was the
subject of the intended gift, it matters not whether the indorsement
was in full or in blank; for, as in the case of the check on the banker,
which not being presented and paid in the lifetime of the maker, the
intended donation of the money was defeated for want of delivery,
notwithstanding the holder of the check might, by presenting it in the
lifetime of the maker, have obtained the money and thus perfected
the gift ; so here, even if by the indorsement of the certificate, whether
filled up or remaining in blank, Mrs. Patterson might have gone to
the bank in the lifetime of her father and caused a transfer of the
stock to herself on the books of the bank, the only way in which the
stock, the thing that was intended to be given, could be delivered,
and thus have perfected the donation ; yet, not having done so, it was
not a valid gift of the stock, either in law or equity, for want of delivery. It was not a valid gift in law, otherwise there would have
been no necessity for going into chancery to perfect it. And being
void in law, chancery can not interpose to make it good or enforce it.
If Mr. Gittings was alive, it could not be seriously contended that he
could be compelled to transfer the stock in the absence of any consideration; and the same principle applies to his executor.
His
death does not make that good which was bad before.

Decree affirmed, ivith

Note.

costs.

See preceding case.

Same,
Sec. 566*
(f) Effect of transfer upon liability of transferrer and transferee; general rule. 1

VISALIA
1895.

&

TULARE RAILROAD COMPANY,

RESPONDENT, v.

HYDE,

APPELLANT.*

IN THE SUPREME

COURT

632637,

52

OF CALIFORNIA,

Am. St. Rep.

no

Cal.

Rep.

136.

J.

The plaintiff is a corporation under the laws of
HARRISON,
this state, for the purpose of constructing and operating a railroad
between the city of Visalia and the town of Tulare, and was incorporated November i, 1887, with a capital stock of one hundred
thousand dollars, divided into one thousand shares of one hundred
dollars each, all of which was subscribed for, and upon each share of
which stock there had been paid into the corporation the sum of fifty
dollars. On March 28, 1894, the directors of the corporation levied
an assessment of ten dollars upon each share of the capital stock, and
1
8

See, infra, creditors and shareholders, p.
Arguments omitted.
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in the order levying the assessment fixed a day on which the stock
would be delinquent, and also a day for the sale of the delinquent stock.
After the day specified for declaring the stock delinquent, and before
the sale, the board of directors, by an order in that behalf, elected to
waive and abandon further proceedings for the collection of the assessment by a sale of the stock, and to proceed by action to recover the
amount that should be delinquent.
November 29, 1890, the defendant became the owner of one hundred shares of the capital stock which
had been originally subscribed for by Thomas Creighton, and on that
day a certificate for said one hundred shares of stock was issued to
and received by him, and he was then registered on the books of the
plaintiff as the owner thereof, and has since remained registered as
such stockholder.
The present action is brought to recover from him
the amount of the assessment, by virtue of the provisions of section
The answer to the complaint does not question
349 of the civil code.
the regularity of the steps taken in levying the assessment, or in the
election of the plaintiff to proceed by action to collect the same, or
that the plaintiff was indebted in an amount greater than the amount
of the assessment ; but. sets up as special defenses that, at the time
the plaintiff incurred the liability for which he alleges the assessment
was levied, he was not a stockholder; that prior to the commencement of the action he had sold, indorsed, and delivered the shares of
stock to another person ; and that at the time of levying the assessment the plaintiff had sufficient property with which to meet all of its
The plaintiff
obligations, without levying an assessment therefor.
had judgment and the defendant has appealed.
i. By purchasing the stock from Creighton, and causing a transfer
thereof to himself to be entered upon the books of the plaintiff, the
defendant was substituted for Creighton as a stockholder of the corporation, and thereafter held the shares on the same conditions, and
subject to the same obligations, as did Creighton prior to the transfer.
(Morawetz on Corporations, section 159; Cook on Stock and Stockholders, section 256; Hall v. United States Ins. Co., 5 Gill 484;
Hartford, etc., R. Co. v. Doorman, 12 Conn. 530; Upton v. Hansbrough, 3 Biss. 417; Merrimac Min. Co. v. Bagley, 14 Mich. 501.)
In the case last cited the court say: "The very essence of a corporation consists in its corporate succession, which, in stock companies, is
kept up by the substitution of one owner for another in the proprietorship of shares. If the original stockholders stand under different
relations to the company from their assigns, the corporation itself loses
some of its attributes by the substitution, or else becomes introduced
into more complicated relations.
It seems to be an unavoidable conclusion that every liability which attaches to a stockholder, as such, is
And in Hartford,
inseparable from the ownership of the stock."
"
The reasons for subetc., R. Co. v. Boorman, supra, it is said:
jecting the original subscribers to personal liability apply with equal
The relation
force to <those who become stockholders by purchase.
of stockholder and company exists. A privity between them is created."
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The defendant did not divest himself of this liability by
of the certificate to another subsequent to the levy of

ment
ment,
upon
those
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an assignthe assess-

especially as his assignee did not procure a transfer to himself
For the purpose of ascertaining
the books of the corporation.
who are liable to it for the amount of the assessment, the corporation can look only to the list of stockholders as their names are
registered upon its books.
2. The liability of the defendant to the creditors of the corporation for his proportion of their claims against the corporation, and his
liability to the corporation for the unpaid portion of his subscription,
are entirely distinct, and rest upon different principles.
The stockholder is liable to a creditor upon only such liabilities as were incurred during the time he has been a stockholder, but he is liable to
the corporation for the unpaid portion of his subscription, whenever
the corporation may choose to call it in; and, while the creditor may
enforce his claim against the corporation, and seek its entire satisfaction out of the corporate property, he can recover from the stockholder only his proportionate part of the claim. The corporation is
authorized to levy an assessment for the express purpose of providing
a fund with which to meet its outstanding obligations, and it is no defense to the assessment that the defendant was not a stockholder at the
time the obligation was contracted or the liability incurred.
Nor is it
defense
that
the
has
sufficient
with
which
to
corporation
any
property
The liability of the defendant rests upon his
meet its obligations.
contract of subscription, and the propriety or necessity of requiring
him to pay it for the purpose of meeting the corporate liabilities,
rather than to resort to property in the hands of the corporation with
which to meet such liabilities, has been placed in the discretion of the
board of directors.
The judgment and order are affirmed.
Garoutte, J., and Van Fleet, J., concurred.
There are various holdings as to the liability of the transferrer and
Note.
transferee, after the transfer, to corporate creditors.
Transferrer is no longer liable: 1796, Huddersfieid Canal Co.v. Buckley,
7 Term Rep. 36; 1821, Franklin Glass Co. v. Alexander, 2 N. H. 380, 9 Am.
Dec. 92; 1823, Middletown Bank v. Magill, 5 Conn. 28; 1855, Chouteau Spring
Co. v. Harris, 20 Mo. 382; 1880, Johnston v. Laflin, 103 U. S. 800; 1898,
White v. Green, 105 Iowa 176; 1899, Rochester, etc., Co. v. Raymond, 158 N.
Y. 576; 1899, Eflrd v. Piedmont L. I. Co., 55 S. C. 78, 32 S. E. Rep. 758.
L. 425;
Transferrer continues liable: 1892, Hood v. McNaughton, 54 N.
1898, Sprague v. National Bank, 172 111. 149, 64 Am. St. Rep. 17; 1899, Ingles
Tenn. Ch. App.
, 53 S. W. Rep. 1111.
Land Co. v. Knoxville F. I. Co.,
1875, Webster v. Upton, 91 U. S. 65; 1896,
Transferee becomes liable:
Wishard v. Hansen, 99 Iowa 307,61 Am. St. Rep. 238; 1897, Wallace v. Carpenter E. H. Co., 70 Minn. 321, 68 Am. St. Rep. 530; 1898, White v. Green,
105 Iowa 176; 1899, Rochester, etc., Co. v. Raymond, 158 N. Y. 576; 1899,
Efird v. Piedmont L. I. Co., 55 S. C. 78, 32 S. E. Rep. 758.
Transferee who takes without knowledge that shares are not fully paid does
1879, Steacy
not become liable to corporate creditors for the unpaid sums:
v. R. Co., 5 Dill. 348; 1880, Keystone Bridge Co. v. McCluney, 8 Mo. App.
496; 1887, West Nashville P. M. Co. v. Nashville Savings Bank, 86 Tenn. 252,
6 Am. St. Rep. 835, infra, p. 1695 ; 1898, Sprague v. National Bank, 172 111. 149,
64 Am. St. Rep. 17.

J.
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Sec. 567.
Same.
chaser; liability of transferee.
WEST

4887.

NASHVILLE

PLANING MILL COMPANY
SAVINGS BANK.

IN THE SUPREME

COURT OF TENNESSEE.

252, 6

Am. St. Rep. 835.
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bona fide pur-

a

v.

86

NASHVILLE
Tenn. Rep.

J.

The complainant, a manufacturing corporation creLURTON,
ated under the provisions of the general incorporation act of 1875,
sues the defendant upon a stock call duly made for twenty-five per
cent, of subscription price upon forty-five shares of stock now standing upon the stock-books of complainant in the name of Julius Sax,
This stock was originally subscribed by one J. B. Tucker,
president,
who paid one-half of the subscription price, but to whom was issued
stock certificates, one of which was in the following words:
"Shares $100 each.
"West Nashville Planing Mill and Lumber Company, Nashville,
Tennessee.
" This is to certify that
B.
J. Tucker is entitled to thirty-five shares,
of one hundred dollars each, in the capital stock of the West Nashville Mill and Lumber Company, of Nashville, subject to all the conditions and stipulations contained in their articles of incorporation ;
transferable by him or his attorney only on surrender of this certificate.
" In testimony whereof, the president and secretary of said company have hereunto subscribed their names.
" R. F. WOODARD, President.

" T. O.

TREANOR, Secretary."
The defendant bank, without notice that the stock was not in fact
paid up, and in good faith, made a loan to Tucker, and took his stock
certificates as collateral security, with usual power of attorney to
transfer same.
Subsequently, the bank surrendered original certificates, and caused new certificates to issue to itself, identical in form,
with the original.
Under these facts, defendant must be treated as if
an innocent purchaser for value, without actual notice of the fact that
the stock was subject to future calls for unpaid balance of subscription price. A number of defenses to this suit have been very ably
and earnestly pressed by the solicitor for the bank, but in the view we
take of the case, we need only determine one of them.
The general
rule concerning the effect of the transfer of shares in a corporation is,
that such transfer operates as a novation of the contract of memberThe transferrer ceases to be a shareholder, and the transferee
ship.
becomes one.
The first is ordinarily relieved from all further liability to contribute capital, and loses all right to participate -in the further profit or management;
the transferee takes the place of the retiring member, and by implication assumes all the obligations which
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rested upon the former holder as a member of the company, and ordinarily becomes liable for calls to the same extent as the former
owner before the transfer was made.
Assuming the burdens, he becomes likewise entitled to all the benefits attaching to ownership of
In the absence of charter provisions or statutory regulathe shares.
tions, this general rule is almost universally recognized.
Morawet
on Corporations, 2d ed., section 159, and authorities cited.
It is clearly so settled in this state. Jackson v. Sligo M. & M. Co.,
i Lea 213; Moses v. Ocoee Bank, i Lea 398.
either by original subStockholders become such in several ways,
scription, or by assignment of prior holders, or by direct purchase
from the company.
It is not at all essential that at the time there is
an original subscription there shall be an express promise to pay the
Oftener than otherwise there is none, the subsubscription price.
scription being a simple agreement to take so many shares of stock.
By necessary implication, there arises from such a subscription a
promise to pay the par value of such stock, upon which an action of
East Tenn., etc., R. R. v. Gammon, 5 Sneed 570.
assumpsit lies.
The Massachusetts and Maine cases, holding an express promise
necessary are exceptional, and are based chiefly upon the charter
remedy of a sale of the stock being regarded as exclusive in the abThe liability of the transsence of an expressed agreement to pay.
feree of unpaid stock is expressly put upon the same ground of an
agreement by implication from the acceptance of a transfer of unpaid
stock, thus coming into privity with the corporation, and by implication rendering himself liable to action by the corporation for subseMorawetz on
quent calls for unpaid balance of subscription price :
Corporations, 2d ed., 159; Webster v. Upton, 91 U. S. 65.
The Pennsylvania cases, holding that the transferee is not liable
without express agreement, are exceptional, and do not commend
themselves to us by their reasoning.
The general incorporation act of 1875, un der which complainant
holds its charter, contains nothing which affects the question of the
Section 5 of that
ordinary liability of a transferee to the corporation.
act only provides for the continued liability of the transferrer in the
case mentioned.
As we have seen, the rule which makes a transferee liable for unpaid calls is based upon the implied agreement arising where one takes
shares subject to calls, and causes them to be transferred to himself.
But where the purchaser of such shares buys them as paid-up shares,
and without notice that in fact they are not paid up, then no implication arises of an agreement to pay anything to the corporation for
In such case there are no facts from which to imply an
such shares.
The representation made by the corporation, either
agreement.
upon the face of the stock certificate or by its officers, that the shares
are paid up will, as between the corporation and such transferee,
Morawetz on Corporations,
prevent any contract by implication:
section 161 ; Cook on Stocks, sections 50, 257, 418.
The question arising upon the certificates in this case is not so easy
of solution, inasmuch as there is no express declaration on the face of
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In such a case the
it that the shares are non-assessable or paid up.
one
as
to
is
a
whether
the
purchaser of such
perplexing
question
shares is bound, at his peril, to make inquiry, or whether he is not
protected by the want of notice.
This certificate is in the usual commercial form of certificates issued
for shares fully paid up. There is no intimation upon its face that it
The corporation, in putting such shares
is not what it appears to be.
in
the power of the subscriber to sell the
has
it
market,
the
put
upon
same to persons innocent of the true fact.
Under such circumstances,
be
suffered
from an innocent
the
to
to
demand
corporation
ought
transferee, for value, the balance of the subscription price?
CertifiThe vast number of
cates of stock are quasi-negotiable securities.
such shares daily sold upon the market have led the courts to aid
their commercial and negotiable character in favor of purchasers
without notice of secret liens.
Thus an assignment of a certificate of stock is held to pass the legal
title to such shares to the assignee, even without transfer upon stockbook or other notice to the corporation:
Cornick v. Richards, 3
Lea i.
Again, this court held that if the pledgee of a stock certificate,
with blank power of attorney, subpledged such certificate for money
loaned, the subpledgee, if ignorant of the title of his pledgor, will
hold the certificate as against the true owner. Cherry v. Frost, 7
Lea i.
In view of the important character assumed by shares of stock in
both the speculative and investment markets, and in view, of the readiness with which corporations can guard themselves, as well as purchasers of such shares by using only fully paid shares, or by
expressing upon the face of such as are not paid up the fact
that they are subject to call for unpaid subscription price, we
hold, in the interest of the negotiability of such shares and of
what we deem a true public policy, that a bonafide purchaser
of a certificate of stock, for value, and without notice, either from
the face of the certificate or otherwise, that the subscription price has
not been paid, will be protected as between himself and the corporation negligently issuing such shares.
This rule we regard as most in
accord with the usages, customs, and demands of commerce, and as
calculated to prevent the assumption of unsuspected liabilities on the
one hand, and the illegitimate use of unpaid shares of stock on the
other.
Cook on Stocks, sections 50, 257.
This rule is in analogy with the principles governing contracts, as
there can be no implied contract to pay unpaid calls where the purchaser buys what he is entitled to believe are paid-up shares.
The decree of the chancellor is affirmed.
See note, preceding case.
Note.
As to effect of transfer upon a corporate Men on shares, see : 1893, Bank of
Atchison v. Durfee, 118 Mo. 431, 40 Am. St. Rep. 396; 1897, Boyd v. Redd,
120 N. C. 335, 58 Am. St. Rep. 792; 1898, Dorr v. Life Ins. Co., 71 Minn. 38,
70 Am. St. Rep. 309; 1899, Stafford v. Produce Ex. Bk. Co., 61 O. S. 160, 76
Am. St. Rep. 371, note 374; 1900, Bronson Elec. Co. v. Rheubottom, 122 Mich.
608, 81
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[Action to compel the corporation to transfer certain shares to
plaintiff and issue a new certificate to her. The original certificate
was issued to plaintiff's husband, who, on January 26, 1875, executed
in blank and without consideration an assignment and power of attorney (one Seals being
witness) upon the back of the certificate, and
delivered
to plaintiff, who filled up the blanks properly, presented
a

is

is a

a

a

a

a

a

it,

a

a

a

is

is

a

a

J.

a

it

demanded
transfer to her
to the company, offered to surrender
These were refused, upon
upon the books, and a new certificate.
the ground that plaintiff's husband had, after the assignment to plaintiff, assigned the same shares to Beals for valuable consideration,
and caused the same to be transferred to Beals upon the books.
The
stock was transferable only upon the books of the company upon surrender of the certificate.
Judgment below in favor of plaintiff.]
MILLER,
The right of the plaintiff to maintain this action depends upon the question whether an equitable action will lie to compel transfer of stock by
corporation to the owner of the same, or
the plaintiff must seek a remedy by an action at law for damages.
The latter action
frequently of no avail, and does not always afford complete and full redress. It
party may
easy to see that
have become the owner or purchaser of stock in
corporation, which
he desires to hold as
permanent investment, which may be at the
time of but little value, in fact without any market value whatever,
and its real worth may consist in the prospective rise which the owner
has reason to anticipate will follow from facts within his knowledge.
To say that the holder shall not be entitled to the stock, because the
and that
corporation, without any just reason, refuses to transfer
he shall be left to pursue the remedy of an action for damages, in
which he can recover only a nominal amount, would establish
rule
which must work great injustice in many cases, and confer
power
on corporate bodies which has no sanction in the law.
A court of
contract for the sale of
specific performance on
equity will enforce
deed by the vendor to the
real estate, and compel the execution of
vendee, although an action at law may be brought to recover damages
for the breach of the contract.
Such a case bears
striking analogy
to the one now presented, and the same principle
manifestly applicable where the remedy at law
inadequate to furnish the proper re-

lief.
That an equitable action will lie, in such

1

a

a

case, has been distinctly
recognized in number of the adjudicated cases in this state. In Middlebrook v. The Merchants' Bank (41 Barb. 481, 27 How. 474) the
action was brought to compel the bank to allow the transfer of certain
Statement abridged,

arguments

and part of opinion omitted.
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A decree was made directing
shares of bank stock to the plaintiff.
the transfer, and upon appeal to the court of appeals, the judgment
of the supreme court was affirmed.
(3 Abb. App. Dec. 295.) No
question was raised in either of the courts as to the right to maintain
the action; and it is said, in the opinion of the court of appeals:
" right was perfect and his demand wrong(the plaintiff's)
As no point was made that the action did not lie, it
fully refused."
is fair to assume that it was conceded that it could be maintained.
In the Com. Bank of Buffalo v. Kortright (22 Wend. 348), it was
held that an action of assumpsit lies against a corporation for damages
for refusing to permit a transfer of stock on its books.
The chancellor, who dissented from a majority of the court, in his opinion says
that the plaintiff might still file a bill to have a sale of the pledge and to
The
compel the bank to allow a transfer of the stock to the purchaser.
decision of the case did not turn on the question now considered ; and
hence, fhe point was not decided, and the remarks of the chancellor
are only entitled to weight as the opinion of a judge learned and disIn Pollock v. The National
tinguished in this department of law.
Bank (3 Seld. 274), it was held that a bank which has permitted a transfer of stock owned by a stockholder, upon a forged power of attorney, and has canceled the original certificates, may be compelled to
issue new certificates; and if it has no shares which it can so issue, to
If, in such a case, new certificates may be
pay the value thereof.
decreed to'be issued, surely it should be done where the right of the
owner is entirely clear.
The action was of an equitable character,
and the principle decided recognizes the right to compel a transfer .of
stock by the bank.
In Purchase v. N. Y. Ex. Bank (3 Robt. 164),
it was held that after an assignment of bank stock, the bank, upon the
application of the owner, is bound to allow the transfer to be made
on its books, and to issue a new certificate, unless restrained by the
order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
In White v. Schuyler
Abb. Pr. N. S. 300), it was held that specific performance of an agreement to transfer stock may be decreed, where the contract to convey
is clear, and the uncertain value of the stock renders it difficult to do
The specific objection that the
justice by an award of damages.
party had a remedy at law was not taken, although the point was in
the case.
The question was considered in the opinion of Hogeboom,
J., and numerous authorities cited to sustain the principle laid down.
The same rule is held in the case of Buckmaster v. The Consumers'
Ice Co. (5 Daly 313). These cases show a recognition of the principle that a court of equity will interfere when the remedy is defective
at law, if such an interference be not against equity and good conscience.
See Seymour v. Delancey (6 Johns. Ch. 222, 3 Cow. 445).
While the general rule is for courts of equity not to entertain jurisdiction for a specific performance on the sale of stock, this rule is
limited to cases where a compensation in damages would furnish a
complete and satisfactory remedy.
(Phillips v. Berger, 2 Barb. 608;
in section 717, states, as the
Story's Eq. Jur.,
Story,
Judge
717.)
reason why a contract for stock is not specifically decreed, that " it is

"His"

(i
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He further says:
ordinarily capable of such an exact compensation."
" But cases of a peculiar stock may easily be supposed, where courts
of equity m-ight still feel themselves bound to decree a specific performance, upon the ground that, from its nature, it has a peculiar
value, and is incapable of compensation by damages."
He also
in
the
to
rule
as
to
in
section
general
regard
says,
jurisdiction,
718:
" The rule is a qualified one, and subject to exceptions; or, rather,
the rule is limited to cases where a compensation in damages furThe case considered
nishes a complete and satisfactory remedy."
comes directly within the exception stated.
A recovery of damages
would furnish inadequate compensation ; the remedy by mandamus
can not be invoked, as the authorities hold, and there can be no question that, in a case of this kind, a court of equity alone can grant the
proper relief.
It is insisted that when the plaintiff demanded a transfer on the
books of the company the stock had already been transferred to another person, who had paid a money consideration to the plaintiff's
husband, from whom she claimed, and the remedy, if any, was by an
We think that the transfer alleged, under the
action for damages.
circumstances, was not a valid one as against the plaintiff, and furnishes no sufficient answer to the plaintiff's claim, if, as we have seen,
she had a right to maintain an action in equity to compel a transfer of
Her right was paramount to that which. the defendthe stock to her.
The stock had previously, and
ant seeks to interpose as a defense.
on the ipth of January, 1875, been transferred to her by an assignment indorsed on the back of the certificate, and on the same day a
power of attorney had been executed by the owner to her, which authorized the plaintiff to act for him and in his behalf.
That the transfer was made without a moneyed consideration can make no differThe assignments to Beals, which, it
ence, as it was otherwise valid.
is claimed, are entitled to priority, bore date some time after the
As they were subsequent to such transfer,
transfer to the plaintiff.
and as by the certificate the stock was only transferable upon the
books of the company upon a surrender of the same, no title could
The delivery of the certifipass unless the transfer was thus made.
cate, as between the owner and assignee, with the assignment and
power indorsed, passes the entire legal and equitable title in the
stock, subject only to such liens or claims as the corporation may
have upon it.
(McNeil v. The Tenth National Bank, 46 N. Y. 331 ;
N. Y. & N. H. R. Co. v. Schuyier, 34 N. Y. 30, 80.) Any act suffered by the corporation that invested a third party with the ownership of the shares, without due production and surrender of the certificate, rendered it liable to the owner; and it was its duty to resist
any transfer on the books without such production and surrender.
(Smith v. The American Coal Co. of Allegheny Co., 7 Lans. 317;
Beals
see, a-lso, N. Y. & N. H. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 83.)
was a witness to the original assignment to the plaintiff, was an officer of the company, and took the transfer to himself with full knowledge of plaintiff's claim, for a very trifling consideration, and in fraud
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of plaintiff's rights as the owner of the stock.
In view of the facts,
Beals has no reason for questioning the plaintiff's title; and the defendant certainly has no valid grounds for claiming that Beals was
*
*
*
the owner instead of the plaintiff.
Affirmed.
The general rule is, that where stock can be procured upon the
market, an action at law for damages, as for a conversion of shares, is an
adequate remedy, and therefore neither mandamus, nor a suit in equity can
be maintained.
As to the circumstances under which the corporation becomes liable, either for refusal to transfer shares or for an improper transfer, see, 1857, Mandlebaum v. N. A. Min. Co., 4 Mich. 464; 1878, Telegraph
Co. v. Davenport, 97 U. S. 369; 1883, Moores v. Citizens' Bank, 111 U. S.
156; 1887, Supply Ditch Co. v. Elliott. 10 Colo. 327, 3 Am. St. Rep. 586; 1889,
Allen v. South Boston R., 150 Mass. 200; 1890, Rice v. Rockefeller, 134 N. Y.
174; 1892, Peck v. Providence Gas Co., 17 R. I. 275; 1893, Fifth Ave. Bank
v. 42d St. R., 137 N. Y. 231; 1896, Knox v. Eden Musee Am. Co., 148 N. Y.
441 ; 1897, Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Citizens' Nat'l Bank, 56 Ohio St. 351.
Note.

Sec. 569.
IN

Same.

THE MATTER OF

1813.

Mandamus.

MORRIS

SHIPLEY

AND OTHERS v.

BANK.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.
Rep. 484-5.

THE MECHANICS'
10

Johns.

(N Y.)

A motion was made for a mandamus, to be directed to the presiident, directors and company of the Mechanics' Bank, commanding
them to permit Morris Shipley and others, assignees of Samuel Kip,
to transfer eight shares of the capital stock of the bank standing on
the books of the company.
It appeared from the affidavits read, that Kip had been regularly discharged under the insolvent act, and that Shipley and others had been
duly appointed the assignees of all his estate, real and personal,
and that the shares in question were inserted in the inventory of his
The assignees applied to the comestate exhibited by the insolvent.
be
to
transfer
the
to
shares, which the company repermitted
pany
fused, on the ground that Kip was indebted to them in the sum of
$ i ,474.60 for money lent, etc. , and at the time held the eight shares to
the value of twenty-five dollars each, which they claimed the right of
retaining and applying towards paving the debt due to them from
Kip.

Per Curiam.

The applicants have an adequate remedy, by a
on
the
action
case, to recover the value of the stock if the
special
bank have unduly refused to transfer it. There is no need of the extraordinary remedy by mandamus in so ordinary a case. It might as
well be required in every case where trover would lie. It is not a
matter of public concern, as in the case of public records and documents ; and there can not be any necessity, or even a desire of possess2 WIL. CAS.
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By recovering the market value
ing the identical shares in question.
of them, at the time of the demand, they can be replaced.
This is
not the case of a specific and favorite chattel, to which there might
The case of The King v. The Bank
exist the pretium affectionis.
of England (Doug. 524) is in point, and this remedy in that case was
denied.

Motion denied.
1807, Gray v. Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 364; 1870, Baker v
Note. Accord:
Marshal, 15 Minn. 177; 1870, State v. Eombauer, 46 Mo. 155; 1872, Kimball v. Union Water Co., 44 Cal. 173; 1872, Murray v. Stevens, 110 Mass. 95;
v. Seymour, 127 Mass. 104; 1881, Bank v. Harrison, 66 Ga.
1879, Stackpole
696 ; 1882, Townes v. Nichols, 73 Me. 515 ; 1884, Freon v. Carriage Co., 42 Ohio
St. 30, 51 Am. Rep. 794, note, 798; 1889, Burnsville Tp. Co. v. State, 119
Ind. 382, 3 L. R. A. 265, note; 1899, Durfee v. Harper, 22 Mont. 354. See,

also, note supra, p. 1319, and preceding case.
But when there is no adequate remedy by the ordinary processes of the law,
mandamus mav be had.
See note supra, p. 1319; 1858, People v. Crockett,
9 Cal. 113; 1870, State v. Cheraw & Darlington R. Co., 2 S. C. (N. S.) 25;
1873, Green Mountain Tp. Co. v. Bulla, 45 Ind. 1; 1881, People v. Goss &
Phillips Mfg. Co., 99 111. 355; 1881, State v. Cheraw & Chester R., 16 S. C. 524;
1883, State v. First Nat'l Bank, 89 Ind. 302; 1886, In re Klaus, 67 Wis. 401;
1892, Slemmons v. Thompson, 23 Ore. 215.

c. 570.

Same.

PRATT v. BOSTON AND ALBANY RAILROAD COMPANY.
1879.

IN THE SUPREME
126

JUDICIAL COURT OF
Mass. Rep. 443-445.

MASSACHUSETTS.

[Bill in equity alleging certain facts, and praying that the defendant company be ordered to procure and transfer to the plaintiff five
shares of its capital stock, issue to her a proper certificate therefor,
make proper record thereof on the books, and pay her dividends deDefendant demurred for nonclared thereon since January n, 1876.
this was overruled and an appeal taken.]
joinder of parties,
GRAY, C. J. The bill alleges, and the demurrer admits, that,
without any negligence or any authority of the plaintiff, a certificate
of five shares owned by her in the defendant corporation, having indorsed thereon a forged power of attorney to Brown to transfer the
shares to Richardson, Hill and Company, was presented and surrendered by Brown to the corporation, and the shares were transferred
by Brown to Richardson, Hill and Company, and that the corporation thereupon issued a new certificate for these shares to RichardThe bill
son, Hill and Company, who claim to hold the same.
does not seek to cancel that certificate, or ask for any relief which
may require a decree against Richardson, Hill and Company, or against
Brown ; but prays that the corporation may procure five shares of its
capital stock, and record and issue to the plaintiff a certificate thereof,
and pay to her the dividends thereon.
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The corporation, by its unauthorized and illegal act, has clearly made
itself liable to the plaintiff; and her right to maintain this bill
against the corporation is wholly independent of the questions whether
it has also made itself liable to Richardson, Hill and Company upon
the new certificate, and whether it can maintain any action against
them or against Brown by reason of their having obtained that certificate by means of a forged paper.
It was therefore rightly held
that neither of them was a necessary party to the bill.
Pratt v.
Taunton Copper Co., 123 Mass, no: Machinists' Bank v. Field, 126
Mass. 345; Salisbury Mills v. Townsend, 109 Mass. 115; Loring v.
Salisbury Mills, 125 Mass. 138; Telegraph Co. v. Davenport, 97 U.
S. 369; Dalton v. Midland R., 12 C. B. 458; Duncan v. Luntley, 2
Macn. & Gord. 30, s. c. 2 Hall&Twells 78; Taylor v. Midland R.,
28 Beav. 287, and 8 H. L. Cas. 751.
Decree affirmed.
Note.

See, 1897,

Kerr

Estate Trust Co. v. Bird,

Sec. 571.

6.

86 Md. 72, 38 L. R.
229, 44 Atl. Rep. 1048.

v. Urie,
90

Md.

A. 119;

1899,

Real

Right to participate in issue of new stock.

DOUSMAN v. THE WISCONSIN AND LAKE SUPERIOR MINING AND
SMELTING COMPANY. 1
1876.

IN THE SUPREME

COURT OF WISCONSIN.
418-423.

40

Wis. Rep.

[Plaintiff alleged he was the owner of seven shares in the company,
all of which were fully paid ; that there were 131 shares of $500
each, none of which (except plaintiff's shares and one other) were
more than half paid up.
Under authority it was determined to increase the stock to 1,000 shares, of which 250 were to be used in performing a contract with another corporation, 95 shares reserved to the
five
company, and the other 655 shares issued to the shareholders,
shares fully paid for each share of the old stock.
Plaintiff alleged
that the company refused to allow him any greater interest for his
fully-paid shares than was allowed to a like number of half-paid
shares; he asked that he be allowed new shares, in proportion to the
amount paid, or that half of those issued to holders of half-paid stock
be canceled.
The facts were found as alleged, and further distribution was enjoined, unless the issue of new shares were made in proportion demanded by plaintiff.]
RYAN, C. J.
i. The injury which the respondent, as a shareholder of the appellant, sets up in his complaint, is one peculiar and
personal to himself, not common to other shareholders, alleged to
have been committed by the board of directors, as the governing body
of the corporation ; that is, by the corporation itself.
Clearly his
1
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a

is

;

a

it

it
is

a

it,

remedy is against the corporation. Probably he might have maintained an action at law against it.
Gray v. Portland Bank, 3 Mass.
of
effect
such
an
action
But
the
would be to convert part of his
364.
interest as a shareholder into a judgment for damages ; in other words,
That he is not
to sell a portion of his stock to the corporation.
obliged to do. He has a right to maintain his proportionate interest
in the corporation, certainly as long as there is sufficient stock remainTrading corporations of the
ing undisposed of by the corporation.
character of the appellant have been likened to partnerships, and the
remedies of stockholders to those of partners, by very high authority.
Gray v. Portland Bank, supra; Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige 222;
Adley v. Whitstable Co., 17 Vesey 315. And equity has always afforded a remedy to a stockholder, in such a case as this, by injunction, account, or other appropriate decree.
Adley v. Whitstable Co.,
This principle has been repeatedly recognized in this court,
supra.
as in Putnam v. Sweet, 2 Pin. 302 ; Nazi'o v. Ins. Co., 14 Wis. 319.
Such a case is clearly distinguishable from suits by stockholders in
the right of the corporation, founded on wrongs against the corporation. In that class of cases, as the authorities cited by the appellant
show, the right of suit is primarily in the corporation itself; and
stockholders take the right, in lieu of the corporation, only upon refusal of the governing body of the corporation to sue.
Here the wrong complained of is by the corporation, not against
The right is against
it.
not against individual directors.
The
judgment, to be effectual, must be against the corporation itself; not
against the directors personally, who may be changed from time to
time.
And even where a suit would lie by corporation against its
governing body for wrongs done against
by the governing body,
demand upon the governing body to bring
sufficiently manifest that
the suit would be nugatory.
in like condition as the re2. If there are other shareholders
spondent, their right and his are several
they may bring their separate suits, or they may submit to the wrong at their several pleasure.
The case
The respondent has no right to represent them.
entirely
wrong done by the governing body common to
distinguishable from
* *
*
all the stockholders.

Affirmed.

;

,

;

;

3

3

Mass. 364,
Am. Dec. 156 1865,
See, 1807, Gray v. Portland Bank,
Note.
Eeese v. Bank of Montgomery Co., 31 Pa. St. 78, 72 Am. Dec. 726; 1871, Bidman v. Bowman. 58 111. 444, 11 Am. Rep. 90; 1876, State v. Smith, 48 Vt. 266
1883, Jones v. Morrison, 31 Minn. 140; 1891, Jones v. Concord, etc., R., 67 N.
H. 119; 1892, Jones v. Concord, etc., R., 67 N. H. 234, 68 Am. St. Rep. 650;
1892, Humboldt, etc., Park Assn. v. Stevens, 34 Neb. 528, 33 Am. St. Rep. 654,
note; 1893, Baltimore, etc., R. v. Hambleton, 77 Md. 341, supra, p.1582; 1899,
Real Estate Trust Co. v. Bird, 90 Md. 229, 44 Atl. Rep. 1048; 1901, Electric
Pa. St.
Co. of America v. Edison Elec. Co.,
50 Atl. 164.
Compare, 1879, Terry v. Eagle Lock Co., 47 Conn. 141 1882, Mason v. Davol Mills, 132 Mass. 76; 1886, Pratt v. Telephone Co., 141 Mass. 225, 55 Am.
,

55

N.

J.

Eq.

211

;

;

1897, Meredith v. New Jersey Zinc Co.,
Rep. 465
68 Pac. 130.
Crosby v. Stratton,
Col. App.

1902,
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Sec. 572.

7.

(a)

1

705

Right to be released from corporate liability:
For fraud or mistake in inducing subscriptions.

See Martin v. South Salem L. Co., 94 Va. 28, supra, p. 539, note
544; Rockford, R. I. & St. L. R. Co. v. Shunick, 65 111. 223,
supra, p. 545, note 547.

Same,
Sec. 573.
not subscribed.

In case the requisite amount of stock is

(b)

See Anderson v. Middle
supra, p. 511, note 514.
Note.

See, 1827, Salem

ford v. Davis, 5 M. & W. 2;
78 Am. St. Rep. 288.

Sec. 574. Same,
the corporation.

E. T. Central R. Co.,

91

Tenn. 44,

v. Ropes, 6 Pick. 23;
McCoy v. World's Columb. Ex.,

1839, Pitch186 111. 356,

&

Mill Dam Corp.
1900,

(c)

By

a

material change in the business

of

See Ashton v. Burbank, 2 Dill. 435, Fed. Cas. No. 582, supra, p.
87; Railway Company v. Allerton, 18 Wall. 233, supra, p. 442.

Sec. 575.

Same.

ment.

(d)

By

a

forfeiture of shares for non-pay-

See Small v. Herkimer Mfg. Co., 2 N. Y. 330, supra, p. 1567;
Budd v. Multnomah St. Ry. Co., 15 Ore. 413, supra, p. 1569.

Sec. 576.
shares.

Same,

(e)

By

a

valid

and

completed

transfer of

Visalia & Tulare R. Co. v. Hyde, no Cal. 632, supra, p.
and note, p. 1694; West Nashville Planing Mill Co. v. Nashville Savings Bank, 86 Tenn. 252, supra, p. 1695.
See

1692,

8.
Right to enjoin a change in the corporate enterSec. 577.
prise, unless such power is reserved to the state.

See Railway Company v. Allerton, 18 Wall. 233, supra, p. 442;
Durfee v. Old Colony, etc., R., 5 Allen (Mass.) 230, supra, p. 1462 ;
Zabriskie v. Hackensack, etc., R., 18 N. J. Eq. 178, supra, p. 1466.
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9. Right to share in distribution of surplus assets upon
dissolution of the corporation.

Sec. 578.

See Bacon v. Robertson, 18 How. 480, supra, p. 899; Foster v.
Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245, supra, p. 895; Wilson v. Leary, 120 N.
C. 90, supra, p. 903. See, also, note, supra, p. 910; and compare
State Bank v. State, i Blackf. 267, supra, p. 891 ; Titcomb v. Kennebunk Mut. F. Ins. Co., 79 Me. 315, supra, p. 901; Romney v.
United States, 136 U. S. i, supra, p. 906.

Sec. 579.

10.

(a)

Right to sue for wrongs done to the corporation,
General doctrine, as to action at law.

JOSEPH SMITH
1847.

v.

JOHN KURD, ET

AL. 1

IN THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
Mete. (Mass.) Rep. 371-387.

12

[Special action on the case by a stockholder in the Phoenix Bank
against the directors, charging them with non-feasance of official duty
in negligently permitting the president to control the whole business,
and to loan large sums of money without reasonable security and misfeasance in paying an excessive salary to the president, making dividends when there were no profits, causing false returns of the condition of the bank to be made to the secretary of the commonwealth,
and false exhibits to the bank examiners, by all of which plaintiff was
misled into purchasing ninety shares of stock in addition to the ten
shares he originally subscribed for; and further that the directors so
" fraudulently mismanaged the bank that the whole capital thereof
was utterly lost and destroyed."
Defendants demurred.]
SHAW, C. J. This is certainly a case of first impression.
We are
not aware that any similar action has been sustained in England, or
in any of the courts of this country.
It is founded on no statute. It
is an action on the case, at common law, brought by an individual
holder of shares in an incorporated bank against the directors, not including the president, setting forth various acts of negligence and
malfeasance, through a series of years, in consequence of which, as
the declaration alleges, the whole capital of the bank was wasted and
The cirlost, and the shares of the plaintiff became of no value.
cumstance that no such action has been maintained would certainly be
no decisive objection if it could be shown to be maintainable on principle. But the fact that similar grievances have existed to a great
extent, and in numberless instances, where such an action would have
presented an obvious and effective remedy, affords strong proof that,
in the view of all such suffering parties, and their legal advisers and
guides, there was no principle on which such an action can be
maintained.
1
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If an action can be brought by one stockholder, it may be brought
by the holder of a single share ; so that for one and the same default
of these directors, thirty-five hundred actions might be brought. If
it may be sustained by proof of an act, or series of acts, of carelessness, neglect, and breach of duty, in managing the affairs of the
bank, by which the whole value of the stock is destroyed, it may, on
the same principle, be maintained on any act or instance of such negligence, by which the shares are diminished in value fifty, ten, five or
Still, notwithstanding these consequences, if the
one per cent.
plaintiff has a good right of action, upon recognized and sound legal
principles, his action ought to be sustained.
But the court are of opinion that the action can not be maintained ;
and that on several grounds, a few of the more prominent of which

is

a

a

a

;

is

is
a

I

is

it

it

a

it

it,

may be alluded to.
1. There is no legal privity, relation, or immediate connection, between the holders of shares in a bank, in their individual capacity, on
the one side, and the directors of the bank on the other.
The directors are not the bailees, the factors, agents or trustees of such indiThe bank is a corporation and body politic,
vidual stockholders.
having a separate exi'stence as a distinct person in law, in whom the
whole stock and property of the bank are vested, and to whom all
agents, debtors, officers and servants are responsible for all contracts,
express or implied, made in reference to such capital, and for all torts
The very purpose of incorand injuries diminishing or impairing it.
poration is to create such legal and ideal person in law, distinct
from all the persons composing
in order to avoid the extreme diffinot too much to say, the utter impracticability,
culty, and perhaps
of such
number of persons acting together in their individual
The practical difficulty would be nearly as great, whether
capacities.
were held that all must join in an action to recover damage for an
injury to the common property, or that each might sue separately.
The stockholders do, indeed, ordinarily elect the directors; but
as parts and members of the corporation, in their corporate capacity, in modes pointed out by the charter and by-laws, so that the
directors are the appointees of the corporation, not of the individuals.
Indeed, believe there
there cerprovision in the bank charters
tainly was formerly which
equally to the present purpose namely,
that the commonwealth shall be at liberty to add
certain amount to
the capital of various banks and appoint
proportional number of directors.
Such directors so appointed, pursuant to the charter regulating the legal organization of the body, would stand in all respects
If these were
on the footing of directors chosen by the stockholders.
liable to the action of individual stockholders those would be in like
manner.
2. The individual members of the corporation, whether
they
should all join or each act severally, have no right or power to intermeddle with the property or concerns of the bank, or call any officer,
agent or servant to account or discharge them from any liability.
Should all the stockholders join in
power of attorney to any one,

1/08

JOSEPH SMITH V. JOHN HURD,

ET AL.

579

he could not take possession of any real or personal estate, any
security or chose in action, could not collect a debt or discharge a
claim, or release damage arising from any default, simply because
they are not the 1'egal owners of the property, and damage done to such
Their rights and their powers are
property is not an injury to them.
limited and well defined.
They are members of an organized body,
and exercise such powers as the organization of the institution gives
them.
Stockholders in banks have a separate right to dividends,
when declared, and to a distributive share of the capital stock, if any
remains when the charter of the bank is at an end and its debts

paid.

3. But another important consideration is, that the inj.ury done to
the capital stock by wasting, impairing and diminishing its value, is
not, in the first instance, nor necessarily, a damage to the stockholdAll sums which could, in any form, be recovered on that ground,
ers.
would be assets of the corporation, and when collected and received
by directors, receivers, or any other persons entitled to receive the
same, they would be held in trust, first to redeem the bills and pay
the debts of the bank ; and it would be only after these debts were
paid, and in case any surplus should remain, that the stockholders
It is, therefore, an indirect,
would be entitled to receive anything.
contingent and subordinate interest, which each stockholder has in
If, upon such indirect,
damages so to be recovered against directors.
contingent and remote interest, individual stockholders could recover
for the defaults of directors, and especially, as is alleged in this case,
where these defaults have been so great as to sink the capital, a fortiori would the creditors of the bank individually have a right to
maintain similar actions ; because their claim upon the funds, being
prior to that of stockholders, would be somewhat more immediate
and dii'ect.
In the same connection, it is obvious to remark, that a judgment in
favor of one stockholder would be no bar to an action by a creditor,
nor a judgment by both, to an action by the corporation.
4. But it is said that although the real and personal estate, the
securities and capital stock, are, in legal contemplation, vested in the
corporation, yet the individual has a separate and distinct property
and interest in his particular shares, by any injury to which he may
To some extent it is true that he has a sevhave a separate damage.
eral interest in his shares, but it is to be taken with some qualifications.
Strictly speaking, shares in a bank do not constitute a legal
estate and property; it is rather a limited and qualified right which
the stockholder has to participate, in a certain proportion, in the benefits of a common fund, vested in a corporation for the common use;
it is a qualified and equitable interest, a valuable interest, manifested
To the extent of this
usually by a certificate, which is transferable.
separate and peculiar interest, a stockholder, no doubt, might maintain his separate and special action, according to the nature of the
wrong done to him in respect to it; as trover or trespass, for the conversion or tortious taking of his certificate ; trespass on the case for
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refusing to make a transfer on a proper occasion; assumpsit for a
dividend declared, and the like. But an injury done to the stock and
capital, by negligence or misfeasance, is not an injury to such separate interest, but to the whole body of stockholders in common.
It is
like the case of a common nuisance, where one who suffers a special
damage, peculiar to himself, and distinguishable in kind from that
which he shares in the common injury, may maintain a special action.
Otherwise, he can not. Co. Lit. 563 ; 3 Steph. N. P. 2372 ; Lansing
v. Smith, 8 Cow. 146.
But we are pressed with the argument that for every damage which
one sustains, which is caused by the wrongful act of another, he
This is far from being universally true.
ought to have a remedy.
Another maxim in regard to claims for damages is, causa proxima,
non remota, spectatur.
Thousands of instances occur in which one
sustains consequential and incidental damage from the misconduct of
another, without a remedy at law.
By the misconduct of the officers
or agents of a parish, town, county, or even of the state or the Union,
defalcations may take place, treasure be squandered and wasted, and
all the members of the respective aggregate bodies suffer damage, for
which the law, from the nature of the case, can afford no direct
But the true answer to the objection is, that stockholders
remedy.
have a remedy, a theoretic one, indeed, and perhaps often inadequate,
in the power of the corporation, in its corporate capacity, to obtain
redress for injuries done to the common property, by the recovery of
damages; and each individual stockholder has his remedy, through
the powers thus vested in the corporation for the common benefit.
On the whole, the court are of opinion that the demurrer is well
taken, and that the action can not be maintained.
See note, infra, p. 1723, and 1899, Home M. Co. v.
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against it, its six directors and the six promoters of a new company,
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asking that the directors and promoters be required to pay back to the
company ^5,500, alleged to have been paid out of the company's
funds by its directors to buy off the promoters of the new company
from securing an act of parliament to enable them to operate in the
The bill was demurred to.]
same district.
SIR GEORGE JESSEL, M. R. I am of opinion that this bill is open
The nature of the case which
to genei^al demurrer on two grounds.
I suppose was intended to be made by the bill is that the water-works
company were not authorized to pay a sum of ^5,500 to the promoters of an opposition company, who were opposing a bill for extending
the powers of what I will call the old company, in order to buy off
The bill seeks to make liable both the directors of
the opposition.
the old company who had paid the money and the promoters of the
new company who received the money.
The two objections, which I think are well founded, are these:
First, it is said there is no case made by the bill showing that the act
complained of wr as beyond the powers of the old company, there being no direct allegation of fraud, although the word "corrupt" is
used; and secondly, it is said that, even if the act complained of was
shown to be ultra vires, it was a case in which ^the old company,
which was an incorpoi'ated company, ought to sue.
(His honor then reviewed the allegations in the bill, and considered that the bill did not sufficiently allege that the payment complained of was beyond the powers of the old company.)
A great deal of the argument in this case turned upon what maybe
described, perhaps, in one sense, as a technical objection, but which is
It was said that this is a
a very formidable and important objection.
bill to make a stranger pay back money belonging to a company
which the stranger has illegally or improperly possessed himself of,
or appropriated
to his own use, and that any person who takes possession of a trust fund is liable to be sued in equity by the owner of
the trust fund if he had notice at the time that it was a trust fund ;
and although he gave value, still in that way the bill can be maintained against him.
The answer was, that where the owner of the trust fund is an incorporated company, the corporation is the only party to sue ; the stranger
has nothing whatever to do with the individual corporators ; and although in a sense it is their property, because individual corporators
make up the corporation, yet in law it is not their property, but the
property of the corporation, and therefore the right person to sue is the
corporation, who is the cestui que trust or equitable owner of the fund.
In this court the
That I take to be the general rule of this court.
fund,
is
a
of
trust
because
the
it
is applicable only to
company
money
the special purposes of the company in the hands of the agents of the
company, and it is in that sense a trust fund applicable by them to
those special purposes ; and a person taking it from them with notice
that it is being applied to other purposes can not in this court say that
he is not a constructive trustee.
But the general rule being that the cestui que trust must sue, and
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not the individual corporator who has only an ultimate beneficial interest, the only point remaining to be considered is, whether there are
I entirely agree that the
any exceptions to the general rule.
general rule, if I may say so respectfully, is correctly stated by
Lord Justice James in the case of Gray v. Lewis, Law Rep. 8
"Where there is a corporate body capable of
Ch. App. 1035, 1050:
filing a bill for itself to recover property, either from its directors
or officers, or from any other person, that corporate body is the
proper plaintiff, and the only proper plaintiff." I do not understand the Lord Justice to intend to state more than the general rule,
because he began by saying:
is very important, in order to avoid
oppressive litigation, to adhere to the rule laid down in Mozley v.
Alston, i Ph. Ch. 790, and Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461, which cases
have always been considered as settling the law of this court."
So
that in laying down the general rule he did not intend to impeach or
interfere with those cases, but only to express the result of them.
In
reality Mozley v. Alston, i Ph. Ch. 790, simply affirmed Foss v. Harbottle, and therefore when you want to find the rule you must look to
Foss v. Harbottle, where you will find the general rule is that which
I have stated. But that is not a universal rule ; that is, it is a rule
subject to exceptions, and the exceptions depend very much on the
necessity of the case ; that is, the necessity for the court doing justice.
In Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 491, Vice-Chancellor Sir J. Wigram
says this: "The first objection taken in the argument for the defendants was that the individual members of the corporation can not in
During the
any case sue in the form in which this bill is framed.
argument I intimated an opinion, to which, upon a further consideration, I fully adhere, that the rule was much too broadly stated on the
I think there are cases in which a suit might
part of the defendants.
Corporations like this, of a private nature, are
properly be so framed.
in truth little more than private partnerships, and in cases which may
easily be suggested it would be too much to hold that a society of
private persons associated together in undertakings which, though
certainly beneficial to the public, are nevertheless matters of private
property, are to be deprived of their civil rights inter se because, in
order to make their common objects more attainable, the crown or
the legislature may have conferred upon them the benefit of a corporate character.
If a case should arise of injury to a corporation by
some of its members, for which no adequate remedy remained except
that of a suit by individual corporators in their private characters, and
asKing in such character the protection of those rights to which in
their corporate character they were entitled, I can not but think that
the principle so forcibly laid down by Lord Cottenham, in Wallworth
v. Holt, 4 My. & C. 619, 635, and other cases, would apply, and the
claims of justice would be found superior to any difficulties arising
out of technical rules respecting the mode in which corporations are
That I take to be the correct law on the subject.
required to sue."
It remains to consider what are those exceptional cases in which,
for the due attainment of justice, such a suit should be allowed. We
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are all familiar with one large class of cases which are certainly the
first exception to the rule.
They are cases in which an individual
corporator sues the corporation to prevent the corporation either commencing or continuing the doing of something which is beyond the
Such a bill, indeed, may be maintained
powers of the corporation.
on behalf of himself and of others,
a
not
corporator,
single
suing
by
as was settled in the house of lords in a case of Simpson v. WestIf the subject-matminster Palace Hotel Company, 8 H. L. C. 711.
ter of the suit is an agreement between the corporation acting by its
directors or managers and some other corporation or some other person strangers to the corporation, it is quite proper and quite usual to
make that other corporation or person a defendant to the suit, because
that other corporation or person has an interest, and a great interest,
in arguing the question and having it decided, once for all, whether
the agreement in question is really within the powers or without the
So
powers of the corporation of which the corporator is a member.
that in these cases you must always bring before the court the other

corporation.
The cases are

so numerous on this subject that one ought not perBut may mention a few of them. There is,
haps to refer to them.
first, the well-known case of Hare v. London and Northwestern Railway Company, 2 J. & H. 80 ; there is the case of Simpson v. Denison, 10 Hare 51 ; there is a case of Beman v. Rufford, i Sim. (N. S.)
550; and a vast number of cases as regards agreements between railway companies which have been held to be ultra vires. When you
have got the second corporation or person a party to the suit it may
happen that, in addition to the relief that you are entitled to as regards the first, you are entitled to have relief against the second for
You
something that has been done under the ultra vires agreement.
may be entitled to have money paid back which has been paid under
the ultra vires agreement, as in the case of Salomons v. Laing, 12
Beav. 377, and you may be entitled to have property returned or
other acts done.
If the detainer or holder of the money or property,
that is, the second corporation or other person, is already a party, and
a necessary party, to the suit, it would indeed be a lame and halting
conclusion if the court were to say it could do justice in a suit so
framed by ordering the money to be returned or the property restored.
It is a necessary incident to the first part of the relief which
can be obtained by individual corporators, and will do complete justice on each side, and that has always been the practice of the court.
Therefore, in a case so framed there is no objection to a suit by an
individual corporator to recover from another corporator, or from any
other persons being strangers to this corporation, the money or propBut that is not the only case. Any
erty so improperly obtained.
other case in which the claims of justice require it is within the
exception.
Another instance occurred in the case of Atwool v. Merryweather,
Law Rep. 5 Eq. 464, n., in which the corporation was controlled by
the evil-doer, and would not allow its name to be used as plaintiff in
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It was said that justice required that the majority of the
the suit.
corpbrators should not appropriate to themselves the property of the
minority, and then use their own votes at the general meeting of the
corporation to prevent their being sued by the corporation, and consequently in a case of that kind the corporators who form part of the
minority might file a bill on their own behalf to get back the property
It is not necessary that the corpoor money so illegally appropriated.
ration should absolutely refuse by vote at the general meeting, if it
can be shown either that the wrong-doer had command of the majority of the votes, so that it would be absurd to call the meeting ; or
if it can be shown that there has been a general meeting substantially
approving of what has been done ; or if it can be shown from the
acts of the corporation as a corporation, distinguished from the mere
that they have approved of what has been
acts of the directors of
done, and have allowed
long time to elapse without interfering, so
In all those cases
that they do not intend and are not willing to sue.
the same doctrine applies, and the individual corporator may mainAs have said before, the rule
tain the suit.
general one, but
case where the interests of justice require the rule
does not apply to
do not intend by the observations
have
to be dispensed with.
made in any way to restrain the generality of the terms made use of
by the learned judge who decided the case of Foss v. Harbottle,
can not help seeing
Hare 461. Therefore
quite possible so to
amend this bill as to get rid of the difficulty which now exists, and
should give leave to amend.
think that on this part of the case
Of
in the usual form.
allow
course, in allowing the demurrer,
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The petition prayed that R. might defend the bill on the part
Leave was granted to make defense in the name
said
company.
of
R., howof the M. & M. Co., and to the same extent as it could.
ever, put in an answer in his own name, whereupon F., another shareholder, upon a like petition, was permitted to put in an answer signed
"The M. & M. R. Co., by F., stockholder." Replications were
filed to these answers.]
MR. JUSTICE NELSON. As the two stockholders (Rockwell and
Fleming), though not made defendants by the bill, were permitted,
by leave of the court, to appear and put in answers in the name of
the Milwaukee and Minnesota Company, it is material to inquire into
so.
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That they can not be regarded as the
the effect to be given to them.
answers of the corporate body is manifest, as a corporation must appear and answer to the bill, not under oath, but under its common
And an omission thus to appear and answer, according to the
seal.
rules and practice of the court, entitles the complainants to enter an
order that the bill be taken pro confesso. A. further objection to
the practice of permitting a party to appear and answer in the name
of the corporation is the inequality that would exist between the parThe corporation not being before the court, it
ties to the litigation.
nor
would not be bound by any order or decree rendered against
by any admissions made in the answer or stipulations that might be
thus apparent, that
entered into by the parties or their counsel.
thus used as
real party in the
while the name of the corporation
litigation, so far as the rights and interests of the complainants are
an unreal and fictitious party so far as respects any.
concerned,
obligation or responsibility on the part of the respondents.
It
insisted, however, that the directors of this company refused to
appear and defend the bill filed against them, and for the fraudulent
purpose of sacrificing the interests of the stockholders; and, hence,
the necessity, as well as the propriety and justice, of permitting the
defense by
stockholder in their name.
would be
Undoubtedly, in the case supposed,
reproach to the
court of equity,
the stockholders were remlaw, and especially in
case, the court in its discretion will permit
But in such
ediless.
stockholder to become
party defendant, for the purpose of protecting his own interests against unfounded or illegal claims against the
company; and he will also be permitted to appear on behalf of other
But this destockholders who may desire to join him in the defense.
fense
independent of the company and of its directors, and the
real and substantial party to the extent of his
stockholder becomes
own interests and of those who may join him, and against whom any
binding, and
proceeding, order, or decree of the court in the cause
true, the remedy
an extreme one, and
It
may be enforced.
but
should be admitted by the court with hesitation and caution
grows out of the necessity of the case and for the sake of justice, and
A complainflagrant wrong.
may be the only remedy to prevent
he chooses, may compel a corporation to appear and answer
ant,
diwrit of distringas; or he may join with the corporation,
by
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rector, or officer, if he desires a discovery under oath.
But we are
not aware of any other except a complainant who can compel an appearance or answer.
Now, although the appearance and answers of the stockholders
(Rockwell and Fleming) were irregularly allowed by the court, as
each was permitted to appear and answer in the name of the company, yet, as the defense set up is doubtless the same as that which
they would have relied on if they had been admitted simply as stockholders, we are inclined to regard the answers the same as if put in
by them in that character, in the further views we shall take of the case.
Each one swore to the truth of his answer in the usual way. * * *
Note.

See note, infra, p. 1723.

Sec. 583.

TOMKINSON
1887.

t>

Same,

(c)
v.

Ultra mres acts.

SOUTHEASTERN

IN CHANCERY DIVISION.
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35

1

Ch. Div. Rep. 675-681.

[Motion by plaintiff, the owner of ^500 of the stock of the S. E.
Ry. Co. , for an injunction to restrain the company carrying out a res-

olution of shareholders carried by a vote of 10,229 v tes, representing
^1,209,035 of stock, against 175 votes, representing ^13,500 of
stock, to subscribe ^1,000 of the company's money to the Imperial
Institute.
The plaintiff was not present at the meeting, but as soon
as he heard of it protested to the secretary, who replied that the directors usually carried out the orders of the shareholders, and that the
plaintiff's share of the contribution would be about I3d. After some
further correspondence plaintiff began this suit.]
KAY, J. I have no doubt that it is the duty of the court to grant
an injunction in this case.
The question, as the attorney-general said, is whether the act proposed to be done is within the powers of the railway company, or
outside its powers.
If it is outside its powers, it is now perfectly set-

tled that any one shareholder may come to this court and say, "This
company is going to do an act which is beyond its power; stop it;"
and the court thereupon has no discretion in the matter.
Now, what is proposed to be done here is this: The chairman of
the railway company, at a meeting of the company, proposed this
resolution: "That the directors [of the company] be authorized, either
by way of donation from the company or by an appeal to the proprietors
as they may be advised"
the resolution
thus proposing two alternative modes
"to subscribe the sum of ^1,000 to the Imperial Institute." I pause there. The Imperial Institute has no more connection
with this railway company than the present exhibition of pictures at
Burlington House, or the Grosvenor Gallery, or Madam Tussaud's, or
1
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The only
any other institution in London that can be mentioned.
ground for the suggestion that this company has the right to apply its
funds, which it has been allowed to raise for specific purposes, to this
purpose, is, that the Imperial Institute, if it succeeds, will very probably greatly increase the traffic of this company. If that is a good reason,
then, as I pointed out during the argument, any possible kind of exhibition which, by being established in London, would probably increase
the traffic of the railway company by inducing people to come up to
see
would be an object to which railway company might subscribe
rule, and, as far as
never heard of such
part of its funds.
understand the law, that clearly would not be
proper application of
the money of
can not distinguish
this case
railway company.
from that at all, though, of course,
do not mean to disparage the
enormous importance of the Imperial Institute.
may be established for the highest possible objects of interest to this country; but
still, the only reason given to me why this railway company thinks
this, that
right to spend part of its funds in subscribing to
will probably greatly increase the traffic of the company by inducing
can not accept
many people to travel up to visit this Institute.
that as
reason for
moment.
Therefore, as at present advised,
seems to me that this
ultra vires. * * *

Injunction granted.
Note.

See note, infra, p. 1723.
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Rep. 450-462.
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an appeal from
MR. JUSTICE MILLER. This
decree in chancitizen of New
cery dismissing the complainant's bill, wherein he,
York, alleges that he
stockholder in the Contra Costa Wateron beworks Company,
California corporation, and that he files
half of himself and all other stockholders who may choose to come
in and contribute to the costs and expenses of the suit.
The defendants are the City of Oakland, the Contra Costa Waterworks Company, and Anthony Chabot, Henry Pierce, Andrew
Pope, Charles Holbrook, and John W. Coleman, trustees and directors of the company.
that the city of Oakland claims
The foundation of the complaint
for all
at the hands of the company water, without compensation,
municipal purposes whatever, including watering the streets, public
squares and parks, flushing sewers, and the like, whereas
only entitled to receive water free of charge in cases of fire or
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other great necessity; that the company comply with this demand, to
the great loss and injury of the company, to the diminution of the
dividends which should come to him and other stockholders, and to
The allegation of his attempt
the decrease in the value of their stock.
to get the directors to correct this evil will be given in the language
of the bill.
He says that * on the tenth day of July, 1878, he applied to the
president and board of directors or trustees of said water company,
and requested them to desist from their illegal and improper practices
aforesaid, and to limit the supply of water free of charge to said city
to cases of fire or other great necessity, and that said board should
take immediate proceedings to prevent said city from taking water
from the works of said company for any other purpose without compensation ; but said board of directors and trustees have wholly
whatever in the premises, and
declined to take any proceedings
threaten to go on and furnish water to the extent of said company's
means to said city of Oakland free of charge, for all municipal purposes, as has heretofore been done, and in cases other than cases of
fire or other great necessity, except as for family uses hereinbefore referred to ; and your orator avers that by reason of the premises said
water company and your orator and the other stockholders thereof
have suffered, and will, by a continuance of said acts, hereafter suffer,
great loss and damage."
To this bill the water-works company and the directors failed to
make answer; and the city of Oakland filed a demurrer, which was
The complainant apsustained by the court and the bill dismissed.
pealed.
Two grounds of demurrer were set out and relied on in the court
below, and are urged upon us on this appeal.
They are:
(1) That appellant has shown no capacity in himself to maintain
this suit, the injury, if any exists, being to the mterests of the corporation, and the right to sue belonging solely to that body.
(2) That by a sound construction of the law under which the company is organized the city of Oakland is entitled to receive, free of
compensation, all the water which the bill charges it with so using.
The first of these causes of demurrer presents a matter of very
great interest, and of growing importance in the courts of the United
States.
Since the decision of this court in Dodge v. Woolsey, 1 the principles of which have received more than once the approval of this
court, the frequency with which the most ordinary and usual chancery
remedies are sought in the federal courts by a single stockholder of a
corporation who possesses the requisite citizenship, in cases where the
corporation whose rights are to be enforced can not sue in those courts,
of the grounds on which that case
seems to justify a consideration
was decided, and 'of the just limitations of the exercise of those

principles.
1

18

How.

331, supra, p. 88.

2 AVIL. CAS.

36

I/

18

HAWES V. OAKLAND.

584

This practice has grown until the corporations created by the laws
of the states bring a large part of their controversies with their neighbors and fellow-citizens into the courts of the United States for adjudication, instead of resorting to the state courts, which are their
natural, their lawful, and their appropriate forum. It is not difficult
to see how this has come to pass.
A corporation having such a conwhich
end in litigation, and preferring
it
is
foreseen
must
troversy,
for any reason whatever that this litigation shall take place in a federal
court, in which it can neither sue its real antagonist nor be sued by it,
has recourse to a holder of one of its shares, who is a citizen of

This stockholder is called into consultation, and is
another state.
told that his corporation has rights which the directors refuse to enforce or. to protect.
He instantly demands of them to do their duty
in this regard, which of course they fail or refuse to do, and thereupon he discovers that he has two causes of action entitling him to
equitable relief in a court of chancery; namely, one against his own
company, of which he is a corporator, for refusing to do what he has
requested them to do ; and the other against the party which contests
the matter in controversy with that corporation.
These two causes of
action he combines in an equity suit in the circuit court of the United
States, because he is a citizen of a different state, though the real
If no
parties to the controversy could have no standing in that court.
non-resident stockholder exists, a transfer of a few shares is made to
The real
some citizen of another state, who then brings the suit.
defendant in this action may be quite as willing to have the case tried
in a federal court as the corporation and its stockholder.
If so, he
makes no objection, and the case proceeds to a hearing.
Or he may
file his answer denying the special grounds set up in the bill as a
reason for the stockholder's interference, at the same time that he
answers to the merits.
In either event the whole case is prepared for
on
the
the
merits,
right of a stockholder to a standing in
hearing
receives
but
little
and the overburdened courts of
attention,
equity
the United States have this additional important litigation imposed
upon them by a simulated and conventional arrangement, unauthorized by the facts of the case or by the sound principles of equity

jurisdiction.
That the vast and increasing proportion of the active business of
modern life which is done by corporations should call into exercise
the beneficent power and flexible methods of courts of equity, is
neither to be wondered at nor regretted ; and this is especially true of
controversies growing out of the relations between the stockholder
and the corporation of which he is a member.
The exercise of this
power in protecting the stockholder against the frauds of the governing body of directors or trustees, and in preventing their exercise, in
the name of the corporation, of powers which are outside of their charters or articles of association, has been frequent, 'and is most beneficial, and is undisputed.
These are real contests, however, between
the stockholder and the corporation of which he is a member.
The case before us goes beyond this.
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This corporation, like others, is created a body politic and corporate, that it may in its corporate name transact all the business which
its charter or other organic act authorizes it to do.
Such corporations may be common carriers, bankers, insurers, merchants, and may make contracts, commit torts, and incur liabilities,
and may sue or be sued in their corporate name in regard to all of
The parties who deal with them understand this,
these transactions.
and that they are dealing with a body which has these rights and is
subiect to these obligations, and they do not deal with or count upon
a liability to the stockholder whom they do not know and with whom
they have no privity of contract or other relation.
The principle involved in the case of Dodge v. Woolsey permits the
stockholder in one of these corporations to step in between that corporation and the party with whom it has been dealing and institute
and control a suit in which the rights involved are those of the corporation, and the controversy is one really between that corporation and
the other party, each being entirely capable of asserting its own rights.
This is a very different affair from a controversy between the shareholder of a corporation and that corporation itself, or its managing
directors or trustees, or the other shareholders, who may be violating
his rights or destroying the property in which he has an interest.
Into
such a contest the outsider, dealing with the corporation through its
'
managing agents in a matter within their authority, can not be
dragged, except where it is necessary to prevent an absolute failure
of justice in cases which have been recognized as exceptional in their
character and calling for the extraordinary powers of a court of equity.
It is, therefore, always a question of equitable jurisprudence, and as
such has, within the last forty years, received the repeated consideration of the highest courts of England and of this country.
The earliest English case in which this subject received any very careful consideration is Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461, where Vice-Chancellor Wigram gave a very full and able opinion. The case was decided
in 1843 on a demurrer to the bill, which was brought by Foss and
Turton, two shareholders in an incorporation called the Victoria Park
Company, on behalf of themselves and all other stockholders, except
those who were made defendants, against the directors and one shareholder not a director, and against the solicitor and architect of the
company. The bill charged that the defendants concerted and effected various fraudulent and illegal transactions, whereby the property of the company was misapplied, aliened, and wasted ; that there
had ceased to be sufficient number of qualified directors to constitute
a board ; and that the company had no clerk or office.
It prayed for
the appointment of a receiver and for a decree against the defendants
to make good the loss.
After showing that the case was one in which
the right of action was in the company, the Vice-Chancellor says"In law the corporation and the aggregate members of the corporation are not the same thing for purposes like this; and the only question can be, whether the facts alleged in this case justify a departure
from the rule which prima facie would require that the corporation
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should sue in its own name and in its corporate character, or in the
name of some one whom the law has appointed to be its representative."
Again, after pointing out that cases may arise where the
claims of justice would be found superior to the technical rules reare required to sue, he
specting the mode in which corporations
adds:
" But, on the other hand, it must not be without reasons of a very
urgent character that the established rules of law and practice are to
be departed from,
rules which, though in a sense technical, are
founded on the general principles of justice and convenience;
and
the question is, whether a case is stated in this bill entitling the plaintiffs to sue in their private characters."
He then, in an elaborate
argument, holds that the bill is fatally defective because it does not
aver that there is no acting or de facto board of directors who might
have ordered the bringing of this suit; and, secondly, that it was the
the two shareholders who complain of what
duty of the plaintiffs
had been done
to have called a meeting of the shareholders or attended at some regular annual meeting, and obtained the action of a
majority on the matters in issue. The majority, he says, may have
been content with what was done, and may have ratified the action
of the board, in which case the whole body would have been bound
by it.
The demurrer was sustained and the bill dismissed.
In the subsequent case of Mozley v. Alston, i Ph. Ch. 79 decided in 1847, Lord Chancellor Lyndhurst says that " the observations
of the Vice-Chancellor in Foss v. Harbottle correctly represent what
is the principle and practice of the court in reference to suits of this

description."
These cases have been referred to again and again in the English
courts as leading cases on the subject to which they relate, and always
with approval.
In Gray v. Lewis, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 1035, decided in 1873, Sir W.
am of opinion that the only person, if
M. James, L. J., said:
you may call it a person, having a right to complain was the incorIn its corporate characporated society called Charles Lafitte & Co.
ter it was liable to be sued and was entitled to sue ; and if the company sued in its corporate character, the defendant might allege a
release or a compromise by the company in its corporate character,
a defense which would not be open in a suit where a plaintiff is suing
I think it is of the uton behalf of himself and other shareholders.
most importance to maintain the rule laid down in Mozley v. Alston,
and Foss v. Harbottle, to which, as I understand, the only exception
is where the corporate body has got into the hands of directors, and
of the majority, which directors and majority are using their power
for the purpose of doing something fraudulent against the minority,
who are overpowered by them, as in Atwool v. Merryweather.. L. R,
Wood sustained a bill by a share5 Eq. 464^ where Vice-Chancellor
holder on behalf of himself and others, and there it was after an attempt had been made to obtain proper authority from the corporate
body itself in a public meeting assembled."
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But perhaps the best assertion of the rule and of the exceptions to
it are found in the opinion of the court by the same learned justice in
MacDougall v. Gardiner, i Ch. D. 13, in 1875. "I am of opinion," he
I think it is of the
says, "that this demurrer ought to be allowed.
utmost importance in all these controversies that the rule, which is well
known in this court as the rule in Mozley v. Alston, and Lord^v. Copper
Miners' Company, and Foss v. Harbottle, should always be adhered
to ; that is to say, that nothing connected with internal disputes
between shareholders is to be made the subject of a bill by some
one shareholder on behalf of himself and others, unless there be something illegal, oppressive or fraudulent; unless there is something
ultra vires on the part of the company qua company, or on the part
of the majority of the company, so that they are not fit persons to
but that every litigation must be in the name of the
determine
the company really desire it.
Because there may be a
company,
there may be claims
great many wrongs committed in
company,
against directors, there may be claims against officers, there may be
claims against debtors
there may be
variety of things which
matter
company may well be entitled to complain of, but wh ch, as
of good sense, they do not think
right to make the subject of litigathe company, as
tion and
company, which has to determine
whether will make anything that
wrong to the company subof
or
whether
will
take steps to prevent the
litigation,
ject-matter
wrong from being done."
The cases in the English courts are numerous, but the foregoing
citations give the spirit of them correctly.
In this country the cases outside of the federal courts are not
numerous, and while they admit the right of
stockholder to sue in
the proper party to bring the suit, they
cases where the corporation
limit this right to cases where the directors are guilty of
fraud or
breach of trust, or are proceeding ultra vires.
Marsh v. Eastern R.
R. Co., 40 N. H. 548; Peabody v. Flint, Allen (Mass.) 52. In
Brewer v. Boston Theater, 104 Mass. 378, the general doctrine and its
limitations are very well stated. See, also, Hersey v. Veazie, 24 Me.
Woolw. 400.
9; Samuel v. Holladay,
The case of Dodge v. Woolsey, decided in this court in 1855, is,
however, the leading case on the subject in this country.
(After examining and commenting upon this case, proceeds.)
This examination of Dodge v. Woolsey satisfies us that
does not
intended to establish,
establish, nor was
doctrine on this subject
different in any material respect from that found in the cases in the
English and in other American courts, and that the recent legislation
of congress referred to leaves no reason for any expansion of the rule
in that case beyond its fair interpretation.

1

a

is

a

a

court of equity, in his own name,
suit
corporation to sustain, in
of
action
founded on
right
existing in the corporation itself, and in
which the corporation itself
the appropriate plaintiff, there must exas
the
the
suit
ist
foundation of
Some action or threatened action of the managing board of direcSupra, p. 88.
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tors or trustees of the corporation -which is beyond the authority conferred on them by their charter or other source of organization ;
Or such a fraudulent transaction completed or contemplated by the
acting managers, in connection with some other party, or among
themselves, or with other shareholders, as will result in serious injury to the corporation, or to the interests of the other shareholders;
Or -where the board of directors, or a majority of them, are acting
for their own interest, in a manner destructive of the corporation
itself, or of the rights of the other shareholders;
Or where the majority of shareholders themselves are oppressively
and illegally pursuing a course in the name of the corporation,
which is in violation of the rights of the other shareholders, and
which can only be restrained by the aid of a court of equity.
Possibly other cases may arise in which, to prevent irremediable
injury, or a total failure of justice, the court would be justified in exercising its powers, but the foregoing- may be regarded as an outline
of the principles which govern this class of cases.
But, in addition to the existence of grievances which call for this
kind of relief, it is equally important that before the shareholder is
permitted in his own name to institute and conduct a litigation which
usually belongs to the corporation, he should show to the satisfaction
of the court that he has exhausted all the means within his reach toobtain, within the corporation itself, the redress of his grievances^
He must make an earnest,
or action in conformity to his wishes.
not a simulated, effort, with the managing body of the corporation,
to induce remedial action on their part, and this must be made aptime permits , or has permitted, he must show,
parent to the court.
he fails with the directors, that he has made an honest effort to
obtain action by the stockholders as a body, in the matter of which
And he must show a case,
this is not done, where
he complains.
it could not be done, or it was not reasonable to require it.
The efforts to induce such action as complainant desires on the part
of the directors, and of the shareholders when that is necessary, and
the cause of failure in these efforts should be stated with particularity,
and an allegation that complainant was a shareholder at the time of
the transactions of which he complains, or that his shares have devolved on him since by operation of law, and that the suit is not a
collusive one to confer on a court of the United States jurisdiction in
a case of which it could otherwise have no cognizance, should be in
the bill, which should be verified by affidavit.
It is needless to say that appellant's bill presents no such case as
we have here supposed to be necessary to the jurisdiction of the court.
He merely avers that he requested the president and directors to
desist from furnishing water free of expense to the city, except in case
of fire or other great necessity, and that they declined to do as he reNo correspondence on the subject is given; no reason for
quested.
declining. We have here no allegation of a meeting of the directors,
in which the matter was formally laid before them for action ; no attempt to consult the other shareholders, to ascertain their opinions or
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obtain their action.
But within five days after his application to the
There is no allegation of fraud or of acts
directors this bill is filed.
ultra vires, or of destruction of property, or of irremediable injury of
any kind.
Conceding appellant's construction of the company's charter to be
correct, there is nothing which forbids the corporation from dealing
That city conferred on the
with the city in the manner it has done.
company valuable rights by special ordinance ; namely, the use of the
streets for laying its pipes, and the privilege of furnishing water to
the whole population.
It may be the exercise of the highest wisdom
The dito let the city use the water in the manner complained of.
rectors are better able to act understandingly on this subject than a
The great body of the stockholdstockholder residing in New York.
ers residing in Oakland or other places in California may take this
and be content to abide by the action of their directors.
view of
If this be so,
bitter litigation with the city to be conducted by
one stockholder for the corporation and all other stockholders, because
the amount of his dividends
diminished?
This question answers itself, and without considering the other
was properly
point raised by the demurrer, we are of opinion that
sustained, and the bill dismissed, because the appellant shows no
court of equity
no right in himself to prosecute this
standing in
suit.

Decree affirmed,
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Note.
Upon the general doctrine as to when and for what wrongs shareholders may sue for wrongs done to the corporation, see, 1843, Foss v. Harbottle,
Hare 461 1855, Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331, supra, p. 88; 1859,
Burt v. British, etc., Assn.,4De G.
J. 158,61 Eng. Ch. 158; 1861, Forrest v.
Manchester S.
L. R., De G., F.
J. 126; 1863, Peabody v. Flint, Allen
(Mass.), 52; see, supra, p. 1706; 1867, Atwool v. Merry weather, L. R.
Eq.
464, note; 1873, Dudley v. Kentucky High School,
Bush (Ky.) 576; 1873,
Davenport v. Dows, 1* Wall. 626; 1874, Menier v. Hooper's Tel. Works, L. R.
Ch. App. 350; 1875, Russell v. Wakefleld W.-W., L. R. 20 Eq. 474, supra, p.
1709; 1875, MacDougall v. Gardiner,
Ch. D. 13; 1879, Mason v. Harris, 11
Ch. D. 97 1892, Willoughby v. Chicago Jet. R., 50 N. J. Eq. 656; 1895, Eaton
v. Robinson, 19 R.
146; 1896, Elyton L, C. v. Dowdell, 113 Ala. 177, 59
Am. St. Rep. 105; 1896, Decatur Min.
L. Co. v. Polen, 113 Ala. 531, 59 Am.
St. Rep. 140; 1896, Farmers' L.
N. R. Co., 150 N. Y. 410,
T. Co. v. N. Y.
55 Am. St. Rep. 689; 1898, Cameron v. Groveland Imp. Co., 20 Wash. 169, 72
Am. St. Rep. 26, note, 29; 1898, Blair v. Tel. Newspaper Co., 172 Mass. 201,
51 N. E. 1080; 1898, Stahn v. Catawba Mills, 53 S. C. 519, 31 S. E. 498; 1899,
State v. Dist. Ct. of Silverbow Co., 22 Mont. 220, 56 Pac. Rep. 219; 1899,
Reynolds v. Bank of Mt. Vernon, 158 N. Y. 740; 1899, Dillon v. Lee, 110
Iowa 156, 81 N. W. Rep. 245; 1899,Ulmer v. Maine Real Estate Co., 93 Maine
324, 45 Atl. Rep. 40; 1899, Wineburgh v. U. S. Steam, etc., Co., 173 Mass. 60,
73 Am. St. Rep. 261; 1899, Arkansas B.
L. Assn. v. Madden, 175 U. S.
269; 1900, Spaulding v. N. M. T. S. Co., 106 Wis. 481,81 N. W. Rep. 1064;
1900, Center Creek Water and Ir. Co. v. Lindsay, 21 Utah 192, 60 Pac. Rep.
559; 1900, Wolf v. Pennsylvania R., 195 Pa. St. 91, 45 Atl. Rep. 936; 1900,
Cunningham v. Wechselberg, 105 Wis. 359, 81 N. W. Rep. 414.
Demand upon the corporate authorities for redress through corporate means
1884, Dimpfell v. Railway
or in the corporate name
usually necessary
Co., 110 U. S. 209; 1888, Dunphy v. Travelers' Assn., 146 Mass. 495; 1898,
Robinson v. W. Va. Loan Co., 90 Fed. Rep. 770; 1898, Clarke v. Eastern
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Building Assn., 89 Fed. Rep. 779; 1898, Exter v. Sawyer, 146 Mo. 302, 47 S.
W. Rep. 951 ; 1898, Weir v. Bay State Gas Co., 91 Fed. Rep. 940; 1899, Jasper
Land Co. v. Wallis, 123 Ala. 652, 26 So. 659; 1899, Montgomery L. Co. v.
Lahey, 121 Ala. 131, 25 So. Rep. 1006 ; 1899, Flynn v. Brooklyn C. R., 158 N. Y.
493; 1899, Blair v. Newspaper Co., 172 Mass. 201; 1900, Wolf v. Pennsylvania
R. Co., 195 Pa. St. 91, 45 Atl. Rep. 936.
What is sufficient demand, see, 1899, Ball v. Rutland R. Co., 93 Fed. Rep.
513 ; 1899, Jasper Land Co. v. Wallis, 123 Ala. 652, 26 So. Rep. 659.
Demand upon the corporation is unnecessary if the officers themselves who
control corporate action are the guilty parties, or the court has jurisdiction on
other grounds, or if the corporation itself could not enforce the claim or demand and generally when the act is an ultra vires corporate act: 1863,
Bronson v. La C. & M. R., 2 Wall. 283, supra, p. 1713; 1890, Eschweiler v.
Stowell, 78 Wis. 316, 23 Am. St. Rep. 411 ; 1892, Hannerty v. Standard Theater
Co., 109 Mo. 297, 19 S. W. Rep. 82; 1892, Chicago, etc., Cab Co. v. Yerkes, 141
111. 320, 33 Am. St. Rep. 315, note 325; 1898, Barcus v. Gates, 89 Fed. Rep.
(C. C. A.) 783; 1898, Rogers v. Nashville, etc., R., 91 Fed. Rep. 299; 1898,
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Dubnque, etc., Co., 89 Fed. Rep. 794; 1898, Pencille
v. State F. M. H. Ins. Co., 74 Minn. 67, 73 Am. St. Rep. 326, 76 N. W. Rep.
1026; 1898, Forrester v. Min. Co., 21 Mont. 544; 1899, Harding v. Am. Glucose Co., 182 111.551, 74 Am. St. Rep. 189; 1899, Hodges' Admx. v. South F.
L. Co., 21 Ky. L. Rep. 20, 50 S. W. Rep. 969; 1900, Shively v. Eureka T. G.
M. Co., 129 Cal. 293, 61 Pac. Rep. 939; 1900, Fitzwater v. Nat'l Bank, 62 Kan.
163, 61 Pac. Rep. 684 ; 1900, State v. Holmes, 60 Neb. 40, 82 N. W. Rep. 109.
Suits by shareholders to restrain ultra vires acts, see, 1862, Durfee v. Old
Colony R. Co., 5 Allen 230, supra, p. 1462; 1867, Zabriskie v. Hackensack,
etc., R. Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 178, supra, p. 1466; 1887, Tompkinson v. S. E. R.
Co., L. R. 35 Ch. D. 675; 1899, Davis v. Congregation, etc., 40 App. Div. 424.
Compare, 1884, Dimpfell v. R. Co., 110 U. S. 209; 1899, Burden v. Burden,
159 N. Y. 287.
As to multifariousness of bill, see, 1875, Winsor v. Bailey, 55 N. H. 218;
1888, Dunphy v. Travelers' Assn., 146 Mass. 495; 1900, South Bend Chilled
Plow Co. v. Cribb, 105 Wis. 443, 81 N. W. Rep. 675.
The corporation is a necessary party : 1898, Edwards v. Bay State Gas Co.,
91 Fed. Rep. 946.
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Same, (e) Good faith of shareholder.
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JOSEPH.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA.

92

Ala. Rep.

403-407.

[Bill by Joseph, a stockholder in a street railroad company, to have
certain certificates of stock canceled.]
COLEMAN, J. The purpose of the bill is to have certain certificates of stock issued by the Birmingham, Powderly and Bessemer
Street Railroad Company to defendant Parsons canceled, on the
ground that the stock is fictitious, and was issued in violation of the
The bill prayed an inconstitution and statute law of the state.
A demurrer
junction and the writ was awarded by the chancellor.
The
was interposed, and also an answer by the defendant Parsons.
cause was submitted for decree on the demurrer and upon motion to
The court overruled the demurrer and dedissolve the injunction.
nied the motion to dissolve the injunction, and from this interlocutory
decree the appeal is taken.
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Among other averments, the bill substantially
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alleges that plaintiff
stockholder in said company ; that shortly after organization of the company, the defendant subscribed for one hundred and
seven shares- of the capital stock of the company, of the par value of
fifty dollars each, and paid for the same in full by conveying to the
company thirty-nine acres of land (describing the land) at an agreed
price and valuation of one hundred and thirty-seven dollars per acre,
when the land was not worth more than twenty-five dollars per acre,
and for this land Parsons was to receive one hundred and seven shares
of the stock; that shortly thereafter, the capital stock of the company
was doubled, and without further consideration than the thirty-nine
acres of land, Parsons' stock was doubled, and he received two
hundred and fourteen shares of the capital stock.
The bill, as
amended, charges the excessive valuation of the land was made
knowingly, 'willfully, and with the fraudulent intent of having issued to
Parsons the fictitious stock, in violation of law. This is a sufficient
statement of the facts for the consideration of the demurrer.
It is contended
The demurrer admits the truth of the averments.
that the bill is defective in not averring that plaintiff was a stockholder at the time of the transaction complained of as being fraudulent, or that his stock devolved upon him by operation of law.
In the case of Dimpfell v. Ohio & Mississippi R. Co., no U. S.
209, relied upon by appellant, it was held that a stockholder, contesting as ultra vires an act of the directors, should aver "that he
was a stockholder at the time of the transaction of which he complains, or that his shares have devolved on him since by operation of
law." To the same effect was Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450,
and many others might be cited.
Upon an examination of these authorities it will be seen that the principle asserted rests solely upon
equity Rule No. 94, adopted by the United States supreme court, and
which may be found in the preface to volume 104 of U. S. report.
Morawetz on Private Corporations, speaking of this rule, says it was
evidently designed as a rule of practice merely, and was deemed necessary to guard courts from being imposed upon by collusion of
The rule is not a
Morawetz on Priv. Corp.,
269, 270.
parties.
general principle of law, applicable to pleadings in all the courts, and
The demurrer to
has never been applied to the courts of this state.
the bill for failing to make this averment was properly overruled.
The motion to dissolve the injunction was heard upon the sworn
bill and answer.
The answer denied that plaintiff was a bona fide
stockholder, and set up that plaintiff was the transferee of one E . Lesser.
The answer admits that the defendant's stock was doubled without
the payment of any additional consideration than that of the land ;
but by way of explanation and defense, avers that the lands were not
truly and properly valued at first, and the increased valuation of the
lands only raised them to their real and true value, and the additional
The answer
issue of stock was for property at its fair valuation.
That if said transaction had been
continues, however, as follows:
illegal and fraudulent, and not done in good faith, complainant is esis
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topped from setting up fraud in said transaction, or seeking to cancel
said stock, because E. Lesser, who was complainant's transferrer,
participated in all of said transactions and himself fixed the value of
said lands, with full knowledge and after full investigation of the
value of said lands.
A transferee of stock is not necessarily disqualified as a suitor in
all cases because the prior holders were personally disqualified. If the
transferee purchased the shares in good faith, and without notice of
the fact that the prior holder had precluded himself from suing, he
would have as just a title to relief as if he had purchased from a
shareholder who was under no disability; but if the purchaser was
aware that the prior holder had barred his right to relief, neither
justice nor public policy would require that the transferee, under these
circumstances, should be accorded any greater rights than his trans-
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ferrer. Morawetz, supra,
267.
The same rule prevails in this state in favor of derivative purchasers.
The claimant, who was a bona fide purchaser, without notice of
or
fraud, or of facts which the law considers sufficient to establish
inferable, then he could not be affected by notice to
from which
Horton v. Smith,
Ala. 78; Fenno v. Sayre,
his vendor.
Ala.
Davis,
Ala.
Martinez
v.
v.
Ala.
Wier
Lindsey,
458;
334;
442
91
628, 630.
Wait on Insol. Cor.,
If stockholder participates in wrongful or fraudulent contract,
or silently acquiesces until the contract becomes executed, he can not
court of equity to cancel the contract, and more
then come into
or himself, as
stockholder, has reaped
the
company,
especially
a benefit from the contract; and this rule holds good, although the
consideration of the contract may be one expressly prohibited by
The same disability would attach to the transferee of his
statute.
stock who bought with notice. We consider this general rule of equity
Morawetz on Priv. Corp.,
261, 262; Cook
abundantly sustained.
on Stock and Stockholders,
Wright v. Hughes, 12
39, 40, 735
sustained by the familiar rule that he who
Am. St. Rep. 413. It
court of equity must have clean hands.
Mr.
invokes the aid of
stockholder can sustain
suit
Cook states the conditions upon which
to remedy the frauds, ultra vires acts or negligence of directors, to
First, the acts complained of must be such as to amount to
be
breach of trust, and such as neither
majority of the directors nor of
second, that the complaining
the stockholders can ratify or condone
free from laches, acquiescence of the acts to
stockholder himself
brought; third, that the corporation has
remedy which the suit

if

6,

is

been requested and refused or neglected to institute the suit, that the
instituted by bona fide stockholders as complainants, and that
suit
the corporation and the guilty parties, and other proper parties, have
Cook, supra,
been made defendants.
646.
If the averments of the bill are sustained by proof, the stock
issued to the defendants was in violation of section 1662 of the code,
article XIV, of the constitution.
On the contrary,
and of section
the proof shows that the property was received in payment of stock,

THE CORPORATION AND ITS OFFICERS.

586

Davis Bros. v.
at a fair valuation, such would not be the result.
Montgomery Fur and Chem. Co., at present term.
In cases where the stockholders or the company by any laches, acquiescence or participation in the unlawful and fictitious issue of
stock, or for any other sufficient cause, are precluded from instituting
the proper proceedings to remedy the wrong, the remedy is still
open to the state to institute all necessary and proper proceedings to
vacate and dissolve the corporation, or have such other proper judgment and decree rendered as the proof and justice may demand.
It may be that stockholders, who knowingly and intentionally have
subscribed and paid for stock with property upon a fictitious valuation, are liable as stockholders who have not paid up in full for their
stock, within the meaning of the statute, to creditors who have not
precluded themselves from maintaining the suit. Wait, supra,
593 ;
Douglas v. Ireland, 73 N. Y. 100; Boynton v. Andrews, 63.

N. Y.

93.

Applying the rule of law applicable when

a motion to dissolve an
bill,
and
answer, and consideris
submitted
exhibits,
upon
injunction
much
of
the
answer
is
so
as
ing only
responsive to the bill, we are of
that
the
decretal
order,
overruling the demurrers and motion
opinion
to dissolve the injunction, is free from error.

Affirmed.

v. Grant, L. R. 2 Ch. App. 459; 1896, Green v.
111.489, 50 Am. St. Rep. 178; 1900, Morris v. Elyton Land
, 28 So. Rep. 513.
Compare, 1883, Parsons v. Hayes, 14 Abb. N. C. 419 ; 1898, Robinson v. W.
Va. Loan Co., 90 Fed. Rep. 770. Also, Hawes v. Oakland, supra, p. 1716.
Note.

See, 1867, Seaton

Hedenberg, 159
Co.,
Ala.

SUBDIVISION

III.

THE CORPORATION

ARTICLE I.
Sec. 586.

AND ITS OFFICERS.

RIGHTS OF THE CORPORATION.

I. General doctrine.

Smith v. Hurd,

12

Mete. (Mass.) 371, supra, p.

1706.

2. Theories of the relation of the directors
Sec. 587.
Same.
and the corporation.
(a) Agents of the corporation, and not trustees of the

shareholders.

ALLEN
1857.

v.

CURTIS.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS OF CONNECTICUT.

26

Conn. Rep. 456-461.

Action on the case, brought by a stockholder of the Woodbury
The declaration
Bank against the defendants, as directors thereof.
1

Arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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alleged that on the 27th day of September, 1852, the stockholders of
the Woodbury Bank appointed the defendants directors thereof, who
accepted the trust and undertook to manage and conduct its business
and financial affairs in a prudent and skillful manner, but that they
did not so conduct the affairs of the bank, but on the contrary willfully and designedly managed the same in an unskillful, careless and
reckless manner, making false entries in the books of the bank, loaning money without security, etc., whereby the bank became insolvent,
The
and the stock of the plaintiff wholly worthless and a total loss.
declaration contained three counts substantially alike, the third conThe detaining a more direct averment of fraud in the defendants.
fendants demurred generally and the case was reserved for the advice
of this court.
ELLSWORTH, J. * * * It is obvious that the present is not the
proper form of redress to be pursued, even for civil purposes, unless
we are prepared to break down long established principles of law.
No such private suit will lie against the defendants, nor even a bill in
equity without more parties are brought in and the allegation of certain further facts.
The general rule of law is, that an action at law must be brought
by the person having the title or right to the thing demanded, or
to the damages which are sought to be recovered for the injury.
Hence the Woodbury Bank should have brought this suit. It is its
property which has been misappropriated and lost, and the damages
to be recovered belong to it to be sure, in trust for bill-holders, depositors and other creditors, if any there be, and finally for the stockholders, but for all of them and not for some of them exclusively.

is

is

by

is

a

is

if

it

a

it,
it

The bank then must sue. It may compromise, and settle, or release
the defendants on terms mutually satisfactory, which the stockholders
would be no bar to suit aftercan not do, and should they do
wards brought by the bank. In this respect the defendants are liable
to the bank as any other agents or persons would be for robbing or
Now, to
defrauding or in any way injuring the corporate property.
he recovers
permit the plaintiff to recover for himself, as he does
at all, to the extent of the loss which he suffers in his stock, will be
the means of giving him
not entitled.
preference to which he
The defendants can be sued only once, and not separately by every
one who
indirectly injured by their wrongful acts. Coke, Lit., 563.
Stetson v. Faxon, 19 Pick. 155.
Besides, the directors of the bank are the agents of the bank.
The bank is the only principal, and there is no such trust for, or rethe plaintiff.
The
lation to a stockholder as has been claimed
entire duty of the directors, growing out of their agency, is owed to
the sole representative of the
the bank, -which, under the charter,
stockholders, and the legal protector and defender of their property.
Nor
any other protector or defender necessaiy, until the bank shall
neglect its duty in refusing to call the directors to account; in which
event, upon a case properly stated, and with proper parties before the
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*

if

it

it

it

is

it

is

is

a

a

if,

court, a court of equity may grant relief, according to the existing
exigency.
It is said that the first count states that a promise was made by the
directors that they would be honest and faithful in their trust, and
that the action is brought on that promise.
We discover no such
nor
do
we
essential
difference in the three
statement,
perceive any
of
of
the
cause
action
in
modes
the three counts ; but if
presenting
and
the
be
a
first
count
states
a breach of contract as
difference,
there
,the
of
action,
then
declaration
bad
on demurrer, for the
the cause
is
in
tort;
are
as
in
other counts
but
we have said,
their frame and aspect the three counts are not dissimilar ; each sets forth a breach of
trust, and nothing besides of material importance.
Suppose, howbe
a
be
held
be
to
made to and for the
ever, there
promise, it must
corporation, and not severally to and for the individual stockholders
of the corporation. If for any cause the corporation is unable to
bring suit, or
through fraud and collusion, the directors refuse or
neglect to bring suit in the corporate name, and will not seek redress,
ground will be laid for invoking the interposition of court of equino allegation that the corporation
Here there
unable to obty.
refuses to seek it;
tain redress, or that through fraud or collusion
nor
alleged that application has been made to the corporation or
to the directors for leave to make use of the corporate name to obtain
redress and that
has been refused.
Had these preliminary steps
been taken,
would seem quite proper, from the necessity of the
case, for a court of equity to grant relief, upon an application by an
individual stockholder,
the stockholder should so frame his bill as
to proceed for others as well as himself, and make the corporation
*
and the directors parties to the bill. *

Declaration insufficient.

See, 1889, Ten Eyck v. Pontiac, etc., R. Co., 74 Mich. 226, 16 Am.
Note.
St. Rep. 633, note 639.
See, also, note to
592, infra.

Sec. 588.

Same,

(b) Trustees.

J. ALDER ELLIS ET
1890.

AL. v.

SAMUEL D. WARD ET

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.
533, on 518-521.

137

111.

AL.

Rep. 509

a

[Bill in equity brought in 1882, by Ward as receiver of the Republic Life Insurance Company against Farwell, formerly president,
and Ellis, Peet, Nickerson, and other directors of that company,
decree against them for the alseeking discovery and praying for
Farwell
leged wrongful payment of $23,200 to the said Farwell.
is

'Statement much abridged.
Only the part of the opinion relating to the
relation of directors to the corporation
given. Arguments omitted.

ELLIS V. WARD.
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claimed that this sum, with $42,800 more, had been received by him
in payment for 1,420 shares of stock sold by him to Ellis, Peet and
Nickerson in order to enable them to obtain control of the company.

The evidence showed that after the 1,420 shares were delivered and
$37,600 paid therefor, an election was held, at which Ellis, Peet and

if,

Nickerson and others voted for by them were elected directors, and
these three with two others were appointed a finance committee ; this
committee immediately afterward,
June 14, 1876, voted to pay
$23,200 to Farwell, out of the fund of the company, for past services
as president, when neither by-law nor resolution fixed any compensation for such service.
They also voted to pay him $5,200 for like
past services as president of another company of which they had control. After such votes these two sums, $23,200 and $5,200, were
the sum
paid to Farwell making in all, with trie $37,600, $66,000
Farwell asked and was to receive for his stock. The evidence was
conflicting as to Farwell's knowledge of this part of the transaction,
but the lower court dismissed the suit as to Farwell, and granted the
decree as to Ellis et al.
They appealed and among other defenses
relied upon the statute of limitations.]
*
* If the funds of the company were
*
MR. JUSTICE SHOPE.
by them (Ellis, Peet and Nickerson) applied to the discharge of their
individual indebtedness to Farwell, under the contract of March 2,
1876, there could be no question of their liability to the company, or
its representative, the receiver, for the amount thus misappropriated
after obtaining control of the corporation,
So, also,
by them.
they wrongfully and illegally paid out the funds of the company to
Farwell for past services, in violation of their duty, they would be

a

a

a

a

is

*

*

is

87

65

a

it

a

a

is

likewise liable.
The doctrine
well settled in this court, that the law will not imprivate corporation to pay its officers
promise on the part of
ply
In order that such officers
for the performance of their usual duties.
may legally demand and recover for such services, or the corporation
must appear that
legally make allowance and payment therefor,
by-law or resolution had been adopted authorizing and fixing such
American Central R.
allowance before the services were rendered.
Co. v. Miles, 52 111. 174; Merrick v. Peru Coal Co., 61 111. 472;
111. 328;
Rockford, Rock Island and St. Louis R. Co. v. Sage,
Cheeney v. La Fayette, Bloomington and Mississippi R. Co., 68 111.
111. 446; Holder v. La Fayette, Bloomington and Mississippi
570;
R. Co., 71 111. 106; Gridley v. La Fayette, Bloomington and Mississippi R. Co., 71 111. 200; Illinois Linen Co. v. Hough, 91 111. 63.
The rule
analogous to that governing trustees generally, who, at common law, were not entitled to compensation, except as there was war*
rant therefor in the contract or statute under which they acted..
It
principle of general application, and recognized by this court,
trust fund (St. Louis
Jhat the assets of
corporation are, in equity,
and Sandoval Coal and Mining Co. v. Sandoval Coal and Mining Co.,
116 111. 170), and that the directors of
corporation are trustees, and
have no power or right to use or appropriate the funds of the qorpo-
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1

ration, their cestui que trust, to themselves, or to waste, destroy,
Holder v. La Fayette, Bloomington
give away or misapply them.
and Mississippi R. Co., 71 111. 106; Cheeney v. La Fayette, Bloomington and Mississippi R. Co., 68 111. 570; i Morawetz on Private
And it is equally well settled, that no lapse of
Corp.,
516, 517.
time is a bar to a direct or express trust, as between the trustee and
cestui que trust.
Chicago and Eastern Illinois R. Co. v. Hay, 1 19
on
Limitation of Actions,
200, and cases cited
Wood
111.493;
in note.
If the trust assumed by the directors of a corporation in
respect of the corporate property under their control is to be regarded
as a direct trust, as contradistinguished from simply an implied trust,
then it is apparent, under the rule announced, the statute presents no
bar to this proceeding by the receiver of the corporation.
Ordinaor
an
trust
is
a
deed
will
are
created
but
there
;
rily,
express
by
many
fiduciary relations established by law, and regulated by settled legal
rules and principles, where all the elements of an express trust exist
and to which the same legal principles are applicable
and such apto
be
the
relation
established
law
between directors and corpears
by
2
And see, also,
6, 10881090, 1094.
poration.
Pomeroy's Eq.,
as respects stockholders, Hightower v. Thornton, 8 Ga. 486; Payne
v. Bullard, 23 Miss. 88; Curry v. Woodward, 53 Ala. 371. The
statute of limitations therefore presented no bar to a recovery by the
receiver.

*

*

*

Affirmed.

,

Note.
See, 1881, Duncomb v. N. Y. H. & N. R., 84 N. Y. 190; 1886, Munson v. Syracuse G. & C. R., 103 N. Y. 58; 1887, Sweeney v. Grape Sugar Co.,
30 W. Va. 443, 8 Am. St. Rep. 88; 1889, Beach v. Miller, 130 111. 162, 17 Am.
St. Rep. 291, note 298; 1891, Mullanphy Sav. Bank v. Schott, 135 111. 655, 25
Am. St. Rep. 401 ; 1899, Stanley v. Luse, 36 Ore. 25, 58 Pac. Rep. 75; 1899,
Barnes v. Lynch, 9 Okla. 156, 59 Pac. Rep. 995; 1899, McClure v. Law, 161
N. Y. 78, infra, p.1735; 1900, Spaulding v. N. M. T. S. Co., 106 Wis. 481, 81 N.
W. Rep. 1064; 1900, Center Creek Water & Ir. Co. v. Lindsay, 21 Utah 192,
60 Pac. Rep. 559;
1901, Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N. Y. 157, 55 L. R. A. 751,
note ; 1902, Consolidated Vinegar Works v. Brew,
Wis.
, 88 N. W. 603.
Compare, 1899, Patterson v. Portland Smelting, etc., Works, 35 Ore. 96,
56 Pac. Rep. 407.
592, infra.
See, also, note to

See. 589.

Same,

(c) Mandataries.

WALLACE

v.

LINCOLN

SAVINGS BANK. 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE. 89 Tenn. Rep.
630-660, on 648, 652, 659, 24 Am. St. Rep. 625, 637, 639, 643.

1891.

[Bill by shareholder and creditor on behalf of himself and all other
shareholders and creditors against such directors of the bank as held
the office between 1870 and 1886, the bank itself, and its trustee, under an assignment for creditors, charging that through the inattention,
1

Statement much abridged.
Arguments omitted.
as relates to the duties of directors is given.

Only so much of opinion
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negligence and mismanagement of the directors, the bank had become
insolvent, its capital wasted and its shares rendered worthless.
They
were not charged with any fraudulent collusion, or private gain, but
wholly with negligence resulting in loss, by substantially abdicating
their trust in failing to superintend the management, and turning over
the entire control of the business to the unlimited discretion and unaided judgment of the cashier;
and especially, among other things,
an alleged loss of over $20,000, said to have resulted from loans
made by the cashier to himself and to a firm of which he was a member, beginning in 1873 and continuing till iSycj^then amounting to
over $50,000, and then first discovered by the board of directors.
There was a decree in favor of the complainant upon some charges
in the bill, but a dismissal as to the loan above mentioned.
Both
One of the grounds of dismissal as to the losses
parties appealed.
arising from the loans was that the statute of limitations had run.]
LURTON, J. * * * But upon another and distinct ground complainant can not recover, and that is the bar of the statute of limitaNone of these loans were made after 1879.
The negligence
tions.
of defendants, if any there was, occurred prior to January i, 1880.
This suit was begun in December, 1886, more than six years after
the last act of negligence in this matter.
The chancellor seems to
have entertained the opinion that because a stockholder can alone
sue in equity upon such a cause of action, that therefore this was one
of that class of purely equitable actions against which the statute does
But, as we have before seen, this kind of suit is, at last,
not operate.
but the suit of the corporation for its benefit and upon its right of action.
If for any reason the corporation is estopped from suing, or its
action is barred, the suit by the stockholder or creditor is likewise
affected. "A suit of this character," says Mr. Morawetz, " is brought
to enforce the corporate or collective rights, and not the individual
It may therefore properly be regarded as
rights of the shareholders.
a suit brought on behalf of the corporation, and the shareholder can
enforce only such claims as the corporation itself could enforce.
Moreover, the essential character of a cause of action belonging to a
corporation remains the same, whether the suit to enforce it be
Thus a legal
brought by the corporation or by a shareholder.
right of action would not be treated as an equitable one, or become
governed by the rules applicable to equitable cause of action, as to
limitations, etc., because a shareholder has brought suit in equity to
enforce it on behalf of the company."
Section 271.
The language of Special Judge
Directors are not express trustees.
Ingersol in Shea v. Mabry, i Lea 319, that "directors are trustees,"
It is a statement
etc., is rhetorically sound, but technically inexact.
often found in opinions, but is true only to a limited extent.
They
are mandataries ; they are agents; they are trustees in the sense that
every agent is a trustee for his principal, and bound to exercise diligence and good faith; they do not hold the legal title, and more
having
. often than other-wise are not the officers of the corporation
possession of the corporate property ; they are equally interested with
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those they represent; they more nearly represent the managing
At most they
partners in a business firm than a technical trustee.
are implied trustees in whose favor the statutes of limitations do
run.
Hughes v. Brown, 88 Tenn. 578; Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa.
St.
; Morawetz on Corporations,
516.
An action at law lies in favor of the corporation against directors
for malfeasance, misfeasance, or negligence in office, whereby loss or
damage has resulted ; and the limitation applicable to the suit of the corporation at law is equally applicable to the suit of the stockholder upon
Morawetz on Corporations,
the corporate right of action in equity.
Law,
O1
on
Godbold v. Bank of MoCook
Corporation
;
7
271
bile,
Ala. 191; Williams v. Hillard, 38 N. J. Eq. 383; Spering's
Appeal, 71 Pa. St. n; Brickerhoff v. Bostwick, 99 N. Y. 193.
Our statutes of limitation operate upon all causes of action save
suits between cestui que trust and express trustee under pure technical trusts cognizable only in courts of equity. Hughes v. Brown, 88
Tenn. 578.
The statutes of six and three years were relied upon by defendants,
both by demurrer and plea, as applicable to complainants' entire cause
of action.
By section 2773 it is provided that "actions for injuries
to personal or real property, actions for the detention or conversion
of personal property," shall be barred unless suit is brought within
This is not a
three years from the accruing of the cause of action.
suit for either injury to or conversion of personal property, and this
The last clause of section 2775 provides a
section is not applicable.
limitation of six years for all actions " on contracts not otherwise proThe case of Bruce v. Baxter, reported in 7 Lea, at
vided for."
page 477, was a bill in chancery against an attorney for neglect of
duty in the collection of claims in his hands, whereby they were lost.
The clause we have quoted from section 2775 was held applicable to
The reasoning of Judge Freeman, who delivered the opinthe suit.
ion of the court, was that the relation of client and attorney implied
a contract for the exercise of reasonable skill and diligence in doing
what was undertaken, and that a failure to exercise such diligence
was a breach of contract rendering the attorney liable for the loss reA similar ruling was made in the earlier case
sulting but no more.
of Ramsay v. Temple, 3 Lea 252, it being a suit against an attorney
for negligence in failing to sue out an execution.
Those cases are
The relation of a director to a corporation imcontrolling in this.
plies a contract that he will use ordinaiy diligence in the discharge ot
For a breach of
the duties he undertakes by accepting the office.
this duty an action lies, which is barred unless begun within six
There has been no
years from the time right of action accrued.
fraudulent concealment of the cause of action by defendants, and the
remedy of the corporation for any negligence in the matter of the
*
*
*
loans to Hampton, or Hampton & Carloss, is barred.
(As to other points of the case, directors' duties are stated to be

ii

ii

as

follows:)

Directors, by assuming office, agree to give
2 WIL. CAS.

36

as much

of their time
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and attention to the duties assumed as the proper care of the interests
If they are inattentive to these duties,
intrusted to them may require.
if they neglect to attend meetings of the board, if they turn over the
management of the company to the exclusive control of their agents,
thus abdicating their control, then they are guilty of gross negligence
with respect to their ministerial duties ; and if loss results to the corporation by breaches of trust or acts of negligence committed by those
left in control, which by due care and attention on their part could
have been avoided, they will be responsible to the corporation.
The
diligence required from them has been defined as that exercised by
prudent men about their own affairs, being that degree of diligence
If a less degree of diligence is exercised,
characterized as ordinary.
the negligence is gross, and for losses consequent he is liable.
" What constitutes a proper performance of the duties of a director," says Mr. Morawetz, "is a question of fact which must be determined in each case in view of all the circumstances;
the character of
the company, the condition of its business, the usual methods of managing such companies, and all other relevant facts must be taken into
Morawetz on Corporations,
consideration."
552.
Bank directors are not expected to give their whole time and attenThe customary method in retion to the business of the company.
gard to such associations is that the active management and responsible custody is left to the cashier and other agents selected by the diThese are paid salaries, demanding their
rectors for that purpose.
skill and time should be given to the duties of immediate manageAs a rule, the custodian of the assets is the cashier. The
ment.
duty of directors with respect to such is to supervise, direct, and control. These agents, though usually selected by the directors, are not
the agents of the directors, but agents of the corporation.
Mor.

Corp.,

552, et seq.

The neglect which would render them responsible for not exercising that control and direction properly must depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.
They are not insurers of their
for
liable
their acts on any principle of the
fidelity, and they are not
of
law
agency.
" Directors," says Mr. Morawetz, " can be held responsible for a
loss resulting from wrongful acts or omissions of other directors or
agents only provided the loss was a consequence of their own neglect
of duty, either in failing to supervise the company's business with
attention, or in neglecting to use proper care in the appointment of
*
* *
Morawetz on Corporations,
such agents."
562.
in
a
suit
between
himself
and
the
director
A
corporation, or those
of
action,
is
not
the
right
presumed to have
corporate
suing upon
the
of
of
all
that
shown
books
the
The
is
knowledge
by
company.
to
a
is
referred
of
which
director,
knowledge attaching
presumption
to in the case of Lane v. Bank, 9 Heis. 437, applies only in suits beThe doctrine has never been extween the bank and a stranger.
tended to suits between the bank and its directors.
Savings Bank of
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Louisville v. Caperton, 87 Ky. 306; Clews v. Barden, 36 Fed. Rep.
617; In re Denham, 25 Ch. Div. 752.
The doctrine of the Lane case is carefully limited in Martin v.
Webb, noU. S. 7. * * *
Reversed on other grounds.
See, 1872, Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 11, 10 Am. Rep. 684; 1891,
Note.
Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132, 11 Sup. Ct. 924; 1892, Swentzel v. Penn.
Bank, 147 Pa. St. 140.
See also note to
592, infra.

General rules as to duties and liabilities of
Sec. 590. Same.
3.
directors to the corporation.
HUGHES, DISTRICT JUDGE, IN TRUSTEES OF THE MUTUAL BUILDING
FUND AND DOLLAR SAVINGS BANK v. BOSSIEUX ET AL., DIRECTORS, ETC.

1880.

IN THE U. S. DISTRICT COURT (VA.) 4 Hughes Rep. 387,
on 397 and 413, states the liability of directors as follows:

First. Fraud or
Second. Willful

embezzlement committed by themselves.
misconduct or breach of trust committed for their
own benefit, and not for the benefit of the stockholders.
Third. Acts ultra vires, that is to say, acts beyond the chartered
powers of the corporations which they manage, and beyond the general powers conferred by law upon corporations.
Fourth. Gross inattention and negligence, allowing fraud or misconduct on the part of agents, officers or co-directors, which could
have been prevented if they had given ordinary care and attention
to their duties.
And in this latter case: i. Gross non-attendance in
a director may make him guilty of the breaches of trust committed by
officers and other directors.
2. That a director's saying that he had
no benefit from his office but such as was merely honorary, is no excuse for his want of diligence; and 3. That when a supine negligence appeared in all the board, by which a complicated loss has
happened, they are all liable.

Right of corporation
SeG. 591.
Same.
4.
by officers by virtue of their office.
DAVID McCLURE,

AS RECEIVER

OP THE

WILLIAM H. LAW,

1899.

to all profits made

LIFE UNION,

RESPONDENT.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.
Rep. 78-82, 76 Am. St. Rep. 262.

APPELLANT,

161

v.

N. Y.

HAIGHT, J. This action was brought to recover of the defendant,
former president and director of the Life Union, the sum of $3,000,
which the plaintiff claims was profits made by the defendant out of his
a
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The facts established by the
trust relationship with the company.
An agreement was entered
evidence are, in substance, as follows :
into on the 28th day of December, 1891, between one Horace
Moody, party of the first part, and Lucius O. Robertson and Lewis
P. Levy, parties of the second part, by which the party of the first
part undertook to deliver to the parties of the second part the absolute
control and management of the Life Union Association in consideration of the sum of $15,000.
This was to be accomplished by the
resignation, from time to time, of one or more directors of the corporation, and the election of the parties of the second part, or the
This agreement was
persons they should designate, as directors.
entered into by Moody under the directions of the defendant, for
It was modified on the
whom he was acting as agent and attorney.
reference
of
to
details in payments,
with
February,
1892,
5th day
etc., but not in any respect affecting the question here presented.
These agreements were subsequently executed. Mr. Levy was elected
a director to fill a vacancy theretofore existing, and then the defendant resigned as president and had Mr. Levy elected in his place.
Subsequently, the defendant, with other directors from time to time
resigned, and their places were filled by persons designated by Levy.
The money was paid over to a person designated by the defendant
and then was distributed among the directors, the defendant receiving
$3,000. His excuse for this proceeding was that this transfer was
made for the purpose of reimbursing himself and other directors for
moneys that they had theretofore invested in the purchase of promissory
notes which had been issued by the corporation for the purpose of
purchasing the property and assets of the Flour City Life Association
The notes, however, were, by their terms, payable
of Rochester.
out of the expense funds, to be derived from the transfer membership
of the Flour City Association, and inasmuch as the transfer was never
effected, the notes were not collectible from the Life Union.
(McClure v. Levy, 147 N. Y. 215.) The defendant held three of these
notes of $1,000 each, but they can not be accepted as a justification
The
of the transaction, or be received as a defense to this action.
whether
is,
therefore,
the
defendant
is
bound
to
presented,
question
account for the money received from Levy for the transfer to him and
his associates of the management and control of the Life Union, toThe learned appellate division
gether with its property and effects.
has treated this transaction as a bribe paid to the directors of the Life
Union by Levy, and reached the conclusion that the money did not
belong to the corporation. We think, however, that the law does not
permit the defendant to avail himself of his own wrong as a defense
As president and director of the Life Union he was
to this action.
bound to account to that association for all moneys that came into his
hands by virtue of his official acts, and he can not be permitted to
shield himself from such liability under the claim that his acts were
illegal and unauthorized. As an officer he had the right to resign,
It was paid
but the money was not paid to him for his resignation.
over upon condition that he procure Levy and his friends to be elected
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and given the control and management, together with the
property and effects of the corporation. The election of directors
and the transfer of the management and property of the corporation
were official acts, and whatever money he received from such official
acts were moneys derived by virtue of his office for which we think
directors

*
*
*
*
he should account.
In Cook on Corporations, section 650, it is said: " It is a well-established principle of law that a director commits a breach of trust in
accepting a secret gift or secret pay from a person who is contracting
or has contracted with the corporation, and that the corporation may
compel the director to turn over to it all the money or property so received by him.
(See, also, Chandler v. Bacon, 30 Fed. Rep. 538;
Rutland El. L. Co. v. Bates, 68 Vt. 579; Farmers' and Merchants'
Bank v. Downey, 53 Cal. 466; Sheridan v. Sheridan El. Light Co.,
38

Hun 396.)
Reversed.

Note.

Minn.

Accord, 1900, Goodhue Farmers' Warehouse Co.
N. W. 531. Compare, 1900, Larwill v. Burke,

210, 83

v.
19

Davis, 81
Ohio C. C.

449.

Right of the corporation to careful service by its
Sec. 592.
5officers^Degree of care due.
THE NORTH HUDSON BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION
CHILDS ET AL. J
1892.

IN THE SUPREME
460-487,

COURT
33

OF

WISCONSIN.

Am. St. Rep. 57.

82

v.

Wis. Rep.

[Action by the loan association against Childs, president, and
Denniston, treasurer, and ex officio members of the board of directors
(consisting of the officers and seven others elected by the shareholders) to recover $28,000 alleged to have been lost by their gross
neglect, mismanagement, and inattention to their duties, from their
election in 1882 until 1887, and especially in usurping powers that
should
have been exercised by the directors
the specific losses
charged arising from uncollected dues, issuing shares for too small
sums, paying too much for canceled shares, canceling loans before
Other facts sufficiently appear in the opinion.]
they were fully paid.
PINNEY, J. i. The corporation plaintiff has a remedy against its
directors and officers for negligence, fraud, breaches of trust, or for acts
done in excess of their authority, and the case against each is distinct,
depending upon the evidence against him, unless two or more have
joined or participated in the wrongful act, in which case all particiAnd where the act is illegal or in
pants may be joined in the suit.
violation of some positive law, the authorities indicate that there is no
right of contribution where one only is sued and charged ; and therefore it is held in many cases that it is not necessary to make all the
1

Statement much abridged.

Arguments and much of opinion omitted.
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directors parties who have more or less joined in the act complained
of.
Thomp. Liab. Off. Corp., in note 352, 353, 411, and cases
A different rule is maintained in the modern cases in England
cited.
and America, in cases where the wrongful act is the result of negligence or gross misjudgment and is not, in and of itself, illegal or a
violation of some positive law, as will be shown hereafter; and there
exists high authority in such cases for holding that in all cases where
contribution would be allowed in equity, there, those who are liable
to contribute are necessary parties to a suit in equity to obtain redress
The remedy of the
for the loss which the corporation has suffered.
corporation for the wrong done is either at law or in equity, according
to the nature of the case.
Hence, in every such case as the present it
is important to determine at the outset whether the action shall be or
is a legal or equitable one, and if the latter, whether the necessary
parties are before the court to enable it to make a proper and comThis action has been treated
plete determination of the controversy.
throughout by the plaintiff and by the circuit court as a legal action,
both in the demand for judgment and in the course taken at the trial,
a trial by jury having been waived, and the court ruling that no evidence of liability was competent that did not equally affect both defendants ; and, after judgment by the remission of damages for the
periods mentioned, on the ground that for these sums the defendants
were not jointly liable, though this fact was either overlooked or was
not regarded in the decision of the case.
2. The complaint is not entirely definite and clear in the allegations upon which the liability of the defendants is rested, but groups
together grounds, not entirely congruous, when stated in the same
cause of action, as the charge against them is gross neglect, mismanagement, and inattention of the defendants " to the duties of their
said offices," and they are, to some extent, at least, attempted to be
charged for negligence or misconduct in their respective offices of
president and treasurer, and also as members of the board of directors, the by-laws making them ex officio such.
Some of the acts as to
which negligence and misconduct are predicated lie wholly outside
the scope of the duties of either one or both the president and treasurer.
In the main, the gravamen of the case seems to be that the
defendants have exceeded their respective powers as such president
and treasurer in dealing with the property and property rights of the
plaintiff, and have usurped the powers of the board of directors in
these respects; and it is expressly charged in the 7th, 9th, loth, nth,
I2th, i3th and i4th "causes of action" (so designated) that they did
the acts complained of " without the knowledge, consent and approval of the board of directors;" and the last of these causes of
action, grouping the plaintiff's losses in one aggregate sum of $22,ooo, charges "that between the ist of March, 1882, and the ist of
September, 1887, the plaintiff, through the gross neglect, mismanagement, and inattention of the defendants to the duties of their said
offices, has lost in dues, interest, and charges on stocks and loans, and
on loans made by defendants, and in the wrongful cancellation of
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stock by the defendants, and paying thereon more than the holders
thereof were entitled to receive and be paid by said corporation, and
without the knowledge, consent, or authority of the board of directors of said corporation, and without the knowledge, consent or
authority of the stockh6lders thereof, to the amount of $22,000."
The first five "causes of action" (so designated) proceed entirely
upon the ground of gross neglect and mismanagement of the defendants, and there are items also in the other causes of action based on
that ground.
The circuit court based the finding against the defendants on the ground " of gross negligence and usurpation of authority
not given them by the by-laws but reserved to the board of directors."
These different allegations thus blended in the several so-called
"causes of action," which are in fact but enumerations of items of
liability under what is really but one general count, require different
answers and different evidence to meet them, creating difficulties of
procedure which can be best dealt with and overcome in an equitable
action.
We think that the case made by the pleadings and proofs is
not one where an adequate and proper remedy by legal action can be
obtained, but the action must be treated as an equitable one; and that
the circuit court erred in dealing with it on any other basis.
As a recovery in a legal action, the judgment must stand or fall on the
liability of the defendants as president and treasurer, for no recovery
can be had at law against a minority of the board of directors for
misconduct or negligence, inasmuch as they can act only when lawfully assembled, and their duties as such are devolved on them as a
Franklin Insurance Co. v. Jenkins, 3
board, and not individually.
Wend. 134; Gaffney v. Colvill, 6 Hill 572, 573.
3. Much argument was had upon the rule of liability of corporate
officers in cases such as this, presenting for consideration some questions in respect to which a considerable difference of opinion has prevailed. The liability of officers to the corporation for damages
caused by negligent or unauthorized acts rests upon the common-law
rule, which renders every agent liable who violates his authority or
It seems to be now
neglects his duty to the damage of his principal.
that,
no
matter
whether
the
act
is prohibited by
universally agreed
the charter or by-laws, the liability is on the ground of violation of
Thomp. Liab. Off., 357; Briggs v.
authority or neglect of duty.
n
S.
Spaulding, 141 U.
Sup. Ct. Rep. 924. There can be no
146,
doubt that, if the directors or officers of a company do acts clearly
beyond their power, whereby loss ensues to the company, or dispose
of its property or pay away its money without authority, they will be required to make good the loss out of their private estates. Thomp. Liab.
Off. Corp., 375 ; Joint-Stock Discount Co. v. Brown, L. R. 8 Eq. 381 ;
Flitcroft's Case, L. R. 21 Ch. Div. 519; Franklin Insurance Comand many other authorities to this efpany v. Jenkins, 3 Wend. 130,
fct were cited by the respondent's counsel.
This is the rule where the
of
of
the corporation is one
made
or
disposition
property
money
either not within the lawful power of the corporation, or, if within
the power of the corporation, is not within the power or authority
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Where the ground of liability
of the particular officer or officers.
is for nonfeasance, negligence, or misjudgment in respect to matters within the scope of the proper powers of the officer, he will
be held responsible only for a failure to bring to the discharge
of his duties such degree of attention, care, skill, and judgment
as are ordinarily used and practiced in the discharge of such duties
or employments; the degree of care, skill, and judgment depending upon the subject to which it is to be applied, the particular cirIn respect to
cumstances of the case, and the usages of business.
directors, or those acting ex officio as such, the rule of liability has
been the subject of much discussion in the recent case of Briggs v.
Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132, n Sup. Ct. Rep. 924, in which, although
there was a strong dissent, the rule may be regarded as settled, in the

federal courts, at least, and in the courts of several of the states, as
there laid down, and to the effect that directors, although often called
" trustees," are not such in any technical sense, but that they are
mandataries, the relation between them and the corporation being
rather that of principal and agent, but under circumstances they may
be treated as occupying, in consequence of the powers conferred
on them, the position of trustees to ceshiis que trustent; that the degree of care required of them depends upon the subject to which it
is to be applied, and each case is to be determined upon its own circumstances; that, as they render their services gratuitously, they are
not to be held to the degree of responsibility of bailees for hire, or
expected to devote their whole time and attention to their duties ; that
they are not, in the absence of any element of positive misfeasance,
and solely on the ground of passive negligence, to be held liable,
unless their negligence is gross, or they are fairly subject to the imputation of a want of good faith. It is to be remembered that they
have the same interests to protect and subserve as other stockholders,
and self-interest naturally prompts them to look after their own,
and the degree of care they are bound to exercise is that which ordinarily prudent and diligent men would exercise under similar circumstances in respect to a like gratuitous employment, regard being had
to the usages of business and the circumstances of each particular
case ; that they are not liable, in the absence of fraud or intentional
breach of trust, for negligence, mistakes of judgment and bad management in making investments on doubtful or insufficient security.
Where they have not profited personally by their bad management,
or appropriated any of the property of the corporation to their own
Were a more rigid
use, courts of equity treat them with indulgence.
rule to be applied, it would be difficult to get men of character and
Thomp. Liab. Off.
pecuniary responsibility to fill such positions.
These
views
are
sustained in Briggs
Corp. 357 ; Beach Corp.,
249.
Citv. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 130; Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. St.
izens' B., L. & S. Assn. v. Coriell, 34 N. J. Eq. 383, 392 ; Swentzel v. Bank (Pa. Sup.), 23 Atl. Rep. 413 ; In re Forest of Dean
Coal Min. Co., L. R. 10 Ch. Div. 450; Ackerman v. Halsey, 37 N.
Eq. 363 ; Hun v. Gary, 82 N. Y. 65 ; In re Denham, L. R. 25 Ch.

n;

J.
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Div. 752 ; Watt's Appeal, 78 Pa. St. 391. These views are applicable, we think, to the case of all officers serving and acting within the
The rule of
scope of their authority gratuitously, or practically so.
liability in case of service for reward is well understood, and need not
be repeated.
It has been thought best to indicate the rules we think
applicable to the liability of directors and other officers of corporations,
as these questions were fully discussed at the argument, and in view
of the probable importance of these questions in the future disposition
of this cause.

The finding of the circuit court that no directors' meetings were
held within the period mentioned, and that the business of the corporation, consisting of issuing stock, making loans, accepting prepayment of loans, and in fact all the business of the corporation, was
transacted without any direction of the board of directors by the defendants and Harvey, the secretary, since deceased, is we think, sustained by the evidence, although stoutly denied by the defendants.
There is not only no record of any such meetings, but those who are
said to have been directors during the period all deny attending any
such meetings or transacting any such business, and the defendants
themselves are wholly unable to name a single director who was
While the absence of a record of propresent at any such meeting.
ceedings, due to the negligence of the secretary, would not defeat the
action of the directors, we are satisfied no such meetings were held,
and that the alleged want of authority in respect to many matters
transacted by the defendants, or one of them, and Harvey, was not
supplied at any of the stockholders' meetings, and, unless ratified subDuring a period of
sequently, they were without requisite authority.
about five years the regularly chosen directors of the corporation
wholly abdicated their functions as such, and gave no attention whatever to their duties, and left everything connected with the affairs of
the corporation to the management of the president, secretary, and
treasurer, by virtue of their several offices, and beyond this, to take
At the annual meetings of stockholders,
their own unheeded course.
officers and directors were regularly elected, and reports were made by
the secretary and treasurer, but the directors elected utterly neglected
their duties as before.
The death of Harvey caused investigation,
when the entire absence of proper entries on the ledger and record
during all this period was discovered, as well as the fact that there was
a shortage in the funds of the corporation.
The defendants during all
this time had proceeded to discharge the duties of their respective
offices, and looked after and conducted the affairs of the corporation
in connection with Harvey, the secretary, in entire good faith, not
deriving any improper personal gain or profit, and without improperly appropriating to themselves any of its property or funds.
They may have made mistakes and misjudged as to their powers
and duties.
They were not guilty of intentional wrong. The defendant Denniston, the treasurer, whose functions were purely ministerial, and extended only to receiving the moneys of the plaintiff and
paying them out, and to the safe-keeping of its securities, and keeping a correct account, has accounted for and paid over every cent he

I/4 2

NORTH HUDSON BUILDING

&

L. ASSN. V. CHILDS.

592

is

it,

is

it

is

;

is

is

is

it

a

a

it

it.,

received, and yet he was charged by the circuit court with losses of
the corporation, by the judgment in this case, to the amount of over
We are unable to see how the defendants are to be thus
$21,000.
charged as ex ojficio members of the board.
They were not technically directors, and neither of them had it in his power to call a
They could act as ex officio members only at
meeting of the board.
a meeting regularly convened, and no meetings were held.
Directors can not act in any other manner.
Cook Corp.,
592, and cases
in note. This is so well settled that citations of authority would be
Stated monthly meetings of the board were required to
superfluous.
be held on the next Tuesday after the monthly stockholders' meetings,
but the directors came not.
Special meetings might be called on the
written request of two directors, but no such request appears to have
been made, and none are willing to own, now that misfortune has
that he ever acted as a director during
overtaken the company,
in
All
have been eager to take the benefits,
the period
question.
whatever they were, of the management of the defendants, and accept their share of the money disbursed in paying off the first series
of stock at a figure amounting to nearly $8,000 more than was due
None but the president, treasurer and
on
as
now claimed.
been
have
to
willing to give the affairs of the corsecretary appear
attention.
And at least five of the directors
poration any particular
are understood to have received, and still hold, their shares of this
amount, and now all appear to be demanding that these defendants
shall put back that amount of money from their own funds into the
treasury of the plaintiff to make good the alleged loss on this and
other accounts, arising out of their attempt to manage the affairs of
the plaintiff without the aid or authority of the board of directors.
claim, when well founded in law, ought to be established by
Such
Regarding the case now presented by
entirely satisfactory evidence.
the record as one where
recovery must depend upon the liability of
the defendants disconnected with their ex officio membership of the
board,
plain thatChilds and Denniston, in their respective capacities as president and treasurer, are not responsible for the nonfeasance, negligence, or misfeasance of Harvey as secretary; nor
either of these liable for the nonfeasance, negligence, or misfeasance
Their liability
of the other in his official relations to the plaintiff.
can
not
be
held
several and separate.
jointly liable for any
They
act in excess of the authority of either, or both of them, without proof
of joint participation, to be proved in each instance, and not presumed
and here we have neither finding nor proof of improper combination
or intentional wrong. If Childs and Harvey, as president and secretary, exceeded their powers in any given instance to the loss or
not chargeable with
without
damage of the plaintiff, Denniston
in
If
and
excess
of
that
he
intermeddled
with
his
proof
authority.
Denniston and Harvey, as treasurer and secretary, exceeded their
powers in any case to the loss or damage of the plaintiff, Childs
not liable without proof that he intermeddled or participated in the
wrong. While these rules are obviously correct, and so clearly so
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that citation of authority is not needed to vindicate them, in view of
the finding and the evidence upon which it was based we have felt it
proper to state them at length, and with some particularity, as bear* *
ing upon the correctness of the judgment of the circuit court. *

Reversed.

Note.
The cases are not in entire accord as
Care required of officers :
to the degree of care required of corporate officers, and especially of directors.
It would seem that in case of all officers who receive compensation for
their services they should exercise ordinary care, prudence, and intelligence
in serving the corporation, and would be liable for damages resulting from a
failure to reach such a standard.
In the case of directors and officers who do
not generally receive compensation one line of authorities states the rule that
they are liable only for fraud or gross negligence, i.e., only for failing to exercise a slight degree of care (1872, Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 11, 10 Am.
Rep. 684; 1892, Swentzel v. Pennsylvania Bank, 147 Pa. St. 140; 1899,
Lagunas Nitrate Co. v. Laguna Nitrate Syndicate, 68 L.
Ch. 699, 81 L. T.
Rep. (N. S.) 334; 1900, Killen v. State Bank, 106 VVis. 546, 82 N. W. Rep.
536) ; another, and perhaps the best, line of authorities states the rule t;hat
such officers must exercise ordinary care, skill, and diligence, and must ane., the omission of that care which every man of
swer for ordinary neglect,
common prudence and discretion takes of his own concerns (1868, Bank v.
Hill, 56 Maine 385, 96 Am. Dec. 470 1878, Shea v. Mabry, Lea (Tenn. 319
Lea (Tenn.) 385 1889, Marshall v. Farmers',
1880, Vance v. Phoenix Ins. Co.,
etc., Bank, 85 Va. 676, 17 Am. St. Rep. 84 1898, San Pedro L. Co. v. Reynolds,
121 Cal. 74; 1899, Warren v. Robinson, 19 Utah 289, 75 Am. St. Rep. 734, note
753). They are not, however, liable for errors of judgment, mistakes of fact,
or of law, when they act in good faith, and with proper care (1880, Vance v.
S. Assn.
Phoenix Ins. Co., Lea (Tenn.) 385; 1881, Citizens' Building, L.
v. Coriell, 34 N.
Eq. 383; 1898, Seymour v. Spring Forest Assn., 157 N. Y.
697).
On the general subject of the degree of care required, see the following:
Note, 17 Am. St. Rep. 95-101; 1832, Robinson v. Smith,
Paige Ch. (N.
Y.) 222, 24 Am. Dec. 212; 1850, Hodges v. N. E. Screw Co., R. 312, 53
Am. Dec. 624, note 639; 1855, Smith v. Poor, 40 Maine 415, 63 Am. Dec. 672;
1868, Bank v. Hill, 56 Maine 385, 96 Am. Dec. 470; 1872, Spering's Appeal, 71
Pa. St. 11, 10 Am. Rep. 684; 1878, Shea v. Mabry,
Lea (Tenn.) 319; 1880,
Vance v. Phoenix Ins. Co., Lea (Tenn.) 385; 1881, Citizens' Building, L.
S.
Assn. v. Coriell, 34 N.
Eq. 383; 1889, Marshall v. Farmers', etc., Bank, 85
Va. 676, 17 Am. St. Rep. 84, note 94; 1889, Ten Eyck v. Pontiac, etc., R., 74
Mich. 226, 16 Am. St. Rep. 633, note 638; 1891, Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S.
132, 11 Sup. Ct. 924; 1891, Wallace v. Lincoln Sav. Bank, 89 Tenn. 630, 24
Am. St. Rep. 625; 1892, Swentzel v. Pennsylvania Bank, 147 Pa. St. 140;
1893, Hoffman v. Reichert, 147 111. 274, 37 Am. St. Rep. 219; 1898, San Pedro
Lumber Co. v. Reynolds, 121 Cal. 74; 1898, Mclntyre v. Ajax Min. Co., 17
Utah 213 53 Pac. Rep. 1124; 1898, Fougeray v. Laurel S. L. Co., 57 N.
Eq.
318, 41 Atl. Rep. 694 1898, Seymour v. Spring Forest Assn., 157 N. Y. 697 1899,
Lagunas Nitrate Co. v. Lagunas Nitrate Syndicate, 68 L. J. Ch. 699, 81 L. T.
R. (N. S.) 334; 1899, Wineburgh v. U. S. Steam, etc., Ry. Co., 173 Mass. 60,
1899, Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 111. 551, 74
73 Am. St. Rep. 261
Am. St. Rep. 189; 1899, Warren v. Robinson, 19 Utah 289, 75 Am. St. Rep.
734, note 753; 1900, Killen v. State Bank, 106 Wis. 546, 82 N. W. Rep. 536;
1900, Center Creek Water
Co. v. Lindsay, 21 Utah 192, 60 Pac. Rep. 559;
1902, Consol.
1901, Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N. Y. 157, 55 L. R. A. 751, note
Vinegar Works v. Brew,
Wis.
88 N. W. 603.
One who receives payment of the individual obligation of corporate officer
out of the corporate funds is liable to the corporation for such misappropria1900, Rochester
tion
Charlotte Tp. Co. v. Paviour, 164 N. Y. 281, 52 L. R.
A. 790, note.
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593

Right of corporation to remove officers.

6.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ELECTION OF DIRECTORS AND OF
CERTAIN OFFICERS OF THE A. A. GRIFFING IRON COMPANY. 1
1898.

IN THE SUPREME

OF NEW JERSEY.
Rep. 168-176.

COURT

63

N. J. Law

[The iron company was organized in

1881, under the general corof
The
law
poration
by-laws provided for a board of five di1875.
rectors, to be elected by ballot at an annual meeting in May, and to
hold office for one year and until their successors should be elected ;
they were to elect one of their number president, were also to elect a
treasurer, and were authorized to fill all vacancies in the board or
offices ; to call special meetings of shareholders, and amend the bylaws. In November, 1898, a meeting of shareholders was called, by
notice given, "to amend the by-laws, by increasing the board to nine
directors, to be elected at the annual meeting or at any special meeting; to allow the board to remove any officer of the company at any
meeting; to fill all vacancies; and to elect four new directors."
At
this meeting all the 3,000 shares of stock were represented, and by a
vote of 1,566 to 1,434, the by-laws were amended in accordance with
the notice, and under protest of some of the shareholders four new
directors were elected, receiving the vote of 1,566 shares, the 'other
shares not being voted.
A recess was then taken and a directors'
meeting, in accordance with special notice formerly given, was held,
participated in by one old, and the four new directoi's, and at which

the president and treasurer were removed, and new ones elected.
The other directors refused to participate.
The stockholders reconvened, and by the same vote of 1,566 shares ratified the action of the
The removed officers challenge these acts.]
directors.
COLLINS, J. The organic law of the A. A. Griffing Iron Company subjected that corporation to the control of the legislature.
Sections 14, 35. Therefore, we are now to look to the revision of
Section i of that
1896 of the corporation act for its regulation.
statute enacts that every corporation shall have power to make bylaws fixing and altering the number of directors and providing for the
management of its property and the regulation and government of its
affairs.
Section 2 enacts that the power to make and alter by-laws
It is clear, therefore, that the amendshall be in the stockholders.
ment of November 23, 1898, increasing the number of directors was
legal. That the stockholders had delegated to the directors power to
amend the by-laws did not curtail their own power to amend them,
and of course the later statute removed all possible restriction on such
power. The protest read at the stockholders' meeting was, therefore, unavailing in this regard.
Insufficiency of notice was alleged,
but no defect was pointed out or has been proved.
As every share of
stock was represented and voted on at the meeting, no irregularity
should be considered.
The
Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417.
1
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amendments must stand.
It is argued that the increase of directors
should not be held to have had immediate effect; that, under the provisions of section 12 of the statute, directors must be chosen for at
least a year, and the argument is not only that the individual directors, but that the board as constituted at the time of election, hold for
a year, not subject to change in the composition of the board.
It is
not denied that, where the by-laws permit special meetings, there may
be an alteration in the number of directors, at any such meeting, but
it is claimed that such alteration becomes effectual only at the next annual election.
We are referred to numerous decisions that, in the
of
fraud
or abuse of trust, stockholders must submit to the
absence
control of a corporation by its directors during their term of office.
These decisions all relate to collateral attack.
They have no reference
to direct action of the stockholders taken by legitimate and orderly
methods.
The right to take such action is inherent, though generally
declared and directed by statute.
It
Thomp. on Corp.,
3972.
would be preposterous to leave the real owners of the corporate propOur
erty at the mercy of their agents, and the law has not done so.
statute authorizes action by the stockholders under by-laws subject to
alteration.
Special meetings of the stockholders may be held under
the by-laws, or, in case of necessity, under the statute.
Sections i,
If the by-laws so warrant directors may even be removed
2, 17, 46.
during their term.* In Imperial Hydropathic Hotel Co. v. Hampson,
23 Ch. D. i, it was held that without such warrant in the articles of
association the directors of a joint stock company could not be removed except for cause; but Sir George Jessel, the learned master of
the rolls, said that under a clause in the articles of association, authorizing amendments, it was competent for the stockholders to pass a
clause enabling them to remove the directors and then act upon it.
From the time of the adoption of the amendments, therefore, the
stockholders were entitled to have nine directors in the board.
How
should the four new places have been filled pending the next annual
election? Counsel for these applicants submit and cite authority that
newly-created offices are " vacant;" and they contend that under the
statute and the by-laws of the company the power to fill vacancies is
in the directors.
The provision of the statute is in section 15, which
reads as follows:
"Any vacancy occurring among the directors, or in office of president, secretary or treasurer, by death, resignation, removal or otherwise, shall be filled in the manner provided for in the by-laws; in the
absence of such provision such vacancies shall be filled by the board
of directors."
This language is inappropriate to a directorship newly
created.
The filling up of a board whose membership is enlarged
In
seems to be left to the creating body, that is, the stockholders.
the absence of express provision there is implied power in the stockholders to do everything necessary to effectuate the corporate funcThe by-law of this
tions.
Thomp. on Corp.,
5641, 5642.
company above cited is based on the statute and is even more inap-
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a newly-created
directorship, for the reference to an
We think it
unexpired term" presupposes a previous incumbent.
clear that under the amended by-laws it became the right and duty
of the stockholders to elect the additional directors, and that they
*
*
*
could do so at a special meeting called for that purpose.
(As to the election of the new president and treasurer the opinion
proceeds :)
Its validity, of course, can be questioned only if there was invalidfor there can be no doubt
ity in the removal of the former incumbents
of the power of the directors to fill vacancies caused by removal.
The statute recognizes a power of removal (section 15), and such
If there be a fixed term of office removal
power is indeed inherent.
must be for cause, but otherwise, unless limited by statute or by-law,
the power to remove ministerial officers is absolute, in the body that
elects, subject only to a right of action if there be a breach of contract of employment.
The
Thoinp. on Corp.,
804, 805, 820.
president of a corporation has no securer tenure than any other minOur statute (section 13)
isterial officer.
Thomp. on Corp.,
4611.
simply provides that every corporation organized thereunder shall have
a president, secretary and treasurer, who shall be chosen either by the
directors or stockholders as the by-laws may direct, and shall hold
their offices until others are chosen and qualified in their stead. The
by-laws of the Griffing Company directed that the directors should
choose these officers, but fixed no term of office, and at the meeting
of November 23d .were amended so as to give express power of removal. Such an amendment has been judicially upheld in this state.
Weinburgh v. Union, etc., Advertising Co., 10 Dick. Ch. Rep. 640,
The stockholders ratified the removal made under this authority.
The attempt of the directors, in May, 1898, to fix a term of one
year for the president and treasurer was certainly ineffectual to create
It was probably ineffectual as a contract, but, if not,
any franchise.
the remedy for a breach is by an action for damages.
The application to set aside these elections is denied, with costs.
Compare, 1758, Rex v. Richardson, 1 Burrows 517; 1882, Imperial Hydropathic Hotel Co. v. Hampson, L. R. 23 Ch. D. 1 ; 1899, Mobile, J. & K. C. R.
Co. v. Owen, 121 Ala. 505, 25 So. Rep. 612; 1899, Stanley v. Luse, 36 Ore. 25,
The right to remove officers by those who elect or appoint
58 Pac. Rep. 75.
them is now frequently provided for in articles of incorporation or in the byThis is especially true in the large corporations recently formed unlaws.
der New Jersev laws.

propriate to

"

ARTICLE II.. RIGHTS

<Q

OF

OFFICERS.

To manage the ordinary business of the corporation.
See Metropolitan EL R. Co. v. Manhattan El. R. Co., n Daly
(N. Y.) 373, supra, p. 694; National State Bank v. Vigo Co. Nat'l
Bk., 141 Ind. 352, 50 Am. St. Rep. 330, supra, p. 703.
Sec. 594.

I

See, 1840, Burrill v. Nahant Bank, 2 Met. 163, 35 Am. Dec. 395 ; 1886,
v. Green, 91 Mo. 367; 1889, Beveridge v. N. Y. El. R., 112 N. Y.
Eq. 389, 67 Am. St. Rep. 494.
1; 1897, Sternberg v. Wolff, 56 N.
See also, note 64 Am. Dec. 485, et seq.

Note.

Hutchinson

J.
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HENRY WALLACE v. THE FIERCE-WALLACE PUBLISHING COMPANY AND J. M. PIERCE, APPELLANTS. 1
1897.

IN THE SUPREME

101 Iowa
COURT OF IOWA.
Am St. Rep. 389.

333' 6 3

Rep.

313-

[Suit by Wallace against the publishing company and Pierce to
have a receiver appointed.
Wallace was the owner of half the
stock, and was secretary and treasurer.
Pierce owned the other half
of the stock and was president and business manager, and they together
were the only directors.
The company published two papers, one in
Wisconsin and one in Missouri ; it also owned a majority 1 18 shares
of stock in Homestead Company, another publishing company, of
which Wallace had been editorial manager.
Bitter dissension had
arisen between Pierce and Wallace, which it was alleged made it
impracticable and impossible to transact business with each other,
that the business could not be carried on, and that the objects of the
Much, if not all, of the uncorporation were completely frustrated.
adjusted difficulties related to the management and control of the
The lower court so found, and appointed a
Homestead Company.
receiver to take charge of the 118 shares of stock in this company,
but refused a receiver as to the other property of the Pierce- Wallace
Defendants appealed.]
Company.
*
*
*
DEEMER, J.
With reference to

the

Homestead Com-

pany, we find there are decided differences between the members of
the company, which are, apparently, irreconcilable; but they relate
to matters intra vires, and, except as hereafter noted, do not have
reference to the Fierce-Wallace Company.
These disputes are quite
largely, if not wholly, related to the editorial management of the newspaper published by the Homestead Company ; Wallace insisting that
he should control the utterances of that department, while Pierce and
the other stockholders and directors were asserting the right of supervision, and, to a certain extent, at least, control of the editorial colThe breach caused by this difference widened until it led to
umns.
the deposition of plaintiff, by the regular vote of the directors of the
Now,
corporation, from the editorial management of the paper.
without going into the merits of this unfortunate controversy, and
without indicating our views as to who is at fault, we simply say, that
if it be conceded that the managers and directors of the Homestead
Company were at fault, it would give the plaintiff no right to the apThe Homestead Company is not a party
pointment of the receiver.
to this suit.
It is an independent corporation, composed of different
stockholders from those who own the stock in the Fierce-Wallace
Again, no actionable
Company, and is managed by other officers.
fraud is charged against the officers of the Homestead Company.
Plaintiff was deposed by a regular majority vote, and as a minority
1

Statement abridged.

Part of opinion omitted.
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It is a general
stockholder or officer he has no cause for complaint.
rule that a minority can not dictate the policy of the corporation, and
no interference with its management in their behalf can be justified,
Peatunless it be absolutely necessary to the attainment of justice.
man v. Power Co., 100 Iowa 245 (69 N. W. Rep. 541).
But we
have already said too much as to the power to appoint a receiver for
the Homestead Company, for such relief is not asked, and the receiver was not granted in a suit against it.
The appointment was
made with directions to the receiver to take charge of a part of the
property of the Fierce-Wallace Company, to wit, the stock owned
by it in the Homestead Company; and the part of this opinion referring to this last-named corporation is designed to make plain the
difference which exists in these two bodies, and to show, if we can,
that a dispute as to the management of the Homestead Company will
not of itself authorize the appointment of a receiver for the other corporation. We take it from the record that the lower court concluded
that there were such differences between Pierce and Wallace 1as to the
management of the Homestead Company that they could not act together in matters relating to the Fierce-Wallace Company, and could
not properly represent the latter corporation in the meetings of the
Homestead Company, and it seems that the receiver was appointed
in order that it might be represented at the meetings of the stockholders of the Homestead corporation.
It further appears that the
did
not
think
there
were
such
differences
as would hinder
court below
in
of
the Fierce-Wallace corporation
the exercise
its functions, except
in relation to the Homestead stock, for he denied the receivership as
to all the property save this stock, and we may say, in justification
of the court's refusal, that we think it was right in so doing. Plaintiff
He is still at libhas not been denied any right in this corporation.
handle
the
funds
and
duties
a stockholder,
to
to
his
as
perform
erty
director and officer.
What have we then as to the management of
the stock in the Homestead Company?
It appears, that after Wallace's deposition as editor of the HomePierce
stead paper, he demanded a meeting of the board of directors.
It was said that
called the meeting, but Wallace was out of town.
Pierce did not know of his absence, but this is immaterial, for the
treason that a second meeting was- called shortly afterward, when
As soon as
Wallace was in the city, and this he refused to attend.
resolution,
called
which
was
Pierce
drew
a
the meeting
gave to
up
each of the parties a proxy to vote one-half of "the Homestead ComThis resolution was
pany stock at the meeting of that corporation.
in
advance
of
to
Wallace
the
submitted
meeting, as indicating
anxious that all matters
views;
seems
Pierce
was
and
it
that
Pierce's
with reference to the action of this corporation should be agreed
Now, it seems to be held
upon, to avoid any possibility of difficulty.
will be appointed where
courts
that
a
receiver
of
the
some
English
by
there is such a dispute among the members of a governing body as
See Featherstone v.
prevents the affairs being carried on properly.
Cooke, L. R. 16 Eq. 298; 2 Cook, Stock, Stockh. and Corp. Law,
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Mr. Cook says, how284, 285.
684; Morawetz, Priv. Corp.,
unless
the
interfere
will
not
ever, the court
corporation is in a condino
is
proper governing body, or there are such
tion in which there
in
the governing body, as that it is impossible to carry on
dissensions
" In such a
with
advantage to the parties interested.
the business
time,
for
but
a
and to as
interfere,
will
limited
case the court
only
are
other
There
as
authorities
holding to a
small extent
possible."
Loan
and
Trust
American
Company v. Toledo,
contrary doctrine.
Co.,
Fed.
Co.
v.
Rep. 416; Coal
Hooper (Ala.), 17
C. & S. R.
29
So. Rep. 118; Einstein v. Rosenfeld, 38 N. J. Eq. 309. And it is
manifest that courts are loth to appoint a receiver for the mere purpose of carrying on the business of a corporation which is being conducted by its proper officers, although not to the profit or satisfaction
of its stockholders, for the reason, as said by Judge Thompson, in his
work on Corporations, at section 6834, " that the sovereign does not
furnish public agencies for the carrying on of private enterprises.'*
But, whatever may be the true rule with reference to this matter, it
appears that the Pierce- Wallace Company is being managed by the
officers selected for that purpose, just as it was before plaintiff was
deposed, except that he has voluntarily refused to attend its meetings,
or to participate in the management of its business.
There has been
no such disagreement between the officers of this corporation, with
reference to its affairs, as to render it impossible for it to carry on the
The record shows but one
business for which it was organized.
meeting of the directors after plaintiff's deposition as editor of the
Homestead, and this he refused to attend.
Not as we understand it,
because of any disagreement between the directors or stockholders as
to the management of this corporation, but because of the effect it
might have upon the affairs of the Homestead Company. Evidence
is abundant to the effect that all essential differences grew out of difficulties which arose with reference to the management of the Homestead ; and that these litigants are not at variance with reference to the
Plaintiff, as we bemanagement of the Fierce-Wallace Company.
lieve, failed to attend the meetings of the latter corporation simplybecause he did not wish to have the stock held by it in the Homestead
Company represented at the meeting of this last-named concern, and
would not agree to the appointment of proxies, as suggested byPierce, solely because of the effect it might have upon the Homestead
difficulty. * * *
The relief asked is, in effect, the dissolution of the corporation, or
if this be not the prayer, it is that the management of the corporation

be taken out of the hands of the officers who have been conducting
its business and placed in the hands of an officer of the court for some
indefinite period.
It has already been seen that this is rarely, if ever,
done ; and, if such practice should be approved in this court, it is well
to inquire, how long should the receivership be continued ? There
are but two stockholders in this corporation, plaintiff Wallace and deNow, a court of equity has no power to make them
fendant Pierce.
agree ; and, if their differences are such as that it is impossible for
2

WIL. CAS.

37
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them to carry on their business, it is not likely that the appointment
It is practically conof a receiver will bring about a reconciliation.
no
in
the
absence
of a statute,
ceded that a court of equity has
power,
What then must result? Either
to dissolve a going corporation.
that a court must carry on this business for the interest of the stockholders until the corporation is dissolved by lapse of time, or that one
of the parties should sell his stock, or such portion thereof as will
We have
give a majority to one or the other of these litigants.
already seen from the cases cited that it is with great reluctance that
any court authorizes the appointment of a receiver because of dissension in the governing bodies, and when it does " it will only interfere fora limited length of time, and to as small an extent as possible."
It is not necessary to decide whether the rule announced in Featherstone v. Cooke is applicable in a state where the statute enumerates
the causes for which a receiver may be appointed, for, if we accept it
as correct doctrine, we do not think it applies to the facts of this case.
It may be unfortunate that there is no remedy other than a sale of his
stock by one or the other of the stockholders, but, if this be the case,
it is a situation into which the parties voluntarily placed themselves;
and, so long as no actual legal wrong is committed by either, they
Our conclusions find support
must be content with their condition.
other
authorities:
in the following, among
Hinkley v. Blethen, 78
Co., 12 Blatchf. 280,
Pond
Railroad
v.
Me. 221 (3 Atl. Rep. 655);
Ross
No.
v.
Fed. Case
11265; State
(Mo. Sup.), 25 S. W. Rep.
McKenzie,
v.
Iowa
425; People v. Weigley (111.
947; Loomis
31
E.
Rep. 300; Strong v. McCogg (Wis.), 13 N. W.
Sup.), 40 N.
Rep. 895; Hinckley v. Pfister (Wis.), 53 N. W. Rep. 21; "French
Bank Case, 53 Cal, 495 ; Republican Mountain Silver Mines v.

Brown,

7

C. C. A. 412 (58 Fed. Rep. 644)

;

Spelling, Priv. Corp.,

The District
851 ; Jones v. Bank, 10 Colo. 464 (17 Pac. Rep. 272).
in
in
and
error
the
receiver
its
order
court was
is reversed.
appointing
Note.

See note,
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Same.

688, supra.

2.

Right to deal with the corporation.
ories

(a^

Dealings are not necessarily void.

TWIN-LICK OIL COMPANY
1875.

The-

:

v.

MARBURY. 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
Rep. 587-594.

91

U. S.

[Suit by the company to have the defendant declared to hold certain' oil land as trustee for the company, and to account to it for the
income during the time he had control. In 1867 the company became
much embarrassed, and borrowed of the defendant $2,000, giving a
1

Statement abridged ; only part of opinion given.
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note therefor, secured by deed of trust, conveying all its property,
rights and franchises, to one Thomas, with power to sell upon default. Default was made and the land sold under the deed of trust,
At the time of all these transacand was bought by the defendant.
tions the defendant was a stockholder and director of the company.
It was found that the loan was made in good faith to help the company out of difficulty, and that the sale was open, fair, without fraud or
any advantage taken by the defendant as director of the company.
Decree was rendered for the defendant, and the company appealed.]
*
*
The first question which arises
MR. JUSTICE MILLER. *
in this state of the facts is whether defendant's purchase was absolutely void.
That a director of a joint-stock corporation occupies one of those
fiduciary relations where his dealings with the subject-matter of his
trust or agency, and with the beneficiary or party whose interest is
confided to his care, is viewed with jealousy by the courts, and may
be set aside on slight grounds, is a doctrine founded on the soundest
morality, and which has received the clearest recognition in this court
and in others.
Koehler v. Black River Falls Iron Co., 2 Black 715;
Drury v. Cross, 7 Wall. 299; Luxemburg R. R. Co. v. Magnay, 25
Beav. 586; The Cumberland Co. v. Sherman, 30 Barb. 553; 16 Md.
The general doctrine, however, in regard to contracts of this
456.
class is not that they are absolutely void, but that they are voidable
at the election of the party whose interest has been so represented by
the party claiming under it.
We say this is the general rule, for
there may be cases where such contracts would be void ab initio, as
when an agent to sell buys of himself, and by his power of attorney
But, even
conveys to himself that which he was authorized to sell.
here, acts which amount to a ratification by the principal may validate

it

is

a

it,

the saleThe present case is not one of that class. While it is true that the
defendant, as a director of the corporation, was bound by all those
rules of conscientious fairness which courts of equity have imposed as
the guides for dealing in such cases, it can not be maintained that any
rule forbids one director among several from loaning money to the
corporation when the money is needed, and the transaction is open
and otherwise free from blame.
No adjudged case has gone so far
as this. Such a doctrine, while it would afford little protection to the
corporation against actual fraud or oppression, would deprive it of the
aid of those most interested in giving aid judiciously, and best qualified to judge of the necessity of that aid, and of the extent to which it
may safely be given.
There are in such a transaction three distinct parties whose interest
is affected by
namely, the lender, the corporation and the stockholders of the corporation.
The directors are the officers or agents of the corporation, and represent the interests of that abstract legal entity, and of those who own
the shares of its stock.
One of the objects of creating
corporation
law
to
to
enable
make contracts, and these contracts may be
by
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made with its stockholders as well as with others. In some classes of
corporations, as in mutual insurance companies, the main object of
the act of incorporation is to enable the company to make contracts
with its stockholders, or with persons who become stockholders by
the very act of making the contract of insurance.
It is very true, that
as a stockholder, in making a contract of any kind with the corporation of which he is a member, is in some sense dealing with a creature
of which he is a part, and holds a common interest with the other
stockholders, who, with him, constitute the whole of that artificial
entity, he is properly held to a larger measure of candor and good
faith than if he were not a stockholder.
So, when the lender is a
director, charged, with others, with the control and management of
the affairs of the corporation, representing in this regard the aggregated interest of all the stockholders, his obligation, if he becomes a
party to a contract-with the company, to candor and fair dealing is increased in the precise degree that his representative character has
given him power and control derived from the confidence reposed in
him by the stockholders who appointed him their agent. If he should
be a sole director, or one of a smaller number vested with certain powers, this obligation would be still stronger, and his acts subject to more
severe scrutiny, and their validity determined by more rigid principles
of morality and freedom from motives of selfishness.
All this falls
far short, however, of holding that no such contract can be made
which will be valid, and we entertain no doubt that the defendant in
this case could make a loan of money to the company, and as we
have already said that the evidence shows it to have been an honest
transaction for the benefit of the corporation and its shareholders,
both in the rate of interest and in the security taken, we think it was
valid originally, whether liable to be avoided afterwards by the company or not.
If it be conceded that the contract by which the defendant became
the creditor of the company was valid, we see no principle on which
the subsequent purchase under the deed of trust is not equally so.
A trustee was
The defendant was not here both seller and buyer.
interposed who made the sale, and who had the usual powers necessary
to see that the sale was fairly conducted, and who in this respect was
the trustee of the corporation, and must be supposed to have been
Defendant was at liberty
selected by it for the exercise of this power.
to bid, subject to those rules of fairness which we have already conceded to belong to his peculiar position; for, if he could not bid, he
would have been deprived of the only means which his contract gave
him of making his debt out of the security on which he had loaned
We think the sale was a fair one. The company was
his money.
The well was exhopelessly involved beside the debt to defendant.
The machinery was of little use for any
hausted, to all appearance.
Most of the stockother purpose, and would not pay transportation.
holders who now promote this suit refused to pay assessments on their
shares to aid the company.
Nothing was left to the defendant but to
*
* *
buy it in, as no one would bid the amount of his debt.
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(After holding that it was unnecessary to decide whether the circumstances would justify setting the sale aside on account of the
fiduciary relation, that it could not be done here because of the delay
in bringing suit, the decision below was affirmed.)
See, generally, note 57 Am. St. Eep. 74, et seq.; 1871, Merrick v.
Note.
Pennsylvania Coal Co., 61 111. 472; 1889, Beach v. Miller, 130111. 162, 17 Am.
St. Rep. 291, note 301; 1891, Mullanphy Savings Bank v. Schott, 135 111. 655,
25 Am. St. Rep. 401 ; 1898, Singer v. Salt Lake, etc., Mfg. Co., 17 Utah 143, 70
Am. St. Rep. 773 ; 1899, Patterson v. Portland Smelting, etc., Works, 35 Ore.
96, 56 Pac. Rep. 407 ; 1899, Porter v. Lassen L. & C. Co., 127 Cal. 261, 59 Pac.
Rep. 563; 1900, Ryan v. Williams, 100 Fed. Rep. 172. See note to next case.
As to contracts between corporations having the same directors they are
generally valid unless fraud is shown see, 1868, Goodin v. Cincinnati, etc.,
Co., 18 Ohio St. 169, 98 Am. Dec. 95; 1878, TJ. S. Rolling St. Co. v. Atlantic &
G. W. R. Co., 34 Ohio St. 450, 32 Am. Rep. 380; 1883, Pearson v. Concord,
etc., R. Co., 62 N. H. 537, 13 Am. St. Rep. 590; 1889, Memphis, etc., R. Co. v v
Woods, 88 Ala. 630, 16 Am. St. Rep. 81 ; 1892, McComb v. Barcelona, etc.,
Assn., 134 N. Y. 598; 1895, Pauly v. Pauly, 107 Cal. 8, 48 Am. St. Rep. 98;
1896, San Diego, etc., Co. v. Pacific, etc., Co., 112 Cal. 53, 33 L. R. A. 788;
1899, Salina National Bank v. Prescott, 60 Kan. 490.

Sec. 597.

Same.
can refuse to perform or may
have contract set aside.

(b) Corporation
MUNSON ET
1886.

AL. v.

THE SYRACUSE, GENEVA AND CORNING RAIL-

IN THE COURT

ROAD COMPANY.

OF APPEALS

1

OF NEW YORK.

Rep. 58-77.

103

N. Y.

[Action by Munson and his associates to enforce specific performS., G. & C. R. Company of a contract to deliver bonds
of the property, franchises, etc., of the S., B. & C. R.

ance by the
in exchange

Company, for which the plaintiffs tendered a proper conveyance.
The plaintiffs were the bondholders of the S., B. & C. R. Co., which
had become insolvent, and under foreclosure proceedings under the
mortgage securing the bonds, had purchased all the property, rights
of way, franchises, etc., of the S., B. & C. R. Co. ; before this was
done the plaintiffs had entered into an agreement with one Magee,
whereby he had agreed to organize the S., G. & C. Co., and to purchase for it the property of the S., B. & C. Co., of the plaintiffs, and
pay therefor in bonds of the new S., G. & C. Co. ; Magee organized
the S., G. & C. Co.; Munson, with nine others were made directors
of the new company, and Munson became president.
Soon after its
organization the board of directors bv unanimous vote resolved to
assume the contract made by Magee with plaintiffs, and September 14,
1875, by Munson, its president, entered into a contract for that purall parties at the time understanding that the S., G. &. C.
pose
Co. intended to build its road upon the line of the former company,
Arguments omitted.
Statement much abridged.
opinion relating to the single point is given1
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it

it,

which was partly graded, and for which considerable of the right of
way had been obtained, and all of which were agreed to be conveyed
The S., G. & C. Co., however, afterward deby the plaintiffs.
termined to locate and build on an entirely different route, and
refused to deliver the bonds to the plaintiffs, or accept their tendered
There was no evidence of actual fraud in any of the
conveyance.
The court "below gave judgment for defendants, and
transactions.
plaintiffs appealed.]
*
*
*
ANDREWS, J.
We are of opinion that the contract of
September 14, 1875, is repugnant to the great rule of law which invalidates all contracts made by a trustee or fiduciary, in which he is
personally interested, at the election of the party he represents. There
is no controversy as to the facts bringing the case as to Munson within
the operation of the rule.
He and his associates were dealing with a
in which Munson was a director, in a matter where the
corporation
interest of the contracting parties were or might be in conflict.
The
contract bound the corporation to purchase, and Munson, as one of
the directors, participated in the action of the corporation in assuming
the obligation, and in binding itself to pay the price primarily agreed
upon between the plaintiffs and Magee. He stood in the attitude of
The law permits no one
selling as owner and purchasing as trustee.
It does not stop to inquire
to act in such inconsistent relations.
whether the contract or transaction was fair or unfair.
It stops the
inquiry when the relation is disclosed, and sets aside the transaction
or refuses to enforce
at the instance of the party whom the fiduciary
undertook to represent, without undertaking to deal with the question
of abstract justice in the particular case. It prevents frauds by making
them as far as may be impossible, knowing that real motives often
elude the most searching inquiry, and
leaves neither to judge nor
jury the right to determine upon a consideration of its advantages or

a

it

a

it

it

a

is

a

s

a

contract made under such circumstances
disadvantages, whether
shall stand or fall.
It can make no difference in the application of
the rule in this case, that Munson'
associates were not themselves
disabled from contracting with the corporation, or that Munson was
The
only one of ten directors who voted in favor of the contract.
contract on its face notified Munson's associates of his relation to the
corporation, and that the contract was subject to be defeated on that
conground, and on the other hand a corporation, in order to defeat
tract entered into by directors in which one or more of them had a
not bound to show that the influence of the director
private interest,
or directors having the private interest determined the action of the
board. The law can not accurately measure the influence of trustee
enter into the inquiiy, in an action by
with his associates, nor will
the trustee in his private capacity, to enforce the contract in the making of which he participated. The value of the rule of equity, to
which we have adverted, lies to a great extent in its stubbornness and
one of its chief uses as
Its rigidity gives
preventive
inflexibility.
or discouraging influence, because
weakens the temptation to dishonesty or unfair dealing on the part of trustees by vitiating, without
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attempt at discrimination, all transactions in which they assume the
dual character of principal and representative.
The rule has been declared and enforced in a great variety of cases,
but in none perhaps with more vigor and completeness, both upon
principle and authority, than in the leading case of Davoue v. Fanning (2 Johns. Ch. 251, 252). But the case of Aberdeen Railway
Company v. Blaikie and others (2 Eq. 1281), decided by the house of
lords, is in many of its features similar to the present one.
In that
case it appeared that the plaintiffs were a manufacturing firm, and
that one of them was also a manager of the Aberdeen Railway ComAt a meetpany, the defendant, and the chairman of the board.
ing of the managers, they, by resolution, authorized their engineer
to contract for iron chairs needed by the company.
The agent
It did not appear that the
contracted with the plaintiffs' firm.
member of the firm, who was also a manager and the chairman
of the company, intermeddled with the dealing on either side, further
than that it may be assumed he was at the meeting which authorized
the engineer to procure a supply of chairs.
The plaintiffs brought their
suit to enforce specifically the performance of the contract, or in the
alternative to recover damages for its non-performance.
After a decision in their favor in the lower court the company appealed to the
house of lords where the ruling was unanimously reversed on the
ground that the contract was condemned by the rules of equity, as
having been made between the company of which one of the plaintiffs was a manager, and ~a private firm of which he was a member.
The opinion of Lord Chancellor Cranworth and Lord Brougham vindicate upon impregnable grounds the general rule and its application to
*
*
the particular case. *

Affirmed.

See, 1881, Duncomb v. N. Y., H. & N. R., 84 N. Y. 190; 1899, Griffith
v. Blackwater B. & L. Co., 47 W. Va. 56, 33 S. E. Rep. 125, supra, p. 897;
1899, Stanley v. Luse, 36 Ore. 25, 58 Pac. Rep. 75; 1899, Barnes v. Lynch, 9
Note.

Okl.

156, 59

Pac. Rep.

995.

Sec. 598. Same.

(3) Right of officer to compensation,
(a) General doctrine.

NATIONAL LOAN

AND INVESTMENT COMPANY
COMPANY. 1

1899.

v.

ROCKLAND

IN THE U. S. CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT,
MINNESOTA.

94 Fed. Rep. 335-340.

[Action on a note for $3,747.64, dated October i, 1896, signed by
the investment company, by its vice-president and secretary, payable
to H. S. Jenkins, and indorsed by him to the Rockland Company.
1 Statement
much abridged, and only the part of the opinion relating to
salary of officers given.
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The defense was that the note was without consideration and void. A
referee found that at the commencement of business by the investment company, soon after its incorporation, all the persons interested
in
understood and agreed with Jenkins, the president, that all officers should receive reasonable compensation for their services, and
by-law was adopted by the stockholders at the organization authorizing the board of directors to fix salaries of officers.
Jenkins served
The directors in
as president from October 14, 1886, vmtil after 1892.
1890 approved and allowed his claim of $600 per year, from Seplike sum;
tember i. 1887, to September i, 1890, and the next year
at the time these sums were allowed there was an oral agreement that
In 1893 these sums
per cent, interest until paid.
they should draw
with interest due were put in the form of note, and the note sued on
At the times
was the last renewal of the note thus given for salary.
the claims were allowed Jenkins and two others were directors, and
No fraud was charged there
the claims were unanimously allowed.
were no creditors, and no complaint was ever made by anyone until
suit was brought on the notes in 1897.]
*
* It
contended that the facts
SANBORN, CIRCUIT JUDGE.
found by the referee do not warrant his conclusion of law, that
the defendant in error was entitled to judgment upon the note. The
that the note was given for back pay voted to
position here urged
the president of the corporation by the board of directors, of wh'ich he
debt of the commember, that this was an attempt to create
was
pany by mere vote of the board without any consideration, and that
this act was beyond the powers of the directors and void.
The directors of
corporation are trustees for its stockholders.
They represent and act for the owners of its stock.
Ordinarily, the employment
of
servant by
contract to
corporation raises the implication of
reasonable salary for the service rendered, because
pay fair wages or
the custom to pay such compensation, and men rarely sacrifice
their time and expend their labor or their money in the service of
Directors of corporations, however, usually
others without reward.
serve without wages or salary.
They are generally financially interested in the success of the corporation they represent, and their
service as directors secures its reward in the benefit which
confers
to pay
upon the stock which they own. In other words, the custom
the ordinary employes of corporations for the services they render, but
the custom of directors of corporations to serve gratuitously, without
The presumption of law follows
compensation or expectation of it.
the custom.
From the employment of an ordinary servant the law
From the service of
contract to pay him.
director, the
implies
that he serves gratuitously.
The latter presumption
implication
prevails, in the absence of an understanding or an agreement to the
contrary, when directors are discharging the duties of other offices of
the corporation to which they are chosen by the directory, such as
those of president, secretary, and treasurer.
Moreover, as the members of boards of directors act in
fiduciary capacity, they are without
the power or authority to dispose of the property of the corporation
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The note was not without consideration,
* *
*
was right.

and the judgment upon
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without consideration.
Consequently they may not lawfully vote
back pay to an officer who has been serving the corporation voluntarily without any agreement that he shall receive any reward for the
It is beyond their powers to create a debt of
discharge of his duties.
the corporation by their mere vote or resolution.
Some authorities have gone so far as to hold that officers of a corporation, who are also its directors, can not recover for the discharge
of their duties unless their compensation is fixed by a by-law or by a
resolution of the board before their services are rendered.
Gridley v.
Co.,
200,
Co.,
111.
v.
Bridge
Railway
203; Kilpatrick
71
49 Pa. St.
1 1 8, 121 ; Wood v. Manufacturing Co., 23 Ore. 20, 25,
23 Pac. Rep.
The fact is, however, that, in the active and actual business
848.
transactions of the world, many officers of corporations, who are also
members of their boards of directors, spend their time and their energies for years in the interest of their corporations, and greatly benefit
the owners of their stock, under agreements that they shall have just,
but indefinite, compensation for their services.
We are unwilling
to hold that such officers should be deprived of all compensation because the amounts of their salaries were not definitely fixed before
A thoughtful and
they entered upon the discharge of their duties.
deliberate consideration of this entire question, and an extended conhas led to the conclusion that
sideration of the authorities upon
this
the true rule:
Officers of
corporation, who are also directors, and who, without any agreement, express or implied, with the
corporation or its owners, or their representatives, have voluntarily
rendered their services, can recover no back pay or compensation
therefor; and
beyond the powers of the board of directors, after
such services are rendered, to pay for them out of the funds of the
corporation, or to create debt of the corporation on account of them.
Jones v. Morrison, 31 Minn. 140, 147, 16 N. W. Rep. 854; Blue v.
Bank, 145 Ind. 518, 522, 43 N. E. Rep. 655 Doe v. Transportation
Co.,
Fed. Rep. 62,
Association v. Stonemetz, 29 Pa. St. 534;
Railroad Co. v. Ketchum, 27 Conn. 170; Road Co. v. Branegan, 40
Ind. 361, 364. But such officers, who have rendered their services
under an agreement, either express or implied, with the corporation,
its owners or representatives, that they shall receive reasonable, but
indefinite, compensation therefor, may recover as much as their servand
ices are worth
not beyond the powers of the board of directors to fix and pay reasonable salaries to them after they have disMissouri River Co. v. Richards,
charged the duties of their offices.
Kan. 101
Rogers v. Railway Co., 22 Minn. 25, 27; Railroad
Co. v. Tiernan (Kan. Sup.), 15 "Pac. Rep. 544, 553; Stewart v.
Railroad Co., 41 Fed. Rep. 736, 739; Rosborough v. Canal Co., 22

:

Compensation of officers
Note.
The general rule is that the general corsuch as directors, the president, vice-president, secretary,
porate officers,
and treasurer,
are not entitled to any compensation for the performance of
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their purely corporate duties unless there is an express promise to pay for the
same, or an understanding before they are performed that they are to be paid
for.
See, 1865, Kilpatrick v. Penrose Ferry Bridge Co., 49 Pa. St. 118, 88
Am. Dec. 497; 1872, Rockford, etc., R. Co. v. Sage, 65 111. 328, 16 Am. Rep.
587; 1880, Citizens' Nat'l Bk. v. Elliott, 55 Iowa 104, 39 Am. Rep. 167; 1890,
Martlndale v. Wilson Cass Co., 134 Pa. St. 348,- 19 Am. St. Rep. 706; 1893,
Crumlish v. Central Imp. Co., 38 W. Va. 390, 45 Am. St. Rep. 872; 1899, St.
L. A. & S. R. Co. v. O'Hara, 177 111. 525; 1899, Henry Wood's Son's Co. v.
Schaefer. 173 Mass. 449, 53 N. E. Rep. 881 ; 1899, Fitchett v. Murphy, 26
Miscl. (N. Y.) 544; 1899, Ravenswood S. & G. R. Co. v. Woodyard, 46 W.
Va. 558, 33 S. E. Rep. 285. Compare, 1899, Mobile J. & K. C. R. Co. v.
Owen, 121 Ala. 505, 25 So. Rep. 612, and cases following,
592, 593.
But persons not stockholders may be compensated for services as officers :
1893, Crumlish v. Cent. Imp. Co., 38 W. Va. 390, 45 Am. St. Rep. 8?2.
And for services rendered outside of their regular corporate duties, there is
an implied promise to pay what they are worth : 1873, Cheeney v. La Fayette
R. Co., 68 111. 570, 18 Am. Rep. 584; 1878, Santa Clara Min/Assn. v. Meredith, 49 Md. 389, 33 Am. Rep. 264; 1884. New Orleans Co. v. Brown, 36 La.
Ann. 138, 51 Am. Rep. 5; 1890, Wood v. Lost Lake Mfg. Co., 23 Ore. 20, 37
- Tenn. Ch. App.
Am. St. Rep. 651; 1897, Reeve v. Harris,
, 58 S. W.
Ky.
, 49 S. W. Rep.
Rep. 658; 1899, Louisville, etc., Assn. v. Hegan,
796; 1899, Kenner v. Whitelock, 152 Ind. 635, 53 N. E. Rep. 232; 1900, Bassett
,61 Pac. Rep. 791; 1900, Flynn v. Columbus Club,
Cal.
v. Fairchild,
21 R. I. 534, 45 Atl. Rep. 551.

-

Sec. 599.

Same.

(b) Strict rule.
See
Note.

Ellis v. Ward,

See note preceding

ec. 600.

case.

Same.

REEVE ET
1897.

509, supra, p. 1729.

111.

137

IN THE COURT

OF

S.

AL. v.

HARRIS ET

AL.

CHANCERY APPEALS OF TENNESSEE.

W. Rep.

50

658-661.

[Bill filed to settle the affairs of

a manufacturing company.
One
intervened and filed a claim for services as treasurer of the company ; this was referred to a master, who reported, allowing the claim ;
the corporation excepted, and on a hearing the chancellor disallowed
it upon the ground that no compensation was provided for by any bylaw or resolution of the stockholders or directors.
H. then fifled a
claim for services performed while treasurer outside his duties as such.
This was partly allowed by the chancellor, and the corporation assigns this as error.]
NEIL, J. * * * The state of the law upon this subject is cor" The authorities
rectly set forth in Beach Priv. Corp., as follows:
are not uniform upon the question of the right of executive officers of

H.

1
Statement much abridged.
aries of officers is given.

Only the part of the opinion relating to sal-
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It has been held in
corporation to compensation for their services.
Illinois and in Pennsylvania that a treasurer can not, in the absence of
any contract agreement, recover a salary from the corporation for his
In Iowa, an officer of a corporation can reservices rendered to it.
cover payment only where there is a special contract therefor, and it
is there held that no contract to pay for his services can be implied as
So, in a lower court in New York, it was
aga'mst the corporation.
said that one is not necessarily entitled to a salary from the fact that
he was chosen secretary of a corporation, and rendered services as
such, especially where the facts rebut the presumption of -a promise of
a

The New York case, however, was reversed in the court
payment.
of last resort, wnere the ground was taken that, if the secretary were
neither a director nor a stockholder, an agreement to compensate him
for his services would be presumed from the fact of his appointment.
And this is probably the general rule in respect of executive officers
other than the president or vice-president of the company."
Section
200.
See, also, 2 Cook Stock. Stockh. and Corp. Law,
657, and
notes thereto; Kilpatrick v. Bridge Co., 49 Pa. St. 118; Gridley v.
Railway Co.. 71 111. 200; Bank v. Elliott, 55 Iowa 104, 7 N. W.
470; Crumlish's Admr. v. Improvement Co., 38 W. Va. 390, 18 S.
E. 456, 4? Am. St. Rep. 872, 881-883, an( * authorities there cited.
In the case last cited the reason of the rule is thus quoted, with ap" The rule is just as
proval, from Kilpatrick v. Bridge Co., supra:
applicable to presidents and treasurers and other officers as to direct*
*
*
ors.
It is well the law is so. Corporate officers have
ample opportunities to adjust and fix their compensation before they
render service, and no great mischief is likely to result from compelling them to do so. But if, on the other hand, actions are to be maintained by corporate officers for services which, however faithful and
valuable, were not rendered on the foot of an express contract, there
would be no limitation to corporation liabilities, and stockholders
would be devoured by officers."
See, also, Ten Eyck v. Railroad
Co. (Mich.), 3 Lawy. Rep. Ann. 378, and notes (s. c. 41 N. W.
905), and Brown v. Silver Mines (Colo. Sup.), 30 Pac. 66.
But it is also true that a corporation official rendering services to
the corporation outside of the scope of his official duty, and not required thereby, may recover compensation therefor upon a promise
implied from facts and circumstances, even though he be a director in
the corporation.
Association v. Meredith, 49 Md. 389; i Mor. Priv.
Construction
Corp.,
Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 U. S. 98, n Sup.
508;
Ct. 36. * * * (The court found that the only work H. performed
outside his duties of treasurer was acting as a member of a committee
to measure and report upon a stock of lumber purchased by the company, but there was no proof as to the value of these services, and,
therefore, dismissed the petition of H.)
Note.

See note,
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Sec. 601 a.
See supra, Rights and duties of the corporation, p. 914,
supra, Liabilities of the corporation, p. 1236, et seq.

ARTICLE I.
Sec. 602.

I. Notice

NOTICE TO THE CORPORATION.
to a director.

FAIRFIELD SAVINGS BANK
rS8i.

et seq.;

v.

ISAAC CHASE. 1

IN THE SUPREME

JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE.
Rep. 226-230, 39 Am. Rep. 319.

72

Maine

PETERS, J. A notice to a bank director or trustee, or knowledge
obtained by him, while not engaged either officially or as an agent or
attorney in the business of the bank, is inoperative as a notice to the
bank. If otherwise, corporations would incur the same liability for
the unofficial acts of directors that partnerships do for the acts of partners, and corporate business would be subjected oftentimes to extraorCarry the proposition, that notice to
dinary confusion and hazards.
a director is notice to the bank, to its logical sequence, and a corporation
might be made responsible for all the frauds and all the negligences
pertaining to its business of any and all its directors not officially employed. Any one director would have as much power as all the
directors.
A single trustee or director has no pow rer to act for the institution
It is the
that creates his office, except in conjunction with others.
board of directors only that can act. If the board of directors or
trustees makes a director or any person its officer or agent to act for
it, then such officer or agent has the same power to act, within the
authority delegated to him, that the board itself has. His authority is in
such case the authority of the board. Notice to such officer, or agent, or
attorney, who is at the time acting for the corporation in the matter in
question, and within the range of his authority or supervision, is notice
to the corporation. Abbott's Trial Ev. 45, and cases in note; Fulton
Bank v. Canal Co., 4 Paige 127; La Farge Fire Ins. Co. v. Bell, 22
Barb. 54; National Bank v. Norton, i Hill (N. Y.) 578; Bank of
1

Facts sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Arguments omitted.

602

THE CORPORATION AND OUTSIDE PARTIES.

U. S. v. Davis,

Hill (N. Y.)

2

Hill (N. Y.) 454; North River Bank

263; Ins. Co. v. Ins.

Co.,

10

1 76 1

v. Aymar,

3

Md. 517; Bank v. Payne,

Smith v.
25 Conn. 444; Farrell Foundry v. Dart, 26 Conn. 376;
South Royalton Bank, 32 Vt. 341 ; Washington Bank v. Lewis, 22
Pick. 24; Commercial Bank v. Cunningham, 24 Pick. 270; Housatonic Bank v. Martin, i Met. 294; i Pars. Con. *77 ; Story Agen.,
140; South. Law Rev. N. S., vol. 6, p. 45; Hoover v. Wise, 91
U. S. 308.
Another question arises in the case before us. It appears that
Brown's knowledge of a previous conveyance was acquired anterior
to his employment by the bank, if employed by the bank at all, and
not during or in the course of his employment on their account.
The
question is, whether a principal is bound by knowledge or notice
which his agent had previous to his employment in the service of the
principal.
The negative of
Upon this question the authorities disagree.
been
maintained
in
the question has
uniformly
Pennsylvania and some
In the late case of Houseman v. The Building
other of the states.
Association, 81 Pa. St. 256, it was said, that "notice to an agent
twenty-four hours before the relation commenced is no more notice
than twenty- four hours after it has ceased would be." But we think,
all things considered, the safer and better rule to be that the knowledge of an agent, obtained prior to his employment as agent, will be
an implied or imputed notice to the principal, under certain limitations and conditions, which are these:
The knowledge must be
present to the mind of the agent when acting for the principal, so
fully in his mind that it could not have been at the time forgotten by
him ; the knowledge or notice must be of a matter so material to the
transaction as to make it the agent's duty to communicate the fact
to his principal ; and the agent must himself have no personal interest in the matter which would lead him to conceal his knowledge
from his principal, but must be at liberty to* communicate it. Additional modification might be required in some cases.
These elements appearing, it seems just to say that a previous notice to an agent is present notice to the principal.
The presumption
that an agent will do what it is his right and duty to do, having no
personal motive or interest to do the contrary, is so strong that the
law does not allow it to be denied.
There may be instances where
the rule operates harshly; but, under the rule reversed, many frauds
could be easily perpetrated.
Of course, the knowledge must be that
of a person who is executing some agency, and not acting merely in
some ministerial capacity, as servant or clerk.
For instance, if in the
present case Brown had merely taken the acknowledgment of the
deed to the bank, or had transcribed the deed as a clerk or copyist,
such acts would not have imposed a duty to impart his knowledge to
the bank.
But if employed to obtain the title for the bank by a deed
to be drawn by him for the purpose, that would place the transaction
within the rule.
Notice of the existJones Mort. (2d ed.),
587.
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ence of an unrecorded mortgage upon the property to an officer emTucker v.
ployed to make an attachment, is notice to the plaintiff.
Tilton, 55 N. H. 223. In the case before us, Brown, it is claimed
by the defendant, was employed by the bank to make an instrument
Brown knew that such
to convey a title from a person to the bank.
It would be his duty to so inform his client.
person had not the title.
He would be likely to do so. He had no motive not to do it. The
We think such a
law conclusively presumes that he did inform him.
case comes reasonably within the rule, though it is not so marked a
case as it would be if Brown had been employed by the bank to ascertain if the grantor had the title, and if he had, then to make the deed.
The general rule or principle touching this case, guarded by the
cautions and conditions stated, is supported by the later English cases,
although the earlier English cases went the other way, is also the law
of the United States Supreme Court, and is, we think, sustained by
a preponderance of opinion in the state courts where the question has
Fuller v. Bennett, 2 Hare 394 ; Dresser v. Norbeen discussed.
wood, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 466; Rolland v. Hart, L. R. 6 Ch. App.
678; The Distilled Spirits, n Wall. 356; Hovey v. Blanchard, 13 N.
H. 145; Hart v. The Bank, 33 Vt. 252; Suit v. Woodhall, 113 Mass.
391; National Bank v. Cushman, 121 Mass. 490; Anketel v. ConLawrence
verse, 17 Ohio St.
; Hoppock v. Johnson, 14 Wis. 328;
v. Tucker, 7 Maine 195; Jones Mort. (2d ed.),
584, and following section and notes. Many other cases, on both sides the questions,
will be found cited and reviewed in a learned article in the Amer.
Law Reg. (Phila.) New Series, vol. 16, p. i.
An application of this rule to the facts of this case requires the verdict to be set aside. S. S. Brown, while a trustee of the Fairfield
Savings Bank, had actual knowledge that John W. Chase had deeded

ii

cei'tain land to Isaac

Chase.

Knowing that fact, he

as an attorney

wrote and took the acknowledgment of a mortgage of the same land
from John W. Chase to the bank, and the mortgage was recorded
first. The question was whether the bank had knowledge of the prior
The pro forma ruling that the
deed when the mortgage was taken.
knowledge of Brown was sufficient notice to the bank to overcome
the legal effect of the fact that the mortgage was recorded before the
deed, irrespective of the further question whether Brown was, at the
time of making the mortgage, acting as an attorney in the business
It is contended
and employment of the bank or not, was erroneous.
that the evidence shows that Brown was acting for the bank. But the
fact being at least questionable, it should have been passed upon by
the jury.
Exceptions sustained.
Appleton, C. J., Walton, Barrows, Danforth and Symonds, JJ.,
concurred.

In 1893, Bard v. Pennsylvania, etc., Ins.
See note, 39 Am. Rep. 322.
Note.
Co., 153 Pa. St. 257, 34 Am. St. Rep. 704, it is held that notice to a director is
not notice to the corporation. Notice must be given to an executive officer.
But notice given to the board of directors at a regular meeting is sufficient
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(1840, Bank of Pittsburgh v. Whitehead, 10 Watts. (Pa.) 397, 36 Am. Dec. 186,
note 186. See, also, note 6 So. Law Rev. 816;.
And a director is not charged
with notice of the contents of the corporate books (1878, In re Wincharn
Shipbuilding Co., L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 329). Notice to a single shareholder or
corporator is not notice to the corporation (1893, Mercantile Nat'l Bank v.
Parsons, 54 Minn. 56, 40 Am. St. Rep. 299); but notice to all the shareholders
or members seems to be sufficient (1854, Wilson v. McCullough, 23 Pa. St.
440, 62 Am. Dec. 347).
See, further, next case and note.

Sec. 603. Same.
(2)
in his own behalf.

THE MERCHANTS'
1893.

Notice

to an officer, when he is acting

NATIONAL BANK OF KANSAS CITY
APPELLANT.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI.
527, 35 Am. St. Rep. 770.

114

v.

LOVITT,

Mo. Rep. 519-

[Suit by the bank upon a note for $2,900, executed by Lovitt, and
The
payable to one Dickinson, and by him indorsed to the bank.
defense was a failure of consideration, the facts showing that the note
had been given to Lovitt by Dickinson for fifty-five shares in the
stock of a corporation about to be formed, and which Dickinson
The corporation never was formed.
agreed to deliver to Lovitt.
Before the note was due Dickinson, who was vice-president of the
bank, presented it to the bank to be discounted, and the president of
the bank agreed to take the note, the figuring up of the discount being left to Dickinson, who did this, gave the slip to the discount clerk,
indorsed and delivered the note to the bank, obtained credit for the
amount, and then checked it out.
The defendant asked the court to
declare that the knowledge of Dickinson, as vice-president of the
bank, was the knowledge of the bank. The court refused, and this
is the error assigned.]
BLACK, P. J. * * * It is a general rule that notice of a fact
acquired by an agent while transacting the business of his principal is
notice to the principal, and this rule applies to banking and other corporations as well as to individuals. It is the duty of the agent to communicate to the principal information thus acquired, which would affect the rights of the principal ; and the presumption is that the agent
has performed his duty in this behalf.
If he has not, still the principal should be charged with notice of the existence of such facts thus
coming to the knowledge of the agent, because he selects his own
agent, and confides to him the particular business.
Story on Agency,
But
the
reason
of
acts for himthe
rule
when
the
ceases
agent
140.
self and not his principal, and the rule itself ought not to apply in
such a case.
Accordingly it has been held by this court that knowledge of an unrecorded deed acquired by officers of a corporation,
Statement abridged, arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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while acting for themselves and not for the corporation, will not be
imputed to the corporation.
Johnston v. Shortridge, 93 Mo. 227.
An officer of a banking corporation has a perfect right to transact
his own business at the bank of which he is an officer, and in such a
transaction his interest is adverse to the bank, and he represents himself and not the bank.
The law is well settled that, when an officer
of a corporation is dealing with it in his individual interest, the corporation is not chargeable with his uncommunicated
knowledge of
facts derogatoiy to his title to the property which is the subject of the
transaction.
210; i Waterman
Taylor on Corporations (2d ed.),
on Corporations,
135; Frenkel v. Hudson, 82 Ala. 158; Wickersham v. Zinc Co., 1 8 Kan. 481 ; Barnes v. Gas Light Co., 27 N.
Eq. 33; Innerarity v. Bank, 139 Mass. 332.
In the case last cited, the court, after speaking of the general rule
that knowledge of the agent will be imputed to the principal, says:
"But this principle can have no application where the director of the
bank is the party himself contracting with it.
In such case the position he assumes conflicts entirely with the idea that he represents the
* * A director offering a note, of which
*
interest of the bank.
he is the owner, for discount, or proposing for a loan of money on
collateral security alleged to be his own property, stands as a stranger

J.

to

it."

Now, the facts

set up to defeat a recovery here are the facts constituting the transaction between Dickinson and the defendant, in which
Dickinson did not represent or profess to represent the bank, and with
which the bank had nothing whatever to do. Again, Dickinson in
offering the note to the bank for discount represented his own personal interest, and Clark, the president, represented the bank. In
this particular transaction Dickinson occupied the position of any other
customer, and not that of an officer or agent of the bank, and it must
follow from the principles of law before stated that the bank is not
chargeable with his knowledge of uncommunicated facts affecting his
title to the note.
But it is said Dickinson fixed and figured out the
The
discount, and hence he did in point of fact represent the bank.
note bore interest at the rate of 8 per cent, per annum from date, and
it appears Dickinson calculated interest at that rate from the nth of
July, the date of the transaction, to the 27th of that month, the date of
the note, and deducted as discount $10.30, but it does not appear who
The broad fact redesignated the amount of discount to be paid.
bank
mains that the president of the
agreed to take the note, and that
the bank accepted the discount as figm'ed up by Dickinson, and the
fact, if such it was, that he may have designated the rate of discount
in the first instance is wholly immaterial.
He nevertheless represented
his own interest in the entire transaction.
The judgment is affirmed.

All

concur.

Note. The 'general rule is that knowledge casually obtained, or obtained
by or given to an officer who is at the time engaged in a private transaction,
is not notice to the corporation. 1891, Koehler v. Dodge, 31 Neb. 328, 28
Am. St. Rep. 518; 1891, Lyndon Mill Co. v. Lyndon, etc., Inst., 63 Vt. 581,
25 Am. St. Rep. 783; 1892, Gemmell v. Davis, 75 Md. 546, 32 Am. St. Rep.
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v. Denise, 50 N. 'J. Eq. 482, 35 Am. St. Rep. 788 ; 1893,
v. Clark, 139 N. Y. 307, 36 Am. St. Rep. 705; 1893, Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Clark, 139 N. Y. 314, 36 Am. St. Rep. 710; 1895, Kearney Bank v. Froman, 129 Mo. 427, 50 Am. St. Rep. 456; 1896, Franklin Min.
Co. v. O'Brien, 22 Colo. 129, 55 Am. St. Rep. 118; 1898, Seaverne v. Presbyterian Hospital, 173 111. 414, 64 Am. St. Rep. 125 ; 1898, Dorr v. Life Ins. Co.,
71 Minn. 38, 70 Am. St. Rep. 309, note 312; 1898, Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U.
S. 133; 1898, Hart Pioneer Nurseries v. Coryell, 8 Kan. App. 496, 55 Pac.
Rep. 514; 1898, Wells, Fargo & Co. Express v. Walker, 9 N. M. 170, 456, 54
Pac. Rep. 875; 1898, Red River Valley L. & I. Co. v. Smith, 7 N. Dak. 236;
Dry Goods Co., 99 Fed. Rep. 971.
1900, Brennan v. Emery-Bird-Thayer
If the proper officer knows stock is pledged, this is the knowledge of the
corporation. 1895, Guarantee Co. v. East R. T. Co., 96 Ga. 511,' 51 Am. St.

412 ;

1893,

Rep.

150.

Willard

Casco Nat'l Bank

Sec. 604.

Same.

(3)

Notice to

CITY OF DENVER ET
1898.

a servant.
AL v.

SHERRET.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, COLORADO.

88 Fed. Rep. 226-237.

[Action by Sherret against the City of Denver and the Denver
Consolidated Electric Company to recover damages for injury caused
by the falling of an electric light pole, alleged to be due to the negligence of both defendants ; judgment was rendered for the plaintiff,
and errors were assigned relating, among other things, to the charge to
the jury as to what constituted notice of the condition of the pole to
the electric company.]
SHIRAS, DISTRICT JUDGE. * * * It is also assigned as error
that the court charged the jury that if Blake, who was an employe
of the company, made an examination of the pole and discovered its
rotten and unsafe condition, this would be notice to the company,
whether he communicated this knowledge to any officer of the company or not. Blake was called as a witness for the defendant in error,
and he testified that he was in the employ of the electric company as
a lamp trimmer, it being his duty to trim the lamps, report the "outs,"
to report any
put in carbons, and to report anything that looked bad
He further testified that, some ten or fifteen days before the
trouble.
pole fell which injured Miss Sherret, he examined the pole with a
screwdriver and found " that the screwdriver went in pretty easy, and
showed that it (the pole) was pretty rotten, "and that he was led to
He furmake this examination from seeing the pole " wriggling."
ther testified that he notified Mr. Sheridan, a storekeeper of the company, of the fact he had discovered. Mr. Sheridan, being called as a
witness, denied receiving such report or notice from Blake. Mr. McSparrin, the line foreman of the electric company, and Mr. Barker, the
superintendent, both testified that it was Blake's duty to report any
defects he discovered either to the foreman or the superintendent,
1

and

Statement abridged. Only the part of the opinion relating to notice is given.
2 WIL. CAS.
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both witnesses denied receiving any report of the defect in the pole
from him. The court instructed the jury that if they found from the
evidence that Blake did in fact examine the pole and discover the unsafe condition thereof at the time he stated in his testimony, this would
be notice to the company, regardless of the question whether he
made a report thereof to any other employe or officer of the company,
and this ruling is assigned as error.
In Thompson on the Law of Corporations (volume 4,
5195)
the rule is stated to be to the effect that, in order to bind the principal, the notice must be communicated to one whose duty it is "to act
for the principal upon the subject of the notice, or whose duty it is to
communicate the information either to the principal or to the agent
whose duty it was to act for him with regard to it."
Counsel for the
in
the
brief
state
their
electric company,
views of the rule
submitted,
" The general rule with reference to the
in the following terms:
question of notice is that notice to the agent is notice to the principal,
if the agent comes to a knowledge of the facts while he is acting for
the principal ; but this rule is limited by the further rules that notice
to the agent, to bind the principal, must be within the scope of the
and cite in support thereof the cases of The Distilled
employment,"
In the
Wall.
Spirits,
356, and Rogers v. Palmer, 102 U. S. 263.
former case it was said that "the general rule that a principal is bound
by the knowledge of his agent is based on the principle of law that it
is the agent's duty to communicate the knowledge which he has respecting the subject-matter of negotiation, and the presumption that
he will perform that duty"; and in the latter case it was held that
knowledge obtained by an attorney when conducting a case for a client was imputable to the latter.
As already stated, Blake testified that it was his duty to report anything wrong or any trouble he discovered about the poles or wires of
the company ; and none of the witnesses for the electric company deny
this fact, but, on the contrary, McSparrin and Barker, the line foreman and superintendent, both testify that it was Blake's duty to report to them any defects he might discover; and thus it was made
plain that it was Blake's duty to take notice of defects in the plant
coming under his observation, and to report the same when discovered; and therefore, within the doctrine of the authorities cited, the
court was justified in instructing the jury that knowledge acquired by
Blake of the defective condition of the pole, when he was going his
rounds as employe of the company, would be imputable to the company, because it was proven beyond dispute that it was his duty to
take notice of defects, and, noticing them, to make report thereof. * * *
Reversed on other grounds.

ii

- N. H.
Note.

See note to preceding case.
, 50

Atl.

103.

1901,

Wheeler v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co.,
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INDIVIDUAL RELATIONS.

TITLE I.

INTERNAL

CHAPTER

RELATIONS.
18.

RELATION OF PROMOTERS, SHAREHOLDERS,

OFFICERS,

ETC., AMONG THEMSELVES, TO ONE ANOTHER,

AND TO OTHER PARTIES.

I.

SUBDIVISION
Sec. 605.
See

I.

Relation to the state.

Walker v. Devereaux,

supra, p. 390.

Sec. 606.

2.

PROMOTERS.

4

Paige Ch. 229, supra, p. 385, note,

Relation to the

corporation,

the

shareholders,

and to third parties.
See, supra,

Sec. 607.
EGBERTS
1895.

3-

506-511,

607.

Relations among themselves.

MANUFACTURING COMPANY

IN THE SUPREME

COURT
33

2

v.

FRANK SCHLICK, Ju. 1

OF MINNESOTA.

62

Minn. Rep.

-334-

START, C. J. Briefly stated, the facts in this case are that certain
individuals, named in the second subdivision of the findings of the
trial court, on February 28, 1893, associated themselves together for
the purpose of forming a corporation, securing a bank charter, and
engaging in a general banking business as the Metropolitan National
Bank of St. Paul, Minnesota, under the provisions of the national
bank act. They executed articles of association, elected directors
and other necessary officers.
The defendant was not one of the
original associates or promoters, but on April 15, 1893, he was chosen
a director to fill a vacancy caused by a resignation, accepted the position, and thereafter acted as a director of the association.
The board
of directors, through its authorized committee, entered into certain
contracts, for the association, and in its proposed coiporate name, for
the lease of a banking office, and for a safe and the necessary office
furniture and fixtures.
The contract for the latter was made with the
1

Arguments and part of the opinion omitted.
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plaintiff on April 19, 1893, by a committee appointed by the board
After the perof directors before the defendant became a member.
formance of this contract by the plaintiff on its part, the promoters
voluntarily abandoned their purpose of becoming a corporation and
engaging in the banking business, and are not, and never were, a cor-

All the promoters except the defendant and one other have
poration.
paid their proportionate share of the amount due to the plaintiff on
its contract, and have been released by it from further liability therefor.
This action was brought to recover from the defendant the balance
The trial court found
of his proportionate share of such amount.
substantially the foregoing facts, and other evidential facts, and ordered judgment for the plaintiff for the amount claimed, and from an
order denying his motion for a new trial the defendant appealed.
i. The plaintiff claims that the defendant is liable as a partner, but
we neither discuss nor decide this question, for we are of the opinion
that the defendant, in any view of the case, is liable upon the general
principles of contract and agency. Where individuals associate themselves for the purpose of promoting and organizing a corporation for
the pecuniary gain of its members, and act as an association by electing directors and other officers, through whom contracts are made for
and in the name of the proposed corporation, and they afterwards
abandon their purpose to form a corporation, their relation, one to
the other, as to persons dealing with the association, if not that of
partners, is that of agent and principal, and each will be individually
liable upon any contracts of the association which he directly or indirectly authorized or ratified.
The defendant vigorously challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
to bring him within this rule, and insists that there is no evidence in
the case that he ever authorized or ratified the contract in question.
Where, as in this case, it is shown that the defendant was one of several promoters, and that all acted as a body by a board of directors,
and that he was a member thereof, only slight additional evidence
is required to establish prima facie his authorization or ratification of
contracts made in the name of the association, whether they were
We are of the opinion
made before or after he became a director.
that the evidence in this case is ample to sustain the material findings
of fact and conclusion of law of the trial court to the effect that the
The evidence shows
defendant is liable on the contract in question.
that the promoters organized by electing a board of directors, president, cashier, and other officers, and that business was done by the
board, which kept a correct record of all its acts and proceedings.
At its first meeting, March 2, 1893, a committee on location and
fixtures for the bank, consisting of three directors, one of whom was
This committee reported at the second
the cashier, was appointed.
meeting held on March 15, the terms upon which a lease of an office
could be secured, and the board accepted the terms, and authorized
The defendant, at the third meetthe committee to take the lease.
a
and at this meeting the comdirector,
ing, April 15, was elected
mittee reported in favor of accepting the bid of the plaintiff for office
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fixtures, and the report was referred back to it to enter into and complete the contract in their discretion, which it did on April 19. The defendant was not present at any of these meetings, but at the fourth meeting, April 1 8, he was present as a director, and was present at all subsequent meetings, acting as a director, up to and including June 29,
1893. At the first meeting at which he was present as a director the
board voted $300 for advertising purposes, and at the last one it appointed a committee to arrange the best possible adjustment of all
claims against the bank under contracts with various parties.
This evidence tends to show that the promoters were acting as an
association under a common name, promoting the common enterprise
by and through its representatives, its directors, of whom the defendant was one ; and that he had ample opportunity to learn, and in the
exercise of ordinary prudence and sagacity in the discharge of his
duties as director he must have learned, by an examination of the
The records
records, of the making of this contract here in question.
were not voluminous, and afforded the defendant the ready means to
learn all about the association he was acting for.
It is for this reason
that the records of the proceedings of the board of directors prior to
the time the defendant became a member thereof were properly received
in evidence, notwithstanding his objection to such evidence.
The
articles of association, although not executed by the defendant, were
correctly received in evidence, for they show the organization and
purposes of the association, of which he afterwards became a member.
If the defendant knew that the board of directors had made and were
making contracts for and in the name of the association as a reasonable, necessary work of preparation for doing a general banking business when it should become incorporated, and with such
knowledge he continued to take an active part in the proceedings of
the board as a director, without objection or protest, it would tend to
show a ratification of this contract.
If he did not do so, and had no
notice of the making of this contract, it was a matter peculiarly within
his own knowledge; yet he was not a witness on the trial, and there
is no explanation of his significant silence.
The undisputed evidence
tends further to show that he knowingly and without objection,
No
through a third party, paid to the plaintiff $50 on this contract.
further evidence was necessary to make a strong prima facie case
*
*
*
against the defendant.

Affirmed.
Compare, 1822, Holmes v. Higgins, 1 B. & C. 74; 1846, Reynell v.
Lewis, 15 M. & W. 517; 1852, Bright v. Hutton, 3 H.'L. Cas. 340; 1853, Batard v. Hawes, 2 El. & B. 287; 1859, Hamilton v. Smith, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 32;
1889, Abbott v. Hapgood, 150 Mass. 248; 1902, Friedman v. Janssen,
Ky.
Note.

, 66

S.

W.

752.
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SUBDIVISION

I

Sec. 608.

.

II.

608

OR MEMBERS.

SHAREHOLDERS

Relation to the state.

of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518,
supra, p. 78 ; Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 Wall. 454, supra, p. 754;
Ireland v. The Palestine, etc., Co., 19 Ohio St. 369, supra, p. 757.
See Trustees

Sec* 609.

2.

See supra,

Sec. 610.

3-

(a)
See White

Relation to the corporation, promoters and officers.
513-585, 506-512, 586-604,

607.

Relation among themselves.
Right to good faith upon the part of
scribers to the stock.
Mountains

R. R.

v. Eastman, 34

N. H.

fellow-sub-

124,

supra,

P- 75 8 -

.

Same.

(b) Right to equality, in proportion to stock owned.
(i) In management:
Voting, see supra,
534-541; notice of meetings, seeStowev.
Wyse, 7 Conn. 214, supra, p. 835.

Sec. 612.

Same.

(2) In the distribution of profits:

See supra,

Sec. 613.

542-549.

Same.
(3 )

See supra,

In contributing to the corporate enterprise
and uniformity of calls
519, 520, 521.

:

:

Equality
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Sec. 614.

t)

Same,

(4)

In discharging corporate debts.

DAVID BENNISON ET
1898.

1 77 1

AL. v.

IN THE SUPREME

JOSEPH H. McCONNELL ET

COURT

OF NEBRASKA.

56 Neb.

AL. 1

Rep.

46-50.

1

*

;

it

a

;

it,

RAGAN, C. In 1888 there was organized, under the laws of this
state, and domiciled in the city of Omaha, a corporation known as
the Guaranty Loan and Investment Company.
This corporation was
organized for the purpose of negotiating real estate loans and guarantying the payment of the same. The authorized capital stock of the
company was subscribed ; but it seems that each subscriber paid in
cash for only a part of the stock subscribed for by him, giving his
The
note to the corporation for the remainder of the subscription.
corporation made a loan of $6,500, which was secured by a mortgage
It then sold this mortgage loan to one Bertha Zenupon real estate.
ner, guarantying the payment of the same.
The loan was also guarantied by John L. Kennedy and David Bennison and other stockholders of the corporation.
Early in 1889 the stockholders of the corporation held a meeting, and. because it was not doing a profitable busiAt this meeting the stockholdness, resolved to wind up its affairs.
ers set aside out of the company's funds $500 to be used in defraying
future expenses, "liabilities, and needs."
They also levied an assessment of three per cent, on the stock for the purpose of covering losses
of the company, and by resolu'tion returned to each stock subscriber
seventy-seven per cent, of the cash paid by him on the stock for which
he had subscribed, called in the outstanding stock and canceled
and surrendered to each stock subscriber his note.
Some four years
after this, Bertha Zenner foreclosed the mortgage which had been
sold to her by this investment company, and caused the property
but the proceeds of the sale were not sufficient
mortgaged to be sold
to satisfy the mortgage debt, and Zenner took
deficiency judgment
L.
and David Benagainst the investment company.
Kennedy
John
nison, two of the stockholders in said investment company, and who
had guarantied the payment of the mortgage sold by
to Zenner,
then advanced the money to Zenner on the deficiency judgment, and
An execution
took from her an assignment thereof to themselves.
was then issued on this deficiency judgment against the investment
and thereupon Bennison
company, and returned wholly unsatisfied
and Kennedy brought this suit in equity in the district court of Douglas county, making the investment company and all the stock subscribers and creditors thereof parties.
The object of Bennison and Kennedy's action was to recover from their co-stock subscribers their proportionate share of the mortgage debt which they had paid to Zenner.
The district court dismissed Bennison and Kennedy's petition and
*
*
they have appealed.
Part of opinion omitted.
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*

*

it

;

it,

The district court placed its denial of the appellants' right to re" That the plaintiffs in this action
cover on the following grounds:
are estopped from recovering from the defendant stockholders of the
Guaranty Loan and Investment Conpany by reason of their participation in the distribution of the assets of the company, whereby they
received back the notes which they had given in payment for their
stock, and whereby a large amount of money then on hand was distributed to stockholders who had made cash payments upon their
stock, a number of said stockholders being now without the jurisdiction of this court and are not parties to this suit."
But we can not
We are of
agree to this conclusion of the learned district judge.
opinion that the rule of estoppel should not be enforced against the
If at the time the stockappellants under the facts of this case.
holders met and resolved that the incorporation should go out of business, distributed its assets, called in its stock, and returned the stock
subscribers' notes, this deficiency judgment against the corporation
had been in existence, then it may be that Bennison and Kennedy,
being stockholders of the investment company, could not afterward
have purchased this judgment and enforced it against their co-stock
subscribers.
But when the distribution of the assets of the investment company took place, this deficiency judgment was not in existence ; and it was not at that time within the contemplation of any of
the stockholders that the corporation or themselves would be called
The appellants by parupon to make good the company's guaranty.
ticipating in this distribution of the investment company's assets
neither said nor did anything nor omitted to say or do anything which
These stock
caused any other stock subscriber to change his status.
subscribers have not been injured by the distribution made of the investment company's assets ; and, if it can not be said that they have, we
are unable to see how the appellants are responsible for such injury.
Again, it must be remembered that the distribution made of the assets
of the corporatibn by the stockholders did not impair Zenner's right,
after the corporate property was exhausted, to call upon the stock
subscribers to the extent of their unpaid stock subscriptions for the
All the stock subscribers, after the
satisfaction of her judgment.
exhaustion of the corporate property, became liable to the extent of
their unpaid stock subscriptions to her for this deficiency judgment.
The appellants were among these unpaid stock subscribers and therefore liable for this deficiency judgment; and, by paying the judgment and taking an assignment of
they succeeded to the rights
Zenner had and, since she could enforce the judgment against the
stock subscribers, any one of them liable might pay the judgment,
and enforce contribution against his co-subtake an assignment of
*
Gardner,
scribers.
v.
Pelt
(Van
54 Neb. 701.)
Re-versed.
Accord: 1895, Brown v. Merrill, 107 Cal. 446, 48 Am. St. Rep. 145;
A. Assn. 122 Cal. 669, 55 Pac. Rep. 689; 1900.
Myers v. Sierra Val. S.
Moxham v. Grant, 69 L. J. Q. B. 97, 81 L. T. R. (N. S.) 431, infra, p. 1794.
has been
But in the case of the payment of the statutory penal liability
it

&

Note.

1898,
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said no contribution can be enforced (1889, Sayles v. Brown, 40 Fed. Rep. 8;
but see, 1900, Moxham v. Grant, 69 L. J. Q. B. 97, infra, p. 1794). It is said,
also, that when shares have, by agreement, been issued at a discount, those
who have paid up the amount agreed can not be called upon by other shareholders to pay more (1894, In re Ry. Time Tables Pub. Co., L. R., 1895, 1 Ch.
Div. 255; 1897, Peter v. Union Co., 56 Ohio St. 181, 46 N. E. Rep. 894).

Sec. 615.

D

Same.
(

5 )

In distribution of corporate assets upon dissolution.

RE ANGLO-CONTINENTAL
1898.

CORPORATION

LIA, LIMITED.

1

OF WESTERN

AUSTRA-

IN THE ENGLISH CHANCERY DIVISION.
67 L. J. Ch.
T.
R.
L.
Wkly.
Rep.
157,
46
(N. S.)
78
413.
*

*

*

179,

In the present case 100,000 shares of 203. each
had been issued with 55. paid up, and afterwards 25,000 more were issued in one block to persons who paid them up in full. The company is
After providing for the debts and expenses, a
now in liquidation.
considerable sum remains in hand, and the question is on what principle that sum is to be distributed, or rather returned, to the shareholders? In Ex parte Maude (23 L. T. R. 749) there was in the company's articles of association no express provision for regulating the
distribution of surplus assets. The shares had been unequally called up.
After payment of the debts and expenses there remained a balance as
in the present case, insufficient for the return of all the paid-up capital.
It was held that the real question was not how profits should be distributed, but how a loss should be borne, and that the uncalled capital
was as much liable to be called up for the purpose of meeting this
loss as it would have been for the payment of debts; and the result
was that after the capital account had been equalized by calling up,
or treating as called up, unpaid capital, the whole resulting balance
was returned in proportion to the amount paid up on each share, that
is to say, to its whole nominal amount, and every shareholder lost
In Birch v.
the same percentage of what he had subscribed and paid.
no
T.
R.
there
was
for
L.
again
regulating
provision
Cropper (61
621)
The shares had been unequally called
the distribution of surplus assets.
up. There was a large real surplus, t. e., more than enough for the
North, J., and the court of appeal
return of all the paid-up capital.
held that the paid-up capital must b'e returned and the balance distributed in proportion to the amount which had been paid up on the
several classes of shares ; but the House of Lords held that, after the
capital paid had been returned, the balance must, in the absence of
any different provision in the memorandum or articles of association,
be distributed in proportion to the nominal amounts of the shares.
Thus all equities were satisfied by the return of all capital paid, and
there remained no reason for treating the surplus assets as held for
WRIGHT,

1

J.

Arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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CORPORATION.

the shareholders in proportions differing from the amounts of their
shares.
In the present case there is an express provision regulating the distribution of assets after payment of debts and expenses.
Article 129
provides as follows:
(His lordship read the article and continued:)
The shares are all of the same nominal amount of 205., but they are
unequally paid up. There is no real surplus; for, although there is
more than enough to pay the debts and expenses, there is not enough
for the return of the capital paid up. Under these circumstances,
and under this article, there is no room for the application of Birch v.
Had there been a real surplus after returning
Cropper (ubi sup.~).
the paid-up capital, it would, by the express terms of the contract,
have been divisible, not according to the nominal amounts of the
shares, but according to the amounts which had been paid up (subject
to correction in respect to any arrears and advances), and which, therefore, had presumably had the principal merit in earning the profit.
There being no such surplus, however, but a deficit on the whole adventure, there still remains an equity to be satisfied in order to equalize the loss, and the uncalled capital ought on general principles to be
called up or treated as called up so far as is necessary for that purI think that it has
pose, unless the contract has otherwise provided.
It says that in the event which has occurred
not otherwise provided.
the surplus assets shall be distributed so that the losses shall be borne
by the members in proportion to the capital paid (subject to correction in cases of arrears or advances) on the shares held by them respectively at the commencement of the winding up. What is the meaning
of the term " capital paid? "
On a somewhat similar article it was held by the court of appeal,
in Re Sheppard's Corn Malting Company Limited, Ex parte Lowenfeld (70 L. T. R. 3), that these words did not mean merely capital
paid before the liquidation or called up in the liquidation for payment
of debts and expenses, but must be held to include capital called up or
treated as called up for the very purpose of satisfying equities in the
So in the present case. There is not in truth a
repayment of capital.
The loss and the mitigation of
surplus at all, but a mitigation of loss.
it are, I think, intended to be distributed equally, but subject to equalization of the capital account, and not irrespectively of such equalization ; and a call (actual or in account) is necessary for that equalization which is an essential part of a winding-up unless excluded by the
contract; and 'the amount of that call must be included in the words
" capital paid or which ought -to have been paid." The same thing
may be put in another way, as implied in the term "surplus assets,"
So used, the term priwhen used in relation to this subject-matter.
ma facie implies that the capital account must have been properly
equalized before any balance can exist for a general and equal return
Then, how are the figures
of capital, or for equal division of profits.
In
the
to be worked out?
liquidator must proceed to
my judgment
actual
or
as
the case may require) on
make a call (either
imaginary,
If all
to
the
the 100,000 shares sufficient
equalize
capital account.
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the shareholders are solvent, the call in this case will be one of 35.
The amount
per share on the 100,000 shares, making them 8s. paid.
so obtained would be sufficient to repay to the holders of the 25,000
shares 125. per share, leaving them also with 8s. paid.
The assets
in hand will then be divided equally amongst the whole 125,000
shares, and the ultimate loss of each shareholder will be the difference
between the 8s. and the dividend so paid.
Assuming the moneys in
hand to be ^25,000, then each of the 100,000 shareholders will, as a
result of the whole, have received back is., and each of the 25,000,
i6s. , and every shareholder will have lost 45. per share.
The only
alternative that I can see is to hold that every 55. paid up is to abate
equally ; but on this alternative the result will be just the same as on
the other, if " paid up " is to have the meaning assigned to it in Re
Sheppard's Corn Malting Company Limited, Ex parte Lowenfeld
(ubi sup.) ; that is to say, is to include sums called up for equaliza*
*
*
tion of the capital account.
Note.
See, 1880, McGregor v. Home Insurance Co., 33 N. J. Eq. 181 ; 1884,
Gordon's Exm. v. Richmond, etc., R., 78 Va. 501; 1888, Re Bridgewater
Nav. Co., 58 L. T. R. (N. S.) 866; 1889, Birch v. Cropper, 61 L. T. R. (N.
S.) 621; 1891, Re Bridgewater, etc., Co., 64 L. T. R. (N. S.) 576; 1894, In re
Railway Time Tables Pub. Co., L. R. (1895) 1 Ch. Div. 255; 1897, Hamlin v.
Continental Trust Co., 47 U. S. App. 422, supra, p. 785 ; 1897, Peter v. Union Co.,
56 Ohio St. 181, 46 N. E. Rep. 894; 1898, In re Driffleld Gaslight Co., 67 L. J.
Ch. 247,78 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 162,46 Wkly R. 411; 1900, Moxham v. Grant,
69 L. J. Q. B. 97, 81 L. T. R. ,N. S.) 431, infra, p. 1794; 1900, MacMurray v.
Sidwell, 155 Ind. 560, 80 Am. St. Rep. 255, 58 N. E. 722.

Sec. 616.
See
36

In case of preferred shareholders.

v. Continental Trust
826, supra, p. 785.

Hamlin

L. R. A.

Note.

Same,

Co., 47 U. S. Appeals 422,

See preceding case and note.

O

Sec. 617. Same,
(c) Right to good faith upon the part of the
Power of the majority :
majority :
In the management of the corporate affairs:
( i)
See Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, supra, p. 1323; Wallace v. Pierce- Wallace Pub. Co., 101 Iowa 313, 63 Am. St. Rep.
389, supra, p. 1747; Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450, supra, p. 1716.
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Same.

THE FARMERS' LOAN AND TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE, RESPONDENT, v. THE NEW YORK AND NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY ET AL., RESPONDENTS, AND A. H. HOLMES
AND A. R. PICK, APPELLANTS. 1
1896.

IN THE COURT

OF

APPEALS OF NEW YORK.
Rep. 410-439.

150

N. Y.

[Appeal from judgment of general term of the supreme court in
favor of plaintiff, in a suit to foreclose a second mortgage upon the
property of the railway company, given by it to plaintiff as trustee
to secure the payment of the second mortgage of $3,200,000, providing that after one year's default in payment of the interest, and upon
the written request of the holders of $2,000,000 of the bonds, foreThe capital stock of the
closure proceedings should be instituted.
railway company was $3,000,000 common and $6,000,000 preferred.
Default having been made, representatives of the holders of over
$2,000,000 of the bonds directed foreclosure proceedings to be commenced.
None of the defendants interposed a defense, and Holmes
and

Pick,

as shareholders,

representing

about

20,000 shares, on be-

half of themselves and others, were allowed to put in an answer
charging that the foreclosure proceedings were brought in pursuance
of an unlawful plan and combination between the New York Central
& H. R. R. Co. and others to render the stock of the N. Y. & N.
R. Co. valueless, and secure its property for the benefit of the New
York Central. And in order to do this it had purchased a large
amount of the bonds, and a majority of the stock of that company,
and had procured the resignation of three of the directors of that company, appointed others in their places, and displaced two other prominent officers thereof and filled their places by those in the employ of
the New York Central, and thereby had obtained control of the N. Y.
& N. Co., and had prevented it from taking measures for its safety, or
save its default in payment of interest, all of which had been done
"to secure the property through such foreclosure for its own benefit
and at a price much less than its true value."]
*
*
*
MARTIN, J.
(After holding that the evidence fairly
established the foregoing facts, proceeded:)
On the trial the appellants sought to prove that after the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company became the owner of such stock and
bonds, and while its officers were in substantial control of the
New York and Northern Railway Company, they declined to aca fund
cept traffic from other roads that would have produced
with which to pay the interest due on the bonds in question ; that the
income of the road which should have been employed to pay such interest was used for other and improper purposes; and that such action
caused the inability of the New York and Northern Railway Com1

Statement much abridged

;

arguments

and part of opinion omitted.
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panyto pay the interest and thus cure its default. This evidence was
rejected as immaterial and the appellants duly excepted.
In determining the correctness of the rulings made by the trial court,
it becomes necessary to determine incidentally whether a corporation,
purchasing a majority of the stock of another competing corporation,
may thus obtain control of its affairs, cause it to divert the income
from its business, or to refuse business which would enable it to pay
the interest for which it was in default, and then institute an action in
equity to enforce its obligations for the purpose of obtaining control
of its property at less than its value to the injury of the minority stockOr, in other words, whether a
holders, and they have no remedy.
court of equity, with those facts established, would lend its aid to
such a stockholder by enforcing the mortgage and decreeing a foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged premises, at its request, in its beIf it would, then the rulings
half, and to accomplish such a purpose.
of the trial court were proper ; if not, then the appellants were entitled to prove those facts, and it was error to reject the evidence.
In Gamble v. Q. C. W. Co. (123 N. Y. 91), in discussing a similar question, Judge Peckham, in effect, said that, although it is not
every question of mere administration or of policy upon which there
might be a difference of opinion that would justify the minority in
coming into a court of equity to obtain relief, yet, where the action
of a majority of the stockholders of a corporation is fraudulent or oppressive to the minority shareholders, an action may be maintained by
the latter, where the contemplated action of the majority is so far opposed to the interests of the corporation as to lead to a clear inference
that such action is with an intent to serve some outside purpose, regardless of the consequences to the company and inconsistent with its
*
*
*
interests.
(Quoting to the same effect from Pondir v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R.
Co., 72 Hun 384, 389; Barr v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. Co., 96 N.
Y. 444 ; Sage v. Culver, 147 N. Y. 241 ; Meyer v. Staten Island R.
Co., 7 N. Y. St. Rep. 245 ; Ervin v. Oregon, R., etc., Co., 27 Fed.
Rep. 625; Wright v. Oroville M. Co., 40 Cal. 20; Meeker v. Winthrop Iron Co., 17 Fed. Rep. 48; Goodin v. Cincinnati & W. C.
Co., 18 Ohio St. 169; Jackson v. Ludeling, 21 Wall. 616; Menier
v. Hooper's Tel. Works, L. R. 9 Ch. App. 350; Gregory v. Patchett, 33 Beavan 595.)
" The law requires of the majority of the stockholders the utmost
good faith in their control and management of the corporation as regards the minority, and in this respect the majority stand in much the
same attitude towards the minority that the directors sustain towards
all the stockholders.
Thus, where the majority are interested in another corporation, and the two corporations have contracts between
them, it is fraudulent for that majority to manage the affairs of the
A court of equity will
first corporation for the benefit of the second.
intervene and protect the minority upon an application by the latter."
The
662, p. 945.)
(2 Cook on Stock and Stockholders (3d ed.),
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same principle is stated in i Morawetz on Private Corporations (2d
ed.,
529); i Beach on Private Corporations ( 70); 2 Bigelow on
Frauds ( 645), and Beach on Mod. Eq. Juris. (
132, 686).

Hackettstown Nat'l Bankv. D. G. Yuengling Brewing Co. (15 N.
541) is to the effect that every delegation of power implies that it will be honestly exercised, and in that case it was held
that the evidence offered upon the trial presented a question of fact
for the jury whether a consent, given in pursuance of a resolution
passed by the majority of the bondholders of a corporation, extending the time of payment of the principal and interest of its bonds,
was given in good faith in the common interest of all, or amounted
to an unwarranted
exercise of the power of the majority because
given in the interest of one bondholder, with a view of enabling him
to compel the minority bondholders to sell their bonds on such terms
as he might dictate.
While the question in some of the cases cited arose between stockholders and directors and officers of a company who as such held a
position of trust as to the former, still, where, as in this case, a majority of the stock is owned by a corporation or a combination of individuals, and it assumes the control of another company's business

Y. Law Jour.

and affairs through its control of the officers and directors of the cor-

poration, it would seem that for all practical purposes it becomes the
corporation of which it holds a majority of stock, and assumes the
same trust relation towards the minority stockholders that a corporation itself usually be#rs to its stockholders, and, therefore, under such
circumstances, the rule stated in the Sage and other similar cases
applies to majority stockholders who control the affairs of the company, as well as to its directors or officers.
It is a controlling maxim that a court of equity will not aid parties
in the perpetration or consummation of a fraud, nor give any assistance whereby either of the parties connected with the betrayal of a
trust can derive any advantage therefrom.
(Farley v. St. Paul, Min"It is a sound
neapolis and Manitoba Ry. Co., 4 McCrary 138.)
principle, that he who prevents a thing being done shall not avail
himself of the non-performance
he has occasioned."
(Fleming v.
Gilbert, 3 Johns. 527, 531; United States v. Peck, 102 U. S. 64;
Dolan v. Rodgers, 149 N. Y. 491.)
The principle of these authorities renders it quite obvious that a
corporation, purchasing a majority of the stock of another competing
one, can not obtain control of its affairs, divert the income of its business, refuse business which would enable the defaulting company to
pay its interest, and then institute an action in equity to enforce its
obligations, for the avowed purpose of obtaining entire control of its
Such a course of
property, to the injury of the minority stockholders.
action is clearly opposed to the true interests of the corporation itself,
plainly discloses that one thus acting was not influenced by any honest
desire to secure such interests, but that its action was to serve an outside purpose, regardless of consequences to the debtor company, and
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a manner inconsistent with its interest and the interest of its minority
stockholders.
The respondents, however, contend that the doctrine of the authorities cited is not controlling in this case, but that the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company had a right to purchase a
majority of the stock and bonds of the New York and Northern
Railway Company, for the express purpose of obtaining control of
the affairs of the latter for its own use and benefit, and to thus acquire
its property at less than its actual value, to the injury of the minority
stockholders, and that such stockholders had no remedy in law or in
equity to protect themselves against such action of the majority stockholder, although it diverted the income which should have been
applied to the payment of such interest to other and improper purposes, and refused business which would have enabled the defaulting
In other words, the claim of the recompany to pay its interest.
spondents is, and the general term in effect held, that the purpose for
which the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company
obtained a majority of the stock and bonds of the New York and
Northern Railway Company is entirely immaterial, and that notwithstanding the existence of such a purpose, a court of equity will aid
To sustain this contention they cite
them in enforcing the mortgage.
Morris v. Tuthill (72 N. Y. 575), Phelps v. Nowlen (72 N. Y. 39),
Chenango Bridge Co. v. Paige (83 N. Y. 178), Ramsey v. Erie R.
Co. (8 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 174), Clinton v. Myers (46 N. Y. 511),
Simpson v. Dall (3 Wall. 460), Oglesby v. Attrill (105 U. S. 605),
Adler v. Fenton (24 How. (U. S.) 407), and Beveridge v. N. Y. E.
*
*
*
Y.
R.

in

Co.

(ii2N.

i).

cases and holding they were clearly distinguishable from the case at bar, proceeds:)
As we have already seen, there are circumstances under which the
majority stockholders occupy substantially the same relation of trust
towards the minority as the board of directors would occupy towards
the stockholders it represents, and hence, where there are corrupt
motives, personal interest or fraud, the case cited is an authority to
sustain the conclusion which we have already reached.
That any person or corporation authorized to do so might have purchased the bonds of the New York and Northern Railway Company,
and have rigorously enforced them by a sale of its property, there can
be no doubt.
They might also have purchased the stock of the company and thus have become the owners of both, and, while such owners, might have enforced the liability of the company upon its bonds,
so long as they acted in good faith and their purpose was proper ; but
when the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company
purchased the stock and bonds in question, thus obtaining a controlling
interest in the affairs of the New York and Northern Railway Comto serve
purpose enpany for the avowed purpose of destroying
was organized, and in hostility to
tirely outside of that for which
owed
becomes clear that as such stockholder
duty to the minority
stockholders, that the law implied
qruasi-trust upon its part, and
a

a

it

it

it

it,

a

it,

(After reviewing these
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a

a

it

a

it

a

it

a

it

in the destruction of that corporathat
court of equity will not aid
held
tion and
confiscation of its property, although
majority of
its stock and the required amount of its bonds.
Hence, we are of the opinion that the court erred in rejecting as
immaterial evidence offered by the appellants to show that, after the
New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company became the
owner of a majority of the stock and bonds of the New York and
Northern Railway Company, and while its officers were in control of
declined to accept traffic
the latter corporation and its affairs,
from other roads which would have produced
fund with which to
pay the interest that was due; that the income of the road, which
should have been employed to pay such interest, was used for other
and improper purposes, and that such action upon the part of the
majority stockholder occasioned the inability of the company to pay
the interest and cure the default.
To the rejection of this evidence
the defendants excepted.
We think many of these rulings were erroneous, and that the appellants had the right to make the proof offered,
related to the transaction of the business of the New York
so far as
and Northern Railway Company during the time the New York
Central and Hudson River Railroad Company owned
majority of
its stock and controlled its affairs, and for the error in those rulings
*
*
*
the judgment should be reversed.
(Remainder of opinion on other points omitted.)

Or

,

&

8

1;

See, 1858, Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R. Co., 30 Pa. St. 42, 72 Am.
Note.
Dec. 685; 1876, Taylor v. Earle,
1884,
Hun (N. Y.)
v. Bracken Co.,
81 Ky. 593; 1898, Rogers v. Nashville, C.
St. L. R. Co., 91 Fed. Rep. 299;
1898, Henshaw v. Salt River Valley Canal Co.,
54 Pac. Rep.
Ariz.
577; 1900, Dickerman v. Northern Trust Co., 176 U. S. 181.

In selling all the corporate property.

Sec. 619.

Same.

FORRESTER

ET AL. v. BOSTON AND MONTANA CONSOLIDATED
COPPER AND SILVER MINING COMPANY.
1

(2.)

IN THE SUPREME

COURT OF MONTANA.
544-57

3

1898.

21

Mon. Rep.

-

J

[Suit by Forrester and another, as shareholders of the mining company, to enjoin the voting or allowing to be voted any of the stock of
the company in favor of disposing of its assets to another company of
the same name, and from ratifying or adopting any act or deed of conThe company was organized in Montana
veyance for that purpose.
in 1887, with 150,000 shares of $25 each, and had at the time suit
was brought $30,000,000 worth of property, very little debt, and an
income of $3,000,000 annually. Its mining operations were carried
on in Montana, but its general offices were in New York City. Most of
Statement

much abridged,

rehearing omitted.

part of opinion and all of the opinion on the
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the 1887 shareholders resided in the eastern states, and it was difficult and expensive to hold stockholders' and directors' meetings in
Montana, as required by the laws of that state. To meet this difficulty, the directors April 5, 1898, incorporated and organized in New
York a new company with the same name, and same amount of stock
and shares, with offices in New York, to take all the property of the
Montana company, assume all that company's liabilities, and issue
to it all the shares of the new company to be exchanged share for
share of the stock of the old company, or, at the option of the shareholder, to receive $130 per share of the old stock.- April 6, 1898, the
directors executed a conveyance to the new company for this purpose,
and called a meeting of all the shareholders, to be held June 6, 1898,
to ratify the same.
May 31, 1898, the written consent of the holders
of 131,036 shares of the old company was obtained, and a new deed
in conformation of the former was executed, similar to it in every
way, except agreeing to pay $170 per share to dissenting shareholders.
Plaintiffs became owners of one hundred shares each of stock April
8, 1898, having purchased the same from shareholders who had not
consented to the proposed sale.
They brought suit June 4, after formal protest against the proposed transfer, to enjoin the ratification of
the same by the shareholders at the meeting to be held June 6; 131,036 shares were represented at this meeting, all in favor of, and
would have been voted for, the ratification of the sale, if the injuncThe company offered to
tion pendente lite had not prevented.
give bond to the amount of $50,600, or any other sum, to purchase
plaintiffs' two hundred shares of stock at the market value at any
The
time, and pay all damages resulting from the proposed action.
court declined to accept the bond, and granted the injunction, and
this is the order appealed from.
At the time statutes provided as follows:
Section 492. "The board of trustees of any mining company
*
*
*
shall not have power to sell, lease, mortgage, or otherwise
of
the whole or any part of the mining ground, quartz mills,
dispose
*
*
*
etc., unless they shall first call a meeting of the
smelters,
*
*
* for the purpose of submitting to them the
stockholders
propositions to sell, etc. * * * Section 493. If * * * stockholders shall appear in person or by proxy representing not less than
*
*
*" and "at least two-thirds of
three-fourths of all the shares,
all the shares of the capital stock" shall be voted in favor of selling,
etc., " the chairman and secretary of such meeting shall make a certificate showing" the details of the vote, sign and verify the same under oath, enter the same at length on the corporate records, and a
copy thereof, under the corporate seal, duly attested and acknowledged, shall be recorded in the office of the recorder of every county
wherein any such property is situated.
Section 494. "If a sale shall
*
* * the
be made, as above provided, of the whole property,
be
dissolved,"
shall
corporation
thereby
etc.]
PIGOTT, J. * * * (After holding that under the circumstances
it was unnecessary to state or prove that plaintiffs had exhausted their
remedies within the corporation, or for them to have been owners of
2 WIL. CAS.

39
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at the time of the alleged transaction; also, that there was
no error in the court below finding that plaintiffs were acting in good
faith, and were not guilty of delay; also, there was no error in refusing to accept the bond, proceeds:) The question to be decided is
involved in the statement that the directors and the holders of more
than 87 per cent, of the shares of the Montana company are attempting to dispose of its entire property and business to the New York
company, in exchange for the capital stock of the latter, against
The defendants claim that
the objection of minority stockholders.
the power so to transfer exists, while plaintiffs assert that the action
intended to be taken is ultra vires the corporation, employing that
term in its strict sense as designating acts which are beyond the powers of a majority, or of any number less than all, of the stockholders,
as against the minority.
At common law, neither the directors nor a majority of the stockholders have power to sell or otherwise transfer all the property of a
going, prosperous corporation, able to achieve the objects of its creaThis doctrine is
tion, as against the dissent of a single stockholder.
firmly established by the authority of adjudged cases, and rests upon
the soundest principles. (Abbott v. Am. Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578 ;
People v. Ballard, 134 N.'Y. 269, 32 N. E. Rep. 54, 7 Am. and Eng.
Ency. Law (2d ed.) 734-736; Cook on Stock and Stockholders,
Our attention is called
667, and the numerous cases there cited.)
to certain decisions which are said to recognize a contrary doctrine,
but examination discloses no conflict of opinion among the various
Treadwell v. Manufacturing Co., 7 Gray 393,
courts of last resort.
A short extract
is typical of the cases relied upon by the defendants.
from the opinion (page 405) will serve to illustrate the error into
which counsel has fallen: "Upon the facts found in the case before
us, we see no reason to doubt that the vote of the majority of the
stockholders for the sale of the corporate property, and the closing of
the business of the corporation, was justified by the condition of their
affairs. Without available capital, and without the means of procuring
it, the further prosecution of their business would be unprofitable, if
not impracticable. Under these circumstances, it was in furtherance
of the purposes of the corporation to pay their debts, close their affairs and settle with their stockholders on terms most advantageous
to them."
In that case, as in every one cited by the defendants, the
corporation was unable further to prosecute the purposes for which it
was created.
By the common law, the acts complained of are void. If the stockholders possess the power asserted to reside in them, statutory authority must confer it. Defendants earnestly contend that such power is
given by an act entitled "An act in relation to alienation of mining
property by corporations," approved March 9, 1887, and carried into
the fifth division of the compiled statutes of 1887, as sections 492, 493
*
* *
and 494.
Defendants argue with much vigor, and some plausibility, that
these sections constitute an enabling act, which grants to stockholders

their shares
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owning two-thirds of the shares the power to dispose of all the property of a solvent and prosperous corporation despite the protest of
Now, by the common law, a solvent and prosother stockholders.
with the unanimous consent of its stockholdcorporation
may,
perous
ers, dispose of its entire assets, but may not do so without such unanimity. Again, at the common law, a corporation which is insolvent
or unable to execute the purposes for which it was created may, by
its directors (or, at least, by the directors and a majority of its stockholders), sell or assign all its property when the best interests of the
stockholders would be served thereby.
In the proper pursuit of its
business, and within the purposes for which it was created, a corporation may, by the common law, sell, lease or mortgage any part of its
property, though the minority, or perhaps the majority, of the stockholders dissent.
Have the statutes quoted altered the common law in the respects
mentioned ? It is to be borne in mind that the common law, so far as
it is applicable and of a general nature, and not in conflict with the
constitution or with special enactments of the legislative assembly, is
the law and rule of decision in this state, and is in full force until reSuch is the declaration of section 201, division 5,
pealed by statute.
of
statutes
It is to be observed, also, that a statute is
compiled
1887.
not presumed to work any change in the rules of the common law beyond what is expressed in its provisions, or fairly implied in them, in
order to give them full operation. For the written law to effect a repeal of those doctrines of the common law which are not unsuited to
our condition, the intent of the legislature to bring about the change
must be clear; and, if the intent be not fairly evident, the common
*
*
*
law remains the rule of decision.

By section 450, division 5, compiled statutes of 1887, it is provided
that the stock, property and concerns of an industrial corporation shall
be managed by trustees ; and section 482 of the same division declares that every such corporation has power, among other things, "to
hold, purchase and convey such real and personal estate as the purSections 450, 482, 492, 493
poses of the corporation may require."
In our opinand 494, supra, should be read together as one statute.
ion, sections 492 to 494, inclusive, were intended for the protection of
in a mining corporation.
stockholders
The legislative assembly
seemed to be of the opinion that the interests of stockholders in such
corporations were not sufficiently guarded by the principles of the
common law, under which a sale, mortgage or lease, or an assignment
for the benefit of creditors, could be made by the trustees or directors
alone, or by them with the consent of the majority of the shares, provided the exigencies of the corporation required such disposition to be
made ; and for that reason, doubtless, it enacted sections 492, 493 and
By section 492 the trustees are declared to be without
494, supra.
power to sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise dispose of certain mining
property of their corporation, without first calling a meeting of the
stockholders ; and by section 493 it is provided that, if two-thirds of
the stockholders vote in favor of the proposition submitted, a certifi-

1784

FORRESTER V. BOSTON

&

M.

C. C.,

ETC.,

CO.

619

cate of that fact shall be made and recorded in the office of the
Neither of
recorder of the county in which the property is situate.
these sections declares that the trustees or corporation may sell at all.
In section 494 there is, at most, an implication only that a sale may be
If a
made if not less than two-thirds of the shares consent thereto.
sale of the whole of the property results from proceedings conducted
in conformity with the provisions of sections 492 and 493, the corporation is thereby dissolved, and its affairs must be wound up
according to the provisions of section 489 by a division among the
stockholders of the money and other property that shall remain after
the payment of the debts and necessary expenses.
Where, under sections 450 and 482, the directors would have the
right, at least with the consent of a majority of the shares, to convey
or otherwise dispose of the property mentioned in section 492, they
may not now do so without the consent of the stockholders owning
two-thirds of the shares. As we have said, at common law the directors (at least with the consent of the majority of shares) may sell
the entire corporate property when the exigencies of a waning business require such action ; while, to sell the entire property of a going,
prosperous corporation, the consent of all the stockholders is necessaIn view of the language of the statutes quoted, there is strong
ry.
reason to believe that the legislative assembly intended to prevent the
alienation of the mining property specified in section 492, in any and
all cases, without the consent of two-thirds of the shares. The language
used in that section, being negative and prohibitory, and not permissive, also favors the conclusion that the statute was intended as a limitation upon the common-law powers possessed by the directors and a
majority of the shareholders, and not as a grant of power. The statute operates, not as an enlargement, but as a restriction, of corporate
power. Another consideration may be suggested as lending support
A transfer or other disposition of all its property
to this conclusion :
will not, ipso facto, dissolve a corporation, although the practical effect thereof may be to defeat the object of its organization.
This is so,
because ownership or possession of property is not essential to corporate existence.
(Gans v. Switzer, 9 Mont. 408, 24 Pac. Rep. 18; 9

Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.) 565.)

A flourishing mining corporation may desire to sell o otherwise
dispose of its entire assets for the purpose of reinvesting the proceeds
in a new enterprise within the corporate purposes, or of acquiring
other mining property. Such sale or other disposition might be made
at common law with the unanimous consent of the stockholders, without working a dissolution ; nor would a dissolution be produced by
the sale or assignment of the whole property of an insolvent corporation made by the directors, either with or without the consent thereto
of all the stockholders therein.
It does not seem that the legislature,
when it enacted sections 492 to 494, supra, intended that the dissolution of a prosperous mining corporation, able to continue its existence
and to accomplish the objects of its creation, should be brought about
It was, however, the
by the mere fact that it has sold all its assets.
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evident design of the legislature that a sale, made under sections 492
and 493, of the entire property of an insolvent mining corporation,
or of one unable to perform the objects of its organization, should
effect its dissolution, and that any transfer or disposition other than a
sale would not have such an effect.
There seems to be reason for affording greater protection to stockholders in mining than to those in other industrial corporations. Mining,
of all legitimate enterprises, is probably the most uncertain, and, inMines and mining claims are more subject to suddeed, precarious.
den and unexpected fluctuations in value (or seeming value) than is
any other character of real propeity; and this is true in a peculiar
degree as to those of gold and silver, which in 1887, when the act was
passed, before the copper output of Montana was as considerable as
it has since become, constituted the chief mining interest in the state.
The temptation to sell or dispose of such property unadvisedly or
fraudulently, and the facilities to that end recognized by the common
to prohibit any transfer not consented to
1-aw, induced the legislature
by two-thirds of the shares. * * *
There is another reason why the attempted disposition of the propEven if it Ije conceded that the
erty is ultra vires the corporation.
act of March 9, 1897, is an enabling act, clothing the directors and
the stockholders owning two-thirds of the shares with power not
possessed at common law, yet the disposition intended to be made is
not one authorized by the act.
Manifestly, the transfer proposed
lacks an element necessary to constitute a sale, namely, a pecuniary
consideration.
To constitute a sale there must, as a general rule, be
in money.
The proposed transaction is, at best,
a consideration
" or
merely an exchange ; and the defendants claim that the expression
otherwise dispose of," used in section 492, operates to confer upon
the corporation the power to exchange as well as to sell the entire
property of the corporation without the consent of every stockholder
therein.
We do not think the general enumeration of the powers by
the terms "sell, lease, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of" operates
either to confer upon mining corporations the power to exchange, or
as a recognition of it as already possessed by other industrial corpora* * *
tions.
It has been suggested that a power of sale must include the power
to exchange, because the greater includes the 'less; but no such
comparison can properly be made, as neither includes the other,
In the event of a sale, properly
and neither is part of the other.
and farrly conducted, whether by public auction, or sealed bids,
or by any other method calculated to produce the best result attainhas an equal right to become the
able, each of the stockholders
purchaser of the whole or any part of the corporate assets, each is
equally interested in obtaining the highest price for the common
property, and each is entitled to an equal pro rata share of the proceeds; but if the holders of any number of shares, however large,
be authorized to exchange the corporate assets for the capital stock
of a foreign corporation, the law furnishes no measure by which to
determine the prudence or wisdom of the exchange, or to test the
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fidelity of those clothed with the power and charged with the duty
If defendants' contention be correct
incident to such proceedings.
that sections 492 and 493 contain a grant of power, these quasitrustees may, when authorized by two-thirds of the shares, determine
to convert the assets into cash and distribute the proceeds among those

beneficially interested ; but they can not change the nature of the trust
estate except in the manner provided by law, and they can then do so
only for the purpose of continuing operations in this state, and not
for the purpose of transferring the corpus of the estate or its owner(Taylor v. Earle, 8 Hun i.)
ship to a foreign jurisdiction.
It is true that, under our laws, the holders of the requisite majority of shares in a mining corporation may determine to abandon the
mining industry, and, for example, embark in a manufacturing enterprise, by amending their charter, and may sell the mining assets and
reinvest in proper purchases for the new corporate object; but these
steps, however important, are part of the internal management of a
domestic corporation, and must be conducted in accordance with our
lawj The power to exchange the corporate property for the capital
stock of a foreign corporation is not incident to these proceedings.
But there seems to be neither a sale nor an exchange nor other disposition of the mining property, within the meaning of the statute. "To
otherwise dispose of" does not signify and include "to give away,"
within the meaning of the statute. The New York corporation is
It has no property. It possesses nothing but a name. Atformed.
tempt is made in the name of the Montana company to convey its
property to the New York company, for which the Montana comIt does not exchange its property
pany receives nothing in return.
for other property. There is, in effect, simply a change of corporate
habitation. So far as stockholders are concerned, they are, perhaps,
permitted to exchange their shares in the Montana company for the
same kind of property in another state, and the laws of Montana for
The statute does not provide that, by a twothe laws of New York.
third vote, stockholders shall exchange their shares for shares in another corporation, or in the same corporation with changed citizenship.
It has no reference to such a scheme. A stockholder, we think, may
not be compelled to take, in lieu of his stock in the Montana corporation, an equal number of shares in the New York corporation, or the
value of those shares; nor can he be compelled to accept payment
for his shares in any other way than that prescribed by the Montana
The Montana
statute on a dissolution of the Montana corporation.
If
company conveys all its property, and gets nothing in return.
the trustees attempt to wind up its affairs, under section 489, supra,
The new company promises to
there would be nothing to distribute.
issue certain of its shares to each Montana stockholder, but we are
unable to see how he can be deprived of his interest in the Montana
Our statutes do not seem to confer
company without his consent.
upon two-thirds of the stockholders of a solvent and prosperous corporation the right to take the citizenship of the corporation to another
* *
*
state, without the consent of all the stockholders.
Affirmed.
Pemberton, C.
Note.

See

J.,

and Hunt,

J.,

concur.

next case and note, and preceding case and note.
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Sec. 620.

Same.

TREADWELL

1856.

AND

ANOTHER

v.

PANY

SALISBURY MANUFACTURING COMAND

OTHERS. 1

IN THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
Gray's (Mass.) Rep. 393-406, 66 Am. Dec. 490.

7

[Bill in equity by Treadwell as trustee under the will of one C.
holding forty shares of stock in the manufacturing company, in order
to obtain the advice of the court as to whether the trustees could,
under the will, exchange stock in the manufacturing company for the
stock of a proposed new corporation by the name of the Salisbury
Mills, which it was alleged had been or was about to be organized
for the purpose of taking the property of the manufacturing company.
It was averred that at a stockholders' meeting it had been voted by
the majority, against the wishes of the minority, and the protest of
one of the plaintiffs, that the officers of the manufacturing company
have authority to sell at public or private sale all the real estate, machinery, etc., as they think will best promote the interest of the stockholders, provided, if a sale is made to a new company the old stockholders shall have a right to take an interest in the new company in
proportion to their holdings in the old company; it averred further
that the directors were about to sell all the real property of the old
much less than it was
company to the new company for $250,000,
worth, take payment therefor in stock of the new company, and divide it among the shareholders pro rata according to their holdings in
the old company, and close up its affairs and surrender its charter.
It averred also that said votes were illegal and void ; also that the directors of the old company were directors of the new, and the sale
would in effect be by trustees in one capacity to themselves in another,
and therefore void.
The answer substantially admitted the allegations of the bill, except as to the invalidity of the acts, and stated that
it was the intention to make the sale for the purpose of paying the
debts, winding up the affairs, and distributing the property, either in
stock of the new company or by payment of cash received from the
sale thereof,
and that the same was " an expedient and just act towards themselves and their creditors that it should be dissolved and
wound up." Evidence was introduced to show the debts were about
$1,000,000, and that the corporation could not go on without raising
two or three hundred thousand dollars; that there was nearly enough
personal property to pay their debts; that the property had never been
appraised, and would not bring nearly $250,000 at auction; and that
" the proposed arrangement was the only proper and feasible course
for the company to pursue, and if the plan was not perfected the
company must stop business."]
1
Statement much abridged.
Arguments omitted.
opinion relating to the one point given.

Only the part of the
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TREADWELL

BIGELOW,

J.

*

SALISBURY*

V.
*

*

MANUFACTURING

CO.
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(After holding the fact that plaintiffs were
trustees under a will, did not give a court of equity jurisdiction of such
But we entertain no doubt of the right of a cora case, proceeds:)
poration, established solely for trading and manufacturing purposes, by
a vote of the majority of their stockholders, to wind up their affairs and
close their business, if in the exercise of a sound discretion they deem it
At common law, the right of corporations, acting
expedient so to do.
by a majority of their stockholders, to sell their property is absolute,
Angell and
and is not limited as to objects, circumstances or quantity.
Ames on Corp.,
127, et seq. ; 2 Kent Com. (6th ed.) 280; Mayor,
etc., of Colchester v. Lowton, i Ves. & B. 226, 240, 244; Binney's
Case, 2 Bland 99, 142. To this general rule there are many exceptions,
arising from the nature of particular corporations, the purposes for
which they were created, and the duties and liabilities imposed on
them by their charters.
Corporations established for objects quasipublic, such as railway, canal and turnpike corporations, to which
the right of eminent domain and other large privileges are granted in
order to enable them to accommodate the public, may fall within the
exception; as also charitable and religious bodies, in the administration of whose affairs the community or some portion of it has an
interest to see that their corporate duties are properly discharged.
Such corporations may perhaps be restrained from alienating their
property, and compelled to appropriate it to specific uses, by mandamus or other proper process.
But it is not so with corporations of a
private character, established solely for trading and manufacturing
Neither the public nor the legislature have any direct
purposes.
These are committed
interest in their business or its management.
solely to the stockholders, who have a pecuniary stake in the proper
conduct of their affairs.
By accepting a charter, they do not undertake to carry on the business for which they are incorporated indefinitely, and without any regard to the condition of their corporate
property. Public policy does not require them to go on at a loss.
On the contrary, it would seem very clearly for the public welfare, as
well as for the interest of the stockholders, that they should cease to
transact business as soon as, in the exercise of sound judgment, it is
found that it can not be prudently continued.
If this be not so, we do not see that any limit could be put to the
business of a trading corporation, short of the entire loss or destruction
of the corporate property. The stockholders could be compelled to
Such a doctrine is
carry it on until it came to actual insolvency.
without any support in reason or authority.
The case of Ward v.
Society of Attorneys, I Collyer 370, cited by the plaintiffs, does not
They were not a trading corporation, nor were their afsupport it.
fairs in an embarrassed condition.
It was the case of a majority of a
corporation attempting to surrender the old charter, and to pervert the
corporate funds to a different purpose, by passing them over to a new
association.
Besides, the questions raised in the case were not finally
determined by the vice-chancellor. They were only considered so far
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necessary to decide the question of granting an injunction
preliminary to the hearing.
Upon the facts' found in the case before us, we see no reason to doubt
that the vote of the majority of the stockholders for the sale of the corporate property and the closing of the business of the corporation was
Without available capital,
justified by the condition of their affairs.
the further prosecution of their
and without the means of procuring
business would be unprofitable,
not impracticable.
Under these
was in furtherance of the purposes of the corporation
circumstances
to pay their debts, close their affairs and settle with their stockholders on terms most advantageous to them.
Sargent v. Webster, 13
it

if

it,

as it was

Met. 504.

a

a

is

a

it

is

Bill dismissed.

I.

See, 1899, Phillips v. Prov. Steam Eng. Co., 21 R.
302, 45 L. R.
Compare preceding case and, 1858, Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R.
Pa. St. 42, 72 Am. Dec. 685, and, 1876, Taylor v. Earle,
Hun (N. Y.)

1.

560.
Co., 30

*

8

Note.

A.

undertook to do.

*

that the defendants

*

a

is

a

a

it

a

a

is

is

a

It

i

I.

a

is

a

is

;

It

a

Nor can we see anything in the proposed sale to
new corporation, and the receipt of their stock in payment, which makes the
not
transaction illegal.
sale by
trustee to himself for his own
benefit
but
sale to another corporation for the benefit and with
the consent of the cestuis que trust, the old stockholders.
The new
stock
taken in lieu of money, to be distributed among those stockholders who are willing to receive it, or to be converted into money
by those who do not desire to retain it. Being done fairly and not
mode of payment for the property of the corporation,
collusively, as
that transaction
not open to valid objection by
minority of the
Co.,
stockholders.
v.
New
R.
Hodges
England Screw
312, 347.
was urged by the plaintiffs that the common law right 'of
corand
close
their business had been taken
poration to sell their property
But we do not think that such
its true
away by St. 1852, ch. 55.
It not restrictive in its terms, but only permissive.
interpretation.
It was intended to provide mode in which the charter of corporation might be dissolved without
resort to the legislature.
But
did not take away the right of
corporation to proceed in the sale of
their property preparatory to surrender of their charter, which
all

Sec. 621.

Same.

(3)

In surrendering the corporate charter.

&

See Mechanics' Bank v. Heard, 37 Ga. 401, supra, p. 877;
P. L. v. Waganer, 71 Ala. 581, supra, p. 880.
chants'

Mer-
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v Sec. 62 la.

Same.

(4)

62 I a

In accepting material amendments.

See Stevens v. Rutland & B. R., 29 Vt. 545, supra, p. 1448;
Sprague v. The Illinois R. Co., 19 111. 174, supra, p. 1454; Buffalo
& N. Y. C. R. v. Dudley, 14 N. Y. 336, supra, p. 1461 ; Durfee v.
Old Colony, etc., R. Co., 5 Allen 230, supra, p. 1462; Zabriskie v.
Hackensack R., 18 N. J. Eq. 178, supra, p. 1466.
Note.

Rep.

586.

See, also, 1899, Pronick v. Spirits Dist. Co., 58 N.
Of. 1900, Looker v. Maynard, 179 TJ. S. 46.

Sec. 622.

623.

See

Eq.

97, 42

Atl.

of shareholders and creditors.

infra, Creditors and Shareholders,

See

6C.

Relation

4.

J.

670-727.

Relation of shareholders to third parties.

5.

Rider v. Fritchey, 49 Ohio St. 285, infra, p. 1994.

Note.

SUBDIVISION

<rx

I. Relation

Sec. 624.
See supra,

Sec. 625.

2.

(a)

(i)

la.

See, 1901, Boddy v. Henry,

III.

, 52

L. K. A.

769.

OFFICERS.

to the corporation.

586-601.

Relation to shareholders,
Rights of shareholders.

When the right to vote, or to receive dividends or
books, or to transfer shares, is interfered with, see supra,
534, 542, 55 1 . 554, 5 68 -

Individual:

to inspect
5 2 9>

Same.
(2) Collective, only secondary in case the
not, or will not, or can not, act.
does
corporation

Sec. 626.

See supra,

579 594.
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Sec. 627.

(b) Rights of officers.
( i ) To deal with shareholders

:

officers are not trustees

for shareholders.

JAMES G. DEADERICK ET
1874.

AL. v. R. T.

WILSON ET

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF TENNESSEE.
Rep. 108-141.

8

AL. 1

Baxter (67 Tenn.)

a

1

a

is

a

.

;

i

&

is

is

a

is

a

a

is

is

it,

[Bill by Deaderick and some other stockholders, and others who
had before suing sold their stock in the East Tenn., V. & G. R. R.
Co., against Wilson and others constituting the board of directors,
charging them both officially and individually with conceiving and executing a scheme of speculating in the stock of the railroad company
to the damage of the other owners and to the gain of themselves.
Other facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.]
*
*
FREEMAN, J. *
Stripped of all verbiage, this charge is,
simply, that officers and directors of a railroad corporation have purchased stock of parties owning small amounts of stock at below the
par value of the stock, and below the value which they foresaw it
and that they so purchased
would command
that is, in the future
because of their superior knowledge of the real value of stock, or
their superior foresight as to its future value, which knowledge was
obtained by means of their official positions.
on which relief
The legal proposition that underlies
sought,
and the charge made,
that the officers and directors of
corporation of this kind are trustees for the stockholders, or individual owners
of the stock, and, as such, can not be allowed to make
profit out of
their trust the rule applicable to all trustees in courts of equity. On
the correctness and accuracy of this proposition all this branch of the
case made by the bill turns, assuming for the present, but not deciding, that complainants have presented themselves properly before the
To this question we now address ourcourt to obtain this relief.
selves.
Numerous cases, both in England and this country, have settled
in some sense one of
that the position of director
fiduciary character; in most of them directors are stated to be trustees for the
true in some particulars
stockholders.
That this
beyond all question. See cases of Overend, Gurney
Co. v. Gibb, 3<i vol. Eng. R.
Redf. on
717; Liquidators v. Coleman, 6th vol. Eng. R. 2633;
Railway 576, and numerous authorities cited in printed brief of Shields,
Counsel, pp. 29, 30, 31 also cases collected in Board of Commissioners
of Tippecanoe County v. Reynolds, June number Amer. L. Reg., p.
To call direct376, decided by supreme court of Indiana [44 Ind. 509]
ors of
corporation trustees for the stockholders, however, without
limiting the use of this term by the facts of the cases in which the
calculated to mislead
question has been presented for adjudication,
and induce
very wrong conclusion as to the liabilities of officers, or
Statement

abridged.

Part of opinion omitted.

JAMES G. DEADERICK

1792

V.

R.

T.

WILSON.
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As said by Judge Sharswood in
agents, of corporations.
Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. n, Am. Rep., vol. 10, p. 689: "It is by
no means a well settled point what is the precise relation which directors
sustain to stockholders.
They are undoubtedly said in many authorities to be trustees, but that, I apprehend, is only in a general sense,
as we term an agent or any bailee intrusted with the care and manIt is certain they are not techagement of the property of another.
nical trustees."
This statement of the learned judge, we think, is correct beyond
The officers and directors of a railroad corporation do not
doubt.
have the legal title of the corporate property vested in them as such,
to be held by them for the use of the company or the stockholders ;
much less have they the title to or control of the individual shares of
rather

stockholders.

The corporation, the legal entity, owns the franchise and cqrporate
property. The officers and directors are the agents through whom
this legal entity acts, and, in the performance of the duties pertaining
And so with reference
to their positions, represent the corporation.
to the stockholder, who, by virtue of his ownership as his individual
property, is entitled to the dividends properly accruing to him as
owner of such shares of stock, the officers and directors are under
obligations to the faithful management and the use of the corporate
franchises and property, so as to secure him the benefit of such dividends.
ces, in

In both

cases they are responsible,

under certain circumstan-

proper proceeding in a court of equity, and probably in some
cases in a court of law, for any wrong conduct in violation of the
rights of either the corporation or injuriously affecting the interests in
In a word, they are agents
which the stockholder is concerned.
charged with the performance with fidelity of the duties that grow out
of their position, as defined by the powers, objects and purposes of
To this extent is their position fiduciary,
the charter of the company.
of
and for breaches
good faith in the performance of these trusts they
a

*
*
*
are held responsible.
sustain
the argument of complainants, and
But do these principles
branch
of the case?
bill
on
this
It is, first, that
the theory of their
ten
to
thousand, sold by defendants,
the shares of stock, amounting
Thomas A. Scott, or Security Company, be declared null and void,
Second, if this is not
for reasons that will be referred to hereafter.
held
be
to
account
to
the
stockholders from
done, then that defendants
on
stock
what
whom they purchased,
they purchased from them, for
and
sale ; and this on the ground
said
all profits realized by
purchase
were
in such a sense as to
directors
trustees
that the officers and
of
stock
the
shares
owned
forbid their purchasing
by individual stockrules
that
under
the
holders, except
stringent
govern as between trusor
trust,
in
a
as
between principal and
technical
tee and beneficiary
and
client.
agent, attorney
It suffices to say, first, on this proposition, that we have been pointed to no case that holds such a doctrine, and we feel sure none can be
found going this length.
We are totally unable to see the application
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The officers and directof the principle invoked to the case in hand.
ors of a corporation are charged with no trust, nor fixed with any
duty, as far as we can see, as to the sale or disposition or transfer in
They have
any way of the shares of stock owned by the shareholder.
no power to control its sale or transfer, are charged with no duty in
reference to such sale or transfer, by reason of their official position.
*

*

*

a

a

if

it,

It certainly is not in the line of the duty of the president, directors, or other officers of a railroad company, to sell the shares of
If not, then as such they can be
stock owned by the shareholders.
charged with no breach of trust or duty in connection with said transfer or sale growing out of their official relation to the company, for
no such duty is imposed or trust assumed to be violated. Nor can it
be said that such officers may not, as individuals, purchase and hold
stock in the corporation of which they are members ; certainly not,
No such prohibition is
unless prohibited so to do by the legislature.
In fact, we believe it is a general qualification in all corposhown.
rations of this character that the directors and officers shall own stock,
and in most cases, in order to be eligible to offices of a certain charThere being no limit
acter, to own some considerable amount of it.
as to the amount which he may own, as a matter of course he may
he may do this, he must necessarily do so from
and
purchase
stockholder.
Whether he owns much
an owner, and that must be
or little can have no possible bearing on the question of his right to
After all, the simple question involved
sell, nor of the other to buy.
is, whether the officers and directors are free to purchase stock from
To this
shareholder in the corporation on the same terms as others.
there can be but one answer, that is, they may, unless prohibited by
legislative restriction.
The true relation between

a

is

shareholder

a

is

a

directors and officers of
corporation
thus stated by Chief Justice Shaw in the case of
Smith v. Hurd, 12 Met. 371, cited in A. L. R., vol. 13, p. 378:
no legal privity relation or immediate connection between
"There
bank, in their individual capacity, on the
the holders of shares in
The directors
one side, and the directors of the bank on the other.
are not the bailees, the factors, agents, or trustees of .such individual
and

stockholders."

Yer. 490,

10

Yer.

9

a

a

is

is

is

is

a

is

In the language of the supreme court of Indiana, in the case from
cited, "stock in
which the above quotation
corporation held by
his own private property, which he may sell or disan individual
pose of as he sees proper, and over which neither the corporation nor
the subject of daily commerce, and
its officers have any control. It
-bought and sold in market like any other marketable commodity."
clear and accurate statement of the relation of the parties on
This
We refer to this case for very complete review of the
this subject.
See, also, Delacases, both English and American, on this subject.
ware R. R. Tax, 18 Wai. 206, 230, with authorities referred to by
Field, J., as to the character of such property; also, in our State,
197.

MOXHAM ET AL. V. GRANT.
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It being clear and beyond all question, both on sound principle and
authority, that the directors or officers of the company were charged
with no trust in reference to the sale or disposition, the management
or control of the shares of stock owned by the individual stockholders,
it follows that none of the responsibilities growing out of this relation
attach to them in making such purchase from the stockholder as are
contended for by complainant, and that this feature of the bill can not
be maintained, and the demurrer was properly sustained on this
question.

*

*

*

Sec. 628.
(2) To contribution or indemnity, where they are
required to discharge corporate debts for which shareholders
are also liable.

MOXHAM ET
1899.

AL. v.

GRANT.

IN THE ENGLISH COURT OF APPEAL.
97-102.

1

69

L. J. Q. B.

a

a

1

it it

a

a

it

it

it,

a

is

it,

A. L. SMITH, L. J. This is an appeal from a decision of a divisional court affirming the judgment of the judge of the Swansea
The action was brought by
County Court in favor of the plaintiffs.
directors of a company named Cory's Steamers, Lim., to recover
from the defendant, a shareholder in the company, a sum of ^35 158.,
which they had paid to him, and had subsequently been compelled to
pay to the liquidator of the company. The company owned, as part of
its capital, a steamship named the Primrose.
This vessel was lost,
and the underwriters paid to the company a sum of money in respect
of the loss. There can be no doubt that this money was a part of the
capital of the company, but the directors and the shareholders came
and the defendant received .35 155. as
to an agreement to divide
This, therefore,
not
case in which money has been
his share.
paid by the directors of a company to shareholder who has received
in ignorance of the fact that he had no right to
but
case in
which was known to all concerned that that which was being paid to
and received by the shareholder was
part of the capital of the comIf proper steps had been taken to reduce the capital of the
pany.
company everything would have been in order, but unfortunately this
course was not taken.
After the money had been divided the comwinding-up order was made against
pany got into difficulties, and
it. A liquidator was duly appointed, and he inquired what had become of the money which represented the lost ship, and found that,
had been divided amongst the shareholders.
In these circumstances
was open to the liquidator to sue every one of the persons who had
received portions of the money or to sue the directors for the whole
amount.
He took the latter course, and recovered the amount from
the directors.
Thereupon the directors asked the shareholders to reArguments and part of opinions omitted.
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pay to them the money, part of the capital of the company, which the
shareholders had received and which the directors had been compelled
to pay to the liquidator, and the county court judge and the divisional
court have held that they are entitled to recover it.
Now what was the position of the defendant when as a shareholder
in the company he received this sum, with notice that it was part of
the capital of the company?
It seems to me that he occupied the position of a constructive trustee, in accordance with the ruling of Jessel,
M. R., in Russell v. Wakefield Water-works Co. (1875), 44 L. J.
Ch. 496, as being a person who had taken money from the company
with notice that it was being applied to a purpose other than the special purposes of the company.
That being so, what is the rule of
the directors and shareequity applicable to the case of two trustees
holders
who are in part delicto, one of whom has made good a loss
occasioned by a breach of trust for which both are liable?
It was settled long ago.
I will refer to the case of Chillingworth v. Chambers
(1896), 65 L. J. Ch. 343, where the matter was fully discussed before Lord Justice Lindley, Lord Justice Kay, and myself, and I will
cite the third of the three rules which I there referred to as having application to that case, since it deals with the position in which the defendant is in this case.
It is, " that as between two trustees who are
in pari delicto, the one who has made good a loss occasioned by a
breach of trust for which the two are jointly and severally liable may
obtain contribution to that loss from the other"; and later on I said,
now come to the third rule, which is, that, where two trustees concur in committing a breach of trust and are in pari delicto, the one,
if he has made good the loss occasioned thereby to the trust estate,
can obtain contribution from the other.
The existence of this rule is
not disputed at the bar
i Ves. &
see Lingard v. Bromley (1812),
B. 114." Here it seems to me that the defendant took the money
with notice that it was a part of the capital of the company, and was
therefore a constructive trustee and in pari delicto with the directors ;
and as the directors have been compelled to pay back the money to
the company, it follows, applying the rule of equity which I have
cited, that they are entitled to recover it from the defendant.
For these reasons, I think that the divisional court was right in its
* *
*
decision.
*
* *
COLLINS, L.
The only possible answer to the claim

"I

J.

of the person who has paid the sum to be recouped is that both persons were joint tort-feasors, between whom there is no contribution.
Even at common law, as far back as 1834, Lord Dunman, in dealing,
in Betts v. Gibbins (1834), 2 Ad. & E. 29, with the rule laid down in
"The
Merryweather v. Nixan (1799), 8 Term Rep. 186, says:
rule
neither
is,
that
is
between wrong-doers there
general
indemnity nor
contribution ; the exception is, where the act is not clearly illegal in

I do not suppose that anyone concerned in the present case
It was indeed illegal in the
that
what was done was illegal.
thought
sense of being ultra vires, but it has been held over and over
again that the payment of money by a trustee to a cestui que trust,
itself."

*
*

*

tort-feasor.

is

knowing that the payment

constitute the trustee

a

it,

who takes
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breach of trust, does not

#

a

it

a

is

is

a

a

it

a

a

a

*

J.

*
In my opinion, the docVAUGHAN WILLIAMS, L.
trine under which
person who has made
voluntary payment under
mistake of law can not recover back the amount paid has no application here, because the money paid to the liquidator, and now
for the defendant,
sought to be recovered by those who have paid
of
was money paid under compulsion.
doctrine
In this state
things
which
in
few words. Wnere two persons are
applies
maybe stated
liable
to
be
sued
for
sum of money, and one
sued and
equally
to
the
follows
have
sum,
that such person will
right
compelled
pay
over against the other, which right will be measured by the benefit

*

is

a

* a

the other person has received by the payment.
It may sometimes be
to
and
sometimes
right
right to contribution, but the
indemnity
*
the
same
in
either
case.
principle

Appeal dismissed.
Note. Compare,

Sec. 629.
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1889, Sayles v.

Brown,

40

Fed. Rep.
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Relation of officers among themselves.

See North Hudson Building Ass'n v. Childs, 82 Wis. 460, supra,
p. 1737; Nix v. Miller, 57 Pac. Rep. 1084, infra, p. 1874.
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[Suit by the bank to recover damages against Friend for falsely representing he had authority to issue notes for the Friend-Stebbins Manto be treated as
demurrer
was
ufacturing Company. A motion
filed, which by the second assignment asked the plaintiff to state
was damaged.]
definitely how and wherein
*
The second assignment of
THOMPSON, DISTRICT JUDGE.
the motion
an innocent
predicated upon the fact that the plaintiff
Parts of opinion upon other points omitted.
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holder of the notes, and has a right of action thereon against the
Friend-Stebbins Manufacturing Company to recover the amount of
the moneys mentioned therein, and that, therefore, in this action,
which is one to recover damages against the defendant, Friend, for
falsely representing that he had authority to sign and put the notes in
circulation, the plaintiff is only entitled to recover nominal damages,
unless special damages be assigned and definitely set forth in the
petition. This proposition concedes the right of the plaintiff to sue
the Friend-Stebbins Manufacturing Company upon the notes to recover the amount thereof, and also to sue the defendant, Friend, for
damages for falsely warranting that he had authority to sign and put
I doubt if this position can be maintained.
the notes in circulation.
In my opinion, the plaintiff is either limited to an action against the
Friend-Stebbins Manufacturing Company on the notes, or has an election either to sue that company upon the notes, or the defendant,
Friend, for damages, and can not pursue both remedies.
If the
plaintiff can recover its moneys, with interest, by an action on the
notes against the company, it has no claim against the defendant,
Friend ; and, on the other hand, if the present action can be sustained,
and the plaintiff is entitled to be made whole for the moneys expended
by it in the purchase of these notes, then it has waived its right of
action against the company.
The questions, therefore, for consideration upon this motion are:
Is the plaintiff limited to an action on the notes against the
Friend-Stebbins Manufacturing Company ? (2) Or has it an election
between an action on the notes against the company and an action
against the defendant for damages, for falsely warranting his authority
to sign and put the notes in circulation ? A distinction must be made
between cases where there is an absolute want of authority on the
part of the agent and cases where the agent has authority, but abuses
it.
Where the agent has authority, and where negotiable commercial
paper is the subject of the transaction, an innocent holder of the paper
gets just what he bargained for; but where the agent is without
Where the agent is without
authority, the holder gets nothing.
authority, according to some of the cases, the holder has an election
to sue the agent on the paper, treating it as his contract, or to sue him
for damages for falsely warranting his authority to put the paper
forth. But the great weight of authority is to the effect that the
holder must resort to the latter remedy.
The holder can not look to
the principal.
Taylor v. Nostrand, 134 N. Y. 109, 31 N. E. Rep.
246; Trust Co. v. Floyd, 47 Ohio St. 525, 538-541, 26 N. E. Rep.
no; White v. Madison, 26 N. Y. 117, 123-125. And the holder,
although but an indorsee of the paper, may maintain an action for
damages against the agent if the representation of authority is untrue,
even though the agent's motives were good, and no fraud in fact was
In such cases, the representation may be regarded as made
intended.
to all to whom the paper may be offered in the course of circulation.
Polhill v. Walter, 3 Barn. & Adol. 38, 123.
But where the agent has authority to sign and put forth negotiable

(i)

. 2

WIL. CAS.

40

1798
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commercial paper in behalf of his principal, but abuses the authority
given him, if, as in this case, Friend, as the president and treasurer of
the Friend-Stebbins Manufacturing Company, had authority to sign
and put in circulation negotiable commercial paper in furtherance of
and in the regular course of the business of the corporation, and, instead of doing that, abused the authority given him by putting forth
the paper in question for the accommodation of a stranger, and the
paper came into the hands of the plaintiff as an innocent holder, then
the corporation is bound, and must pay the notes, and look to Friend
Here the holder has not
for redress for the injury it has sustained.
or
misled.
been deceived
It has got just what it expected to obtain,
and can maintain an action against the corporation to compel the payThe wrong inment of the notes, and has no claim against Friend.
volved in Friend's abuse of authority was committed against the corFriend, the agent,
poration, and not against the holder of the paper.
had authority to put forth business paper on behalf of the corporation,
and, so far as the holder is concerned, this is the business paper of the
corporation. It was intended that the holder should have a good title
It was necessary to protect the holder in order to acto the paper.
The representation, so far as the holder
commodate Hargrave & Co.
But in view of the fact that
is concerned, was not untrue or false.
and
has sustained no injury, the
the plaintiff got all it bargained for,
if false, is immaterial. Bird v. Daggett, 97 Mass.
representation,
Therefore, if there was no false representation to the plaintiff,
494.
and if plaintiff has a right of action on the notes against the corporation for the recovery of the amount of moneys for which they were
given, it can have no right of action against Friend for damages,
It has no election, therefore, between an acnominal or otherwise.
tion on the notes against the company and an action against the defendant for damages for falsely warranting his authority to sign and
put the notes in circulation, but is limited to an action on the notes
*
*
*
against the company.
sufficient
to constitute a cause of action.
not
facts
state
Petition does
See, 1895, Greenberg v. Lumber Co., 90 Wis. 225, 48 Am. St. Rep.
Note.
911, note 913 infra, p. 1799; 1895, Nunnelly v. Southern Iron Co., 94 Tenn. 397,
28 L. R. A. 421, note; 1898, Davenport v. Newton, 71 Vt. 11, 42 Atl. Rep.
1087;
1898, Houston v. Thornton, 122 N. C. 365, 65 Am. St. Rep. 699; 1900,
Michelson v. Pierce, 107 Wis. 85, 82 N. W. Rep. 707; 1900, Utley v. Hill, 155
Mo. 232, 78 Am. St. Rep. 569. See, also, following cases.
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Sec. 632.

Same.

(b) Torts

GREENBERG,

in general.

RESPONDENT, v.

GREENBERG,
1895.

1/99

THE WHITCOMB LUMBER COMPANY,

APPELLANT.
APPELLANT, v. SEMPLE, RESPONDENT.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN.
225-232, 48 Am. St. Rep. 911.

90

1

Wis. Rep.

NEWMAN, J. The complaint states, in substance, that the defendant, The VVhitcomb Lumber Company, is a corporation ; that the defendant, Parian Semple, was one of its officers and its general managing agent; that its business was the manufacturing of timber into
firewood; that it operated, in this work, a machine which was
defective and dangerous ; that it knew the machine to be defective and
dangerous ; that the defect which rendered it dangerous was that the
saw was defectively and insecurely fastened to its shaft ; that the
plaintiff was employed to work upon or with this machine; that he
was inexperienced in such work and as to such machine, and did not
know of the defect of the machine ; that the defendants knew that he
was so inexperienced and ignorant; that plaintiff received no instructions ; that he was injured, without his fault, by reason of the defect
of the machine.
Fairly construed, this is the substance of the complaint. It was the duty of the defendant, The Whitcomb Lumber
Company, to furnish the plaintiff a safe machine to work with, and,
knowing the defect of the machine and that he was inexperienced, to
Not to do this
instruct him of the dangers of the employment.
The complaint states a cause of action against the
was negligence.
defendant, The Whitcomb Lumber Company.
Whether the complaint states a cause of action against the defendHe was the agent or servant of
ant, Parian Semple, is more complex.
The Whitcomb Lumber Company, charged with the oversight and
management of its operations, and with the duty of providing a safe
machine for the work in which the plaintiff was engaged.
The principle is well settled that the agent or servant is responsible to third
persons only for injuries which are occasioned by his misfeasance and
not for those occasioned by his mere nonfeasance.
Some confusion
has arisen in the cases from a failure to observe clearly the distinction
between nonfeasance and misfeasance.
These terms are very accurately defined', and their application to questions of negligence pointed
out by Judge Metcalf in Bellv. Josselyn, 3 Gray 309. "Nonfeasance."
says the learned judge, "is the omission of an act which a person
ought to do ; misfeasance is the improper doing of an act which a person might lawfully do; malfeasance is the doing of an act which a
The application of these definitions
person ought not to do at all."
to the case at bar is not difficult.
It was Semple's duty to have had
this machine safe.
His neglect to do so was nonfeasance.
But that
1

Statement,

except as given

in

the opinion, and arguments

omitted.
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alone would not have harmed the plaintiff if he had not set him to
work upon it. To set him to work upon this defective and dangerous machine, knowing it to be dangerous, was doing improperly an
It was misact which one might lawfully do in a proper manner.
Both elements, nonfeasance and misfeasance, entered into
feasance.
But the nonthe act or fact which caused the plaintiff's damages.
feasance alone could not have produced it.
The misfeasance was
For this the defendant Semple is responsible to the
the efficient cause.
Mechem Agency,
plaintiff.
569, et seq.; 14 Amer. & Eng. Ency.
of Law 873, and cases cited in note 4; Wood Mast. & Serv. (2d
ed.) 667; Osborne v. Morgan, 130 Mass. 102.
The complaint states but a single cause of action.
It is the same
cause of action against both defendants, arising from the same acts of
the master for the negligence of its servant; the servnegligence
ant for his own misfeasance.
Both master and servant, being liable
for the same acts of negligence, may be joined as defendants. Wood
Mast. & Serv., supra; Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 343; Phelps v.

Wait, 30 N. Y. 78.
BY THE COURT.

The order appealed from by The Whitcomb
Lumber Company is affirmed, and the order appealed from by the
plaintiff is reversed.
Note,

See preceding case and notes, and following case.

Sec. 633.

Same.
(c) Negligence.

MINNIE CAMERON, ADMINISTRATRIX, APPELLANT, v. KENYON-CONNELL
COMMERCIAL COMPANY ET AL., RESPONDENTS.'
1899.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF MONTANA.
312-323, 74 Am. St. Rep. 602, 44 L. R.

22

A.

Mont. Rep.

508.

[Suit by administratrix of A. D. Cameron, against the company and
its directors, for damages for the killing of Mr. Cameron, by the explosion of giant powder alleged to have been negligently kept by the
corporation, with the knowledge and consent of the directors and ofA nonsuit as to the directors as individual defendants was
ficers.
granted, upon which plaintiff moved for a new trial ; this motion was
overruled, and plaintiff appealed.]
*
*
*
The record discloses these facts: The deHUNT, J.
fendant corporation dealt in hardware, merchandise and powder.
It
owned a large frame, iron-roofed warehouse, near a railroad depot
within the corporate limits of the city of Butte, where it kept its
merchandise, including Hercules powder, a dangerous explosive comOn the night of
pound of nitro-glycerine and other substances.
Plaintiff's intestate,
January 15, 1895, the warehouse took fire.
Cameron, was the chief of the fire department of the city of Butte,
1

Statement

abridged.

Arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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and commanded the firemen who responded to the alarm. While the
firemen were actually engaged in an endeavor to put the fire out, a
fearful explosion occurred within the corporation's warehouse, and
many persons, including Cameron, were killed. From the beginning
of the year 1893 Hercules and giant powder had been kept in the warehouse. Defendants Kenyon and Connell had both been seen in or about
the building during 1893, and at divers times up to the time of the explosion, Kenyon often, Connell very seldom, the other defendants
never. The quantity of powder kept in the warehouse about the ist
of each month was from twenty to fifty boxes, larger quantities being
stored in a powder magazine three miles out of the city.
On the day before the explosion a witness saw some seven boxes of
An employe,
powder, fifty pounds in each box, in the warehouse.
one Orcutt, had immediate charge of the warehouse, and ordered the
He said that on the day of the explosion
powder put where it was.
he thought there was somewhere about three to five cases of powder
in the warehouse ; while another witness, a mining superintendent accustomed to using powder, said he thought a ton must have exploded
on the night of the fire.
Defendant Connell was president of the corporation ; Kenyon was
general manager.
Kenyon' s duties were to give attention to the corhis particular business being to look after the
business,
poration's
financial part, and ordering goods, but not to manage or control the
warehouse or magazine, which were under the warehouseman Orcutt's
direct charge.
Neither Connell, the president, nor any of the other
trustees, except Kenyon, had anything whatever to do with the actual
personal management of the affairs of the corporation.
It is plain that this corporation, like many others in the commercial
world, had one head director to whom all the other trustees gave
the entire practical management of the concern.
It thus furnishes but a single instance of the common practice
among business men to incorporate commercial enterprises, and, in
doing so, of their trusting the entire actual management to the one
director who is familiar with, and assumes the real control of, the
This custom has doubtless been the
particular business undertaken.
outgrowth of a belief, generally correct, too, that, by incorporating
mercantile or other undertakings, directors are not liable to creditors
in case of business reverses, while those who associate themselves as
members of a partnership are.
But, notwithstanding all this, there are various unavoidable responsibilities that attach themselves inseparably to the office of corporate
directorship, which, in case of negligence or misconduct, often illustrate the risks incidental to accepting such positions of trust in a corporation and of not prudently guarding against their possible consequences.
It is a general rule that the ordinary business of a corporation is
managed in the name and on behalf of the corporation by particular
These agents are the directors.
agents, chosen by the stockholders.
For their acts, performed within the apparent scope of their author-
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is responsible, while, e cohverso, the corporation
can act through these agents alone.
These principles are generally familiar to business men, as well as
to lawyers.
They control the relation of the artificial being, the corporation, to the world at large.
They find their foundation in the
law of agency, which makes the corporation the principal; still, they
are extended, under certain conditions, far enough to inculpate the
agents or directors of the corporation, notwithstanding the fact that
* *
the principal may also be liable for a wrong done. *
(After stating that upon a motion for nonsuit, everything that the
evidence tended to prove must be taken as true, and the corporation
was clearly liable, proceeds:)
Hence we pass to the more direct inquiry whether the directors of
the guilty corporation are also liable for Cameron's death.
As said before, the trustees manage the stock, property and concerns of a corporation (Comp. St., Fifth Div., 450), wherefore it is
difficult to see how all responsibility in this management can be
avoided as long as the trustees hold their offices.
Certainly, the ministerial work of a corporation may be delegated to subordinate agents,
and often must be.
The details of a corporation's business necessitates this, and if directors act in good faith, and with reasonable care
and diligence, in appointing and supervising such inferior agents, they
are not personally responsible for damages occasioned by the agents'
negligence, or even crimes. (Thomp. Corp.,
4107.) But a director
can not wholly escape his duty of supervision or transfer his authority
to represent his principal, at least without the principal's consent, otherwise he could evade every responsibility imposed by law upon him
by simply absenting himself from meetings, or by avoiding information of the acts of the other directors in expressing the will of the corporation, or by delegating an employe to act as trustee for him.
Morawetz on Private Corporations, in section 536, says: "The general supervision and direction of the affairs of a corporation are especially intrusted by the shareholders to the board of directors ; it is upon
the personal care and attention of the directors that the shareholders
It follows that authority
depend for the success of their enterprise.
to delegate these general powers of management can not be implied.
Thus, the directors of a company have no implied authority to enter
into a contract with a creditor by which the entire management of the
company's affairs is placed in his control until the debt has been paid."
Third persons may hold directors liable in positive tort, upon the
principle that a positive wrong done by a servant or ordinary agent
must be applied to the misfeasance of directors also.
(Salmon v.
Richardson, 30 Conn. 360, 79 Am. Dec. 255.)
Persons having in their custody gunpowder or other instruments of
" The risk incident
danger should keep them with the utmost care.
to dealing with fire, firearms, explosive or highly inflammable mat* * is
*
ters, corrosive or otherwise dangerous or noxious fluids,
the
actor
accounted by the common law among those which subject
'
'
care
to strict responsibility.
the
is
term consummate
Sometimes

ity, the corporation
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used to describe the amount of caution required ; but it is doubtful
At least we do not know of any
whether even this be strong enough.
English case of this kind (not falling under some recognized head of
part
exception) where unsuccessful diligence on the defendant's
was held to exonerate him."
(Webb's Pollock on Torts, p. 615.)
A company charged with an obligation of this nature can not devolve it upon another in a manner so as to exonerate the company
from a liability for an injury caused to a third person by the negligent
way in which the duty pertaining to the care of giant powder or other
In torts, the relation of prindangerous explosives may be executed.
cipal and agent can not relieve the wrong-doer. (Berghoff v. McDonald, 8;Ind. 559.)
It is unnecessary to consider the rule which relieves the master from
liability for his servant's acts, where the servant does something outside of his employment for that is not involved.
But the case does present facts to which this principal fits: that
whatever the servant is intrusted by the master to do for him must be
performed with a like degree of care which the law holds the master
to were he acting for himself.
We apply this principle for the reason that there is a presumption
that the trustees of a trading corporation know of the principal articles in which the company deals, and whether or not such articles are
highly dangerous to life and property.
It is therefore the duty of the trustees of a corporation dealing in
explosives to exercise such reasonable supervision over the management of their company's business as will result in the observance of
the utmost care on the part of the subordinates who direct or handle
the explosives.
This rule grows out of "the great principle of social
duty that every man, in the management of his own affairs, whether
by himself or by his agents or servants, shall so conduct them as not
to injure another ; and if he does not, and another thereby sustains
damage, he shall answer for it."
(Farwell v. B. & W. Railroad
Go., 4 Mete. (Mass.) 49.) It is likewise their duty to avoid the creation of nuisances by their corporation, through its employes acting
within the line of their duties.
Nor will inaction by itself overthrow the force of this obligation
upon- trustees to so control their corporation's business as to not negAlong with the assumption of the duligently injure third persons.
ties of trusteeship go the duties of exercising reasonable care in the
manner of performing those duties.
This reasonable care appears
not to have been exercised in this case, where the corporation, by its
trustees, permitted a public nuisance to be created, and to continue,
third person,
whereby, as a consequence of the act of permitting
not in fault, has been killed.
Because directors are themselves agents,
none the less true that
common-law duty to third persons.
If they violate that
they owe
the result of
duty, they are responsible, whether the violation
on
wrongful omission or commission.
Agency,
(Mechem
572.)
Were the rule such that wrongful commission alone meant liability,
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as before indicated, directors' statutory duties to manage would be
sufficiently performed by absence ; and, the denser the ignorance on
a director's part of the business of his concern, the more certain his
exoneration from liability for the tortious acts of the company's emSuch a rule would be unhealthy and unsound.
ployes.
The liability of a director in tort is not to be avoided by his "vicarious character," where the tort of the corporation has been committed through the directors.
(Nunnelly v. So. Iron Co. (Tenn.
Sup.), 28 Lawy. Rep. Ann. 421, s. c. 29 S. W. Rep. 361 ; Bank v.
Byers, 139 Mo. 627, 41 S. W. Rep. 325; Delaney v. Rochereau, 34

La. Ann. 1123.)

a

is

is

it,

Relationship of contract to a corporation neither adds to nor subtracts from a man's duty to strangers to so use his own property, or
that under his control, as not to injure another.
Baird v. Shipman
L.
R.
A.
N.
E.
Riche's note to
128,
Sup.),
Rep.
384;
(111.
7
23
Nunnelly v. So. Iron Co., supra; Jenne v. Sutton, 43 N. J. Law
257 ; Mayer v. Thompson-Hutchinson Building Co. (Ala.), 28 L. R.
A. 433, 16 So. Rep. 620.
Eminent judges have drawn distinctions between a trustee's liability
for misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance.
(Bell v. Josselyn,
of
no
But
are
vital
on this appeal.
importance
Gray
they
3
309.)
Nevertheless, reasoning upon these distinctions, defendants have
argued that they are liable, if at all, to the corporation only, inasmuch
of the
as the record shows nonfeasance
merely, or nonexecution
This argument seems to overlook the
duties of their directorships.
proposition that directors are charged with the affirmative duty of
knowing something of the management of their company's business,
and of exercising reasonable supervision of its management.
Management usually signifies positive, rather than negative, conduct.
As a matter of defense, it is proper to show all facts by which the
jury can say whether the inaction or ignorance relied on is a sufficient
But we have no hesitation in saying that,
excuse for the wrong done.
upon a state of facts like that before us, nonexecution which resulted
in the positive act of a creation and maintenance of a continuing nuisance on account of which a third person was killed amounts, unless
explained, to misfeasance upon the part of all the directors of the
company, except as to Kenyon, who, it appears, prima facie, must
have actually known of and authorized the nuisance.
As to him it
was malfeasance.
A director who knew nothing of the nuisance, and who could not,
or,
by exercising ordinary diligence in control, have known of
generally speaking, one who, considering the situation and all the attendant circumstances, has performed his duty of taking care,
not
liable, and can not be held so. In this case the defense must show
this though, for
made by plaintiff.
prima facie case
Reversed and remanded.
Note.

See note, supra,
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RIGHTS OF THE STATE.

I. To change remedies.

JAMES READ ET
1843.

CREDITORS.

AL. v.

THE FRANKFORT BANK.

IN THE SUPREME

JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE.
Rep. 318-322.
Shep.)
(10

23

Maine

[Exceptions to ruling of the court below denying plaintiff's right to
recover upon certain promissory notes from the bank as indorsers.]
TENNEY, J. By the statute of March 29, 1841, ch. 139, the act
incorporating the Frankfort Bank was repealed, and provision made
for the appointment of receivers, who were required, when qualified
to act, to demand and receive of tjie officers of the bank the property
On the i6th of April, 1841, an additional
to the same belonging.
act was passed requiring all creditors, in order to entitle themselves
to a distributive share of the assets, and to prevent their claim from
being barred, to exhibit and prove them to the receivers on or before
the first day of July, 1842.
This action was commenced and an attachment of property made
previous to the repeal of the charter of the bank, and it is insisted
that thereby a right became vested in the plaintiffs to proceed with the
suit under the laws which were in force at the time of its commencement, and that the same can not constitutionally be affected injuriously
But if the repeal was not in contravenby any act of the legislature.
of
it
contended
that the plaintiffs have subthe constitution,
is
tion
the
of
statute
the i6th of April by causing a
stantially complied with
of
on
the writ to be served
the receivers on the i7th of June,
copy
1841, a time long before that, when the claim was to have been
barred, if the same had not been exhibited and proved to the receivers.
By the act of 1831, chapter 519, entitled "an act to regulate banks
and banking," section 32, the legislature reserve to themselves, in cases
therein named, after certain proceedings, the right to declare charters of
banks forfeit and void. The Frankfort bank, incorporated after the en-
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actmentof this statute, was subject to its provisions, which were a part
It is not contended that the bank had not exposed
of its charter.
itself so that its charter was properly revoked, or that all the neces-

is a

it

2

a

a

;

if

it,

sary steps were not taken by the legislature agreeably to the general
statute of 1831, previous to the repealing act; and in default of evidence
Neither is it contended that
to the contrary, it must be so presumed.
the bank did not submit to the provisions of the repealing statute,
acknowledged the authority of the receivers, and surrendered to them
its books and its property.
After this, the creditors of the bank can not object to the constitutionality of the act dissolving the corporation, when it was done for
causes which by the charter were sufficient for the purpose, and when
Indeed, it is not seen how
the repeal was conclusive upon the bank.
any objection can be made by those who had no other connection
Whoever entered into contherewith than that of being its creditors.
tracts with it exposed himself to losses which might arise from its
dissolution, as he would with natural persons by their death.
No
security was provided in the charter, or other statute, against such an
exposure to injury.
The bank having ceased to exist, excepting so far that the receivers
could prosecute any suit pending in its name, and could use the name
of the bank in any suit which might be necessary to enable them to
collect any of the debts due to the bank, there is no party whom the
plaintiff can prosecute or take judgment or execution against, unless
The bank as such has no longer the power
it be in a court of equity.
to sue or to be sued; the receivers alone are the successors of the corporation, and they take all the property for the purposes specified in
Their appointment
the act of repeal, and for those purposes only.
and the power given to them in nowise infringe the previously existing rights of the plaintiffs. It is by and through them that the property is to be made available in the payment of the debts against the
bank. If the receivers had not been appointed, the plaintiffs could
have no better prosecuted their suit than they are now able to do.
The repeal of the charter has presented the obstacle to their further
proceedings by dissolving the party against whom they had commenced them.
The obligation of the contract between the plaintiffs and the bank
was not impaired by the repeal of its charter, but the mode of obtainThe bank was created
ing indemnity for its violation was changed.
by the legislature, and by the charter there was no provision made for
that charter should be declared by
the prosecution of suits against
void
but
forfeit
and
mode has been provided in
the same power
the repealing act, by which creditors are enabled to obtain satisfaction
for their claims, to the extent of the means existing therefor.
A remor
for
be
taken
the
changed
wholly
legisparty may
edy
away by
the constitution of the United States.
lature without contravening
Fairf. 284; Oriental Bank v. Freese, 18 Me. R.
Thayer v. Seavey,
And
such
change may constitutionally affect suits pending at
109.
the time when
made.
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Have the plaintiffs saved themselves from the operation of the limitation contained in the act of April 16, 1841 ? We are satisfied that
they have not, though we do not perceive how a decision of that question can influence this case.
For if we have taken the correct view of
the effect of the. act of repeal, this action can be no farther prosecuted in any court.
The claim of the plaintiffs in this case is upon
two notes of hand indorsed by the bank.
The writ was the legal
In order to bring the
process to obtain a judgment upon this claim.
affairs of the bank to a close within the time prescribed, the receivers
were to be made satisfied of the existence of the demands and the legal
title of the claimants to payment.
The writ' could not tend in the
least to do either, and the service of the same by a copy was not such
an act as to take the case from the effect of the limitation.
Non-suit confirmed.
Note.

See Foster v. Essex Bank,

Sec. 635.

2.

16

Mass. 245, supra, p. 895.

To dissolve the corporation.

See Mumma v. Potomac Company, 8 Pet. 281, supra, p. 896.

Sec. 636.

bility.

3 .

To amend corporate charters

;

repeal statutory lia-

See Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wall. (69 U. S.) 10, supra, p. 752;
Woodworth v. Bowles, 61 Kan. 569, 6oPac. Rep. 331, infra, p. 2014.
See, also, 1884, Webb P. & F. Co. v. Beecher, 97 N.
Note.
v. Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co., 134 U. S. 515.

Hill

Sec* 637.

4-

To protect, or discriminate

Y.

651 ;

1890,

in favor of, resident

creditors.

McClung, 172 U. S. 239, infra, p. 2036; Blake v.
McClung, 176 U. S. 59, infra, p. 2045; Sully v. American Nat'l
Bank, 178 U. S. 289, infra, p. 2046; People v. The Granite State
Assn., 161 N. Y. 492, infra, p. 2050.
See Blake v.
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RIGHTS OF CREDITORS.

To have their security and remedy against the corporate as.sets substantially preserved without impairment.

Sec. 638.

See Mumma v. Potomac R,, 8 Peters 281, supra p. 896; Read v.
Frankfort Bank, 23 Me. 318, supra, p. 1805; Hawthorne v. Calef, 2
Wall. 10, supra, p. 752; Woodworth v. Bowles, 61 Kan. 569, 60
Pac. Rep. 331, infra, p. 2014.
Note.
See, 1884, Webb P. & F. M. Co. v. Beecher, 97 N.
v. Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co., 134 U. S. 515.

SUBDIVISION

II.

THE CORPORATION

ARTICLE I.

1 88 1.

651 1 1890,

Hill

AND ITS CREDITORS.

RIGHTS OF THE CORPORATION.

I. To manage its own business.

Sec. 639.

VIRGIL

Y.

S.

POND ET

AL. v.

FRAMINGHAM

&

LOWELL R. R. CO.

IN THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
Mass. Rep. 194,' 195.

130

MORTON, J. This is a bill in equity, the substantial allegations of
which are, that the plaintiffs are creditors of the defendant corporation ; that the corporation is insolvent ; that all its property is mortgaged to trustees for the benefit of one class of creditors ; that it
owes large amounts to other creditors, one of whom has attached all
its property ; that it is about to execute a lease to said attaching creditor for the term of nine hundred and ninety-nine years, at a rental
which will not pay the interest upon its indebtedness, and that the
execution of said lease would be injurious to the interest of its credThe prayer is for an injunction to restrain the
itors and stockholders.
defendant from further prosecuting its business, and for the appointment of receivers.
There is no statute giving this court equity jurisdiction in such a
case as this, and the bill does not state a case within the general equity
As is stated in Treadwell v. Salispowers of a court of chancery.
bury Manuf. Co., 7 Gray 393, "It is too well settled to admit of question, that a court of chancery has no peculiar jurisdiction over corpo-

rations, to restrain them in the exersise of their powers, or control
their action, or prevent them from violating their charter, in cases
where there is no fraud or breach of trust alleged as the foundation of
the claim for equitable relief."
The plaintiffs can not maintain this bill, unless upon the ground
that any creditor can maintain a bill in equity against an individual
debtor upon like allegations.
But there is no allegation of fraud or
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breach of trust, or any other ground of jurisdiction, which brings the
The
case within the general equity powers of a court of chancery.
bill is an attempt by a creditor to restrain his debtor from making
The rights of the parwhat is alleged to be an improvident contract.
The plaintiffs as
ties are governed by the rules of the common law,
creditors might, by an attachment, have obtained security which
would take precedence of the contemplated lease ; but if they could
not, the court has no power to restrain the debtor from making a disposition of his property which is permitted by the common law, unless fraud or breach of trust is alleged and shown.
The allegation that the defendant corporation is insolvent does not
In the absence of any statute giving the power,
aid the plaintiffs.
this court has no authority to act as a court of insolvency for the
liquidation of the affairs of an insolvent railroad corporation.
Decree dismissing the bill affirmed.
Note.
See, 1874, Barr v. Bartram & F. Mfg. Co., 41 Conn. 506; 1882, Swepson v. Exchange, etc., Bank, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 713.

Sec. 640.

Same.

2.

To dispose of its property.

GRAHAM
1880.

v.

RAILROAD COMPANY.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
Rep. 148-161.

102

U. S.

MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY. In September, 1855, the La Crosse and
Milwaukee Railroad Company, not being at that time, so far as ap-

pears, indebted in any considerable amount, sold certain lands in the
city of Milwaukee not then wanted for railroad purposes to Charles
The officers of the company who
D. Nash, for the sum of $25,000.
took a leading part in negotiating the sale are charged to have been
interested in the purchase, and to have furnished Nash the means for
At all events, shortly after it was made, Nash conveyed
effecting it.
the property, for the original consideration, to Moses Kneeland, one
of the officers referred to, and Kneeland, retaining one third part,
subsequently conveyed the other two third parts to Ludington and
Kilbourn, they all being directors of the company, and members of
The company itself never questioned the
the executive committee.
fairness of this transaction; on the contrary, the sale was subsequently (in March, 1858) expressly confirmed by the board of directors,
and a further quitclaim deed executed by the company in confirmation
In September and November, 1858, the appellants recovthereof.
ered two judgments against the company for indebtedness on contract,
arising after the sale of the lands, and issued executions thereon, un1
Statement
ted.

sufficiently given in the opinion, part of the latter being omit-
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der which levies were made on said lands, as lands of the company. In
January, 1860, the appellants, having sued on these judgments in the
United States court, recovered a second judgment for upwards of
$40,000, issued execution thereon, and made another levy on the lands.

a

if

is

It

8

is

;

(i

it,

Being unwilling to attempt a sale under their said execution in consequence of the deeds for the lands being recorded, the appellants, in
June, 1860, filed the bill in this case against Kneeland, Kilbourn, Ludington, and the railroad company, setting forth their said judgments,
executions, and levies, stating the fact of the said sale to Nash and
his conveyance to Kneeland, and the latter's conveyance to the other
parties; alleging that the transaction was a fraud against the corporation and its creditors, and complaining that the said conveyances of the
lands were a cloud upon their right to sell the lands under execution,
and an impediment in the way of the execution of their writ of fieri
facias; and prayed that the lands might be decreed subject to the lien
of their judgment; that they might be decreed to be authorized to sell
the same, or so much as might be necessary for the purpose of satisfying their judgment; and that Kneeland, Kilbourn and Ludington
might join in the conveyance, and might be restrained from claiming
the land ; and that the conveyance to them might be declared null and
void. The bill, amongst other things, averred that the lands were
sold to Nash for much less than their real value; but it contained no
allegation that the company was insolvent, or that it had not other assets available under an execution ; nor was any offer made to repay
the consideration which the purchaser had given for the lands.
[Answers were put in averring the lands were sold in good faith ;
that the title was embarrassed ; that the lands were worth no more than
$25,000; that they had been offered in the market for sale without
success ; that after Nash purchased and investigated the title he asked
The proofs showed substantially
to be relieved from the purchase.
had
these facts, and'that the company
confirmed the sale.]
The main question is, whether the sale to Nash, made before the
railroad company became indebted to the appellants, and when, for
all that appears, it was perfectly solvent, even though made for the
use and benefit of the officers referred to, can be set aside at the instance of the complainants, for the purpose of subjecting the lands to
sale under their execution.
And this question, we think, must be
in
answered
the negative.
It is a well-settled rule of law that if an individual, being solvent
at the time, without any actual intent to defraud creditors, disposes
of property for an inadequate consideration, or even makes a volunsubsequent creditors can not question the transtary conveyance of
are
not
action.
They
injured. They gave credit to the debtor in the
status which he had after the voluntary conveyance was made.
The authorities on this subject are fully collected in the notes to
Sexton v. Wheaton
Am. L. Cas. i), and in the opinion of Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall in that case and the general doctrine
affirmed in Mattingly v. Nye,
Wall. 370.
true that
debtor dispose of his property with intent to de-
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fraud those to whom he expects to become immediately or soon indebted, this may be a fraud againt them, which they may have a right
to unravel.
But that is a special case to which the present bears no
resemblance.
It is not pretended that the railroad company disposed
of the property in question for the purpose of defrauding creditors,
much less for the purpose of defrauding those who afterwards in due
course of business might become its creditors.
But it is contended that this is a case in which the debtor corporation was defrauded of its property, and that as the company had a
right of proceeding for its recovery, any of its judgment and execution creditors have an equal right; that it is a property right, and one
that inures to the benefit of creditors.
Conceding that creditors who were such when the fraudulent proand cases to that effect
curement of the debtor's property occurred
been
still
have
cited
the question
remains whether, the debtor being
unwilling to disturb the transaction, subsequent creditors have such
an interest that they can reach the property for the satisfaction of their
debts.
We doubt whether any case, going as far as this, can be
found. No such case has been cited in the argument. Dicta of judges
to that effect may undoubtedly be produced, but they are not supported by the facts of the cases under consideration.
It seems clear that subsequent creditors have no better right than
subsequent purchasers to question a previous transaction in which the
debtor's property was obtained from him by fraud, which he has acYet,
quiesced in, and which he has manifested no desire to disturb.
in such a case, subsequent purchasers have no such right. In French
v. Shotwell (5 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 555), Chancellor Kent decided,
upon full consideration, that when a party to a judgment, entered
upon a warrant of attorney, voluntarily waives his defense or remedy
on the ground of fraud or usury, and releases the other party, a subsequent purchaser under him, with notice of the judgment, will not
be allowed to impeach it, or to investigate the merits of the original
transaction between the original parties, and he dismissed a bill filed
*
*
*
by the subsequent purchaser for relief in such a case.
This decision of Chancellor Kent was afterwards nearly unan20 Johns. (N. Y.) 668.
imously affirmed by the court of errors.
When the question of the right of a creditor to set aside a conveyance procured from the debtor by fraud first came before the courts
in England, it was held that the debtor's own right was merely the
right to file a bill in equity against the fraudulent grantee adversely;
and, if he did not see fit to take such a proceeding, his creditor had
no such privity with the transaction as to enable him to obtain relief,
even though the debtor should assign his supposed right to the creditor; that the transaction savored of champerty, and was opposed, at
least, to the spirit of the law against champerty and maintenance.
This was the substance of the decision by the court of exchequer in
*
* *
1835, in Prosser v. Edmonds, i Y. & C. 481.
[Quoting from this case, and also from Crocker v. Bellangee et al.,
6 Wis. 645 ; Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co. v. M. & M. R. Co., 20 Wis.

I8l2
174;
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also commenting upon and showing that Dickinson v. Burrell,
337, and McMahon v. Allen, 35 N. Y. 403, had not

L. R. i Eq.

overruled Prosser v. Edmonds, proceeds:]
The principle that subsequent creditors can not question a voluntary or fraudulent disposition of property by their debtor, not intended as a fraud against them, is especially applicable in cases of constructive fraud, like that charged in the present bill.
Suppose it be
true that the purchase of the lands in question by or for the benefit of
officers of the company actively concerned in the transaction could be
set aside at the instance of the company as a constructive fraud, yet,
if there was no actual fraud, if the company received full consideration for the property sold, how can it be said that subsequent creditors
of the company are injured?
In the present case we are satisfied from the evidence that the property was sold for its fair value at the time, and that no actual loss accrued to the railroad company's estate.
It would be unjust, and a great hardship, therefore, on the mere
ground of the constructive fraud, to allow creditors who had no interest at the time to seize and dispose of the property sold.
It is contended, however, by the appellant that a corporation debtor
does not stand on the same footing as an individual debtor ; that,
whilst the latter has supreme dominion over his own property, a corporation is a mere trustee, holding its property for the benefit of its
stockholders and creditors, and that if it fail to pursue its rights against
third persons, whether arising out of fraud or otherwise, it is a breach
of trust, and creditors may come into equity to compel an enforcement of the corporate duty. This, as we understand, is the substance
of the position taken.
We do not concur in this view. It is at war with the notions which
we derive from the English law with regard to the nature of corporate bodies.
A corporation is a distinct entity. Its affairs are necessarily managed by officers and agents, it is true, but, in law, it is as
distinct a being as an individual is, and is entitled to hold property (if
not contrary to its charter) as absolutely as an individual can hold it.
Its estate is the same ; its interest is the same ; its possession is the
same. Its stockholders may call the officers to account, and may prevent any malversation of funds, or fraudulent disposal of property on
But that is done in the exercise of their corporate rights,
their part.
not adverse to the corporate interests, but coincident with them.
When a corporation becomes insolvent, it is so far civilly dead that
its property may be administered as a trust fund for the benefit of its
A court of equity, at the instance of the
stockholders and creditors.
make
those funds trust funds, which, in other
will
then
proper parties,
circumstances, are as much the absolute property of the corporation
We see no reason why the disposal by
as any man's property is his.
a corporation
of any of its property should be questioned by subsequent creditors of the corporation any more than a like disposal by an
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individual of his property should be so. The same principles of law
apply to each.
We think that the present bill can not be maintained.
Decree affirmed.
Also, accord: 1897, Shoemaker v. Lumber Co., 97
Smith-Dunnick L. Co. v. Teague, 119 Ala. 385, 24 So. Rep. 4;
1899, In re Nat'l Bank of Wales, 68 L. J. Ch. 634, 81 L. T. R. (N. S.) 363 ; 1899,
Dykman v. Keeney, 160 N. Y. 677; 1899, McDonald v. Williams, 174 U. S.
397, infra, p.1981 ; 1899, Texas Consol. Comp. & M. Assn. v. Storrow, 92 Fed.
Rep. 5, 34 C. C. A. 182; 1900, Hamilton v. Menominee F. Q. Co., 106 Wis.
352, 81 N. W. Rep. 876.
As to effect of selling out to another corporation, upon creditors' rights, see,
1890, Montgomery Web Co. v. Dienelt, 133 Pa. St. 585, 19 Am. St. Rep. 663;
1896, Austin v. Tecumseh Nat'l Bank, 49 Neb. 412, 59 Am. St. Rep. 543 ; 1896,
Lebeck v. Fort Payne Bank, 115 Ala. 447, 67 Am. St. Rep. 51; 1897, Grenell
v. Gas Co., 112 Mich. 70; 1898, Sprague v. National Bank, 172 111. 149, 64 Am.
St. Rep. 17; 1900, Andres v. Morgan, 62 Ohio St. 236, 78 Am. St. Rep. 712.
As to sales and reorganizations, see, 1898, Sprague v. National Bank, 172
111. 149, 64 Am. St. Rep. 17 ; 1900, National Foundry, etc., v. Oconto City, etc.,
105 Wis. 48, 81 N. W. Rep. 125.
Corporation may also, through its board of directors, make an assignment
for the benefit of its creditors: 1897, Boynton v. Roe, 114 Mich. 401; 1898,
Calumet Paper Co. v. Haskell Show Ptg. Co., 144 Mo. 331, 66 Am. St. Rep. 425.
Note.

Wis. 585;

See next case.

Sec. 641.

1898,

Same.

RAILWAY OF BUENOS AYRES COMPANY.

MILLS

v.

1870.

IN CHANCERY APPEALS.

NORTHERN

L. R.

5

1

Ch. App. Cas. 621-632.

[Appeal from order of the vice-chancellor granting an injunction.
Plaintiffs were the executors of one member, and trustees in assignment of the other member of a firm of contractors who had constructed part of the railway, for which they claimed there were yet
about ^65,000 due and unpaid. This was disputed by the company.
In 1870 the directors of the company issued a report showing about
^33,000 net profit, leaving, after allowing certain claims, ^i 7,000,
which they advised to be paid toward discharging arrears of dividends
They also addue to guaranteed preferred shareholders, in 1867.
vised that, inasmuch as it would take some time to pay these arrears
of dividends out of accumulations, and constant improvements and
extensions were being made out of earnings, that these should be
treated as payment on capital to the extent of ^10,000, and ^20,000
should be raised by issuing 6 per cent, debentures, and the dividends
be paid. This plan was adopted, and over ; 16,000 were paid as diviPlaintiffs objected to this as amounting to an increase of the
dends.
liabilities of the company, in order to borrow money to distribute
An injunction was
among shareholders under the guise of revenue.
asked to prevent the carrying out of this scheme, and was granted by
the vice-chancellor, and an appeal was taken.]
1

Statement abridged.
2 WIL. CAS.

41

Only part of opinion relating to the one point given.
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The Vice-Chancellor appears to have
LORD HATHERLEY, L. C.
formed his judgment in this case, partly at least, upon the view which
he took that one of the plaintiffs, Mr. Mills, was a shareholder in the
But, so far as the
company, and therefore had a right to interfere.
case rests on the simple fact of the plaintiffs being creditors of the
Work is done
company, it seems to me hardly capable of argument.
for a limited company; no engagement is taken from them by way of
security ; no debenture or mortgage is granted by them ; but the work
The only remedy for a
is done simply on the credit of the company.
creditor in that case is to obtain his judgment and to take out execution ; or it may be that he may have a power, if the case warrants
But
of applying to wind up the company.
wholly unprecedented
mere creditor to say, "Certain transactions are taking place
for
within the company, and dividends are being paid to shareholders
am entitled to
which they are not entitled to receive, and therefore
come here and examine the company's deed, to see whether or not
ultra vires, and to interfere in order that, as
they are doing what
bill quia timet,
proper state of securmay keep the assets in
by
ity for the payment of my debt whensoever the time arrives for its

a

Sec. 642.

Same.

3.

*

*

it

is

it

a

a

it

a

is

a

a

I

I

;

payment."
The case must have occurred, of course, many years ago, before
joint stock companies were so abundant, but certainly within the last
twenty or thirty years the money due to creditors must have been many
millions, and the number of creditors must have been many thousands
asked in vain for any such precand
have never before heard
yet
edent
of any attempt on the part of creditor to file bill of this description against
company, claiming the interference of this court on
the ground that he, having no interest in the company, except the
about to be defrauded by reason of
mere fact of being a creditor,
It would be fearful authority
their making away with their assets.
for this court to assume, for would be called on to interfere with the
concerns of almost every company in the kingdom against which
creditor might suppose that he had demands, which he had not established in
court of justice, but which he was about to proceed to eswould apply
this power in any case, of course
tablish. If there
not only to the raising of money by debentures and to paying shareholders, but
would extend to an interference in every possible way
with the dealings of the company. *
Reversed.

To accept amendments.

473-

;

2

Wall. 10, supra, p. 752 Ireland v. The
See Hawthorne v. Calef,
Palestine, etc., Tp. Co., 19 O. S. 369, supra, p. 757; also,
466-
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Sec. 643.
See

Same.

l8l5

To surrender the charter.

4.

244-246, and Slee v. Bloom, 5 John Ch. 366, 19
Banking Co. v. Eisenman, 94
; Louisville

supra,

Johns. 456, supra, p. 881
Ky. 83, supra, p. 887.
Sec. 644,

Same.

See supra,
Note.

282-287.

See, also, note, supra, p. 1003.

Sec. 645.

6.

(a)
CATLIN
1826.

To consolidate with other corporations.

5-

v.

Right to prefer creditors.

Theories

:

Can.

THE EAGLE BANK OF NEW HAVEN"

IN THE SUPREME

COURT

OF ERRORS

AND

OTHERS.

OF CONNECTICUT.

1

6

Conn. Rep. 233-245.

This was

a

bill in chancery.

The Eagle Bank is a corporation, established, by an act of the
legislature, in October, 1811, for banking purposes, with the usual
powers of such an institution, the charter being, at all times, subject
to alteration, amendment or revocation by the general assembly. The
plaintiff is a creditor of this corporation to the amount of between
The bank, on the i5th of September, 1825,
$90,000 and $100,000.
failed, and was in fact insolvent.
Among its creditors was The
Savings Bank of New Haven, a corporation, empowered to receive
deposits from individuals, for safekeeping and management, and
obliged to pay the depositors the interest or profits that should accrue.
This institution had deposited with the Eagle Bank, at an interest of
4 per cent, and to be returned on demand, all the money, which it
had received, in small sums, from a great multitude of depositors,
In payment and seamounting to between $80,000 and $90.000.
curity of this demand, the directors of the Eagle Bank, after its actual
insolvency, mortgaged to the savings bank real estate worth about
$20,000, paid to Samuel J. Hitchcock, Esq., secretary of the savings
bank, about $15,000 in money, and assigned to him sundry negotiable
The bill prayed
promissory notes to the amount of about $52,000.
that these conveyances might be set aside, and that all the funds of
the Eagle Bank, at the time of its failure, might be equitably distributed among its creditors, in proportion to their respective claims.
The case was reserved for the advice of this court.
1

Arguments omitted.
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It is an undoubted principle that the powers of
HOSMER, CH. J.
corporation are solely derived from its charter, which is the law of
its nature ; and that it is invested with such powers only as are expressly delegated, or which are necessary to carry the express deleThe New York Firemen Insurance Company v.
gations into effect.
Elyet al., 5 Conn. Rep. 560. By the act of incorporation the Eagle
Bank had authority to purchase, hold and convey property, with the
usual banking powers superadded ; and the directors of the bank
were authorized to dispose of and manage its moneys, credits and
property, and to regulate its concerns in all cases not especially
provided for. To this general grant, in relation to the rights, privileges and duration of the bank, there is neither exception nor limitation, save that the charter is alterable, amendable, and revocable, at
the pleasure of the legislature.
It results, undeniably, that the rights,
powers and duties of the bank, so far as they depend on the act of incorporation, remain unchanged, until it is revoked, and independent
of its actual solvency or insolvency.
The general laws of the land,
or the principles which guide this court, as a court of chancery, may
make a difference on this subject; but setting aside these considerations, and admitting the operation of the charter exclusively, the bank
is authorized to exercise the same powers, at all times, without reference to its condition.
Whether the directors of the corporation, after it has become
actually insolvent, can make payment or give security to one of its
creditors and leave another unpaid and without security, is the general question to be determined.
It has been contended, in behalf of
the plaintiff, with no inconsiderable ingenuity, that the legislature intended to render the corporation at all times a trustee for the creditors.
This suggestion is too unfounded, and too destitute of practical imSuch a principle, during the
portance, to be admitted or discussed.
solvency of the bank, must be dormant and useless; and neither the
charter nor the nature of the case furnishes any warrant for the supposition.
If the corporation, so far as regards its right to manage and dispose
of its property, has power analogous with that which is vested in an
individual, the plaintiff's bill is wholly destitute of merits.
An individual debtor, who is actually insolvent, may prefer one creditor to
another, unless in certain cases, under the bankrupt laws ; and to do
this, as was said by Lord Kenyon, is neither illegal nor immoral. We
have no bankrupt system to control the acts of the insolvent merchant; and in the absence of all legal liens he may prefer a creditor,
if the act is done in good faith. To discuss the reasons of the rule
is unnecessary.
It is sufficient to say to those who are not disposed to unsettle foundations, that it is firmly and uniformly estabEstwick v. Caillaud, 5 Term
lished, both at law and in chancery.
Rep. 420; Nunn v. Wilsmore, 8 Term Rep. 521 ; Hopkins v. Gray,
7 Mod. Rep. 139; Meux et al. v. Howell et al., 4 East i ; McMenomy et al. v. Ferrers, 3 Johns. Rep. 84; Willes et al. v. Ferris, 5
Johns. Rep. 344; Small v. Oudley, 2 P. Wms. 427; Cock v. Gooda

$

fellow,
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Mod. Rep. 489; Phoenix v. Assignees of Ingraham.

Johns. Rep. 412, 426, 427; Hendrick v. Robinson,

2

Johns.

5

Ch.

Rep. 283. The same rule is equally applicable to partners ; and
what is a banking corporation, in the essence, but a partnership authorized by a special act of the legislature? Gow on Part., 234. It
is an artificial person ; and this denomination is given to it by reason
of its resemblance to a natural person, in respect of its powers, rights
It is difficult for me to conceive, where no restraint
and legal duties.
is interposed, in a charter of incorporation, on what ground the genei-al authority delegated is subjected to exceptions, or fettered by
restrictions, from which an individual and a mercantile company are
free.
And this difficulty is much increased, as no case intimating
this diversity between corporations and individuals has been cited, nor
Where no legal lien has been
can be found by my utmost researches.
obtained it is a reasonable supposition that the relation of creditor and
debtor must, in all cases, infer the same consequences ; and that where
the same mischief exists there is the same law. The cases of an individual and of a corporation, in the matter under discussion, it appears to
me, are not merely analogous, but identical ; and I discern no reason
for the slightest difference between them.
There exists no doubt that
there have been many instances of actually insolvent corporations

where certain creditors have been preferred to others ; and the perfect
silence until now, on the subject of this fancied diversity, is powerful
to show what has been the universal opinion
It, however, has been insisted for the plaintirJt, tnat on the actual
insolvency of the bank the torporation were the trustees of the creditors; and if this be true, the latter become the cestui que trusts of
all the corporate estate. The consequence, on this supposition, would
be that all persons coming into possession of the bank property, with
notice of the trust, must be considered as trustees.
Daniels v. DaviNo
son, 16 Ves. Jun. 249; Moore v. Butler, i Scho. & Lef. 262.
express trust was created on the happening of the bank's insolvency,
but the charter, on every fair principle of construction, conferred on
the corporation the entire control of its property, as well after as
before this event.
It. however, has been imagined that the trusts arose by operation
of law. I inquire of what law? No principle, or case, or analogy
has been referred to that supports the proposition, nor am I capable
of conceiving any. The insolvent banking corporation is just as
much a trustee of the creditors, and no more, as the insolvent individual is the trustee of his creditors.
The relation of creditor and
debtor exists in both cases, but from this relation no trust arises. Undoubtedly, in all cases of actual insolvency, the creditor would derive
security from this doctrine, and often great losses might be prevented.
But the interest of the insolvent person is not be entirely disregarded.
His creditor has voluntarily become such, with full knowledge that
his security must very much depend on the integrity of his debtor.
With open eyes he has given credit, and the public charter of the cor-
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poration has instructed him in all the powers and rights of the corporation.
Now, it would be a very harsh and inequitable doctrine, but on the
plaintiff's claim it is inevitable, that the moment a banking institution
is unable to pay all its debts, the directors of the bank may not issue'
a bank bill, dispose of bank property, make payment of a single debt,
or perform one bank operation.
May not an individual, or mercantile company, under the same circumstances, proceed in the usual
This is not disputed.
train of business?
It is the law of chancery,
that they may prefer one creditor to another; and this, on a principle
of analogy, refutes, entirely, the supposition of a trust in this case.
The novelty and unsoundness of the plaintiff's claim are such that it
is difficult to support or even to oppose
without taking leave of
That the directors
every established principle and beating the air.
admit; but they are the trustees of
of the Eagle Bank are trustees,
the stockholders.
The stockholders are the cestui que trusts, and the
The Attorney-Gencharge of breach of trust must come from them.
eral v. The Utica Insurance Co.,
Ch.
Rep.
371, 385.
Johns.
The funds of the corporation, after its insolvency, have been called
Equitable asequitable assets; but the name was wholly misapplied.
sets, generally speaking, are such as the debtor has made subject to
his debts generally, that would not thus be subjected without his act
and which can be reached only by the aid
(2 Fonb. Eq. 402, n. d.)
of
court of equity.
They are divisible among the creditors, as all
property is, when placed under the jurisdiction of court of chancery,
part passu, in ratable proportions. Riggs et al. v. Murray et al.,
Johns. Ch. Rep. 565, 577- But they must be assets or they can not
be equitable assets
and this term does not express the nature of property, in the hands of an individual, partnership or corporation actually
no equitable lien
insolvent.
On the estate of such persons there
to interrupt the free progress of their business or prevent the fair disposition of their property. * * *
class of cases in which chancery has exercised
There
control
over corporations in relation to breaches of trust, but in such cases the
Shaw
jurisdiction has alone been extended to charitable institutions.
Ball v. Montgomery,
Bro. Ch. Rep. 145
Ves.
v. Cunliffe,
*

&

it

is

it

a

a

r

a

On the other hand, in The Attorney-General v. The Corporation of
Carmarthen, Coop. Eq. Rep. 30, the jurisdiction was denied, by the
And in
chancellor, in the very case of
misapplication of funds.
Ves.
Bea.
The Mayor and Commonalty of Colchester v. Lowton,
trust attaching,
226, Lord Eldon held that there was no instance of
upon the ground of misapplication of funds by corporations, except
in the case of corporations holding to charitable uses.
that the jurisdiction of
From this discussion
unquestionable
chancery does not extend to the disposal of the corporation estate or
More time has been occupied in the exfunds of the Eagle Bank.
has
amination of the principle than perhaps can be justified, as
The bank has, in no proper
no application to the case before us.
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sense, misapplied its funds.
It has done what it had a right to do,
and what is uncontrollable by this court; that is, it has preferred to
pay and secure the claim of what was considered a meritorious creditor. Of its creditors, the corporation was not a trustee ; they had no
lien upon its funds, and no case is made out entitling the plaintiff to
relief, or showing any jurisdiction exerciseable by this court.
The plaintiff's bill must be dismissed.
Brainard and Lanman,
, were of the same opinion.
Peters, J., being interested in the question, and Daggett, J., having
been of counsel in the cause, gave no opinion.
Bill to be dismissed.

JJ.

Accord: 1879, Smith v. Skeary, 47 Conn. 47 ; 1890, Rollins v. Shaver
Note.
Co., 80 Iowa 380, 33 Am. & Eng. C. C. 291 ; 1892, Bank of Montreal v. Potts
Co., 90 Mich. 345, 38 Am. & Eng. C. C. 60; 1893, Brown v. Grand Rapids Furniture Co., 58 Fed. Rep. 286; 1894, Worthen v. Griffith, 59 Ark. 562, 47 Am. &
Eng. C. C. 258; 1895, Tradesman Pub. Co. v. Knoxville, etc., Co., 95 Tenn.
634, 49 Am. St. Rep. 943 (can so long as the corporation is a "going concern") ;
1895, Waggoner Co. v. Ziegler Co., 128 Mo. 473, 31 S. W. Rep. 28; 1895, Chicago, etc., Co. v. Fowler, 55 Kan. 17, 39 Pac. Rep. 727; 1895, Bank v. Dovetail, etc., Co., 143 Ind. 550, 52 Am St. Rep. 435; 1896, Ford v. Hill, 92 Wis.
188, 53 Am. St. Rep. 902 (by confession of judgment) ; 1896, Ames v. Heslet, 19
Mont. 188, 61 Am. St. Rep. 496; 1898, Burchinell v. Bennett, 10 Colo. C. A. 150,
8 Am. & Eng. C. C. (N. S.) 289; 1898, National Bank v. Allen, 90 Fed. Rep.
545; 1898, M. A. Seeds Dry Plate Co. v. Heyn, etc., Co., 57 Neb. 214, 77 N.
W. Rep. 660; 1898, Burnham H. M. & Co" v. McCormick, 18 Utah 42,55
Pac. Rep. 77 ; 1899, First National Bank v. Garretson, 107 Iowa 196, 77 N. W.
Rep. 856; 1899, Grand De Tour Plow Co. v. Rude Bros., etc., Co., 60 Kan.
145, 55 Pac. Rep. 848; 1899, Jefferson Co. National Bank v. Townley, 159 N.
Y. 490; 1900, Binder v. McDonald, 106 Wis. 332, 82 N. W. Rep. 156 (national bankrupt law).
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(Error

to the superior court; this court, among other things, found

"follows:)
That on

the 23d day of June, 1884, the T. J. Nottingham Manufacturing and Supply Company, defendant, being insolvent, resolved
to make a general assignment of its property for the benefit of its
creditors, and resolved to give a mortgage on the same property to the
plaintiff, and other mortgages to other creditors, which mortgages
should have preference over the assignment, and appointed F. W.
Browne assignee.
" The deed of assignment was executed and delivered to the said
1
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and acted as attorney

for the company in the whole matter as well as assignee, on the 24th
of June.
Before the execution of the assignment, the mortgage was
drawn, but a blank was left therein for the insertion of the amount
secured by it. Next day, the 25th of June, the mortgage was completed

and executed, and immediately thereafter the other mortgages were
completed and executed, the whole being done at one sitting. * * *
"On the 25th of June, the completed mortgage was filed in the recorder's office of Hamilton county, where chattel mortgages executed
in Cincinnati by residents thereof are required by law to be filed, and
on the same day, an hour or two later, the assignment was filed with
the judge of the probate court.
" The amount due the plaintiff on the first day of this term,
secured by said mortgage, is $6,542.41 ; F. W. Browne, assignee,
was removed, and George L. Rouse, defendant,
was appointed
trustee in his place.
The property has been sold, and the proceeds
are in the hands of said trustee.
The plaintiff presented his claim to
said trustee, and demanded its allowance and payment, all of which
the said trustee refused.
"As conclusion of law the court finds that the mortgage is a valid
instrument, and has preference over the assignment, and the plaintiff
is entitled to the payment thereof from the proceeds of the mortgaged

property.
" To all of which findings the defendant then and there excepted."
* * *
WILLIAMS, J. The general question for decision in this case is,
whether a corporation for profit, organized under the laws of this
state, can, in the disposition of the corporate property, after it has
become insolvent, and ceased to further prosecute the objects for
which it was created, prefer some of its creditors over others.
The claim of the plaintiff in error is, that when the corporation
becomes insolvent and ceases to carry on business, its property and
assets constitute a trust fund for the benefit of its creditors, and the
directors in possession of the corporate property, being trustees for
all the creditors, can not lawfully dispose of it otherwise than for the
The defendant in error,
equal benefit of all the corporate creditors.
on the other hand, contends that when not restricted by the law of
their creation, or prevented by the operation of some bankrupt or insolvent law, insolvent corporations may, the same as natural persons,
make preferences among their creditors.
Decisions of courts will be found maintaining each of these diverse
The precise question has not been decided in this state,
positions.
and in view of the conflict of authority elsewhere, we are at liberty
to adopt that rule which best harmonizes with the policy and legislation of the state, rests upon the sounder reason, as we conceive it to
be, and coincides with our sense of justice and right.
The right of the individual debtor to prefer one creditor to another,
though at the time insolvent, rests upon his complete dominion over,
and consequent unrestricted power of disposition of his property.
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cases which hold that insolvent corporations are entitled to
make preferences among their creditors, attribute to them the same
unlimited control over their property that is possessed by individuals
over theirs.
In Catlin v. Eagle Bank of New Haven, 6 Conn. 233,
which is the leading case in this country maintaining the right of an
insolvent corporation to prefer one or more of its creditors over others,
the decision is distinctly placed upon the ground that the particular
corporation was invested with the control and power to dispose of the
corporate property, as fully and to the same extent that natural persons
*
* *
have with respect to their property.
(Quoting from the case.)
We have not the charter of the corporation in question in that case
"before us, but we assume that the learned judge was correct in saying
that by every fair construction it conferred upon the corporation the
If so, no fault need
entire control of its property after its insolvency.
be found with his conclusion, that it might, like any individual, prefer
some of its creditors over others.
Corporations generally do not possess such amplified powers, and
especially those created under the laws of this state. In this state
corporations have not the same powers and capacities as natural persons, but are authorized for specified and defined purposes.
They
are clothed with those attributes only with which the law under which
they are created invests them, and can exercise no powers not expressly conferred, or necessary to carry into effect those in terms
granted.
Since the constitution of 1851, it has been the settled policy of this
state to afford adequate protection to the creditors of corporations.
That constitution contains the provision that "dues from corporations
shall be secured by such individual liability of the stockholders and
other means as may be prescribed by law, but in all cases each stockholder shall be liable, over and above the stock by him or her owned,
and any amount unpaid thereon, to a further sum, at least equal in
amount to such stock." Legislation, under this constitution, has been
All corporashaped to fully effectuate the constitutional
guarantee.
tions organized for profit are required to have a capital stock, 50 per
cent, of which must be subscribed, and at least 10 per cent, paid in,
before the organization can be effected, and the stockholders are made
liable, in addition to their stock, to an amount equal to the stock held
by them, to secure the payment of the debts of the corporation. This
liability, it has uniformly been held by this court, is a security exclusively for the benefit of the creditors of the corporation, over which
the corporation has no control; and, moreover, the security is for the
The suit to enforce it must be by all
equal benefit of all the creditors.
the creditors, and against all the stockholders, and no creditor can
acquire priority over the others with respect to it. And, while power
is conferred on corporations to reduce their capital stock, it is expressly provided that the rights of creditors shall not be affected, nor
in any way impaired.
The corporate powers, business and property of the corporation
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must be exercised, conducted and controlled by a board of directors,
all of whom must be stockholders; and, as a still further guarantee
for creditors, the powers of corporations over their property, its use
and disposition, are so circumscribed
by positive statute that no corporation can employ its stock, means, assets or other property, directly or indirectly, for any other purpose whatever than to accomplish the legitimate objects of its creation.
The extent of the powers
conferred
on
them
to
sue
and
be sued, contract and be
are,
expressly
contracted with, and acquire and convey such real and personal estate
as may be necessary or convenient to carry into effect the objects of
the incorporation, to make and use a common seal, and do all needful acts to carry into effect the objects for which they are created.
It
is obvious that the corporate property can not with propriety be said
to be owned by the corporation, in the sense of ownership as applied
to property belonging to natural persons.
The latter may without
restriction acquire and dispose of property for any lawful purpose,
while both the power of acquisition and disposition of the former are
limited to the special objects already mentioned.
The corporate
property is in reality a fund set apart to be used only in the attainment of the objects for which the corporation was created, and it can
not lawfully be diverted to any other purpose.
As soon as acquired
it becomes impressed with the character of a trust fund for that purpose, and the. shareholder or creditor may interpose to prevent its diversion from the objects of the incorporation injurious to him.
Taylor on Private Corporations,
34.
The custody and control of the property, and the management of
the business of the corporation, are confided to a board of directors
chosen by the shareholders.
Into the hands of these officers, through
whom alone corporations can act, the shareholders surrender their
funds and entrust the management of the affairs and property of the
A relation of trust and confidence, therefore,
corporation to them.
arises between the stockholders and directors of a corporation, out of
which grow the duties of the latter, to so administer the trust as will
best promote the interests of the former, to pay them their appropriate dividends from time to time, and upon the termination of the corporation to distribute to them their respective shares of the corporate
These duties
property after the payment of its debts and liabilities.
are eminently of a fiduciary nature.
It is now so well established as
to be no longer a subject of controversy, that the relation of trustee
and cestui que trust subsists between the directors and shareholders.
And, since the directors, as such trustees, represent and act for all the
shareholders, they can not lawfully favor any particular shareholder
or class of shareholders, but every authority and power possessed by
them must be exercised for the benefit of all alike.
Otherwise no
If the directors and officers of a corporacorporation could endure.
tion were allowed, in the conduct of the business and disposition of
the property, to favor one or more shareholders to the detriment of
the others, the minority would be the prey of the majority, for it
would then be within the power of the majority to combine and elect
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the officers, who in turn should manage the whole business and apply
the whole corporate property for the benefit of the majority, and thus
practically confiscate the entire property interest of the minority.
Corporations would thus become traps for the unwary and legalized
instruments of fraud.
The doctrine that the directors are trustees for
the shareholders, and for the equal benefit of all, it is obvious, is essential to the existence of corporations.
But it is the right of the creditors, equally with the shareholders,
to have the corporate property applied to the purposes for which the
corporation was created, and this includes the payment of the corporate indebtedness contracted in the prosecution of its business. The
rights of the creditors to the corporate property, so far as it is necessarv to meet their demands, are superior to those of stockholders.
In Perry on Trusts, section 242, the relative rights of the creditors
and shareholders are thus defined:
corporation holds its property
in trust, first, to pay its creditors, and second, to distribute to its
If, therefore, a corporation should dissolve,
stockholders -pro rata.
and divide its property among its shareholders without first paying its
debts, equity would enforce the claims of its creditors by converting
all persons, except bona fide purchasers for value, to whom the property had come, into trustees, and would compel them to account for
the property and contribute to the payment of the debts of the corporation to the extent of its property in their hands."
It is now firmly established that the property and assets of a corpotion are a trust fund for the payment of its debts, especially in case
of its insolvency.
Since the case of Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason
311, where Mr. Justice Story is said to have first formulated the doctrine, it has been generally accepted, and is sustained by the highest
Mr. Justice Swayne announces it with great clearness, in
authority.
Sanger v. Upton, 91 U. S. 56, 60, as follows: "The capital stock of
an incorporated company is a fund set apart for the payment of its
debts.
It is a substitute for the personal liabilities which subsists in
When debts are incurred, a contract arises
private co-partnerships.
with the creditors that it shall not be withdrawn or applied, otherwise
The
than upon their demands, until such demands are satisfied.
creditors have a lien upon it in equity.
If diverted, they may follow
it as far as it can be traced, and subject it to the payment of their
claims, except as against holders who have taken it bona fide for a
valuable consideration, and without notice.
It is publicly pledged to
those who deal with the corporation for their security."
[Citing and quoting from, to the same effect, CuiTan v. State of
Arkansas, 15 How. 312; Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45, 47;
Haywood v. Lumber Co., 64 Wis. 639; Taylor v. Miami Exporting
Co., 5 Ohio 165; Goodin v. -The Canal Co., 18 Ohio St. 182.]
It being established that the corporate property is a trust fund for the
benefit of the corporate creditors, it follows that after the insolvency of
the corporation is ascertained, and the objects of its creation are no
longer pursued, the managing board of directors then having the custody of the property, become trustees thereof for the creditors; and
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this relation necessarily forbids any discrimination between the beneficiaries in the distribution or application of the fund.
The due execution of the trust demands absolute impartiality toward the cestui
They must be treated alike, and no preference can be
que trtistent.
made among them without a direct violation of the duties arising from
It would seem clear that, if the corporate property conthe relation.
stitutes a fund for the creditors, it is as much so for one creditor as for
another, and that the directors in possession are without authority to
dispose of it in disregard of the rights of any creditor.
They can
no more discriminate between creditors in such cases than they could
before the insolvency of the corporation between the shareholders.
The objects for which the corporation was created being no longer
prosecuted, and the occasion for the exercise by the board of directors
of the power of control and disposition of the property for such purpose having ceased, there remains no purpose to which its assets can
lawfully be devoted except to the payment of the debts.
In equity the corporate property becomes the property of the creditors, and their equities are equal.
Every creditor, who became such
by parting with his money, property or other thing of value to the
of its purposes, and
corporation, contributed to the accomplishment
augmented its corporate fund ; and when the fund is no longer demanded for the purposes of the corporation, the rights of the creditors
become fixed instantly and equally; for each, having contributed to
in proportion to his claim,
the common fund, has an interest in
This interest
sometimes called
equally with every other creditor.
the equitable lien of the creditor on the corporate property, which enhas left the hands of the directors,
even after
ables him to follow
can be found, except in the possession of bona fide purwherever
to the payment of the corporate indebtchasers for value, and subject
It would seem to result, as necessary consequence, that inedness.
solvent corporations which have ceased to carry on business can not, by
pledge or mortgage of the corporate property to some of the creditors,
in payment or security of antecedent debts, without other consideraand this
tion, create valid preferences in their favor over others
the view maintained by the more recent writers on the subject.
In the last edition of Taylor on Private Corporations,
said
"When corporations become insolvent, the duty of the directors tofor,
ward its creditors becomes even stricter and more imperative
under such circumstances, the rights of creditors are paramount, and
and
has become probable that they will be somewhat damaged
the plain duty of directors who control the funds from which corpoto see that the loss
as small as possible.
rate debts are paid,
Moreover, since, upon the insolvency of the corporation, the rights of
would seem to be unlawful, even in
unsecured creditors are equal,
for directors to make
the absence of
statute expressly forbidding
And,
in section 668,
prefei'ences among them."
(Section 759.)
further said:
"To allow an insolvent corporation to make an assignment of its property, giving preferences to
portion of its creditors over the others,
unjust, as well as utterly repugnant to the doc-
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trine that corporate property is a trust fund, on the credit of which
If such property constitutes
persons contract with the corporation.
such a fund, it is clearly held in trust for the benefit of one creditor
just as much as another, and to prefer one creditor to another is eviThis view is far from
dently beyond the authority of the trustee.
being unsupported by direct authority."
Mr. Morawetz, in his excellent work on private corporations, referring to the cases which hold that corporate preferences are valid,
says:
"This doctrine, in the opinion of the writer, is wholly indefensible
on principle.
The capital provided for the security of the creditors
of a corporation is a fund held for the benefit of all the creditors
equally. That the unsecured creditors of a corporation are entitled
to an equal, distribution of the common security, has often been recognized by the courts of equity in adjusting the rights of creditors among
themselves and in relation to the company's shareholders.
After a
corporation has become insolvent, and has ceased to carry on business, the rights of its creditors become fixed. If a corporation, whose
assets are not sufficient to satisfy all of its creditors in full, can prefer
certain creditors, leaving others unpaid, this must be by virtue of a
power reserved by implication to the company and its agents. But
this power can not justly be included in the general powers of management which a corporation must necessarily possess over its property, in order to carry on its business and further the purposes for
which the company was formed. The purposes of a corporation are
not furthered in any manner by giving it or its agents the power, after
the company has become insolvent and has ceased to carry on business, and after its shareholders have lost their interests in the corporate
estate, to prefer a portion of the creditors, according to interest or
mere whim, and to pay their claims in full, leaving the others wholly
without redress. The doctrine that an insolvent corporation may prefer certain creditors at the expense of others, seems to have been first
started in Catlin v. Eagle Bank (6 Conn. 233), a case in which the
fundamental rule that the assets of an insolvent corporation constitute
a trust fund pledged for the security of creditors was denied.
It is a
doctrine which is at variance with the whole theory of the law concerning the rights of creditors of insolvent corporations, and is contrary to the plainest principles of justice."
(2 Morawetz Corporations,
803.)
And in a very recent work on insolvent corporations it is said :
"The practical working of the rule sustaining corporate preferences
The unpref erred creditors have only a myth or shadow
is monstrous.
left to which resort can be had for payment of their claims; a soulless, fictitious, unsubstantial entity that can be neither seen nor found.
The capital and assets of the corporation, the creditors' trust fund,
may, under this rule, be carved out and apportioned among a chosen
few, usually the family connections or immediate friends of the officers making the preference.
This rule of law is entitled to take prec-
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edence among the many reckless absurdities to be met with in cases
affecting corporations, as being a manifest travesty upon natural jus" Elsewhere we
tice." (Wait on Insolv. Corporations,
162.)
have deprecated the right, which is recognized in a number of cases,
It would
of insolvent corporations to make preferential assignments.
seem to be an idle waste of words to designate the capital and assets
of a corporation as a trust fund for the benefit and security of creditors in the event-of dissolution or insolvency, if one of the first princicould be openly
equality of distribution
ples of the law of trusts
violated, and the effects of the bankrupt company apportioned among
a favored few."
(Wait on Insolv. Corporations,
654.)
Without extending the discussion, we are of opinion that when a
corporation for profit, organized under the laws of this state, becomes
insolvent and ceases to carry on its business or further pui'sue the purposes of its creation, the corporate property constitutes a trust fund
for the equal benefit of the corporate creditors, in proportion to the
amounts of their respective claims ; and that it can not then, by pledge
or mortgage of the property to some of its creditors as security for antecedent debts, without other consideration, create valid preferences
in their behalf, over the other creditors, or over an assignment thereafter made for the benefit of creditors.
Instead of the individual liability of the stockholders being a ground
of objection to this conclusion, it furnishes an additional reason in its
It is well settled that the corporate property is the primary
support.
fund for the payment of the debts of the corporation, and the statutory
liability of the stockholder is a security to be resorted to only when the
payment of its debts can not be enforced against its property, and it was
held in Harpold v. Stobart, 46 Ohio St. 397, decided at this term, that
stockholders who have assigned their stock to an insolvent assignee,
are liable only for such portion of the debts existing while they were
such stockholders, as is equal to the proportion which their stock bears
Adto the stock held by all stockholders liable for the same debts.
mit the power of the board of directors of an insolvent corporation to
make preferences among its creditors, and it must follow that they may
This would be
prefer any they choose to select for that purpose.
relation
trust
between the
inconsistent
with
the
subsisting
wholly
directors and shareholders, for since different stockholders, or classes
of stockholders, may be liable for different debts, and not all for the
same debts, if the directors could apply the corporate property to
some of its debts, leaving others entirely unprovided for, they would
be at liberty to select the debts for which particular stockholders alone
were liable, and appropriate all of the property to their satisfaction,
leaving the other stockholders to respond to the full extent of their
The directors would in
statutory liability for the remaining debts.
this way be enabled to apply the whole corporate property to their
own exoneration.
Whether an insolvent corporation, which is still a going concern,
and in good faith engaged in the prosecution of its business, may borrow money, or contract, or procure an extension of other bona fide
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indebtedness, and convey or pledge the corporate property in security
thereof, is a question not involved in this case, and upon which we
here express no opinion.
It appears from the rinding of facts in this case that the directors of
the corporation declared its insolvency, and directed by the same resolution the execution of an assignment for the benefit of its creditors,
and of the preferential mortgages to the bank and other creditors.
It
does not appear that there had been any agreement between the mortgagees and the corporation that such mortgages should be given, nor
that they were given for any other consideration than the antecedent
indebtedness of the corporation to the creditors receiving them. Being
merely voluntary mortgages to secure pre-existing debts, without other
consideration, they can not prevail against the equitable rights of the
Lewis v. Anderson, 20 Ohio St. 281. * * *
corporate creditors.

Reversed.

Note.
Accord: 1893, Lyons, Thomas H., Co. v. Perry, 86 Tex. 143, 22 L. R.
A. 802; 1895, Tradesman Pub. Co. v. Knoxville, etc., Co., 95 Tenn. 634, 49
Am. St. Rep. 943, 32 S. W. Rep. 1097; 1895, Pollak v. Muscogee, etc., 108 Ala.
467,54 Am. St. Rep. 165; 1895, Adams & W. Co. v. Deyette, 8 S. D. 119, 59
Am. St. Rep. 751, 65 N. W. Rep. 471 ; 1897, Cook v. Moody, 18 Wash. 114, 63
Am. St. Rep. 872, note; 1897, Campbell, etc., Co. v. Harder, 50 Neb. 283, 61
Am. St. Rep. 573; 1897, Memphis Barrel, etc., Co. v. Ward, 99 Tenn. 172, 63
Am. St. Rep. 825; 1899, Tate v. Commercial Building Assn., 97 Va. 74, 45 L.
R. A. 243 (statute) ; 1899, Burrell v. Bennett, 20 Wash. 644; 1899, Slack v. N.
W. Nat'l Bk., 103 Wis. 57, 79 N. W. Rep. 51 (fraudulent preference) ; 1899, U.
S. Rubber Co. v. Am. 0. L. Co., 96 Fed. Rep. 891 (same).
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It would seem, from the language of the second issue submitted to
the jury, which is similar to language found in the opinion in LyonsThomas Hardware Co. v. Perry Stove Mfg. Co., 86 Tex. 143, 24
S. W. Rep. 16, that the trial court concluded that it had been held in
that opinion that if the corporation " had taken, or was in the act of
taking, any steps which would practically have incapacitated it from
conducting its business with reasonable prospects of success," the
point had been reached when the property had become trust funds for
all the creditors.
No such inference can be legitimately drawn from
that decision.
It is true that very similar language is used in that decision, but it is copied from the case of Corey v. Wadsworth (Ala.),
r i So. Rep.
But the theory of that opinion was not adopted by
350.
the supreme court, and it was clearly indicated by language immediately following the quotation that the rule enunciated was not adopt-

1
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ed.
It was not necessary to the decision of the case before the supreme court, and was adopted only in so far as it held " that when a
corporation's assets are insufficient for the payment of its debts, and
it has ceased to do business," the point is reached where its property
can not be attached at the instance of a creditor.
The assertion in
the opinion in Rogers v. Lumber Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 33 S. W.
Rep. 312, that the language of the opinion in Corey v. Wadsworth
was approved by Judge Stayton, seems to be founded on a misconThe court of civil appeals on rehearing in
ception of his language.
the Rogers Lumber Co. case receded from the position it had taken
in its original opinion, that a writ of attachment could not properly
be levied on corporation assets after its insolvency, and placed its decision on the ground laid down in Lyons-Thomas Hardware Co. v.
Perry Stove Mfg. Co., that when a corporation has ceased to do
business its property becomes a trust fund for the benefit of all the
In the case of Farmers' and Merchants' Nat. Bank v.
creditors.
Waco EL Ry., etc., Co., 36 S. W. Rep. 131, it was said by the
court of civil appeals of the third district: " The supreme court has
recently decided that no preference over general creditors can be acBut
quired by levy upon the property of an insolvent corporation."
we haVe not seen any opinion of the supreme court in which such
doctrine was enunciated, but in the cases of Shoe Co. v. Thompson 1 and Moon Bros.' Carriage Co. v. Waxahachie Grain and Imp.
Co., 2 hereinbefore cited, it was distinctly held that a preference over
general creditors would be obtained by the levy of an attachment upon
the property of an insolvent corporation, if it had not ceased to carry
on its business in the usual course of trade.
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90 Texas Rep. 150,

The question involved is this, could the McLeod Artesian Well
Company, a corporation doing business in this state, but created under the laws of the state of Iowa, being insolvent and having ceased
to do business, make a mortgage upon its property in this state giving
a preference to one or more creditors over others, which mortgage a
corporation created under the laws of this state could not have made
under similar conditions? In other words, do the general laws of another state govern in the interpretation of a contract made by a corporation of such state with reference to its property situated in this state,
when such contract is in violation of the laws or public policy of this
state
1

?

35 S.

W. Rep.

473.

a

35 S.

W. Rep.

337.
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Mr. Thompson, in his recent woi -k on Corporations, volume

1829

6, section 7885, states the rule, which we believe to be correct, as follows:
"Without attempting to enumerate in a single section all the cases to
which this comity does not extend, it may be observed, in the first
place, that it does not extend so far as to concede to foreign corporations the powers which their own charters do not permit them to exercise, nor so far as to permit a foreign corporation to exercise powers
within the state which a domestic corporation of the same kind is not
permitted to exercise under the constitution and policy of the state."
This rule is well sustained by the authorities, of which we cite the
Falls v. U. S., etc., B. Co., 97 Ala. 417, 38 Am. St.
following:
Rep. 194; Guilford v. Tel. Co., 59 Minn. 332, 50 Am. St. Rep.
407; Hutchins v. The N. E. Coal and Mining Co., 4 Allen 580;
Milnor v. Railway, 53 N. Y. 363; Rorer on Interstate Law, 288.
Morawetz on Private Corporations, section 976, volume 2, states
the proposition thus:
"It is the charter alone which is recognized by
the law of comity, and not the general legislation of the state in which
The word charter is here used to sigthe corporation was formed.
nify the agreement between the shareholders of the corporation,
whether this agreement be contained in a special act of the legislature
or in articles of association or in either of these taken in connection
with certain general laws of the state.
"The law of comity merely enables the corporators to exercise the
franchise of acting in a corporate capacity in foreign states, and the
extent of this franchise is determined by the agreement entered into
when the charter was accepted.
The laws of the state where the
formed
the
was
agreement of the corporators are recorporation
by
determine
so
far
as
the scope and validity of this
garded only
they
itself.
agreement
"The general law and regulations of a state are intended to govern
only within the limits of the state enacting them, and the state would
*
*
*
have no power to give them extra-territorial force.
It follows, therefore, that if a statute enacted by a state, whether as a general law or as a special provision in the charter of a corporation, was
enacted for the enforcement of a local policy only, it would not be
presumed that such statutory provision was intended by the state or
by the shareholders forming the corporation to enter into the charter
contract and to regulate the company in its transactions outside of the
state, and such enactment will, therefore, not affect the validity of the
dealing of the company in foreign states."
Applying these principles of law to the facts of this case, it follows
that, if the mortgage in question was made contrary to the laws of
this state or to its public policy, it is void, and conferred no rights
A corporation created in this state, which has
upon the mortgagee.
and
become insolvent
has ceased to carry on its business, can not
of
make any disposition
its property which gives a preference to one
or more creditors over others, for the reason that, upon insolvency
and cessation of the business, the assets of the corporation by operation of the law becomes a trust fund in the hands of its directors to be
2 WIL. CAS.
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disposed of for the benefit of its creditors, and any disposition which
between such creditors is a violation of that trust.
discriminates
Lang v. Dougherty, 74 Texas 226; Hardware Co. v. Mfg. Co., 86

Texas

If

143.

McLeod Artesian Well Company had been a domestic corporation and had made the mortgage in question under the same conditions it would be void because contrary to the laws and public policy
of this state, as declared in the decision of its court as above cited;
and it must be so held in this case unless its validity can be supported
upon the ground that it is sustained by the laws of the state of Iowa.
Counsel for the defendants in error claim that the mortgage in question in this case is valid for the following reasons.1. That there is no law in Texas which renders such transaction invalid, but that the decisions of our courts, and especially that of LyonsThomas Hardware Co. v. Manufacturing Co., rest upon the ground
that the statutes of this state do not confer upon corporations power
the

to make such instruments.
2. Because the transaction is to be governed by the laws of Iowa,
where the contract was made, and in which state it would be valid,
and not by the laws of Texas.
In the case of Lyons-Thomas Hardware Co. v. Manufacturing
Co., 1 cited above, Judge Staytori reviewed the authorities exhaustively
to show that an insolvent corporation which had ceased to do business
could not make a mortgage giving preferences to some creditors over
others, for the reason which we have before stated, that upon the happening of such conditions the directors of the corporation by operation
of law become trustees charged with the distribution of its assets
among all of its creditors, and thus being constituted trustees they could
not deprive the beneficiaries of that trust of their proportionate part
of the assets of the corporation by means of conveyances of the property so held to one or more of the creditors in preference to the others.
The decision is not placed upon the ground that the authority is not
conferred upon the corporation by the laws of this state, as is insisted
by counsel for the 'defendant in error, but in that case it was insisted that a corporation had the inherent right at common law to
make such a conveyance.
Judge Stayton conclusively showed, from
the best considered authorities, that the rule claimed applied only to
common-law corporations, and not to those created by statute, and
then, in order to conclusively show that the rule announced as applicable
to insolvent corporations
applied in this state under such circumstances, he examined our statutes, from which examination it appeared
that no such authority had been either directly or by implication conferred upon corporations in this state. That case clearly settled the law
upon this question in Texas, and it is no longer open to controversy
that an insolvent corporation can not, in this state, when it has ceased
to perform the business for which it was created, dispose of its assets
so as to deprive its creditors of a fair and just distribution of the same.
In support of the second proposition above stated, it is claimed that
1 86
Tex. 143.
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this mortgage having been executed in Iowa, where the law permitted
such disposition of the property, it is to be governed in its construction and enforcement by the laws of that state.
We will remark,
however, that it was made with a view to its enforcement in Texas,
*
*
*
and embraced alone property situated in Texas.
v.
Tex.
Weider
v. Madreviewing
Ryan
Railway,
13;
(After
65
dox, 66 Tex. 372; Rue v. Railway, 74 Tex. 479; Estate of Prime,
136 N. Y. 347; Barth v. Backus, 140 N. Y. 230, proceeds:)
We are earnestly asked to carefully examine Vanderpoel v. Gorman, 140 N. Y. 563, which, upon careful examination, we find to be
a case in which a corporation created under the laws of New Jersey,
doing business in the state of New York, made a general assignment
for the benefit of all of its creditors without preferences.
An attachment was levied in the state of New York upon the property assigned,
and the assignee brought suit to recover damages for the levy upon
and sale of the property.
The defendant in that suit claimed that the
on
of the provisions of a statute of the
void
account
was
assignment
state which, among other things, provided: "That no corporation
shall make any transfer or assignment to any person whatever in contemplation of its insolvency, and every such assignment is declared
to be void."
It was claimed that the foreign corporation was embraced in the
The court held that the law above
general language of this statute.
did
not
to
That court also held
foreign corporations.
quoted
apply
that the right to make such an assignment as was made in that case
was inherent in all corporations unless prohibited, and not being prohibited to the foreign corporation by the terms of the statute, the assignment was not violative of any law in the state of New York.
There are two marked distinctions between that case and this:
1.
The instrument in that case was of a character which the laws
of New York permitted to be made and which the courts of that state
held all corporations had the inherent power to make unless restrained
therefrom. In this case the instrument is one which the courts of this
state held that no corporation has the power to make unless authorized by statute of this state.
2. In that case the instrument was a general assignment distributing
all of the assets of the corporation equally among the creditors, which
is not denounced by any decision in this state.
While the instrument
in this suit is one which is not approved by the New York case, but is
directly and emphatically denounced by the laws of this state as embodied in the decisions of its courts.
The two cases are so dissimilar that the one is not authority in the
*
*
*
consideration of the other.
If the power claimed for the Artesian Well Company had been explicitly expressed in its charter, it could not have been exercised in
this state by that corporation, because in direct conflict with the laws
and policy of this state, and in such conflict the law of this state must
prevail over the foreign law. Falls v. U. S. Bldg. Co., 97 Ala. 417.
We hold that the mortgage executed by the McLeod Artesian Well

OLNEY ET AL. V. THE CONANICUT LAND CO.

1832

649

Company to Mrs. Bell was null and void, and that the district court
erred in foreclosing it upon the property embraced therein and in giving
judgment against the defendant Fowler for the said property, or the
value of any part thereof, and that the court of civil appeals erred in
affirming the said judgment. * * *
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Bill in equity to annul a mortgage and for a receiver.
STINESS, J.
The complainants, judgment creditors of the Conanicut Land Company, seek to set aside a mortgage given to the defendants, Lippitt, Davis and Bradford, to secure them for advances, and
for their indorsements of the notes of the company.
The mortgage
had
was given immediately after the complainants
brought suits for
for
damages against the company
negligence, and when the company
was insolvent, the agreed statement of facts showing that it had not
sufficient assets with which to discharge all its outstanding indebtedness, were payment of the same to be demanded when due.
Since
then the complainants have levied execution on the property of the
The complainants claim that, as the mortgagees are three
company.
of the four directors who voted to give the mortgage, thereby securing
themselves, their action is so inconsistent with their fiduciary relation
that it should be set aside.
No fraudulent act in regard to the giving
of the mortgage is alleged other than the fact itself, and the case
being submitted on bill, answer and agreed facts as to the validity of
the mortgage, we have the simple question whether directors of an
insolvent corporation are debarred in equity, by virtue of their posiIn so far as the morttion, from preferring debts due to themselves.
is
be
mere
to
regarded as a
gage
preference, it is not contended that
it is invalid.
Except as limited by statute, the right of a debtor to
prefer a part of his creditors has always been upheld in this state.
Dockray v. Dockray, 2 R. I. 547; Elliot v. Benedict, 13 R. I. 463.
The vital question is, whether a director of an insolvent corporation
If he is so, the duty
is to be regarded as a trustee for its creditors.
For
a
trustee
to collect his
of a trustee to a cestui trust is plain.
own debt, to the detriment of that of his cestui, is a clear breach of
fidelity. When one accepts the trust of caring for another's interest
he accepts the attendant duty.
It must be admitted that directors of
a corporation are not technical trustees.
They do not have in themselves the title to property which they hold for the benefit of others ;
The
and certainly, as to creditors, they are under no express trust.
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a legal being, distinct from its stockholders and officers.
It may deal with them as individuals and may owe them debts.
It holds its own property, and has the capacity and responsibility of
Nevertheless the conduct of its affairs must, of neacting for itself.
cessity, be intrusted to officers in .whom confidence is reposed, to
whom large powers are given, and by whom its property is managed
As corporations have multiplied and have
for the common benefit.
become so greatly concerned in business affairs in recent years, the
obligations arising from such a relation have become correspondingly
prominent. While the decisions in regard to this relation are not harmonious, it has been generally agreed that directors are trustees for
stockholders.
This being established, we think it follows naturally
that, when the corporation becomes insolvent and the stockholders
have no longer a substantial interest in the property of the corporation, directors should be regarded as trustees of the creditors to whom
If directors, with their ofthe property of the corporation must go.
fice, assume the duty of caring for the interests of the stockholders,
why do they not also assume the duty incidentally of caring for the
interests of those who, instead of the stockholders, may come to have
claims upon the corporate property?
In speaking of directors as trustees for stockholders, Mr. Justice
Miller, in Sawyer v. Hoag, 17 Wall. 610, calls this "a doctrine of
modern date," but as long ago as the time of Lord Hardwicke we
find the duties and obligations of a director of a corporation thus
take the employment of a director to be of a
clearly set forth:
mixed nature ; it partakes of the nature of a public office, as it arises
from the charter of the crown. But it can not be said to be an emTherefore, committeemen
ployment affecting the public government.
are most properly agents to those who employ them in this trust,
and who empower them to direct and superintend the affairs of the
corporation. By accepting a trust of this sort, a person is obliged to
execute it with fidelity and reasonable diligence, and it is no excuse
to say that they had no benefit from it. but that it was merely honorary, and, therefore, they are within the case of common trustees."
Charitable Corporation v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400. To the effect that the
officers of a corporation are trustees for the stockholders, see Hodges
v. New England Screw Co., i R. I. 312; Hoyle v. Plattsburgh
and Montreal R. R. Co., 54 N. Y. 314; Koehler v. Black River
Co., 2 Black 715; York and North Midland Railway Co. v. Hudson, 16 Beav. 485, 19 Eng. Law & Eq. 361 ; Great Luxembourg
Railway v. Magnay, 25 Beav. 586; Hope et ux. v. Valley City Salt
Co., 25 W. Va. 789. Indeed, no cases that we know of deny a
fiduciary relation of directors to stockholders, however they may differ
in the use of terms to describe it.
This relation has led logically to
the conclusion that in case of insolvency, the assets of the corporation
being no longer held for the benefit of stockholders, but for the benefit
of creditors, the directors owe to the creditors the duty of a trustee.
This duty is clearly stated by Clifford, J., in Bradley v. Converse, 4
Cliff. 375: "Assets of an incorporate company are regarded in equity

corporation is

"I
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as held in trust for the payment of the debts of the corporation, and
courts of equity will enforce the execution of such trusts in favor of
creditors, even when the matter in controversy may not be cognizable in a court of law.
Such assets are usually controlled and managed by directors or trustees, but courts of equity will not permit such
managers in dealing with the trust estate, in the exercise of the powers
of their trust, to obtain any undue advantage for themselves, to the
injury or prejudice of those for whom they are acting in a fiduciary
Exact equality of benefit may be enjoyed, but the trustees
relation.
are forbidden to protect, indemnify or pay themselves at the expense
of those who are similarly in relation to the same fund."
To the same effect are Bradley v. Farwell, i Holmes 433; Jackson v. Ludeling, 21 Wall! 616; Corbett v. Woodward, 5 Sawyer
403; Stout v. Yaegers Milling Co., 13 Fed. Rep. 802; Haywood v.
Lincoln Lumber Co., 64 Wis. 639; Richards v. New Hampshire
Ins. Co., 43 N. H. 263 ; San Francisco and North. Pacific R. R. Co.
v. Bee, 48 Cal. 398; Gaslight Improvement Co. v. Terrell, L. R. 10
Eq. 167; Hopkins & Johnson's Appeal, 90 Pa. St. 69. Of the
cases cited by the defendants, only three fully sustain their claim that,
as creditors of the company, directors may, in the absence of fraud,
secure themselves for their own debt, viz. : Burr's Executors v. McDonald, 3 Grat. 215; Planters' Bank of Farmville v. Whittle, 78
Va. 737; Garrett v. The Burlington Plow Co., 70 Iowa 697. * * *
We think the weight of recent authority regards directors of an insolvent corporation as trustees for creditors, and that this authority
If, as judge Dillon said, the right to
stands upon the better reason.
collect a debt is "a race of diligence," open alike to both, it must be
admitted that it is a race in which the outside creditor is unduly handiThe parties do not contend upon an equal footing, and,
capped.
although it is said that the director has only an advantage which results from his position, and which is known to all who deal with the
corporation, yet no one would say that an ordinary trustee should be
entitled to an unequal start with his cestui, by means of information
If, then, the director be a
received in the discharge of his trust.
relation
to the creditors, in case
trustee, or one who holds a fiduciary
of
his position for his own
of insolvency he can not take advantage
of
the
The right
creditor does not depend upon
benefit to their loss.
*
*
*
fraud or no fraud, but upon the fiduciary relation.
Note.
Accord: Note, 45 Am. St. Rep. 835; note, 57 Am. St. Rep. 78; 1889,
Beach v. Miller, 130 111. 162, 17 Am. St. Rep. 291, note; 1891, Corey v. Wadsworth, 99 Ala. 68, 42 Am. St. Rep. 29; 1893, Hill v. Lumber Co., 113 N. C. 173,
37 Am. St. Rep. 621 ; 1895, Adams & Westlake Co. v. Deyette, 8 So. Dak. 119,
59 Am. St. Rep. 751; 1897, Campbell, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Marder, 50 Neb. 283,
61 Am. St. Rep. 573; 1899, Slack v. Northwestern Natl. Bank, 103 Wis. 57, 74
Am. St. Rep. 841 ; 1900, James Clark Co. v. Colton, 91 Md. 195, 49 L. R. A.
Neb.
698; 1902, Williams v. Turner,
, 88 N. W. 668.
N. C.
Compare, 1902, Graham v. Carr,
, 41 S. E. 379.
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT, DISTRICT OF INDIANA.
Fed. Rep. 231, on 233.

44

It seems to me enough to say that a sound public policy and a sense
of common fairness forbid that the directors or managing agents of a
business corporation, when disaster has befallen or threatens the enterprise, shall be permitted to convert their powers of management and
their intimate, and it may be exclusive, knowledge of the corporate
affairs into means of self-protection to the harm of other creditors.
They ought not be competitors in a contest of which they must be
the judges.
The necessity for this limitation upon the right to give
preferences among creditors when asserted by corporations may not have
been perceived in earlier times, but the growing importance and
variety of modern corporate enterprises and interests, I think, will
The fact in this case that the
compel its recognition and adoption.
stockholders authorized the making of the mortgage seems to be immaterial.
That action was, it is averred, procured by the directors proposed to be benefited, they themselves being stockholders; and, even
if this were not averred, the case would not, I think, be essentially
different.
Whether or not such preferences are fairly given is an impracticable inquiry, because there can be in ordinary cases no means
of discovering the truth, and, consequently, the presumption to the
Concede that it is a
contrary should in every case be conclusive.
of
and
a
in
of a director will be
that
favor
question
proof,
preference
deemed valid if fairly given, and it may as well be declared to be
a part of the law of corporations
that in cases of insolvency debts to
directors and liabilities in which they have a special interest must be
first discharged.
That will be the practical effect, and the examples
will multiply of individual enterprises prosecuted under the guise of
corporate organization, for the purpose, not only of escaping the ordinary risks of business done in the owner's name, which may be legitimate enough, but of enabling the promoters and managers, when
failure comes, to appropriate the remains of the wreck by declaring
themselves favored creditors.
Besides inconsistency with that equality
which equity loves, such favors involve too many possibilities of dishonesty and successful fraud to be tolerated in an enlightened system
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One of the main questions in this case is whether an insolvent and
failing corporation can make a valid transfer of property to one of its
directors in payment of a debt owing from the corporation to him,
thus preferring him to other creditors in the payment of its debts, or,
perhaps more accurately, whether directors of such corporation can
The writer not
prefer themselves in the payment of corporate debts.
only has very affirmative views favorable to the validity of such a
transfer on abstract principles, but he is further quite convinced that
the point has been to all intents and purposes so decided by this court.
We are, of course, aware that many courts have held the contrary
view, and some of the text-writers have strongly condemned the doctrine we believe to be absolutely sound; some of them, indeed, resorting largely to invective and epithet in denunciation of the idea
that a corporation may pay a just debt to an honest creditor, though he
be a director, in preference to the just debts of other honest creditors
who are strangers to the corporation. We have no epithets to apply
to such courts and writers, nor to the rule they declare.
Many of
them are able expounders of the law, and all of them are doubtless
actuated only by a purpose to ascertain and expound the true princiAnd they may be right, and we wrong; but
ple in this connection.
we do not think so, and we shall endeavor to give the reasons for the
faith that is in us.
We are utterly unable to conceive upon any just and sound principle or consideration the least shadow of difference or distinction between the debt of a director and the debt of a stranger against a
corporation upon which could be predicated one rule in respect of a
preference by the corporation in the payment of the former and another rule in respect of such preference in payment of the latter.
Take the case we have here, assuming for the discussion of the point
immediately under consideration that the transaction involves no actual
fraud. The corporation is a going concern, and its managers do not
But it is in debt and needs money to concontemplate its failure.
tinue its business and to pay its maturing obligations. It borrows the
At
money from a director directly or through a pledge of his credit.
the same time it incurs debts to strangers for supplies necessary in
its business.
The money borrowed from the director is used for corIt is paid out to other creditors, or is applied to
porate purposes.
So, also, the supplies constituting the
liquidate corporate expenses.
consideration of the debts to strangers are applied to the authorized
1
This case covers fifty-nine pages, and is entirely too long to print here.
Only the most forcible arguments of McClellan, C. J., can be here given.
He covers the whole ground, both upon reason and authority, in an exhaustive 7way. Coleman, J., dissents in a very vigorous and exhaustive opinion.
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There is nothing
uses of the corporation and inure to its advantage.
*
*
*
covinous in the creation of either class of debts.
A step further in unfolding this question and case: The expectations of the officers and managers of the corporation, entertained at
the time of borrowing the money on the faith of the director, as to
keeping the corporation a going concern and continuing indefinitely to
carry on its business are disappointed. They find that notwithstanding the personal efforts of the director in pledging his credit to raise
money for the business and creditors of the concern, the corporation
can not keep its head above water, but must discontinue its business,
cease to be a going concern and apply its assets to the payment of its
Among these liabilities they find the debt due its director
liabilities.
for money borrowed, and a debt due a stranger for property purThe assets are sufficient to pay one in full and a percentage
chased.
The debts were equally just and bona fide in their
only on the other.
inception. The corporation and its creditors have been equally benefited by each of the transactions by which these debts, respectively,
were incurred.
Neither is tainted by any infirmative circumstance
There is no more abstract justice in paying the stranger
whatever.
in full to the exclusion of the director, than in paying the director in
If one may be so paid, so may
full to the exclusion of the stranger.
the other upon every conceivable consideration of justice and right.
That the stranger creditor may be so paid to the exclusion of the
-director creditor nobody denies.
Indeed there is a sort of alacrity and
in
of
the
so holding, as if the director
authorities
joyousness
many
creditor had been guilty of some enormous wrong or crime in advancing his money to the corporation for the primary benefit of its
stranger creditors without reward or the hope thereof, and he and his
claim for simple reimbursement were unclean and unrighteous things
before the law. That the director creditor may be so paid is strentiously denied bv many authorities, sometimes with an acerbity of
statement and a bitterness of denunciation which happily is rarely
And why may the director creditor
found in jifdicial writings.
not be so preferred and paid ? Confessedly his debt is a just one.
Confessedly the corporation, its business and its creditors are benefited
by the consideration of it as fully as by the consideration of the debt
due the stranger creditor.
Confessedly under a general assignment
the
he
would
be entitled to share upon the same footby
corporation
the
as
creditor.
ing
stranger
Confessedly, indeed, in every continand
under
all
circumstances
and conditions the director creditor
gency
and his claim stand upon the same footing and have the same rights
as the stranger creditor and his claim, except only that, as is insisted,
the corporation may prefer and pay the latter in full while the preference and payment in full of the former is fraudulent and void. There
is, we are firmly of the opinion, no reason whatever for this distinction; and we believe it can be so demonstrated.
Let us first examine the reasons which are advanced by the judges
and writers who hold to that view.
Nearly all of the adjudged cases
which hold that an insolvent and failing corporation can not convey
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property to its officers and directors in payment of their debts in preference to the debts of stranger creditors rest their conclusions entirely
upon the ground that the assets of such corporation constitute a trust
fund in the hands of its officers and managers as trustees for the payment of its debts, and that such trustees can not pay themselves in
We content ourselves upon this point
preference to other creditors.
this
fund
doctrine" has been utterly repudiated
that
"trust
by saying
in this state in a thoroughly considered case, and by an opinion prepared with considerable care and research in which all the judges of
O'Bear Jewelry Co. v. Volfer & Co., 106 Ala.
this court concurred.
s.
28
L.
R.
A.
c.,
But leaving
707; s. c., 54 Am. St. Rep. 31.
205;
the trust fund doctrine out of the case, it is sought to rest the conclusion that the transfer to a director involved in this case is fraudulent
upon other grounds, being the same to which a text-writer or two,
And what
and, perhaps, some courts, have referred a like conclusion.
are they?
In the first place the notion is advanced that such a transfer involves
whether to the corporation
the reservation of a benefit to somebody
or to the director creditor or to the other creditors is not made at all
clear in the statement of the general proposition ; and when a more
concrete statement is ventured upon, the identity of the person or
entity receiving an undue benefit becomes more and more uncertain.
And we do not hesitate to maintain that no benefit is, in such transaction, reserved, or in any way inures to anybody beyond What the
What is a
law clearly and fully contemplates, allows and approves.
benefit reserved which will vitiate the transfer of property by an inIs it not in the
solvent and failing debtor in the payment of a debt?
Is it not essentially and necessanature of things an undue benefit?
rily the securing of some advantage beyond and in addition to the satisfaction of the debt sought to be paid ? Can there be any such thing
as the reservation of a benefit when the whole effect of the transaction
is the payment of a just and honest debt by the transfer to the creditor
of property precisely equal in value to the amount of the debt? * * *
The whole end of the law is, that all the property of an insolvent
The debtor may be a father,
debtor shall be applied to his debts.
son, brother, husband, wife, principal, agent, corporation or individual. Whatever the outside relations are, the law requires only that
his assets shall go to his creditors, and does not require that they shall
go to them ratably; but only that for each dollar in value of such assets a dollar of honest indebtedness shall be paid, wholly irrespective
of whether the debt so paid is due to one creditor or many, or to all
We draw a line. Upon one side of it is the insolvent
of the many.
On the other are ranged his
debtor and his insufficient property.
The law is simply and merely that that
creditors and their claims.
property must pass to the other side of that line, to somebody on the
other side, and to the payment, in whole or part, as the case may be,
of some to the exclusion of other claims on that side, or of all of them
The property must go to the indebtedness ; it must reduce
ratably.
the aggregate of the claims of the several creditors considered as one
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gross sum, and though it thus reduce the gross indebtedness only by
satisfying in full a particular item entering into the aggregate, by paying one claim in full and nothing on the others, the law is satisfied,
its ends have been met, its purpose effectuated ; no undue benefit has
been reserved ; no undue advantage has been taken; and it lies in no
man's mouth to complain.
But it is said that " the officers of an insolvent corporation are in a
position to know the real condition of the corporation, an advantage
not attainable by creditors generally," and for this reason preferences
in the payment of their debts should not be allowed.
Has it ever
been suggested before that better knowledge of a debtor's pecuniary
condition by a particular creditor was any ground for declaring fraudWas
ulent and setting aside a preferential transfer to such creditor?
*
*
such a doctrine ever ruled by any court ? *
The suggestion that a transfer by directors to one of their number
of property in payment of a debt is invalid as being the act of the
party accepting the transfer has no merit dissociated from the exploded "trust fund" doctrine.
On that doctrine the directors become
trustees, and on the principle that a trustee can not transfer the trust
estate to himself as an individual, is rested the further proposition
that directors of an insolvent corporation can not, being trustees,
transfer its property to themselves in payment of debts which the corBut with the elimination of the main proposiporation owes them.
tion, that such directors are trustees, falls the dependent proposition
With
that they can not prefer themselves in the payment of debts.
the trust fund doctrine out of the way, the separate corporate entity
continues to exist for all purposes, wholly unaffected by the fact of
These
insolvency, and its functions must continue to be performed.
functions are performed by the directors, for and in the name of the
corporation, and their official acts are not their individual acts at all,
but the acts of the corporation ; and not being trustees for creditors,
their acts when assailed by creditors are not subject to the rule that
if a trustee contracts with himself in reference to the trust estate his
acts are void at the election of or as against the cesttii que trust.
There being, in such case, no trustee, and no relation of trustee and
cestui que trust between the directors of the corporation
and its
creditors, the matter stands thus :
A corporation without assets to
The debts
pay all its debts, owes its directors and it owes strangers.
of the two classes of creditors are equally honest and just, and stand
The corporation has an
upon the same footing in law and in equity.
undoubted right to pay some creditors to the exclusion of others.
The
Any creditor has the undoubted right to accept a preference.
corporation has the same right to pay its directors as it has to pay stranThe directors have the same right to preferential payment as do
gers.
To the exercise of this undoubted right to make preferstrangers.
ences it is essential that the corporation must act. It can only act through
If the directors can not act to the end of preferring their
the directors.
the
own just debts having the undoubted right to such preference
preference can not be made, and the undoubted right of the corpora-
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tion to make it and of the directors to accept it is denied and defeated.
The ends of the law that the assets of the corporation shall be applied
to such of its debts as the corporation prefers is defeated.
And for
what? Upon what ground? Not that the directors are under any
incapacity to prefer themselves which can be referred to any principle
of law. Not that they "are trustees, for they are not trustees for the
creditors.
Not that they are agents of other creditors, for they are
Not that they occupy any other fiduciary relation
not such agents.
to other creditors, for being only the agents of the corporation, and,
in that capacity only, the trustees for stockholders alone, they bear
and can bear to the creditors, who have to do with the corporation as
an entity and not with the shareholders at all, only the relation of the
agent of a debtor to his creditor, a relation which is obviously as devoid of every attribute of a fiduciary character as the direct relation
of debtor and creditor.
Upon what ground, then, we repeat, is rested
the idea that directors can not prefer themselves?
Getting away
from the trust-fund doctrine, it is based upon the bald assertion that
the director in such case is acting both for the corporation and himself, in contracting in his representative capacity with himself as an
individual ; and this, it is said, the law will not allow. That is the
It can not for a moment be sustained upon
sole ground put forward.
The results claimed do not
principle or well-considered authority.

follow.

is

;

is a

a

;

is

is
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The contract of a director with himself as an individual, the sale of
corporate property by directors to themselves as individuals, is not
void even as against the corporation itself or the stockholders.
Upon
all reason and authority it is perfectly valid, if not disaffirmed by the
And the election belongs excorporation itself or the stockholders.
If they do not exercise
clusively to the corporation and stockholders.
the transaction must stand. Strangers, of course, can not question
it, for they are wholly without interest in the premises. General credsince no right of theirs has been violated by
itors can not question
it. They can not hold the directors to account as fiduciaries, as there
are no fiduciary relations between them. As creditors their only right
to have the corporate assets applied to just corporate debts, and this
not impinged upon, but, to the contrary, fully conserved by
right
the payment of the just debts of the directors.
They have no lien
upon corporate assets they have no rights of ownership in corporate
property. They can not claim their debts should be paid in full to
the total or partial exclusion of other equally honest and just debts.
The property not being impressed with
trust in their favor, and
standing as they do in no superior right to director creditors, they,
the right of preference being recognized, have no shadow of right to
insist upon even pro rata application of the assets to all indebtedness,
their only right
to insist that all the assets shall be applied preferenand this right
absolutely
tially or otherwise to the indebtedness
subserved, as we have seen, by the payment of director creditors to
the exclusion of stranger creditors. They have no right to insist upon
the equal payment of all debts pro rata.
The right of preference,
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which every debtor confessedly has, necessarily involves favoritism,
the right of choice of one creditor, and of any one creditor, to the
exclusion of others.
It is utterly inconsistent with all notions of
equality, and as a natural person may prefer his relatives and friends
to the exclusion of strangers, so an artificial person may prefer its
friends and those occupying official relations to it to the exclusion of
There is, the writer thinks, no semblance of sound prinstrangers.
ciple or well-considered authority for a different conclusion. * * *
Accord: 1890, Rollins v. Shaver Co., 80 Iowa 380 (attachment);
Gould v. L. R. M. R. & I. R. Co., 52 Fed. Rep. 680; 1895, Sanford Fork
& T. Co. v. Howe B., etc., Co., 157 U. S. 312 (mortgage to secure a loan to
the corporation by directors) ; 1895, Schufeldt v. Smith, 131 Mo. 280, 52 Am.
St. Rep. 628; 1895, Bank v. Dovetail, etc., Co., 143 Ind. 550, 52 Am. St. Rep.
435; 1897, South Bend Chilled Plow Co. v. Cribb, etc., Co., 97 Wis. 230;
1897, Atlas Tack Co. v. Hardware Co., 101 Ga. 391 (claim secured by directors) ; 1897, Butler v. Harrison L. & M. Co., 139 Mo. 467, 61 Am. St. Rep. 464;
1898, Rockford Wholesale G. Co. v. Standard G. & M. Co., 175 111. 89, 67 Am.
St. Rep. 205 (claim secured by directors) ; 1898, National Bank v. Scott & Co.,
18 Utah 400, 55 Pac. Rep. 374; 1899, Millsaps v. Chapman, 76 Miss. 942, 71
Am. St. Rep. 547 (mortgage to secure a loan by directors) ; 1898, Anderson
v. Bullock Co. Bk., 122 Ala. 275, 25 So. Rep. 523; 1900, Converse v. Sharpe,
161 N. Y. 571 (secured loan made by director in good faith, when the corporation was thought to be solvent) ; 1901, American Exchange Natl. Bk. v.
Ward, 111 Fed. 782, 49 C. C. A. 611, 55 L. R. A. 356; 1902, Hogsett v. Columbia Iron & Steel Co.,
Pa. St.
, 52 Atl. 179;
1902, Swentzel v. Franklin
Ins. Co.,
Mo.
, 67 S. W. 596.
Note.

1892,

ARTICLE II.

RIGHTS OF CREDITORS.

I . In general : ' 'The legal relations between a creditor
Sec. 652.
and the corporation are occasioned either by a contract binding on the latter, or by a tort, for which it is responsible.
Before the claims of a creditor arise, and during the transaction itself on which his claims are based, the creditor is
simply an outsider towards whom the corporation, or the corporate agent with whom the creditor contracts, owes no duty
And creditors
not due to members of the public at large.
will rarely have any standing in court to object to acts of the
From the mocorporation done before their claims arose.

ment, however, that a person becomes a creditor, the corporation owes it to him to satisfy his claim from the corporate
funds, and is under a duty towards him which he may enforce, not to waste the corporate funds or divert them from
From that mothe purposes for which they were set apart.
funds
in regard to
in
charge
the
corporation, having
ment
it has such
because
which the creditor has rights, occupies,
funds in charge, a position of trust towards him." Taylor
197, 204, and
See, supra,
Private Corporations,
651.
ch. 12, pp. 914-936, supra.
"As a general rule the rights and remedies of the creditors
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of a corporation against it are the same,. both at law and in
equity, as the rights and remedies of the creditors of a natural person are against him. They may sue the corporation
and may
at common law, and recover a judgment against
enforce the judgment by execution against the corporate asnatural person, also, they may come
sets. Like creditors of
court of equity and reach and subject equitable assets
into
Credof the corporation to the satisfaction of their claims.
coritors of
corporation may also attach the property of
the
the
of
statutes,
under
where
natural
property
poration
'person' within
person could be attached. A corporation
Clark, Corporations,
the meaning of the attachment laws."
214-

Sec. 653.

At

2.

law;

execution, etc.
1

THE LOUISVILLE, NEW ALBANY AND CHICAGO RAILWAY COMPANY v. BONEY.
1888.

IN THE SUPREME

COURT

OF

INDIANA.

117

5"-

Ind. Rep.

501

a

;

*
*

Statement abridged

;

1

J.

;

a

a

it

a

&

I.

&

a

a

a

a

&

C. R.

I.

D.

&

Boney, under

I.

1874,

a

contract, constructed some three miles of
in 1875 he gave notice of
contractor's lien, specifying the amount due for work. In 1876 he began suit against the company, got
personal judgment and decree
foreclosing his lien, under which part of the road-bed of the company
was sold, and which Boney purchased for part of the amount of his
judgment; afterwards he levied upon other parts of the road-bed.
Afterward, without making Boney
party, under foreclosure proto Boney's lien, all the propunder
mortgage
subsequent
ceedings
of
were
and
franchises
the
sold to
new corporation
company
erty
called the C.
A. L. R. Co., which, in 1881, completed and put
in operation the railroad, including the three miles purchased by
Boney, and the rest of the road-bed upon which he had levied execuA. L. Co. was consolidated with the
tion. Afterward the C.
Louisville, New Albany
Chicago Ry. Co., which has continuously
In suit, in which
operated and claimed to own all the former road.
both
and
this
were
was
parties,
Boney
company
adjudged that
his
former
of,
or levy upon,
had
nothing
acquired
purchase
by
Boney
He thereupon instituted this suit in the nature of
the property.
creditor's bill to establish his claim against the company, and obtain
in this suit he obtained judgment
decree for the sale of the road
for $4,580, and for default of payment for forty days an order to sell
the railroad, with all its rights, franchises, privileges and immunities.
From this the company appeals.]
*
MITCHELL,
(After holding there was no error in render-

[In

the road-bed of the

part of opinion omitted.
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ing a judgment in personam against the appellant as successor of the
former company, proceeds:)
The other feature of the case presents a question of much greater
difficulty. According to the established rule of common law, which
controls the current of modern authority, the franchises of a corporation, mere incorporeal hereditaments, were not subject to seizure and
sale upon execution, in the absence of express statutory provisions
It folauthorizing the sale and prescribing the method of transfer.
lows, as a natural sequence, that lands, easements, or things essential to the existence of the corporation and the execution of its
corporate duty, and without which its franchise would be of no practical use, can not be levied upon and sold on execution at law, so as
to detach them from the franchise and thus destroy its use. Indianapolis, etc., G. R. Co. v. State, ex rel., 105 Ind. 37; Ammant v. President, etc., 13 S. & R. 210; Baxter v. Turnpike Co., 10 Lea 488 (4
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cases 134); Herman Ex.,
361.
Thus it has been said, in effect, that the franchises and corporate
rights of a company, and the means which are necessary to enable it
to maintain its existence, and subserve the objects and purposes of
its creation, are incapable of being granted away or transferred by any
act of the company, without express authority, or by any adverse
Canal Co. v. Bonham, 9 W. &
process against it.
Susquehanna
S. 27.
Accordingly, where, upon an execution issued on a judgment recovered against a canal company, the marshal had seized and advertised for sale a toll-house and sundry canal locks and other tangible
property, an injunction was sustained, the court holding that, in the
absence of a statute, neither the franchise of the company, nor any
lands or works essential to the enjoyment of the franchise, and which
could not be separated from it without destroying or impairing its
value, could be sold on execution.
Gue v. Tide Water Canal Co.,
24 How. 257; Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, 21 How. 112.
In a recent case, in which it appeared that a contractor had recovered a judgment against a railroad company, under which the "right
of way to the railroad, so far as the right of way has been obtained,
and all appurtenances belonging to said railroad," were sold by the
sheriff and conveyed to the purchaser, the supreme court of the United
States held the sale void, saying, in effect, that the company had no
estate in its right of way capable of being sold on execution on a
judgment at law, apart from its franchise to own and operate a railroad ; that what the company acquired was merely an easement in
the land to enable it to discharge its function of making and maintaining a public highway, the fee of the soil remaining in the grantor.
Moreover, the court said, in substance, that it would be clearly violative of the policy of the state under whose laws the railroad company had been organized, to permit a private individual to seize and
appropriate, by means of an execution sale, the right of way which
had been acquired by the railroad company in pursuance of the pur-
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East Alabama R. W. Co. v. Doe,
poses for which it was organized.
Ex.
Freeman
ed.),
U.
S.
340;
(2d
179.
114
"It may be considered as settled that a corporation can not lease
or alien any franchise or any property necessary to perform its obligations and duties to the state without legislative authority."
Black v.
Delaware, etc., Canal Co., 22 N. J. Eq. 130-399; Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 71.
Although a corporation, in respect to its capital, may be private, it
may have been created, nevertheless, to accomplish objects in which
the public have a direct concern, and its authority to acquire and hold
property may have been conferred upon it in order that these objects
In such a case the corporation takes its franmight be consummated.
chise, together with such property as the statute enables it to acquire
by the exercise of the power of eminent domain, as a trust from the
state, and it can neither alien the one nor the other without special authority, nor can they be seized and sold by any adverse process against
it, unless express provision to that end has been made by statute.
Stewart's Appeal, 56 Pa. St. 413; Richardson v. Sibley, n Allen 65.
Accordingly it was held that a corporation organized for the purpose of introducing water into a town for the accommodation of the
inhabitants was, in a certain sense, a corporation for public purposes,
and that its buildings and appendages necessary for carrying on its
operations were not subject to sale in the process of enforcing a mechanic's lien taken thereon.
Foster v. Fowler, 60 Pa. St.
" For the sake of the public, whatever is essential to the 27.
corporate
functions shall be retained by the corporation. The only remedy
which the law allows to creditors against property so held is sequestration. And that remedy is consistent with corporate existence,
whilst a power to alien, or liability to a levy and sale on execution,
would hang the existence of the corporation on the caprices of the
managers or on the mercy of its creditors."
Plymouth R. Co. v.
39 Pa. St. 337 (80 Am. Dec. 526).
While it is true that "the franchise to be a corporation

Colwell,

is not a subject of sale and transfer unless the law, by some positive provision,
has made it so, and pointed out the modes in which such sale and
transfer may be effected;" and while the authorities abundantly justify the statement that property acquired and held by a corporation
for the exclusive purpose of enabling it to accomplish the purposes of
its creation can not, without like authority, be either directly or indirectly alienated, it does not follow that the creditors of such a corpoi Freeman Executions,
ration are remediless,
179.
Railroad corporations may sell or mortgage personal property, and
the better view of the subject seems to be, that the corporation's right
voluntarily to alienate property, and the creditor's power to subject it
to the payment of corporate debts, stand upon the same footing. Coe
v. Columbus, etc., R. Co., 10 Ohio St. 372 (75 Am. Dec. 518).

As has been said, there is a distinction between the road and structures immediately connected therewith, and appliances afterwards ob" The interest or right
tained for the purpose of operating the road.

\
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of way in the land required for the construction of the road, the timber and iron of the track, and the depots and structures for the supply
of water and the like, are said to be part of the realty; and the road
is not regarded as so constructed
and prepared for use until such
are
affixed."
But
when
the
road is thus constructed and prethings
for
cars
and
other articles and materials, some
use,
locomotives,
pared
of which are consumed in the use, are requisite, and the conclusion is
well supported that these, when not in actual use, are liable to seizure
and sale for the payment of debts.
Boston, etc., R. Co. v. Gilmore,
37 N. H. 410 (72 Am. Dec. 336) ; Pierce v. Emery, 32 N. H. 484;
Coe v. Columbus, etc., R. Co., supra.
The seizure and sale of such property does not confer any right in
the franchise of the corporation or to any of the privileges of the corporation. It is analogous to the case in which it appeared that the
copyright of a map had been acquired under the act of congress, and
the copper-plate engravings of the author had been seized and sold
on execution ; it was held that the intangible right to strike off and
sell copies of the map was not sold. Stephens v. Cady, 14 How. 528.
In all those cases in which the owner of an intangible right, such as
letters-patent and the like, might himself voluntarily assign
although
not capable of being seized and sold on
property of that description
account of its incorporeal nature,
may, nevertheless, be subjected to
bill in equity.
the payment of the owner's debt by
Ager v. Murray, 105 U. S. 126
A court of equity may by its decree compel the owner to execute
an assignment of letters-patent, because he
himself possessed of the
But in the absence of
statute authorizing
a
power to assign.
railroad corporation to transfer its
court of equity can not compel
essential to the exercise of its corfranchise or such property as
porate obligations, because, in the absence of such authority, the corporation could not itself voluntarily alienate or assign its property of
that description.
The plaintiff in the present case acquired
mere statutory lien upon
The statute provides
so much of the roadbed as he had constructed.
that the lien may be foreclosed, but
makes no provision for the sale
of the franchise, or of the road as an entirety, or of anything that
would in effect destroy or impair the use of the franchise.
The statutes regulating the construction and operation of railroads
within the state plainly contemplate that the power to condemn lands
and construct and operate railroads shall be confided to railroad corno provision by which an individual citizen may
porations. There
condemn land for railroad purposes, nor
contemplated that lands
condemned and used for such purposes may afterwards be sold out on
execution or by order of the court, and become the property of an
not dissolved and continues
individual, so long as the corporation
The statute, unlike that
in the use of its franchises and property.
which authorizes railroad companies to execute mortgages on their
lien, and nothing more.
property and franchises, gives the contractor
As
appears in the present case that the debt remains unpaid, the
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lien affords the basis for the exercise by a court of chancery of its
flexible jurisdiction to coerce payment of the debt.
The legislature
doubtless deemed it the wiser course to leave the method of coercing
payment in each case to the court, rather than to prescribe a method
which might be suited to one case and not to another. While the corporation is solvent, with property and officers and agents, subject to
the order and process of the court, within the state, a court of chancery
can not be without expedients for coercing payment out of any money
or property which the corporation itself might have applied to that
purpose.

We know judicially that the Louisville, New Albany and Chicago
Railway Company has hundreds of miles of railroad in operation in
There is no suggestion that the corporation is
the state of Indiana.
It has, aside from its franchise and fixed property, perhaps
insolvent.
many thousands of dollars' worth of property within the state which
is subject to seizure and sale ; besides, it has many financial officers
and agents in the state who receive daily thousands of dollars for the
corporation. All these are subject to the order and process of the
court.
This is the extent to which the court can go until it appears
that the corporation is insolvent and unable to pay its debts or meet
unable, in fact, longer to disits current obligations and liabilities
In such a case,
charge the duties resting upon it as a corporation.
doubtless, a court of chancery would have the power to take possession of the corporate property by means of a receiver, and wind up
the corporation and sell its property. Upon that subject we decide
nothing until a case arises.
The conclusion of the whole matter in the present case is, that the
order of the circuit court directing the railroad to be sold as an entirety, together with all its franchises, privileges and immunities
thereto, was in excess of the power of the court.
So far as cases
relied on seem to support a contrary doctrine from that above
enunciated, they are not deemed applicable to the facts in the present
case.
Dayton, etc., R. R. Co. v. Lewton, 20 Ohio St. 401; Railroad Co. v. James, 6 Wall. 750.
The justice of the case requires that, to the extent that the decree
of the court orders the sale of the railroad of the Louisville, New
Albany and Chicago Railway Company, as in the decree specified,
including its franchises, privileges and immunities connected therewith, it should be modified and reversed with the costs of this appeal.
So far as the decree orders and adjudges that the above named railroad company pay the plaintiff the sum therein named, it is affirmed,
with leave to take such further steps, not inconsistent with this opinion,
as may be deemed necessary to coerce payment of the judgment.
See, 1825, Ammant v. Turnpike Road, 13 S. & R. 210, 15 Am. Dec.
Note.
593, note 595, 596; 1845, Susquehanna Canal Co. v. Bonham, 9 Watts & S. 27,
42 Am. Dec. 315; 1855, Baltimore & O. R. v. Gallahue's Admr., 12 Gratt.
(Va.) 655, 65 Am. Dec. 254; 1858, Boston, etc., R. v. Gilmore, 37 N. H. 410,
1860, Gue v.
72 Am. Dec. 336 (rolling stock may be taken on execution^;
Canal Co., 24 How. 257; 1861, Plymouth R. Co. v. Colwell, 39 Pa. St. 337, 80

THE CREDITORS AND THE CORPORATION.

654

1847

Am. Dec. 526; 1892, Overton Bridge Co. v. Means, 33 Neb. 857, 29 Am. St.
Rep. 514; 1893, Gardner v. Mobile, etc., R., 102 Ala. 635, 48 Am. St. Rep. 84;
1895, Reynolds v. Reynolds Lumber Co., 169 Pa. St. 626, 47 Am. St. Rep. 935
(property of purely private corporation may betaken); 1898, Risdon Iron
Works v. Citizens' Tr. Co., 122 Cal. 94, 68 Am. St. Rep. 25 (rolling stock may
be taken on execution) ; 1900, State v. Turnpike Co.,
N. J.
, 46 Atl.
Rep. 569.

Compare

308, 309, 310, supra.

Sec. 654.

3-

(a)

In equity.

JOSHUA B. WOOD
1824.

Theories:

Assets are a trust fund for creditors.
AND

OTHERS v.

JEREMIAH DUMMER

AND OTHERS. 1

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
(U. S. Circuit) Rep. 308-323.

3

Mason

Bill in equity brought by the plaintiffs, as holders of the bank notes
of the Hallowell and Augusta Bank, against the defendants, as stock-

holders in the same bank, for payment of the same notes upon the
ground of an asserted fraudulent division of the capital stock of the
bank by the stockholders.
The defendants put in answers, denying
the fraud, but admitting the division of the capital stock, etc., and
denying the plaintiff's title to relief.
[The bank was incorporated in 1804, with a capital stock of
its charter expired in 1812, but
$200,000, in shares of $iooeach;
for purpose of enabling such banks to settle up their affairs they were
continued in existence until 1819. In January, 1813, the stockholders
declared a dividend of 50 per cent., and in October, 1813. another of
cent, of the
cent, out of the capital of the company;
25 per
25 per
stock was never paid in, but stock notes were given therefor ; $90,000
were due the corporation from insolvent directors, so that the bank
was without funds to pay debts (then amounting to more than $90,ooo), after the above dividends were paid to the shareholders. Plaintiffs were owners of $29,000 of the notes of the bank, which in 1814
were presented for payment, and payment refused.]
STORY, J. * * * The case is full of difficulties. The bill is
drawn in a very loose and inartificial manner.
It proceeds principally
upon the grounds of a gross over-issue of bank notes and other violations of the charter, and of a fraudulent dividend by the stockholders
with a knowledge of their insolvency ; grounds which are denied by
the answers, and are not in the slightest degree established in the
proofs. It does not directly proceed upon the ground that the defendants hold a trust fund applicable to the payment of the debts of
the corporation ; but leaves this to be picked up in fragments by a
minute analysis of the bill.
I pass, however, over these objections
for the purpose of considering that which is the principal point argued
1 Statement
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in the cause, whether the capital stock in the hands of the stockholders
is liable to the payment of the debts of the bank.
It appears to me very clear upon general principles, as well as the
legislative intention, that the capital stock of banks is to be deemed a
pledge or trust fund for the payment of the debts contracted by the
The public, as well as the legislature, have always supposed
bank.
to
be
The individual
a fund appropriated for such purpose.
this
stockholders are not liable for the debts of the bank in their private
The charter relieves them from personal responsibility,
capacities.
and substitutes the capital stock in its stead.
Credit is universally
to
fund
as
the
means
of repayment.
this
the
given
public
only
by
existence
of
the
it
is
the
sole
the
During
corporation
property of the
and
can
be
to
its
charter, that is,
corporation,
applied only according
as a fund for payment of its debts, upon the security of which it may
discount and circulate notes.
Why, otherwise, is any capital stock
our
charters?
If
stock may, the next day after it is
the
required by
in,
be
the
withdrawn
stockholders
without payment of the
paid
by
debts of the corporation, why is its amount so studiously provided
for and its payment by the stockholders so diligently required ? To
me this point appears so plain upon principles of law, as well as
common sense, that I can not be brought into any doubt that the charters of our banks make the capital stock a trust fund for the payment
of all the debts of the corporation. The bill-holders and other creditors have the first claims upon it; and the stockholders have no rights
until all the other creditors are satisfied.
They have the full benefit
of all the profits made by the establishment, and can not take any
portion of the fund until all the other claims on it are extinguished.
Their rights are not to the capital stock but to the residuum after all
demands on it are paid.
On a dissolution of the corporation the billholders and the stockholders have each equitable claims, but those of
The
the bill-holders possess, as I conceive, a prior exclusive equity.
same doctrine has been recognized by the supreme court of Massachusetts, in Vose v. Grant (15 Mass. Rep. 505, 517, 522), and Spear
v. Grant (16 Mass. Rep. 9, 15).
If I am right in this position, the principal difficulty in the cause is
overcome.
If the capital stock is a trust fund, then it may be followed by the creditors into the hands of any persons having notice of
As to the stockholders themselves, there
the trust attaching to it.
can be no pretense to say that, both in law and fact, they are not affected with the most ample notice.
The doctrine of following trust funds into the hands of any persons
who are not innocent purchasers, or do not otherwise possess superior
Lord Redesdale, in Adair v.
equities, has been long established.
Shaw (i Sch. & Lef. 243, 262), lays it down in very broad terms.
He says: "If we advert to the cases on this subject, we shall find that
trusts are enforced not only against those persons who rightfully are
possessed of the trust property as trustees, but also against all persons
who come into possession of the property bound by the trust with notice of the trust ; and whoever comes so into possession is considered
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bound, with respect to that special property, to the execution of
trust."
And a very strong recognition, as well as application of
the principle, will be found in Taylor v. Plumer (3 Maule & Selw.
Upon this ground, assets
562, 574), even in a court of common law.
disposed of by executors by misapplication, or existing in the hands
of debtors, where the executor is insolvent, or there is collusion, are
often reached in favor of creditors as a trust fund.
Hill v. Simpson
cases
cited
and
the
there
Vez.
illustrate
this position.
fully
152),
(7
See, also, Moses v. Murgatroyd, i Johns. Ch. Rep. 119; Dexter v.
Stewart, 7 Johns. Ch. Rep. 52; Shepherd v. McEvers, 4 Johns. Ch.
Rep. 136; Long v. Majestre, i Johns. Ch. Rep. 305; Riddle v.
Mandeville, 5 Cranch 322 ; Russell v. Clark's Executors, 7 Cranch 69.
The cases of partnership furnish, also, a pretty strong analogy.
There, in equity, partnership funds will be followed in favor of credIt is true, that, as the master of
itors into the hands of third persons.
the rolls said in Campbell v. Mullett (2 Swanston R. 550, 575), the
equities of creditors are to be worked out through the medium of the
They have no lien, but something approaching to a lien,
partners.
which courts of equity will regard and enforce, in all cases, where
See,
superior rights, which ought to be protected, do not intervene.
also, Ex parte Ruffin, 6 Vez. 119, 127; Ex parte Fell, 10 Vez. 347;
Ex parte Williams, n Vez. 3; Ex parte Harris, i Madd. R. 313;
Ex parte Kendall, 17 Vez. 514, 526; Murray v. Murray, 5 Johns.
Ch. Rep. 60; Ex parte Lodge & Fendall, i Vez. Jr. 166; Taylor v.
Fields, 4 Vez. 396; Young v. Keighly, 15 Vez. 557. It is not, however, necessary to search for analogous cases ; for upon the plain import of the charter, the capital stock is a trust fund for creditors, and
the stockholders, upon the division, take it subject to all equities attached to it.
They are, to all intents and purposes, privies to the
as
the

*
*
*
trust, and receive it cum onere,
The next consideration is whether the bill makes out a case, which
upon the facts proved or admitted, entitles the plaintiffs to relief. I
have already adverted to the loose structure of the bill.
It primarily
If it
charges the case as a case of fraud; that is now abandoned.
can stand at all, it must be simply on the fact that the defendants have
That alone could not entitle the parthe funds in their possession.
ties to relief without allegations of insolvency on the part of the corNow, the bill does
poration or of the non-existence of other funds.
not allege that the corporation is insolvent, nor that it is dissolved,
nor that there is no other corporate property out of which the debts
can be paid.
These are extraordinary omissions, and if there had
been a demurrer to the bill, it would be difficult for the court to have
strained hard enough to support it.
But these defects are in some
degree helped by the answers, which admit the insolvency of the corporation, and show that in fact no sufficient funds for payment of its
*
*
*
debts are in existence, independent of the capital stock.
head.
There is
The exception as to parties ranges itself under this
no allegation in the bill that the old corporation is defunct, so as to dispense with its being made a party. The answers do not deny that it yet
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afford no help to cure the defect.

has a legal existence, and, therefore,

Now, if in existence, nothing can be more clear than that it ought to have
been made a party to the bill. It is the original debtor ; its funds are

to be applied in payment of debts, and it would be wrong to touch
those funds without the most plenary proofs that the debts were due,
*
*
*
and the corporation had no defense.
This difficulty in point of averment and proof (for the fact of dissolution is notorious to all) may, however, as I think, be overcome.
The acts of the legislature creating the bank, and continuing its existence for a limited time, are made part of the bill ; and as a prolonged
existence can not be presumed, and is not asserted in the answers, the
court must take it to be true that the corporation expired by the legislative limitation, antecedent to the filing of the bill.
Upon the
clearest principles it can not be necessary to make a non-existing cor-

it

r

is

it

it

it,

is

it

is

it,

a

a

it

is

a

a

it

is

a

it,

poration a party.
But, then, it is argued that no decree ought to be made without
making all the stockholders parties to the bill, for all are liable to
contribution. I agree that if proper parties are not made, the defendant
may demur to the bill, or state it by plea or answer, or may object to
a decree at the hearing, or even obtain a reversal, in some cases, after
Whenever, taken either by demurrer, or plea, or answer,
a decree.
or at the hearing, the court, if the objection is well founded, is not
bound to dismiss the bill, but may retain
giving leave to make new
are
The
to
as
who
parties, and when they
necessary
parties.
subject
deal
discussed
with,
be
was
good
by the court in demay
dispensed
livering its judgment in West v. Randall (2 Mason R. 181, 190, etc.).
The principal cases are there collected and commented on. The general rule
that all persons materially interested, either as plaintiffs or
There are exceptions, just as old
defendants, are to be made parties.
and as well founded as the rule itself. Where the parties are beyond the
impossible to join them all
jurisdiction, or are so numerous that
can, without them.
decree, as
court of chancery will make such
will not suffer rule, founded
to administer justice, and
Its object
in its own sense of propriety and convenience, to become the instrument
of
denial of justice to parties before the court who are entitled to
will be
relief. What
practicable, to bring all interests before
has not the rashness to
done. What
impossible or impracticable,
contents itself with disposing of the equities before
attempt, but
leaving, as far as
may, the rights of other persons unprejudiced.
In respect to the exception on account of the numerousness of parties, the question

has been discussed

and acted upon in many cases,

(2

(6

particularly in Chancey v. May (Prec. Ch. 592), Leigh v. Thomas
Vez. 773), Adair v. The New
Vez. Sr. 312), Lloyd v. Loaring
River Company (n Vez. 429), Good v. Blewitt (13 Vez. 397), and
The result of the whole
Cockburn v. Thompson (16 Vez. 320).

*

*

it

is

is

is

it

inconvenient
that where the parties are so numerous that
founded
or impracticable to bring all before the court, the rule, which
would
on the consideration of public good, shall not be applied, since
*
defeat the purposes of justice.
cases
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Upon the whole, my opinion is, that the objection of the want of
sufficient parties can not be maintained.
We may then proceed to
the merits of the defense as disclosed in the answers.
One ground
there taken is, that the demands of the plaintiffs respectively are
barred by the statute of limitations.
But this bar to a deci'ee can not
The rights of the plaintiffs accrued as
upon the facts be sustained.
against the defendants within six years ; for until a refusal of payment
by the bank of its notes, followed by an inability to discharge them,
there was no cause of proceeding in equity against the defendants.
There is no positive bar to suits in equity, but whenever any limitation
is adopted it is ordinarily regulated by analogy to the common law.
Here the claim is against a trust fund in the hands of the defendants;
and in cases, not of constructive, but of express trusts, so long, at
least, as they are not encountered by an adverse possession and denial of right, the statute of limitations does not begin to run. I
should have very great difficulty in allowing a bar of the statute of
limitations to operate in a case of this nature, unless where the circumstances of negligence on one side and of positive denial of right
* *
on the other were very cogent. *
The only other ground suggested as a defense by the defendants is
that they have been guilty of no fraud, and that the division of the
capital stock was an act authorized by law; and there is no equity to
relieve the plaintiffs by throwing the loss on the stockholders.
The
answer to this argument, for such it is, has already been given.
The
stockholders have no right to anything but the residuum of the capital
The funds in their
stock, after payment of all the debts of the bank.
hands, therefore, have an equity attached to them in favor of the creditors, which it is against conscience to resist.
To be sure the plaintiffs might, if their bill had been properly framed, have shown a much
stronger case for equity, and might have shown due diligence in atI allude to the known facts of the
tempting to enforce their rights.
various suits at common law, some of which have been cited at the
bar, -and others brought to this court for decision, in which great efforts
have been made to obtain a remedy at law, by the bill-holders, without success.
The next question is, what sort of decree the plaintiffs are entitled
to.
Are they entitled to a decree, to the full amount of the dividends
received by the defendants respectively, towards payment of the debts
due from the bank to them, or are they entitled only to a pro rata
payment out of that dividend, in the proportion which the stock held
by the defendants bears to the whole capital stock?
The bill does not allege that the other stockholders, who have received dividends, are insolvent or out of the jurisdiction of the court.
Nor does it state what the amount of the debts due from the bank to
the bill-holders, or others, is.
It would have been desirable, as far as
it was practicable, that all the other creditors, who had a common interBut neither party has
est, might have been brought before the court.
it,
of them.
or
waived
formal
to
the
introduction
urged
any
objection
The court, therefore, in proceeding to do equity to those before
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must take care that it is not the instrument of injustice to others who
Non constat, if the whole fund is taken from
are not represented.
the defendants in favor of the plaintiffs, that there will remain any
solvent stockholders, from whom the other creditors can claim any
*
*
*
share.
I have come to the conclusion that our duty is best performed by
holding the plaintiffs entitled to a decree, that the defendants pay out
of the dividends of the capital stock received by them so much of the
debts due to the plaintiffs as the number of shares held by them in
the same capital stock (viz., 320 shares) bears to the whole number
* * *
of shares in the capital stock (viz., 2,000 shares).
Decree accordingly 'with costs,
Note.
As to trust-fund doctrine, see note 54 Am. St. Rep. 65; 3 Am. St.
Rep. 806; 1671, Salem v. Hamborough Co., 1 Gas. Ch. 204; 1819, Vose v.
Grant. 15 Mass. 505; 1822, Slee v. Bloom, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 456, supra, p. 881 ;
1853, Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 304; 1859, Ogilvie v. Knox Ins. Co., 22
How. 380; 1873, Sawyer v. Hoag, 17 Wall. 610; 1875, Upton v. Tribilcock, 91
U. S. 45; 1875, Sanger v. Upton, 91 U. S. 56; Webster v. Upton, 91 U. S. 65;
also, 95 U. S. 665; 96 U. S. 328; 1879, Hatch v. Dana, 101 U. S. 205, infra,
p. 1965; 1879, Hastings v. Drew, 76 N. Y. 9; 1880, County of Morgan v. Allen,
103 U. S. 498; 1880, Hawley v. Upton, 102 U. S. 314; 1881, Scovill v. Thayer,
105 U. S. 143, infra, p. 1907; 1885, Thompson v. Reno Sav. Bk., 19 Neb. 103, 3
Am. St. Rep. 797, note 806; 1886, Coit v. Gold Amal. Co., 119 U. S. 343; 1888,
Morrow v. Iron Co., 87 Tenn. 262; 1889, Rouse v. Bank, 46 Ohio St. 493, supra, p. 1819; 1890, First Nat'l Bk. v. Gustin, etc., Bk., 42 Minn. 327; 1891,
Eylton Land Co. v. Birmingham, etc., Co., 92 Ala. 407, 25 Am. St. Rep. 65;
1891, Camden v. Stuart, 144 U. S. 104; 1893, Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & I.
Co.. 150 U. S. 371; 1893, Lyons-Thomas Hdw. Co. v. Stove, etc., Co., 86 Tex.
143, 22 L. R. A. 802; 1896, Buck v. Ross, 68 Conn. 29, 57 Am. St. Rep. 60;
1896, In re Brockway Mfg. Co., 89 Me. 121, 56 Am. St. Rep. 401 ; 1897, Memphis Barrel, etc., Co. v. Ward, 99 Tenn. 172, 63 Am. St. Rep. 825; 1897, Cook
v. Moody, 18 Wash. 114, 63 Am. St. Rep. 872; 1898, Van Cleve v. Berkey,
143 Mo. 109, 42 L. R. A. 593; 1899, Crofoot v. Thatcher, 19 Utah 212, 75 Am.
St. Rep. 725.
See, also, following cases and notes.
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such, and fraudulently accepted by the company as full payment;
that the company's property had been destroyed by fire, and the
company had become insolvent ; that the property was insured to the
extent of $7,000, and that the policy had been turned over to the
bank to secure it a preference in the payment of a claim of $2,500
due the bank; that the bank collected the $7,000 due under the policy, paid itself the $2,500, and " paid the balance to the persons who
composed the corporation, or to some of them, or for their personal
account;" that the corporation had also confessed a judgment to the
amount of $1,750 in favor of the bank, and immediately thereafter,
on the same day, made an assignment for the benefit of creditors; the
bill asked for a receiver, and that the shareholders be required to pay
in full for their stock, less what had been paid ; that the bank be required to pay back the amount received under the judgment, and any
sum, over and above its share, collected on the insurance policy;
that the assignee be required to file an account and pay over any
sums in his hands to the receiver; and " that all the assets be brought
together to be administered for the equal benefit of all the creditors of
the corporation," on the ground " that the entire assets of said corporation constitute a trust fund for creditors, and that all persons who
in anywise knowingly participate in the unlawful appropriation of said
trust fund or any part thereof will be required in equity to restore the
same."
The bank and one of the shareholders demurred for misjoinder of parties defendant, some of whom had no connection with
in joining
many of the alleged transactions, and multifariousness
claims against shareholders for unpaid subscriptions, and against the
bank for money alleged to be improperly paid to
and to set aside
an alleged fraudulent disposition of property.
Demurrers were overruled and an appeal taken.]
MCCLELLAN,
The respondents, by their demurrers,
insist that said assets do not constitute
trust fund in the sense necesis, against parties
sary to the maintenance of the bill, exhibited, as
who have nothing, and are not chargeable with any wrong, in common, but whose acts, claims and attitudes in respect of and toward
and hence they
the corporation are entirely distinct and independent
multifarious.
And in the arguments submitted in
say that the bill
this court the decree below
attempted to be supported solely and
trust estate.
So
expressly upon this theory of the spoliation of
whether
that the main,
not only, question presented on this appeal
trust fund for its
the assets of an insolvent corporation constitute
creditors in the proper and essential meaning of those terms.
This whole idea, that the property of insolvent corporations
held
and to
trust estate in their hands
by them in trust for creditors
dictum of Judge
be administered by chancery as such, originated in
Mason 308. It had no existence at
Story, in Wood v. Dummer,
common law, and has none to this day in the law of England
but
creation of some courts in this country, and known in judistinctly
obtains as the "American doctrine."
This court
risdictions where
and held, in the cases of Corey v. Wadshas quite recently adopted
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worth, 99 Ala. 68, Goodyear Rubber Co. v. Scott & Co., 96 Ala.
439, and Gibson v. Trowbridge Furniture Co., 96 Ala. 357, that the
assets of an insolvent corporation are impressed with a trust in the
hands of the company, in favor of its creditors first, and then in favor
The present writer dissented from the opinion
of its stockholders.
To his mind
and conclusion of the court in each of those cases.
there is nothing clearer in principle than the proposition that the property of a corporation, solvent or insolvent, bears identically the same
relation to the creditors of such corporation as the property of an individual or copartnership, solvent or insolvent, sustains to the creditors of the individual or partnership; and is or is not to be impressed
with a trust character upon the same circumstances and under the
same conditions in the first case as in the latter two.
Within the
limits of its charter, every corporation authorized to hold and dispose
of property at all, is entitled, and this generally by the very terms of
to hold and dispose of
as
natural person
the statute creating
* *
under the laws of the land.
might hold and dispose of
can not, upon well-settled and elementary general principles and
definitions, see my way to an acceptance of this so-called doctrine.
All trusts are of two kinds: express and implied. It is, of course,
nowhere pretended the relations between an insolvent corporation and
All implied trusts are of two
its creditors constitute an express trust.
"Resulting trusts," says Mr.
kinds: resulting and constructive.
disposed of or acquired, not
Pomeroy, "arise where the legal estate
fraudulently or in violation of any fiduciary duty, but the intent in
inferred of assumed from the terms
theory of equity appears or
of the disposition, or from the accompanying facts and circumstances,
not to go with the legal title."
Pom.
that the beneficial interest
And
are
said
to
arise
under
the
sevEq. Jur.,
they
following
155.
Where the purchaser of an estate pays the
eral states of fact:
third person; (2)
purchase-money, and takes title in the name of
where
fiduciary relation uses fiduciary funds to
person standing in
purchase property, and takes the title in his own name; (3) where
an estate
conveyed upon trusts which fail, either in whole or -in
and, (4) where
part, or are not declared, or are illegal
conveymade without consideration, and
ance
appears from the circumstances that the grantee was not intended to take beneficially.
10 Am.
requires no discussion to the
Eng. Encyc. of Law, pp. 4,
demonstration of the impossibility of referring this "American doctrine" of trusts for corporation creditors to the head of resulting
trusts.
All constructive trusts are of three kinds, or arise from one or the
First, trusts arising from actual
other of three conditions of fact:
fraud; second, tru sts which arise from constructive fraud; and, third,
trusts that arise from some equitable principle independent of the ex10 Am.
istence of fraud.
Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 60. As there
no fraud, actual or constructive, involved in the naked fact that a
has creditors which
insolvent
without assets to
corporation
the base for all the superstructure of this
pay in full and this fact
is
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doctrine of trust for its creditors, it can not be conceived, and, I suppose, has never been contended, that such trust is referable to either
the first or second heads of constructive trusts.
And it is the conclusion of so high an authority as Mr. Pomeroy, that the third classification of constructive trusts stated above has no existence dissociated
from actual and constructive fraud.
It is his opinion, " that all instances of constructive trusts properly so called may be referred to
what equity denominates fraud, either actual or constructive, as an
essential element, and as their final source.
Even in that single class
where equity proceeds upon the maxim that an intention to fulfill an
obligation should be imputed, and assumes that the purchaser intended to act in pursuance of his fiduciary duty, the notion of fraud
is not involved, simply because it is not absolutely necessary under
the circumstances ; the existence of the trust might in all cases of this
class be referred to constructive fraud.
This notion of fraud enters
into the conception in all its possible degrees.
Certain species of the
constructive trusts arise from actual fraud ; many others spring from
the violation of some positive fiduciary obligation ; in all the remaining instances there is, latent perhaps, but none the less real, the necconduct which equity calls
essary element of that unconscientious
2 Pom. Eq. Jur. ,
constructive fraud."
If this view be
1044.
adopted the relation between an insolvent corporation and its creditors
is excluded from every possible category of constructive trusts for the
reason, or by virtue of the fact, that that relation involves no fraud
have seen, the sole ground for
whatever ; and as that relation is, as
the doctrine of trusts in cases like this, the doctrine is unsound, unsupported in principle or reason, and should not be upheld by any
court.
But if we adopt the view first stated above, that constructive trusts
may arise by force of some equitable principle independent of the existence of fraud, actual or constructive, and which seems also to be
the opinion of Mr. Perry (i Perry on Trusts,
168), the same conclusion is equally inevitable.
Eliminating the element of fraud from
the consideration there still remains as an essential predicate for the
existence of a trust by construction of law, some unconscientious conduct on the part of the person to be held as trustee in invitum. or
some unconscionable result through means or under circumstances
which bring the transaction within some recognized title of equity
jurisprudence, as, for instance, where a tenant in common buys in an
outstanding term for his own benefit, he is trustee for his cotenant,
and where a conveyance has been made through ignorance, accident
or mistake, the grantee will be the trustee in a constructive trust for
Thus, wherever one is placed in such relation to another
the grantor.
he
becomes
interested with or for him in property or business, he
that
from
is prohibited
acquiring rights in that property or business antagto
the
onistic
person with whom he is associated, as, for illustration,
if one partner, or other person occupying a fiduciary relation, renew
a lease theretofore held by the partnership, or by the person renewing
and another in confidential relation to him, in his own name and with
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his own funds, he will be a trustee for his associate by construction of
law. And so, where by accident, ignorance or mistake more land is
embraced in a conveyance than was bargained and sold, a con10 Am.
structive trust arises in favor of the grantor for the excess.
& Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 80.
But in all these cases, in all cases of constructive trusts where it is
said by some authorities chancery proceeds without regard to fraud,
relief is granted upon some acknowledged ground of equitable jurisdiction, and administered by holding the wrong-doer to account as a
There must be a confidential relation and unconscientious
trustee.
conduct on the part of one party to, and in abuse of, that relation, or
there must be some ignorance, accident, mistake, or the like, against
the unconscionable
consequences of which equity will, on general
principles, grant relief, else there can be no constructive trust.
That the relation of debtor and creditor is not of 3 confidential
character there can, of course, be no doubt.
It is absurd to say that
the creation of that relation involves aught of accident, mistake or
That a debtor has property of his creditor which in
ignorance.
equity and good conscience belongs to the creditor, because the debt
contracted in its sale has not been paid, there is no warrant for sayEqually unwarranted is the idea that in equity all the property
ing.
of a debtor who has become insolvent belongs to the creditor, and is
And this idea of ownership in
held by the debtor in trust for him.
the cestui que trust underlies the whole doctrine of trusts of every
In all trusts the legal title is in one, the equitable ownerdescription.
A mere debt against one who has property, whether
ship in another.
solvent or insolvent, is not ownership, nor is a right to charge a fund,
the beneficial ownership of it.
or a lien upon
Confessedly the
trust
property and assets of a solvent corporation do not constitute
be possible that the mere passing of
fund for its creditors.
Can
state of solvency to
state of insolvency amounts
corporation from
to a declaration of an express trust for creditors, or to
resulting
trust, upon the theory that title to the assets of the concern should have
been made to the creditors?
conceivable that this mutation
Or
from the one condition to the other does violence to confidential reconstructive trust?
lation which never existed, and hence
Or that
the vestiture in the corporathis mere change of inherent conditions
tion through the ignorance, or mistake of the creditor, or through
mistake, or through fraud, of
greater title, or title to more property
than was contemplated and intended, when before the change, confessedly, the corporation had the absolute and indefeasible title free
from all trusts to all its property and assets, and when the change
itself involves nothing of fraud, of abuse of fiduciary relations, of
ignorance, or mistake or accident?
The learned judges who uphold this "American doctrine" may find
trust,
something in these conditions of fact upon which to construct
but
confess my utter inability to follow their arguments or to see
with their eyes. Nothing
clearer to my humble judgment than
that the insolvency of a corporation the existence of
corporation
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with property and debts, the property being insufficient to pay the
is not within any definition of any trust known to equity jurisdebts
The creditors of such corporation have the same rights
prudence.
against it as they have against an insolvent partnership, or an insolvent individual debtor, and no other or more.
They do not at law
or in equity own the property of the one or the other; but the property of each is a fund for the payment of debts in the sense that
with intent to hinder, delay
neither can give it away, or dispose of
The property of the individual can not be apor defraud creditors.
propriated to his own use to the exclusion of his creditors under any
The property of the partnership can not be approcover whatever.
priated to the personal use of the partners, or in payment of the debts
of the individuals composing the firm, to the exclusion of partnership
creditors under any pretense whatever.
And so the property of the
corporation can not be diverted to the use of the stockholders to the
exclusion of creditors under any circumstances whatever. The powers
and limitations upon the powers of an insolvent corporation to deal
with its property are precisely the same in all essentials as the powers
and limitations upon the powers of insolvent individuals and insolvent

creditors

the same against

their insolvent

a

I

if

a

a

it
is

is

a

is

is

it,

is

is

partnerships.
The estate of the debtor in each class
essentially the same the
corporation, no less than the individual and the partnership, at law and
in equity the owner of its property.
The rights, remedies and estates
of creditors of each are also the same.
They do not ou>n the propin equity or at
erty of their corporation debtor, or any interest in
law, any more than they own the property of their individual or partTheir right against each
the same to have their
nership debtor.
not that of cestui qtie
debts paid out of the property, but this right
trust, but whether the property
corporate or individual or partnerthe right of a creditor simply.
ship,
Confessedly, even this right
sale of the propmay be defeated as to any particular creditors by
erty in payment of another creditor, or by its being taken on execution
in favor of another, or even by its sale by the debtor
corporation, into
third person, and this although such
dividual or partnership
All which, as
purchaser have notice of the insolvency of the debtor.
the property constituted
trust
have seen, would be impossible
estate, with the corporation as trustee and the creditors as cestuis que
trust, for in such case all who take with notice of the insolvency
would take subject to the trust and themselves be held as trustees in
invitum.
Not only are the rights of individual, partnership and corporation
debtors' estates, and each

it
is

is

a

a

a

a

different in the same way from the rights of cestuis que trust, but the
statute, are
remedies of
corporation creditor, in the absence of
creditor of an individual or partnership.
The
precisely those of
given state of facts, be
remedy of each class of creditors may, upon
so,
not because of any supposed trust,
in equity, but when this
but upon some recognized ground of equity jurisprudence, as where the
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debtor has fraudulently transferred his or its property, and chancery is
invoked to set aside the transfer and subject the property. And when
chancery has thus assumed jurisdiction, it will administer the estate
for the equal benefit of all creditors before
and to that end the
court becomes
sort of trustee sub modo, in the administration of the
property, but not with any reference to the character of the estate, as
being held in trust or otherwise, before and at the time jurisdiction
attached.
Not all the publicists and courts in this country, nor the ablest of
them, countenance this so-called American doctrine.
Mr. Pomeroy
He says
"In applying this principle (of
expressly repudiates it.
constructive trusts), care should be taken to distinguish between actual trusts and those relations which are only trusts by way of metaphor; between persons who are true trustees holding the legal title
for beneficial owner, and those who simply occupy
position which
The use of these
analogous in some respects to that of a trustee.
terms to designate relations and parties which have no essential element in common with actual trusts and trustees can only produce con*
*
fusion and inaccuracy.
There are certain relations which
are spoken of as trusts, and as constituting a species of constructive
trusts, but which are not, in any true and complete sense, trusts,
and can only be called so by way of analogy or metaphor.
Since
they lack the element of fraud, they do not, in any view, properly
* The sur* *
belong to the division of constructive trusts.
vivors of
partnership are called trustees for the estate of the deceased partner, with respect to his share of the firm property.
This
there
expression
mostly metaphorical
certainly nothing in the
relation resembling
constructive trust.
Extending the analogy still
further, courts regard partnership property, after an - insolvency or
dissolution of the firm, and in the proceeding for winding up its affairs, as trust fund for the benefit of creditors, and the capital stock
and other property of private corporations, especially after their dissolution,
treated as
trust fund in favor of creditors.
These statements may be sufficiently accurate as strong modes of expressing the
doctrine that such property
fund sacredly set apart for the payment of partnership and corporation creditors, before
can be appropriated to the use of individual partners or corporators, and that the
creditors have a lien upon
for their own security; but
plain
that no constructive trust can arise in favor of the creditors, unless the
breach of fiduciary duty,
partners or directors, through fraud or
wrongfully appropriate the property, and acquire the legal title to
in their own names, and thus place
beyond the reach of creditors
And in note to the above text the
through ordinary legal means."
learned author says:
These "cases are not constructive trusts, and
are mentioned simply for the purposes of completeness, and to distinguish between correct and mistaken conceptions."
Pomeroy

Eq. Jur.,
1044, 1045.
And the highest and ablest court in the land, the supreme court of
the

United States, has quite recently

gone

over this whole subject,

THE CREDITORS AND THE CORPORATION.

655

-l859

a

if

a

it

it

a

is

is

a is

a

a

is

is

a

It

a

a

is

is

a

it

a

a

a

a

a is

it

a

it

is

is

a

is

it,

considered exhaustively all its own decisions and dicta upon
and
in an able opinion by Mr. Justice Brewer repudiated the idea that the
trust fund or estate held by the
property of an insolvent corporation
for
creditors
as
or
its
officers
cestuis
corporation
que trust. Judge Brewer
of
in
the
Graham
v. Railroad Co., 102
quotes
language
Judge Bradley
U. S. 148, to the effect that when a corporation becomes insolvent, a
court of equity, at the instance of proper parties, "will then make its
funds trust funds, which, in other circumstances, are as much the abhis," and says
solute property of the corporation as any man's property
of that case, that "all that
decides
that when
court of equity does
take into its possession the assets of an insolvent corporation,
will
administer them on the theory that they in equity belong to the creditors and stockholders rather than to the corporation itself."
And he
'on
in
to say: "It
rather
trust
the administration
proceeds further
of the assets after possession by court of equity than
trust attaching to the property, as such, for the direct benefit of either creditor or
stockholder;" and he concludes his opinion upon this subject as follows: "The same idea of equitable lien and trust exists to some exWhenever,
tent in the case of partnership property.
partnership
becoming insolvent, court of equity takes possession of its property,
recognizes the fact that in equity the partnership creditors have
right to payment out of those funds in preference to individual creditors, as well as superior to any claims of the partners themselves.
And the partnership property is, therefore, sometimes said, not inaptly, to be held in trust for the partnership creditors, or, that thev
Yet, all that
have an equitable lien on such property.
meant by
such expressions
the existence of an equitable right which will be
enforced whenever
court of equity, at the instance of
proper party
and in
proper proceeding, has taken possession of the assets.
never understood that there
a specific lien, or
direct trust.
"A party may deal with corporation in respect to its property in
the same manner as with an individual owner, and with no greater
danger of being held to have received into his possession property burdened with
The officers of a corporation act in a
trust or lien.
fiduciary capacity in respect to its property in their hands, and maybe
called to an account for fraud, or sometimes even mere mismanagement in respect thereto; but as between itself and its creditors the
corporation
simply debtor, and does not hold its property in trust,
or subject to lien in their favor, in any other sense than does an individual debtor.
there be any
That
certainly the general rule, and
exceptions thereto they are not presented by any of the facts in this case.
Neither the insolvency of the corporation, nor the execution of an illegal trust deed, nor the failure to collect in full all stock subscriptions,
nor all together, gave to these simple contract creditors any lien upon
the property of the corporation, nor charged any direct trust thereon."
Hollins v. Brierfield Coal and Iron Co., 150 U. S. 371, 381-386.
The supreme court of Minnesota, in an able opinion by Mitchell,
J., also repudiates this idea that the property of an insolvent corporation
has this to say:
"This 'trust-fund'
trust fund.
Of
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doctrine, commonly called the 'American doctrine,' has given rise to
much confusion of ideas as to its real meaning, and much conflict of
decision in its application.
To such an extent has this been the case
that many have questioned the accuracy of the phrase, as well as
doubted the necessity or expediency of inventing any such doctrine.
While a convenient phrase to express a certain general idea, it is not
sufficiently precise or accurate to constitute a safe foundation upon
which to build a system of legal rules.
The doctrine was invented
by Justice Story in Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason 308, which called for
no such invention, the fact in that case being that a bank divided up
two-thirds of its capital among its stockholders without providing
funds sufficient to pay its outstanding bill-holders.
Upon old and
familiar principles, this was a fraud on creditors.
Evidently all that
the eminent jurist meant by the doctrine was that corporate property
must first be appropriated to the payment of the debts of the company before there can be any distribution of it among stockholders
a proposition that is sound upon the plainest principles of common
In Fogg v. Blair, 133 U. S. 534, 541, it is said that this
honesty.
The expression used in Wood v. Dummer,
is all the doctrine means.
has,
been taken up as a new discovery which
however,
Mason
308,
3
The phrase
furnished a solution of every question on the subject.
that 'the capital of a corporation constitutes a trust fund for the
benefit of creditors' is misleading.
Corporate property is not held in
trust in any proper sense of the term.
A trust implies two estates or
interests
one equitable and one legal ; one person, a trustee, holding
the legal title, while another, as the cestzti que trust, has the beneficial
interest.
Absolute control and power of disposition are inconsistent
The capital of a corporation is its property.
with the idea of a trust.
It has the whole beneficial interest in it. as well as the legal title. It
and sell and dispose of
the
may use the income and profits of
same as* natural person.
trustee for its creditors in the same
natural person, but no further."
sense and to the same extent as
Hospes v. Northwestern Manufacturing Co., 48 Minn. 174, s. c. 31
Am. St. Rep. 637, 641, 642. * *
am impelled to the conclusion that the property of an insolvent
not
trust fund or estate, accurately speaking, or in any
corporation
sense other than that when the chancery court takes possession and
control of such property upon some general principle of equity jurisdiction, wholly independent of any idea that the property constitutes
will be administered for the equal benefit of creditors.
trust fund,
follows that the bill can not stand against the demurrers for multifariousness unless that objection can be met upon some other consideration than the trust character of the corporation property and assets,
alone and expressly, both in the averments of the bill itself
which
and in the argument of counsel, relied on to support the decree overdo not think the objection can be met upon
ruling the demurrers.
no connection between several of the
There
any other ground.
matters brought forward by the bill, and the defendants attempted to
be charged in respect of some of these matters have no interest what-
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ever in others. For instance : The Alabama National Bank did not participate in the wrongs committed upon the corporation in respect of the
subscriptions to its stock by the O'Bears and Copeland, and it is not interested in the present effort to right those wrongs.
Again, the bill
seeks the settlement of the trust created by the assignment to R. D.
Johnston and to compel the bank to pay into court money which it
owed the corporation, or held belonging to the corporation, and paid
over to the stockholders of the corporation, which constituted no part
of and had no connection with the assignment to Johnston.
And
equally dissociated is the effort of the bill to have an accounting by
the assignee from its purpose to collect unpaid subscriptions
from
And so in respect of the purpose of the bill to have
stockholders.
the judgment in favor of the bank declared a part of the assignment,
and to have the bank refund the amount it received in satisfaction
thereof, this claim is wholly foreign to the relief sought against the
bank as to the insurance money paid to the O'Bears and Copeland,
and also to the relief sought against the subscribers to the stock.
In
other words and in brief, the bill, in my opinion, stands upon the
same plane in respect of multifariousness as if it had been filed
against an insolvent individual debtor, who was wasting or fraudulently disposing of his property, and against his assignee for the benefit of creditors, a creditor to whom he had confessed judgment which
his assignee had paid as a lien on the property assigned, against a
person who, having assets of the insolvent debtor in his hands, had
paid the same to third persons so they could not be reached by creditors, and against other persons who, in equity, owed money to the
debtor defendant.
In such case and no more in this there would
be no relation or connection between the defendants, or the rights asserted against them respectively,
either in the character of their
wrongs or defaults, or in the character of the estate they had despoiled ;
and recovery against each would be had, if allowed at all, not upon,
any idea of conserving a fund which the court, because of its trust
character, had the right to protect and restore, but solely as enforcing
several money demands from several defendants in one and the same
action, in which also the trustee in the assignment would be brought
to account on considerations and in respect of matters with which the
claims against some -of the other defendants had no connection.
In preparing the foregoing opinion, the writer assumed to express
his individual views only because of decisions of this court referred to
above which take a different view as to the assets of an insolvent corporation being a trust fund. This opinion has now, however, been
concurred in by my associates, and stands as the opinion of the court.
The cases of Corey v. Wadsworth, 99 Ala. 68; Goodyear Rubber
Co. v. Scott & Co., 96 Ala. 439, and Gibson v. Trowbridge Furniture Co., 96 Ala. 357, supra, in so far as they are inconsistent with
the views and conclusion we now express, are overruled.
is reThe decree overruling the demurrers for multifariousness
2 wn>. CAS.

44

KEARNS V. LEAF.

1862

ADELBERT

V.

KEARNS.
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versed, and a decree will be here entered sustaining said assignments
of demurrer.
Reversed, rendered and remanded.
See, 1826, Catlin v. Eagle Bank, 6
Assets are not a trust fund.
233, supra, p. 1815; 1891, Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417, infra, p.1923,
and note, p. 1932; 1892, Hospes v. N. W. Mfg. & Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, infra,
p. 1911 ; 1895, First Nat'l Bk. v. Dovetail, etc., Co., 143 Ind. 550, 52 Am St
Rep. 435; 1895, Barrett v. Pollak Co., 108 Ala. 390, 54 Am. St. Rep. 172; 1897,
Butler v. Harrison L., etc., Co., 139 Mo. 467, 61 Am. St. Rep. 464; 1897, Ames
v. Heslet, 19 Mont. 188, 61 Am. St. Rep. 496.
Notes.

Conn.

See, also, supra, cases upon power to prefer creditors, with notes

Sec. 656.

4.

645, et seq.

Right to enjoin waste.

VICE-CHANCELLOR SIR W. PAGE WOOD IN KEARNS v. LEAF.
ADELBERT v. KEARNS. 1 .
1864.

IN THE COURT

OF

CHANCERY,

i Hem. & Mill. Rep. 681, on

707-709.

[The plaintiffs were policy bonus-holders in the Argus Insurance
These policies provided that the funds or property of the
Company.
company should, according to the provisions of the deed of settlement,
be subject and liable to pay within one month after the required proof
of death the sum assured, and the bonus policies also provided that
the assured should,

after the first five years, be entitled to share in 80

per cent, of the profits, according to the annual valuation. Afterwards the Argus Company entered into an agreement with the Eagle
Insurance Company to transfer its business, good-will and property
to that company, which was in turn to pay a certain sum and assume
all the debts and obligations of the Argus Company. Plaintiffs
brought their bill to enjoin the consummation of this transaction. J
Now, I apprehend that under these stipulations the policy-holders
have no right to meddle with anything, wise or unwise, which the
For example, if the
company may do in accordance with the deed.
company invest in a hazardous 'or even ruinous security, the policyIt would be extremely mischievholders are not entitled to interfere.
Still, the conduct of the company
ous to allow such interference.
might reach a point of absolute waste of the assets in contravention of
the provision of the deed, at which the right of the policy-holders to

In the passage I have read,
intervene might be considered to arise.
the Lord Justice, Turner, makes an express reservation of such a contingency; and it is no answer to appeal to the decision at common
law, where it has been held that the company (in such a case) is unbecause, what the policyder no contract to continue its business;
holders would insist on would only be that if the business were discontinued, they shall either be paid, or else the fund preserved to
The principle on which
meet their claims when they might arise.
1

Statement

abridged.
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the plaintiff's case is founded here is, that the fund which was held
out to him as his security, and to which he has himself contributed,
He
shall not be misapplied contrary to the provisions of the deed.
His posisays that he comes here to prevent a waste of the assets.
tion is somewhat analogous to that of a person having a contingent
debt against a testator's estate, who may come into this court to prevent the estate being paid away to legatees, or wasted or thrown
The argument for the company, as I understand
away by executors.
it, goes this length, that the policy-holder is simply a contingent future creditor minus the personal remedy.
If that were the whole of
the contract, it would be very different from what persons who insured in the company must have supposed.
They could not have imagined that it was to be in the power of the directors or the company
to destroy all their interest under their policies, leaving them without
I certainly
redress until their policies should have matured by death.
do not think that this is the conclusion to be drawn from the terms of
the particular contract which I have to consider in this case.
In my
opinion, the plaintiff did acquire under that contract such a species of
interest in the fund as would entitle him to interfere to save the property from being wasted contrary to the provisions of the deed. * * *
I am now only dealing with the case of a policy-holder; and if the
company had made an adequate provision for him by setting aside
a proper fund, or in any other way, they might have arranged their
affairs as they pleased, so far as he was concerned.
But they made
no provision of the kind.
concern to anover
the
whole
Handing
other company having extensive engagements of its own, is not makIt is not enough that they find some
ing provision for liabilities.
other body willing to undertake their engagements.
What is required
is some provision made by the Argus, not the possibility of the contract being carried out by the Eagle.
I should, therefore, have had
no hesitation in granting an injunction to restrain this transfer if it
had not been already annulled.
Note.
Accord:
Lord Justice Turner in, 1864, Evans v. Coventry,
M. & G. (54 Eng. Ch.) *911. See next case.

Sec* 657.

G.,

Same.
FOSTER

1899.

5 De

v.

BORAX COMPANY.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, CHANCERY DIVISION, AND
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE, COURT OF APPEAL.
80 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 461 and 637.

The Borax Company, Limited, was formed on the 3Oth of November, 1887.
By its memorandum it was authorized to "form or assist in the
formation of any subsidiary
It proceeded to issue
company."

1 864

FOSTER v. BORAX COMPANY.

^295,200 6 per cent, debentures, of which ^11,400 worth were held
by the plaintiff.
On the 22d of June, 1898, it was resolved to wind the company up
voluntarily, and on the 8th of July, 1898, a scheme was arranged under which, instead of each ;ioo debenture, an A debenture of ^50
and a B debenture of ^50 should be issued to every existing deThere would thus be ^147,600 worth of A debenture holder.
bentures, which were to carry interest at 4 per cent., and ^147,600
worth of - B debentures, which were to carry interest at 6 per cent.
The liquidation was to stop on the confirmation of the scheme.
By an agreement, made on the 29th of November, 1898, between
the Borax Company, Limited, of the one part, and a trustee for a new
company, to be called the Borax Consolidated Company. Limited, of
the other part, the old company agreed to sell its assets for ^320,000,
to be paid ^100,000 either in cash or debentures, at the option of
the new company, ^150,000 either in cash or cumulative preference
shares, at the option of the new company, and ^70,000 by the allotment of ordinary shares.
The capital of the new company was to be ^1, 400,000, divided
into ^800,000 worth of 5^ per cent, cumulative preference shares,
and ^600,000 worth of ordinary shares.
From the 29th of September, 1898, the old company was to be considered as carrying on business on behalf of the new company, and
the old company was to engage in no further business, except for the
benefit of the old company.
On the 9th of January, 1899, the sale was approved by the shareholders of the old company.
By an agreement made between the trustee for the new company in
the agreement of the 29th of November, 1898, and H. E. Thomas, on
behalf of the new company, it was provided (inter alia) :
(4) Save as aforesaid all principal moneys and interest in respect
of mortgages or other charges in the nature of mortgages in respect of
such premises shall be paid and satisfied by the Borax Company,
Limited.
Completion was to take place on the 29th of March, 1899, and the
benefit of the agreement of the old company not to carry on business
except for the benefit of the old company was assigned.
The plaintiff now sought to obtain an injunction to restrain the carrying out of the scheme.
NORTH, J. I must grant the injunction that is asked for. The
matter is one of great importance, and one in which the party against
whom I decide may desire to take the opinion of the court of appeal,
and if this is going to be done, the sooner the better.
I have heard
arguments at great length, but prefer to give my decision at once, as
what I ought to do seems to me reasonably clear. With reference to
the question whether the proposed arrangement would be a sale or an
amalgamation, it would in my opinion be a sale; but that does not in
As far as regards the shareholders there
any way affect my decision.
is power either to sell the undertaking or to amalgamate.
The short
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ground on which I consider that I ought to grant the injunction is that
what the company is doing is destroying the substratum of its existence, and the result is that the floating charge which the debentureholders have on the whole assets attaches, and the company has no
right, as agamst the debenture-holders, to part with the property.
(On appeal by defendants from this decision, before Lindley, M.
R., Rigby and Collins, L.
Their lordships said that if the money owing to the entire number
of still dissentient debenture-holders, amounting in all to ^16,900,
were brought into court, the order of North, J., would be discharged,
the costs to be costs in the action.

JJ.)

Note.

See preceding case, and following case and note.

Sec. 658.

5-

To enjoin threatened wrong.

SHIPMAN, J.,
1875.

IN

LOTHROP

v.

STEDMAN.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS OF CONNECTICUT.
Conn. Rep. 583, on 589.

42

[The American National Life Insurance Company was incorporated
in Connecticut in 1866, the charter reserving the right to the legislature
to alter, amend or repeal the same. In 1874 the insurance commissioners of the state reported to the legislature that the company had transferred its assets to another company, which had assumed the obligations
of the former; that its liabilities were $400,000 more than its assets,
and that it had ceased to do business, whereupon the legislature repealed its charter, and directed the insurance commissioner to take
charge of its assets and apply them to the credit of the policy-holders.
The commissioner was about to do this when the plaintiffs, citizens of
New York and policy-holders, brought their bill in equity to enjoin
the commissioner from taking, and the corporation from delivering,
the assets, on the ground that the repealing act was unconstitutional.
The hearing was upon the application for a temporary injunction until
the final hearing.]
The defendant corporation is a stock corporation authorized to issue
life policies upon the mutual plan of insurance, but it is not strictly a
mutual insurance company, and the policy-holders are not necessarily
members of the corporation, and have no right to participate in its
The complainants appear before the court only as
management.
creditors of the company.
Being citizens of the state of New York,
they have a right to bring this bill against the defendants, citizens of
Connecticut, and their interest as creditors of the corporation and
cestuis que trust of the fund, which is now in the control of the directors of the corporation, entitles them to maintain their suit if they have
The principle that a stockholder of a company can
suffered injury.
not maintain a bill in equity against a wrong-doer to prevent an injury

1

COLE V. THE MILLERTON

866

IRON CO.
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to the corporation, unless it shall be averred, and shall affirmatively appear, that the corporation has refused to take measures to protect itself,
does not extend to a bill which is in good faith filed by a creditor.
Note.
Creditor may sue for wrongs done to the corporation: 1896, In re
Brockway Mfg. Co., 89 Me. 121, 56 Am. St. Rep. 401 ; 1897, Wilcox Cordage
Co. v. Mosher, 114 Mich. 64 (statute) ; 1898, Winchester v. Mabury, 122 Cal.
522, 55 Pac. Rep. 393 (statute); 1898, Gores v. Day, 99 Wis. 276 (statute);
1899, Seeberger v. McCormick, 178111.404; 1899, Hodges' Adm'x v. South'
Fork L. Co., 21 Ky. L. Rep. 20. 50 S. W. Rep. 969; 1899, Hequembourg v.
Edwards, 155 Mo. 5"l4, 50 S. W. Rep. 908; 1900, Cunningham v. Weohselberg,
105 Wis. 339, 81 N. W. Rep. 414 (no statute necessary) ; 1900, Killen v. State
Bank, 106 Wis. 546, 82 N. W. Rep. 536.

Sec. 659.

6.

EMERY COLE,
1892.

To set aside fraudulent corporate conveyance.
RESPONDENT,

v.

THE MILLERTON IRON COMPANY

ET AL., RESPONDENTS ET AL., APPELLANTS.

1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.
Rep. 164-169, 28 Am. St. Rep. 615.

133

N. Y.

[This action was brought by plaintiff, a judgment creditor of the
National Mining Company of Pawling, to set aside a conveyance
made by it of all its property to defendant, the Millerton Iron Company, and also to release said property from the lien of a mortgage
executed by that company to defendant, the Mercantile Trust Company, and for appointment of a receiver, etc.]
FINCH, J. The plaintiff is a creditor of the National Mining Company, a corporation formed and existing under the laws of this state.
He commenced an action to recover damages done to his property by
the wrongful act of the corporation, serving the summons in October,
During the
1887, and recovering judgment in July of the next year.
pendency of the action all the property and assets of the debtor corporation were transferred to the Millerton Iron Company, also a domestic corporation, upon a nominal consideration, except an assumption by
the vendee of the debts of the vendor, and thereupon the former executed a mortgage to the Mercantile Trust Company covering all its
property, including that acquired from the National Mining Company. When the plaintiff obtained his judgment nothing remained
upon which it was a lien and his execution was returned unsatisfied.
He then began this action, in which he assailed the transfers made with
a view of subjecting the property of the debtor corporation to the satisfaction of his debt. Upon the trial his complaint was dismissed, but
the general term reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial.
From that order the trust company alone appeals and has given the
usual stipulation for judgment absolute.
The trial court has refused to find that the National Company was
1
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insolvent at the date of its transfer, but did find that such transfer suspended and terminated the regular business of the grantor, and was
made and accepted with that purpose and intention.
The practical
effect was to dissolve the grantor corporation and subject its charter
to forfeiture at the hands of the state, for it voluntarily stripped
itself of all its property and assets and became incapable, and intended to be and remain incapable, of performing its corporate
duties.
Such a transfer, which involves the destruction of the corporation and an abandonment of the purposes of its organization, is
illegal as against creditors, whose rights are thereby sacrificed and
their remedies destroyed.
The transfer was illegal, also, because
made in contemplation
of insolvency.
Those who accomplished it
knew that its necessary and inevitable effect would be to make the
corporation unable to pay its debts, and must be held to have intended
that consequence of their acts.
I do not agree to that reading of the
statute which limits its prohibition to cases in which payment of some
note or obligation has been previously refused.
An interpretation so
narrow would seriously maim and distort the obvious purpose of the
statute and make a transfer, in contemplation of insolvency, good the
As against the
day before a note matured and bad the day after.
creditor the transfer to the Millerton Company was illegal and in
fraud of its rights. The assets of a corporation are a trust fund for the
payment of its debts upon which the creditors have an equitable lien,
both as against the stockholders and all transferees, except those purchasing in good faith and for value.
(Bartlett v. Drew, 57 N. Y.
587; Brum v. Ins. Co., 16 Fed. Rep. 140; Morawetz on Corporations, 79 1 -) The Millerton Company was not such a purchaser.
It
It knew and participated in the illegal purpose
parted with nothing.
to destroy the National Company, to make it utterly insolvent, and to
deprive its creditors of the trust fund upon which they had a right to
rely, and so they were at liberty to set aside the transfer so far as it
barred their remedy and to enforce their equitable lien upon the property in the hands of the transferee.
It is not a sufficient answer to say that the transfer was rather formal than real, because, before its occurrence, the Millerton Company,
having the same stockholders and officers, managed and conducted
the business of the National Company before the transfer as well as
after, and that what occurred was a practical consolidation.
Companies may consolidate, but under the permission and safeguards of the
statute, all of which were disregarded, and what is called the formal
transaction cuts off and destroys the right of the creditor, and is being
used for that exact purpose.
Neither is it an answer to say that the creditor is not harmed by a
change of the party liable to pay, unless there be some disproportion
in the assets.
He can not be forced to change his debtor against his
will, and it appears in the proof that the transfer to the Millerton
1
Company was followed by a mortgage sweeping in to its lien and
peril the very property transferred.
We are satisfied, therefore, that the plaintiff was entitled to judg-
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ment of sequestration and for a receiver, and so the order of the general term was right.
The judgment obtained by Chapman is not a
It is not relied upon for that purpose, and the
bar to the remedy.
appointment of a receiver was without notice to the attorney-general,
as the law required.
(Laws of 1883, ch. 378.) In the present case
the plaintiff must give such notice when he applies for the appointment.
The rights of the mortgagee, who is the present appellant, need not
now be accurately determined.
Whether that mortgage was valid at
all for want of proper consents, or whether any of the bondholders
have acquired equities superior to those of the plaintiff, may or may
not become questions in the future.
Enough appears to show that
some of them do not stand in the attitude of bona fide creditors, and
that the remedies of all may be confined to the property of the Millerton Company not derived from the National, until at least the former
is exhausted.
Those questions, however, may be left to the developments consequent upon further proceedings.
The order of the general term should be affirmed and judgment absolute for the plaintiff be rendered upon the stipulation, with costs.
All concur.
Order affirmed and judgment accordingly.
Note.
See, 1874, Bartlett v. Drew, 57 N. Y. 587 ; 1899, U. S. Rubber Co. v.
Am. O. L. Co., 96 Fed. Rep. 891; 1899, Slack v. N. W. Nat'l Bank, 103 Wis.
57, 79 N. W. Rep. 51.
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HOLLINS v. BRIERFIELD COAL AND IRON COMPANY.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
371,

14

Sup. Ct.

150

1

U. S.

127.

[Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the middle
district of Alabama.
The iron company was incorporated May 4, 1882.
On September
i, 1882, a conveyance was made by the company to P. B. Plumb, as
On July 25, 1887,
trustee, to secure an issue of $500,000 in bonds.
Plumb requested a further conveyance and assurance, pursuant to a
covenant in the deed of September, 1882, which further conveyance
On August i he
was executed by the company on July 29, 1887.
demanded the surrender of all the company's property to him as
trustee.
This was done, and he placed John G. Murray in charge,
to control and manage it.
On August 3 he filed a bill in the circuit
court of the United States against the company, certain stockholders,
bondholders and creditors, though not the plaintiffs in the present
1
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That bill set out the stockholders, with the amounts subscribed
and paid, and alleged the subscribers were liable for the unpaid subscriptions, but that the assistance of the court was necessaiy for the
It also set out the issue of the bonds, and
assessment of such sums.
their owners, default in the payment of the interest, the property and
the unsecured
indebtedness being
indebtedness of the company
bill
asked that all the creditors of the corpoThe
about $200, OCX).
ration be permitted to make themselves parties and have their claims
adjudicated; that a full administration be had, and, if need be, a foreProceedings resulted, on July 8, 1889, in a decree
closure and sale.
for the foreclosure and a sale of the property. On October 28, 1887,
these appellants, as plaintiffs, filed a bill in the same court, making
the iron company and sundry stock and bond holders, with Plumb, defendants. Plaintiffs were unsecured creditors, having claims contracted
four or five years after the issue of the bonds and execution of the
trust deed, and sued on behalf of themselves and all other creditors
who were willing to come in and contribute to the expenses of the
After setting forth their claims, they alleged that the conveysuit.
ance to Plumb was absolutely void; that a large amount was still due
on the stock.
They asked to have a receiver appointed and the
property sold in satisfaction of their claims, and that such receiver
have authority to collect the unpaid stock subscriptions, to be also apThey alleged the pendency of
plied in satisfaction of their claims.
the suit brought by Plumb, but did not ask to intervene therein. After
the decree of foreclosure and sale in the Plumb case a final decree
was entered, dismissing the bill, and plaintiffs appealed.]
MR. JUSTICE BREWER. The plaintiffs were simple contract credTheir claims had not been reduced to judgitors of the company.
ment, and they had no express lien by mortgage, trust deed or
otherwise.
It is the settled law of this court that such creditors can
not come into a court of equity to obtain the seizure of the property
of their debtor, and its application to the satisfaction of their claims,
and this notwithstanding a statute of the state may authorize such a
proceeding in the courts of the state. The line of demarcation between equitable and legal remedies in the federal courts can not be
obliterated by state legislation.
Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S. 106, n
Sup. Ct. 712; Gates v. Allen, 149 U. S. 451, 13 Sup. Ct. 883, 977.
Nor is it otherwise in case the debtor is a corporation, and an unpaid
stock subscription is sought to be reached.
Tube- Works Co. v. Ballou, 146 U. S. 517, 13 Sup. Ct. 165; Cattle Co. v. Frank, 148 U. S.
603, 612, 13 Sup. Ct. 691. Nor is this rule changed by the fact that the
suit is brought in a court in which at the time is pending another suit
for the foreclosure of a mortgage or trust deed upon the property of the
Doubtless, in such foreclosure suit, the simple contract
debtor.
creditor can intervene, and if he has any equities in respect to the
property, whether prior or subsequent to those of the plaintiff,
can secure their determination
and protection ; and here, by the
express language of the bill filed by the trustee, all claimants and
creditors were invited to present their claims and have them adjudicated.
suit.
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These plaintiffs did not intervene, though, as shown by the allegations
of their bill, they knew of the existence of the foreclosure suit.
Neither did they apply for a consolidation of the two suits.
On the
contrary, the whole drift and scope of their suit was adverse to that
brought by the trustee, and in antagonism to the rights claimed by
him. They obviously intended to keep away from that suit, and
maintain, if possible, an independent proceeding to have the property
of the debtor applied to the satisfaction of their claims.
But this, as
has been decided in the cases cited, can not be done.
The excuse
suggested, that the rule which forbids in a suit to foreclose a mortgage
the litigation of a title adverse to that of the mortgagor prevented
Their rights, like those of the
them from intervening, is not sound.
trustee and the bondholders, were derived from the corporation deEach claimed under
and the validity and amount of such
fendant.
claims were matters properly and ordinarily considered and determined in
foreclosure suit.
It
true the corporation might admit the validity of any or all of the claims, and then the validity could
only be a subject of inquiry as between the claimants for the purpose
of determining the matter of priority; but to that extent, at least, both
validity and amount are always open to contest and determination.
It
urged, however, that this court has sustained the validity o
and decrees in suits of this nature, in which
approceedings
that
the
plaintiffs had not exhausted their remedies at law, and
peared
the cases of Sage v. Railroad Co., 125 U. S. 361,
Sup. Ct. 887,
and Mellen v. Iron Works, 131 U. S. 352,
Sup. Ct. 781, are cited
But, passing by other matters disclosed by the facts
as illustrations.
of those cases,
will be noticed that in neither of them was the
outset, and when action on the part of the court
made
the
at
objection
invoked.
Defenses
was
existing in equity suits may be waived, just
in
law
as they may
actions, and, when waived, the cases stand as
the
Given
suit in which there
though
objection never existed.
of
in
the
matter
within
the
parties,
general scope of
jurisdiction
of
of
and
decree
rendered
the jurisdiction
courts
will be
equity,
binding, although
may be apparent that defenses existed, which,
*
* *
decree of dismissal.
presented, would have resulted in

;
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This doctrine has been recognized, not merely in the cases cited,
but also in those of Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U. S. 354,
Sup. Ct.
486; Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 130 U. S. 505,
Sup. Ct. 594; Brown
None of these cases
v. Iron Co., 134 U. S. 530, 10 Sup. Ct. 604.
the
the
seasonably presented,
proposition that,
question
objection
will be effective.
But
has been held by this court in
earnestly insisted that
v.
101
688,
S.
that
whenever
creditor has a
Case
U.
Beauregard,
lien upon property for debt due him, he may
trust in his favor, or
has also
go into equity without exhausting his legal remedies; that
been
affirmed
the
and
assets
of
that
stock
capital
corporafrequently
tion constitute
trust fund for the benefit of its creditors, which
neither the officers nor stockholders can divert or waste
and several
of
cases are cited,
v.
them,
that
Sanger
Upton, 91 U. S.
among
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in which, perhaps, the proposition is asserted in the most em56,
phatic and direct language, and Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 636,
in which Chief Justice Waite made these observations:
"Ordinarily,
a creditor must put his demand into judgment against his debtor, and
exhaust his remedies at law, before he can proceed in equity to subTo this rule, however, there are
ject choses in action to its payment.
some exceptions ; and we are not prepared to say that a creditor of a
dissolved corporation may not, under certain circumstances, claim to
be exempted from its operation.
If he can, however, it is upon the
that
the
of
assets
the
ground
corporation constitute a trust fund, which
will be administered by a court of equity, in the absence of a trustee;
the principle being that equity will not permit a trust to fail for want

of

a

trustee."

While it

is true language has been

frequently used to the effect that

the assets of a corporation are a trust fund held by a corporation for
the benefit of creditors, this has not been to convey the idea that there
is a direct and express trust attached to the property.
As said in 2

Pom. Eq.
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Jur. , 1046, they "are not, in any true and complete sense,
and
can only be called so by way of analogy or metaphor."
trusts,
To the same effect are decisions of this court. The case of Graham
v. Railroad Co., 102 U. S. 148, 1 was an action by a subsequent creditor to subject certain property, alleged to have been wrongfully conveyed by the corporation debtor, to the satisfaction of his judgment;
and the very proposition here presented was then considered, and, in re*
the court, by Mr. Justice Bradley, said (page 160): *
spect to
so far civilly dead
"When
corporation becomes insolvent,
that its property maybe administered as
trust fund for the benefit of
its stockholders
and creditors.
A court of equity, at the instance of
the proper partis, will then make those funds trust funds which, in
other circumstances, are as much the absolute property of the corporation as any man's property
his."
T
W ith reference to the suggestion in this paragraph,
may be observed that the court does not attempt to determine who are proper
suit for the administration of the assets of an inparties to maintain
solvent corporation.
All that decides that, when court of equity
does take into its possession the assets of an insolvent corporation,
will administer them, on the theory that they, in equity, belong to the
creditors and stockholders, rather than to the corporation itself. In other
words, and that
the idea which underlies all these expressions in
reference to "trust" in connection with the property of corporation,
the corporation
an entity, distinct from its stockholders as from its
Solvent,
creditors.
holds its property as any individual holds his,
free from the touch of
creditor who has acquired no lien free, also,
from the touch of
stockholder who, though equitably interested in,
has no legal right to, the property.
Becoming insolvent, the equitable interest of the stockholders in the property, together with their concondition of
ditional liability to the creditors, places the property in
trust, first for the creditors, and then for the stockholders.
Whatever
Supra, p. 1809.
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of trust there is arises from the peculiar and diverse equitable rights of
the stockholders as against the corporation in its property, and their
It is rather a trust in the adminconditional liability to its creditors.
istration of the assets after possession by a court of equity, than a
trust attaching to the property, as such, for the direct benefit of either
creditor or stockholder.
Again, in the case of Railway Co. v. Ham, 114 U. S. 587, 5 Sup.
Ct. 1081, it appeared that four railway corporations, owing debts,
were consolidated under authority of law, and by the terms of the
consolidation agreement the new corporation was to protect the debts
of the old. Subsequently, the new corporation executed a mortgage
on all its property, and, in a contest between the mortgagees and the
unsecured creditors of one of the constituent companies, the court
In respect to this,
held that the lien of the mortgagees was prior.
Mr. Justice Gray (page 594, 114 U. S., and page 1084, 5 Sup. Ct.)
thus stated the law:
"It was contended that the property of the Toledo and Wabash Railway Company was a trust fund for all its creditors, and that upon the consolidation the Toledo, Wabash and Western
Railway Company took the property of the Toledo and Wabash Railway Company charged with the payment of all its debts. The property
of a corporation is doubtless a, trust fund for the payment of its debts,
in the sense that when the corporation is lawfully dissolved, and all
its business wound up, or when it is insolvent, all its creditors are entitled, in equity, to have their debts paid out of the corporate property
before any distribution thereof among the stockholders.
It is also
true, in the case of a corporation, as in that of a natural person, that
any conveyance of property of the debtor, without authority of law,
and in fraud of existing creditors, is void as against them."
The case of Fogg v. Blair, 133 U. S. 534, 541, 10 Sup. Ct. 338.
presented a similar question; and this court, by Mr. Justice Field, obl 'We do not
served:
question the general doctrine invoked by the
appellant, that the property of a railroad company is a trust fund for
the payment of its debts, but do not perceive any place for its appliThat doctrine only means that the property must first
cation here.
be appropriated to the payment of the debts of the company before
It does not
any portion of it can be distributed to the stockholders.
mean that the property is so affected by the indebtedness of the company that it can not be sold, transferred, or mortgaged to bona fide
purchasers for a valuable consideration, except subject to the liability
of being appropriated to pay that indebtedness.
Such a doctrine has
no existence."
In the case of Hawkins v. Glenn, 131 U. S. 319, 332, 9 Sup. Ct.
739, which was an action brought by the trustee of a corporation
against certain of its stockholders to recover unpaid subscriptions, and
in which the defense of the statute of limitations was pleaded, Chief
" Unpaid subJustice Fuller referred to this matter in these words:
scriptions are assets, but have frequently been treated by courts of
equity as if impressed with a trust sub modo, upon the view that, the
corporation being insolvent, the existence of creditors subjects these
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liabilities to the rules applicable to funds to be accounted for as held
in trust, and that, therefore, statutes of limitation do not commence to
run, in respect to them, until the retention of the money has become
adverse, by a refusal to pay upon due requisition."
These cases negative the idea of any direct trust or lien attaching
to the property of a corporation in favor of its creditors, and at the
same time are entirely consistent with those cases in which the assets
of a corporation are spoken of as a " trust fund," using the term in
the sense that we have said it was used.
The same idea of equitable lien and trust exists, to some extent, in
Whenever, a partnership becomthe case of partnership property.
of
a
court
takes
insolvent,
equity
ing
possession of its property, it recognizes the fact that in equity the partnership creditors have a right
to payment out of those funds in preference to individual creditors, as
well as superior to any claims of the partners themselves;
and the
partnership property is therefore sometimes said, not inaptly, to be
held in trust for the partnership creditors, or that they have an equitable lien on such property, yet, all that is meant by such expressions is
the existence of an equitable right, which will be enforced whenever
a court of equity, at the instance of a proper party, and in a proper
It is never understood
proceeding, has taken possession of the assets.
that there is a specific lien or a direct trust.
A party may deal with a corporation, in respect to its property, in
the same manner as with an individual owner, and with no greater
danger of being held to have received into his possession property
The officers of a corporation act in a
burdened with a trust or lien.
fiduciary capacity in respect to its property in their hands, and may be
called to an account for fraud, or sometimes even mere mismanagement, in respect thereto ; but, as between itself and its creditors, the
corporation is simply a debtor, and does not hold its property in tmst,
or subject to a lien in their favor, in any other sense than does an inThis is certainly the general rule, and, if there be
dividual debtor.
any exceptions thereto, they are not presented by any of the facts in
this case. Neither the insolvency of the corporation, nor the execution of an illegal trtist deed, nor the failure to collect in full all
stock subscriptions, nor all together, gave to these simple contract
creditors any lien upon the property of the corporation, nor charged
any direct trust thereon.
With respect to the propriety of the decree of dismissal in this suit
after the entry of the decree of foreclosure in the trustee suit, the case
Indeed, that case is
of Stout v. Lye, 103 U. S. 66, is conclusive.
conclusive of every question in this, except such as arise from the fact
It apthat the debtor is a corporation, rather than an individual.
peared that, pending a foreclosure suit, J. W. and J. O. Stout obtained a judgment against the mortgagor on an unsecured claim.
They thereupon instituted a suit, making both mortgagee and mortgagor parties defendant, to set aside the mortgage as illegal, or, H
not illegal, to have its amount reduced by certain payments of usuri-
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ous interest.
While this suit was pending the foreclosure suit passed
into decree, the Stouts having never been made parties or entered an
Thereupon, their suit was dismissed, and
appearance in that suit.
such dismissal was held by this court proper, on the ground that the
Stouts, being simple contract creditors at the time the foreclosure suit
was commenced, were not only unnecessary but improper parties.
they had been made parties when the suit was begun, they could
have done nothing by way of defense to the action until they had acquired some specific interest in the mortgaged property. As creditors at large, they were powerless in respect to the foreclosure probut, when they obtained their judgment,
not before,
ceedings;
in
were
a position to contest in all legitimate ways the validity
they
and extent of the superior lien which the bank asserted on the property, in which, by the judgment, they had acquired a specific interest."
And on the further ground that the mortgagor represented in
the foreclosure suit not merely himself, but all parties who, like the
Stouts, acquired any interest in the property since the commencement
of that suit.
So, here, these plaintiffs were simple contract creditors when the
trustee's suit was commenced.
That suit passed to decree of foreclosure, and up to that time these plaintiffs had acquired no specific
lien upon the property. They entered no appearance in that suit, did
not intervene, or claim any rights in the property, and they were represented in that suit by the corporation, the party under whom both
A decree of dismissal 'was therefore
they and the trustee claimed.
It
in
record
as a decree upon the merits.
the
It
proper.
appears
should have been for want of jurisdiction, and to that extent the deThe appellants will be charged
cree, as entered, will be modified.
with all the costs in the case.

"If

Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Mr. Justice Brown and Mr. Justice Jackson dissented.
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CAMPBELL, C. J. This action by a judgment creditor of an insolvent corporation, whose right of execution on the judgment was returned nulla bona, was brought against its directors to recover from
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them the amount of the judgment, on the ground of their wrongful
The judgment
diversion and misapplication of the corporate assets.
below went against two of the directors, one of whom (Charles H.

Nix)

has appealed.

*

*

*

The propositions vigorously maintained by appellant may thus be
stated : First, that appellant did not participate in or consent to the alleged frauds of the directors that worked the insolvency of the corporation ; second, that if, in law, by inattention to his official duty he may
be held to have contributed to the alleged fraudulent acts, they are not
of such a character as to entail personal liabilities upon the director
committing them; third, that the alleged frauds were committed before the plaintiff became a creditor of the corporation, and, therefore,
even if the appellant participated therein, the plaintiff, as a subsequent creditor, can not call him to account therefor; fourth, that before the plaintiff became a creditor, appellant resigned his office as
director, and so can not be chargeable for any default of the other
directors respecting plaintiff's charge of fraud, in so far as it was committed after the time of his resignation; fifth, that he is not liable as
a stockholder.
Preliminary to the separate consideration of these propositions, it is
well briefly to state the salient facts necessary to an understanding of
the case: Previous to July, 1892, the firm of Home & Co., composed
of W. S. Home and Charles H. Nix, was engaged in the general merchandise business at the town of Ouray.
Being indebted, they conceived the plan of forming a corporation to which to transfer all of the
firm property, with a view the better to pay off this indebtedness.
In
accordance therewith, the Ouray Mercantile Company was formed by
the members of this firm, they, and two others named by them, becoming the directors, the capital stock consisting of $20,000, which
was issued as fully paid up stock, the consideration being the transfer
by the firm to it of the firm property, burdened by the indebtedness
of the firm, which the corporation assumed and agreed to pay.
Its
business was carried on and purchases made from time to time for a
period of eight months, when the corporation, about March 26, 1893,
became insolvent and ceased doing business.
The plaintiff sold merchandise to it between the latter part of December, 1892, and the date
of insolvency.
A judgment against the corporation for the amount
of his debt was recovered, and, the execution thereon being returned unsatisfied, the plaintiff brought this action against the directors, charging them with diversion of the corporate property.
The
court found, as a matter of fact, that the directors had misapplied
over $i t,ooo of the corporate assets, which caused its insolvency, and
this insolvency was admitted at the trial.
i. It may be that the record failed to show any direct, positive and
specific fraudulent act of the appellant concerning the corporate business. He himself testifies that, practically, he gave it no personal attention, but entrusted it entirely to Home and Sparks, his co-directors. That
they were guilty of misappropriation of the corporate assets, as the trial
court found, the appellant, in discussing this branch of the case, does
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not controvert, but his defense is that he had nothing whatever to do
with such acts, and did not participate therein or consent thereto.
It
is not every act of a director of a mercantile corporation, whether it
be of omission or commission, that entails upon him individual liability for loss to a stockholder or creditor resulting from such act.
While the appellant in this case may not be held for knowingly committing a fraudulent act, yet for gross neglect of and inattention to
his official duty he may be, and under the facts of this case is, accountable to the plaintiff, as a judgment creditor, just as certainly as
if he personally did the act that caused the damage.
That his neglect of duty in this direction permitted his co-directors to commit the
acts that worked the injury to plaintiff we think entirely clear, and
the proof is amply sufficient to uphold the findings of the trial court
to that effect.
2. The second point is closely allied with the first, and might well
be considered with it.
The acts of the directors complained of were
nothing more nor less than a diversion of the funds of the corporation
from their legitimate channel, and, instead of paying therewith corporate debts, applying them to the payment of the individual debts of
one of the directors.
We have already decided that appellant's gross
neglect of the company affairs enabled the active managing directors
of the company to accomplish this fraud. That this misapplication of
the corporate property, which is a tnist fund for the creditors, instead
of paying therewith the corporate indebtedness,
when the necessary
result is to make the corporation insolvent, thus rendering creditors
unable to collect from it their claims.
is a fraud upon them, for
which they may proceed against the directors after fruitlessly exhausting their remedy against the corporation, is too clear for dispute.

Tayl. Priv. Corp. (3d ed.),
616-619, 75 6 ~75 8 > et seq.; 3 Thomp.
et seq.;
Corp., 4152, and cases cited; i Beach Priv. Corp.,
2=^7c,
Cole v. Iron Co., 133 N. Y. 164, 30 N. E. Rep. 847; Scott v. DeAppellant relies upon Briggs v. Spauldpeyster, I Edw. Ch. 512.
ing, 141 U. S. 132, ii Sup. Ct. 924, as authority for his position that

The theory of the
the acts of the directors here are not actionable.
bill in that case was that the defendants were " liable, not to stockholders nor to creditors, as such, but to the bank, for losses alleged
to have occurred during their period of office because of their inattention." The defendants were held not liable, but the charges against
them were not of the grave and serious character established against
In the opinion, Chief Justice Fuller thus speaks:
these defendants.
"If particular stockholders or creditors have a cause of action against
the defendant individually, it is not sought to be proceeded on here,
and the disposition of the questions arising thereon would depend
The rule he lays down in that case,
upon different considerations."
governing the liability of directors to the corporation, would, however, clearly make these defendants liable, under the facts of this case,
while confessedly the duty of directors to creditors is to be determined
by a stricter rule.
in this country (Graham v.
3. It is held by the highest authority
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Railroad Co., 102 U. S. 148) that the disposal by a corporation of
any of its property can not be questioned by any of its subsequent
creditors. Other authorities might be cited, but this case is controlling.
It is upon the ground that the diversion of funds occurred before
the plaintiff became a creditor that appellant seeks to escape liability.
If the facts of the case at bar brought it within the principle of the
authority cited, we would not hesitate to recognize the rule therein
announced, because not only is it a sound one, but, in the absence of
a controlling rule in our own jurisdiction (of which there is none),
we would be inclined to follow the decision of the august tribunal
from which it emanated.
Whether, as contended by appellee, the character of the action in
this case is different in kind from the principal case, or whether it is,
of a trust
as claimed by him, one merely to compel an accounting
fund, is not important; for conceding that the two are of the same
class, there is enough in the facts of the pending action, as set out in
the findings of facts, which the record supports, to differentiate this
case from that, in this : that the fraudulent acts here complained of
were clearjy intended to operate as a fraud upon subsequent creditors, and of necessity, as the directors must have known, could have
no other effect.
So that this case falls within the exception of the
rule
that
subsequent creditors may not question a fraudulent
general
of
debtor's property made before the relation of
their
disposition
creditor and debtor existed, and is brought within that class of cases
which hold, where such fraudulent disposition of the debtor's property was intended as a fraud upon subsequent creditors, and necessarily
could have no other effect, that the latter may complain. It is also
to be observed that it does not appear just what proportion of the
fund was misapplied before, and what after, the plaintiff became a
creditor. Upon the showing made by plaintiff, it was incumbent
upon the defendants to make this point clear.
4. If the appellant resigned as a director before the plaintiff became
a creditor, it does not necessarily follow that this releases him from
If, as we have held, the diversion
all previous acts of misfeasance.
of assets was intended as a fraud upon subsequent creditors, and so resulted, and appellant by his inattention to duty contributed thereto so
as to make him personally holden, the same as those directly guilty
of the fraud, his liability may have become fixed for past acts before
his resignation took effect, so that, in one sense, and as to past acts,
it is immaterial as to the exact date of his resignation. But the finding of the trial court, to the effect that this resignation was not effectuated until after the plaintiff became a creditor and the wrong was
At the trial the apcommitted, is not without support in the record.
the company, and
a
to
written
addressed
instrument,
pellant produced
it
bore
date Novemhim,
and
his
tendering
resignation,
signed by
became
a
creditor. We
and
this
26,
was
before
the
ber
plaintiff
1893,
had
a
to
concede
that
the
resign, and that
right
appellant
may safely
of
his
for
no
an
there was
resignation by the
necessity
acceptance
his
connection as a
or
That
of
formal
otherwise.
directors,
board
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director with the corporation, and his liability for all subsequent acts,
ceased the moment he tendered his resignation to the proper authority,
doubtless true.
even if that authority refused to accept
may
conceded
that
the
be
that a written instrualso
legal presumption
bore date, and that
ment like this was executed when
was delivEv.
the
same
time.
ered at
Whart.
Greenl.
1313;
(3d ed.),
Ev. (15* ed.), 38; Holbrook v. Zinc Co., 57 N. Y. 616; People
10.
v. Snyder, 41 N. Y. 397; Abb. Tr. Ev., p. 527,
Still there
in
record
to
that
the
the
the
finding
enough
resignation was not
justify
was formally actendered or made until March 18, 1893, when
board.
other
the
Among
things bearing upon this point
cepted by

*

a

it

the fact that Mr. Nix, when on the stand, did not state when he tendered his resignation, or that
was in fact made prior to the date of
his
and
subsequent conduct in relation to the corporation
acceptance,
of
was
such
character as to indicate that he still considered himself
*
*
as a director, and acted in that capacity.

(Fifth point omitted.)
Affirmed.
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See, generally, note 49 Am. St. Rep. 698, and 1832, Robinson v.
Note.
Smith,
Paige (N. Y.) 222, 24 Am. Dec. 212; 1850, Hodges v. N. E. Screw
R.
312, 53 Am. Dec. 624; 1868, Bank v. Hill, 56 Maine 385, 96 Am.
Co.,
Dec. 470; 1878, In re Wincham, etc., Co.,
Ch. D. 329; 1887, Delano v.
Gardner Case, 121 111. 247; 1888, Seale v. Baker, 70 Texas 283,
Am. St.
Rep. 592; 1889, Marshall v. Farmers', etc., Bank, 85 Va. 676, 17 Am. St. Rep.
84, note 95, infra, p. 1879; 1895, Grant v. Walsh, 145 N. Y. 592, 45 Am. St.
Rep. 626; 1895, Tradesman Pub. Co. v. Knoxville, etc., Co., 95 Tenn. 634, 49
Am. St. Rep. 943; 1896, Tate v. Bates, 118 N. C. 287,54 Am. St.Rep. 719; 1896,
In re Brockway Mfg. Co., 89 Maine 121, 56 Am. St. Rep. 401 1898, Corn Exchange Bk. v. Solicitors, etc., 188 Pa. St. 330, 68 Am. St. Rep. 872; 1898, Bird
43 Atl. Rep. 278; 1898, Warner v. Pennoyer, 91
v. Magowan,
N. J. Eq.
1899, Seeberger v. McCormick, 178 111. 404;' 1899,
Fed. 587, 44 L. R. A. 761
Mo.
Kent v. Clark, 181 111. 237; 1899, Hequernbourg v. Edwards,
50 S.
W. Rep. 908; 1899, In re Natl. Bank, 68 L. J. Ch. 634, 81 L. T. (N. S.) 363;
1899, Warren v. Robinson, 19 Utah 289, 75 Am. St. Rep. 734; 1900, Hay ward
v. Leeson, 176 Miss. 310, 49 L. R. A. 725; 1900, Michelson v. Pierce, 107 Wis.
85, 82 N. W. Rep. 707; 1901, Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N. Y. 157, 61 N. E. 163,
N. J. Eq.
50 Atl. 120;
55 L. R. A. 751, note; 1901, Campbell v. Watson,
Tex. Civ. App.
66 S. W. 485.
M. Bk.,
i902, Scott v. Farmers'
Compare, 1900, Utley v. Hill, 155 Mo. 232, 78 Am. St. Rep. 569.
After insolvency the directors are trustees of the corporate assets for the
See, generally, 1887, Sweeney v.
benefit of creditors and shareholders.
Am. St. Rep. 88; 1889, Beach v. Miller, 130
Grape Sugar Co., 30 W. Ya. 443,
111. 162, 17 Am. St. Rep. 291, note 301;
1895, Tradesman Pub. Co. v. Knoxville, 9f> Tenn. 634, 49 Am. St. Rep. 943; 1896, In re Brockway Mfg. Co., 89
Maine 121, 56 Am. St. Rep. 401; 1899, Millsaps v. Chapman, 76 Miss. 942,
71 Am. St. Rep. 547.
Contra, 1900, Utley v. Hill, 155 Mo. 232, 78 Am. St. Rep. 569.
By the weight of authority, however, creditors may be preferred, even after
court of
insolvency, until the property has been taken possession of by
See, supra,
645, 646.
equity or trustee to wind up its concerns.

THE CREDITORS AND CORPORATE OFFICERS.

662

Sec. 662.

Same.

MARSHALL
1889.

1879

v.

F.

& M.

SAVINGS BANK

OP

ALEXANDRIA ET

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA.
Rep. 676-689, 17 Am. St. Rep. 84.

AL. 1

85

Va.

[Appeal from decree of lower court dismissing a bill by Marshall,
on behalf of himself and the other creditors of the bank, to distribute its assets and to charge the officers and directors with losses
The matter
alleged to be due to their negligence and inattention.
was referred to a commissioner who reported that the directors not
only did not exercise ordinary care, but were guilty of gross negligence.
Upon the hearing in the lower court this part of the report
was overruled and plaintiff appealed.]
LACY, J. * * * By the appellees no error is assigned, so the
question involved here does not raise any other question than the single
inquiry, was there such negligence on the part of the directors of this
bank as to make them, or any of them, personally liable for its losses?
There is no dispute as to what the losses have been, and their several
amounts ; and of the terms or periods as to which each director is
liable, if at all. The appellees insist, through their learned counsel,
that while there have been errors of judgment and unfortunate loans
made, there has been no negligence.
The liability of directors for
losses growing out of their mismanagement of the concerns of the
bank, and their negligence in the discharge of their duties, has been
often the subject of judicial investigation and decision. It is a question at this day well understood by the profession, and is not controverted to any degree by the learned counsel in this case.
We find
the settled rule upon this subject well stated in a recent work of great
practical usefulness.
The American and English Encyclopedia of Law, under the head
"Banks," speaking of directors, says: "The directors of a bank
have the general control and government of its affairs, and constitute
the corporation.
They are bound to exercise ordinary skill and diligence, and are liable tor losses resulting from mismanagement of the
affairs and business of the bank."
Citing Society v. Underwood, 9
Bush 609, which appears to have been criticised in Zinn v. Mendel,
9 W. Va. 580-597, and by Mr. Redfield in 13 Amer. Law Reg. (N.
S.) 218; Dunn v. Kyle, 14 Bush 134; Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 88
N. Y. 52 ; Chester v. Halliard, 34 N. J. Eq. 341 ; Spering's Appeal,
There it is further said:
"But for excusable mis71 Pa. St. n.
takes concerning the law, and for errors of judgment when acting in
Citing Spering's Appeal, supra;
good faith, they are not liable."
Dunn v. Kyle, supra; Godbold v. Bank, n Ala. 191; Hodges v.
Screw Co., i R. I. 312. See 2 Amer. & Eng. Cyclop. Law, 114,
Morse, in his work on Banks and Banking, says:
116.
bank

"If

1

Statement

abridged and part of opinion omitted.
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directors do not manage the affairs and business of the bank according to the directions of the charter, and in good faith, they will be liable to make good all losses which their misconduct may inflict upon
either stockholders or creditors, or both.
Hodges v. Screw Co., sube
held
an
to
account
to
injured party in a court of
pra. They may
Ala.
566), or they, or any one of
chancery (Bank v. St. Johns, 25
in
the
their number who shared
wrong-doing, may be sued at law for
*
*
* They are
Bank,
v.
i
Ohio St. 298.
Conant
damages.
for
the
to
show
a
reasonable
position they
required simply
capacity
to use in it their best discretion and industry; to show the
accept;
scrupulous bona fides and conscientiousness in every matter, however
minute, which is exacted rigorously from all trustees of the property
of others ; and to obey accurately the requisitions of the charter, or of
Morse, Banks,
the general law under which they are organized."
133-

Mistakes as to what is the law serve to excuse cases where correct
knowledge could be reasonably expected only from a professional

man, and even in such cases, if the directors feel any doubts, they
may be guilty of neglect, if they fail to seek and be guided by
But ignorance of any fact in the bank's afcompetent legal advice.
fairs, which it is their duty to know, can never be set up by them in
defense or exculpation for any act which the existence of that fact
The high degree of
Morse, Banks, 135.
should have prohibited.
confidence and responsibility resting upon directors of corporations
has often led the courts to regard them as trustees, and to declare the
relationship existing between them and the stockholders to be that of
If this can be asserted
trustees and cestui que trust, respectively.
of
with regard to the generality
corporations, it is peculiarly and exThe directors
ceptionally true with regard to banking corporations.
of a bank are not trustees for the stockholders alone, but they owe an
The law is, as it ought to be,
even earlier duty to the depositors.
and
thorough performance of these
very jealous in exacting the strict
of
duties, and it is in the scrutiny
possible breaches of them that the
rigid rules which govern trustees have been applied. It is not enough
to exculpate a director that no actual dishonesty can be shown ; that
he can not be positively proved to have been influenced by interested
Mr. Morawetz, in his work
Morse, Banks, pp. 113, 114.
motives.
to
the
on Private Corporations, says, as
degree of care to be exercised
have
been
made to define the degree
(section 552): "Attempts
directors
must
exercise in the performof care and prudence which
of
cases
has been said that inasIn
some
the
it
ance of their duties.
for
services, they are to
not
their
much as directors are usually
paid
have
be regarded as mandataries
gratuitously underpersons who
to
and
are
bound
exercise only ordiduties,
taken to perform certain
liable
to the corporation
and
that
are
care
and
prudence
they
nary
But
or
is
for
called
crassa
what
gross negligence.
only
negligentia,
The plain and obvious rule is that
all this is, at the best, misleading.
directors impliedly undertake to use as much diligence and care as
What
the proper performance of the duties of their office requires.
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constitutes a proper performance of the duties of a director is a question of fact which must be determined in each case in view of all the
circumstances ; the character of the company, the condition of its business, the usual methods of managing such companies, and all other
relevant facts must be taken into consideration.
It is evident that no
abstract reasoning can be of service in reaching a proper solution."
Directors, as trustees of a corporation, are bound to manage the
affairs of the company with the same degree of care and prudence
which is generally exercised by business men in the management of
Hun v. Caiy, 82 N. Y. 65 ; Charitable Corporatheir own affairs.
2
Atk. 400 ; Litchfield v. White, 3 Sandf . 545 ;
tion v. Sutton,
Co.,
Directors are not merely bound to be
Hodges v. Screw
supra.
be
honest; they must also
diligent and careful in performing the duties
They can not excuse imprudence on the
they have undertaken.
ground of their ignorance or inexperience, or the honesty of their intentions; and, if they commit an error of judgment through mere recklessness, or want of ordinary prudence and skill, the corporation may
hold them responsible for the consequences.
See the case of Hun v.
Gary, 82 N. Y. 65 ; Earl, J., saying, in delivering the opinion in that
case:
"One who voluntarily takes the position of director, and invites confidence in that relation, undertakes like a mandatary, with
those whom he represents or for whom he acts, that he possesses at
least ordinary knowledge and skill, and that he will bring them to bear
in the discharge of his duties.
Such is the rule applicable to public
officers, to professional men and to mechanics, and such is the rule
which must be applicable to every person who undertakes to act for
another in a situation or employment requiring skill and knowledge ;
and it matters not that the service is to be rendered gratuitously.
These defendants voluntarily took the position of trustees of the bank.
They invited depositors to confide to them their savings, and to intrust
the safe-keeping and management of them to their skill and prudence.
They undertook, not only that they would discharge their duties with
proper care, but that they would exercise the ordinary skill and judgment requisite for the discharge of their delicate trust."
Directors
can never set up as a defense that they were ignorant of a provision
of the company's charter or by-laws.
See Spering's Appeal, supra,
and the opinion of Chief Justice Greene in Hodges v. Screw Co.,

supra.

We can not better close the discussion upon this question than by

case of Bank v. Bossieux, 4 Hughes 387, 398, 3 Fed. Rep.
817, much relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant, who says:
" This question has been the subject of investigation and judicial determination by the United States Circuit Court for the eastern district
of Virginia. Judge Hughes, in an elaborate opinion, stating the law
with great force and clearness, exhibiting a thorough and patient examination of all the authorities, held the defendant directors liable
upon this ground: 'Gross inattention and negligence, allowing fraud
or misconduct on the part of agents, officers, or co-directors, which
could have been prevented if they had given ordinary care and atten-

citing the
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Indeed, this opinion is not only the most thortion to their duties.'
ough examination, but the ablest exposition of the law upon the subject the writer has been able to find after examining many authorities, and he might well be content to rest the law of this case upon
In it he reviews the case of Spering's
the opinion of Judge Hughes.
Appeal, and shows that the very principle was declared in that case
upon which he found the directors of the Dollar Savings Bank liable.
He declares that 'negligence maybe of such a character as to amount
" Citing
to fraud.'
Jones' Ex'rs v. Clark, 25 Gratt. 642, 655, and Neal
will
v. Clark, 95 U. S. 707. In that case Judge Hughes says:
abundantly appear from authorities and reported cases to be cited in
the sequel that the managing officers of corporations are personally
liable for the results of gross negligence, or what the jurists call crassa
If by reckless inattention to the duties confided to them
negligentia.
by their corporation, frauds and misconduct are perpetrated by officers, agents, and co-directors, which ordinary care on their part would
have prevented, then I think it may be said with truth that it is now
elementary law, to be found in all the books, that directors are personally liable for the losses resulting. Moreover, all authorities now
tend to the conclusion that directors of banks and other moneyed corporations hold the relation to stockholders, depositors, and creditors
of trustees to cestuis que trust, and as such are personally responsible
for frauds and losses resulting from gross negligence and inattention
Bank v. Bossieux, 4 Hughes 398; 3
to the duties of their trust."
Fed. Rep. 817, and the authorities cited in the opinion.
We will now proceed to briefly review the facts of this case to
which this well-established rule of law is to be applied. The question
arises in this case as between the directors and the depositors, and
not between the directors and the stockholders.
The by-laws of this
bank prescribed weekly meetings.
It is conceded that these were
scarcely ever held, the answers admitting that formal meetings were
not held.
The decree of the circuit court of Alexandria city, that it
appears to the court that there has been no such dereliction of duty on
the part of the directors, or any of them, as to fix upon them personal responsibility, can not be sustained upon any sound principle
whatever.
Upon what principle can Andrew Jameison be held not
to be personally liable for the acts already detailed concerning him ?
The commissioner reports that he took $2,187.33 out of the cashdrawer; that he withdrew without authority the bonds of the bank,
deposited elsewhere, caused their sale and appropriated the money to
>his own use;
overdrew his account $341.64, and in other ways converted to his own use the property of the bank, aggregating $11,713.97.
The passenger railway company was allowed to overdraw its account
to the amount of thousands ($i 1,321.91) at one time. The notes of the
company were discounted to the amount of $6,500, and at maturity
neither protested, renewed, collected, nor sued on, and the overdraft
was allowed to increase for a year or more without security, until it
reached $7,530.45, which was entirely lost to the bank, he being the
president of this company part of the time, and one of the bank

"It
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directors being president of the company the other part of the time in
question, while the treasurer of the railway company was the cashier
of this savings bank.
Stilson was allowed to withdraw the sole valuable security for his note of $2,000, and that was lost.
He lent his
brother $3,311.62 practically without any security, and that was lost,
and actually lent him $1,211.62 a few months before the bank closed
its doors ; lending to Robert Jameison, with no security, except worthless indorsers, $2,300, when he had already gone to protest on a note

?

it

if

is

;

a

a

it

a

a

it,

of $500.
But the co-directors seek to escape responsibility for all this, including the large loss to the Washington and Ohio Railroad, by
claiming to have no actual knowledge of it at all. Did they exercise
ordinary diligence to inform themselves, as their duty certainly required that they should? They were required to meet weekly by
their own by-laws.
They did not always meet semi-annually meeting sometimes once a year, as we have stated. They were in duty
bound to cause the books of the bank to be examined at regular intervals.
This they never did at all throughout their whole career, nor
did they ever call for a statement of their accounts with other banks.
Their vaults and their cash-drawer were emptied by illegal abstractions and insolvent loans, and they admit that they never knew
and
for
not
this
as
their
The
subscribed
was
stock
exculpation.
pleaded
paid up, as has been stated, and yet such part as was paid up was
loan, and interest paid on it, and
treated as
large part had never
been paid up at the time of the suspension, and some of
has not
been
bank
small
with
so
nominal
capital,
paid up. Having
yet
with empty vaults, and despoiled cash-drawer, they owed at the suspension of the bank, to depositors who had intrusted to them their
money, $53,063.63, on which they have been able to pay ten per cent.
If these directors had any duty to perform whatever towards their depositors, the records of this case do not show its performance. They
One of their number was the president of the
plead ignorance.
and
Ohio Railroad in its last hours, and knew its condiWashington
tion, and secured himself but the notes due the bank were allowed to
sleep unprotested, unsecured, unrenewed, uncollected, and unsued on.
One of their number was the president of the Alexandria Passenger
Railroad Company, and knew its condition. One of their number
was the brother of their defaulting debtor, Jameison, who was insolvIt
ent at the time of the loan of thousands to him without security.
all
this.
of
difficult to concede that they could have been ignorant
But suppose they were? Their duty required that they should have
looked well into all these matters, and
they have negligently trusted
fall on them, or
to
them
others, and loss has occurred, should
and
whose
trust they had
upon the depositors who had trusted them,
care and atsuch
accepted, and to whom they had solemnly promised
men
were
to
be
business
tention as
expected of good
We think the record shows that these directors, and all of them,
have been guilty of such negligence in the premises as makes them
personally liable for the losses caused by their negligence, and we
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are of opinion that the circuit court of Alexandria city erred in holdWhile this is true, there is nothing in the recing them exonerated.
ord which shows any bad faith, or tends to show any dishonesty on
the part of some of these gentlemen, who appear to have confided
their duties to others and to have been betrayed by them ; but this
was such negligence as will fix liability upon them, and their act in
assuming this attitude of trust and confidence was voluntary, and led
to the confidence which has resulted in loss.
We are of opinion to
reverse the decree of the circuit court of Alexandria city appealed
from, and to render such decree here as the said court ought to have
rendered.

Fauntleroy, J., concurred in the opinion.
Hinton, J., concurred in the result.
Lewis, P., and Richardson, J. , dissented.

Decree reversed.
Note.

See note preceding case.
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Rep. 140-154.

147

Pa. St.

[Bill by creditors against the directors and officers of the bank to
hold them personally liable for loss of funds due to the misappropriation of its funds by the president, and alleged to have been made possible through the negligence and inattention of the directors.]
This case has been so carefully considered
MR. JUSTICE PAXSON.
by the learned master and court below, that little remains for us to
Indeed, in a case of such magnitude, involving a mass of testiadd.
mony, we can do little more than see that the principles upon which
it has been decided below are sound.
Briefly stated, the bill was filed for the purpose of holding the officers and directors of the bank responsible for the losses resulting
from its failure. It is claimed that the officers and directors were
negligent in their management of the bank's affairs, and that by reason
of such negligence the losses occurred.
It is conceded on all sides that the losses and the disastrous failure of
the bank were directly traceable to Mr. Riddle, its late president, nowHe practically emptied the vaults of the bank in carrying
deceased.
on a gigantic speculation in oil.
This was done with the knowledge
of the cashier, and the co-operation of one or more clerks or subIt would have been extremely difficult, if not practically
ordinates.
1
Facts sufficiently stated in the opinion
parts of opinions upon other points omitted.

;

arguments,

master's

report and
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impossible, for any person to have committed such a swindle without
the co-operation of someone inside.
The question is whether the directors ought to have known of these
transactions, and whether their failure to know what the real plunderer
was doing was such negligence on their part as to render them liable
to the creditors of the bank.
The Penn Bank closed its doors in May, 1884. It is not too much
to say that its failure was a great shock to the business interests of
It was the cause of much excitement; led to a large
Pittsburg.
amount of litigation, much of it directed against the board of directors. As usual in such cases, the current of public opinion was turned
against them, and up to the present time they have been defending
The time has now arrived when
themselves against hostile litigation.
the rights of the parties can be considered calmly, and disposed of in
disregard of prejudice or popular clamor.
The first question that naturally suggests itself for our consideration
is, the extent of the duty which the directors of a bank owe to the
stockholders, whom they represent directly, and the creditors, whom
they represent indirectly.
Upon this point there is a general misapprehension in the popular
mind. This finds expression, after bank failures, in severe condemnation of directors, and a general assertion of the doctrine that their
duty requires them to be familiar with all the details of the manageIn the popular mind they are held to the rule that they ought
ment.
to take the same care of the affairs of the bank that they do of their
Even the learned judge below evidently
own private business.
adopted this view, when he said in his opinion :

" If

we were to decide

the case on first impressions,

as to the con-

clusions of fact to be drawn, and under the decisions cited and rules
laid down in the 1 minority opinion in Briggs v. Spaulding, 1 we would
say there was gross negligence, or want of the ordinary care that a
man of fair intelligence would take of his own affairs."
It can not be the rule that the director of a bank is to be held to
He receives
the same ordinary care that he takes of his own affairs.
no compensation for his services. He is a gratuitous mandatary.
His
principal business at the bank is to assist in discounting paper, and
for that purpose he attends at the bank at stated periods
generally
for an hour or two. The condition of the bank is
once or twice a week
then laid before him, in order that he may know how much money there
is to loan. Once or twice a year there is an examination of the condition
The cash on hand is counted,
of the bank, in which he participates.
the bills receivable and sureties examined, to see whether they correBeyond this
spond with the statement as furnished by the officers.
he has little to do with either the cash or the books of the bank. They
are in the care of salaried officials who are paid for such services, and
To expect
selected by reason of their supposed integrity and fitness.
a director, under such circumstances, to give the affairs of the bank
the same care that he takes of his own business is unreasonable, and
few responsible men would be willing to serve upon such terms. In
1
141 U. S. 132.

1
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the case of a city bank, doing a large business, he would be obliged
to abandon his own affairs entirely. A business man generally understands the details of his own business, but a bank director can not grasp
the details of a large bank without devoting all his time to
to the
utter neglect of his own affairs.
A vast amount of authority has been cited upon this question,
It sufficient to refer
which we do not think
necessary to review.
to
few cases only. In Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. n, the subject
very fully discussed by the late Justice Sharswood, and the rule of orlaid down. Not, however, the ordinary care which a
dinary care
man takes of his own business, but the ordinary care of a bank director in the business of
bank. Negligence
the want of care
according to the circumstances, and the circumstances are everything
in considering this question. The ordinary care of business man in his
own affairs means one thing; the ordinary care of
gratuitous manThe one implies an oversight and
quite another matter.
datary
knowledge of every detail of his business the other suggests such
care only as a man can give in a short space of time to the business of
other persons, from whom he receives no compensation.
The same learned judge, in Maisch v. Savings Fund,
Phila. 30,
laid down the rule as follows:
"As to the directors, however, re-,
ceiving no benefit or advantage, they can be considered only as
gratuitous mandataries, liable only for fraud or such gross negligence
as amounts to fraud."
Again, in Spering's Appeal, supra, he said:
" Indeed, as the directors are themselves stockholders, interested as
well as all others that the affairs and business of the corporation should
be successful, when we ascertain and determine that they have not
sought to make any profit not common to all the stockholders, we
raise
strong presumption that they have brought to the administration their best judgment and skill."
We may also refer to Briggs, Receiver, v. Spaulding, 141 U. S.
It
132, which goes even further than our own cases upon this point.
does not relieve
director from the consequence of gross negligence
in the performance of his duty, but
holds that he
not responsible
where he has used the ordinary care which bank directors usually exercise.
It
true this was
case of
national bank, but we apprehend that what
director of
national
negligence on the part of
bank would, as general rule, be
director of a state
negligence by
bank, and subject to the same liability.
In regard to what
ordinary care, regard must be had to the usages
Thus,
of the particular business.
the director of a bank performed
his duties as such in the same manner as they were performed by
all other directors of all other banks in the same city,
could not fairly
be said that he was guilty of gross negligence.
And care must be
taken that we do not hold mere gratuitous mandataries to such
severe rule as to drive all honest men out of such positions. This thought
so well expressed by Sir George Jessel, M. R., in his opinion in In
re Forest of Dean Coal Mining Co., 10 Ch. Div. 450, that
give his
remarks in full: "One must be very careful in administering the law
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of joint-stock companies, not to press so hard on honest directors as
liable for these constructive defaults, the only effect of
which would be to deter all men of any property, and, perhaps, all
men who have any character to lose, from becoming directors of comOn the one hand, I think the court should do its utpanies at all.
most to bring fraudulent directors to account ; and, on the other hand,
should also do its best to allow honest men to act reasonably as directors.
Willful default no doubt includes the case of a trustee neglecting to sue, though he might, by suing earlier, have recovered a
trust fund ; in that case he is made liable for want of due diligence in
his trust.
But I think directors are not liable on the same principle."
Holding, then, the rule to be that directors, who are gratuitous
mandataries, are only liable for fraud, or for such gross negligence as
amounts to fraud, it remains but to apply this principle to the facts of
to make them

this case.
It is not alleged
that the hands of these
it has never been alleged
directors are stained by fraud.
The bank was wrecked by its president, with the cashier and some of the clerks aiding and abetting.
It
was adroitly done, so far as the means were concerned, and it was
concealed wholly from the directors.
False entries were made in the
books, and false accounts, or accounts with fictitious persons, were
The reports of the bank's condition,
opened so as to hide the theft.
made by the president to the directors from time to time, showed it
to be in good condition, while in point of fact it was honeycombed
with fraud, and its assets squandered in wild speculations.
It may be
asked, why did not the directors discover this by an examination of
the books?
The answer is, that, if they had examined every book in
the bank, with a single exception, they would not have found the
fraud.
That exception is the individual ledger.
All the frauds were
The individual
dumped into this book, and appeared nowhere else.
ledger contains the accounts of the individual depositors, and this
book, by the rules of a large majority of the Pittsburg banks, the
directors are not allowed to see.
This is a rule of policy on the part
of most city banks, and the reason for it is, at least, plausible. A
director, largely engaged in business, may have a number of rivals in
the same business who are depositors in the bank. If he is permitted
to examine their accounts it gives him an advantage and an insight
Hence, it
into a rival's affairs that few business men would tolerate.
is a question with many banks whether to adopt this rule or lose valuable customers, and they generally prefer the former.
We are not
speaking of the wisdom of the rule, only of its existence, as bearing
Are they to be held
upon the question of the directors' negligence.
to be guilty of gross negligence in not examining a book, which, by
the rules of their own bank, and of four-fifths of all the other banks
in Pittsburg, the directors were not permitted to see?
Nor do we think the directors were bound to regard the statements
submitted to them as false, and the president, cashier and clerks as
thieves. They had nothing to arouse suspicion. All of these gentlemen
stood high ; they were the trusted agents of the corporation, paid for

1
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in the community in which they lived

Aside from this, the directors were among the heaviest stockholders
of the bank.
They collectively owned a large proportion of it. And
so thoroughly were they deceived by the president as to its condition
that, when the first stoppage occurred, they not only believed the suspension was temporary, but they showed their faith by their work,
and upon their individual credit raised the sum of $289,000 to enable
it to resume.
They did not desert the ship like a parcel of drowning
rats, but imperiled their private fortunes in an effort to keep it afloat.
Under such circumstances it would be an act of gross injustice to hold
them liable for the frauds of others, in which they had not particiof which they had no knowledge and which have only been
pated
We must measure this
brought to light with the aid of experts.
transaction by the light which these directors had at the time the
transaction occurred.
It would be unfair to judge them by the calcium light which has been turned on for six years, and which has enabled us to trace at last the sinuous path of Riddle and his confederates
in crime, and the means by which this bank has been robbed and
plundered. We are of opinion that the master and the court below
were right in their conclusion, and the decree is affirmed upon the ap*
* *
peal of the assignee, and the appeal dismissed at his costs.
Note.

See preceding cases.

Sec. 664.
See
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MCFARLAND, J. This is an action at law brought by the plaintiff
of some of the creditors of the Savings Bank of San Diego
County against Mabury, Howard and Witherby, directors of said
bank, for certain sums of money alleged to have been misappropriated
by the defendant, Bryant Howard, who was president, treasurer, etc.,
of the bank, for which it is alleged Mabury and Witherby were liable
as assignee
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under the latter clause of section 3, article xii, of the constitution of
the state.
That clause reads as follows:
"The directors or trustees of corporations and joint-stock associations shall be jointly and severally liable to the creditors and stockholders for all moneys embezzled or misappropriated by the officers
of such corporation or joint-stock association during the term of office
of such director or trustee."
The defendant, Mabury, demurred to the complaint upon various
grounds ; the demurrer was sustained by the court below, and judgment was rendered for defendants, and from this judgment the plaintiff
appeals.
It is conceded that the alleged liability of the respondent rests enThere has
tirely upon the clause of the constitution above quoted.
never been any legislation with respect to said constitutional provision.
No legislative act has been passed touching any character of
action that may be brought under the provision, or defining its meaning, or referring to it in any manner whatever.
Conceding, therefore, for the purposes of this case, that the clause of the constitution
in question is self-executing, and requires no legislative aid in carrying it into effect, its meaning, the parties who may take advantage of
and the form of action by which its provisions may be enforced,
are all matters of judicial construction.
Whether or not the averments in the complaint constitute "misappropriations" within the
meaning of the constitution, and as construed in Fox v. Hale, etc.,
Co., 108 Cal. 422, et seq., need not, under our view of the case, be
There are also some other questions raised by the
here determined.
demurrer which are not necessary to be here discussed.
It
stated
in the brief of appellant that the court below sustained the demurrer
upon the ground that the action should be one in equity and for the
benefit of all the creditors; and we think that the demurrer was properly sustained on that ground. The clause in question provides that
in case of embezzlement or misappropriation the directors shall be
liable "to the creditors and stockholders" for moneys embezzled or
misappropriated; and the phrase "the creditors" evidently means all
the creditors.
For the purposes of this case we need not consider
the moneys embezzled or misthe other phrase "and stockholders;"
of, at least, all the credfor
the
benefit
fund
constitute
appropriated
itors who have been injured by the wrongful acts, and the only proper
bill in equity where all the creditors are
case
remedy in such
or
are
parties,
represented, and in which there can be an accounting
and equities adjusted, after all the facts have been ascertained.
that "as between credThe equitable principle applicable here
Gleason,
v.
itors equality
equity" (Cavin
105 N. Y. 256, 262).
the
authorities, and the rule
The above view
sustained
by
amply
cited has been held to apply even under statutes imposing liabilities
like those here in question, which provide that "a creditor," or "any
creditor," or "any person," wronged, etc., may sue. Our attention has
provision exactly
not been called to any statutory or constitutional
like the one here involved, but there have been many decisions under
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statutes of states and of congress imposing liabilities of similar character on directors and officers of corporations, and the principles declared in those decisions are equally applicable to the case at bar.
The rule above stated is declared to be law in Morawetz on Private
Corporations, paragraph 910, and reference is there made to the case
of Hornor v. Henning, 93 U. S. 228. The syllabus of that case,
which correctly states the matter decided, is as follows: "The act of
congress (16 Stats. 98) under which certain corporations are organized in the District of Columbia, contain a provision that 'if the indebtedness of any company organized under this act shall at any time
exceed the amount of its capital stock, the trustees of such company
assenting thereto shall be personally and individually liable for such
Held: i. That an action
excess to the creditors of the company.'
at law can not be sustained by one creditor among many for the liability thus created, or for any part of it, but that the remedy is in equity.
2. That this excess constitutes a fund for the benefit of all the creditors, so far as the condition of the company renders a resort to it
necessary for the payment of its debts." In that case a demurrer had
been sustained to the complaint, and Mr. Justice Miller, delivering the
opinion of the court, said: "The demurrer raises the right of a single
creditor among many of the corporation to bring his separate action
at law for his debt, and recover a judgment for it against the trustees,
though the allegations of his declaration be true."
" Nor can we believe that an act
After some discussion he says:
intended for the benefit of the creditors generally, when the bank
proves insolvent, can be justly construed in such a manner that any
one creditor can appropriate the whole or any part of this liability of
the trustees to his own benefit, to the possible exclusion of all or any
But such may, and probably would,
part of the other creditors.
often be the result if any one creditor could sue alone while there
We are of opinion that the fair and reasonwe/e others unsecured.
able construction of the act is that the trustees who assent to an increase of the indebtedness of the corporation beyond its capital stock
are to be held guilty of a violation of their trust; that congress
intended that, so far as this excess of indebtedness over capital stock
was necessary, they should make good the debts of the creditors who
had been the sufferers by their breach of trust ; that this liability constitutes a fund for the benefit of all the creditors who are entitled to
in proportion to the amount of their debts, so far as maybe
share in
The remedy for the violation of duty as
necessary to pay these debts.
trustees
in its nature appropriate to
court of chancery."
He further says:
"In the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts, under
the identical form of words which we are construing in the present
suit in
case,
has been repeatedly decided that the only remedy
equity, in which all the creditors are parties; and that even in equity
one creditor can not sue alone, but must either join the other creditors
or bring his action on behalf of himself and all the others.
In Stone
v. Chisolm, 113 U. S. 302,
was held (we quote from the syllabus)
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suit in equity is the proper remedy, in the courts of the United
States, to enforce the statutory liability of directors to a creditor of
the corporation (organized under the act of legislature of South Carolina of December 10, 1869) by reason of the debts of the corporation being in excess of the capital stock.
An action at law will not
lie." Although the statute under review there provided that when
the officers of a company were liable, "any person to whom they are
so liable may have an action against any one or more of said officers,"
still it was held that an action at law would not lie, but that a bill in
Mr.
equity was necessary, in which all creditors were made parties.
Matthews,
in
the
of
the
said
that
the
court,
delivering
opinion
Justice
directors liable had a right to have all the facts determined "once for
all in a proceeding which shall conclude all who have an adverse interest, and a right to participate in the benefit to result from enforcing
Otherwise, the facts which constitute the basis of liathe liability.
bility might be determined differently by juries in several actions, by
which some creditors might obtain satisfaction and others be defeated.
The evident intention of the provision is that the liability shall be for
the common benefit of all entitled to enforce
according to their interest, an apportionment of which, in case there can not be satisfaction for all, can only be made in
single proceeding to which all interested can be made parties.
The case can not be distinguished
from that of Hornor v. Henning, 93 U. S. 228, the reasoning and result of which we affirm.
immaterial that in the present case
It
does not appear that there are other creditors than the plaintiffs in error. There can be but one rule for construing the section, whether
the creditors be one or many.
To the question certified, therefore,
must be answered that an action at law will not lie, and that the only
National Bank v. Dillingham, 147
by suit in equity."
remedy
N. Y. 603, 49 Am. St. Rep. 692,
case where the question under
consideration
fully discussed and decided as above stated. The
individual liability of stockholders, and their relation to the creditors
of
corporation, are not the same in the state of New York as they
are here, and there
some discussion in the opinion in that case
which
not relevant here, and
seems to have been held that an action to enforce the liabilities of directors guilty of misconduct could
not be maintained until after the usual remedies against the corporation itself had been resorted to, and all those parts of the opinion are
not in point here; but
was there held that, in no event, could the
The
liability of the directors be enforced except by suit in equity.
full syllabus of that case, which shows accurately what was decided,
as follows:
"The personal liability imposed by the provisions of
section 24 of the stock corporation law (laws 1890, ch. 564, as
amended by laws 1892, ch. 688), to the effect that the directors of
stock corporation creating or consenting to the creation of any debt of
the corporation unsecured by mortgage, in excess of its paid-up capital stock,
shall be personally liable therefor to the creditors of the
corporation,'
secondary, and can be resorted to only after the usual
remedies against the corporation itself have been exhausted, and then
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can be enforced only by a suit in equity where all the creditors and
the corporation itself are parties or represented, where an accounting
can be had, all the facts ascertained and equities adjusted."
(See,
also, Orr, etc., Shoe Co. v. Thompson, 89 Tex. 501; Merchants'
Bank v. Stevenson, 10 Gray 232.)
The fact that the language to be construed here is a part of the constitution of the state, and not a statutory provision, makes no difference.
The rules of construction by which the meaning of the language is to be ascertained, and the rights and remedies which grow
out of it are the same, no matter where the language to be construed
is found.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Temple, J., Harrison, J., Garoutte, J., Van Fleet, J., and Henshaw, J., concurred.
The statutory liability of officers is usually because of:
file report: See, 1858, Derrickson v. Smith, 27 N. J. L. 166;
Bk. v. Johnson, 18 Mont. 440, 56 Am. St. Rep. 591; 1899,
Witherow v. Slayback, 158 N. Y. 649, 70 Am. St. Rep. 507 ; 1900, Davis v. Mills,
99 Fed. Rep. (C. C. Conn.) 39.
2. Filing a false report:
1892, Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, infra,
Note.

1. Failure to
1896, State Sav.

p. 1892.
3.
237.
4.

Contracting before the stock is subscribed

:

1899,

Kent

v. Clark,

181 111.

Contracting debts in excess of stock : 1895, Tradesman Pub. Co. v. Knoxville, etc., Co., 95 Tenn. 634, 49 Am. St. Rep. 943; 1895, National Bank v.
Dillingham, 147 N. Y. 603, 49 Am. St. Rep. 692, note 698.

Sec. 666. 2. When contractual and when penal.
in foreign state.
HUNTINGTON
1892.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

v.
OF

ATTRILL.

Enforcement

1

THE UNITED STATES.

S. Rep. 657-689.

146

U.

[Bill in equity, filed in 1888, in the circuit court of Baltimore city,
by Huntington against the Equitable Gas Light Company, a Maryland corporation, and Attrill, his wife and three daughters, to set
aside as fraudulent a transfer of stock in the gas company made by
Attrill to his wife and daughters, and to charge that stock with the
payment of a judgment recovered by the plaintiff against Attrill, upon
his liability as a director of the Rockaway Beach Improvement Company, a New York corporation, under the statute of 1875, providing
that, "If any certificate or report made, or public notice given by the
officers of any such corporation, shall be false in any material representation, all the officers who shall have signed the same shall be jointly
1
Statement much abridged ; arguments, part of opinion of Mr. Justice Gray
and dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Fuller omitted.
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and severally liable for all the debts of the corporation contracted while
" The bill alleged that the
they are officers thereof.
judgment was recovered in 1886, for $100,240, on a loan made to the improvement company in 1880, at which time and until 1881 Attrill was a director; that
June 30, 1880, he knowingly made a false certificate stating the stock
of the corporation was wholly paid in, when in truth no part was paid
in; and that this company became insolvent in 1880, and was dissolved in 1882, whereby each shareholder by the laws of New York
became liable to the amount of stock held by him, which in the case
of Attrill was $340,000, in addition to his liability for all the debts
under the false certificate, all of which made him insolvent from
March, 1882, until suit was brought. That in 1882 he acquired 1,750
shares in the gas company, which he forthwith transferred to himself
as trustee for his wife and daughters, without consideration and with
intent to defraud his creditors ; that these transfers were made in New
York, where the company's principal office was, and were fraudulent
by the laws of New York and Maryland ; that unless these were set
aside, plaintiff would be deprived of his rights ; the bill prayed that
the transfers might be set aside, the shares brought into court, sold by
of plaintiff's claim.
a trustee and the proceeds applied to payment
One of the daughters demurred to the bill, on the ground that the bill
was for the recovery of a penalty under the New York statute, and
The trial court
was not enforceable in the courts of another state.
overruled the demurrer, and on appeal the Maryland court of appeals
reversed this ruling and dismissed the bill, first, on the ground that the
original cause of action being for the recovery of a penalty, and
though merged in the judgment, its essential nature was not changed,
and so could not be enforced in another state ; and second, that if it
was not so merged, the statute of limitations barred all further liaWrit of error was sued out by Huntington, and allowed by
bility.
the court of appeals of Maryland, upon the ground that the federal
question, whether full faith and credit had been given by the courts of
Maryland to the New York judgment, was involved.]
MR. JUSTICE GRAY. * * * The question whether due faith
and credit were thereby denied to the judgment rendered in another
state is a federal question of which this court has jurisdiction on this
writ of error. Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307, 311; Crapo v
Kelly, 16 Wall. 610, 619; Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 21 Wall. 130,.
134; Crescent City Co. v. Butchers' Union, 120 U. S. 141, 146, 147;
Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107; Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.
S. 87, 103.
In order to determine this question it will be necessary, in the first
place, to consider the true scope and meaning of the fundamental
maxim of international law, stated by Chief Justice Marshall in the
" The courts of no country execute the penal
fewest possible words:
The Antelope, 10 Wheaton 66, 123.
In interlaws of another."
preting this maxim there is danger of being misled by the different
" in our language.
shades of meaning allowed to the word " penal
In the municipal law of England and America the words " penal"
2 WIL. CAS.

46

1
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senses.
Strictly and
whether corporal or pecuniary,
imposed and enforced by the state for a crime or offense against its
laws. United States v. Reisinger, 128 U. S. 398, 402.; United States
But they are also commonly used
v. Chouteau, 102 U. S. 603, 611.
as including any extraordinary liability to which the law subjects a
wrong-doer in favor of the person wronged, not limited to the damThey are so elastic in meaning as even to be familiarly
ages suffered.
applied to cases of private contracts, wholly independent of statutes,
In
as when we speak of the " penal sum," or " penalty" of a bond.
" In general, a sum of money
the words of Chief Justice Marshall:
in gross, to be paid for the non-performance of an agreement, is considered as a penalty, the legal operation of which is to cover the damages which the party in whose favor the stipulation is made may have
sustained from the breach of contract by the opposite party."
Tayloe v. Sandiford, 7 Wheat. 13, 17.
Penal laws, strictly and properly, are those imposing punishment
for an offense committed against the state, and which, by the English
and American constitutions, the executive of the state has the power
to pardon.
Statutes giving a private action against the wrong-doer
are sometimes spoken of as penal in their nature, but in such cases it
has been pointed out that neither the liability imposed nor the remedy
given is strictly penal.
The action of an owner of property against the hundred to recover
damages caused by a mob was said by Justices Willes and Buller to
be " penal against the hundred, but certainly remedial as to the sufferer." Hyde v. Cogan, 2 Doug. 699, 705, 706. A statute giving the
right to recover back money lost at gaming, and if the loser does not sue
within a certain time, authorizing a qui tarn action to be brought by
anv other person for threefold the amount, has been held to be remedial as to the loser, though penal as regards the suit by a common informer. Bones v. Booth, 2 W. Bl. 1226; Brandon v. Pate, 2 H. Bl.
308; Grace v. McElroy, i Allen 563; Read v. Stewart, 129 Mass.
As said by Mr. Justice
407, 410; Cole v. Groves, 134 Mass. 471.
Ashhurst in the king's bench, and repeated by Mr. Justice Wilde in the
" it has been held in many
supreme judicial court of Massachusetts,
instances that where a statute gives accumulative damages to the parWoodgate v. Knatchbull, 2 T.
ty grieved it is not a penal action."
R. 148, 154; Read v. Chelmsford, 16 Pick. 128, 132. Thus, a statute giving to a tenant ousted without notice double the yearly value
of the premises against the landlord, has been held to be " not like a
penal law where a punishment is imposed for a crime," but "rather
as a remedial than a penal law," because "the act indeed does give
Lake v. Smith, i Bos. &
a penalty, but it is to the party grieved."
Pul. (N. R.) 174, 179, 180, 181; Wilkinson v. Colley, 5 Burrow
So, in an action given by statute to a traveler injured
2694, 2698.
through a defect in a highway, for double damages against the town,
it was held unnecessary to aver that the facts constituted an offense,

primarily they denote punishment,
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or to conclude against the form of the statute, because, as Chief Jus"The action is purely remedial, and has none of
tice Shaw said:
the characteristics of a penal prosecution.
All damages for neglect
or breach of duty operate to a certain extent as punishment, but the
distinction is that it is prosecuted for the purpose of punishment and
to deter others from offending in like manner.
Here the plaintiff
sets out the liability of the town to repair and an injury to himself
from a failure to perform that duty.
The law gives him enhanced
damages, but still they are recoverable to his own use, and in form
Reed v. Northfield, 13
and substance the suit calls for indemnity."

Pick. 94,

100,

101.

*

*

*

The provision of the statute of New York, now in question, making the officers of a corporation who sign and record a false certificate
of the amount of its capital stock liable for all its debts, is in no sense
The statute, while it enables pera criminal or guasi-crim'mal law.
sons complying with its provisions to do business as a corporation
without being subject to the liability of general partners, takes pains
to secure and maintain a proper corporate fund for the payment of
With this aim it makes the stockholders indithe corporate debts.
vidually liable for the debts of the corporation until the capital stock
is paid in and a certificate of the payment made by the officers, and
makes the officers liable for any false and material representation in
The individual liability of the stockholders takes the
that certificate.
place of a corporate fund until that fund has been duly created, and
the individual liability of the officers takes the place of the fund in
If the officase their statement that it has been duly created is false.
cers do not truly state and record the facts which exempt them from
liability, they are made liable directly to every creditor of the company who, by reason of their wrongful acts, has not the security for the
payment of his debt out of the corporate property, on which he had a
right to rely. As the statute imposes a burdensome liability on the
officers for their wrongful act, it may well be considered penal, in the
But as it gives a civil remsense that it should be strictly construed.
the
of
the
creditor
at
suit
only, and measured by the
private
edy
To maintain
amount of his debt, it is, as to him, clearly remedial.
such a suit is not to administer a punishment imposed upon an offender against the state, but simply to enforce a private right secured under its laws to an individual.
We can see no just ground, on princifor
such
a
statute
to be a penal law, in the sense that it
holding
ple,
can not be enforced in a foreign state or country.
The decisions of the court of appeals of New York, so far as they
have been brought to our notice, fall short of holding that the liability
imposed upon the officers of the corporation by such statutes is a pun'
ishment or penalty which can not be enforced in another state. *
It is true that the courts of some states, including Maryland, have
declined to enforce a similar liability imposed by the statute of another state. But in each of these cases it appears to have been assumed to be a sufficient ground for that conclusion, that the liability
was not founded in contract, but was in the nature of a penalty im-
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1

1

a

if

it,

posed by statute, and no reasons were given for considering the statute a penal law in the strict, primary and international sense.
Derrickson v. Smith, 3 Dutcher (27 N. J. Law) 166; Halsey v. McLean, 12 Allen 438; First National Bank v. Price, 33 Md. 487.
It is also true that in Steam Engine Co. v. Hubbard, 101 U. S. 188,
192, Mr. Justice Clifford referred to those cases by way of argument.
But in that case, as well as in Chase v. Curtis, 113 U. S. 452, the only
point adjudged was that such statutes were so far penal that they must
be construed strictly, and in both cases jurisdiction was assumed by the
circuit court of the United States, and not doubted by this court,
which could hardly have been if the statute had been deemed penal
within the maxim of international law. In Flash v. Conn, 109 U. S.
371, the liability sought to be enforced under the statute of New York
was the liability of a stockholder arising upon contract, and no question was presented as to the nature of the liability of officers.
But in Hornor v. Henning, 93 U. S. 228, this court declined to
consider a similar liability of officers of a corporation in the District
of Columbia as a penalty.
See, also, Neal v. Moultrie, 12 Georgia
v.
Sanford,
104; Cady
53 Vermont 632, 639, 640; Nickerson v.
Wheeler, 118 Mass. 295, 298; Post v. Toledo, etc., Railroad, 144
Mass. 341, 345; Wolverton v. Taylor, 132 111. 197; Morawetz on
*
*
*
Corporations (2d ed.),
908.
In this view that the question is not one of local, but of international law, we fully concur.
The test is not by what name the statute
is called by the legislature or the courts of the states in which it is
passed, but whether it appears to the tribunal which is called upon to
enforce it to be in its essential character and effect a punishment of
an offense against the public, or a grant of a civil right to a private
person.
In this country the question of international law must be determined
in the first instance by the court, state or national, in which the suit is
If the suit is brought in a circuit court of the United States
brought.
it is one of those questions of general jurisprudence which that court
must decide for itself, uncontrolled by local decisions.
Burgess v.
Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 33. Texas and Pacific Railway v. Cox, 145
U. S. 593, 605, above cited. If a suit on the original liability under
the statute of one state is brought in a court of another state, the constitution and laws of the United States have not authorized its decisNew York
ion upon such a question to be reviewed by this court.
Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U. S. 286; Roth v. Ehman, 107 U. S. 31.9.
But if the original liability has passed into judgment in one state, the
are bound by the
courts of another state, when asked to enforce
constitution and laws of the United States to give full faith and credit
to that judgment, and
they do not, their decision, as said at the
outset of this opinion, may be reviewed and reversed by this court on
writ of error.
The essential nature and real foundation of
cause of action, indeed, are not changed by recovering judgment upon it.
This was
directly adjudged in Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., above cited. The
127 U. S. 265.
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difference is only in the appellate jurisdiction of this court in the one
case or in the other.
If a suit to enforce a judgment rendered in one state, and which
has not changed the essential nature of the liability, is brought in the
courts of another state, this court, in order to determine, on writ of
error, whether the highest court of the latter state has given full faith
and credit to the judgment, must determine for itself whether the
original cause of action is penal in the international sense. The case,
in this regard, is analogous to one arising under the clause of the constitution which forbids a state to pass any law impairing the obligation
of contracts, in which, if the highest court of a state decides nothing but
the original construction and obligation of a contract, this court has
no jurisdiction to review its decision, but if the state court gives
effect to a subsequent law, which is impugned as impairing the obligation of a contract, this court has power, in order to determine
whether any contract has been impaired, to decide for itself what the
true construction of the contract is.
New Orleans Water- Works v.
Louisiana Sugar Co., 125 U. S. 18, 38. So if the state court, in an
action to enforce the original liability under the law of another state,
passes upon the nature of that liability and nothing else, this court
can not review its decision ; but if the state court declines to give
full faith and credit to a judgment of another state, because of
its opinion as to the nature of the cause of action on which the judgment was recovered, this court, in determining whether full faith and
credit have been given to that judgment, must decide for itself the
nature of the original liability.
Whether the court of appeals of Maryland gave full faith and
credit to the judgment recovered by this plaintiff in New York depends upon the true construction of the provision of the constitution
and of the act of congress upon that subject.
The provision of the constitution is as follows: "Full faith and
credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records and' judicial proceedings of every other state. And the congress may, by
general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and
Article 4, secproceedings shall be proved and the effect thereof."

tion

i.

This clause of the constitution, like the less perfect provision on
the subject in the articles of confederation, as observed by Mr. Justice
Stoiy, "was intended to give the same conclusive effect to judgments

of all the states, so as to promote uniformity, as well as certainty, in
First, to dethe rule among them," and had three distinct objects:
clare, and by its own force establish, that full faith and credit should
be given to the judgments of every other state; second, to authorize
congress to prescribe the manner of authenticating them; and third,
to authorize congress to prescribe their effect when so authenticated.
Story on the Constitution,
1307, 1308.
Congress, in the exercise of the power so conferred, besides prescribing the manner in which the records and judicial proceedings of
any state may be authenticated, has defined the effect thereof by en-
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acting that "the said records and judicial proceedings so authenticated
shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within
the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state
from which they are taken."
Rev. Stat.,
905, re-enacting act of
n,
ch.
i
Stat.
122.
26,
May
1790,
These provisions of the constitution and laws of the United States
are necessarily to be read in the light of some established principles,
which they were not intended to overthrow. They give no effect to
judgments of a court which had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter
or of the parties.
D'Arcy v. Ketchum, n How. 165 ; Thompson v.
Whitman, 18 Wall. 457. And they confer no new jurisdiction on
the courts of any state, and, therefore, do not authorize them to take
jurisdiction of a suit or prosecution of such a penal nature that it can
not on settled rules of public and international law be entertained by
the judiciary of any other state than that in which the penalty was incurred.
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., above cited.
do
these provisions put the judgments of other states upon the
Nor
of
domestic judgments, to be enforced by execution, but they
footing
leave the manner in which they may be enforced to the law of the
state in which they are sued on, pleaded or offered in evidence.
McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 325. But when duly pleaded and proved
in a court of that state they have the effect of being not merely prima
facie evidence, but conclusive proof, of the rights thereby adjudicated ;
and a refusal to give them the force and effect in this respect which
they had in the state in which they were rendered denies to the party
and laws of the United
a right secured to him by the constitution
States.
Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290; Green v. Van Buskirk,
Insurance Co. v. Harris, 97 U, S. 331,
5 Wall. 307, and 7 Wall. 139;
v.
Butchers'
Union, 120 U. S. 141, 146,
Crescent City Co.
336;
147; Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U. S. 87.
The judgment rendered by a court of the state of New York, now
in question, is not impugned for any want of jurisdiction in that court.
The statute under which that judgment was recovered was not, for the
reasons already stated at length, a penal law in the international sense.
The faith and credit, force and effect, which that judgment had by
law and usage in New York, was to be conclusive evidence of a direct
civil liability from the individual defendant to the individual plaintiff
for a certain sum of money and a debt of record, on which an action
would lie, as on any other civil judgment inter paries. The court of appeals of Maryland, therefore, in deciding this case against the plaintiff
upon the ground that the judgment was not one which it was bound
in any manner to enforce, denied to the judgment the full faith, credit
and effect to which it was entitled under the constitution and laws of
the United States.

Reversed.

Note.

Accord:

First Nat'l Bank
Fed. Rep.

Huntington v. Attrill, L. R.
v. Weidenbeck, 97 Fed. Rep. 896;

1892,

39.

See note preceding case, and cases,

700, 704,

18

App. Gas. 150; 1899 r
Davis v. Mills, 99

1900,

infra, and notes.
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ARTICLE II.

RIGHTS

1899

OF OFFICERS.

I. To manage corporate affairs within their powers
Sec. 667.
and in good faith without interference by creditors.
587, 588, and Pond v. Framingham & L. R. R. Co.,
Mass.
supra,
p. 1808; Graham v. R. R. Co., 102 U. S. 148,
194,
130
supra, p. 1809; Mills v. Northern Ry., etc., Co., L. R. 5 Ch. App.
621, supra, p. 1813.
See supra,

Sec. 668.

2.

To contract or deal with the corporation.

See Twin Lick Oil Company v. Marbury, 91 U. S. 587, supra,
p. 1750; Munson v. Syracuse & G. R. Co., 103 N. Y. 58, supra,
P-

Sec. 669.

3.

To obtain

a

preference as creditor.

See Olney v. Conanicut Land Co., 16 R. I. 597, supra, p. 1832;
Howe, Brown, etc., Co. v.Sandford F., etc., Co., 44 Fed. Rep. 231,
supra, p. 1835; Corey v. Wadsworth, 118 Ala. 489, supra, p. 1836.

SUBDIVISION

IV.
I.

A.

CREDITORS

RIGHTS

OF

AND SHAREHOLDERS.

CREDITORS.

ARISING FROM IMPERFECT INCORPORATION.

Sec. 670.
See Martin v. Fewell, 79 Mo. 401, supra, p. 673 ; Fay v. Noble, 7
Cush. (Mass.) 188, supra, p. 677; Montgomery v. Forbes, 148 Mass.
249, supra, p. 594; Snider's Sons' Co. v. Troy, 91 Ala. 224, supra,
p. 656; Guckert v. Hacke, 159 Pa. St. 303, szipra, p. 662; Hawes
v. Anglo-Saxon
Petroleum Co., 101 Mass. 385, supra, p. 581 ;
Wechselberg v. Flour City Nat'l Bk., 24 U. S. App. 308, supra,
Curtis v. Tracy, 169 111. 233, supra, p. 650; Metcalf v.
p. 574;
Arnold, no Ala. 180, supra, p. 97.

TRUSTEES OF FREE SCHOOLS

I9OO

B.

COMMON

LAW

ARTICLE I.

I. Who

Sec. 671.

OR

EQUITABLE

ARISING

V

FLINT.

67

1

LIABILITY OF SHAREHOLDERS.

FROM OWNERSHIP

OF SHARES.

are shareholders.

See supra,

529-533.
532, 533 ; note 3
Stock
books
are prima facie evidence : Supra,
Note.
1.
Am. St. Rep. 866; 1896, Holland v. Duluth Iron Co., 65 Minn. 324, 60 Am. St.
Rep. 480, note.
529, 530 ; 1892, Marson v. Deither,
2. Certificate is not necessary : Supra,
49

Minn.

423.

One who holds himself out as a member, becomes such by estoppel, as
to creditors: 1882, Wheeler v. Millar, 90 N. Y. 353; 1899, Blien v. Rand, 77
Minn. 110, 79 N. W. Rep. 606; 1900, Beals v. Buffalo, etc., Co., 49 App. Div.
(N. Y.) 589. But compare, 1878, In re Wincham Shipbuilding Co., L. R. 9
Ch. D. 329.
4. Holder of shares as collateral security, from the corporation itself, is not
a shareholder, though his name is on the corporate books: 1882, Burgess v.
Seligman, 107 TT. S. 20 ; but if they are so held from another shareholder the collateral holder may be treated as a shareholder: 189?, State v. Bank of N. E.,
70 Minn. 398, 68 Am. St. Rep. 538, note, supra, p. 1585.
A
5. As to transferees generally, see supra,
566, 567 and note, p. 1695.
purchaser of shares (through a broker on the stock exchange) to be sold on a
margin, and whose name is not registered on the stock books, is not a shareholder, and is not liable to respond as the holder of unpaid shares : 1892,
Glenn v. Garth, 133 N. Y. 18.
Private: See, 1898, Chemical National
6. Corporations
as shareholders.
Bank v. Havermale, 120 Cal. 601, 65 Am. St. Rep. 206. See, also, note, supra,
p. 1064. Municipal: See, 1900, Monongahela Br. Co. v. Pittsburgh, 196 Pa.
3.

Atl. Rep.

25, 46

99.

2. Creditors have no right, at common law or in equity,
to have more than the face value of shares paid up.

Sec. 672.

TRUSTEES
1847.

OF THE FREE SCHOOLS IN THE SOUTH PARISH IN
ANDOVER v. JOHN FLINT. 1

IN THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
Mete. (Mass.) Rep. 539-544.

13

[Assumpsit by the trustees upon a note given by the Andover Mechanic Association, signed by Flint as treasurer, to collect from Flint,
as a member of the association, the sum due, for which judgment
had been rendered against the association, and execution returned
The corporation was authorized to make by-laws, the
unsatisfied.
eleventh of which provided that "the members pledge themselves in
their individual as well as collective capacity to be responsible for all
The plaintiff offered to prove
moneys loaned to this association."
that Flint, while treasurer, had told other creditors that the members
1

Statement abridged.

Part of opinion omitted.
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\vere individually liable, and also by other members, that they considered themselves so liable.]
*
*
DEWEY, J. *
Upon looking at the act incorporating the
Andover Mechanic Association (St. 1821, ch. 40) we find it in the
usual form of acts of incorporation, giving a corporate name and corporate powers, but imposing no individual liability on its members for
the debts of the corporation. Individual liability, as incident to membership of a corporation, arises only from express legislative enactment, either in the charter or by some general law, to which all similar
But
corporations and their individual members are made subject.
there is no general law applicable to this species of corporations, such
as exist in reference to manufacturing corporations, or corporations
for banking purposes, providing certain liabilities on the individual
stockholders of such corporations, in certain specified cases. * * *
The only effect that can be given to this by-law is that of an act or
vote of the members of the corporation acting in their corporate capacity. It is not the act of an individual member, nor does the fact
of it being found upon the records of the corporation, as a vote duly
adopted, authorize the inference that all or that any number greater
than a bare majority voted for its adoption.
The question then
arises, whether it be competent for an aggregate corporation, whose
act of incorporation imposes no individual liability upon its members
for the debts and contracts of such corporation, to render, by force
of by-law, each individual member a guarantor or surety for all
It is clearly quite foreign from the
moneys lent to the corporation.
general purposes and objects, in reference to which by-laws are authorized to be made by corporate bodies.
See Rev. Sts., ch. 44,
2,
giving authority to corporations to make by-laws.
It is not, in the opinion of the court, within the corporate powers
conferred upon this and similar corporations, to impose upon their
members, by any such by-laws, any personal and individual liability
to third persons, beyond such as are specified in the charter, or in the
general laws of the commonwealth. Such a power would be liable to
great abuse, and would subject every member of a corporation, however liberal its charter in excluding individual liability, to be made
responsible for the entire indebtedness of the corporation by the act
of a majority of those convened at a meeting of such corporation.
Take the case of a bank in a doubtful credit, and its active managers
deem it useful to sustain it by pledging the individual responsibility
of some of its more wealthy stockholders.
Can they, by a corporate
vote, impose upon all the stockholders a personal liability for all the
debts of the corporation?
We think not, and are of opinion that each
stockholder, by becoming such, subjects himself to no liability beyond
that created by the force of the charter itself, or declared by other
*
*
*
statutes of the commonwealth.
It is to be borne in mind that these declarations of the defendant
The proposed
were not made to the plaintiffs, but to other persons.
evidence would, therefore, be inadmissible on a trial of this case beWhether
fore a jury, as it would not tend to charge the defendant.
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for such false representations he may be held responsible to those to
whom he made them, and who may have lent their money upon the
faith of them, is a question not now before us. It is a fatal objection
to the maintenance of the present action, that the defendant has never,
by any valid legal contract, bound himself individually for the payment of the loan made by the plaintiffs to the mechanic association/
His name was never subscribed to the pledge of the corporation, that
the individual members would guaranty the debts of the corporation.
His oral promises, if made, would be inoperative and void, by reason
To give any legal effect to these pledges of
of the statute of frauds.
individual liability, they must have been the individual acts of the
members, adopted and sanctioned by them by their signatures under
their own hands. Without this the corporate act was a dead letter, and
of no binding efficacy upon individual members in their personal capacity.
We see no ground upon which this action can be maintained.

Judgment for the defendant.

See. 1854, Carr v. Iglehart, 3 Ohio St. 458 ; 1869, Ireland v. Pales19 Ohio St. 369, supra, p. 757; 1875, Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.
S. 45; 1895, Sampson v. Fox, 109 Ala. 662, 55 Am. St. Rep. 950; 1898, Omaha
Law Lib. Assn. v. Connell, 55 Neb. 396; 1899, Sullivan Co. Club v. Butler, 29.
Miscl. (N. Y.) 306; 1899, Enterprise Ditch Co. v. Moffitt, 58 Neb. 642, 79 N. W.
Rep. 560, supra, p. 1579 ; 1900, Woodworth v. Bowles, 61 Kan. 569, 60 Pac. Rep.
1900, Johnson Elec. Service Co. v. Detroit Ch. of Com.,
33Mn/ra,p.2014;
Note.

tine, etc., Co.,

124

Mich.

115, 82

Sec. 673.

3.

N. W. Rep.

795.

Right of creditors to have the full face value of

shares paid, if necessary

FLINN,
1881.

to pay creditors,

ASSIGNEE, v.

BAGLEY ET

general rule.
AL. 1

IN THE U. S. DISTRICT COURT, E. D. MICHIGAN.
Rep. 785-792.

7

Fed.

In equity.
This was a bill in equity by the assignee of the Detroit Novelty Works

to compel the payment of the balance due upon certain unpaid subThe material facts
scriptions to the capital stock of the company.
were that the company was organized in 1859, with a capital stock of
In 1871 it was pro$50,000, divided into 2,000 shares of $25 each.
posed to increase the stock of the company to $100,000, and the following agreement was entered into by the defendants in this suit, or
by those from whom the defendants hold their stock:

"The undersigned subscribe hereby the amount set opposite our respective
names, and agree to pay the same towards the increased stock of the Detroit
Novelty Works, in three equal installments, on April 3, 1871, May 3, 1871, and
June 3, 1871 (without grace), it being understood that stock shall be is1

Part of opinion omitted.
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sued to subscribers
for such subscriptions at 66% cents upon the dollar, and
that a total amount of the subscriptions hereto shall be $20,000; and further,
that negotiations upon the basis proposed by T. W. Misner, under date of
March 31st, shall be completed before these subscriptions shall be of binding
Detroit, April 1, 1871."
force.

This agreement was assented to by all the existing stockholders of
the company, and was carried out by the payment of the money,
$20,000, and the issuance of the stock, $30,000.
The corporation
having gone into bankruptcy, and its assets proving insufficient to pay
its liabilities, the complainant in the suit, who had been chosen its assignee, filed this bill to compel the defendants, who are stockholders
of the company under the above subscription, to pay one-third of the
On
par value of the increased stock taken under that agreement.
July 29, 1874, a majority of the directors of the company filed with
the secretary of state the annual report required by the statute, in
which it was stated that the amount of capital paid in was $75,000,
and also set forth the names of the stockholders and the number of
shares held by each, the aggregate being 4,000 shares, which at $25.
each would be $100,000.
BROWN, D. J.
That the capital stock of a corporation is a trust
fund for the payment of its debts, and that the law implies a promise
by the subscribers of stock to pay its par value, which in this instance
was twenty-five dollars per share, when called for, and that no subsequent release of their original contract or subscription by the corporation will avail against the claims of creditors, are propositions tooBut whether a court can not
clearly established to admit of question.
a
subscriber
to
live
to
a
only compel
bargain he has made, but can
up
make another bargain for him, and compel him to live up to that, is
a different question.
In the case under consideration it is clear that
no actual fraud was intended.
The novelty works found itself embarrassed for means, and resolved to raise money by increasing its
As its existing stock, however, was worth only twocapital stock.
thirds of its par value, it was obviously impossible to sell its new stock
at par, since all the stock would stand upon an equal footing and no
one could be found to pay a dollar for that which was worth but 66^i
cents.
There was, therefore, no recourse but to issue new stock at
its real value. All the stockholders of the corporation having assented
to this arrangement, it was evidently no fraud upon them, and the
corporation itself would be estopped to claim more than the agreed
price. Neither was it a fraud upon the existing creditors, since the
assets of their debtor were increased by the amount of money actually
paid in, and, to that extent, they were benefited by the subscription.
It is, then, only as a fraud upon future creditors that exception can
be taken to the transaction.
While the statute (Comp. Laws, 2841)
requires the capital stock of such corporations to be divided into shares
of twenty-five dollars each, there is no express prohibition against
stock being issued for less than its par value.
But conceding, upon
the authority of Hawley v. Upton, 102 U. S. 314, and Sturges v. Stetson, i Bissell 246, that the directors of a corporation have no right to-
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issue stock at less than its par value, that the subscription was void,
and that an action will lie by the assignee of the corporation against
the contributories to compel a surrender of the stock or payment for
the same at its real value when the subscription was made, does it
follow that a court can compel the subscribers to pay the par value of
the shares ? Subscriptions to the stock of a corporation are purely a
matter of contract.
Sturges v. Stetson, i Biss. 246 ; Parker v. North
Cent. Mich. R. Co., 33 Mich. 23. And where there is an express
contract the law will not permit one to be implied.
Cutter v. Powell, 6 T. R. 320; Pittsburgh & Connellsville R. Co. v. Stewart, 41
Pa. 54-58. Undoubtedly when a subscriber originally agrees to take
so many shares, the law will imply that he is to pay at the rate of
twenty-five dollars per share, and no subsequent release or modification of that agreement by the corporation will prevent creditors from
But the English cases hold that if for
insisting upon full payment.
the
be
reason
void at all, it is void in toto, and that
subscription
any
the assignee can not treat it as void to compel a return of the stock
and valid to obtain the payment of its par value.
It follows from this,
that if the contributory agrees only to take paid-up shares he can not
be compelled to take unpaid shares.
(Citing and quoting from Cur& S. 367; Carling's Case, L. R. i Ch. Div.
rie's Case, 3 DeG.,
115; De Ruvigne's Case, 5 Ch. Div. 306; Anderson's Case, 7 Ch.
Div. 75, 9}.) * * *
These cases appear to be decisive in favor of the position assumed
There is, however, a series of opinions of
by the defendants here.
the supreme court of the United States, beginning with the cases of
Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45, and culminating in Hawley v.
Upton, 102 U. S. 314, which put the obligation of the subscriber to
stock in an entirely different light. While none of these cases, except
the last, are necessarily inconsistent with the views expressed by the
English courts, or with the position assumed by the defendants here,
the general drift of the opinions is to the effect that the acceptance of
of stock, not fully and actually paid up, ipso facto,
a certificate
the
holder to make up its par value if the duty of the corpoobligates
creditors
ration to its
requires
although he originally agreed to take
the stock as fully paid up.
In Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45, the defendant agreed to bestockholder, and, with intent to become such, accepted a cercome
tificate for stock whereby he became bound to pay the full amount
thereof, as follows: Five per cent, upon the delivery of the certificate,
per cent., in
per cent, in six months,
per cent, in three months,
nine months, and residue whenever called for by the company, according to the charter -of the company and the laws of the state of
The defense was that the subscription was obtained by
Illinois.
the fraudulent representations of the agents of the company, to the
effect that the defendant would only be responsible for 20 per cent, of
the subscription made by him, and that he delivered his note in full
He received
certificate with the word
payment of this amount.
face.
It
was held that the legal
'non-assessable"
across
the
printed

4

5

a

5

5

a

it,

J.
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effect of the instrument was to make the remaining 80 per cent, payable upon the demand of the company, and that the word "nonassessable" was no qualification of this result.
"At the most, the
legal effect [is] that the word in question is a stipulation against liability to further taxation or assessment after the holder shall have fulfilled
his contract to pay the 100 per cent, in the manner and at the times
In other words, the court adopted the view that the
indicated."
original contract of the subscriber was to pay the par value of the
stock, and that the word "non-assessable" did not vary this contract.
While there is nothing in Chubb v. Upton, 95 U. S. 665, irreconcilable with the position assumed by the defendants here, Mr. Justice
Hunt, in delivering the opinion, observes that when a stockholder receives a certificate of stock for a certain number of shares at a given
sum per share, he thereby becomes liable to pay the amount thereof
when called upon by the corporation or its assignees.
The cases of
Pullman v. Upton, 96 U. S. 328, and Hatch v. Dana, 101 U. S. 205,
contain little more than a repetition of the principles laid down in
the former cases, and have no especial bearing upon the case under
consideration.
The case of Hawley v. Upton, 102 U. S. 314, is very nearly, if not
directly, in point here. In this case the defendant signed an agreement to the effect that for a consideration of ten shares of the capital
stock of the Great Western Insurance Company, received by him, he
His
agreed to pay one-fifth of the par value thereof in installments.
name was entered on the books as a stockholder, but no certificate of
stock was ever delivered to him, and no demand ever made upon the
The supreme court held him liable,
company for such certificate.
upon the theory that the company could not sell its stock at less than
par, and that his agreement amounted in law to a subscription for the
stock and nothing else, and that the receipt of the certificate was not
necessary to complete his obligation, as against the creditors of the
I have sought to find a tenable ground upon which to base
company.
a distinction between this case and the one under consideration, but it
seems to me that there is no substantial difference between them.
Here is an agreement, literally, to subscribe a certain sum and to take
in payment therefor a certificate, the par value of which was fixed by
law, representing a sum one-third larger than the amount of the subscription. How does this differ from the agreement in Hawley v.
Upton, by which the defendant acknowledged the receipt of ten shares
of stock, the par value of which was also fixed by law, and, in consideration thereof, promised to pay one-fifth of such par value? The
In the one the
whole contract in each case must be taken together.
promise to pay precedes the statement of the consideration, in the
other the acknowledgment of the receipt of the consideration precedes
the promise to pay, but in legal effect both are agreements to take
In neither
stock and pay therefor only a percentage of its par value.
case does the party agree to pay more if the necessities of the company
require, though in the light of these decisions it would seem to make
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no difference as against creditors whether he did or not. If, as was
said by the chief justice in Hawley v. Upton, "All that need be done,
so far as creditors are concerned, is that the subscriber shall have
bound himself to become a contributor to the fund which the capital
stock of the company represents," it is difficult to see why the defendants in this case have not done all that is necessary to make themselves liable for the payment of the amounts claimed. The statement
of the court that the suit was not brought on the special agreement of
the defendant to pay 20 per cent., but on his general liability as a
subscriber to pay for his stock whenever it was wanted to meet the
liabilities of the company, is equally applicable when it is made to
appear that the defendants received certificates of stock for which they
had paid only two-thirds of its par value.
This case is certainly a hard one upon the defendants.
Finding
the company embarrassed for the want of funds, they agreed to subscribe a certain sum and take in payment stock at what it was really
worth. It is clear that no fraud was intended, and that they must be
held liable upon an implied agreement to pay more for the benefit of
the creditors than they had expressly agreed to pay for the benefit of
It is a hardship, however, from which I see no way
the corporation.
of relieving them consistent with the views of the supreme court in
Hawley v. Upton, and a decree must, therefore, be entered for the

complainant.
Note. Unpaid subscriptions.
1. See, generally, note 3 Am. St. Rep. 806, 57 Am. St. Rep. 65; 1840, Society for Illus. Prac. K. v. Abbott, 2 Beav. 559; 1853, Curran v. State of Arkansas, 15 How. 304; 1867, Curry v. Scott, 54 Pa. St. 270; 1873, Sawyer v.
Hoag, 17 Wall. 610; 1885, Thompson v. Reno Sav. Bk., 19 Nev. 103, 3 Am. St.
Rep. 797, note; 1890, First Nat'l Bank v. Gustin Minerva, etc., Co., 42 Minn.
327 ; 1892, Hospes v. N. W. Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, infra, p. 1911 ; 1894, In re
Ry. Time Tables Pub. Co., L. R. (1895) 1 Ch. 255; 1897, Wallace v. Carpenter Elec. H. & M. Co., 70 Minn. 321, 68 Am. St. Rep. 530; 1898, Maxwell v.
Akin, 89 Fed. Rep. 178; 1898, Washington Mill Co. v. Lumber Co., 19 Wash.
165; 1899, Cumberland Lumber Co. v. Clinton H. L. Co., 57 N.
Eq. 627,
42 Atl. Rep. 585; 1900, Fish v. Smith, 73 Conn. 377, 84 Am. St. Rep. 161, 47
Atl. 711; 1901, Crowley v. Walton,
R. I.
, 50 Atl. 385;
1902, Vermont
Marble Co. v. Declez Granite Co.,
Cal.
, 67 Pac. 1057.
2. Set-off.
A shareholder can not set off a claim owing to him by the company against his liability for unpaid subscriptions, in order to pay creditors;
he must pay his subscription, and share pro rata with creditors : See, 1885,
Thompson v. Reno Sav. Bk.,.19 Nev. 103, 3 Am. St. Rep. 797, note 806; 1889,
Boulton Carbon Co. v. Mills, 78 Iowa 460, 5 L. R. A. 649; 1892, Gilchrist v.
Helena & R. Co., 49 Fed. Rep. 519; 1894, Merrill v. Cape Ann Granite Co.,
161 Mass. 212, 23 L. R. A. 313, note ; 1897, Ball Elec. L. Co. v. Child, 68 Conn.
522; 1899, Efird v. Piedmont L. Co., 55 S. C. 78, 32 S. E. Rep. 758; 1900,
Wilkinson v. Bertock, 111 Ga. 187, 36 S. E. Rep. 623; 1899, Lauraglenn Mills
v. Ruff, 57 S. C. 53, 49 L. R. A. 448.
Contra: 1895, Bank v. Bank, 130 Mo. 155.
3. Creditors of insolvent corporations have no preference to sums due the
corporation upon a shareholder's liability over other creditors of any insolvent shareholder. 1897, Estate of Beard, 7 Wyo. 104, 75 Am. St. Rep. 882.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
S. Rep. 143-159.

105

U.

[Error to circuit court, district of Massachusetts.

;

85

a

Scovill, as assignee in bankruptcy, sued Thayer to collect sums alleged to be due
This
upon a subscription to the stock of Kansas mining company.
company had been organized in 1870 with $100,000 capital stock,
which in 1871 was lawfully increased to $200,000, and afterwards, in
Thayer owned 200 shares
1872, unlawfully increased to $400,000.
of the original issue, upon which he had paid $20 per share;
shares of the lawful increase, for which he had paid $40 per share
and 585 shares of the unlawful increase, for which he had paid $50
The shares were $100 in face value, and all the other
per share.
shareholders had paid like sums on their shares, the balance unpaid
credited by "discount," and certificates as for full-paid shares delivered to subscribers, in accordance with the subscription agreement.
The corporation became bankrupt. Scovill was appointed assignee by
the United States District Court of Kansas and filed his petition
therein asking that he be permitted to make an assessment on the
shareholders for purpose of paying the corporate debts, amounting to
-$124,684 over and above the assets, and alleging that the amount unpaid on the stock was $222,650, and alleged that an assessment of 76
per cent, on the stock (allowing credits to the extent paid) would
After hearing in court, an
equalize the burdens and pay the debts.
order was made to this effect, and the assignee made the call to be
paid August i, 1876. Thayer having failed to pay, Scovill brought
this action at law to collect $27,160, the amount of the assessment on
his unpaid stock.
He defended on the ground
that the stock unlawfully issued was void; (2) that the sums he had voluntarily paid
thereon should be credited as payments on the valid stock; (3) that
the two-year statute of limitations barred the claim.
The trial court
held the claim barred by the statute.]
*
MR. JUSTICE WOODS.
(After holding the unlawful issue
of stock to be void, and that there were no acts upon the part of
Thayer estopping him from asserting its invalidity, proceeds:)
As forcibly suggested by counsel,
creditor who has been defrauded by misrepresentation of the real capital of the company, has
his remedy in an action of tort against all who participated in the
fraud. But the wrong done to him can not entitle the entire body of
creditors, who have not suffered from the alleged fraud, to recover of
the entire body of stockholders, who have taken no part in it.
We are of opinion, therefore, that the defendant
not estopped by
Statement abridged

;

1

is

a

*

*

(i)

part of opinion omitted.
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the acts of the agents and officers of the company to allege the nullity of the overissue stock, and his non-liability to an assessment on
such void stock.
The next question for our consideration is whether he is entitled tooffset against his liability to pay the sum due on his valid stock
the money paid on his void stock.
It is a general rule that a holder of claims against an insolvent corporation can not set them off against his liability for an assessment on
his stock in the corporation in a suit by an assignee in bankruptcy.
Sawyer v. Hoag, 17 Wall. 610; Sanger v. Upton, 91 U. S. 56;
Scammon v. Kimball, 92 U. S. 362 ; County of Morgan v. Allen,

U. S. 498.
The ground upon which this rule stands is thus stated by Mr. Justice Miller in Sawyer v. Hoag:
"The debt which the appellant
103

owed for his stock was a trust fund devoted to the payment of all the
As soon as the company became insolvent,
creditors of the company.
and this fact became known to the appellant, the right of set-off for
an ordinary debt to its full amount ceased.
It became a fund belonging
in equity to all its creditors, and could not be appropriated by the
debtor to the exclusive payment of his own claim."
The defendant seeks to avoid the application of this rule to his case,
on the ground that the real capital of the company was only $200,000,
and this constituted the trust fund for the security of the debts of the
company; that all the money that had been paid in as capital stock
had been paid into that fund, and that the party paying any money tothat fund was entitled to credit upon his dues thereto.
We can not assent to this view. He was as much bound to know
the limits of the charter of the company in which he was a stockholdHe knew, therefore,
er, as the public or creditors of the company.
that all stock issued beyond the limit fixed by the charter was absolutely void. When he paid in his money on the void stock, he knew
that he was not paying it on valid stock, and he is presumed to have
known that it was not a good payment on the valid stock.
The company had no right to apply it on the valid stock without his direction.
He never directed such application, and it remained in the possession
of the company until the rights of the assignees in bankruptcy attached.
To say that it was a contribution to the trust fund devoted to the payment of the creditors of the company is an entire misapprehension.
It could not be such contribution unless it were a payment on the
No call had been
stock, and this, we have seen, was not the case.
made for payment on the valid stock, to which the amounts paid on
No call could have been made
the void stock could be said to apply.
by the company under its agreement with its stockholders, unless to
pay its creditors, and it does not appear that when the payments were
made the company had any creditors.
It was a voluntary payment
for the benefit of the company, and tended to increase the value of
the authorized stock.
In that way the stockholder got the benefit of
it.
There is no rule of law or equity which entitles him, in a contest
between himself and a creditor of the company, either to receive a
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credit for it on his unpaid stock, or to have it repaid to him pro rata
We are of opinion, therefore, that
out of the assets of the company.
it could not be offset against the money due on the valid stock held
by him.
We are next to consider whether, upon the facts as disclosed by the
record, the defense of the statute of limitations should have been susThe precise question with which we have to deal is, When
tained.
would this action at law, brought by the assignees of the bankrupt
company against a stockholder, to recover a part of the balance due
on his stock, be barred by the statute?
This will depend on the answer to the question, When did the
cause of action accrue to the assignees ? In other words-, When could
they have commenced this action against this defendant to recover the
Wilcox v. Plummer's Ex'rs, 4 Pet. 172;
amount due on his stock?
Amy v. Dubuque, 98 U. S. 470.
The stock held by the defendant was evidenced by certificates of
full-paid shares. It is conceded to have been the contract between
him and the company that he should never be called upon to pay any
further assessments upon it. The same contract was made with all
the other shareholders, and the fact was known to all.
As between
It was
them and the company this was a perfectly valid agreement.
not forbidden by the charter or by any law or public policy, and as
between the company and the stockholders was just as binding as if
it had been expressly authorized by the charter.
If the company, for the purpose of increasing its business, had
called upon the stockholders to pay up that part of their stock, which
had been satisfied "by discount" according to their contract, they
could have successfully resisted such a demand.
No suit could have
been maintained by the company to collect the unpaid stock for such
The shares were issued as full paid, on a fair understanda purpose.
ing, and that bound the company.
In fact, it has been held in recent English cases that not only is the
Watercompany but its creditors also are bound by such a contract.
house v. Jamieson, Law Rep. 2 H. L. (Sc.) 29; Currie's Case, 3,
De G., J. & S. 367; Carling, Hespeler, and Walsh's Cases, i Cru

D.

115.

But the doctrine of this court is, that such a contract, though binding on the company, is a fraud in law on its creditors, which they can
set aside ; that when their rights intervene and their claims are to be
satisfied, the stockholders

can be required to pay their stock in

full.

Sawyer v. Hoag, Assignee, 17 Wall. 610; New Albany v. Burke,,
Wall. 96; Burke v. Smith, 16 Wall. 390.
The reason is that the stock subscribed is considered in equity as a
Wood v. Dummer, 3.
trust fund for the payment of the creditors.
Mason 308; Mumma v. Potomac Co., 8 Pet. 281 ; Ogilvie v. Knox
It is so held
Insurance Co., 22 How. 387; Sawyer v. Hoag, supra.
out to the public, who have no means of knowing the private contracts
The creditor
made between the corporation and its stockholders.
has, therefore, the right to presume that the stock subscribed has been.
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or will be paid up, and if it is not,
stance require it to be paid.

a
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In this case the managers and agents of the bankrupt company
had \n effect represented to the public that all its capital stock had
been subscribed for, and had been or would be paid in full. Considered, therefore, in the view of a court of equity, the contract between the company and its stockholders was this, namely, that the
stockholders should pay, say, for example, twenty dollars per share on
their stock and no more, unless it became necessary to pay more to
satisfy the creditors of the company, and when the necessity arose and
the amount required was ascertained, then to make such additional
payment on the stock as the satisfaction of the claims of creditors
required.
When the company was adjudicated a bankrupt, the assignees were
Their duty was to
bound by this contract, thus equitably construed.
collect a sufficient sum upon the unpaid stock, which, with the other
assets of the company, would be sufficient to satisfy the company's
If it should
creditors.
They were authorized to collect no more.
turn out that the other assets were sufficient, no action would lie
For if in a
against the stockholder for the balance due on his stock.
bankruptcy proceeding any surplus remained after payment of debts,
And we
it would go to the company and not to the stockholders.
have seen that the company in this case would have no right to any
surplus.
The question for solution is, therefore, when, under the facts of
this case, did the cause of action accrue against the defendant in error?
Certainly not until it became his duty to pay according to the terms of
his contract or according to law.
It is well settled that when stock is subscribed to be paid upon call
of the company, and the company refuses or neglects to make the
call a court of equity may itself make the call, if the interests of the
The court will do what it is the duty of the
creditors require it.
Curry v. Woodward, 53 Ala. 371 ; Robinson v.
company to do.
Bank of Darien, etc., 18 Ga. 65 ; Ward v. Griswoldville Manufacturing Co., 1 6 Conn. 593. But under such circumstances, before there
is any obligation upon the stockholder to pay without an assessment
and call by the company, there must be some order of a court of competent jurisdiction, or, at the very least, some authorized demand
And it is clear that the statute of limitations
upon him for payment.
does not begin to run in his favor until such an order or demand.
Van Hook v. Whitlock, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 409; Salisbury v. Black's
Adm'r, 6 Har. & J. (Md.) 293 ; Sinkler v. The Turnpike Company,
Walter, i Whart. (Pa.) 292; Quigg v. Kit3 Pa. 149; Walter v.
tredge, 18 N. H. 137; Nimmo v. Walker, 14 La. Ann. 581.
In this case there was no obligation resting on the stockholder to
pay at all until some authorized demand in behalf of creditors was
The defendant owed the creditors nothing, and
made for payment.
he owed the company nothing, save such unpaid portion of his stock
Upon
as might be necessary to satisfy the claims of the creditors.
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the bankruptcy of the company his obligation was to pay to the assignees, upon demand, such an amount upon his unpaid stock as
would be sufficient, with the other assets of the company, to pay its
debts. He -was under no obligation to pay any more, and he was under no obligation to pay anything until the amount necessary for him
to pay was at least approximately ascertained.
Until then his obligation to pay did not become complete.
But not only was it necessary that the amount required to satisfy
creditors should be ascertained, but that the agreement between the
company and the stockholder to the effect that the latter should not
be required to make any further payments on his stock should be set
aside as in fraud of creditors.
No action at law would lie to recover
the unpaid balance due on the stock until this was done.
The proceeding for an assessment in the bankruptcy court was in effect a
proceeding to accomplish two purposes : First, to set aside the contract between the company and the stockholder; and, second, to fix
the amount which he should be required to pay.
Until these things
were done, the cause of action against the stockholder did not accrue,
although his primary obligation was assumed at the time when he subscribed the stock.
It appears from the petition of the assignees for an assessment upon
the stock of the bankrupt company that they had used due diligence
to ascertain what additional payments on the stock would be required
to pay off the claims of creditors; that at as early a time as possible
they applied to the court for an order directing that the stockholders
should pay a part of the amount due on their shares of stock, and assessing the stock therefor ; that the order was made accordingly, and
within five months thereafter this action at law was begun to enforce
its payment.
If, therefore, the right to bring this suit did not accrue to the assignees until the assessment was made upon the stock by the court,
and the stockholders were required to pay
the action was brought
long before the limitation of the statute could bar it. *

Reversed.
Mr. Justice Field and Mr. Justice Gray dissented.
Sec. 375.
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(b) Fraud in equity.
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MITCHELL,
This appeal
from an order overruling
demurrer
to the so-called "supplemental complaint" of the Minnesota Thresher
The Northwestern Manufacturing and
Manufacturing Company.
Car Company was
manufacturing corporation organized in May,
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1882.
Upon the complaint of a judgment creditor (Hospes & Co.),
after return of execution unsatisfied, judgment was rendered in May,
1884, sequestrating all its property, things in action, and effects, and
appointing a receiver of the same. This receivership still continues,
the affairs of the corporation being not yet fully administered; but it
appears that it is hopelessly insolvent, and that all the assets that have
come into the hands of the receiver will not be sufficient to pay any
considerable part of the debts. The Minnesota Thresher Manufacturing Company, a corporation organized in November, 1884, as creditor,
became a party to the sequestration proceeding, and proved its claims
In October, 1889, in behalf of
against the insolvent corporation.
all
creditors
who
itself and
other
have exhibited their claims, it filed this
complaint against certain stockholders (these appellants) of the car
company in pursuance of an order of court allowing it to do so, and
requiring those thus impleaded to appear and answer the complaint.
The object is to recover from these stockholders the amount of certain
stock held by them, but alleged never to have been paid for. * * *
The principal question in the case is whether the complaint states
facts showing that the thresher company, as creditor, is entitled to the
relief prayed for; or in other words, states a cause of action.
Briefly
stated, the allegations of the complaint are that on May 10, 1882,
Seymour, Sabin & Co. owned property of the value of several million
dollars, and a business then supposed to be profitable.
That, in order to continue and enlarge this business, the parties interested in
Seymour, Sabin & Co., with others, organized the car company, to
which was sold the greater part of the assets of Seymour, Sabin &
Co. at a valuation of $2,267,000, in payment of which there were issued to Seymour, Sabin & Co. shares of the preferred stock of the
car company of the par value of $2,267,000, it being then and there
agreed by both parties that this stock was in full payment of the propIt is further alleged that the stockholders of
erty thus purchased.
Seymour, Sabin & Co., and the other persons who had agreed to become stockholders in the car company, were then desirous of issuing
to themselves, and obtaining for their own benefit, a large amount of
" without paying therefor, and
common stock of the car company,
without incurring any liability thereon or to pay therefor;" and for
that purpose, and " in order to evade and set at naught the laws of
this state," they caused Seymour, Sabin & Co. to subscribe for and
agree to take common stock of the car company of the par value of
That Seymour, Sabin & Co. thereupon subscribed for
$1,500,000.
that amount of the common stock, but never paid therefor any consideration whatever, either in money or property.
That thereafter these
persons caused this stock to be issued to D. M. Sabin as trustee, to be
That it was so distributed without
by him distributed among them.
receipt by him or the car company from any one of any consideration
whatever, but was given by the car company and received by these
The car company was, at this time,
parties entirely "gratuitously."
free from debt, but afterwards became indebted to various persons for
about $3,000,000.
The thresher company, incorporated after the in-
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solvency and receivership of the car company, for the purpose of securing possession of its assets, property, and business, and therewith
engaging in and continuing the same kind of manufacturing, prior to
October 27, 1887, purchased and became the owner of unsecured
claims against the car company, "bona fide, and for a valuable consideration," to the aggregate amount of $1,703,000.
As creditor,
standing on the purchase of these debts, which were contracted after
the issue of this "bonus" stock, the thresher company files this complaint to recover the par value of the stock as never having been paid
for. The complaint does not allege what the consideration of these
debts was, nor to whom originally owing, nor what the intervener
paid for them, nor whether any of the original creditors trusted the
car company on the faith of the bonus stock having been paid for.
Neither does it allege that either the thresher company or its assignors
were ignorant of the bonus issue of stock, nor that they or any of them
were deceived or damaged in fact by such issue, nor that the bonus
Neither is there any traversable allegation
stock was of any value.
of any actual fraud or intent to deceive or injure creditors.
A desire
and actually getting
to get something without paying for
not
fraudulent or unlawful
the donor consents, and no one else
inwas done " in order to
jured by it; and the general allegation that
evade and set at naught the laws of the state" of itself amounts to
mere conclusion of law.
As
creditors' bill, in the
nothing but
The thresher
ordinary sense, the complaint
manifestly insufficient.
company, however, plants itself upon the so-called "trust-fund" doctrine that the capital stock of corporation
trust fund for the payment of its debts; its contention being that such
"bonus" issue of
stock creates, in case of the subsequent insolvency of the corporation,
in favor of creditors to pay for
a liability on part of the stockholder
it, notwithstanding his contract with the corporation to the contrary.
This "trust-fund" doctrine, commonly called the "American doctrine," has given rise to much confusion of ideas as to its real meaning, and much conflict of decision in its application. To such an extent has this been the case that many have questioned the accuracy of
the phrase, as well as doubted the necessity or expediency of inventWhile convenient phrase to express cering any such doctrine.
tain general idea,
not sufficiently precise or accurate to constitute
The
a safe foundation upon which to build
system of legal rules.
doctrine was invented by Justice Story in Wood v. Dummer,
Mason 308, which called for no such invention, the fact in that case being that bank divided up two-thirds of its capital among its stockholders without providing funds sufficient to pay its outstanding billholders. Upon old and familiar principles this was
fraud on creditors. Evidently all that the eminent jurist meant by the doctrine was
that corporate property must be first appropriated to the payment of
the debts of the company before there can be any distribution of
sound upon the plainest
among stockholders,
proposition that
*
*
and quoting from Fogg
of
common
Citing
principles
honesty.
v. Blair. 133 U. S. 534, 541
M. R. Co., 102
Graham v. LaCrosse
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U. 8.148; Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Ham, 114 U. S. 587, 5 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 1081 ; Clark v. Bever, 139 U. S. 96, no, n Sup. Ct. Rep. 468.
There is also much confusion in regard to what the "trust-fund'*
Some cases seem to hold that unpaid subscribed
doctrine applies.
that is, so long as
capital is a trust fund, while other assets are not,
the subscription is unpaid, it is held in trust by the corporation, but,
when once paid in, it ceases to be a trust fund; while other cases
hold that, paid or unpaid, it is all a trust fund. * * * Citing and
quoting from Sawyer v. Hoag, 17 Wall. 610; Upton v. Tribilcock r
91 U. S. 45 ; Sanger v. Upton, 91 U. S. 56; County of Morgan v..
Allen, 103 U. S. 498, 508.
The capital (not the mere share certificates) means all the assets,,
If a subscriber gives his note for his stock, that
however invested.
note is no more and no less a trust fund than the money would have
been if he had paid cash down.
Capital cannot change from a trust
It is either all a trust or all
to not a trust by a mere change of form.
not a trust, and the "trust-fund" rule, whatever that be, must apply
If the assets of a corporation are
to all alike, and in the same way.
given back to stockholders, the result is the same as if the shares had
The latter is merely a short
been issued wholly or partly as a bonus.
cut to the same result.
So with dividends paid out of the capital,
voluntary conveyances, stock paid in overvalued property ; all are
forms of one and the same thing, all reaching the same result (a disposition of corporate assets,) which may or may not be a fraud on
This much being once setcreditors, depending on circumstances.
tled, the solution of the question when a subsequent creditor can insist
on payment of stock issued as paid up, but not in fact paid for, or not
paid for at par, becomes, as we shall presently see, comparatively
simple.
Another proposition which we think must be sound is that creditors
can not recover on the ground of contract when the corporation could
The right to recover in such cases must rest on the ground 1?hat
not.
the acts of the stockholders with reference to the corporate capital conWe have here a case where the contract
stitutes a fraud on their rights.
between the corporation and the takers of the shares was specific that
Therefore, unlike many of the
the shares should not be paid for.
cases cited, there is no ground for implying a promise to pay for them.
The parties have explicitly agreed that there shall be no such implicaIn such a case
tion by agreeing that the stock shall not be paid for.
the creditors undoubtedly may have rights superior to the corporation,
but these rights can not rest on the implication that the shareholder
agreed to do something directly contrary to his real agreement, but
In England,
must be based on tort or fraud, actual or presumed.
since the act of 1867, there is an implied contract created by statute
that "every share in any company shall be deemed and betaken to
have been issued and to be held subject to the payment of the whole
This statutory contract makes every conamount thereof in cash."
trary contract void.
Such a statute would be entirely just to all, for
every one would be advised of its provisions, and could conduct him-
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accordingly. And in view of the fact that "watered" and
"bonus" stock is one of the greatest abuses connected with the man-

self

of modern corporations, such a law might, on grounds of
But this is a matter for the legispublic policy, be very desirable.
We have no such statute ; and, even
lature, and not for the courts.
if the law of 1873, under which the car company was organized, impliedly forbids the issue of stock not paid for, the result might be that
such issue would be void as ultra vires, and might be canceled, but
such a prohibition would not of itself be sufficient to create an implied contract, contrary to the actual one, that the holder should pay
for his stock.
It is well settled that an equity in favor of a creditor does not arise
absolutely and in every case to have the holder of "bonus" stock pay
for it contrary to his actual contract with the corporation. Thus no
such equity exists in favor of one whose debt was contracted prior to
the issue, since he could not have trusted the company upon the faith
of such stock.
First Nat. Bank v. Gustin Min. Co., 42 Minn. 327,
N.
W.
Rep. 198; Coit v. Amalgamating Co., 119 U. S. 343, 7
44
Sup. Ct. Rep. 231 ; Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417, 435, n Sup.
Ct. Rep. 530. It does not exist in favor of a subsequent creditor who
has dealt with the corporation with full knowledge of the arrangement
by which the "bonus" stock was issued, for a man can not be defrauded by that which he knows when he acts.
First Nat. Bank
v. Gustin, etc., Min. Co., supra.
It has also been held not to exist
agement

where stock has been issued and turned out at its full market value to
Clark v. Bever, supra. The same has been
pay corporate debts.
held to be the case where an active corporation, whose original capital has been impaired, for the purpose of recuperating itself, issues
new stock, and sells it on the market for the best price obtainable, but
for less than par (Handley v. Stutz, supra;) although it is difficult
to perceive, in the absence of a statute authorizing such a thing (of
which every one dealing with the corporations is bound to take
notice,) any difference between the original stock of a new corporation and additional stock issued by a "going concern."
It is difficult,
if not impossible, to explain or reconcile these cases upon the "trustfund" doctrine, or, in the light of them, to predicate the liability of
the stockholder upon that doctrine.
But by putting it upon the
ground of fraud, and applying the old and familiar rules of law
on that subject to the peculiar nature of a corporation and the
relation which its stockholders bear to it and to the public, we have
The
at once rational and logical ground on which to stand.
capital of a corporation is the basis of its credit. It is a
substitute for the individual liability of those who own its stock.
People deal with it and give it credit on the faith of it.
They
have a right to assume that it has paid in capital to the amount
which it represents itself as having ; and
they give it credit
on the faith of that representation and
the representation is false,
it is a fraud upon them; and, in case the corporation becomes insolvent, the law, upon the plainest principles of common justice, says to
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''Make that representation good by paying for your stock." It certainly can not require the invention of
any neiv doctrine in order to enforce so familiar a rule of equity.
It is the misrepresentation of fact in stating the amount of capital
to be greater than it really is that is the true basis of the liability of
the stockholder in such cases ; and it follows that it is only those credthe delinquent stockholder,

itors who have relied, or who can fairly be presumed to have relied,
upon the professed amount of capital, in whose favor the law will
recognize and enforce an equity against the holders of "bonus" stock.
This furnishes a rational and uniform rule, to which familiar principles are easily applied, and which frees the subject from many of the
difficulties and apparent inconsistencies into which the "trust-fund"
doctrine has involved it ; and we think that, even when the trust-fund
doctrine has been invoked, the decision in almost every well-considered case is readily referable to such a rule.
It is urged, however, that, if fraud be the basis of the stockholders'
liability in such cases, the creditor should affirmatively allege that he
believed that the bonus stock had been paid for, and represented so
much actual capital,

and that he gave credit to the corporation

on the

is

if

it

is
78 a

a

is

is

it

if

a

a
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faith of it; and it is also argued that, while there may be a presumption to that effect in the case of a subsequent creditor, this is a
mere presumption of fact, and that in pleadings no presumptions of
fact are indulged in. This position is very plausible, and at first sight
would seem to have much force, but we think it is unsound.
Certainly any such rule of pleading or proof would work very inequitably
in practice.
Inasmuch as the capital of a corporation is the basis of
its credit, its financial standing and reputation in the community has
its source in, and is founded upon, the amount of its professed and
supposed capital, and every one who deals with it does so upon the
faith of that standing and reputation, although, as a matter of fact,
he may have no personal knowledge of the amount of its professed
capital, and in a majority of cases knows nothing about the shares of
stock held by any particular stockholder, or, if so, what was paid for
them.
Hence, in a suit by such creditor against the holders of
"bonus" stock, he could not truthfully allege, and could not affirmatively prove, that he believed that the defendants' stock had been
paid for, and that he gave the corporation credit on the faith of
although, as a matter of fact, he actually gave the credit on the faith
of the financial standing of the corporation, which was based upon its
The misrepresentation as
apparent and professed amount of capital.
to the amount of capital would operate as fraud on such
creditor as
he had personal knowledge of the existence
fully and effectually as
of the defendants' stock, and believed
to have been paid for when
he gave the credit.
For this reason, among others, we think that all
that
that the plaintiff
necessary to allege or prove in that regard
the fact was that he dealt with
subsequent creditor, and that,
the corporation with knowledge of the arrangement by which the
"bonus" stock was issued, this
matter of defense.
Gogebic Inv.
Co. v. Iron Chief Min. Co.,
Wis. 427, 47 N. W. Rep. 726.
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Counsel cites Fogg v. Blair, supra, to the proposition that the complaint should have stated that this stock had some value ; but that case
is not in point, for the plaintiff there was a prior creditor, and, as his
debt could not have been contracted on the faith of stock not then
issued, he could only maintain his action, if at all, by alleging that
the corporation parted with something of value.
In one respect, however, we think the complaint is clearly insufficient. The thresher company is here asking the interposition of the
court to aid in enforcing an equity in favor of creditors against the
stockholders by declaring them liable to pay for this stock contrary to
their actual contract with the corporation. While the proceeding is
not, strictly speaking, an equitable action, yet the relief asked is
Under such circumstances it was incumbent
equitable in its nature.
upon the thresher company to show its own equities, and that it was
in a position to demand such relief. It was not the original creditor
of the car company, but the assignee of the original creditors.
By
of course, succeeded to whatever strictly legal rights
that purchase
its assignors had, but
not rights of that kind which
here seekwas incumbent
ing to enforce. Under such circumstances we think
to state what
paid for the claims, or at least to show that
upon
mere nominal, consideration.
The only
substantial, and not
paid
This might
that
allegation
paid "a valuable consideration."
have been only one dollar. On this ground the demurrer should have
*

Same.

(c)

*

Fraud at law; joint tort-feasors!

STEAM STONE-CUTTER CO.
1900.

v. SCOTT.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI.

VALLIANT,

J.

57

S.

W. Rep.

Defendants are sued

157

Mo. Rep. 520,

1076.
as stockholders

in

a

Sec. 676.

*

been sustained.

dissolved

a

it

;

is

corporation on three notes issued by the corporation to plaintiff. The
first count of the petition contains statements to the effect that the
defendants organized the corporation with an ostensible capital of
$70,000, divided into 700 shares, which were all taken by themselves,
except two shares, given one each to two other persons named, to enable them to organize
the number of shares taken by each defendant
stated, and they aggregate 698; that the articles of association upon
which the defendants obtained the charter stated that the full amount
of the capital stock was paid in lawful money of the United States,
was paid, and that not in
but in truth not more than 10 per cent, of
money, but in property conveyed by the defendants to the corporation, and constituted its whole capital stock; that the defendants severally named respectively owe for their stock $20,340, $34,550 and
$7,920; "that said property was conveyed to said corporation at
grossly excessive valuation, and was fraudulently and intentionally so
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conveyed by said parties to said corporation, with the fraudulent intention on the part of said defendants to organize a corporation with an
apparently large capital stock as fully paid up, and thereby obtaining
a credit for such corporation to an amount far in excess of what the
amount actually paid said corporation on the stock would justify,
and with the fraudulent purpose on the part of said defendants by'
said pretended and sham payment of said stock of exempting themselves from liability to the creditors of said corporation for such unpaid stock as they then and now hold;" that the defendants then
fraudulently represented to plaintiff that the stock was paid in full,
and thereby induced plaintiff to extend to the corporation the credit
which resulted in the debt sued for ; that afterwards the corporation
was in fact dissolved, leaving the debt unpaid, which in the first count
is a note for $1,094.97, for which judgment is prayed.
The second
and third counts are like the first, except that each is on a different
The answer admits the organization of the
note, for $1,000 each.
corporation, denies the other allegations of the petition, and avers
that the debts were not to be paid within one year, and that no suit was
brought against the corporation within one year after the debt became
due.
Replication, general denial.
When the cause came on for trial a jury was waived*, and it was
tried by the court on the pleadings and proof.
On the part of the
plaintiff there was substantial evidence tending to prove all the allegations of the petition, and on the part of the defendants there was
substantial evidence tending to show that their conduct was honest,
and that the property conveyed to the corporation was worth the
The court found for the plaintiff on all the isamount of the stock.
sues, and made special findings that at the dissolution of the corporation it was indebted to the plaintiff on the note sued on in the first
count in the sum of $1,425, on that in the second count $1,565, on
that in the third count $1,565, and in all $4,555, and that each of the
defendants was indebted to the corporation on his stock subscription
in an amount in excess of that sum, and judgment against all the defendants for $4,555 and costs was rendered, from which in due course
*
*
*
defendants have appealed.
(After considering effect of statute, proceeds:)
Besides, under the allegations of the petition and the findings of
the court, the defendants are liable independent of the statute, upon
the ground that they made false representations upon -which they induced the plaintiff to give the credit to the corporation that resulted
in the debt sued for. Under that theory, the defendants are jointly
and severally liable at common law, although one or more of them
*
*
*
may not have been indebted at all to the corporation,

Affirmed.
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Exceptions to the general rule.
By payment of a corporation debt in good
faith, by issue of stock.

5.

(a)
VAN COTT,

19

DAVID

C.

1880.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.

RECEIVER, ETC., RESPONDENT, v.
IMPLEADED, ETC., APPELLANT.*

BRUNT,

JAMES A. VAN
82

N. Y. Rep.

535-543-

MILLER, J. The plaintiff, as receiver of the Hudson Avenue Railroad Company, in his complaint claims to recover of the defendant,
Van Brunt, and one Slaght, as stockholders of said company, on account of unpaid stock held by them respectively.
It is alleged that,
the defendant Van Brunt was president, director and principal manager, and Slaght director, of said company; that the management of
the corporation from the commencement was fraudulent and illegal
toward the corporation and its creditors, and an accounting is asked of
the assets, debts and liabilities, and of the stock held by said defendants and the amount unpaid thereon ; also of the amount of the paid-up
capital of the company, and of the debts incurred and owing by the
It is also decompany while the defendants were such directors.
manded that the defendants, as stockholders, may be adjudged to pay
up what is unpaid on their stock, or such amount as may be necessary
to pay up the debts of the company, and that they may be compelled
to pay the excess of debts incurred while they were directors, without
their dissent, according to law, over and above three times the amount
of capital actually paid up. The special term found, among other
the action havthings, that defendant Van Brunt, who only appeals
ing been discontinued as to Slaght, since the interlocutory decree was
the holder of 504 shares of stock, upon which the whole amount of
the par value was never paid, and upon which no payments had been
made, except that he, being president, made an agreement with one
Cowperthwaite to build and equip a portion of the road for a certain
sum in stock and for a certain sum in bonds, which contract immediately afterward was assigned to Van Brunt ; that the stock and bonds
were issued accordingly, and that Van Brunt and others associated
with him built and equipped the portion of the road referred to, at an
expense less than the amount in stock and bonds prescribed by the
contract, and that said Van Brunt has ever since held 475 shares of
said stock; that the contract with Cowperthwaite was not made with
the intention of being performed by him, but of being transferred to
the defendant Van Brunt ; and that the arrangement was promoted
by the said Van Brunt, as president and director of the company,
with a view of enabling the latter, and persons who might associate
with him, to build and partially equip a portion of the road and to receive stock and bonds of the company to an amount, at the par value
1

Arguments and small part of opinion omitted.
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thereof, greatly in excess of the actual amount which it would cost or
which it was worth.
The court also found that the defendant, Van Brunt, was, at the
time of the dissolution of the company, and has since been, also, the
holder of twenty-nine other shares of the stock of said company, no
part of which had been paid, except twenty-five per cent, on two
It was further found that, during the defendant Van Brunt's
shares.
administration as president and director, stock and bonds were issued
to a large amount, and that a greater part of said stock and bonds
were diverted from their legitimate use and disposed of by him, in
violation of his duty as president and director.
As conclusions of
law, among others, the court found that the scheme or arrangement
for building and equipping of the road was fraudulent against the
company and its creditors ; that the defendants, as holders of the unpaid stock, were only entitled to have credited, as a payment thereon,
the actual outlay paid or incurred for the work and materials, and
running stock or equipments, furnished by them in good faith, and
held that the defendants were liable for the amount of the unpaid
stock held by them.
The important question to be determined in this case is, whether
the defendant Van Brunt was liable to pay for the stock held by him,
for which he did not actually subscribe, at the par value thereof?
Most of the stock was received under the agreement with Cowperthwaite to build and equip a portion of the road, and in consideration
thereof.
The right of the officers of a railroad corporation to enter into
an agreement to build its road and pay for the construction of the same
in stock or bonds can not be seriously questioned, and contracts of this
In Ang. &
description are frequently made for such a pui'pose.
Ames on Corporations ( 5poa) it is laid down: "An agreement is
often made by railroads to pay the persons building them a certain
proportion of the contract-price in stock.
Under such a contract the
contractor is entitled to the proportion in stock at its current market
value at the time payment should have been made.
And if the stock
depreciate so that it has no market value, the amount agreed to be
paid in stock must be paid in money."
(See Hart v. Lauman, 29
Barb. 410; Moore v. H. R. R. Co., 12 Barb. 156; Porter v. Buckfield Branch R., 32 Me. 539.) If a contract can be made to pay in
part for building a portion of the road, it may also be made to pay
for the whole thereof in like manner ; and there is no valid ground
for claiming that where the contractor is entitled to stock at its market
value, he would be liable for the difference between the market value
and the par value thereof.
There is no evidence in the record before
us to establish affirmatively that the value of the work done and materials furnished was less than the fair and just value of the stock, or
that the road built and equipped was worth less than said stock.
In
fact, the testimony shows that the amount expended exceeded the actual value of the stock and bonds which were received in consideration
of the same.
The evidence also established that the stock never had any market
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value whatever.
It is tine that some of the bonds were disposed of
at fifty and sixty-five cents upon the dollar and less, and in some instances by throwing in stock to the same amount and one-half more,
and in one instance taken at par in part payment of a debt ; but they
were intrinsically valueless, and after a while were sold for only a
nominal sum, until at last no one outside of the company would take
either the bonds or stock at any real price.
The arrangement for the
building of the road was made after full deliberation and consultation, with the knowledge and approval of all the directors and stockholders. It was assented to as the only means furnished, and the only
offer which could be obtained from any one to insure the construction
of the railroad. It was the best thing which could be done under the
circumstances, was entirely satisfactory and made most clearly without any intention to defraud the company or its creditors and in perfect good faith. It is difficult to see how creditors could be defrauded
when all the property which the company ever had remained in its
In view of the facts presented no
possession and under its control.
sufficient reason appears why the stock held by Van Brunt and not
subscribed for by him should be treated and regarded as full paid-up
stock.
It was evidently intended by the partners that it should not,
and such was manifestly the agreement by which the stock was transferred in payment of the building of a portion of the road.
If the
rule be once established that no agreement can be made to build railroads by the transfer of stocks or bonds to the contractor, without
rendering him liable for the par value thereof, it would seriously interfere with the construction of enterprises of this description, and
would prevent the building of many railroads. We are unable to discover any reason why stock and bonds may not be transferred to a
contractor to pay for the building of a railroad, where the contract is
made in good faith and with no fraudulent intent, although such stock
or bonds should prove to be worth even more than the amount allowed
for same.
It is claimed that the defendant, as president, director and trustee,
having wrongfully appropriated the stock to himself without paying
This depends upon
for
takes all the obligations of
subscriber.
the question whether the transfer of the stock to the defendant and
the application of the same was wrongful.
was done, as we have
neseen, with the full approval of the stockholders, and in fact was
cessity, and without the contract entered into no portion of the road
could have been built.
If the defendant had realized sum beyond
the amount actually expended, there might have been, perhaps, some
ground for claiming that the arrangement should inure to and for the
As, however, this was not the fact, and no
benefit of the company.
special advantage accrued to the defendant from the contract, and as
no proof of any fraud,
not apparent that there was any
there
wrongful appropriation of the stock and bonds, or that the stock and
The mere fact that
bonds were diverted from their legitimate use.
certificate of the stock which was transferred to
the defendant held
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him did not make him liable, as it was to all intents and pxirposes
paid-up stock. The cases of Upton v. Tribilcock (91 U. S. 45),
.and Sanger v. Upton (91 U. S. 56), and the other. cases cited by
the respondent's counsel, do not sustain the principle that in cases
where stock has been transferred in good faith to pay a contractor to
T^uild the road, the certificate renders the holder liable to pay for the
number of cases are cited to sustain the position that the
stock.
liability does not depend upon the subscription. Without examining

A

them, and conceding that this position may be correct, it can not affect the question whether the owners of the stock and bonds which
were transferred were liable to pay for the stock as unpaid stock,
when it had been disposed of as paid-up stock, for the purpose of
Some cases are cited which involved a question
building the road.
as to the valuation of property received and work done in consideration of the transfer of stock.
(See Boynton v. Hatch, 47 N. Y. 225 ;
The Same v. Andrews, 63 N. Y. 93 ; Tallmadge v. Fishkill Iron Co.,
All of these relate to the construction of the provis4 Barb. 382.)
ions of the general manufacturing act, and we think none of them are

in point.
Section 16 of chapter 282, Session Laws of 1854, which provides
for the liability of stockholders for an amount unpaid on stock, is not,
we think, applicable where the stock has been disposed of, in good
faith and without fraud, to a contractor for building the road.
Nor
does section 5, i R. S., title 3, part i, chapter 18, which was adopted
i, Laws of 1850) relate to any
by the railroad act (chapter 140,
So, also, the provision contained in 2 R. S. 465 (i Edm.
such case.
ed.),
4549, is equally inapplicable where the stock has been
fairly appropriated. From the discussion had it follows that the court
was wrong in its finding that the arrangement in regard to the contract and its transfer was promoted by Van Brunt as president, to
enable him and his associates to build the road and to receive
stock and bonds at the par value in excess of the amount which it
For the same reason the couvt erred in
actually cost or was worth.
holding that the stock and bonds issued were diverted from the legitimate use of the company and disposed of by Van Brunt, in violation
of his duty as president and director.
So, also, the conclusion of law was erroneous that the scheme was
fraudulent as against the company and against the creditors, and
that the defendants were only entitled to credit for the actual outlay
paid or incurred, and were liable for the amount unpaid on the stock.
The result must be that the defendant was not liable to pay the par
value of the stock received by him under the contract for building
and equipping a portion of the road.
In regard to the twenty-nine shares which were held by the defendant Van Brunt, and which the court found had not been paid for,
except twenty-five per cent, on two shares, it is not important to determine the extent of the defendant's liability on this appeal, as it is
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for the reasons already

Reversed.

Earl,
Note.
139

Ind.

J.,

dissenting.

Accord:

1891,

Clark v. Bever,

139
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S. 96

; 1894,

Bruner v. Brown,

600.

See next case and note.
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To save

HANDLEY
1891.

a
v.

"going cone
STUTZ. 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
S. Rep. 417-438.

139

U.

[This was a bill in equity, filed by Stutz and other judgment creditors, on behalf of themselves and such other creditors of the Clifton
Coal Company as should come in against that company and certain of its stockholders, to compel an assessment upon certain shares
of stock held by the individual defendants, and payment of the same
as a trust fund for the satisfaction of the debts of the company.
The
bill averred in substance that the company was incorporated under
the laws of Kentucky in 1883, with power to purchase, lease and operate coal mines in Kentucky, with a capital stock of $120,000, in
shares of $100 each, with power to increase the same to $200,000, by
a majority vote of the stockholders ; that the stockholders, in May, 1886,
unanimously increased the stock to $200,000, being 800 new shares ;
that of these the defendant Handley subscribed for 86 y^ shares, two
of the other defendants for 15 shares each, and two others for 75
shares each, certificates of which were issued by the company, and
delivered to and received by said subscribers as they were respectively
entitled ; but that neither one of them ever paid to the company any
part of the said shares, and they each, respectively, owe the said company the full par value of the shares of the said capital stock subscribed for and issued to them.
The bill also averred that in 1886, it having been previously resolved to issue bonds to the amount of $50,000, secured by a mortgage upon its property, the defendants subscribed for bonds of the
company aggregating $50,000, and $50,000 capital stock was distributed pro rata among such subscribers ; that said subscribers paid the
company for the bonds, and that with the money thus received, to the
extent of $30,000, the company paid its debts to certain of its officers
and managers, who had become liable by indorsement for the company, and that nothing was or ever had been paid for or upon any of
the shares of capital stock thus subscribed for, and distributed among
them.

The bill further averred that the plaintiffs' debts were created be1
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fore all of the capital stock of said company was paid in, and that all
of said $80,000 increase of the capital stock, and each and all of the
amounts due to the company for any part of its capital stock, constituted a trust fund for their benefit, which they'were entitled to have
administered in a court of equity to the satisfaction of their said debts,
the company being insolvent.
It appeared from the testimony that the company was organizedsoon after its articles of incorporation were filed, and began business
at once, and made large outlays for machinery, buildings, materials
In the early part of 1886 the company was led to believe
and labor.
that its coal would coke, and therefore its products could be profitably extended from grate and steam purposes to iron-making coke. To
embark in the manufacture of coke, however, money was needed, and
a meeting of the stockholders was held March 31, 1886, at which a
resolution was passed, reciting that $50,000 was needed with which
to erect coke ovens, buildings, improvements, etc., to further develop
the property ; and it was unanimously resolved to issue $50,000 of
bonds of the company, in sums of $1,000 each, due thirty years from
April i, with six per cent, interest, and secured by trust mortgage
upon the property of the company, and the president was authorized
The mortto dispose of such bonds as in his discretion seemed best.
It was
gage was executed to the designated trustee and recorded.
found, however, that the bonds could not be sold, and to meet the
demands upon the company for money, it borrowed a large amount
upon its notes, indorsed by its directors and stockholders, and to secure the lenders and indorsers, the $50,000 of bonds were deposited
in two banks in Nashville, Tennessee, as additional collateral security
for the loans.
Finding that no one would purchase the bonds, and
being advised that in order to effect their sale it would be better to
add an equal amount of stock to the bonds, and propose to the purchasers of such bonds to give as a gratuity $1,000 of stock with each
$1,000 bond, a meeting of the stockholders of the company was held
at Nashville, May 31, 1886, at which all the stockholders were present in person or by proxy, although without any call or previous notice, and "it was unanimously resolved that the capital stock of the
company be increased to $200,000, as authorized by the charter."
This resolution was not then entered upon the records of the corporation, but was formulated in the shape of a pencil memorandum, and
adopted unanimously, although no vote appeared to have been taken,
and no formal record was made of the meeting until the summer of
1888.
No notice of such change in the amount of its capital stock
was recorded or published, as required by the laws of Kentucky.
The subscribers to the bonds subsequently executed the agreement
set forth in the bill, and bonds to the amount of $45,000 were delivered to the subscribers with equal amounts of certificates of "paid-up"
stock, the receipts reciting that it " was issued with bonds for same
amount, as per agreement."
The certificates on their face recited
that the shares of stock were fully paid up "and were non-assessable,"
or language to that effect.
Five thousand dollars of the bonds were
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left in one of the national banks at Nashville as collateral security for
a loan to the company, no one having subscribed for them.
The remaining $30,000 shares of increased stock, which were not needed to
secure the subscribers to the bonds, appeared to have been distributed
In the latter part of 1887, and
pro rata among the old stockholders.
in the early part of the following year, plaintiff obtained judgments
against the company, which were unsatisfied, and in September, 1887,
by an order of the circuit court of Hopkins county, Kentucky, the
entire property of the company was placed in the hands of a receiver,
and its operation stopped.
On February 8, 1889, this bill was filed against the coal company
and the holders of this increased stock, to compel payment therefor,
and to recover the amounts of the judgments against the company.
The court dismissed the bill as to three of the defendants not served
with process, and as to the i"est held them liable to all the creditors of
the company whose debts originated after the alleged increase of
stock, and fixed May, 1886, as the date of such increase.
As to
debts contracted prior to that date, they were excluded because, as
between the company and the stockholders, the latter held such stock
properly, and without liability to the company, and all creditors who
dealt with the company prior to such increase, and not upon the faith
of such stock, had no equity to demand more than the company itself
could. Five of the defendants against whom decrees were rendered
in excess of $5,000 appealed to this court, and the circuit court suspended the execution of the decree as to those who could not appeal
until this court should determine the rights of the appellants.
The opinion of the circuit court is reported in 41 Fed. Rep. 531.]
BROWN, J., after deciding the following points: * * *
MR.

[i.

JUSTICE
Although

the resolution increasing the stock was not formally
entered at that time upon the books of the company, the failure to do
so did not affect its validity, as most corporate acts can be proved as
well by parol as by written entries.
Moss v. Averell, 10 N. Y. 449.]
of
Nor
were
the
such meeting any less binding
proceedings
[2.
those
in
it
reason
of the fact that it was held
upon
participating
by
without call or notice and outside the boundaries of the state under
the laws of which the company was incorporated.
In this case the
two,
was
stockholders
attended
all
the
but
who' were repmeeting
by
resented by proxy, the vote increasing the stock was unanimous, and
it does not lie in the mouth of those who participated in this act or
received the stock voted at this meeting to question its validity.]
[3. It is further claimed that this issue of stock was invalid by
reason of the fact that there was no amendment of the charter authorizing such increase ever recorded or published, as required by the law
of Kentucky.
The statutes of Kentucky require a notice to be published, specifying the amount of capital stock authorized, and provide
that no change shall be valid, unless recorded and published as the
original articles are required to be.
In the case under consideration, however, the articles of incorporation did provide that the capital stock should be $120,000, with power
2 WIL. CAS.
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to increase to $200,000 by a majority vote of the stockholders, and
the defect was merely in the failure to record and publish such change,
as required by the statute.
We think that the clause upon which reliance is placed must be
read in connection with section 18 of the same act, which provides
that "no persons, acting as a corporation under the provisions of this
act, shall be permitted to set up or rely upon the want of a legal organization as a defense to action brought against them as a corporation; nor shall any person who may be sued on a contract made with
such corporation be permitted to rely upon such want of legal organization in his defense." We think this should be regarded as applying to amendments to such organization, and that no defense connected
with the original organization, which a party contracting with the corporation would be disqualified to set up, can be made available in
*
* *
connection with an amendment to the original articles.]
So far as the question of liability to the proposed assessments is
concerned, these defendants, with respect to their relations to this corporation, are divisible into two distinct classes : First, those of the
original stockholders who received the $30,000 increased stock as a
gift; second, those who subscribed to the $50,000 bonds and received
an equal amount of stock as a bonus or inducement to make the sub-

scription.

4. With regard to the first class, namely, the original stockholders,
who voted for this increase of 800 shares, and then distributed among
themselves 300 of those shares, without the shadow of right or consideration, it is difficult to see why they should not be called upon to
The only claim made upon their behalf is
respond for their value.
that they never agreed to contribute or pay for the same ; that the
stock was expressly declared to be "fully paid" and "free from all
claims or demands upon the part of the company ;" that there was
no evidence that the creditors of the company knew of, or relied
upon, this increase, in their dealings with the company, and that they
had a right to return and surrender the same, which they offered to
There is no reason to suppose that these stockholders did not act
do.
in good faith, and in the belief that they were entitled to this stock.
The fact that they did not subscribe for it or agree to take it until the
receipt of the certificates is immaterial, as the acceptance of the certificates is sufficient evidence of an agreement to pay their par value.
Sanger v. Upton, 91 U. S. 56, 64; Chubb v. Upton, 95 U. S. 665 ;
Brigham v. Mead, 10 Allen 245.
Ever since the case of Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U. S., 17 Wall. 610, it
has been the settled doctrine of this court that the capital stock of an
insolvent corporation is a trust fund for the payment of its debts ; that
the law implies a promise by the original subscribers of stock who did
not pay for it in money or other property to pay for same when
called upon by creditors, and that a contract between themselves and
the corporation, that the stock shall be treated as fully paid and nonassessable, or otherwise limiting their liability therefor, is void as
The decisions of this court upon this subject have
against creditors.
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been frequent and uniform, and no relaxation of the general principle
lias been admitted.
Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45 ; Sanger v.
Upton, 91 U. S. 56; Webster v. Upton, 91 U. S. 65 ; Chubb v. Upton, 95 U. S. 665 ; Pullman v. Upton, 96 U. S. 328; Morgan County
v. Allen, 103 U. S. 498; Hawkins v. Glenn, 131 U. S. 319; Graham
v. La Crosse & M. R. Co'., 102 U. S. 148, 161 ; Richardson v. Green,
133 U. S. 30. ^
It is simply in affirmance of this general principle that section 14,
-chapter 56, of the General Statutes of Kentucky, declares that
nothing in the act conferring corporate franchises, or permitting the
organization of corporations, "shall exempt the stockholders of any
corporation from individual liability to the amount of the unpaid installments on stock owned by them." If the corporation has no right,
as against creditors, to sell or dispose of this stock with an agreement
that no further assessment shall be made upon
the
much less has
right to give
among shareholders, without reaway, or distribute
fair equivalent therefor, and thereby induce the public to
ceiving
deal with
upon the credit of such shares, as representing the assets
of the corporation. Union Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Frear Stone Mfg. Co.,
The stock of
corporation
supposed to stand in the
97 111. 537.
place of actual property of substantial value, and as being convenient method of representing
the interest of each stockholder in
such property, and to the extent to which
fails to represent such
value,
either
deception and fraud upon the public, or an evidence that the original value of the corporate property has become
The market value of such shares rises with an increase
depreciated.
in the value of the coiporate assets, and falls in case of loss or misfortune, whereby the value of such assets
impaired. And the
increase of value of such stock
taken to represent either an appreciation in value of the company's property beyond the par value
of the original shares, or so much money paid to the corporation as
is represented by such shares. If
be once admitted that
corporation may issue stock without receiving
consideration therefor, and

a

it

:

5.

it

is

it

where
does not represent actual or substituted value in corporate
assets, there
apparently no limit to the extent to which the original
stock may be "watered," except the caprice of the stockholders.
While an agreement that the subscribers or holders of stock shall
never be called upon to pay for the same may be good as against the
has been uniformly held by this court not to be
corporation itself,
binding upon its creditors.
Somewhat different considerations apply to those who subscribed
for the bonds of the company, with the understanding that they were
to receive an amount of stock equal to the bonds as an additional inducement to their subscription.
The facts connected with this transaction are substantially as follows Some three years after the company
was organized
became apparent that the enterprise, as originallv
contemplated, namely, the mining and selling of coal for steam and
domestic purposes, was not likely to be
success, owing to the inferior character of the product, and the only hope of the company lay
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in the manufacture of the coal into an iron-making coke, that is, a
coke containing a percentage of sulphur low enough to admit of the
manufacture of merchantable pig-iron.
To embark in this, however,
money was needed, and as the stock of the company was not worth
more than fifty cents on the dollar, it was evident this could not
be effected simply by the issue of new stock.
It was proposed at
the meeting in March that money should be raised by the issue of
$50,000 of bonds, with which to add the requisite structures to the
plant. But it was soon evident that the bonds could not be negotiated
without the stock, and acting upon the suggestion of a Nashville
banker, it was resolved at the meeting in May that the stock should
be increased 800 shares, 500 of which should be turned over to the
subscribers to the bonds, as a bonus or an additional consideration.
The evidence is uncontradicted that the bonds could not have been
negotiated without the stock ; that they were both sold as a whole ; that
the transaction was in good faith, and, considering the risk that was
taken by the subscribers, the price paid for -the stock and bonds was
fair and reasonable.
The directors appear to have done all in their
power to obtain the best possible terms, and thei -e is no imputation of
unfair dealing on the part of any one connected with the transaction.
At that time the mines and property of the company were in good
condition, and the prospects of success were fair.
The case then resolves itself into the question whether an active
corporation, or, as it is called in some cases, a "going concern," rinding its original capital impaired by loss or misfortune, may not, for
the purpose of recuperating itself and providing new conditions for
the successful prosecution of its business, issue new stock, put it upon
The
the market and sell it for the best price that can be obtained.
question has never been directly raised before in this court, and we
are not, consequently, embarrassed by any previous decisions on the
point. In the Upton Cases, arising out of the failure of the Great
Western Insurance Company, in Hatch v. Dana, 101 U. S. 205, and
in Hawkins v. Glenn, 131 U. S. 319, the defendants were either
original subscribers to the increased stock, at a price far below its par
and the stock was issued,
value, or transferees of such subscribers;
not as in this case, to purchase property or raise money to add
but
to the plant and facilitate the operations of the company,
simply to increase its original stock in order to carry on a larger business, and the stock thus issued was treated as if it formed a part of
the original capital. In Morgan County v. Allen, 103 U. S. 498, the
same principle was applied to a subscription by a county to the capital stock of a railroad company, for which it had issued its bonds,
although such bonds had been surrendered to the county with the consent of certain of its creditors.
To say that a corporation may not, under the circumstances above
indicated, put its stock upon the market and sell it to the highest bidder, is practically to declare that a corporation can never increase its
capital by a sale of shares, if the original stock has fallen below par.
The wholesome doctrine, so many times enforced by this court, that
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the capital stock of an insolvent corporation is a trust fund for the
payment of its debts, rests upon the idea that the creditors have a
right to rely upon the fact that the subscribers to such stock have put
into the treasury of the corporation, in some form, the amount represented by it ; but it does not follow that every creditor has a right to
trace each share of stock issued by such corporation, and inquire
whether its holder, or the person of whom he purchased, has paid
its par value for it. It frequently happens that corporations, as well as
individuals, find it necessary to increase their capital in order to raise
money to prosecute their business successfully, and one of the most
frequent methods resorted to is that of issuing new shares of stock and
putting them upon the market for the best price that can be obtained ;
and so long as the transaction is bona fide, and not a mere cover for
''watering" the stock, and the consideration obtained represents the
actual value of such stock, the courts have shown no disposition to
disturb it. Of course no one would take stock so issued at a greater
price than the original stock could be purchased for, and hence the
ability to negotiate the stock and to raise the money must depend
upon the fact whether the purchaser shall or shall not be called upon
While, as before observed, the precise
to respond for its par value.
been
raised in this court, there are numerous decisquestion has never
effect
the
that
ions to the
general rule that holders of stock, in favor of
creditors, must respond for its par value, is subject to exceptions
where the transaction is not a mere cover for an illegal increase.
Wall. 96; Coit
(Citing and quoting from New Albany v. Burke,

n

v. Gold Amalgamating Co., 119 U. S. 343.)
A case nearer in point is that of Clark v. Bever, 139 U. S. 96,
decided at the present term of this court. In this case a railroad company, of which defendant's intestate was president and stockholder,
had a settlement with a construction company, of which defendant's
intestate was also a member, for work done in building the road. The
railroad company, being unable to pay the claim of the construction
company, delivered to it thirty-five hundred shares of its stock at 20
cents on the dollar, and the same were accepted in full satisfaction of
The stock was not worth anything in the market, and was
the debt.
No other payment than
issued directly to the defendant's intestate.
the 20 per cent, was ever made on account of this stock.
A judgment creditor of the railroad company filed a bill to compel the payment by the defendant of his claim upon the theory that he was liable
for the actual par value of such stock, whatever may have been its
It was held he could not
market value at the time it was received.
"Of course, under this view," said Mr. Justice Harlan, in
recover.
delivering the opinion of the court, "everyone having claims against
even laborers and employes
who could get
the railway company
nothing except stock in payment of their demands, became bound,
by accepting stock at its market value in payment, to account to unsatisfied judgment creditors for its full face value, although at the
time it was sought to make them liable, the corporation had ceased
to exist, and its stock had remained, as it was when taken, absolutely
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*
To say that a public corporation, charged
with public duties, may not relieve itself from embarrassment by
there being no statute forpaying its debt in stock at its real value
a
such
transaction
without
bidding
subjecting the creditor, surrendering its debt, to the liability attaching to stockholders who have
agreed, expressly or impliedly, to pay the face value of stock subscribed by them, is, in effect, to compel them either to suspend operations the moment they become unable to pay their current debts or to
borrow money secured by mortgage upon the corporate property."
So in Fogg v. Blair, 139 U. S. 118, also decided at the present
term, it was held to be competent for a railroad, exercising good
faith, to use its bonds or stock in payment for the construction of its
road, although it could not, as against creditors or stockholders, issue
its stock as fully paid without getting some fair or reasonable equivalent for it.
It was there said: " What was such an equivalent depends primarily upon the actual value of the stock at the time it wascontracted to be issued, and upon the compensation which, under all
the circumstances, the contractors were equitably entitled to receive
for the particular work undertaken or done by them."
It appeared
in that case that full and adequate compensation for the work done had
been paid by the company in its mortgage bonds, and, as the bill conworthless.

tained no allegation whatever as to the real or market value of such
stock, it was held that the contractors receiving this stock were not
" If, when disliable to creditors for its par value.
It was added:
posed of by the railroad company, it was without value, no wrong
was done to creditors by the contract made with Blair and TaylorIf the plaintiff expected to recover in this suit on the ground that the
stock was of substantial value, it was incumbent upon him to distinctly allege facts that would enable the court assuming such fact&
to be true
to say that the contract between the railroad company and
the contractors was one which in the interest of creditors ought to be
It would seem to follow from this that if the
closely scrutinized."
stock had been of some value, that value, however much less than
par, would have been the limit of the holder's liability.
In Morrow v. Nashville I. S. Co., 87 Tenn. 262, the supreme
court of Tennessee held that a contract with a subscriber to stock of
a corporation, that for every share subscribed he should receive bonds
to an equal amount, secured by mortgage on the company's plant, is
void as against creditors, and also between the subscriber and the corporation. But the court drew distinction between such a case and
sales of or subscription to the stock of an organized and going corporation.
It said: " The necessities of the business of an organized
company might demand an increase of capital stock, and if such stock
is lawfully issued, it may very well be offered upon special terms.
In such case, if the market price was less than par, it is clear that a
purchaser or subscriber for such stock at its market value would, in
the absence of fraud, be liable only for his contract price.
So a case
might arise where the stock of a going concern was much depreciated,
and where its bonds were likewise below par, and there was lawful
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Now, in such case, the
authority to issue additional stock and bonds.
real market value of an equal amount of stock and bonds might not
In such cases, the
exceed, or even equal, the par value of either.
of
a
fraud
would
be
held for his conaside,
question
purchaser
only
This case from Tennessee puts as an illustration the
tract price."
exact case with which we are now dealing.
The liability of a subscriber for the par value of increased stock
taken by him may depend somewhat upon the circumstances under
which, and the purpose for which, such increase was made.
If it be
for
of
to
the
of the
the
stock
adding
original capital
merely
purpose
and
do
a
it
to
and
more
enabling
corporation,
larger
profitable business, such subscriber would stand practically upon the same basis as
a subscriber to the original capital.
But we think that an active corof
for
the
poration may,
paying its debts, and obtaining
purpose
for
the successful prosecution of its business, issue its stock
money
and dispose of it for the best price that can be obtained.
Stein v.
Howard, 65 Cal. 616. As the company in this case found it impossible to negotiate its bonds at par without the stock, and as the stock
was issued for the purpose of enhancing the value of the bonds, and
was taken by the subscribers to the bonds at a price fairly representing the value of both stock and bonds, we think the transaction should
be sustained, and that the defendants can not be called upon to respond for the par value of such stock, as if they had subscribed to the
Our conclusion upon this branch of
original stock of the company.
the case disposes of it as to those who were held liable by virtue of
their subscription to the bonds.
6. We have no doubt the learned circuit judge held correctly that it
was only subsequent creditors who were entitled to enforce their claims
against these stockholders, since it is only they who could, by any legal presumption, have trusted the company upon the faith of the increased stock.
First Nat. Bank of Deadwood v. Gustin Minerva Con.
Min. Co., 42 Minn. 327; 2 Morawetz on Corporations,
832, 833;
Coit v. North Carolina Gold Amalgamating Co., 14 Fed. Rep. 12.
We also agree with him that creditors, who became such after the increase was voted in May, 1886, are entitled to look to those who subsequently received the stock, notwithstanding they did not receive it
until after the debts had been contracted.
The circuit judge found
in this connection that the "complainants had no knowledge or notice
of the subscription paper of December 30, 1886, under which $45,000
of the new stock was distributed to those who subscribed for bonds,
nor of the distribution among the old stockholders of $30,000 of said
increased stock ; nor does it affirmatively appear that they or either of
them dealt with and trusted the company upon the faith of that increased stock; but the fact that the capital stock had been increased
The real
to $200,000 was made public and was generally known."
question in this connection is, when may it be presumed creditors
Obtrusted the corporation upon the faith of the increased stock?
That is a fact to which
viously, when such increase was ordered.
publicity would naturally be given ; the creditors could not be ex-
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pected to know when and by whom such stock would be taken. It is
true they assume the risk of the stock not being taken at all, but the
moment shares are taken they are supposed to represent so much
money put into the treasury as they are worth, which becomes available for the payment, not only of future, but of existing creditors.
It is
manifest that any attempt to gauge the liability of stockholders by the
exact time they took their stock with reference to the dates when the
several claims of the creditors accrued, and by the further fact whether
the creditors actually knew of and relied upon such stock, would in
a case like this, where the creditors and stockholders are both numerous, lead to inextricable confusion.
Even the flexibility of a court of
equity would be inadequate to adjust the rights of the parties. * * *

Reversed.
Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, with whom concurred Mr. JUSTICE
LAMAR, dissenting:
I dissent from the conclusion of the court in respect of the stock
received by the subscribers to the bonds.
That stock was not paid
for in money or money's worth, or issued in payment of debts due
from the company, or purchased at sale upon the market.
It was a
mere bonus, thrown in with the bonds as furnishing the inducement
to the bond subscription, of larger control over the corporation, and
of possible gain without expenditure.
Becoming secured creditors
through the bonds, the subscribers increased their power through the
In my view, there was no actual payment for the stock, and
stock.
to treat it as paid up is to sanction an arrangement to relieve those
who would reap the benefit derived from the possession of the stock,
in the event of the success, from liability for the consequences, in the
event of the failure of the enterprise.
When the capital stock of a corporation has become impaired, or
the business in which it has engaged has proven so unremunerative as
to call for a change, creditors at large may well demand that experiments at rehabilitation should not be conducted at their risk.
My brother Lamar concurs with me in this dissent.
Note. Accord: 1873, In re H. & M. Tin, etc., Co., Spargo's Case, L. R. 8
Ch. App. 407; 1875, In re Western C. Oil Co., L. R. 1 Ch. D. 115; 1876, In re
Compagnie Generale, etc., 4 Ch. D. 470, 7 Eng. Rul. Cas. 676; 1880, Van Cott
v. Van Brunt, 82 N. Y. 535, supra, p. 1919; 1884, Stein v. Howard, 65 Cal. 616,
infra, p.1951; 1887, Christensen v. Eno, 106 N. Y. 97, infra, p. 1933; 1890,
Christensen v. Quintard, 29 N. Y. St. 61 ; 1890, Clark v. Bever, 139 U. S. 96;
1890, Fogg v. Blair, 139 U. S. 118; 1893, Webb v Shropshire Rys. Co , 63 L.
J. Ch. 80, 69 L. T. 533, 7 Eng. Rul. Cas. 382; 1896, Dummer v. Smedley, 110
Mich. 466, 68 N. W. Rep. 260. Compare, also, 1892, Hospes v. N. W. Car Co.,
48

Minn.

174, supra, p. 1911.

Contra: 1884, Haldeman v. Ainslie, 82 Ky. 395; 1889, Morrow v. Iron Co.,
87 Tenn. 262; 1889, Richardson v. Green, 133 U. S. 30; 1891, Camden v.
Stuart, 144 U. S. 104; 1892, Ooregum Gold M. Co. v. Roper, App. Cas. H. L.
125, 7 Eng. Rul. Cas. 644; 1893, In re Ry. Time-Table Pub. Co., 68 L. T. 649;
1896, Rickerson v. Farrell, 43 U. S.
1895, Coleman v. Howe, 154 111.458;
App. 452; 1897, Peter v. Union Co., 56 Ohio St. 181.
See, also, 1 Thompson Corp.,
1579-1582; and Prof. Huffcut, in 26 Am.
Law Rev., p. 861; also Mr. Alfred Russell, in 1 Mich. L. J. 17, 26 Am. L. R.
270.
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Sec* 679.

Same,

(c) In

a case of gift of shares.

CHRISTENSEN
1887.

1933

v. ENO.

1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.
97-103, 60 Am. Rep. 429.

106

N. Y. Rep.

[Appeal by Eno from judgment of the supreme court in favor of
plaintiff Christensen.]
This action was brought by plaintiff, as judgment creditor of defendant, the Illinois and St. Louis Bridge Company, against it and
defendant Eno, among other things, to compel the latter to pay forty
per cent, of the par of twenty-five shares of the stock of said company issued by it to him, upon which stock the forty per cent, was
not paid, but was credited as paid when the stock was issued ; also, to
compel said defendant to account for and pay over, in satisfaction of
plaintiff's judgment, the proceeds of the sale by him of certain
second mortgage bonds gratuitously issued to said Eno as a stockholder
by said corporation, upon payment by him of the remaining sixty per
cent, of said stock.
ANDREWS, J. The judgment below proceeds on the ground that
the forty per cent, credited as paid on the twenty-five shares of stock
of the Illinois and St. Louis Bridge Company, issued to the defendant
Eno in 1871, but which was not in fact paid, and also the sum of
$5,332.18, realized by him on the sale of second mortgage bonds of
the company, received as his share on the distribution of the same
among stockholders, pursuant to the resolution of the company of
December 20, 1871, were equitable assets in the hands of the defendant Eno, applicable to the payment of the debts of the corporation,
and which the plaintiff, as a judgment and execution creditor, may
reach in this action and have applied to the satisfaction of his judgment.
It is very plain, upon the facts, that the plaintiff in asserting
this claim can not stand upon any right existing in the corporation itself to proceed against the defendant Eno. The transactions by which
he acquired the snares as paid-up shares to the extent of forty per cent,
of their nominal amount, and received the bonds, created no obligation as between him and the company to pay the amount unpaid on
the stock or to account to the company for the bonds or their proceeds.
As between Eno and the company, it was not intended that
the former should be accountable to the company for the amount unViewing the transactions in the
paid on the stock or for the bonds.
light most favorable to the plaintiff, the credit on the stock and the
transfer of the bonds were intended as a gratuity to the stockholders
who had been called upon to pay calls upon their original subscriptions in excess of what was expected and of what was represented
would be necessary at the commencement of the enterprise.
1

Arguments omitted.
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There can be no doubt that as between the corporation and its
stockholders these transactions were binding according to the actual
The corporation itself would have no standing to demand
intention.
that the defendant Eno should pay the forty per cent, on the stock
which it acknowledged had been paid, or that he should account for
the proceeds of the bonds.
The claim of the plaintiff, therefore,
must be maintained, if at all, not in right of the corporation, or by
way of equitable subrogation to any right of the corporation against
Eno, but in hostility to the arrangement between them, under which
he received the stock and bonds.
The plaintiff, to entitle himself to
the relief demanded, is compelled to maintain that, as a creditor of
the corporation, he has rights superior to those of the corporation itself, and may hold the defendant to account for the unpaid forty per
cent, on the stock as though he had been a subscriber therefor, and
for the proceeds of the bonds as though he had purchased them of the
So far as respects the
corporation, or had sold them on its account.
claim to recover the forty per cent, unpaid on the twenty-five shares
of stock, we understand it is placed, by the learned counsel for the
plaintiff, mainly on the proposition that the capital stock of a corporation is a trust fund for the security of creditors, which can not be
given away or distributed among stockholders so long as debts of the
corporation remain unpaid, and that the transaction in question was a
The general principle asserted is, doubtviolation of this principle.
less, well founded, but if it had an appropi'iate application in the
present case, the plaintiff would encounter some difficulty, under the
authorities in this state, in maintaining a separate action as an individual creditor of the corporation, to reach assets which constitute a
trust fund, not for the protection of one creditor only, but equally for
all the creditors of the corporation.
(Griffith v. Mangam, 73 N. Y.
But passing this, we are of opinion that the
611, and cases cited.)
forty per cent, credited on the twenty-five shares of stock issued to the
defendant Eno, can "riot be considered as, and does not constitute, a
The capital of a
trust fund applicable to the payment of creditors.
corporation consists of the funds, securities, credits and property of
The word "capital" applied to
whatever kind which it possesses.
corporations is often used interchangeably with the words " capital
stock," and both are frequently used to express the same thing the
property and assets of the corporation.
Strictly, the capital stock of
a corporation
is the money contributed by the corporators to the capital, and is usually represented by shares issued to subscribers to the
stock on the initiation of the corporate enterprise.
(See Burrall v.
Bushwick R. Co., 75 N. Y. 211, 212, and cases cited.)
It may be admitted that the liability of subscribers on unpaid stock
subscriptions constitutes an asset of the corporation, which can not be
surrendered or given up by the corporation without consideration to
the prejudice of creditors.
It is not claimed that there is any express
prohibition in the charter of the bridge company against issuing
The
shares purporting to be fully paid without actual payment.
charter authorizes books of subscription to the stock to be opened.
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The most that could be claimed for this provision is that by implication it prohibits the issue of stock except to actual subscribers, who
should undertake to pay the nominal amount of the shares when required. There is no pretense that the defendant Eno ever subscribed
for the twenty-five shares of bonus stock (so called), or entered into
This
any engagement to pay the forty per cent, credited thereon.

The plaintiff
was distinctly contrary to the intention of all parties.
seeks to charge him as though he had subscribed for the stock, and
entered into a contract obligation with the company to pay the forty
We can see no ground upon which he can be made to reper cent.
spond to the creditors of the company as upon an unpaid subscription. Assuming that the transaction as to the company was ultra
vires, or that it could not give away its shares, the transaction in that
view was simply a nullity, and Eno got nothing as against any one
But it did not convert him into a
entitled to question the transaction.
debtor of the company for the forty per cent.
He entered into no
He has received nothing on account of the twencontract to pay it.
ty-five shares, and it is not claimed that the charter in terms imposes
the liability claimed.
The unissued shares of a corporation are not assets.
When issued
in the cora
of
the
shareholder
interest
proportionate
represent
they
an
to
claims of
subordinate
the
however,
interest,
property
porate
There are unquestioned public evils growing out of the
creditors.
creation and multiplication of shares of stock in corporations not based
But
The remedy is with the legislature.
upon corporate property.
the liability of a shareholder to pay for stock does not arise out of his
relation, but depends upon his contract, express or implied, or upon
some statute, and in the absence of either of these grounds of liability, we do not perceive how a person to whom shares have been
issued as a gratuity has, by accepting them, committed any wrong
upon creditors, or made himself liable to pay the face value of the
shares as upon a subscription or contract.
(Seymour v. Sturgess,
26 N. Y. 134 ; In re Western Canada Oil Co., L. R. i Ch. Div. 1 15 ;
Waterhouse v. Jamieson, L. R. 2 H. L. (Sc.) 29.) The question
as to the right of the plaintiff to compel the defendant to account for
the sum realized by him on the sale of the bonds is affected by the
fatal difficulty that the defendant has received nothing from the corporation, except its promise to pay, which has never been performed.
The plaintiff has withdrawn nothing from the funds of the company
on account of the bonds (unless it may be a sum represented by a
single interest coupon) and creditors have not been prejudiced by the
transaction.
It is alleged, and it was offered to be proved, that the property of
the company had been sold on the foreclosure of the first mortIt is unnecessary to consider what the rights or liabilities of
gage.
defendant
would be in respect to the bonds as between himself
the
creditors
of the corporation on a distribution of assets, or if
and other
it had appeared that the corporation had paid the bonds issued to the
The situation in either of these aspects is not presented.
defendant.
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This is not a case of following assets of a corporation wrongfully
The defendant had received none of the funds or assets
transferred.
The loss on the bonds falls on
of the company available to creditors.
those who have purchased them relying on the credit of the corporation. The situation of the general creditors has not, so far as
appears, been affected by the fact that the company received nothing for
The statute of Missouri, the state from which the bridge
the bonds.
company in part derives its existence, authorizes a creditor of a corporation, who shall have obtained judgment against it, upon which
an execution has been returned nulla bona, to issue execution thereon
against any stockholder to an extent equal in amount to the amount
of stock held by him "together with any amount unpaid thereon."
The courts of Missoui'i on an application under this statute for leave
to issue execution against a person who was a director and stockholder
in the bridge company, who had received bonus stock and bonds,
granted the application and came to the conclusion that the forty
per cent, credited on the stock could be regarded as the amount unpaid
thereon within the statute, and that the amount received on the bonds
was also recoverable.
(Skrainka v. Allen, 7 Mo. App. 434, 435, s. c.
The
Mo.
statutory remedy is, of course, not available in
Rep.
384.)
76
this state.
(Lowry v. Inman, 46 N. Y. 119, 120.) The court seems
to have given much weight to the fiduciary and trust relation existing
That relation
between a director of a corporation and its creditors.
did not exist between the defendant Eno and the creditors of the company. He was a stockholder simply, and no trust relation exists
The debetween a stockholder and a corporation and its creditors.
cision in Missouri may stand on its special circumstances, but it is not
controlling in the case before us.
We are of opinion that the judgment appealed from is erroneous,
and that it should, therefore, be reversed and a new trial ordered.
All concur.
Judgment reversed.
Note.

See note to preceding case.
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The suit was brought by complainants, who are large owners of the stock
of the defendants, the ^National Wall-Paper Company, to restrain the payment of interest upon certain obligations of the company called "debenture
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stock." The complainants insisted that such payment was not justified by
the terms of the debenture stock itself, but was in violation of the agreement
between the company and the complainants, and of the provisions of the
articles of association and by-laws of the company. The company's president
and treasurer were joined as defendants.
The defendant company was organized June 2, 1892, under the New York
business corporation law, to carry on the business of manufacturing and dealing in wall paper, with a capital stock originally of $14,000,000, but which was
soon increased to $30,000,000, all of which, however, has not been issued. The
certificate of incorporation provided for the creation of obligations in the
nature of certificates of indebtedness to the extent of $8,000,000, to be known
as "debenture stock," and sold for cash or for property, or assets purchased
by the corporation at the fair market value thereof. It further provided that:
"The debenture stock hereby authorized to be issued shall be and remain an
obligation of the corporation, or payable at the expiration of the corporate
existence, and entitled meantime to interest at a rate not exceeding eight per
cent, per annum, payable quarter-yearly, as an expense of the business, from
and out of the profits of the company, before any dividend can be declared
or paid on the stock or share capital. No payment of interest can or shall be
made on such debenture stock which will impair the capital, nor unless the
amount paid shall have been actually earned by the company.
The holders
of debenture stock shall not be entitled to demand or sue for the interest payable upon the obligations held by them unless such interest was actually earned
by the company, in which event the amount earned shall be distributed amongst
and paid to the holders of debenture stock, to the proportion of their holdings,
but the unpaid interest shall, notwithstanding, become and remain an obligation of the company, payable out of any future profits to the full extent of the
amount represented by the outstanding certificates before any dividends can
be declared or paid on the stock or share capital. In the event of the dissolution or winding up of the company, the holders of debenture stock or of
certificates representing the ownership thereof shall rank pan passu with
other unsecured creditors of the corporation, and shall be entitled to receive in
full out of the assets of the company the amounts represented by the outstanding certificates of indebtedness or debenture stock in priority to the claims of
the shareholders to be paid any amount in respect of such shares." The bylaws provided that the board of directors shall select accountants as official
auditors to the company, who shall supervise its books of account, and all interest paid upon the debenture stock, and all dividends declared on the share
capital, shall be based upon the net earnings of the company as certified by
such auditors. Each certificate of debenture stock contained the following
provision: "Each of the shares of debenture stock represented by this certificate is entitled to receive interest at the rate of eight per cent, per annum,
payable quarter-yearly on the first days of September, December, March and
June in each year, from and out of the profits of the company before any dividend can be declared or paid on the stock or share capital; but no payment
of interest can or shall be made on such debenture stock which will impair
the capital, nor unless the amount paid shall have been actually earned by
the company. In event of default in payment of the interest on the debenture
stock represented by this certificate, the unpaid interest shall become and remain an obligation of the company, payable out of any future profits to the
full extent of such unpaid interest before any dividend can be declared or
paid on the stock or share capital. In the event of the dissolution or winding
up of the company, the holders of debenture stock shall rank pan passu with
other unsecured creditors of the corporation."
At the time of the organization of the company, the appellants, constituting the firm of Cresswell & Washburn, were manufacturers and dealers in
wall paper, under the firm name of Cresswell & Washburn. Other firms
and individuals were engaged in like business in various parts of the country.
These various concerns commenced negotiations with the National WailPaper Company, which resulted in the acquisition by the latter of the property and assets of the several concerns, including complainants' firm of
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Cresswell & Washburn. All these acquisitions took place under separate
contracts in substantially the same form which contained these provisions:
(1) "The value of the fixed plant, machinery, fixtures, chattels, merchandise, book accounts, and other assets hereby transferred, shall be fixed by
* the
*
*
appraisers."
(2) "There shall be issued to the vendors, in
payment for the property and assets acquired hereunder, the obligation of
the company in the nature of one or more certificates of indebtedness, to be
known as 'debenture stock,' in an amount equal to the appraised value of
the property and assets hereby transferred, such appraised value to be fixed
in the manner hereinbefore provided," etc. (3) "There slrall be further issued and paid to the vendors for the good-will of the business thereby transferred, and in consideration of the execution by them of this agreement, and
of the further contracts assuring the continued good-will of such business to
*
*
*
an amount of common stock equal at par to sixteen
the company
times the net earnings of the vendors in their business, for the eleven months
commencing July 1, 1891, and ending May 31, 1892, less the appraised value
of the property to be transferred to the company; but the issue of such.common stock shall be subject to the conditions and restrictions hereinafter contained, viz. (that vendors should deposit their stock in a voting trust)."
(4) "For 'the purpose of fixing the amount of the common stock of the
company to which the vendors shall be entitled * * * as payment for
the good-will of the business so to be transferred, and for the assurance of
such good-will to the company," the agreement provided for an ascertainment of profits for the eleven months from July 1, 1891.
(5) The vendors
guaranteed the collection of the accounts and bills receivable transferred by
In case of any failure of collection, the vendors were to surrender
them.
foack to the company debenture stock equal at par to the face value of the uncollectible amount, "and also an amount of stock equal at par to sixteen
times the face value of such uncollected book accounts and bills receivable,
The vendors further coveless the amount of debenture stock returned."
nanted with the company that they would, neither directly nor indirectly,
If
engage in the business of manufacturing, buying or selling wall paper.
they did, they were to forfeit to the company all the stock issued to them.
In valuing good-will, patents, copyrights and trade-marks were to be reThese, however, were relatively insignifigarded as part of the good-will.
cant. There is criticism, supported by testimony, of the manner in which the
profits of the respective concerns for the specified eleven months were ascertained, but it is not necessary to set forth the details; the figuring was all
done by the same accountants, and the methods were alike in all the cases.
The stock corporation law (laws 1892, ch. 688), 42, provides: "No corporation shall issue either stock or bonds except for money, labor done, or
property actually received for the use and lawful purposes of such corporation. No such stock shall be issued for less than its par value ; no such bonds
shall be issued for less than the fair market value thereof." It will be perceived from the foregoing statement that the stock of the defendant company
was issued for the "good-will" of the different manufacturing plants (and
some patents, trade-marks, etc.), the tangible assets of which plants, viz.,
machinery, fixtures, material, book accounts, etc., were paid for by the issue
of the debenture stock. Practically the entire capital stock (i. e., the common stock) is represented by the good-will of the establishments which the
defendant company bought up. Complainants received for their old plant,
book accounts, good-will, etc., $326,000 in debenture stock, and $1,831,800 in
common stock, of which, by the reason of uncollectibility of certain accounts,
they subsequently returned $7,702.19 of debenture stock and $135,200 of comWhen the suit was begun, the accountants, designated under the
mon stock.
by-laws as auditors, had made no certificate of net earnings. Subsequently,
and on April 22, 1896, they certified that they had examined the books and
accounts from the date of inception to February 29, 1896, and found the net
They further certified that
profits for the entire period to be $3,046,639.66.
" the surplus profits remaining on hand on said 29th day of February, 1896,
representing the net earnings of the company available for the payment of
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interest on its debenture stock, over and above the sums already expended for
interest, amount to $1,410,522.39."
This sum so certified is $866,528.29 in
excess of the debenture interest unpaid and claimed to be accrued on February 29, 1896; i. e., for 11 months at 8 per cent, per annum, viz., $543,994.

LACOMBE, CIRCUIT JUDGE (after stating the facts). The contention
of the complainants is that, notwithstanding the certificate of the auditors, no debenture interest could be paid without impairing the capital of the company, and that in fact there were no profits.
They
contend that they have demonstrated the impairment of the capital
stock to an extent more than sufficient to prevent the payment of debenture interest; first, on the theory that the capital stock was originally issued for far less than its par value, and has never been fully,
if at all, paid; second, on the theory that, even if it were originally
fully paid, there has been an enormous depreciation in the value of
the capital stock since that time; third, by losses and depreciations in
assets other than the good-will for which the capital stock was originally issued.
The first of these propositions suggests the questions whether stock
is issued for "property actually received," within the meaning of the
statute, when it is issued for good-will only; and whether, assuming
that the entire stock could, under the New York act of 1892, be
issued solely for good-will, the good-will taken in this case was taken
These questions are discussed at great length in
at its actual value.
the briefs.
It is contended that, although "good-will" is property in
the sense that it is a subject of bargain and sale, it is nevertheless but
a so-called "parasitical species of property, which can not exist apart
from the substantial property of which it is an attribute;" that it is
not a thing of value by itself; that the capital of a corporation must
be invested in property capable of existence by itself; that in this case
no effort was made to ascertain the actual value of the good-will ; that
the value at which it was appraised and stock issued against it was
purely arbitrary, and in no sense a proper valuation, and that in determining this arbitrary valuation elements of alleged profits were
taken into consideration which could not fairly be considered such.
Upon this interesting, and possibly perplexing, discussion we do not
fiad it necessary to embark.
Good-will has been defined as "all that
good disposition which customers entertain towards the house of business identified by the particular name or firm, and which may induce
There is nothing marthem to continue giving their custom to it."
velous or mysterious about it.
When an individual or a firm or a
corporation has gone on for an unbroken series of years conducting a
particular business, and has been so scrupulous in fulfilling every obligation, so careful in maintaining the standard of the goods dealt in,
so absolutely honest and fair in all business dealings that customers of
the concern have become convinced that their experience in the future
will be as satisfactory as it has been in the past, while such customers'
good report of their own experience tends continually to bring new customers to the same concern, there has been produced an element of
in some cases, perhaps, far more important
value quite as important
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than the plant or machinery with which the business is carried on. That
it is property is abundantly settled by authority, and, indeed, is not disputed. That in some cases it may be very valuable property is manifest.
The individual who has created it by years of hard work and fair business dealing usually experiences no difficulty in finding men willing to
he be willing to sell
to them.
Legislation devised
pay him for
to restrict the accumulation of the fruits of industry may impair its value
contract enforceable
by denying to its producer the right to enter into
at law not to interfere with its enjoyment by the purchaser, but, so
long as any belief in human honesty remains, there will be found
some persons willing to buy such property, the very existence of which
remains
implies honest business dealing in the past. And so long as
salable
valuable. Nor
indissolubly connected with any particular locality, or any specific tangible property. Reference has
been made on the briefs to the publishing house of "Harper
Bros."
If its present establishment in Franklin Square were destroyed by fire
to-morrow, and everything therein contained were swept out of existence,
surely manifest that, so long as the firm itself survived, and
would still hold its "goodcontinued to transact its old business,
will," although the business should be thenceforward conducted in a
new building erected on some up-town street, and supplied with enIf good-will be "parasite,'*
tirely new machinery and equipments.
sprung, not of the
"parasite" of the business from which
mere machinery by which that business was conducted.
valuaSince good-will
property, and since in some cases
ble property,
would follow that in some way or other
must be
practically possible to determine what that value is. Whether the
particular method employed in the case at bar to ascertain such value
or
not
proper one, and whether the appraisement made when
these several wall paper concerns were bought up by the defendant
company was accurate, we are under no obligation to inquire upon
the complainants' request.
The method of valuation was one which
they fully approved, and which was applied in fixing the value of
their own property, as result of which they received $1,831,800 in
common stock of the defendant.
They certainly, participating in the
transaction, and reaping its benefits, are in no position now to claim
that the good-will bought by the defendant company with common
*

stock was overvalued.

*

*

is

:

It

it

Complainants further contend that on February 29, 1896, there
were not profits sufficient to warrant the payment of interest on the
debenture stock, such interest concededly being payable only out of
will be remembered, amounted to $543,profits. This interest,
994, and the auditors certified that the profits on that day aggregated
insisted that certain items of assets were taken
$1,410,522.39.
by the auditors at an excessive valuation, that in some cases items not
properly assets were included on the credit side of the account, and
that sufficient sums were not deducted for depreciation, reserves,
etc.
These items are
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Birge good-will
Birge bonus
Addition to Block account
Selling expenses treated as an asset
Reserve for depreciation
Reserve for bad debts of business of 1892 to 1894
Reserve for bad debts of business of 1894 to 1896
Eight per cent, for valuation of manufactured goods

194!
$2,100,000
300,000
100,000
166,050
300,000
50,000
150,000
60,000

00
00

$3,226,050

17

00
17

00
00
00

00

The first two items may be considered together.
About the time
when complainants sold their business to the defendant company, in
1892, some effort seems to have been made to buy up the establishment and business of the firm of M. H. Birge & Sons, of Buffalo,
upon the same terms as all the others, but Birge & Sons refused to
entertain the offer.
Subsequently, in December, 1894, a fire deThereupon, defendant
stroyed part of the Birge plant at Buffalo.
company, apparently with a view of ingratiating itself with the firm,
offered to lease it one of the defendant's factories, which was temporarily shut down. Negotiations for the purchase of the entire Birge
business and outfit were subsequently begun, and finally Birge made
an offer to sell at a certain price, leaving his offer open for but a brief
period. It was accepted, although not without disapproval by a minority of the board of directors, including complainant Washburn.
The price agreed upon was $300,000 in cash on the day of signing
the contract, $2,100,000 in common stock, $50,000 in debenture
stock, and an additional sum in cash, to be paid when appraisement
of the tangible assets was completed, and which turned out to be

The auditors treated this transaction as a purchase of
$129,286.36.
investment, and $2,400,000 of it 'as paid for
assets for permanent
and
This is a strictly accurate statement of the
good-will
patents.
transaction, and the only possible objection to the auditors' figuring
is the suggestion that the good-will and patents were not worth $2,400,000, either when bought, in February, 1895, or when counted as
Here, again, the question is presented,
an asset, in Februaiy, 1896.
What is the actual value of this property? But the record gives us
no information upon which to answer.
It is urged on behalf of defendants that Birge & Sons were a wellknown house, which had been in existence for over forty years, and were
most favorably known throughout the entire western part of the state
of New York ; that their annual business largely exceeded $ i ,000,000 ;
that the profits for the three years preceding the purchase (including
the disastrous years of 1893 and 1894) amounted to from $175,000
to $225,000 a year; that they were the owners of a number of patents
of great utility in the manufacture of wall paper, and 147 design patents ; that Mr. Birge, the head of the house, was a man in the prime
of life, active, energetic, of high business capacity, with a thorough
understanding of the wall paper business, and one of the strongest
The
and most dangerous competitors of the defendant company.
he
that
considered
the
of
testified
defendant
company
president
2
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property well worth what was paid for it ; that it was an extremely
valuable business, and that he still considered it one of the best
On the other hand, the compurchases the company ever made.
plainant Washburn expressed the opinion that the price paid for it
was extravagant, although he would have been willing to buy it

on the same terms as the other plants, and that the patents were
This rs practically all the testimony we
not of much, if any, value.
have from which to determine at what figures the auditors should
have set down the property represented by the Birge patents and goodwill. Evidently the majority of the board of directors supposed it
was worth the price paid, or they would not have paid it.
It would
seem to require affirmative evidence to discredit their conclusions.
It
is suggested in the brief that "$2,100,000 is a large amount of
So, too, is $1,800,000, and it is quite apparent from this
money."
record that the long-established
and well-known concern engaged in
this business represents much more value than is to be found in its
real estate, factory outfit, goods and credits.
Certainly it was something of value which enabled complainants in the face of active competition to make a net profit of over $i 10,000 in eleven months out of
Reference is made to
a plant worth considerably less than $320,000.
the statement of the president on direct examination that the price
It is evident
paid for the Birge property was reached "arbitrarily."
from the rest of his testimony, however, that what he meant was that
the rule used in other cases, viz., the difference between tangible assets
and sixteen times the net profits, was not applied.
Upon the testimony, as it stands, we can not find that the auditors erred in treating
the Birge good-will and patents as an asset worth what the company
paid for it. * * *

Affirmed*
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Sulphur Springs Company.
"The capital stock of this company was fixed at $150,000, and the
certificate of incorporation of December 3, 1880, stated that $50,000
* *
*
had been 'paid in on said subscriptions.'
"The experience and good-will of the partners, which it is claimed
were transferred to the corporation, are of too unsubstantial and
shadowy a nature to be capable of pecuniary estimation in this connection.
It is not denied that the good-will of a business may be the
case of
of
barter and sale as between the parties to
but in
subject
no proper basis for ascertaining rts value, and the
this kind there
claim
evidently an afterthought."
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[The Hess Electric Storage-Battery Company was organized in Iowa
in 1890, to perfect a storage-system patented by Hess, adapt it to practical use, buy and sell the patent, obtain others, and to buy and sell
electric light plants, electric batteries, currents, etc.
The capital
stock was fixed at $100,000, 1,000 shares of $100 each, of which
$90,000 might be issued as fully paid for the purchase of the patents
and property.
The articles were signed by Porter, Hess, Case and
others, Case being vice-president and a director.
After articles were
filed, Porter, Hess and Case proposed to sell the patents owned by
them to the company for $90,000 fully paid-up stock and $500 cash
as soon as the corporation could pay.
The board of directors accepted this proposition, and the conveyance of the patents and property
was made and the stock delivered. On the day before the proposition was
made, and other days near that time, thirty shares of fully paid stock
were issued to Turner, for which nothing was paid to the corporation,
but which all treated as part of the $90,000 to be issued to Porter
and his associates, and for which Turner paid 20 cents on the dollar
in cash to Porter and his associates, or their assignees. The remainder
of the $90,000 was issued in blocks of five and ten shares to nine
other persons, all of whom had signed the articles of incorporation,
and to Porter et al., and their assignees.
An agreed statement of
facts set forth that the chemicals, property, etc., were worth $500 at
the time of the purchase, and that the patents had not been largely
put in use, but many experiments had been made showing satisfactory
results, all of which were known to the company, and led the corporators to hope and believe they were of great value, and the
company would realize much more than $90,000 for them ; that after
incorporation, tests and experiments were continued until 1894; many
offers for purchase of territory had been received but rejected, because they were believed to be too small

;

that in the meantime other

inventions had been made by other parties, whereby the company had
not been able to realize revenues from its own patents to the extent
In 1893 it borrowed
anticipated, or sufficient to meet its expenses.
$670 from a loan association, giving its note therefor due in one
month.
This association had full knowledge of the details of organization of the company, the method of payment of the stock, and the
value of the patents.
After the maturity of the note, it was transferred to the plaintiff, who obtained judgment, and after execution
returned "no property found," brought this suit; the court below
gave judgment for the defendant, and plaintiff appeals.]
1

Statement

abridged.
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DEEMER, J. * * * Involved primarily is the so-called "trustfund doctrine," as applied to stockholders' obligations to creditors.
This is founded on the proposition that as the state undertakes to relieve the stockholder in a corporation of general liability for the debts
of the concern to the amount that he has invested in the enterprise,
he ought, in good faith, to pay in money or its equivalent the face
value of the stock received ; and, if he fails to do this, he should be
treated as holding the remainder in trust for the benefit of the creditors
of the corporation. From this proposition two apparently conflicting
and inconsistent rules have grown up, one of which may be called
the "true-value rule," and the other the "good-faith rule."
Courts
adopting the good-faith rule are also divided on the proposition as to
what is necessary to be shown to constitute good faith. Some of
them hold that, in the absence of an affirmative showing of fraud
aliunde, mere overvaluation of the property given in exchange for
stock will not render the stockholder liable for the difference, while others hold that overvaluation itself, especially if gross, constitutes, or at
least raises a strong presumption of fraud.
The development of the
trust-fund doctrine maybe gathered from a reading of the following:
Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason 308, Fed. Cas. No. 17944; Sawyer v.
Hoag, 17 Wall. 610, 21 L. Ed. 731 ; Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417,
1 1 Sup. Ct. 530,
35 L. Ed. 227, and cases cited therein ; Hollins v. Iron
Co., 150 U. S. 371, 14 Sup. Ct. 127, 37 L. Ed. 1113; Osgood v.
King, 42 Iowa 478. Cases holding to the true-value doctrine are as
follows: Van Cleve v. Berkey, 143 Mo. 109, 44 S. W. Rep. 743, 42
L. R. A. 593; Joseph v. Davis (Ala.), 10 South. 830; Gates v.
Stone Co., 57 Ohio St. 60, 48 N. E. Rep. 285; Haldeman v.Ainslie, 82 Ky. 395; Libby v. Tobey, 82 Me. 397, 19 Atl. 904; Elyton
Land Co. v. Birmingham Warehouse & Elevator Co., 92 Ala. 407,
9 South. 129, 12 L. R. A. 307; Clayton v. Knob Co., 109 N. C.
385, 14 S. E. Rep. 36; Gogebic Inv. Co. v. Iron Chief Min. Co., 78
Wis. 427, 47 N. W. Rep. 726. Some of those holding to the first
division of the good-faith rule are Smith v. Prior, 58 Minn. 247, 59
N. W. Rep. 1016; Schenck v. Andrews, 57 N. Y. 133; Van Cott v.
Van Brunt, 82 N. Y. 535 ; Graves v. Brooks, 117 Mich. 424, 75 N. W.
Rep. 932; Coitv. Amalgamating Co., 119 U. S. 343, 7 Sup. Ct. 231,
30 L. Ed. 420; Kelley v. Fletcher, 94 Tenn. i, 28 S. W. Rep. 1099;
Rickerson Roller-Mill Co. v. Farrell Foundry & Machine Co., 43 U.
S. App. 452, 23 C. C. A. 302, 75 Fed. 554; Phelan v. Hazard, 5
Dill. 45, Fed. Cas. No. 11068; New Haven Horse-Nail Co. v.
Linden Springs Co., 142 Mass. 349, 7 N. E. Rep. 773. And of
those holding to the second division are Douglass v. Ireland, 73 N.
Y. too, 104; Boynton v. Andrews, 63 N. Y. 93, 96; Hastings Malting Co. v. Iron Range Brewing Co., 65 Minn. 28, 67 N. W. Rep.
652; Kelly v. Mining Co., 21 Mont. 291, 53 Pac. Rep. 959, 42 L.
R. A. 621; Lloyd v. Preston, 146 U. S. 630, 13 Sup. Ct. 131, 36
L.Ed, i n i ; Wallace v. Manufacturing Co., 70 Minn. 32i,73N.W.
It will be noticed that there is some confusion in the
Rep. 189.
New York and United States Supreme Court cases, and it is difficult
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See Sprague v. Bank, 172
to say just what rule prevails in Illinois.
R.
L.
A.
606.
E.
But the supreme court
111. 149,
N.
Rep.
19,
42
50
of the United States has never departed from the principles of Sawyer
v. Hoag, and other like cases. See Camden v. Stuart, 144 U. S. 104,
12 Sup. Ct. 585, 36 L. Ed. 363.
Nothing further need be said regarding the attitude of the various courts of the countiy on these propositions. Some of the cases cited may not clearly fall to the places
assigned them, but, on the whole, we think this as fair a classificaIn view of our previous
tion of the authorities as can be made.
holdings, this discussion may seem unnecessary, but, as counsel seem
to think that the question is new to this court, we have attempted to
state in brief some of the holdings in other jurisdictions.
We think our previous cases adopt the true-value rule perhaps not
In Osto its full extent; but such has been the drift of these cases.
"Every principle of honesty
good v. King, 42 Iowa 478, we said:
and justice demands that, as between the stockholder and the creditor,
the stock shall be considered paid only to the extent of the fair value
of the property conveyed, and that for the balance the stockholder
shall be held individually liable." In Jackson v. Traer, 64 Ipwa477,
20 N. W. Rep. 767, quoting from Taylor on Corporations, we said:
"If the property secured is grossly unequal in value to the par value
of the shares, the subscriber who secured the shares originally, or his
subsequent transferee with notice of the circumstances, may be comIn Chisholm v. Forny,
pelled to make up the difference in value."
N.
J.,
21
W.
Iowa
speaking for the court,
664,.Seevers,
Rep.
333,
65
said:
"Persons dealing with the corporation had the right to assume
that it owned valuable assets to the amount of its capital stock ; that
for the stock issued, the corporation
is to say, that, in consideration
had received money or property which would be available to pay an
A patent is, as has been said,
indebtedness incurred in its business.
a property in a notion, and has no corporal, tangible substance, and
can not be levied on and sold under execution issuing from state
courts; and whether it can be sold on executions issuing from the
Until its usefulness has been
federal courts is regarded as doubtful.
established, the value of a patent right is purely speculative." Judge
Robinson, in Wishard v. Hansen, 99 Iowa 307, 68 N. W. Rep. 691,
"Where the capital stock of a corporation is
uses this language:
issued to one of its promoters and organizers for property which is
taken at a gross overvaluation, the transaction is fraudulent against
creditors of the corporation, if it be insolvent; and the stockholder
*
*
*
will be liable
who receives such stock with knowledge
to creditors, on the stock he holds, for the difference between the par
*
*
*
and the amount actually paid."
value
In Stout v. Hubbell, 104 Iowa 499, 73 N. W. Rep. 1060, it is
*
*
*
that the land was given and received
said: "It is alleged
This,
under an agreement that it was a full payment for the stock.
alone, would, be no defense ; for this court has held, as to creditors
of a corporation, that, when property is received by the corporation at
an excessive valuation in payment for shares of its capital stock, it is
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payment to the extent of the value of the property received,
and the owner of such stock is liable to creditors for the difference
between the actual value of the property and the face value of the
In Carbon Co. v. Mills, 78 Iowa 465, 43 N. W. Rep. 290,
stock."
5 L. R. A. 649, we again quoted with approval the rule announced
by Mr. Taylor in his work on Corporations, and said that no plea of
From this review it is apparent that we have, in
fraud was necessary.
effect, adopted the true-value rule, although saying in some cases that
the reason for so doing was to prevent fraud.
There is nothing in
these decisions or in the statutes that inhibits the taking of property
in exchange for stock, providing it is taken at its true value; and this
value we do not think should in all instances, if in any, be measured
The parties have the right in good faith to agree on the
by results.
value of the property taken, but this should not be a speculative or
fictitious one. An honest mistake in judgment will not necessarily
destroy the value agreed upon, but it must be such a valuation as prudent and sensible business men would approve.
Values based on
visionary or speculative hopes, unwarranted by existing conditions or
facts, and without reasonable evidence from present appearances, are
not such as the law will tolerate, as against creditors.
It is apparent
that the patent and property sold the corporation by Porter et al. had
The valuation was wholly
no such value as the parties placed upon it.
Inspeculative, visionary, and imaginary, as experience has shown.
deed, we doubt if the parties thought it had any such value as they
fixed upon it.
They say they hoped and believed the company
would realize therefor and thereon more than $90,000, but no one
had the temerity to say that he regarded the patent and property as of
The actual value received was but little over $500.
that value.
But it is said that, as plaintiff's assignor had full knowledge and
This contention renotice of all the facts, plaintiff can not recover.
quires a little further examination of the rationale of the trust-fund
Consideration of the cases will show that it grew out of a
doctrine.
desire on the part of courts to protect creditors who invested their
funds on the faith that the capital stock was fully paid up and repre* *
sented the true assets of the corporation. *
(Citing and quoting from Sawyer v. Hoag, 17 Wall. 610; Upton
v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45; Scovill v. Thayer, 105 U. S. 143; Hollins v. Brierfield, etc., Co., 150 U. S. 371, and Fogg v. Blair, 133

only

a

U. S. 534.)
Following this doctrine to its logical conclusion, it was held in
Bank v. Alden, 129 U. S. 372, 9 Sup. Ct. 332, 32 L. Ed. 725, that

where the creditor has full knowledge of the transaction between the
corporation and its stockholder at the time he extends credit, he can
not be heard to complain, for the reason that no credit is given upon
a representation of a different set of facts than those which actually
See, also, Coit v. Amalgamating Co., 1 19 U. S. 343, 7 Sup.
existed.
Ct. 231, 30 L. Ed. 420; Walburn v. Chenault 43 Kan. 352, 23 Pac.
Rep. 657; Whitehill v. Jacobs, 75 Wis. 474, 44 N. W. Rep. 630;
Young v. Iron Co., 65 Mich,
31 N. W. Rep. 814; Woolfolk v.

in,
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January, 131 Mo. 620, 33 S. W. Rep. 432; Manufacturing Company
v. Wallace, 16 Wash. 614, 48 Pac. Rep. 415; Robinson v. Bidwell,
22 Cal. 379; First Nat'l Bank of Deadwood v. Gustin Minerva Con.
Min. Co., 42 Minn. 327, 44 N. W. Rep. 198, 6 L. R. A. 676. Indeed, we find no case to the contrary, unless it be Sprague v. Bank,
That decision was
172 111. 149, 50 N. E. Rep. 19, 42 L. R. A. 606.
based on a statute, however, which is somewhat different from
ours.

*

*

*

As the Commercial Loan Association had full knowledge of all the
facts relating to the issuance and payment for the stock owned by the
defendant, it could not recover.
Does plaintiff, its transferee after
* *
*
maturity, have any greater right ? We think not.
Our conclusion is that the judgment of the trial court should be,
and it is, affirmed.
As to the right to issue stock for property, see, 1883, Liebke v.
Mo. 22; 1886, Coit v. Gold Amal. Co., 119 U. S. 343. Contra:
1848, Henry v. Vermillion & A. R., 17 Ohio 187.
2. True-value rule:
1840, Society for Illus. Prac. Kn. v. Abbott, 2 Beav.
559; 1896, Wishard v. Hansen, 99 lo'wa 307, 61 Am. St. Rep. 238; 1897, Gates
v. Tippecanoe Stone Co., 57 Ohio St. 60, 63 Am. St. Rep. 705; 1898, Kelly v.
Clark, 21 Mont. 291, 69 Am. St. Rep. 668; 1898, VanCleve v. Berkey, 143 Mo.
109, 42 L. R. A. 593, infra, p. 1953;
1899, Jenkins v. Bradley, 104 Wii. 540, 80
N. W. Rep. 1025 ; 1900, Steam Stone Cutter Co. v. Scott, 157 Mo. 520, 57 S. W.
Rep. 1076. supra, p. 1917; 1902, Berry v. Ross,
Mo.
, 67 S. W. 644.
Compare with Graves v. Brooks, 117 Mich. 424, infra, p. 1950, and note.
Note.

Knapp,

1.
79

Sec. 683.

Same.

F. D. STOUT
1898.

AND

Notice of value from articles of association.

M. E.

McHENRY,

APPELLANTS,

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA.

104

v. F. M.

HUBBELL.

1

Iowa Rep. 499-505.

[Plaintiffs were judgment creditors for over $6,000 against the Des
Moines Driving Park, an insolvent corporation, and sue here to charge
defendant as owner of 548 shares of unpaid stock in the corporation,
of the face value of $54,800, for which it is alleged the corporation
received only ninety-one acres of land worth $8,000, leaving over
The defendant answered that the projectors of the
$46,000 yet due.
corporation agreed before organization to convey their lands at $600
per acre in the stock of the company, and that this was carried out,
and that the same was fully set forth in the articles of incorporation,
which were duly filed, recorded and notices published as required by
law, and that this operated as notice to the plaintiffs. The articles of
incorporation set forth the capital stock, and showed that the directors
were required to purchase these lands (specifically describing them)
and pay for them by issuing $64,437 m stoc k at par, of which defendant was to receive $54,800, and that the stock as issued should be
held and regarded as fully paid up.
The public notice of incorpora1

Statement

abridged,

and part of opinion omitted.
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tion showed the amount of stock, and stated that fully paid-up and
non-assessable shares to the amount of $64,437 should be issued to
pay for the real estate purchased by the corporation.]
GIVEN, J. * * * Defendant's counsel do not contend that an
agreement by which the stock was received as fully paid up, in consideration of land at an excessive valuation, would alone constitute a
defense.
They concede that it is a fraud upon creditors for the corporation to agree to accept either less than par value in money, or
property worth less than par. Their contention is that " it is impossible, however, that such an agreement upon the part of the corporation should be a fraud upon a creditor whose debt is created with full
knowledge of the manner in which, as between the corporation and
the stockholder, the stock has been fully paid."
Relying upon the
rule that -[those dealing with the corporation must be held to have
knowledge of the provisions of its articles of incorporation, they insist that the further allegation of said second count, as to the contents
and recording of the articles of incorporation, and publication of the
notice of incorporation, show actual or constructive notice to the
plaintiffs of the terms upon which this stock was issued, and that,
having extended credit with that knowledge, they are not entitled to
Let it be conceded that the plaintiffs are chargeable with
recover.
all the knowledge which the record of the articles of incorporation
It remains to inquire what that knowledge is. That recimparted.
ord told that the directors were authorized and required to purchase
of the defendant his said tract of land, and to pay therefor by issuing
to him " stock at par for the said sum of fifty-four thousand eight
*
* *
hundred dollars.
Said stock, when so issued, to be held
and regarded as fully paid for by the conveyance of the real estate
A person examining these articles
described to this association."
with a view to determining whether or not to extend credit to the corporation, would know therefrom that the corporation had given, as
fully paid-up, fifty-four thousand eight hundred dollars of its capital
He would have
stock in payment for these ninety-one acres of land.
a right to presume that the transaction was fair and free from fraud,

and therefore to understand that the land was substantially equal in
There is nothing in this record
value to the par value of the stock.
to indicate otherwise, and these plaintiffs, in extending credit to the
corporation, had a right to assume from this record that, instead of
said stock, the corporation had ninety-one acres of land of the value
of fifty-four thousand eight hundred dollars. The fraud upon creditors in this transaction is not in the fact that land was taken in payment for stock, but that, according to these pleadings, land was taken
at an excessive valuation of forty-six thousand eight hundred dollars,
no information.
a fact of which these articles imparted
Charging
these plaintiffs with all knowledge which the record of the articles imparted, it is clear that that record did not impart the very information
Therefore, they
that was necessary to a knowledge of the fraud.
dealt with the corporation without knowledge that the land had been
It is said that no fraud is alleged,
taken at an excessive valuation.
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facts are alleged which constitute a fraud as to the creditors.
In
Carbon Co. v. Mills, 78 Iowa 460, fraud was not pleaded in the petition, and this court said, " But, under the facts of the case, this was
*
* *
not necessary."
Demurrer should have been sustained. Reversed.
but

Note.

See note preceding case.

Sec. 684.
MR.

Same.

JUSTICE

Statute,

BOGGS

IN

notice of value.
SPRAGUE

AMERICA.

v.

NATIONAL

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.
1898.
on 165, 168, 169, 64 Am. St. Rep. 617, 42

172

111.

BANK

L. R. A.

Rep.

OF
149,

606.

The Revised Statutes of Illinois, section 8, chapter 32, provide that
"each stockholder shall be liable for the debts of the corporation to
the extent of the amount that may be unpaid upon the stock held by

him."

*

*

*

Counsel for the appellants cite adjudicated cases wherein it has been
held that where subscription to the capital stock of a corporation was
paid in property, which was received by the corporation as in full
payment of the subscription to its capital stock, such payment is, so
far as the corporation is concerned, payment in full, and the corporation can enforce no further demand against the stockholder, and that
a creditor of the corporation stands in no different position from the
corporation, unless a fraud was committed on him by the arrangement between the corporation and the stockholder which operated to
deprive him of some security upon which he had relied when he extended credit to the corporation ; and also an expansion of the same
doctrine, that if the creditor knew, when he gave credit to the corporation, the stock had been issued as full paid in payment for property
purchased by the corporation, or had means of acquiring such knowledge, the creditor would stand in no better position than the corporation, and could only enforce liability against the stockholder in case
the corporation could recover from such stockholder.
We think the
doctrine of these cases has no application as against the express
declaration of our statute that the creditor shall be invested with a
right to recover if the stock had not been fully paid. The legislative
intent was that any amount unpaid upon subscription to the capital
stock of a corporation should constitute a fund to which a creditor
of the corporation might resort to obtain satisfaction of his demand
We hold, therefore, that under our statute
against the corporation.
the right of a creditor to enforce liability against one who has subscribed for stock in a corporation and has not paid his subscription in
full is not dependent, in any degree, upon the knowledge possessed
by the creditor that such subscription was or was not paid in full. If
*
* *
unpaid to the corporation it must be paid to the creditor.
Note.

See note to State Trust Co. v. Turner, supra, p. 1947.
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Same,

(c) Actual fraud rule.
GRAVES

1898.
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IN THE SUPREME

COURT

v.

BROOKS.
OF

MICHIGAN.

117

Mich. Rep.

424-426.

Bill

by Henry B. Graves, receiver of the Latimer Cash-Register
Company, against Alanson S. Brooks, William G. Latimer, and
Frederick W. Towle, impleaded with the corporation and other stockholders therein, to compel an assessment for the payment of debts.
From a decree for complainant, defendants appeal.
Reversed.
The bill of complaint was filed by the receiver of the Latimer CashRegister Company, a corporation, to compel an assessment upon its
stockholders to pay its debts.
The capital stock of the corporation
was $200,000; $100,000 was issued to the defendants, Latimer,
Brooks, and Towle, who were the owners of the patents conveyed to
the corporation, as fully paid, in consideration for the transfer of such
The other $100,000 of the stock was assessable. The
patents to it.
became
insolvent, and after the sale of all its tangible ascorporation
sets, and the application thereof to the payment of its debts, a considerable amount remained unpaid.
The case was heard upon
and
and
the
Court
below
found that the property
pleadings
proofs,
the
stockholders
was worth $20,000, and that
patentee
conveyed by
had
the cash-paying stockholders
paid in $20,000, and directed an
all
the
assessment upon
capital stock, except certain shares of the
non-assessable stock which had been sold and transferred by the
patentee stockholders to other parties, who were held to be innocent,
From this decree defendants Latimer, Brooks
good-faith purchasers.
alone
and Towle
appealed.
GRANT, C. J. The stockholders of the defendant corporation were
Before organizing the corporation and
lawyers and business men.
making the agreement with the patentee stockholders, a careful investigation was made by them into the merits and value of the patents. A model of the register was submitted. Two firms of attorneys
specially skilled in patent law, and acting independently of each other,
These
had given opinions sustaining the validity of the patents.
submitted
to
the
stockholders.
estimates
were
Careful
opinions were
of
of
the
machines.
The
made
the cost
conclusion was
constructing
reached that $20,000 would suffice to construct the necessary machinThe appellant defendery and place the registers upon the market.
of
non-assessable
stock,
sold
some
their
and
ants
purchased some that
no
claim
of
fraud,
faith, misrepresentaThere
is
bad
was assessable.
or
of
on
the
the
of
the patents.
tion
recklessness
owners
part
They
all
the
For
to
these
submitted
knowledge they possessed.
capitalists
as.
this
the
cash
stockholders
were
record,
that
aught
appears upon
of
and
the
to
of
the
success
the
probable
competent
judge
enterprise
value of the patents as were the others.
For reasons unnecessary to
state, the stockholders, after an expenditure of about $20,000, de-
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cided to abandon the enterprise and wind up the affairs of the corpo-

ration.

The learned circuit judge evidently based his conclusion,

not upon
that
the
in fact
were
patents conveyed
any fraud, but upon the finding
of
the
$100,000,
worth only $20,000, instead
agreed purchase-price.
It is unnecessary to enter into a discussion of the question. The case,
in all its essential features, is similar to Young v. Erie Iron Co., 65
Mich,
where the subject is fully discussed in an opinion by Mr.
It was there held
Justice Morse, concurred in by the entire court.
that, in order to render stock, issued as fully paid and non-assessable,
assessable, it is necessary to establish either an intentional fraud in
fact, or such reckless conduct in fixing the value of the property conveyed, without regard to its actual value, that an intent to defraud
The creditors in that case were remediless.
No
may be inferred.
case of fraud or recklessness having been established, it follows that
the contract of the parties must control.
The decree must be reversed, with the costs of both courts, and the
case remanded to the court below, with directions to enter a decree
against the assessable stock sufficient to pay the debts of the corpora-

in,

tion.

The other justices concurred.
Accord: 1873, In re H. & M. Tin Co.,
Note.

Spargo's Case, L. R. 8 Ch. App.
407; 1886, Coit v. Gold Amal. Co., 119 U. S. 343; 1894, Kelly v. Fletcher, 94
Tenn. 1, 28 S. W. Rep. 1099; 1898, Penfleld v. Dawson Town & G. Co.,
57 Neb. 231, 77 N. W. Rep. 672; 1899, Gillin v. Sawyer, 93 Maine 151, 44 Atl.

Rep.

It

677.

is held, also, by one line of decisions, that a great difference between the
value of the property taken and the face value of the stock is prima facie evidence of fraud, and if not explained is sufficient evidence thereof: 1891,
Elyton Land Co. v. Elevator Co., 92 Ala. 407, 25 Am. St. Rep. 65 ($55,000
property for $250,000 stock) ; 1895, Coleman v. Howe, 154 111. 458, 45 Am. St.
Rep. 133 ($75,000 property for $300,000 stock) ; 1896, Hastings Malting Co. v.
Iron R. B. Co., 65 Minn. 28 ($18,000 property for $30,000 stock) ; 1896, Wishard v. Hansen, 99 Iowa 307, 61 Am. St. Rep. 238 (about $45,000 property for
$120,000 stock) ; 1898, National Bank of Merrill v. Illinois & W. L. Co., 101
Wis. 247, 77 N. W. Rep. 185 ($20,000 property for $60,000 stock) ; 1898, Lea v.
Iron Belt Mercantile Co., 119 Ala. 271, 24 So. Rep. 28 ($100,000 property for
$1,250,000

stock).

See, also, State Trust Co. v. Turner, 111 Iowa 664, 82 N. W. Rep. 1029, supra,
p. 1943, and note.

Sec. 686.

/.
(a)

Fictitious issue of stock,
Meaning of term.

MYRICK, J.,
1884.

IN THE SUPREME

IN

STEIN

v.

HOWARD.

COURT OF CALIFORNIA.
616, on 617, 618.

65

Cal. Rep.

[Suit by shareholders to enjoin the Spring Valley Water-Works
from doubling its stock and issuing the increase as full paid shares,
upon payment of its market value, $87.50 per share, for purpose of
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raising funds to increase its capacity and extend its works. Appeal
from order denying injunction.]
The civil code of this state, section 359, makes provision for an inThe constitution of
crease of the capital stock of an incorporation.
this state contains the following prohibition in article 12, section 2:
"No corporation shall issue stock or bonds except for money paid,
labor done or property actually received, and all fictitious increase of
The question for decision on
stock or indebtedness shall be void."

this appeal is, whether the stock proposed to be issued and sold will
create a fictitious increase of stock.
Webster's dictionary defines the
word "fictitious" to mean feigned, imaginary, not real, counterfeit,
The circumstances under which the stock is profalse, not genuine.
sold, as above stated, are that the corporation
be
issued
and
to
posed
has actual need of money for the purposes of its business, that *the
stock is proposed to be sold at the actual market value of the stock of
the corporation, and to be sold only in such quantities as may produce
the requisite funds.
Under such circumstances, we think it can not
be held that the issue is fictitious.
Perhaps it might be asked at what
in order to make the issue fictibe
offered
for
sale
should
stock
price
tious. We apprehend that no direct and positive answer can be given.
The constitution has given no definition of the word "fictitious" ; it
has not declared what was meant by the use of that word, further
than what the word itself implies, taken in connection with the context.
We apprehend that in ascertaining the purport of the word, or
rather its application, we must take into consideration the surrounding
Of the stock proposed to be issued, there is no one
circumstances.
share upon which a person can place his finger and say that share is or
will be feigned, imaginary, not real, counterfeit, false, not genuine.
*
* *

Affirmed.
Note. Accord: 1882, Peoria & S. R. Co. v. Thompson, 103 111. 187; 1886,
Memphis & L. R. Co. v. Dow, 120 U. S. 287. See next case.
The difficulty of determining the real meaning of a provision that "no corporation shall issue stock or bonds except for money, labor done, or money or
property actually received ; and all fictitious increase of stock or indebtedness
shall be void," is well illustrated by Head, J., in, 1895, State v. Webb, 110
Ala. 214, on 228, where he says: " Can no stock or bonds issue by any corporation, until it has actually received full payment for the stock or the full
Must the money or property have been received,
consideration of the bonds?
or the labor actually performed, before the subscriber can become a stockholder? If so, are stock or bonds issued without such prepayment intended to be
declared void by the provision in question, and, if so, what is their nature, in
respect to their validity, when put upon the market and passed into the hands
of bonafide purchasers?
Does the general principle that a contract or obligation, even of a commercial character, which is denounced void as against
public policy, by the written law, is void even in the hands of bonafide holders,
apply, uncjer this constitutional provision, so as to render utterly invalid, in
all hands, stock issued by a corporation, within the limits of its authorized
capital, if full payment therefor has not been received, or if fraudulently issued, as fully paid up, without consideration, or for a grossly inadequate consideration? Or does the provision in question, as held by some of the courts,
mean to declare void only stock and bonds which are wholly fictitious?"
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Same,
(b) Liability upon fictitiously issued stock:
"No corporation shall issue stock or bonds, except for money
paid, labor done, or property actually received, and all
fictitious increase of stock or indebtedness shall be void."

Sec. 687.

VAN CLEVE ET
1898.

v.

AL.

BERKEY

IN THE SUPREME
109-137, 42

ET AL.,

PELLANTS.

L. R. A.

1

BRETTELLE ET AL., AP-

COURT OF MISSOURI.
143 Mo. Rep.
8
Am.
&
E.
N.
C.
C.
S. 177.
593,

[Proceeding in equity by judgment creditors of the Braun Manufacturing Company against it and its stockholders to charge the latter
as owners of unpaid shares, with a sum sufficient to pay the unpaid
judgments. The corporation was formed under the Illinois law, with
a proposed capital stock of $100,000, $90,000 of which were issued
to one Braun, as full paid and non-assessable, in consideration of the
transfer of a French patent for an improved milling process, and an
application for a United States patent for the same. The other $10,000
$2,000 to each of four persons, and $1,000 to each of
were issued
for which not to exceed ten per cent, was paid, and this
two persons
only for purposes of securing a patent from the United States, and
completing a machine, neither of which was ever accomplished.
Plaintiffs' claims were for furnishing material for constructing the
The court below held that the stock was not fully paid,
machinery.
and charged the defendants with liability.
Two of these, who were
not original subscribers, but who had purchased shares from original
subscribers, after full investigation and information as to how the
stock had been paid for, appealed.
It was found "that all of the defendants acted in good faith, so far as their actual intentions were
concerned, and that none of them was moved by any actual fraudulent intent in the transaction," but further that "they did not consider
the invention to be worth the amount of money for which it was to be
put into the corporation."]
BRACE, J. * * * i. Counsel for the appellants, taking the opinion of the learned trial judge as a text for his argument for a reversal of
the decree in favor of plaintiffs, in effect concedes the facts to be as
stated in the opinion and the case thereby made ; but contends that
thereupon the judgment should have been for the appellants for the reason that it is not alleged in the petition, nor shown by the evidence,
that the stockholders, in capitalizing the Braun invention, or rather the
agreement to transfer the same to the corporation at the sum of $100,ooo and issuing therefor full paid non-assessable stock to that amount,
actually intended to defraud creditors of the corporation or purchasers of its stock
although in point of fact that invention had not
at the time, nor ever since has had, any real, intrinsic or market value.
In other words, the contention is that as the corporation could receive
1
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property in payment for its capital stock, and did in fact accept the
valueless Braun invention in full payment thereof, in the absence of
actual fraud upon the part of the corporators, charged and affirmatively proven aliunde the transaction, the appellants' stock, as to the
creditors of the corporation, was fully paid for, and they should have
had judgment.
A. In order to determine what support is given to this proposition
by the authorities, it may be well,^/?r.s^, to eliminate those cases which
are not in point upon the facts of this case. By this process that class
of cases may be excluded from consideration in which it has been held
that, in the absence of fraud as between the corporation or its representative and its stockholders, that which they have agreed on as payment shall be treated as payment, of which Coffin v. Ransdell, no

In this class may also
Ind. 417, cited by appellants, is an example.
be included those cases in which it is held that the same rule applies
as between the stockholder and an innocent purchaser of the stock, issued as full paid and non-assessable, in good faith for value, without
notice of the actual consideration paid by the subscribers thereof, of
Phelan v. Hazard, 5 Dill. 45;
which the following are illustrations:
Ehlen,
Md.
i.
So,
v.
also, may be excluded from our conBrant
59
sideration as not in point, those cases in which it is held that a creditor who extends credit to a corporation with actual notice of the acceptance by the corporation of property at a fixed value, in full payment for its capital stock, is estopped from denying that the capital
Bank v.
stock is fully paid, of which the following are illustrations :
Alden, 129 U. S. 372; Walburn v. Chenault, 43 Kan. 352; Whitehill v. Jacobs, 75 Wis. 474; Woolfolk v. January, 131 Mo. 620. As
to the last case, however, something further will be said later on.
None of these, or like cases, apply, for the reason that we have here a
case in which the appellants stand in the shoes of the original subscribers by reason of the fact that they accepted their stock after due
inquiry and with full knowledge of the fact that it was paid for by the
Braun invention ; and the plaintiffs are simply creditors of the corporation who extended credit to it upon the faith of its capital stock.
We are to inquire what is the rule between such a creditor and such a
stockholder.

B. It seems that in all the states, either by force of statutory enact-

ment or judicial construction, property may now be taken in payment
of the capital stock of a corporation, but as was aptly remarked by
Depue, J., in Wetherbee v. Baker, 35 N. J. Eq. 501, such transactions
"have been upheld only where * * * the purchase of property
has been made in good faith and the property taken in payment of
stock subscriptions has been put in at a fair bona fide valuation; and
the courts have inflexibly enforced the rule that payment of stock
subscriptions is good as against creditors only where payment has
been made in money or in what may fairly be considered as money's
worth." The soundness of this doctrine has been recognized almost
universally; yet, when we come to inquire how the courts have enforced this rule, as between a creditor and a stockholder, pure and
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simple, we find a line of cases in which it is, or seems to be, held that
where property has been taken at a value less than the par value
of the stock for which full-paid non-assessable stock is issued, in
the absence of an affirmative showing of fraud, the overvaluation
will not render the stockholder liable for the difference.
Bickley v.
Schlag, 46 N. J. Eq. 533; Coit v. Gold Amalgamating Co., 119 U.
S. 343 ; Boynton v. Andrews, 63 N. Y. 93; Douglass v. Ireland, 73
N. Y. 100 ; Van Cott v. Van Brunt, 82 N. Y. 535; Lake Superior
Iron Co. v. Drexel, 90 N. Y. 87; Gilkie & Anson Co. v. Dawson
Town & Gas Co., 46 Neb. 333; Kelley v. Fletcher, 94 Tenn. i ;
and in support of this doctrine we are also cited by counsel for appellants to the cases of Fogg v. Blair, 139 U. S. 118; Clark v. Bever,
It is to be ob139 U. S. 96; and Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417.
served, however, in regard to all of these cases from the supreme
court of the United States, that in the earlier cases it was held as the
settled doctrine of that court that a contract, whereby property was
accepted at a value less than the par value of the capital stock, in
payment for its shares issued as full-paid, that " such a contract,
1 hough
binding on the company, is a fraud in law on its creditors
which they can set aside ; that when their rights intervene and their
claims are to be satisfied, the stockholders can be required to pay
their stock in full." Scovill'v. Thayer, 105 U. S. 154; Sawyer v.
Hoag, 17 Wall. 610; New Albany v Burke, n Wall. 96; Burke v.
Smith, 16 Wall. 390 * * * [citing, quoting from and commenting
upon, Camden v. Stuart, 144 U. S. 104; Clark v. Bever, 139 U. S.
96; Fogg v. Blair, 139 U. S. nS; Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417;
National Tube Works v. Gilfillan, 124 N. Y. 302 ; Coleman v. Howe,
154 111. 458, and showing] that the appellants would be charged as
holders of unpaid stock in an action like unto this ; and it is beyond
question that they might be so held, regardless of the question of actual fraudulent intent under the ruling of the court of appeals of New
York in Boynton v. Hatch, 47 N. Y. 225, and Nat. Tube Works v.
Gilfillan, supra; under the ruling of the supreme court of Ohio
(Gates v. Tippecanoe Stone Co. (1897), 48 N. E. Rep. 285); and
of the supreme court of Minnesota (Hastings Malting Co. v. Iron
Range Brewing Co., 65 Minn. 28; Hospes v. Northwestern Co., 48
Minn. 174); of Washington (Manhattan Trust Co. v. Seattle Coal
Co., 16 Wash. 499; Adamant Man. Co. v. Wallace, 16 Wash. 614) ;
of Utah (Henderson v. Turngren, 9 Utah 432 ; Salt Lake Hardware

Co. v. Tintic Milling Co., 13 Utah 423) ; of Alabama (Elyton Land
Co. v. Birmingham, etc., Co., 92 Ala. 407) ; and of Iowa (Osgood
& Moss v. King, 42 Iowa 478; Chisholm Bros. v. Forny, 65 Iowa
*
*
*
333 ; Bolten Carbon Co. v. Mills, 78 Iowa 460).
Satisfied that the weight of the American authority outside of
this jurisdiction is against the appellants' contention on the facts of
this case, and that they would thereby be held liable, as by the court
below, without other proof of fraud than was afforded by the transaction itself, we will now turn to the law of Missouri, without further
notice of the many cases we have examined from other jurisdictions.
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of 1875, article 12, section 8, it is provided that
no corporation shall issue stock or bonds, except for money paid,
labor done, or property actually received, and all fictitious increase of
stock or indebtedness shall be void."
By statute it is provided that
" the stock or bonds of a corporation shall be issued only for money
paid or property actually received" (R. S. 1879,
727; R. S. 1889,
" if any execution shall have been issued against
and
that
;
2499)
any corporation and there can not be found ariy property or effects
whereon to levy the same, then such execution may be issued against
any of the stockholders to the extent of the amount of the unpaid balance of such stock by him or her owned" (R. S. 1879,
736; R. S.
formed
under
this chapand
that
any
company,
2517);
1889,
ter, dissolve, leaving debts unpaid, suits may be brought against any
person or persons who were stockholders at the time of such dissolution without joining the company in such suit."
(R. S. 1879, 745 ;
R. S. 1889, 2519.
Mr. Cook, the author from whom we have just quoted, 1 after treating of the law as it stood under the adjudications of the courts at the
"Hence, when it betime this legislation was first enacted, says:
came clear that the common law did not prevent the issue of watered
stock, but compelled the public to rely not upon statements of the
capital stock, but upon an investigation of the actual condition of the
company, a demand arose for statutes and constitutional provisions to
This demand gave rise to
protect the people from watered stock.
certain constitutional provisions which have been enacted in several
states.
These provisions are very similar in their wording, and are
'No corporation shall issue stocks or bonds
substantially as follows:
or money or property actually received,
for
labor
done,
except
money,
It is
and all fictitious increase of stock or indebtedness shall be void.'
now twenty years since the first of these provisions was enacted, and
yet it may be said that these constitutional provisions have decidedly
Section 47.
failed to remedy the evil they were expected to cure."
In the recent case of Elyton Land Co. v. Birmingham Warehouse
and Elevator Co., 92 Ala. 423, in an able opinion, after an extended
review of the authorities, Walker, J., speaking for the court, says:
"Our examination satisfies us that the weight of American authority
does not support the statement made by Mr. Cook, in section 47 of
his work on Stocks and Stockholders, to the effect that the attempts
which have been made, in cases where stock was issued for property
taken at an overvaluation, to hold the party receiving such stock liable
for its full par value, less the actual value of the property received
from him, have been unsuccessful ; and that if there has been an overvaluation which is shown to have been fraudulent, then the contract
is to be treated like other fraudulent contracts, and is to be adopted in
We have found no authority
toto or rescinded in toto and set aside.
from such liability
at all asserting the exemption of the stockholder
where it appeared that the stock subscription was governed by a statutory regulation at all similar to section 1805 of the code of 1876,
or section 1662 of the code of 1886.
On the other hand, the New

"

"if

1

See section 46.

687

THE CREDITORS AND SHAREHOLDERS.

IQ57

York, New Jersey, Maryland and Pennsylvania decisions which have

been cited show that the courts in those states, in giving effect to statutory requirements, certainly no more stringent than ours, as to the
mode in which stock subscriptions shall be made payable, do not
allow attempted payments in property worth greatly less than the
amount of stock issued therefor to foreclose the just demands of corporate creditors to require that the stock subscriptions be made good
in money or in money's worth as contemplated by the statutes. Those
courts recognize in such provisions safeguards intended for the protection of persons dealing with corporations as well as for the corporations themselves and the persons associated together therein.
Our general laws afford the amplest and freest facilities for persons
desiring to engage in almost any kind of lawful venture to secure by
corporate association the advantages of defined and limited responsibility and at the same time the efficient execution of their purposes
by means of an artificial being, changes in the membership of which
cause no break in the continuity of its action nor affect its capacity
to act, within the scope of its powers, as a natural person.
It is
plain that such associations, endowed with such powers and privileges,
would be a source of danger to persons dealing with them, unless the
law required that in their formation suitable provisions be made for a
substantial responsibility for such engagements as they may enter into.
When legal provisions are found which are appropriately framed to
secure the existence of such responsibility it is not permissible so to
construe them as to allow a mere formal and illusory compliance
No
therewith to defeat the objects intended to be accomplished.
needed
that
a
that
the
is
to
show
stock
of
a
requirement
argument
be
in
or
in
or
shall
labor
at
its
paid
money,
corporation
property
money value, inures to the benefit of persons who may become creditors of the corporation, in that it requires the capital stock to be the
representative of substantial values and insure the existence of a fund
which must be within the reach of the satisfaction of debts if the affairs of the corporation are managed as contemplated by the law. It
is equally clear that if a stock subscription which is required to be
made payable in money, or in labor or property at its money value,
and is in fact made payable in property at a designated money valuation, may be satisfied by the transfer of property the value of which
is insignificant or merely nominal as compared with the valuation
stated, then, so far as this provision of the law looks to the protection of creditors, it might as well have allowed the subscription to be
made payable in "chips and whetstones."
The Missouri cases decided since the adoption of our present constitution and the enactment of the statutes aforesaid, give no countenance to the idea that these provisions have failed of their purpose in
this state. * * *
(Citing and quoting from Chouteau v. Dean, 7 Mo. App. 210; Gill
v. Balis, 72 Mo. 424; Chouteau Ins. Co. v. Floyd, 74 Mo. 286;
Kehlor v. Lademann, i r Mo. App. 550 ; Liebke v. Knapp, 79 Mo. 22.)
In the next case, Shickle v. Watts, 94 Mo. 410, decided by this
2 WIL. CAS.
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court in 1887, which was a suit by a judgment creditor against a stockholder of an Illinois corporation in the nature of a creditor's bill, as
in the case in hand, in which it was alleged that the defendant was
the owner and holder of a large number of shares of the stock of the
company, subscribed and issued to him, and on which no payment
whatever was made, it was held "that where an agreement is entered
into between a contractor and a corporation whereby the former is to
perform work for or furnish material to the latter and to take unpaid
stock in part or in full payment, that such contractor, whether for
labor or material, can only charge therefor the reasonable market
value for such labor thus given in exchange, and that all agreements
by the corporation to pay more than such reasonable compensation
will be disregai'ded and held for naught by the courts when the rights
And this is the case, even though no fraud is
of creditors intervene.
proven," and it wr as accordingly so ruled in the judgment in that
case.

*

#

*

(Citing and quoting to the same effect from Farmers' Bank, etc.,
v. Gallaher, 43 Mo. App. 482 ; Leucke v. Tredway, 45 Mo. App.
507; Garrett v. Kansas City, etc., Co., 113 Mo. 330; Ramsey v.

Thompson Mfg. Co., 116 Mo. 313.)
In the next case, Shepard v. Drake, 61 Mo. App. 134, decided by
the Kansas City Court of Appeals, and which was a proceeding by motion under section 2517, Revised Statutes 1889, it was held that: "It
is now the well-settled doctrine in this state that while the stock of a
corporation may be paid for in money, labor or property of any kind
used in the business, yet such stock will not, as to the corporation
creditors, be deemed fully paid unless such money, labor or property
In
shall at the time be the fair equivalent of the stock's par value.
other words, mere fictitious values placed on labor or property in payment for stock will be ignored, and the shareholder will get credit on
his subscription for the real value of the labor or property, nothing
more, and be compelled at the suit of a corporation creditor to pay
And this rule seems to hold in this state, whether
up the balance.
the overvaluation of the property received by the corporation be the
result of fraud, mistaken estimate or bad judgment."
In the next and last case, Woolfolk v. January, 131 Mo. 620, decided by Division No. 2 of this court, December 17, 1895, and upon
which appellants mainly rely for a reversal of the judgment in this
case, and which was a proceeding by motion for execution against
the stockholder by purchase from an original stockholder, upon an
allegation that the defendant's stock was wholly unpaid for; and in
which it appeared from the evidence that the plaintiff was a judgment
creditor on bonds issued by the corporation in part payment of a gas
plant in the city of Nevada, which plant and its franchise had been
accepted by the company at a valuation equal to the par value of the
stock in full payment of its capital stock and said bonds ; and in
which the court found, upon the admission of plaintiff himself, that
he purchased the bonds with full knowledge of the transaction ; it
was held that the plaintiff was estopped from claiming that defendThis is the full scope of the deant's stock was not fully paid up.
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cision upon the .facts in judgment in that case.
The ruling is in harmony and entirely consistent with the rulings in all the cases in this
state which we have cited and affords no support to plaintiff's contenIn fact, " the boot is on the other leg," for here it is the aption.
pellants who accepted their stock with full knowledge that it had been
paid for only by the agreement to transfer a hoped-for patent in the
worthless Braun invention, and who, upon the same principle, should
be estopped from claiming that their stock was thereby fully paid for
in an action by a creditor who, without notice, extended credit to the
corporation upon the faith of its capital stock being fully paid as

it

a

it

is

;

a

a a

is

is it

a

it

it,

required by law.
Upon a review of all the cases decided by the appellate courts of
this state since the adoption of the constitution of 1875, the rulings in
all of which will be found to be in harmony, it is impossible to escape
the conviction that in this state, whatever may be the case in some of
the other states, the American trust doctrine, as suggested by Mr.
Justice Harlan, has indeed been "reinforced" by its constitution and
statutes, and that the proposition that the stock of a corporation must
be paid for "in meal or in malt," in money or in money's value, is
not a mere figure of speech, but really has the significance of its
terms.
It may be paid for in property, but in such case the property
must be the fair equivalent in value to the par value of the stock
issued therefor; that it is the duty of the stockholders to see that it
possesses such value ; that when a corporation is sent forth into the
commercial world, accredited by them as possessed of a capital in
money, or its equivalent in property, equal to the par value of its
unless otherwise advised,
capital stock, every person dealing with
has
on the faith of the fact that its capital stock
right to extend to
has been so paid and that the money or its equivalent in property will
In short, that
be forthcoming to respond to his legitimate demands.
the duty of the stockholders and not of the creditors to see that
so paid
case between the creditor and
hence, the inquiry in
stockholder, when property has been paid in for the capital stock of
not whether the stockholder believed or had reason to
corporation,
believe that the property was equal in value to the par value of the
was such equivalent.
capital stock, but whether, in point of fact,
This wholesome and salutary doctrine, beneficial alike to the general
public and to all corporations doing business with bona fide capital,
so firmly applied in Shickle v. Watts, supra, and so well formulated
in the foregoing quotation from the opinion of Gill, J., in the case of
Shepard v. Drake, supra, ought not to be in any way weakened or
impaii'ed by anything said in the opinion in the case of Woolfolk v.
January, in criticism of single expression in the opinion in Shickle v.
Watts, and which criticism was obiter to the case then in hand.
Applying this doctrine to the facts of the case now under consideration the appellants are obviously left without a single shred of claim
to the reversal of the judgment of the circuit court, which is, therefore, affirmed.
All concur.
See preceding case and, 1887, Fitzpatrick v. Pub. Co., 83 Ala 604;
C. Co. v. FarmWilliams v. Evans, 87 Ala. 725 1889, Arkansas R. L. T.
&

;

Note.
1888,
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L. & T. Co., 13 Colo. 587; 1891, Foggv. Blair, 139 IT. S. 118; 1893, Hoffman v. Bloomsburg & S. R., 157 Pa. St. 174; 1895, Coleman v. Howe, 154
111. 458, 45 Am. St. Rep. 133; 1895, Stockton Comb. H. & A. Works v. Houser,
109 Cal. 1 ; 1898, Manhattan Trust Co. v. Seattle Coal & I. Co., 19 Wash. 493,
53 Pac. Rep. 951 ; 1898, Troup v. Horbach, 57 Neb. 644, 74 N. W. Rep. 326.
ers'

Sec* 688.

8.

(a)

Remedy of creditors.
Conditions precedent; in general, exhaust remedies
against corporation.

See Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & I. Co., 150 U. S. 371, supra,
p. 1868; Slee v. Bloom, 19 Johns. 456, supra, p. 881.
Note. In case of stock issued at a discount, or that is not full paid, only subsequent creditors, without knowledge of the facts, can complain : 1890, First
Nat'l Bank of Deadwood v. Gustin, 42 Minn. 327; 1892, Hospes v. N. W. Car
Co., 48 Minn. 174, supra, p. 1910.
Subsequent creditors, who know stock was issued for property at an overvaluation, can not complain : 1900, State Trust Co. v. Turner, 111 Iowa 664,
82 N. W. Rep. 1029, supra, p. 1943.
Generally the creditor must first exhaust his remedy against the corporation : 1875, Kincaid v. Dwindle, 59 N. Y. 548 ; 1882, Handy v. Draper, 89 N. Y.
334 ; 1894, Hunting v. Blun, 143 N. Y. 511 ; 1898, Wehn v. Fall, 55 Neb. 547,
70 Am. St. Rep. 397 ; 1899, Gillin v. Sawyer, 93 Maine 151, 44 Atl. Rep. 677.
But this rule does not apply where the creditor proceeds upon the theory
that there is no valid corporation : 1899, Tennessee Automatic L. Co. v. MasTenn. Ch. App.
, 56 S. W. Rep. 35.
sey,
There is no set-off allowed in favor of creditor shareholders. See supra, 673,
note.

Sec. 689.

Same,

GOLDTHWAITE, J.,

1847.

(b)
IN

At law

ALLEN ET

and in equity.
AL. v.

COMPANY

MONTGOMERY

ET AL.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA,

n

456, on 449, 450.

RAILROAD

Ala. Rep. 437-

[Bill by judgment creditors of the railroad company to reach equitable assets of the corporation and have them applied to the payment
of their claims.
It seems these assets included
rights of the corporation upon subscriptions to the capital stock, for part of which calls
had been made, which were due and unpaid, and for the balance of
which no calls had been made ; and (2) rights to property alleged to
have been fraudulently conveyed, the conveyance of which was asked
After holding the bill was not multifarious because
to be set aside.
all these rights were assets of the company which the creditors had a
right to pursue in equity, and to have all obstructions to their proper
application removed
continued:]

(i)
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2. We come now to consider what is the equity of the bill as
As to those stockholders who
against each class of the defendants.
were in default in paying their subscriptions after the calls of the corporation (if indeed the bill shows there were any such), it is certain
these could be reached by the ordinary course of law as debtors to the
corporation. (7 Ala. Rep. 51 ; 5 Ala. Rep. 403, 787.) And therefore as against such, it may be considered the bill will not lie, as no
additional equitable circumstances are stated to give jurisdiction to
the court.
on whom no calls had been made under the
3. As to stockholders
charter (which we understand is the case intended to be presented
If the act of 1841 (Dig. 261,
by the bill), a different rule obtains.
as
allowing
be
construed
garnishee
to
is
process when the cor10)
poration itself has made no calls, it does not cover this case, for the
bill was exhibited before that act was passed ; and it is certain they
were not liable to that process under the previous legislation, for the
indebtedness was incomplete until a call was made pursuant to the
Has then a court of equity the authorSee cases last cited.
charter.
ity to reach subscriptions for stock to satisfy a creditor when there is a
deficiency of legal assets, in the absence of any call by the corporation upon its stockholders? That it has, is, we think, a clear position,
As the individual corporators are
as well on principle as authority.
not themselves personally responsible for the contracts of the corporation, there is no responsibility anywhere, if the capital stock is not a
fund answerable to the creditors, and it would seem to make no difference in the right whether this capital stock or fund existed in propNor can it vary the right if the legislature,
erty or equitable assets.
instead of requiring the stock to be paid in has permitted the corporation to call for it as their necessities or the convenience of stockholdIn the latter case, the subscription is a debt which
ers may require.
the corporation may call for, and if debts are contracted beyond the
assets in hand, it would be most inequitable to neglect or refuse to
It is on this obvious prinmake the call so as to discharge the debt.
of
and compels the corassumes
a
court
that
jurisdiction
equity
ciple
do
that
which
to
stockholders
and
that is,
justice requires
poration
to discharge the debt to the extent that the capital stock remains in
In Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason 308,
the hands of the stockholder.
individual stockholders were held liable where the capital of the corporation had been paid out to them even after its insolvency and dissolution. The equity of the creditor, as it seems to us, is equally
strong where the stockholder has contracted to pay, but has never
Hence, we conclude the credpaid his portion of the capital stock.
itor has the right to pursue a stockholder when there is not sufficiency
of legal assets, although the corporation has made no calls. * * *

As to multifariousness, see, 1894, O'Bear Jewelry Co. v. Volfer, 106
205, 54 Am. St. Rep. 31 ; 1896, First National Bank v. Peavey, 75 Fed.
Eq. 240.
154; 1896, See v. Heppenheimer, 55 N.

Note.

Ala.

Rep.

J.

FIRST NATIONAL

1962
Sec. 690.

SHIRAS
1895.

Same,

(c) In

BANK V. PEAVEY.
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the United States courts.

IN FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF SIOUX
CITY v. PEAVEY.

DISTRICT JUDGE,

IN THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT, N. D. IOWA, W.
D. 69 Fed. Rep. 455-460, on 457, 458, 459, i Am.
& E. Corp. Cas. (N. S.) 648.
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[Action brought in the Iowa courts by the bank, as judgment creditor of the Sioux City Street Railway Company, against Peavey, a
Minnesota stockholder of that company, to hold him liable upon the
ground that he had never paid anything for the shares he owned, and
for which he had subscribed (the terms of the subscription not being
set forth). Peavey removed the suit to the United States Circuit Court.
The pleadings raised the question as to the proper method of proceeding, whether as provided by the Iowa statute, or by an action at
law, or by a bill in equity.]
In the briefs of counsel much space is devoted to the point whether
the federal court is bound by the rulings of the state supreme court upon
similar questions of practice.
The rule, as I gather it from the decisions of the supreme court, is, that where a state statute creates a right
in favor of creditors, and provides a remedy for the enforcement of the
right thus created, then this remedy, whether at law or in equity, must
be adopted, regardless of the tribunal in which the proceedings are had.
If, however, the state statute does not create the right sought to be
enforced, but only redeclares
so that
would exist in the absence
of the state statute, then
exists as
provision of the general or common law, and when its enforcement
sought in the federal courts the
form of the remedy
determined by the principles which differentiate
Pollard v. Bailey,
legal and equitable jurisdiction in these courts.
20 Wall. 520; Mills v. Scott, 99 U. S. 25; Terry v. Little, 101 U.
S. 216; Bank v. Francklyn, 120 U. S. 747,
Sup. Ct. 757; Clark
v. Bever, 139 U. S. 96, n Sup. Ct. 468. The decision of the supreme court in Sawyer v. Hoag, 17 Wall. 610, and numerous later
rulings based thereon, have firmly established the principle that the
trust fund for the
unpaid portions of corporate capital stock form
benefit of the creditors of the corporation.
The right of the creditor
not created
to look to this fund for the payment of corporate debts
derived from general existing legal principles,
by state statute, but
and therefore its enforcement in federal courts
not dependent upon
The petition
the existence of remedies provided by state legislation.
in the case now before the court
clearly based upon the general
* *
principle recognized in Sawyer v. Hoag, supra,
The question whether this
purely equitable right, not available
in an action of law,
one upon which the decisions are not in accord.
seems to me,
that where
person
Upon principle the true rule,
has subscribed for or purchased stock in
corporation under such cirthe creditors of the
cumstances that the corporation, and through
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corporation, can call upon the stockholders for payment of the unpaid
portion of the capital stock, then this claim is one at law, based
upon the express or implied terms of the subscription or purchase
of the stock.
If subsequently to the subscription or purchase, thus
creating a contract right to call for the unpaid portions of the stock, an
agreement is entered into between the corporation and the stockholder
whereby the latter is released from liability on the stock held by him,
this release, though good between the corporation and stockholders,
may not be binding upon creditors, if injurious to them, or in fraud of
their rights ; and as they are not parties to
its validity may be atIn such case the plaintiff's right of actached in an action at law.
tion at law would be based upon the legal effect of the original contract of subscription or purchase, and the contract of release would be
matter of defense, and when relied on as such its validity would be
If the release was found to
open to investigation in the law action.
be valid, not only as against the corporation, but also against the credwould then be good defense against the action based upon
itors,
If, however, the
the original contract of subscription or purchase.
release was found to be in fact in fraud of the rights of creditors,
then
would not be binding upon them, and would not constitute a
defense to the law action based upon the subscription, and the judgment would go in favor of the creditor upon the legal right of recovIf, however,
ery created by the contract of subscription or purchase.
by the terms of the original subscription or purchase, no liability
assumed by the stock purchaser to the corporation for any further
agreed, as part of the contract of
payments upon such stock, and
subscription or purchase between the corporation and the stockholdissued in
ers, that the stock shall be deemed to be full paid, and
this form, then the creditors' rights,
any, are equitable, and can not
be enforced in an action at law unless the statute of the state so provides.
In such case the creditors can not declare at law upon the
created no legal cause of acoriginal contract of subscription, for
tion. The right of the creditors in such case
based upon the equitable
doctrine that the capital stock
deemed to be trust fund created for
the benefit and protection of the creditors of the corporation.
Unless
expressly so authorized by statute, a court of law can not enforce
also
cause of action at law as the basis of the
equities unless there
proceeding. In cases wherein
person has subscribed for or purchased stock in
corporation, and by the terms of subscription or
contract between the corporation and the
purchase, viewed as
not bound for any further payments on the
stockholders, the latter
expressly released therefrom,

the creditors have no legal

ground for recovery against the stockholder on this contract of subscription, but they may appeal to the court for relief upon the equita*
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ble grounds already suggested. *
If be further tnie that the statute of Iowa creates remedy at law
for the enforcement of equitable rights, then
follows that
litigant
choice of remedies.
He may avail himself
in the federal court has
be sufficient to meet the exof the new statutory legal remedy,
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igencies of the particular case, or he may proceed under the undoubted
equitable jurisdiction which exists in the federal court, and which is
not destroyed or limited in any degree by the creation of a legal remedy
by state legislation. * * *
Demurrer overruled.
Note.

Lynde,

Compare,
106

U.

1879,
S. 519.

Sec. 691. Same,
made.

Ladd v. Cartwright,

Ore. 329

; 1882,

(d) Mandamus, or suit in equity,

JACKSON, J., IN THE DALTON
1876.

7

IN THE SUPREME

&

MORGANTOWN R. CO.

COURT

OF GEORGIA.

196, on 195.

56

v.

Patterson v.

to have calls

McDANIEL.

Ga. Rep. 191-

[Bill in equity by unsatisfied judgment creditors of the railway
company against it and its shareholders to compel the latter to pay
such sums upon the unpaid stock as necessary to pay the corporate
creditors.
The bill was demurred to upon various grounds, one of
which was that the charter required the directors to make all calls, and
the subscription agreement was to pay only on the call of the directors.
The directors had refused, when requested, to make the necessary
calls.]

It is not necessary to apply for a mandamus to compel the directors
to call in and collect a sufficient amount of the stock to pay these
debts.
The remedy by bill in equity is easier and more complete.
With its power to appoint an auditor or master in chancery to audit
the amount of the debts of the corporation in gross and the debt due
to each creditor, to ascertain the number of stockholders solvent and
insolvent, the per cent, necessary to be paid by each stockholder in
proportion to his stock, it is perfectly clear that complete justice can
be better administered to every creditor and to each solvent stockIt
holder by a court of equity than by any other form of procedure.
will prevent multiplicity of suits, save costs, and give speedy and
effectual relief.
Principle, therefore, and sound reason accord with
that
authority
equity will grant relief in all such cases as this at bar.
Ang. on Corp. 602, 603, 611 ; 8 Georgia Reports 492.
Note.
Compare, 1832, King v. Katharine Dock Co., 4 B. & Ad. 360, 24 E. C.
73; 1841, Queen v. The Victoria Park Co., 1 Ad. & El. 288, 41 E. C. L. 544;
1844, Wardv. Griswoldville Mfg. Co., 16 Conn. 593; 1848, Henry v. Railroad

L.

Co.,

17

Ohio

187.

See next case.
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Sec. 692.

Same,

(e)

Parties.

HATCH
1879.

1965

v.

DANA. 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
U. S. Rep. 205-215.

101

[Appeal from circuit court of United States for southern district of
Illinois. Dana, an unsatisfied judgment creditor of the Chicago Republican Company, an insolvent Illinois corporation, brought suit in

a

it

it

is

it,

equity on behalf of himself and all other creditors coining in and contributing to the expenses of the suit against the company, Hatch,
Williams and other Illinois stockholders, to collect 80 per cent, alleged
to be unpaid upon stock subscriptions, or so much as was necessary.
Afterward plaintiff dismissed the bill as to all except Hatch and
Williams, who answered, admitting most of the facts of the bill, except the claims of the plaintiff (of which they asked he be required to
make full proof), giving the names of other shareholders, and asking that all these be made parties, and an accounting be had, and
Replication was filed,
they be held only for their pro rata share.
and the court gave judgment for Dana for $9,398.72 against Hatch
and Williams, but not more than $7,000 with interest to be collected
from either one, that being the sum that each was found to owe to the
corporation. Defendants appealed.]
This bill is an ordinary creditor's bill, the
MR. JUSTICE STRONG.
sole object of which is to obtain payment of the complainant's judgment.
It is true it is brought on behalf of the complainant and all
other creditors of the corporation who might choose to come in and
seek relief by
contributing to the expense of the suit. But no other
does not appear that there
creditors came in, and
any other credbe one of the stockholders, who was made
itor, unless
defendant,
and who filed a cross-bill, which he afterwards dismissed.
All the

were not made defendants.
bill seeking to wind up the company.
sought
of
debt
out of the unpaid stock subscriptions.
simply payment
That unpaid stock subscriptions are to be regarded as fund, which
an undeniable
the corporation holds for the payment of its debts,
of
that
creditor
an insolvent
the
insist
But
proposition.
appellants
or
one
more
delinat
to
not
against
corporation
proceed
liberty
of
debt,
amount
his
without
an
acto
subscribers
recover
the
quent
count being taken of other indebtedness, and without bringing in all
the stockholders for contribution.
They insist, also, that by the terms
of the subscriptions for stock made by these appellants they were to
pay for the shares set opposite their names respectively, "as called
for by the said company;" that the company made no calls for more
that, therefore, this company could not recover
than thirty per cent.
the seventy per cent, unpaid without making
previous call; and
a

1

a

;

is

a

is

a

a

The bill was not

It

stockholders

Statement

abridged, arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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that a court of equity will not enforce the contract differently from
what was contemplated in the subscription.
These positions, we think, are not supported by the authorities,
certainly not by the more modern ones, nor are they in harmony
with sound reason, when considered with reference to the facts of this
The liability of a subscriber for the capital stock of a company
case.
is several, and not joint.
By his subscription each becomes a several
debtor to the company, as much so as if he had given his promissory
At law, certainly, his subnote for the amount of his subscription.
scription may be enforced against him without joinder of other subscribers;
and in equity his liability does not cease to be several.
A
creditor's bill merely subrogates the creditor to the place of the debtor,
It does not
and garnishes the debt due to the indebted corporation.
It may be that
change the character of the debt attached or garnished.
if the object of the bill is to wind up the affairs of this corporation, all
the shareholders, at least so far as they can be ascertained, should be
made parties, that complete justice may be done by equalizing the
But this is
burdens, and in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits.
no such case.
The most that can be said is that the presence of all
When
the stockholders might be convenient, not that it is necessary.
the only object of a bill is to obtain payment of a judgment against a
corporation out of its credits or intangible property, that is, out of its
unpaid stock, there is not the same reason for requiring all the stockIn such a case no stockholder can be
holders to be made defendants.
compelled to pay more than he owes.
In Ogilvie v. Knox Insurance Co. (22 How. 380) the question was
considered.
That was a case in which several judgment creditors of
a corporation had brought a creditor's bill against it and thirty-six
The bill alleged that the complainsubscribers to its capital stock.
ants had recovered judgments against the company upon which executions had been issued, and returned "no property;" that the other
defendants had severally subscribed for its stock, and that the subscriptions remained unpaid, payment not having been enforced by the
The prayer of the bill was that these other defendants
company.
might be decreed to pay their subscriptions, and that the judgments
might be satisfied out of the sum paid. It was objected, as here, that
the bill was defective for want of proper parties ; but the court held
In delivering the opinion of the court,
the objection untenable.
Grier, J., said: "The creditors of the corporation are seeking satisfaction out of the assets of the company to which the defendants are
debtors.
If the debts attached are sufficient to pay their demands,
the creditors need look no further.
They are not bound to settle up
all the affairs of this corporation and the equities between its various
If A. is bound to pay his debt
stockholders, corporators or debtors.
to the corporation in order to satisfy its creditors, he can not defend
himself by pleading that these complainants might have got their satisfaction out of B. as well. It is true, if it be necessary to a complete satisfaction of the complainants that the corporation be treated
as an insolvent, the court may appoint a receiver, with authority to
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collect and receive all the debts due to the company, and administer
all its assets.
In that way all the other stockholders or debtors may
The court, therefore, directed a decree
be made to contribute."
the
against
respondents severally for such amounts as appeared to be
due and unpaid by each of them for their shares of the capital stock.
(Citing and quoting from, to the same effect, Bartlett v. Drew, 57
N. Y. 587 ; Pierce v. The Milwaukee Construction Co., 38 Wis. 253 ;
Marsh v. Burroughs, i Woods 468 ; Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason
308, and distinguishing Pollard v. Bailey, 20 Wall. 520, and Terry v.
Tubman, 92 U. S. 156, on the ground that they related to the enforce*
*
*
ment of a special statutory liability.)
We hold, therefore, that the complainant was under no obligation
to make all the stockholders of the bank defendants in his bill. It was
not his duty to marshal the assets of the bank, or to adjust the equities between the corporators.
In all that he had no interest.
The
had
an
if
such
interest, and,
so, it was quite in
appellants may have
their power to secure its protection.
They might have moved for a
or
filed
a
receiver,
cross-bill, obtained a discoveiy of
they might have
the other stockholders, brought them in, and enforced contribution
from all who had not paid their stock subscriptions.
Their equitable
right to contribution is not yet lost. * * *
(After holding the court could make a call if necessary and that
mandamus could not apply here, because the corporation had no officers to make calls, and that the remedy in equity was more complete,
the decision below was)
Affirmed.
Note.
Parties:
1. One shareholder alone may be made defendant, but more or all can be
and usually are joined: 1885, Thompson v. Reno Sav. Bk., 19 Nev. 103, 3 Am.
St. Rep. 797, note 806; 1892, Baines v. Babcock, 95 Cal. 581, 29 Am. St. Rep.
158; 1895, Coleman v. Howe, 154 111. 458, 45 Am. St. Rep. 133; 1898, Parker
v. Carolina Sav. Bk., 53 S. C. 583, 69 Am. St. Rep. 888; 1899, Siegel v. Andrews, 181 111. 350; 1899, Walter v. Merced Academy Assn., 126 Cal. 582, 59
Pac. Rep. 136; 1899, Welch v. Sargent, 127 Cal. 72, 59 Pac. Rep. 319; 1900,
Singer v. Hutchinson, 183 111. 606; 1902, Schaub v. Welded Barrel Co.,

, 90 N. W. 335.
But one creditor can not sue in his own name for himself alone, but
must sue on behalf of all, or in such a way as all creditors may join : 1882,
Patterson v. Lynde, 106 U. S. 519; 1895, Coleman v. Howe, 154 111. 458, 45
Am. St. Rep. 133; 1898, Van Pelt v. Gardner, 54 Neb. 701 ; 1899, State Nat'l
Bank v. Say ward, 91 Fed. Rep. 443 ; 1899, Foster v. Posson, 105 Wis. 99, 81
N. W. Rep. 123 ; 1899, Brown v. Brink, 57 Neb. 606, 78 N. W. Rep. 280.
But one creditor can not sue on behalf of himself and other creditors to enmust sue for himself alone : 1900, Woodforce the Kansas statutory liability
worth v. Bowles, 61 Kan. 569, 60 Pac. Rep. 331.
See following cases as to assignees and receivers.

Mich.
2.
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a

foreign state.

ASSIGNEE OF THE SOLDIERS' WORLD'S FAIR HOTEL
v. CHAUNCEY H. LUM ET AL., RESPONDENTS. l

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.
159 N.
Rep. 265-278, 70 Am. St. Rep. 541, 45 L. R. A. 551.

Y.

[Action by the assignee of the Hotel Association, an insolvent Illinois corporation, organized with a capital stock of $200,000, against
the New York stockholders to collect unpaid subscriptions
to the
stock of the association to pay creditors.
The complaint alleged the
corporation, as authorized by the Illinois law, had in May, 1893, ex ~
ecuted to plaintiff a general assignment for the benefit of its creditors ;
that the court having jurisdiction of insolvencies found the debts then
to be $9, 972; the tangible assets, $795; and $36,407 still due upon
stock subscriptions, whereupon it ordered the assignee to bring suit
against shareholders for their pro rata share of the debts ; suit was
accordingly brought in Illinois against shareholders there resident,
from which only $1,039 was collected
all the shareholders but two
being found to be insolvent ; upon report being made to this effect,
and showing that all the shareholders outside of Illinois and New
York were insolvent, and that the debts then amounted to $11,670,
$10,432 still remaining unpaid, it was alleged that plaintiff was ordered to institute suits in New York against shareholders there, to collect the sums justly due by them ; the complaint also set forth the
names of fifteen New York shareholders, alleging that some of them
were insolvent, but which ones were so, was unknown to plaintiff.
To this complaint was annexed a schedule setting forth the provisions
of the Illinois law relating to liability of stockholders.
The prayer
asked the court to determine the liability of each New York shareholder, and asks for a receiver, if necessary, to help enforce the same
in that state. Demurrer was interposed, because the complaint showed
on its face the court had no jurisdiction ; did not state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action ; and that plaintiffs had no legal capacity to sue. This was overruled at the special term, but reversed by
the appellate division.]
BARTLETT, J. * * * The point presented by the demurrer is a
very narrow one, and is in substance this : That an action against these
stockholders to recover a balance due on their subscriptions, or such
pro rata share of it as is necessary to pay the indebtedness of the
company, can only be maintained in the state of Illinois, where the
corporation is located, as the laws of Illinois provide a special and
peculiar remedy which can be enforced only in that state.
Chapter 32 of the Revised Statutes of the state of Illinois contains
the provisions involved in this controversy.
Section 8, among other things, enacts that each "stockholder shall
be liable for the debts of the corporation to the extent of the amount
1

Statement

abridged

;

arguments

and parts of the opinion omitted.
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that may be unpaid upon the stock held by him, to be collected in the
*
*
*
manner herein provided.
Whenever any action is brought
to recover any indebtedness against a corporation, it shall be competent to proceed against any one or more stockholders at the same
time, to the extent of the balance unpaid by such stockholders upon
the stock owned by them respectively, whether called in or not, as in
cases of garnishment."
This is clearly an exclusive remedy, available only in the state of

Illinois.
We then come to section

25 of this chapter, which is to be read in
connection with the fact that a corporation may make a general assignment for the benefit of its creditors in the state of Illinois.
This section provides, among other things, that if a corporation
"shall dissolve or cease doing business, leaving debts unpaid, suits in
equity may be brought against all persons who were stockholders at
the time, or liable in any way for the debts of the corporation, by
joining the corporation in such suit, and each stockholder may be required to pay his pro rata share of such debts or liabilities to the extent of the unpaid portion of his stock after exhausting the assets of
And if any stockholder shall not have property
such corporation.
enough to satisfy his portion of such debts or liabilities, then the
amount shall be divided equally among all the remaining solvent

stockholders."

The balance of section 25 provides for the winding up of a corporation by a court of equity and the appointment of a receiver, etc.
This portion of the statute is not involved in the present action.
It will thus be seen that the plaintiff in the case at bar, clothed with
the ample powers of a general assignee for the benefit of creditors, is
duly authorized by the first portion of this section to proceed against
stockholders and all persons liable in any way for the debts of the
corporation in the interest of the creditors, the corporation having
ceased to do business and leaving debts unpaid.
This provision of the statute evidently authorizes the general assignee to bring an omnibus suit in the state of Illinois in the interest
of creditors against stockholders and others in any way liable to conThe statutory limitatribute to the payment of the corporate debts.
his
a
stockholder
to
tion of recovery against
-pro rata share of the
debts, if it be less than the amount unpaid upon his stock subscription, is merely stating the rule in equity when marshaling the assets.
If a stockholder of an insolvent corporation owed a balance on his
stock subscription of five thousand dollars, and it was made to appear
that three thousand dollars was his pro rata share of the indebtedness,
judgment could only go against him for the latter amount.
The liability now sought to be enforced does not rest upon the provisions of the statute cited, but is wholly contractual, and has for its
foundation the principles of the common law. *
The demurrer to the complaint admits that these defendants, residents of this state, are original subscribers to the stock of this Illinois
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corporation, and that they are still indebted for balance due on the
subscription.
This is a contract liability pure and simple, and one that the corporation, if solvent, could have enforced in the courts of this state. This
cause of action, in the event of corporate insolvency, vests in the general assignee for the benefit of creditors, or in a receiver duly appointed.
It has been held that a right of action to enforce a personal liability of the stockholder for the debts of a corporation, given and
created only by the statutes of the state of the corporation's domicile,
is not enforceable in another state where the stockholder resides, upon
any obligation of comity, but it has frequently been adjudged that
the contract obligation assumed by subscribing to the stock of a corporation can be thus enforced.
(Dayton v. Borst, 31 N. Y. 435,
and cases cited.)
Subscribers to the stock of a corporation incur a debt which may
be enforced by any common law or equitable remedy.
(Mann v.
Cooke, 20 Conn. 178.)
The capital stock of a corporation is a fund
set apart for the payment of its debts.
It is a substitute for the personal liability which subsists in private co-partnerships.
The creditors
have a lien upon it in equity.
Unpaid stock is as much a part of this
pledge and as much a part of the assets of the company as the cash
which has been paid in upon it. (Sanger v. Upton, Assignee, 91
U. S. 56.)
At pages 60, 61, of case last cited, the United States Supreme
Court says, in speaking of unpaid stock subscriptions: "Creditors
have the same right to look to it as to anything else, and the same
right to insist upon its payment as upon the payment of any other
debt due to the company.
As regards creditors, there is no distinction between such a demand and any other asset which may form a
part of the property and effects of the corporation."
(Citing many
cases.)

It would

go to

speak ill for state comity if a citizen of New York could
Illinois and in good faith subscribe to the capital stock of a cor-

poration and later repudiate

his obligation to pay a balance due on
the subscription and yet not be liable to an action at law or a suit in
equity in our own courts in the name of the corporation to compel
him to perform his contract.
Fortunately for state comity and commercial integrity no such rule
of law exists, and a creditor whose rights rest in contract may pursue
his debtor into the courts of the latter's domicile.
Several cases are cited as holding that this action is not maintain*
*
*
able, but they are all clearly distinguishable.
(Citing, quoting from, and showing that, the following cases all
related to the enforcement of the purely statutory liability of shareholders, and not their common-law liability for unpaid stock subscriptions: Marshall v. Sherman, 148 N. Y. 9; Barnes v. Wheaton, 80
Hun 8; Cleveland, L. & W. Ry. Co. v. Kent, 87 Hun 329.)
Returning to the case at bar we have, in brief, this situation presented under the demurrer to the complaint :
This action is brought
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1

on behalf of all the creditors of the corporation, who number one hundred and fifteen or more, and is against all the original stockholders
in this state, they being the only ones now liable, as all stockholders
residing instates other than Illinois and New York are insolvent; the
legal remedy has been exhausted against the Illinois stockholders, except that a portion of the amount due from one defendant may be
collected ; that some of the New York stockholders are solvent and
some are not, but which of them are, and which are not, is unknown
to the plaintiff; that the present indebtedness of the corporation, after
crediting all amounts collected from stockholders, has been ascertained in the Illinois proceedings; that under the law of Illinois a domestic corporation may make an assignment for the benefit of its
creditors, and the assignee thereunder may maintain any suit or action that the insolvent company making the assignment could have
maintained if such assignment had not been made.
The sole question to be determined by us at this time is whether
this action can be maintained, and we are not concerned with the
practical difficulties that plaintiff may encounter in establishing to the
satisfaction of the trial court the just pro rata share of the defendant
stockholders in the payment of the indebtedness of this insolvent cor-

poration.

We are of opinion that this action is clearly maintainable upon
principle and on authority.
A subscription to the stock of a corporation creates a debt enforceable at law, or in equity, by the corporation, or its legal representative.
(Sagory v. Dubois, 3 Sand. Ch. 466; Mann, Rec'r, etc., v. Pentz,2 Sand. Ch. 257;
Herkimer, etc., Co. v. Small, 2 Hill 127; Troy
Turnpike & R. Co. v. McChesney, 21 Wend. 296; Mann v. Cooke,
20 Conn. 178 ; Hartford & New Haven R. Co. v. Kennedy, 12 Conn.
499; Hartford & New Haven R. Co. v. Boorman, 12 Conn. 530;
Ward v. Griswoldville Mfg. Co., 16 Conn. 593.)
The receivers and assignees of individuals and corporations domiciled in another state are permitted, under interstate comity, to enforce the contracts of such individuals and corporations in the state of
the debtor's residence.

*

*

*

(Citing Dayton v. Borst, 31 N. Y. 435 ; Petersen v. Chemical
32 N. Y. 21 ; Toronto General Trust Co. v. C., B. &. Q. R.
Co., 123 N. Y. 37; Mabon, etc., v. Ongley Electric Co., 156 N. Y.
196; Mann v. Cooke, 20 Conn. 178; Cooke v. Town of Orange, 48
Bank,

Conn. 401.)

The

case

authorities

at

bar is not to be distinguished

in principle from the

cited.

The plaintiff, as the general assignee for the benefit of creditors of
an insolvent corporation, is vested with the legal title of all its property and the power to reduce its assets to possession, and his title is
perfect, though conferred by the law of the domicile.
(Petersen v.
Chemical Bank, 32 N. Y. 21.)
If, as in Dayton v. Borst (31 N. Y. 435), the receiver of a bank in
New Jersey was allowed to come into our court and recover the amount
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stock subscription, why should not this plaintiff,
to institute a similar action? Can it
be said that there is any legal distinction to be drawn between a receiver created by the order of a foreign court and a general assignee
created by a foreign legislature ? The plaintiff does not come here
seeking to remove assets from this state to the possible prejudice of
domestic creditors, but asks that he be permitted to enforce against
our own citizens the performance of contracts into which they have
entered in another jurisdiction.
Public policy and state comity both require that this request should
be granted.
a

as a general assignee, be permitted

Reversed.

Note.
The corporation can, through its officers, make an assignment for
the benefit of creditors : 1897, Boynton v. Roe, 114 Mich. 401 ; 1898, Calumet
Paper Co. v. Haskell Ptg. Co., 144 Mo. 331, 66 Am. St. Rep. 425.
Or a court can appoint a receiver when necessary to preserve funds (1898,
Cameron v. Groveland Imp. Co., 20 Wash. 169, 72 Am. St. Rep. 26, note),
though there has been no actual default made (1884, Brassey v. N. Y. & N.
E. R. Co., 19 Fed. Rep. 663), and even upon application by the corporation itself (1892, Wabash, St. L. & P. R. v. Humphreys, 145 U.'S. 82, 96, 114).
See, also, 1889, The Coliseum v. Interstate L. Co., 123 Ala. 512, 26 So. Rep. 122 ;
1897, Irwin v. The Granite State Prov., 56 N. J. Eq., 244, supra, p. 1524, note,
p. 1526; and 1899, Shinney v. N. A. Sav. L. & B. Co., 97 Fed. Rep. 9, supra,
p. 1542; 1899, Hale v. Hardon, 95 Fed. Rep. 747.
And now generally a receiver, clothed with authority by the order appointing him, or an assignee of all the corporate assets, may sue in a foreign state,
when such suit does not conflict with the policy of the state : 1895, Parker v.
Stoughton Mill Co., 91 Wis. 174, 51 Am, St. Rep. 881, note 885; 1898, Swing
v. Bentley, etc., Co., 45 W. Va. 283, 31 S. E. Rep. 925; 1898, Hale v. Hardon,
89 Fed. Rep. 283, 95 Fed. Rep. 747; 1898, Castleman
v. Templeman, 87 Md.
546, 67 Am. St. Rep. 363; 1899, Dunn v. Howe, 96 Fed. Rep. 160; 1899, Evans
v. Pease, 21 R. I. 189, 42 Atl. Rep. 506; 1899, Wilson v. Keels, 54 S. C. 545. 71
Am. St. Rep. 816 ; 1900, Howarth v. Angle, 162 N. Y. 179, 47 L. R. A. 725,
infra, p. 2028 and note.
As to jurisdiction of receivers in the state and federal courts, see note 6
Am. St. Rep. 185; Irwin v. The Granite State Prov., 56 N. J. Eq. 244, supra,
p. 1524, note, p. 1526; Shinney v. N. A. Sav. L. & B. Co., 97 Fed. Rep. 9,
supra, p. 1542; also, 1898, Hale v. Hardon, 89 Fed. Rep. 283, 95 Fed. Rep. 747
(C. C. A.); 1899, Rice v. Durham Water Co., 91 Fed. Rep. 433; 1899, Kurtz
v. Phil., etc., R. Co., 187 Pa. St. 59.
See, also, infra, Howarth v. Angle, 162 N. Y. 179, p. 2028.
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GREAT WESTERN TELEGRAPH COMPANY
1896.

of

a

judgment.

Statute of limitations.
v.

PURDY. 1

OF THE UNITED STATES.
Rep. 329-339.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

162

U. S.

[Action by the telegraph company, an Illinois corporation, by its

receiver, brought in an Iowa court, against Purdy, an Iowa stockholder of the company, to collect an amount alleged to be due upon
1
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his stock subscription, under a decree of the Cook County (Illinois)
Court, ordering an assessment to be made upon the stockholders, in a
suit in which Purdy was alleged to have been a party.
The facts
showed that in 1869 Purdy and other stockholders had sued in the
same Illinois court to compel the company to issue shares of stock to
them, to set aside as fraudulent a contract for construction of the line,
to order an accounting and to hold a new election of officers.
A decree to this effect was obtained, reserving to plaintiffs leave to apply
In 1874 other shareholders (Purdy
for any further order necessary.
not being joined), by leave of court intervened and filed a "supplemental" bill, alleging mismanagement and fraud, and asking for a
receiver; a decree was made appointing such receiver, and upon his
report the assessment in question was ordered in 1886, and in 1888,
after Purdy upon request refused to pay, this suit was brought.
The
lower court in Iowa gave judgment for the defendant, which was affirmed by the supreme court of Iowa on the ground that the claim
Plaintiff sued out this
was barred by the Iowa statute of limitations.

writ of error.]
MR. JUSTICE GRAY. By article 4, section i, of the constitution of
the United States, " Full faith and credit shall be given in each state
to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other
And congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in
state.
which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved and the efIn the exercise of the power so conferred, congress,
fect thereof."
besides providing the manner in which the records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any state shall be authenticated, has enacted that
" the said records and judicial proceedings, so authenticated, shall
have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the
United States, that they have by law or usage in the courts of the
state from which they were taken."
Act of May 26, 1790, ch. n ;
i Stat. 122; Rev. Stat.,
905.
The plaintiff relied on the order of assessment, made by a court of
the state of Illinois, as a judgment of that court, entitled to the effect
of being conclusive evidence of the plaintiff's right to maintain this
action against the defendant.
The supreme court of the state of Iowa
denied it that effect.
The question whether that court thereby declined to give full faith and credit to a judicial proceeding of a court
of another state, as required by the constitution and laws of the United
States, was necessarily involved in the decision.
This court, therefore, has jurisdiction of the case, but must judge
for itself of the true nature and effect of the order relied on. Armstrong v. Treasurer of Athens County, 16 Pet. 281, 285; Texas and
Pacific Railway v. Southern Pacific Co., 137 U.S. 48; Grover &
Baker Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U. S. 287 ; Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.
S. 87; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 666, 683, 686, and cases
cited.

By the original contract between the parties, made in

the state

of

Iowa on February 16, 1869, Purdy, the present defendant, agreed to
take fifty shares, of the par value of $25, in the plaintiff company,
2 \VIL. CAS.

51
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and to pay five per cent, (which he .did), and "the balance as the directors from time to time may order;" and the company agreed to
issue the shares to him as soon as forty per cent, had been paid.
On November 19, 1869, Purdy and other subscribers for shares filed
in a court of the state of Illinois a bill in equity to compel the company to issue shares to them, and to set aside as fraudulent a contract
by which the company had agreed to transfer all its capital stock to
one Reeve; and upon that bill, on November 16, 1872, obtained a
decree setting aside that contract, and ordering shares to be issued to
the subscribers as prayed for, and a new board of directors to be
chosen.
By that decree all the objects of the suit were accomplished
and he does not appear to have any
so far as Purdy was concerned;
notice of or part in any further proceedings.
That bill did not ask
for the appointment of a receiver, or of any order of assessment upon
stockholders.
The subsequent proceeding, begun September 19, 1874, alleging
mismanagement and fraud of the new officers, and the insolvency of
the company, was by other stockholders, and although entitled a "supplemental bill," and permitted by the court to be filed in the former
cause, was a distinct proceeding, in which Purdy had and took no inThe orders of the court upon this proceeding, appointed
on
terest.
October 7, 1874, a receiver, and on July 10, 1886, making a "call or
assessment" upon the stockholders of the company, were entered
He was not perwithout any notice to him, or consent on his part.
The receiver
sonally a party to this proceeding, nor named therein.
was appointed almost two years, and the assessment ordered more
than thirteen years after Purdy had ceased to have any connection
with the litigation.
There can be no doubt that, as heretofore declared by this court,
"after a decree disposing of the issues and in accordance with the
prayer of a bill has been made, it is not competent for one of the
parties without a service of new process or appearance, to institute
further proceedings on new issues and for new objects, although conof the original litigation, by merely
nected with the subject-matter
giving the new proceedings the title of the original cause. If this bill
begins a new litigation, the parties against whom he seeks relief are
entitled to notice thereof, and without it they will not be bound."

Smith v. Woolfolk, 115 U. S. 143, 148.
The question, therefore, is of the effect as against Purdy of the
order for an assessment made by the Illinois court in a proceeding to
which the corporation was a party, but to which he personally was
not.

The order of that court was in effect, as it was in terms, simply a "call
or assessment" upon all stockholders who had not paid for their shares
in full.
It was such as the directors might have made before the appointment of a receiver, and in making it the court, having by that
appointment assumed the charge of the assets and affairs of the corporation, took the place and exercised the office of the directors.
Scoyill v. Thayer, 105 U. S. 143, 155; Hawkins v. Glenn, 131 U. S.
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319, 329; Lamb v. Lamb, 6 Bissell 420, 424; Glenn v. Saxton, 68
Cal. 353; Great Western Tel. Co. v. Gray, 122 111. 630, 636, 640;
Great Western Tel. Co. v. Loewenthal, 154 111. 261.
The order of assessment, whether made by the directors as provided in the contract of subscription, or by the court as the successor
in this respect of the directors, was doubtless, unless directly attacked
and set aside by appropriate judicial proceedings, conclusive evidence
of the necessity for making such an assessment, and to that extent
bound every stockholder, without personal notice to him. Hawkins v.
Glenn, 131 U. S. 319; Glenn v. Liggett, 135 U. S. 533; Glenn v.
Marbury, 145 U. S. 499.
But the order was not, and did not purport to be, a judgment against
any one.

It did not undertake to determine the question whether any

It did
particular stockholder was or was not liable in any amount.
not merge the cause of action of the company against any stockholder on his contract of subscription, nor deprive him of the right,
when sued for an assessment, to rely on any defense which he might
have to an action upon that contract.
In this action, therefore, brought by the receiver, in the name of the
company, as authorized by the order of assessment, to recover the
sum supposed to be due from the defendant, he had the right to plead
a release, or payment, or statute of limitations, or any other defense,
going to show that he was not liable upon his contract of subscription.
In each of the three cases last cited above, the defense of the statute
of limitations was entertained and passed upon. Hawkins v. Glenn, 131
U. S. 332; Glenn v. Liggett, 135 U. S. 547; Glenn v. Marbury, 145
U. S. 506.
The whole effect of the order of assessment being to fix the amount
which any stockholder liable under his contract of subscription should
pay, and to authorize the receiver to bring suits against stockholders
for the same, but not to determine whether the present defendant or
any other particular stockholder was liable for anything, the Iowa
court, by sustaining the defense of the statute of limitations, did not
deny the judicial proceeding of Illinois the full faith and credit to
which it was entitled.
The statute of limitations of the state of Iowa provides that "the
following actions may be brought within the times herein limited, re-

spectively, after their causes accrue, and not afterwards, except when
otherwise specially declared:"
"4. Those founded on unwritten contracts, those brought for injuries to property, or for relief on the ground of fraud in cases heretofore solely cognizable in a court of chancery, and all other actions not
otherwise provided for in this respect, within five years.
"5. Those founded on written contracts, on judgment of any courts,
except those courts provided for in the next subdivision, and those
brought for the recovery of real property, within ten years.
"6. Those founded on a judgment of a court of record, whether of
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this or any other of the United States, or of the federal courts of the
United States, within twenty years." Iowa Code of 1873, section 2529.
This action was not brought on a judgment, for there had been no
judgment. But it was brought on the defendant's written contract of
subscription, and was, therefore, by the terms of the Iowa statute,
barred in ten years after the cause of action accrued. The action was
brought more than ten years after the contract, but within ten years
after the order of assessment.
In many jurisdictions the cause of action, within the meaning of a
statute of limitations, would be held to have accrued at the time of the
order for an assessment, and not before.
It has been so held by the
Illinois,
court
of
the
of
state
where
this company was incorsupreme
and
the
order
of
as
assessment
well as by this court in
made,
porated
cases coming up from circuit courts of the United States, and unaffected by decisions of the highest courts of the state in which those
courts were held.
Great Western Tel. Co. v. Gray, Hawkins v.
Glenn, Glenn v. Liggett and Glenn v. Marbury, above cited.
But the supreme court of Iowa in the present case held that, as it
rested with the directors of the corporation to make that order, the
delay in making it could not suspend the operation of the statute of
limitations; and that the case was within the rule, established by a
series of decisions of that court, that when a plaintiff could, at any
time, by making a demand or giving a notice, acquire a right to recover against the defendant, the statute of limitations began to run
when he might have done so.
Great Western Tel. Co. v. Purdy, 83
Iowa 430, 433, and cases cited.
The limitation of action is governed by the lex fori, and is controlled by the legislation of the state in which the action is brought
as construed by the highest court of that state, even if the legislative
act or the judicial construction differs from that prevailing in other
M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312; Bauserman v.
jurisdictions.
Blunt, 147 U. S. 647; Metcalf v. Watertown, 153 U. S. 671 ; Balkam
v. Woodstock Iron Co., 154 U. S. 177.
Neither the statutes nor the decisions of the state of Iowa upon this
subject have made any discrimination against the citizens, the contracts or the judgments of other states, or against any right asserted
The case is thus
under the constitution or laws of the United States.
v.
Russell, 5 Wall. 290, cited at the bar.
distinguished from Christmas
The question at what time the cause of action accrued in this case,
within the meaning of the statute of limitations of Iowa, was not a
federal question, but a local question, upon which the judgment of
the highest court of the state can not be reviewed by this court.

Judgment

affirmed.

Judgment against the corporation is conclusive as to the corporate
liability to the creditor but not as to the shareholder's liability to the corporation. See, 1895, Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Phoenix Furniture Co., 108 Mich.
170, 62 Am. St. Rep. 693; 1896, Holland v. Duluth Iron, etc., Co., 65 Minn.
324, 60 Am. St. Rep. 480 ; 1897, Nickum v. Burckhardt, 30' Ore. 464, 60 Am. St.
Rep. 822; 1897, Ball v. Reese, 58 Kan. 614, 62 Am. St. Rep. 638; 1898, Bear
v. Board of Co. Com'rs, 122 N. C. 434, 65 Am. St. Rep. 711; 1898, Castleman
Note.
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1900, Town of Hinckley v.
Kettle Riv. Co., 80 Minn. 32, 82 N. W. Rep. 1088. Compare, 1900, Ward v.
Joslin, 100 Fed. Rep. 676 (C. C. N. H.).
And when judgment does not bind shareholder, see, 1896, Andrews Powder
Works, 76 Fed. Rep. 166, 36 L. R. A. 139; 1900, Finney v. Guy, 106 Wis. 256,
49 L. R. A. 486, 82 N. W. Rep. 595.

v. Templeman, 87 Md. 546, 67 Am. St. Rep. 363;

ARTICLE II.
Sec. 695.

LIABILITY ARISING FROM WITHDRAWAL

i. What

is a withdrawal of assets.

EDWIN A. BUCK,
1896.

OF ASSETS.

TRUSTEE, v.

WILLIAM

ROSS. 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS OF CONNECTICUT.
Conn. Rep. 29-32, 57 Am. St. Rep. 60.

68

[Action by trustee in insolvency of a manufacturing corporation to
recover the value of certain assets alleged to have been transferred to
the defendant in exchange for his stock, and in fraud of the creditors
of the company.
Judgment in the court below for the plaintiff, and
defendant alleged errors.]
* * * The complaint alleges that said corporaANDREWS, C.
tion was on the 29th day of July, 1889, insolvent, and thereafter continued to be so insolvent until the date it was so declared by the court
of probate, and that "the defendant, on the i4th day of June, 1890,
* * * well knowing the insolvency of said
company, with the purof
financial
loss
and
and
design
escaping
evading liability as a
pose
stockholder of said company, and in fraud of the then existing and
future creditors of said company, unlawfully transferred and surrendered to said company said forty shares of the capital stock of the
said company, and received in exchange therefor from said company
$4,000 in good and valuable notes and securities of said company,
whereby the defendant unlawfully took from the capital of said comIt is also alleged
pany the sum of $4,000, which he still retains."
that the estate of said corporation is deeply insolvent, that said stock
now in the hands of the plaintiff is wholly worthless, and that the
amount so illegally withdrawn by the defendant is needed to pay the
The
claims of creditors proved against the said insolvent estate.
of
with
interest.
claimed
recover
value
said
shares
to
the
plaintiff
The superior court fpund, in substance, that the averments of the
As to
complaint were true, and rendered judgment for the plaintiff.
the transaction between the defendant and the said corporation on the
I4th day of June, 1890, this appears:
Prior to that day the said corporation had sold to one A. G. Turner
a large amount of silk manufacturing machinery, and had taken his
These
notes therefor aggregating in the whole more than $40,000.
One of these notes
notes were absolutely secured by said machinery.

J.

1

Statement abridged

;

small part of opinion omitted.
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for the sum of $2,500 had been sold by the said corporation to the
defendant.
On said day the defendant reconveyed said $2,500 note
to the corporation, transferred to it the said forty shares of its capital stock, and gave in cash $3,384, and received from the said corporation $10,000 of said Turner's notes. The corporation surrendered
to Turner $10,000 of his said notes which were secured upon said
machinery, and in lieu thereof Turner gave his notes for the same
amount directly to the defendant, and secured these by a mortgage of
other property.
These notes so secured were, and are, perfectly
good.

" The
Conn. 73, 94, this court said:
stock of a corporation is its only basis of credit.
Unlike a partnership, its members generally are not individually liable for its debts.
The character, reputation and credit of its promoters do not attach to
the corporation itself, except to a limited extent.
Hence it is of vital
importance that the law should rigidly guard and protect the capital
Otherwise, especially in these days when so large a portion of
stock.
the business of the country is carried on by corporations, confidence,
on which the prosperity of the country largely depends, would be
Hence it is that in equity the capital stock of a
seriously impaired.
corporation is now regarded as a trust fund for the payment of debts.
which
The creditois have a lien upon
prior in point of right to
any claim which the stockholders as such can have upon it; and courts
calwill be astute to detect and defeat any scheme or device which
culated to withdraw this fund, or in any way to place
beyond the
Mason 308. This
reach of creditors."
Citing Wood v. Dummer,
In Cook on Stockholders, section 312,
the settled law.
said:
" The objection usually made to allowing a corporation to purchase
that thereby the corporation funds are expended and
its own stock,
received by the corporation except the right to resell.
no property
*
*
*
The better rule goes still further, and declares that
corpurchase of shares of its own capital stock thereby
poration, by
its actual assets
reduces its actual assets below its capital stock, or
at that time are less than the capital stock, such purchase may be impeached and set aside, and the vendor of the stock rendered liable
Morawetz on Corthereon at the instance of
corporate creditor."
porations, section 781; Webster v. Upton, 91 U. S. 65, 67; HighGa. 486, 499.
tower v. Thornton,
The appellant does not dispute this rule of law. He only attempts
His claim is, that as the propto extricate this case from that rule.
mortgage to secure the notes he had
erty on which Turner gave
given to the defendant was property which had never belonged to the
corporation, therefore the defendant had taken nothing from the fund
from which the creditors of the corporation were to be paid, and conThat claim
sequently ought not to be required to pay back anything.
in
The
of
this court.
the superior
finding
wholly inadmissible
found that by
court settles the facts adversely to such claim. It
the said transaction and sale the defendant obtained from the corporation, in exchange for his forty shares of stock, valuable assets
is

is

a

8

a

if

a

is

a

if

is

is

it

is

3

it

is

is

52

it,
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of the company; and that the assets thus obtained were of the value
of $4,000. That finding is conclusive, unless inconsistent with the
Here the finding is fully supported by the
subordinate facts set out.
The Turner notes, held by the said corporation
facts detailed in it.
and secured upon the machinery, were perfectly good.
The Turner
notes which the defendant obtained, secured upon other property,
were no better.
The Turner notes were the real thing which the defendant took out of the assets of the corporation.
The security given
for the notes, whether before or after the I4th of June, 1890, was
only an incident. There is no subtility of words which can make the
incident displace the real thing, or make a shadow more important
than the substance.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
See, 1896, In re Brock way Mfg. Co., 89 Me. 121, 56 Am. St. Rep. 401 ; 1899,
See, also,
v. National Marine Bank, 89 Md. 602, 73 Am. St. Rep. 212.
cases following.

Heller

Sec. 696.
ency.
See

Same.

2.

Wood v. Dummer,

Withdrawing assets which creates insolv-

3

Mason 308, supra, p.

1847.

Note.
The general rule is that the corporate capital is a fund for the protection of creditors, and no part of this fund can be withdrawn by the shareholders before provision is made for the payment of creditors (Wood v. Dummer, supra; 1853, Curran v. State of Arkansas, 15 How. 304; 1896, Buck v.
Ross, supra, p. 1977; 1896, In re Brockway Mfg. Co., 89 Me. 121, 56 Am. St.
Rep; 401) ; and such part of the funds as are improperly paid out to shareholders, so far as necessary to pay creditors, can be recovered (1898, Grant v.
Southern Contract Co., 20 Ky. L. Rep. 960, 47 S. W. Rep. 1091 ; 1899, Davenport
v. Lines, 72 Conn. 118, infra, p. 1980), or from any one who is not a bonafide
holder (1853, Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 304), in a suit in equity, but not
at law (1899, Lawrence v. Greenup, 97 Fed. Rep. 906, infra, p. 1985), but it
seems that if dividends are paid out of capital when the corporation is solvent, to shareholders who receive them in good faith, they can not be recovered by subsequent creditors if the corporation becomes insolvent (McDonald
v. Williams, 174 IT. S. 397, infra, p. 1981); neither do former losses have to be
replaced, before dividends can be paid, if the corporation is solvent at the
time, and the payment does not make the corporation insolvent (1899, In re
Nat'l Bk., 68 L. J. Ch. 634, 81 L. T. R. (N. S.) 363 ; 1899, Dykman v. Keeney,
160 N. Y. 677; but see supra,
It seems, also, that creditors
542, 543, 544).
can not complain of a solvent corporation disposing of its property for an inadequate consideration (1880, Graham v. Railroad Co., 102 U. S. 148, supra,
1897, Shoemaker v. Lumber Co., 97 Wis. 585; 1900, Hamilton v.
&1809;
enominee F. Q. Co., 106 Wis. 352, 81 N. W. Rep. 876).

DAVENPORT V. LINES.
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IN THE SUPREME

RECEIVER,

v.

GEORGE LINES. 1

COURT OF ERRORS OF CONNECTICUT.

Conn. Rep. 118-130.

72

[Action by the receiver of a corporation to recover certain sums
claimed to have been illegally paid to a stockholder by way of dividends, brought in the lower court, and upon a. rinding of facts there,
After holding that the
reserved for the consideration of this court.
of
court
to
the
effect
that
certain patterns and
the
lower
findings
scales, and the good-will of a former partnership, all inventoried at
$1,500, were not worth half that sum, there being no evidence submitted as to the value of the good-will, and also that another asset
inventoried at $2,200, representing money expended in an exhibit at
the World's Fair, represented "no tangible asset," and had np value,
were conclusive on this court, proceeds:]
* * * Upon the facts set forth in the record, then, the
TORRANCE,
effect, found that the corporation, when the money
in
court
has,
trial
in
was
here
paid to the defendant, was in fact insolvent and
question
its capital stock impaired, and has expressly found that it so continued
until the receiver was appointed.
The remaining question is whether the money paid to the defendant
under the circumstances set forth in the record can be recovered back
in this action.
We think it can be. The defendant claims that he rethis
ceived
money in the shape of dividends which had been, in
effect, regularly declared by the board of directors at a regular and
The record does not, perhaps, support this claim,
lawful meeting.
for
the
but
purposes of the discussion we will assume it to be true.
The general rule, even in the absence of any statute on the subject,
is that dividends, in a going concern, can be properly declared and
paid only out of profits, and not out of capital, or assets required for
Morawetz on Private Corpothe security and payment of creditors.
Redfield
on
rations (ist ed.),
240; 2 Thompson
Railways,
344;
This
the stock upon
rule
whether
on Corporations,
applies,
2152.
declared
is
common
in this case,
is
stock
as
or,
the
dividend
which
Warren
v.
108
King,
U.
S.
preferred stock.
389 ; Getting v. New

J.

York & N. E. R. Co., 54 Conn. 156-169.
In addition to this our statute expressly says that "no corporation

shall declare any dividend while its capital stock is impaired," and
makes the officers voting in favor of such dividend, "knowing, or
having the means of knowing, that such capital is impaired," liable
for all losses resulting from such declaration, and their action in so
General Statutes,
voting is made a misdemeanor.
1932.
The dividends here in question were declared and paid when the
corporation was insolvent and its capital stock impaired, and were
1
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thus declared and paid in direct violation of these legal principles and
The money paid to the defendant in the
form of dividends was wrongfully paid, to the prejudice of the creditors of the corporation, to one who was not only a stockholder of the
corporation but was also a director therein from its organization until
it went into the hands of the receiver.
Its condition when the dividends in question were declared and paid was clearly shown upon its
books, inventories and quarterly statements ; and it is expressly found
that the attention of the defendant was specifically called to its financial
condition, as it appeared upon its books, at the very time these dividends were declared and paid.
It thus appears that the defendant,
when he participated in the declaration and payment of these dividends, and when he accepted them in payment, knew, or had the
means of knowing, that the money really and in fact belonged to the
creditors of the corporation, because it was required for the payment
of their claims, and could not legally be paid away, under the form
of a dividend, to one standing in his position. Under these circumstances the money paid to the defendant was part of a trust fund
which belonged to the creditors of the corporation, to which he could
acquire no title as against them, because he took it without consideration and with full knowledge of the trust which existed in their favor.
The plaintiff in this case, as the representative of the creditors of the
corporation, is entitled to sue for and recover back the money so paid.
Crandall v. Lincoln, 52 Conn. 73; Greene v. Sprague Mfg. Co., 52

of this statutory enactment.

Conn. 330.
The court of common pleas is advised to render judgment for the
plaintiff to recover the dividends paid to the defendant, with interest
from the respective dates of payment.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Note. Accord: 1898, Grant v. Southern Contract Co., 20 Ky. L. Rep. 960, 47
S.W. Rep. 1091. But compare next case and, 1899, In re National Bank, 68 L. J.
Ch. 634, 81 L. T. (N. S.) 363; 1899, Dykman y. Keeney, 160 N. Y. 677, 54 N.
E. Rep. 1090; where it is held that paying dividends without providing for
former losses, or out of capital when solvent, to shareholders who receive
them in good faith, does not make such shareholders liable to subsequent
creditors.

Same. 4. Dividends
were paid out of capital.

Sec. 698.

McDONALD,
1899.

received

RECEIVER,

v.

in

good faith

WILLIAMS.

which

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

174

U. S.

397-408.

[Action in United States Circuit Court by the receiver of a bank to
recover from the defendants the amount of certain dividends alleged
to have been wrongfully paid to shareholders.
Judgment was given
1
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;
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for plaintiff, and an appeal taken to the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals, which, upon a rinding of facts, certified questions of law
The bank became hopelessly insolvent in
to this court for advice.
1893; shareholders have been held to the full extent of their stock
liability, yet with this, and all the assets of the bank, and all the dividends ever paid, will not pay 75 per cent, of the creditors' claims.
Dividends were paid from 1885 to 1892, and all those from January,
1889, to July, 1892, were declared and paid when there were no net
those before July, 1891, being paid out of capital while
profits
the bank was solvent, and those of 1892, out of the capital after inNone of the defendants were officers or directors, and were
solvency.
ignorant of the bank's condition, and received the dividends in good
faith, supposing them to be paid out of profits only. The quesi. Can the receiver recover dividends paid
tions submitted were:
of
capital, when the stockholder received them in good
wholly out
faith, believing them to be paid out of profits, and when the bank was
not insolvent? 2. Has the circuit court of the United States jurisdiction to entertain a bill in equity in such case, when the objection
that there is an adequate remedy at law is raised by answer?]
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM. * * * The complainant bases his right
to recover in this suit upon the theory that the capital of the corporation was a trust fund for the payment of creditors entitled to a portion
thereof, and having been paid in the way of dividends to the shareholders that portion can be recovered back in an action of this kind
for the purpose of paying the debts of corporation. He also bases
his right to recover upon the terms of section 5204 of the revised
statutes.

We think the theory of

a trust fund has no application to a case of
When a corporation is solvent, the theory that its capital
is a trust fund upon which there is any lien for the payment of its
No general creditor has any
debts has in fact very little foundation.
lien upon the fund under such circumstances, and the right of the
corporation to deal with its property is absolute so long as it does not
violate its charter or the law applicable to such corporation. * * *
(Citing and quoting from Graham v. Railroad Company, 102 U.
S. 148, 161 ; Hollins v. Brierfield, etc., Co., 150 U. S. 371, 383,
385; Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Ham, 114 U. S. 587, 594.)
These cases, while not involving precisely the same question now
before us, show there is no well-defined lien of creditors upon the capital of a corporation while the latter is a solvent and going concern,
so as to permit creditors to question, at the time, the disposition of the
property.
The bank being solvent, although it paid its dividends out of
capital, did not pay them out of a trust fund.
Upon the subsequent
of
the
bank
and
of
a receiver, an action
the
appointment
insolvency
could not be brought by the latter to recover the dividends thus paid
on the theory that they were paid from a trust fund, and therefore were
liable to be recovered back.
It is contended on the part of complainant, however, that if the

this kind.
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assets of the bank are impressed with a trust in favor of its creditors
when it is insolvent, they must be impressed with the same trust when
it is solvent; that the mere fact that the value of the assets of the corporation has sunk below the amount of its debts, although as yet unknown to anybody, can not possibly make a new contract between
In case of insolvency, however,
the corporation and its creditors.
the recovery of the money paid in the ordinary way without condition
is allowed, not on the ground of contract to repay, but because the
money thus paid was, in equity, the money of the creditor; that it did
not belong to the bank, and the bank in paying could bestow no title
in the money it paid to one who did not receive it bona fide and for
The assets of the bank while it is solvent may clearly not be
value.
impressed with a trust in favor of creditors, and yet that trust may be
created by the very fact of the insolvency and the trust enforced by a receiver as the representative of all the creditors.
But we do not wish
to be understood as deciding that the doctrine of a trust fund does in
truth extend to a shareholder receiving a dividend, in good faith believing it is paid out of profits, even though the bank at the time of
the payment be in fact insolvent.
That question is not herein preWe only
sented to us, and we express no opinion in regard to it.
would
be
on
the
recoverable,
if
a
dividend
be
it
that
such
princisay,
ple of a trust fund.
Insolvency is a most important and material fact, not only with individuals but with corporations, and with the latter, as with the former, the mere fact of its existence may change radically and materially its rights and obligations. Where there is no statute providing
what particular act shall be evidence of insolvency or bankruptcy, it
may be, and it sometimes is, quite difficult to determine the fact of
its existence at any particular period of time.
Although no trust exwhile
which
creates the trust is
ists
the corporation is solvent, the fact
the insolvency, and when that fact is established, at that instant the trust
arises.
To prove the instant of creation may be almost impossible,
What
and yet its existence at some time may very easily be proved.
is,
in
case,
such
the precise nature and extent of the trust
even
may
be somewhat difficult to accurately define, but it may be admitted in
some form and to some extent to exist in a case of insolvency.
Hence it must be admitted that the law does create a distinction between solvency and insolvency, and that from the moment when the
latter condition is established the legality of acts thereafter performed
will be decided by very different principles than in a case of solvency.
The fact
And so of acts committed in contemplation of insolvency.
one
comof insolvency must be proved in order to show the act was
mitted in contemplation thereof.
Without reference to the statute, therefore, we think the right to
recover the dividend paid while the bank was solvent would not exist.
But it is urged on the part of the complainant that section 5204 of
the Revised Statutes makes the payment of a dividend out 'of capital
illegal and ultra vires of the corporation, and that money thus paid
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remains the property of the corporation, and can be followed into the
hands of any volunteer.
The section provides that "no association, or any member thereof,
shall, during the time it shall continue its banking operations, withdraw, or permit to be withdrawn, either in the form of dividends or
otherwise, any portion of its capital."
What is meant by this lanHas a shareholder withdrawn, or permitted to be withdrawn,
guage?
in the form of a dividend, any portion of the capital of the bank when
he has simply and in good faith received a dividend declared by a board
of directors of which he was not a member, and which dividend he
honestly supposed was declared only out of profits ? Does he in such
case, within the meaning of the statute, withdraw or permit to be withdrawn a portion of the capital ? The law prohibits the making of a
dividend by a national bank from its capital or to an amount greater
than its net profits then on hand, deducting therefrom its losses and
bad debts.
The fact of the declaration of a dividend is in effect the
assertion by the board of directors that the dividend is made out of
Believing that the dividend is thus made, the shareholder in
profits.
faith
receives his portion of it.
Can it be said that in thus doing
good
he withdraws or permits to be withdrawn any portion of the capital of
the corporation ? We think he does not withdraw it by the mere reception of his proportionate part of the dividend.
The withdrawal was
initiated by the declaration of the dividend by the board of directors,
and was consummated on their part when they permitted payment to
be made in accordance with the declaration.
We think this language
or
some
affirmative
act
on
the part of the shareholder
implies
positive
he
the
which
withdraws
capital or some portion thereof,
by
knowingly
or with knowledge permits some act which results in the withdrawal,
and which might not have been so withdrawn without his action.
The permitting to be withdrawn can not be founded upon the simple
receipt of a dividend under the facts stated above.
One is not usually said to permit an act which he is wholly ignorant of, nor would he be said to consent to an act of the commission
of which he had no knowledge. Ought it to be said that he withdraws or permits the withdrawal by ignorantly yet in entire good faith
receiving his proportionate part of the dividend ? Is each shareholder
an absolute insurer that dividends are paid out of profits?
Must he
bank
to
examine
the
books
of
the
to
receiving
employ experts
previous
each dividend?
Few shareholders could make such examination
themselves.
The shareholder takes the fact that a dividend has been
declared as an assurance that it was declared out of profits and not
out of capital, because he knows that the statute prohibits any declaration of a dividend out of capital.
Knowing that a dividend from
would
be
he
receive
would
the dividend as an assurcapital
illegal,
ance that the bank was in a prosperous condition and with unimpaired
Under such circumstances we can not think that congress
capital.
intended by the use of the expression " withdraw or permit to be
withdrawn, either in the form of dividends, or otherwise," any portion of its capital, to include the case of the passive receipt of a divi-
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dend by a shareholder in the bona Jide belief that the dividend was
We think it
paid out of profits, while the bank was in fact solvent.
would be an improper construction of the language of the statute to
*
hold that it covers such a case. * *
We may concede that the directors who declared the dividend under such circumstances violated the law, and that their act was therefore illegal, but the reception of the dividend by the shareholder in
good faith, as mentioned in the question, was not a wrongful or deHence the liability of the shareholder should
signedly improper act.
not be enlarged by reason of the conduct of the directors.
They may
have rendered themselves liable to prosecution, but the liabilitv of
the shareholder is different in such a case, and the receipt of a dividend under the circumstances is different from an act which may be
said to be generally illegal, such as the purchase of stock in one national bank by another national bank for an investment merely, which
is never proper.
Concord First National Bank v. Hawkins, just de*
*
cided, 174 U. S. 364. *
(We answer the first question in the
negative, and it becomes unnecessary to answer the second question.)
Accord:

363;

1899,

In re Nat'l Bk. of Wales, 68 L.
Dykman v. Keeney, 160 N. Y. 677,

1899,

preceding case.

See. 699.

Same.

LURTON,
1899.

5.

CIRCUIT

J.
54

Ch. 634, 81 L. T. R. (N. S.)
N. E. Eep. 1090. But see

Remedy only in equity, not at law.
JUDGE,

IN

LAWRENCE v. GREENUP.

IN THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, MICHIGAN.

97 Fed. Rep. 906, on 910, 911.

[Action at law by the receiver of a national bank to recover of
Greenup a dividend of 50 per cent, of his $2,000 of stock in the bank,
paid in good faith to him by the directors of the bank, and by him
received in good faith, out of the capital of the bank, while it was,
and which left it solvent, and while it was in the process of voluntary liquidation for the purpose of consolidation or merger with the
Mecosta Savings Bank. Afterwards other dividends were paid to
other parties, but not to Greenup, which had the effect with certain
claims of the savings bank which arose upon contracts made after
the bank went into liquidation, to make the latter insolvent.] * * *
We express no opinion as to the effect of a fraudulent distribution of
the assets of a corporation with the purpose of defeating its creditors ;
nor need we deal with the question of the legal right of the receiver
to maintain this suit if the dividend had been paid or received in bad
faith, or for a dividend paid and received in violation of section 5204,
revised statutes, as in Finn v. Brown, 142 U. S. 56, 12 Sup. Ct. 136.
The dividend sued for here was both paid and received in good faith,
both the directors who declared it and the stockholders here sued be-

1986

LAWRENCE

V.

GREENUP.

Having that the bank was solvent, the assets being such as to justify
Neither is it shown that the payment of the 50 per
this dividend.
cent, dividend was made when the bank was in fact insolvent, or that
the payment reduced the bank to a condition of insolvency.
Subsequently other dividends were paid, in which the defendant in error
did not participate.
From the showing of assets now on hand, and debts yet unpaid, it
is indeed plain and obvious that the distribution made through the
original 50 per cent, dividend of November, 1895, did not reduce the
bank to its present probable condition of insolvency.
The subsequent
dividends are alone responsible for the present condition. The fact
that this bank was in liquidation does not materially affect the situaThe corporation was still in absolute control of its assets, and
tion.
Those in charge of the
its power of disposition was unaffected.
the
of
were
with
duty
charged
liquidation
winding up the affairs of
the bank, and applying the proceeds, first, to the payment of debts,
and, second, to the distribution of the remainder among the shareholdIf the bank was not insolvent when this dividend was declared
ers.
or paid, and the division of a portion of the assets did not reduce the
bank to a condition of insolvency, on what theory can it be maintained
that the bank, or a receiver subsequently appointed, could maintain an
action at common law upon implied promises to return the dividend
so paid and received?
The distinction between this case and that of
McDonald v. Williams, 1 cited above, is that the dividend was confessedly paid out of capital, and received with knowledge of that fact.
But in the case referred to the bank was a going concern, and prohibited by section 5204, revised statutes, from withdrawing any part of
its capital for the purpose of paying dividends while it should " conThe directors who declared the divitinue its banking operations."
dend out of capital were said by the court to have rendered themselves
liable under the statute, but the stockholder who received it was acquitted from liability to return same, though in fact paid out of capital, and though the bank subsequently became insolvent, because he
did not receive it knowing that it was paid in violation of the statute.
Section 5204 has no application here, because this bank Was not engaged in its ordinary banking operations, and was in voluntary liquidation.
If this dividend was paid in good faith at a time when the
assets were abundantly sufficient to justify such a return of capital without depriving existing creditors of a fund ample to pay their dividends,
it is difficult, under the doctrine of the cases we have cited, to see any
ground upon which the stockholders can be made to refund. * * *

The considerations we have mentioned lead us to the conclusion
that the plaintiff in error can not, in an action at law, recover dividends paid by a liquidating bank which was solvent when the
dividend was declared and paid, although paid wholly out of capital, if paid and received in the honest belief that the assets jutified
such payment.
The case of McDonald v. Williams, and the cases
no room to doubt but that in the absence of
that,
leave
preceding
fraud, or bad faith, equivalent to fraud, the condition of trust neces1

174TJ. S. 397, supra, p. 1981.
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sary to give a corporate creditor, or a receiver representing both the
corporation and creditors, the right to follow and compel the return
of the dividends paid out of capital, depends upon, and arises out of,
The right when insolvency is shown to
an .established insolvency.
have existed is an equitable right, and will not support a purely leIf we assume, therefore, that insolvency existed in fact
gal action.
there being no fraud or
when this dividend was paid, the remedy
bad faith where it is sought to compel the return of such dividend,
is in equity and not at law.
Note:

See supra,

C

688,

and note; also, infra,

i. Kinds:

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS.
Contractual and penal.

ALFRED H. WILES ET
1876.

and note.

STATUTORY LIABILITY OF SHAREHOLDERS.
ARTICLE I.

Sec. 700.

715

AL., RESPONDENTS, v.
APPELLANT. 1

LAMBERT SUYDAM,

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.

64

N. Y. Rep.

173-179.

[Appeal from general term, overruling

a

demurrer to plaintiff's

complaint.]

The ground of demurrer relied upon is that sevCHURCH, C. J.
eral causes of action are improperly united.
The complaint contains
but one count composed of a series of allegations, and was doubtless
framed upon the theory that there is but one cause of action contained.
If, however, the complaint does contain several causes of action,
and they are improperly united, the omission to state the causes of
action in separate counts properly numbered does not deprive the defendant of the right to demur.
(Goldberg v. Utley, 60 N. Y. 427.)
The complaint alleges an indebtedness against the Imperishable Stone
Block Pavement Company of New York City, which had been prosecuted to judgment and execution; that the defendant was a "stockholder to the amount of $50,000," but had not paid for the same,
and that no certificate had been made and recorded that the capital
was paid in.
Section 10 of the act authorizing the formation of
corporations for manufacturing and other purposes declares that until
such certificate is recorded the stockholders shall be liable for the
debts of the company to the amount of their stock respectively.
The
complaint also alleges that at the time the debt was contracted, and
ever since, the defendant was a trustee of the corporation, and that no
report was filed on the ist day of January, 1873, nor at any time
since, and for this neglect the twelfth section of the act aforesaid de1

ted.

Statement,

except as

given in the opinion, and part of the opinion omit-
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clares that the trustees shall be liable for all the debts of the corporation then existing, or which may be thereafter created, until such
report is filed.
It is insisted by the counsel for the plaintiff that this constitutes but
one cause of action, and he argues that the cause of action is to recover the debt upon two grounds of personal liability created by statute.
I am unable to concur in this view. The recovery of the debt
is the object of the action, but a cause of action must have two factors
the right of the plaintiff and the wrong or obligation of the deThese must concur to give a cause of action.
fendant.
The cause
of action against the defendant as a stockholder consists of the debt
and the liability created by statute against stockholders when the stock
has not been paid in and a certificate of that fact recorded.
In effect,
the statute in such a case withdraws the protection of the corporation
from the stockholders, and regards them liable to the extent of the
amount of their stock as copartners.
(Corning v. McCullough, i N.
Y. 47.) The allegations in the complaint are sufficient to establish a
perfect cause of action against the defendant as a stockholder primarily liable for the debts to the amount of his stock. .The allegations
against the defendant as trustee also constitute a distinct and perfect
Here the liacause of action, but of an entirely different character.
bility is created by statute and is in the nature of a penalty imposed
for neglect of duty in not filing a report showing the situation of the
The object of the action is the same, viz., the collection
company.
of the debt; but the liability and the grounds of it are entirely distinct
That there are two causes of action in this complaint
and unlike.
The more difficult quesseems too clear to require much argument.
tion is, whether they may be united in the same complaint.
The first
cause of action against the defendant as a stockholder is an action on
The six years' statute of limitations applies,
contract.
(i N. Y.,
The defendant is entitled to contribution. (3 Hill iSS.)
supra.")
But in respect to the action against defendant as trustee, this court
held, in Merchants' Bank v. Bliss (35 N. Y. 412), that the three
years' statute of limitations applied under the following provisions of
"An action upon a statute for penalty or forfeiture when
the code:
the action is given to the party aggrieved."
( 92.)
With this decision before us, which we do not feel at liberty to
overrule, this cause of action must be regarded as an action upon a
The liability is far more extenstatute for a penalty or forfeiture.
sive than that of stockholder, it is for all debts, while the former is
The defendant would not be enlimited to the amount of the stock.
titled to contribution except by statute (Laws of 1871, p. 1435), an( ^
contributions would be from different persons than in the other case.
It is claimed also that execution against the person might issue and
this would seem to follow from the decision in i New York (supra))
If these
but we do not deem it necessary to pass upon that question.
actions may be united it must be by virtue of the first subdivision of
section 167 of the code.
From the nature of the two actions they do
not come under either of the other subdivisions.
The first subdivis-
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"The plaintiff may unite in the same comion reads as follows:
plaint several causes of action whether they be such as have been
heretofore denominated legal or equitable, or both, when they all
ist. The same transaction or transactions connected
arise out of :
This language is very general and
with the same subject of action."
very indefinite. I have examined the various authorities upon this
clause, and I am satisfied that it is impracticable to lay down a general
rule which will serve as an accurate guide for future cases. It is safer
for courts to pass upon the question as each case is presented. * * *
In this case it is attempted to unite an action on a statute for a penThe nature of the two actions are
alty with an action on contract.
essentially different, although the object to be attained is the same.
The facts to establish the liability are entirely unlike. The measure
The defenses are different.
of liability is different.
The rights of
the defendant may be seriously prejudiced.
Suppose a general verdict is obtained, from whom would the defendant seek contribution,
from his cotrustees or from his costockholders ? Can it be said that
these causes of action arose out of the same transaction ? If so, what
was the transaction? Was it the formation of the company?
That
created no liability nor cause of action.
Was it the debt of the plaintiff ? That created no liability against the trustees, nor does such liability arise out of it. Was it the failure to file a certificate that the
stock was not paid in? If so, there is no connection between that and
the transaction which created the liability against the defendant as
An omission to record a certificate that the stock was paid
trustee.
is not, in any sense, the same transaction as the neglect of trustees to
file a report of the financial condition of the company.
Without attempting to define the terms of the last clause, I do not think that
there is any such connection between the transactions, out of which
the causes of action arose in this case, and the "subject of action."
*

*

#

Reversed.

All

concur.

1. As to what is contractual liability, see, 1883, Flash v. Conn, 109 TJ.
Note.
S. 371 ; 1890, Cochran v. Wiechers, 119 N. Y. 399 ; 1892, Willis v. Mabon, 48
Minn. 140, 31 Am. St. Rep. 626, infra, p. 2013; 1892, Huntington v. Attrill, L.
R. 18 App. Gas. 150, 146 U. S. 657, supra, p. 1892; 1894, Hencke v. Twomey, 58Minn. 550; 1895, Mandel v. Swan, etc., Cattle Co., 154 111. 177, 45 Am. St.
Rep. 124, note 132; 1898, Bell v. Farwell, 176 111. 489, 42 L. R. A. 804; 1898,
Parker v. Carolina Sav. Bk., 53 S. C. 583, 69 Am. St. Rep. 888; 1899, First
Nat'l Bk. v. Weidenbeck, 97 Fed. Rep. 896; 1900, Davis v. Mills, 99 Fed. Rep.
39; 1900, Whitman v. Oxford Nat'l Bk., 176 U. S. 559; infra, p. 2018; 1900,
Hancock Nat'l Bk. v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 640; 1900, Howarth v. Angle, 162N. Y. 179, 47 L. R. A. 725, infra, p. 2028 ; 1900, Woodworth v. Bowles, 61 Kan.
569, 60 Pac. Rep. 331, infra, p. 2014.
701-703, 705-714.
See, also, infra,
2. As to what is penal, see, 1858, Derrickson v. Smith, 27 N. J. L. 166 (failure to file report) ; 1882, Diversey v. Smith, 103 111. 378; 1884, Webb P. & F.
M. Co. v. Beecher, 97 N. Y. 651; 1884, Stokes v. Stickney, 96 N.Y. 323; 1889,
Attrill v. Huntington, 70 Md. 191, 14 Am. St. Rep. 344, note 350; 1890, Carr
v. Rischer, 119 N. Y. 117; 1896, State Sav. Bk. v. Johnson, 18 Mont. 440, 56
Am. St. Rep. 591 ; 1899, Crippen v. Laighton, 69 N. H. 540. 46 L. R. A. 467,
44

Atl. Rep.

538.
2 WIL. CAS.

52

UMSTED V. BUSKIRK

1990

Sec. 701.

Same.

2.

ET AL.
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General nature of contractual statutory lia-

bility.

ELIJAH
1866.

UMSTED

v.

HENRY A. BUSKIRK ET

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

17

AL.

Ohio St. Rep. 113-118.

WHITE, J. The original petition in this case is in the nature of a
bill in equity, and is filed by a judgment creditor of an insolvent

corporation to obtain satisfaction of his judgment by the enforcement
of the statutory liability of the several stockholders, and of the liability of one of them on an unpaid stock subscription.
No objection is made on the ground of a defect of parties; and,
for aught that appears in the record, the plaintiff is the only creditor
and the defendants the only stockholders of the corporation.
The only ground assigned for the demurrer is that the petition does
not contain facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The corporation of which the defendants are stockholders was organized under the act of May i, 1852, and the liability of the stockholders in question is provided for in section seventy-eight, which,
as originally passed, is as follows:
"All stockholders of any railroad, turnpike, or plankroad, magnetic
telegraph, or bridge company, shall be deemed and held liable to an
amount equal to their stock subscribed, in addition to said stock, for
O. L.,
the purpose of securing the creditors of such company."
vol. 50, p. 296, 3 Curwen's Stat. 1897.
The subsequent amendment of April 17, 1854, did not alter the
section in respect to railroad companies,
i S. & C. Stat. 310, 4
Curwen's Stat. 2582.
The counsel of the defendant in error claims to support the judgment below, on the ground that it was not the intention of the legislature "to make the stockholders in the railroad companies individzially liable to the creditors of the company," but that as stockholders
they are subject to be assessed pro rata by the corporation, to the extent of this statutory liability.
This claim was made in Wright et al. v. McCormack et al. (decided at the present term, 17 Ohio St. 86), and overruled. It was held
in that case that this liability of the stockholders was a security provided by law for the exclusive benefit of the creditors, over which the
corporate authorities had no control.
If the corporation has the right to enforce this liability by assessments, it can exhaust it to discharge a present indebtedness, and continue its business with no other security to its future creditors than its
corporate liability.
This would neither be in accordance with the design of the constitutional provision, nor of the statute.
The intention, doubtless, was
to provide an ultimate security to which the creditors might resort on
the failure and insolvency of the corporation.
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Nor will it follow as counsel suppose from the denial of the right
to the corporation of enforcing this liability, that it may be enforced
against part of the stockholders at the election of the creditor, without the right on their part to call on their costockholders for contribution.
The liability on the part of the stockholders is severel in its nature,
but the right arising out of this- liability is intended for the common
The suit of a creditor under
and equal benefit of all the creditors.
this statute should, in our opinion, be for the benefit of all the creditors ; and the stockholders whose liability is sought to be enforced
have the right to insist on their costockholders being made parties for
the purposes of a general account, and to enforce from them contribution in proportion to their shares of stock.
The right of contribution grows out of the organic relation existAs between them and the creditors,
ing among the stockholders.
each stockholder is severally liable to all the creditors ; as between
themselves, each stockholder is bound to pay in proportion to his
stock.

The corporation ought to have been made a party, but the omission
was not made an objection, and the demurrer was sustained and the
action dismissed on the sole ground of the petition not showing a
cause of action against the defendants.
The omission to make the corporation a party is, therefore, no objection to the reversal of the judgment.
The judgment sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the action is
reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
concurred.
Day, C. J., and Welch, Brinkerhoff and Scott,

JJ.,

See, also, Zang v. Wyant, 25 Colo. 551, 71 Am. St. Rep. 145, infra,
Parker v. Carolina Sav. Bk., 53 S. C. 583, 69 Am. St. Rep. 888.
1. The contractual liability survives
the death of the shareholder, and is
enforceable against his estate (1890, Cochran v. Wiechers, 119 N. Y. 399) ; is
enforceable in other states, unless some peculiar special remedy is provided
(see Whitman v. Oxford Nat'l Bk., 176 U. S. 559, infra, p. 2018; Marshall v.
Sherman, 148 N. Y. 9, infra, p. 2021; Howarth v. Angle, 162 N. Y. 179, infra,
p. 2028); can be imposed by the state only by consent of the shareholder
(1869, Ireland v. Palestine Tp. Co., 19 Ohio St. 369, supra, p. 757); unless
there is a reserved power to amend, in which case the state can impose without consent of shareholders (1886, Sleeper v. Goodwin, 67 Wis. 577; 1894,
Bissell v. Heath, 98 Mich. 472; 1896, McGowan v. McDonald, 111 Cal. 57, 52
Am. St. Rep. 149; 1900, Williams v. Nail, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1526, 55 S. W. Rep.
706) ; and such a liability when once imposed can not be repealed so as to impair the security of existing creditors (1864, Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wall. 10,
supra, p. 752 ; 1900, Wood worth v. Bowles, 61 Kan. 569, 60 Pac. Rep. 331, infra,
p. 2014). It may be waived by the creditor (1883, Brown v. Eastern Slate Co.,
134 Mass. 590) ; those who pay more than their share can have contribution
from others that are also liable (1895, Brown v. Merrill, 107 Cal. 446, 48 Am.
Rep. 145 ; 1898, Myers v. Sierra Val. S. & A. Assn., 122 Cal. 669, 55 Pac. Rep. St.
689; Bennison v. McConnell, 56 Neb. 46, 76 N. W. Rep. 412, supra, p. 1771;
1900, Moxham v. Grant, 69 L. T. Q. B. 97, 81 L. T. (N. S.) 431, supra, p. 1794 ;
but compare, 1899, Sacramento Bank v. Pacific Bank, 124 Cal. 147, 71 Am. St.
Rep. 36, note, p. 40).
2. Set-off. If the statutory liability is primary (and perhaps in some cases,
if secondary), the shareholder may set off a debt due him by the corporation,
See, 1876, Boyd v. Hall, 56 Ga. 563; 1889, Boulton Caragainst his liability.
Note.
p. 2025;

1898,

CHILD

1992

V.

BOSTON

&

FAIRHAVEN

IRON WORKS.

/O2

bon Co. v. Mills, 78 Iowa 460, 5 L. R. A. 649; 1896, Hood v. French, 37 Fla.
117 ; 1900, Ball v. Anderson, 196 Pa. St. 86 ; 1900, Broadway Nat'l Bk. v. Baker, 176 Mass. 294.
Contra: 1899, Lauraglenn Mills v. Ruff, 57 S. C. 53, 49 L. R. A. 448.
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IRON WORKS ET

AL. 1

JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
Mass. Rep. 516-523.

[Bill in equity by Child, on behalf of himself and all the other

against the corporation and its officers to enforce their statutory liability, alleging that he had obtained a judgment for $5,640
damages and $1,778 as costs against the defendant corporation for an
infringement of patents belonging to plaintiff; also, that the debts exceeded the capital stock by $9,000, and that the officers had knowingly filed false certificates of the assets and liabilities of the corporation.
The defendants demurred to the bill on the ground that the statutory
liability did not extend to claims arising from infringement of patents.
The statute provided, "The officers of any corporation shall be jointly
and severally liable for its debts and contracts, when the debts exceed the capital to the extent of such excess, and for signing any certificate required by law, knowing it to be false."
Section 38, Laws
of 1870.]
*
*
FIELD, J. *
(After reviewing the former legislation.)
Whatever reason once existed for giving a liberal construction to the
word "debt" in the earlier statutes, on the ground that a stockholder in
every manufacturing corporation was liable to have his property taken
to satisfy any judgment in any civil suit against the corporation, has
now ceased to exist, when the stockholders and officers are only liable
under special provisions of statute.
The word "debts," and the words "debts and contracts," do not
in their legal sense ordinarily include liabilities for torts not reduced to
a judgment.
There is nothing in the statutes indicating that, for
causes stated, the officers were to be made responsible for all the liabilities of the corporation. Gray v. Bennett, 3 Met. 522; Chase v.
Ingalls, 97 Mass. 524; Lowell v. Street Commissioners, 106 Mass.
540; Zimmer v. Schleehauf, 115 Mass. 52; Heacock v. Sherman, 14
Wend. 58; Esmond v. Bullard, 16 Hun 65; Archer v. Rose, 3
Brewst. 264; Cable v. McCune, 26 Mo. 371 ; Dryden v. Kellogg, 2
Mo. App. 87; Bohn v. Brown, 33 Mich. 257, 263.
It was said by Chief Justice Shaw, in Gray v. Coffin, 9 Cush. 192,
199, that "to create any individual liability of members for the debt of
a corporation, a body politic, created by law, and regarded as a legal
and capabeing, distinct from that of all the members composing
Statement much abridged

;

1

it,

creditors,

part of opinion omitted.
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ble of contracting and being contracted with as a person, is a wide
departure from established rules of law, founded in considerations of
1
public policy, and depending solely upon provisions of positive law.
It is, therefore, to be construed strictly, and not extended beyond the
limits to which it is plainly carried by such provisions of statute."
In Mill Dam Foundry v. Hovey, 21 Pick. 417, 455, a case arising
under the statute of 1829, c. 53, Chief Justice Shaw said:
"For, though a question was made whether such a claim for unliquidated damages is a debt, within the meaning of the statute, we do
not think it admits of a reasonable doubt that all such claims for
'
The
damages were intended to be included in the term 'debts.'
claim there was of unliquidated damages for the breach of a contract
by the corporation. See, also, Byers v. Franklin Coal Co., 106

a

a

it,

Mass. 131 ; Hawes v. Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co., 101 Mass. 385.
In Carver v. Braintree Manuf. Co., 2 Story 432, one Edson was
excluded as a witness on the ground that he was interested in the
The action was case for the infringement of a patevent of the suit.
ent.
The defendant was created a corporation by the statutes of
1823, c. 45, and was made subject to the statutes of 1808, c. 65, and
Edson was a stockholder at the
the several acts in addition thereto.
time of the alleged infringement, although it seems that he had sold
out his stock before the action was brought.
Mr. Justice Story said :
"I follow out the doctrine of the case of Mill Dam Foundry v. Hovey,
21 Pick. 455, which, as far. as it goes, disclaims the interpretation
of
the word debt, as limited to contracts for the payment of determinate
sums of money. Passing that line, it does not seem to me easy to say
that if cases of unliquidated damages may be treated as debts, because
they end in the ascertainment of a fixed sum of money, that we are
at liberty to say that the doctrine is not equally applicable to all cases
of unliquidated damages, whether arising ex contractu or ex delicto.
If ultimately it ends in a debt, as a judgment for damages does, that
Becase asserts that its character as a debt relates back to its origin.
sides, it seems to me upon principle to be reasonable, if not absolutely justified by authority, to hold that if the transaction occurs
while a person is a member of the corporation, and he would, if he
remained a member, be liable for the ultimate debt adjudged, it may
well be treated as an inchoate debt consummated by the judgment."
2 Story 451.
This case was cited in Wyman v. American Powder Co., 8 Cush.
168, 182, which was an action of assumpsit, and independently of the
form of
the cause of action was essentially ex contractu.
There are no cases decided by the courts of the commonwealth in
which
stockholder has been held liable for
tort of the corporation,
and the decision of Mr. Justice Story stands unsupported by any direct
*

is

a

is

a

*

*
authority, either before or since.
The debts and contracts of
corporation may not be the debts and
contracts of individuals, because the corporation
legal person and
If the corporation worthless, the creditor may have
can contract.
no effectual remedy, and, therefore, in the cases specified the statute
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has given an additional remedy.
In this respect the statute was enacted apparently for the protection of persons who deal with the corporation. But the torts of a corporation are also the torts of natural
persons, because the corporation can only act by means of persons,
and these persons are liable as well as the corporation.
There are,
indeed, torts arising from contracts for which either case or assumpsit
is the proper form of action, but the action in either form is essentially
an act for the breach of a contract, express or implied.
Liability for
wrongs done which are independent of contracts can not, we think, be
considered a debt or contract within the meaning of the statute.
Whether, if a judgment is recovered in an action of tort, it then becomes a debt of record within the meaning of the statute, we have no
occasion to consider, because there is no allegation that any of the
personal defendants were officers of the corporation, or did any of the
acts alleged at or after the time when the final decree against the cor*
*
*
See Curtis v. Harlow, 12 Met. 3.
poration was entered.
We think that the decree which the plaintiff has obtained against
the defendant corporation is, in legal effect, a judgment rfor all the
damages done him by the infringement of his patent, which was a
tort not arising from any contract, and that the liability therefor, before the decree was obtained, was not a "debt" or "contract" within
the meaning of the statute of 1870, ch. 224,
38.

Bill

Note.

dismissed.

See, 1852, Gray v. Coffin, 9 Gush. 192, 199.

Sec. 703.

next case.

Same.

RIDER v. FRITCHEY,
1892.

Compare

IN THE SUPREME

COURT

ADMINISTRATOR.
OF

OHIO.

1

49 Ohio

St.

Rep.

285-296.

[Action by Fritchey, a judgment creditor of an insolvent street railroad company, the judgment being for over $1,200, for causing the
death of plaintiff's intestate through negligence, against Rider and the
other shareholders, and on behalf of himself and the other creditors,
to enforce the statutory liability of the shareholders ; the court below
found the names of all the creditors, and the amounts due them, the
names of the shareholders, with amount of stock held by them, and
levied an assessment of about 50 per cent, to pay all claims, includRider's proportion of all being $1,269.
Error
ing the plaintiff's
was prosecuted to the circuit court on the ground that the statutory
The
liability was incident only to claims arising out of contracts.
circuit court affirmed the decision of the common pleas court.]
SPEAR, C. J. * * * A more serious question arises with respect to
the second point: Can the stockholders of an Ohio corporation be held
1

Statement abridged,

part of opinion omitted.
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for obligations of the corporation growing out of its torts ? It follows
from what has already been stated, that we must assume that this street
railroad company was organized under a law which imposed upon
stockholders just such liability as the constitutional provision requires.
The provision,
We look, therefore, to the constitution as our guide.
section 3, of article 13, is : "Dues from corporations shall be secured
by such individual liability of the stockholders and other means as may
be prescribed by law; but in all cases, each stockholder shall be liable,
over and above the stock by him or her owned, and any amount unpaid thereon, to a further sum, at least equal in amount to such
The question turns upon the import of the word "dues."
stock."
It has been contended that provisions creating individual liability on
the part of the stockholders are in derogation of the common law, and
Authorities in support of this
are, therefore, to be construed strictly.
rule are not wanting, and, in so far as such liability is attached by
way of penalty for the omission of some act required by the statute,
as in some of the states, it is probable that the weight of authority
But all concede that this is a remedial profavors the proposition.
vision, and to hold that there must be applied to it the same test as if
it were a penal law, is to hold that all remedial laws must be so
construed, for every remedial law must of necessity be in derogaWhere the provision is simply remedial,
tion of the common law.
though it does impose an obligation which will not attach at common law, we see no reason to insist upon what is called a strict construction, but believe that the ordinary rule which requires the court
to inquire simply as to the intent of the law-makers, reading the provisions as they were intended to be read, will best attain the ends of
justice. This leads us to look to the intent of the section quoted.
Speaking in general terms, it must be manifest that the intent was to
provide that those who derive advantage from the authority of the
state, given by our incorporation laws, shall at the same time assume
responsibility for the acts of the artificial creature which they have
called into legal being affecting the rights of others.
Having in mind
this general intent, and the provision being remedial, it should, we
think, be construed with a view to remove the evil and extend the
benefit proposed.
It is conceded that if a cause of action for a tort can be treated as a
"debt," the liability of the stockholders for it would follow. The
affirmative of this is asserted, and the following authorities are cited
in its support:
Carver v. Manufacturing Company, 2 Story 432;
Milldam Foundry v. Hovey, 21 Pick. 417 ; Gray v. Bennett, 3 Met.
L.
522; Smith v. Omans, 17 Wis. 406, and White v. Hunt, 6 N.
in
error
cite
:
Bohn
for
To
the
of
counsel
this,
plaintiff
contrary
402.
v. Brown, 33 Mich. 257; Cable v. McCune, 26 Mo. 371; Doolittle
v. Marsh, n Neb. 243; Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 59; Archer
v. Rose, 3 Brewster 264; Child v. Iron Works, 137 Mass. 516;
220; Morawetz,
608, 613;
Cook Stock and Stockholders,
Nanson v. Jacobs (Mo.), 6 S. W. Rep. 246; Evans v. Lewis, 30
Kellogg v. Schuyler, 2
Ohio St.
; Crouch v. Gridley, 6 Hill 250;

J.

ii
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Denio 73, and Zimmer v. Schleehauf, 115 Mass. 52. A review of
these authorities would be important if a holding upon the proposition
were necessary to a decision of the case before us.
We think it is
not.

It would seem to be the undoubted duty of the court to give the
word "dues," as found in the section quoted, such construction as will
secure the apparent object of the constitution-makers in its adoption.
Constitutions are necessarily couched in terse language, and we look
there for the use of words in a broad, comprehensive sense.
This
term "dues" is of extended import.
Among other definitions Latham
gives the singular: owed; capable of being justly demanded; that
which may be justly claimed.
Worcester: that which anyone has a
Webster: that ought to be paid or done to or for
right to demand.
another; justly claimed as a right or property; fulfilling obligation;
that which belongs to or may be claimed as a right ; whatever custom,
law, or morality requires to be done ; right, just title or claim. Bouvier
defines it as what ought to be paid ; what may be demanded.
It
seems natural to say that where one is injured by the negligence of
another, reparation is due.
This implies a legal demand for reparation, and in Heacock v. Sherman, supra, Justice Nelson admits that
the word "demand" found in the New York statute, if it stood alone,
would be broad enough to include a cause of action for a tort. * * *
As conclusion, we are of the opinion that the word "dues" should
receive a beneficial construction, one which will include within its scope
as well a demand for unliquidated damages for a tort as a claim for
a debt arising upon contract.
Affirmed.
Note.

See preceding case.

As to debts and dues : See further: 1898, Brown v. Trail,
1900, Ward v. Joslin, 100 Fed. Rep. (C. C. N. H.) 676.

Note.
641 ;

Sec. 704.

Same.

4.

Fed. Rep.

;

Wiles v.

General nature of penal liability.

See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, snpra, p.
Suydam, 64 N. Y. 173, supra, p. 1987.
Note.

89

See note, supra, pp. 1892, 1991.

1892

*

Penal liability does not survive death of the party liable when judgment
has not been obtained (1884, Stokes v. Stickney, 96 N.Y. 323) ; but if judgment has been obtained it survives (1890, Carr v. Rischer, 119 N. Y. 117) ; it
attaches to the directors at the time of default (1880, Bruce v. Platt, 80 N. Y.
379) ; is not enforceable in another state if it is a true penalty (1889, Attrill v.
Huntington, 70 Md. 191, 14 Am. St. Rep. 344, note 350; 1899, Crippen v.
Laighton, 69 N. H. 540, 46 L. R. A. 467, 44 Atl. Rep. 538) ; can be repealed
by the state at any time, for a creditor has no vested right in a penalty (1884,
Webb P. & F. M. Co. v. Beeeher, 97 N. Y. 651) ; and perhaps there can be no
contribution in case one pays ruore than his share (1889, Sayles v. Brown, 40
Fed. Rep. 8 ; 1899, Sacramento Bk. v. Pacific Bk., 124 Cal. 147, 71 Am. St. Rep.
36; but compare, 1895, Brown v. Merrill, 107 Cal. 446, 48 Am. St. Rep. 145;
1900, Moxham v. Grant, 69 L. J. Q. B. 97, 81 L. T. (N. S.) 431, supra, p. 1794) ; the
statute of limitations relating to penalties generally, applies (1896, State Sav.
Bank v. Johnson, 18 Mont. 440, 56 Am. St. Rep. 591).
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ARTICLE II.
Sec. 705.

PARTICULAR KINDS OF CONTRACTUAL

and joint.

v. Buskirk, 17 Ohio St.
Colo. 551, infra, p. 2005.

See Umsted
25

LIABILITY.

I . As to legal character.

(a) Secondary, limited
Wyant,

1997

113,

supra, p. 1990; Zang v.

See, 1890, Barrick v. Gifford, 47 Ohio St. 180, 21 Am. St. Rep. 798;
National Bank v. Dillingham, 147 N. Y. 603, 49 Am. St. Rep. 692; 1899,
Gillin v. Sawyer, 93 Maine 151, 44 Atl. Rep. 677.
Compare, 1894, Hunting v. Blun, 143 N. Y. 511.
Note.

1895,

Sec. 706.

Same,

(b) Secondary, unlimited,

ANDREW HANSON v. CORNELIUS
1877.

IN THE SUPREME

and several.

DONKERSLEY. 1

COURT OF MICHIGAN.

37

Mich. Rep.

184-195.

The Morgan Iron Company owed Hanson for labor,
Assumpsit.
and he consented to extend the time of payment and accepted their note.
He afterwards recovered judgment on the note, but as the execution
was returned unsatisfied he sued Donkersley as a stockholder under
Corp. L.,
2852, which imposes upon stockholders an individual
liability for labor done for the corporation, and allows it to be enforced at any time after the return of an execution unsatisfied, or after
The court below inthe corporation has been, declared bankrupt.
structed the jury that in suing the company upon the note instead of
the original claim, the plaintiff treated the note as a payment and precluded himself from recovering against the stockholders, and directed
Plaintiff brought error.
a verdict for defendant.
CAMPBELL, J. This case is certainly not free from difficulty. But
it seems to me that the liability of the individual members of corporations for their debts, under the statute upon which this suit was
The
brought, can not in any just sense be called a primary liability.
as they are expressdebts which they are called on to pay are in fact
The statdebts of the corporation.
ly regarded in the constitution
ute is clear that the private parties shall not be called upon unless the
corporation has failed to pay, and legal remedies are exhausted, either
The
by unsatisfied execution or by bankruptcy legally adjudged.
of
is
contribution
action
where
recovering
right
only given
by legal
the payment made by the suing party is compulsory.
He has no
make
if
to
and
he
does
he must
so,
without
right
payment
necessity,
L.,
seek redress in some other way.
Corp.
2852.
The corporation is in law a different person from any of its mem1
Only the opinion of Campbell, J., is given. Arguments, concurring opinion of Graves, J., and dissenting opinion of Marsten, J., omitted.
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bers.
A promise by a stockholder to pay a corporation debt is in
The case can not
every sense a promise to pay the debt of another.
be different merely because the obligation is statutory.
It may be
that the statute could be so framed as to create a joint, or a joint and
several responsibility which could be legislated into a primary obligation.
But where the corporation is not put into such relations, and
the stockholder can not be called on until the remedy against the corporation has been tried and exhausted, it is entirely plain that they are
not both original debtors, and that one is only collaterally liable, and
is therefore in law a mere surety.
It is still plainer where, as here,
he has no right to pay in the first instance.
The constitution by making stockholders "individually liable" for
labor debts, does not thereby necessarily make them primarily liable.
Bank corporators are made "individually liable" for bank debts contracted during their connection with the banks.
Originally this was
unlimited. Now it is limited. It would be impossible to regard this
limited responsibility as a primary debt of the stockholders.
It reIf the
quires peculiar legislation to reach such cases at law at all.
constitution could be regarded as making them primary debtors, the
remedy could not be enforced except in equity, unless in very peculiar
cases, if it could be at all.
Here the plaintiff sued expressly under a
statute which treats the stockholder in all respects as a several surety,
and he must, I think, be so treated in determining his responsibility.
It can not be denied that if defendant is a surety, he was discharged
from the debt for labor by taking the corporate note and giving time.
In my view of the case no other question arises, and the judgment
*
* *
should be affirmed.

J.

Affirmed.
Graves, J.
,

,

J.,

Cooley, C.

concurring in the conclusion; Marsten,

dissenting.

Note.

See preceding case.

Am. St. Rep.

565.

Sec. 707.

Same,

(c)

HARGER
1846.

Compare,

Primary,
AND

1899,

Foster v. Row,

120

Mich. 1,77

unlimited, partnership.

ANOTHER v.

McCULLOUGH.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.
Rep. 119-125.

2

1

Denio

(N. Y.)

[Action against McCullough, as a stockholder in the Rossie Galena
Company, to enforce his liability under the New York statute. He
moved for a nonsuit upon various grounds, one of which was that
his statutoiy liability was that of a surety only, and that he had been
discharged from liability by an extension of the time of payment to
This was overruled and exceptions taken.]
the corporation.
*
*
* The charter makes the stockholders
BRONSON, C. J.
1

Statement abridged

;

part of opinion omitted.
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"jointly and severally personally liable for the payment of all debts
or demands contracted by the said corporation."
(Section 9.) But

they can not be sued until a judgment has been recovered against the
corporation and an execution has been returned unsatisfied.
(Section 10.) As between themselves we have regarded the stockholders
as standing in the character of partners.
(Moss v. Oakley, 2 Hill
But in reference to creditors,
265; Bailey v. Bancker, 3 Hill 188.)
they have been spoken of as guarantors or sureties of the company.
If they are to be regarded in all
(Moss v. McCullough, 5 Hill 131.)
respects as sureties, then it is quite clear that the defendant has been
discharged by the acts of the plaintiffs, who have twice given time to
But I think the stockholders in
the company without his consent.
their individual, as well as their corporate capacity, are principal
debtors.
Although they have been incorporated with many of the
privileges usually granted to men associated in that form, yet the privilege of exemption from personal liability for the debts of the company has been denied to them, and their personal liability has been
They are thus placed, in relation to the creditors
expressly declared.
of the company, upon the same footing as though they were an unincorporated association or partnership.
That is the view which was taken of the question under a charter
of the same nature in Allen v. Sewall (2 Wend. 327), and although
that judgment was reversed (6 Wend. 335), yet upon this point the
members of the court of errors who delivered opinions agreed substantially in the doctrine which had been laid down by this court.
And in Moss v. Oakley we considered the stockholders liable in the
same manner as though they had gone on with the business as an unincorporated association, which is nothing but a partnership. And
this doctrine was practically applied in Bailey v. Bancker, where we
held that one member of the association or partnership could not sue
I consider the legislature
another for a debt due from the company.
as saying to those who applied for the charter, "you may have a corporate capacity for the convenience of transacting business, and the
facility of transferring your respective interests in the joint concern,
but you shall remain liable to the creditors of the association in the
as though you had not been incorposame manner, substantially,
rated."
In one respect the burden was made more onerous than it
would have been in going on without a charter, for the copartners are
But that does not affect the prinseverally as well as jointly liable.
ciple. Nor is it affected by another provision, which lightens the
burden by saving the stockholders from an action until the creditor
has attempted to collect the money from the corporation by proceedThe stockholders are debtors from
ing to a judgment and execution.
the beginning, although the creditor has no remedy against them until
This is no more than
he has first tried to collect from the company.
applying an equitable principle, which requires that the debts should
be paid from the joint funds of the associates, rather than from the
I think the defendant was
separate property of any one of them.

COLEMAN V. WHITE.

2000

708

answerable to the plaintiffs as a principal debtor, and consequently
*
*
*
that he was not discharged by giving time to the company.
New trial denied.
See, 1896, McGowan v. McDonald, 111 Cal. 57, 52
Note.
Bank v. Pacific Bank, 124 Cal. 147, 71
Sacramento
Fidelity Ins. T. & S. D. Co. v. Mechanic's Bank,
(Kan.) ; 1899, Foster v. Row, 120 Mich. 1, 77 Am. St. Rep.

1899,
1899,

Sec. 708. Same,
in equity.

(d)

COLEMAN
1 86 1.

IN THE SUPREME

limited,

Primary,

COURT
*

v.

Am. St. Rep. 149;
Am. St. Rep. 36 ;
97 Fed. Rep. 297
565.

joint, enforceable only

WHITE. 1

OF

WISCONSIN.

14

Wis. Rep.

700-* 705.

DIXON, C. J. Section 18 of the general banking law, chapter 71,
"The stockholders in every corporation
Revised Statutes, declares:
under
the provisions of this chapter, shall be
association,
or
organized
the
amount of their respective share or
to
individually responsible,
and liabilities of every kind."
for
all
its
indebtedness
of
stock,
shares
law
founded
action
at
This is an
upon this section, instituted by the
Bank
of Racine, a corporation orof
the
a
creditor
as
City
plaintiff
an individual stockact,
the
defendant,
the
under
against
ganized
holder, to recover a debt due from the bank ; and the questions presented relate to the nature of the liability imposed and the form of
Other questions are presented by the case,
remedy to be pursued.
of these renders their consideration unwe
make
the
but
disposition
necessary.
We are of opinion that the liability is primary and absolute, and
attaches the moment the debt is contracted by the bank that it is a
liability of all the stockholders to all the creditors, on the principle of
copartnership, the stockholders standing on substantially the same footing as though they were partners or an [un] incorporated association,
save only that the responsibility of each is limited to a sum equal to
his share or shares of stock.
Subject to this limitation they are answerable as original and principal debtors, and their liability more
nearly resembles that of copartners than any other with which it can
These positions, it is believed, are fully sustained by
be compared.
the following authorities:
Marcy v. Clark, 17 Mass. 330; Allen v.
Sewall, 2 Wend. 327; Sewall v. Allen, 6 Wend. 335 ; Moss v. Oakley, 2 Hill 265; Harger v. McCullough, 2 Denio 119; Corning v.
McCullough, i Corns. 47; Matter of Empire Bank, 18 N. Y. 199;
Mokelumne Co. v. Woodbury, 14 Cal. 265 ; Wright v. Field, 7 Porter's Ind. 376; Planters' Bank v. Bivingsville Man. Co., 10 Rich.
Law. 95, and cases hereafter cited.
1 Argument

and part of opinion omitted.
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We are persuaded that the remedy should be by suit in equity, in

which all the creditors should join, or one or more of them should sue
for the benefit of all, and that the action should be against the bank
and all the stockholders, unless it be impossible or impracticable to
bring them all before the court, or some other sufficient cause for the
This conclusion, we think, follows necessarily
omission be shown.
from the nature of the obligation imposed, it being a liability on the
part of all the stockholders, in proportion to the amounts of their respective shares, to all the creditors according to the sums severally
due them.
It is an indebtedness which a court of law has no power
to regulate and adjust, and to which the jurisdiction and powers of
The creditors should
equity are peculiarly and exclusively adapted.
all join, because they have a common interest in the funds to be realized ; or, if the action be commenced by one or more of them, the
complaint should be so framed that the others may come in and prove
their claims before the court or a referee, and share in the distribution
of the moneys received.
All the stockholders should be made defendants, because they, too, have a common interest, and without
their presence it is impossible to adjust their rights and liabilities, and
The same reaprotect them from unequal and oppressive burdens.
sons exist for making all the stockholders parties to such actions as in
proceedings against delinquent stock subscribers to compel them to
contribute toward the payment of the debts of an insolvent or bankrupt corporation. See Adler v. Milwaukee Pat. Brick Co., 13 Wis.
*5y. The corporation should be joined, unless it has been dissolved,
or its assets wholly exhausted, for the reason that both creditors and
stockholders are interested in closing its affairs and in having its available property appropriated
to the payment of debts, without which
there can be no final settlement and adjudication of the rights and lia*
*
*
bilities of the parties.
Reversed.
Note.

See note preceding case.

Same,

Sec. 709.

law.

(e)

Primary,

limited,

THE BANK OF POUGHKEEPSIE
1840.

v.

at

bility.]
NELSON, C.

law against

J.

a

at

24

Wend.

(N. Y.)

stockholder to enforce his statutory lia-

The principal question sought to be presented in
law" will lie to charge the stock-

this case is whether "an action at
holder personally under the act.
Statement

enforceable

IBBOTSON. 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.
Re P- 473-4 8 -

[Action

1

several,

and argument omitted.
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The seventh section provides that for all debts due and owing by
the company at the time of its dissolution, the persons then composing
it shall be individually responsible to the extent of their respective
It has been repeatedly held that the
shares of stock.
3 R. S. 222.
dissolution here spoken of in order to subject the shareholder may be
shown short of judicial proceedings for that purpose.
Having ceased
to act, and being without funds and indebted, it is to be deemed dissolved so far as to give the remedy to the creditor.
19 Johns. Rep.
456; Hopk. 300; 8 Cowen 387. This dissolution sub modo being
proved, the liability of the stockholder, as declared by the act, becomes absolute, and I see no valid objection to the enforcement of it
in a court of law. There can be no greater difficulty in establishing
or resisting the demand there than in a court of equity, as the ground
It is true the stockand extent of the liability are distinctly given.
holder may be subjected to several suits, but he can be charged only
to the extent of his stock. Beyond this his defense is as perfect at law
On payment of debts, or a personal charge in respect
as in equity.
It was
to them to this amount, there is an end to further liability.
made a question in the several cases above referred to whether the
suit in equity could be maintained on the ground of a remedy at law;
it is that the credthe answer given confirms the view we have taken
itor is entitled to contribution from all the stockholders, if requisite
to the satisfaction of his debt, and that numerous suits might become
necessary. To avoid this, he may resort to that court. The creditors,
if more than one, may also, it seems, if they apprehend a deficiency
in the fund, enforce in equity a pro rata distribution. 8 Cowen 392.
But this must be at their election.
Any difficulty that may exist on
the part of the stockholder, in protecting himself beyond the statute liability, has never been suggested as a ground for proceedings in equity.
Indeed, it is clear that as to him the defense is as perfect, if not as
This question has been besimple, in the one court as in the other.
fore the chancellor in an analogous case, in which he held, inasmuch
as the creditors had a concurrent remedy at law, the statute of limitations applicable to the proceedings there equally governed in equity.
See, also, Angel & Ames on Corp. 369.
3 Paige 409.
It is supposed the pleader should have set out in the declaration the
grounds upon which a dissolution is predicated. We think not. The
fact upon which the statute liability depends in this respect, to wit,
the dissolution, is averred, and the decisions point out the nature of
proof required to establish it.
There can be no doubt that the liability of the stockholders is several and not joint. The measure of it may be wholly different in
A joint suit would be
each case, depending upon the shares held.
impracticable, as there could be no joint judgment. Besides, the act
did not intend they should be sureties for each other. Each is severally responsible to the amount of his own stock.
The plaintiffs, I think, are entitled to judgment on the demurrer.
Note. 1.
1990 ; 1890,

Several:

See, 1866, Umsted v. Buskirk, 17 Ohio St. 114, supra, p.
47 Ohio St. 180, 21 Am. St. Rep. 798 ; 1892, Willis

Barrick v. Gifford,
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Minn. 140, 31 Am. St. Rep. 626; 1898, Hanson v. Davison, 73
Minn. 454, 76 N. W. Rep. 254; 1898, Sedgwick City Bank v. Sedgwick M. Co.,
59 Kan. 654, 54 Pac. Rep. 681 ; 1898, Hancock Nat'l Bank v. Ellis, 172 Mass.
39, 70 Am. St. Rep. 232, 42 L. R. A. 396.
v. Mabon, 48

Sec. 710.

Same.

As to amount,
(a) Unlimited.
2.

666, 707, supra.

See

Sec. 711.

Same,

(b) Double.

HENRY ROOT
1887.

IN THE SUPREME

v.

Who liable.

THOMAS SINNOCK.

COURT OF ILLINOIS.
Am. Rep. 558.

361, 60

1

120

111.

Rep. 350-

[Appeal from lower court overruling a demurrer to the plaintiff's petition to charge defendant upon his statutory liability as a shareholder in the Union Bank of Quincy.]
MR. JUSTICE SCHOFIELD. * * * First. The contention of
appellant is that the liability imposed by the seventh section of the
charter of the Union Bank of Quincy upon the stockholders is simply
to pay the creditors of the bank the balance unpaid upon subscriptions
for stock.
The language of the seventh section, affecting this question, is:
"Provided, also, That the stockholders in this corporation
shall be individually liable, to the amount of their stock, for all debts
of the corporation, and such liability shall continue for three months
after the transfer of any stock on the books of the corporation."
The
plain and obvious meaning of this language is, to our minds, the
stockholders are liable to creditors for their debts to an extent measured by the amount of their stock.
Omitting the clause expressing
the extent of liability, and we have this:
"The stockholders in this
corporation shall be individually liable for all debts of the corporation." If this were all, their liability would be unlimited they
would be absolutely liable for all debts of the corporation. The intention, however, is to limit that liability; but to what extent?
The
answer is:
"To the amount of their stock" not to the amount unThe language makes the liability because of
paid upon their stock.
the fact of being stockholders, and not because of the fact of being
debtors of the corporation.
If the liability intended was simply to
pay the creditors the amount due the corporation, what would have
been more natural and easy than to have used just that language ? The
difference between a stockholder and a debtor for unpaid stock is
1

Statement, arguments,

and part of opinion omitted.
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recognized in several of the sections, and so was, at the time, in the
legislative mind, and it must therefore be presumed that words expressing the one would not have been used to express the other in this
*
*
*
instance.
But this ought not now to be regarded an open question in this
We have in numerous cases, without much discussion, it is
court.
true, held or assumed that language of the same, or substantially the
same, import, meant what we have indicated in our opinion this
means.
Culver v. Third Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 64 111. 528; Tibballs et al.v. Libby, 87 111. 142; Bromley v. Goodwin, 95 111. 118;
Wincock v. Turbin, 96 111. 141 ; Harper v. Union Manf. Co., 100
111. 225;
Eames et al. v. Doris, 102 111. 350; Thompson v. Meisser,
108 111. 362; Queenan et al. v. Palmer etal., 117 111. 619.
And the
same construction has been placed upon like language in New York
and Pennsylvania.
Slee v. Bloom, 20 Johns. 683 ; Briggs v. Penniman, 8 Cow. 395 ; Bank of Poughkeepsie v. Ibbotson, 24 Wend.
473; Matter of Empire City Bank, 18 N. Y. 218; Lane's Appeal,
105 Pa. St. 49, 57.
Second. The next question is, should it affirmatively appear that
appellant was a stockholder when the cause of action accrued, or is it
sufficient that he was a stockholder when suit was brought?
In our
opinion, it is sufficient that appellant was a stockholder when suit was
The liability is because of being a stockholder that is, bebrought.
cause of the ownership of stock.
(Wheelock v. Kost, 77 111. 296.)
As was said in Brown v. Hitchcock, 36 Ohio St. 681, "the expression,
'all stockholders,' must be regarded, in the absence of any legislative
indication to the contrary, as including not only those who were such
at the time the indebtedness was incurred, but all those who succesThe liabilsively stand in their shoes in respect to the same stock."
of
of
because
the
the
it
follows
stock into
stock,
ownership
being
ity
whosesoever hands it may go, and whoever purchases it does so at the
risk of this liability, and in consonance with this view, we have held
that the liability once discharged, the stock is thereafter free of any
further liability on account of ownership. Thebus v. Smiley, 1 10 111.
316.

The rule is thus stated in Thompson on Liability of Stockholders,
" But in the absence of special statutory provisions, the
section 90:
general rule, applicable alike to the English joint stock company and
the American corporation, is, that liability as contributors, or to creditors, attaches not merely to those who are members at the time or
before the debt was contracted, but to those who were such, either,
first, when by reason of the stoppage, dissolution or winding up of the
company, the right to transfer shares ceased; or, second, in the case
of direct proceedings by creditors against shareholders, when the
right of the creditors against the shareholder became fixed in an apSee, also, to like effect, Middleton Bank v.
propriate proceeding."
Magill, 5 Conn. 28; Curtis v. Harlow 12 Mete. 3; Holyoke Bank
v. Burnham, n Cush. 183; Johnson v. Summerville Dr. Bl. Co., 15
Gray 216 ; McCulloch v. Moss, 5 Denio 567 ; Matter of Empire Bank,
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199;

Johnson v.* Underbill,
*

Franciscus, 43 Mo. 464.
Affirmed.

*

52

N. Y. 203;
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McClaren

v.

See, 1889, Harpold v. Stobart, 46 Ohio St. 397, 15 Am. St. Rep. 619;
Harper v. Carroll, 66 Minn. 487; 1899, Foster v. Row, 120 Mich. 1, 77
Am. St. Rep. 565; 1900, Wick Nat'l Bank v. Union Nat'l Bk., 62 Ohio St. 446,
78 Am. St. Rep. 734.
566, 567, as to effect of transfer.
See, also, supra,
Note.

1896,

Double liability; assignee
Same.
suit only after corporation can not pay.

Sec. 712.

ZANG
1898.

IN THE

v.

can

not enforce;

WYANT. 1

SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO.
551, 7! Am. St. Rep. 145.

25

Colo. Rep.

[Equitable action by creditors on behalf of themselves and such
other creditors as might join them to enforce the statutory liability of
shareholders in an insolvent bank. Judgment below was for plaintiffs,
and defendants appealed.]
*
*
*
GODDARD, J.
Counsel for appellants insist that the assignee was alone entitled to maintain the action, and that the creditors
themselves can not invoke the interposition of a court of equity to enforce the liability of stockholders under this statute. Upon whom the
right to enforce the remedy devolves, and the mode of procedure that
should be adopted, have been in controversy in many of the courts of
last resort, and have been variously decided, some holding that the liability is primary, and enforceable in an action at law by an individual
creditor against one or more of the stockholders, while in others, and
by far the greater number, it is held that the fund created by the statute
is in the nature of a security for the common benefit of all the creditors, and that a suit in equity affords the most effectual and convenient remedy for its enforcement ; that since the fund is exclusively
for the benefit of the creditors, and forms no part of the assets of the
corporation, the right of action accrues to the creditors themselves,
and, in the absence of a statute conferring the right, neither the assignee nor receiver of an insolvent corporation can maintain the action.
Terry v. Little, 101 U. S. 216; Pollard v. Bailey, 20 Wall. 520;
Horner v. Henning, 93 U. S. 228; Farnsworth v. Wood, 91 N.
308; Pfohl v. Simpson, 74 N. Y. 137; Mathez v. Neidig, 72 N. Y.
100 ; Griffith v. Mangan, 73 N. Y. 6n ; Wincock v. Turpin, 96 111.
135; Dutcher v. Marine Nat. Bank, 12 Blatchf. 435; Jacobson v.
Allen, 20 Blatchf. 525; Minneapolis Paper Co. v. Swinburne, etc.,
Co., 66 Minn. 378; Umsted v. Buskirk, 17 Ohio St. 113; Wright v.
McCormack, 17 Ohio St. 86; Crease v. Babcock, 10 Met. 525 ; Lib1
Statement abridged, arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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;

is

is

is

if,

erty Female, etc., Association v. Watkins, 70 Mo. 13; Runner v.
280;
Dwiggins, 147 Ind. 238; Cook on Stock and Stockholders,
Morawetz
on
Private
;
Thompson on Corporations,
Corpora3560
tions,
869.
In Terry v. Little, 101 U. S. 216, Chief Justice Waite, in discussing the procedure that should be adopted for the enforcement of a liability provided in the charter of the Merchants' Bank of South Carolina, in language substantially the same as that used in our statute,
said:
"Undoubtedly the object was to furnish additional security to
creditors, and to have the payments when made apply to the liquidaSo, too, it is clear that the obligation is one that may
tion of debts.
be enforced by the creditors ; but as it is to or for all creditors it must be
The form of the action, therefore, should be
enforced by or for all.
one adapted to the protection of all." * * *
(Citing and quoting from, to the same effect, Pfohl v. Simpson, 74
N. Y. 137; Runner v. Dwiggins, 147 Ind. 238.)
We have carefully examined the cases cited and relied upon by counsel for appellants as sustaining their contention.
It is true that these
cases, while holding that the fund can be reached only by a proceeding in equity, sustain the right of the receiver to enforce the remedy.
We are, however, satisfied that the foregoing cases announce the generally accepted rule, and that, both upon reason and authority, the
additional liability of stockholders imposed by our statute constitutes a
fund for the benefit of all the creditors, which maybe pursued in equity
for their common benefit by or for all ; and an assignee whose trust
relates only to the corporate assets acquires no right to enforce this
statutory obligation.
The right to maintain the present action is also challenged because it
It is argued that
as we have seen, the fund
is prematurely brought.
in the nature of an additional security for
provided by the statute
the creditors, the liability of the stockholders
secondary and not enIt
forceable until the assets of the corporation have been exhausted.
undoubtedly true that this fund does not constitute the primary or
regular fund for the payment of the corporate liabilities, and that the
corporate funds are the primary resource to which creditors must look
for the payment of their debts and the discharge of the corporate obligations but a well recognized exception to this rule exists when,
by reason of dissolution or insolvency, an action against the corpora200;
Cook on Stock and Stockholders,
tion would be unavailing.
Terry v. Tubman, 92 U. S. 156; Hodges v. Silver Hill Min. Co.,

Ore.

200.
.

We think the facts averred in the complaint and disclosed by the
It appears that the North
evidence bring this case within this exception

if

is

it

Denver Bank, on July 18, 1893, was insolvent, and made an assignment of all its assets, that the appellees filed their claim with the assignee, and the same were allowed, and there has been paid only
No further sum having
twenty per cent, of the original amounts.
evident
been realized during the length of time that has elapsed,
that the remaining assets,
any, consist of worthless or doubtful
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claims. Under these circumstances, the creditors ought not to be
compelled to await their collection, or delay the enforcement of the
statutory liability against the stockholders; but justice requires that
the stockholders themselves should be compelled to pay their claims,
and look to the assignee for whatever may be realized from the reMoses v. Ocoee Bank, i Lea 398; Stark v. Burke,
maining assets:
La.
Ann.
As was said in the former case: "They (credi9
341.
will
not
be
to wait the collection of doubtful claims, or
required
tors)
claims in litigation.
The stockholders must pay promptly and take
upon themselves the onus of delay and risk as to all such claims."
For these reasons we think the foregoing objections to the maintenance of this action by appellees were properly overruled.
It is further contended that the court below erred in its conclusion
as to the extent of the liability imposed by the statute, and in rendering judgment against each of the stockholders in double the amount
of the par value of the stock owned by them respectively.
The language of the statute is: "Shareholders in banks * * *
shall be held individually responsible for debts * * * of said
associations, in double the amount of the par value of the stock
owned by them respectively."
It is said that the true intent and meaning of this language is to
make the stockholders responsible to the amount of stock subscribed,
and in addition thereto a sum equal to its par value, or, as expressed
by counsel: "He is first liable to the corporation to the full par value
of his stock, and next liable to the creditors in an equal amount";
and that this constitutes the double liability contemplated by the statute ; that the judgment of the court below in effect imposed upon
them a triple liability.
As supporting this view, counsel cite Beach
on Private Corporations,
152; Thompson's Liability of Stockholdi
on
ers,
and Stockholders,
Cook
Stock
37;
215; 2 Morawetz on
Private Corporations,
88 1.
For instance, as said by Mr. Beach: "Statutes imposing a liability
'
*
to double the amount of stock held by them
receive the same construction as those making shareholders
liable ' to the amount of
their stock.' '
And like expressions are found in the other works
referred to.
As supporting this conclusion they cite Perry v. Turner,
55 Mo. 418; Matthews v. Albert, 24 Md. 527; Norris v. Johnson,
34 Md. 485 ; Booth v. Campbell, 37 Md. 522; Schricker v. Ridings,
65 Mo. 208; Gay v. Keys, 30 111. 413.
In addition to these, Mr. Beach also cited Appeal of Parish (Pa.,
March 24, 1890), 19 Atl. Rep. 569.
Upon a careful examination of these cases we are unable to find
*
*
*
any warrant for the rule as announced.
find
no
in
We
expression
any of these decisions that intimates that
statutes imposing a liability " to double the amount of stock held"
should be given the same signification and receive the same construction as those making shareholders liable "to the amount of their
stock," except in Perry v. Turner, 55 Mo. 418, where the court refers
to section 6, article 8, of the constitution of Missouri of 1865, which
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provides that stockholders should be individually liable, over and
above the stock owned by them, in a further sum at least equal in
amount to such stock, as creating a double liability.
While in Appeal of Parish (Pa., March 24, 1890), 19 Atl. Rep. 569, a case that
involved the construction of a statute which, like ours, imposed a liability upon stockholders " to the extent of double the amount of their
stock," the court clearly shows that this language is not to be construed to mean the same as that which limits the liability of stockholders " to an amount equal to the stock held," but that the latter
phrase imposes a single, while the former imposes a double, liability.
It has been almost uniformly held that when a statute fixes the liability of stockholders "in an amount equal to the stock held by
them," or "to the amount of their stock," it imposes a liability to
the amount of the par value of their shares, in addition to their subscription to the stock: McDonnell v. Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co.,
85 Ala. 401 ; Briggs v. Penniman, 8 Cow. 387,- 18 Am. Dec. 454;
Pettibone v. McGraw, 6 Mich. 441 ; Root v. Sinnock, 120 111. 350,
60 Am. Rep. 558; Lane's Appeal, 105 Pa. St. 49, 51 Am. Rep.
166; Buenz v. Cook, 15 Colo. 38.
It therefore logically follows that where the language is "in double
the amount of stock held," an obligation in double the amount of
such par value is imposed: Appeal of Parish (Pa., March 24, 1890),
19 Atl. Rep. 569; Terry v. Little, 101 U. S. 216.
In the latter case, the charter under consideration provided that
stockholders should "be liable and held bound * * * for any sum
*
*
*
*
*
not exceeding twice the amount of *
their
shares."
After quoting this language, Chief Justice Waite said:
"This, as we think, means that on the failure of the bank each stockholder shall pay such sum, not exceeding twice the amount of his
shares, as shall be his just proportion of any fund that may be required to discharge the outstanding obligations."
Although the double liability clause, as found in our statute, is,
and for several years has been, in force, either by virtue of constitutional, statutory or charter provisions, in the states of Illinois, Minnesota and Pennsylvania, we are aware of no case wherein it has been
expressly passed on and construed except in the Appeal of Parish
(Pa., March 24, 1890), 19 Atl. Rep. 569. There are, however,
cases which reached the courts of final resort in these jurisdictions
where the amount recoverable thereunder was necessarily involved, and
while the meaning of this clause was in no way raised or discussed,
from an examination of the cases it will be seen that a liability in
double the amount of the stock in addition to the subscription was
enforced: McCarthy v. Lavasche, 89 111. 270, 31 Am. Rep. 83;
Munger v. Jacobson, 99 111. 349; Harper v. Carroll, 66 Minn. 487 ;
Allen v. Walsh, 25 Minn. 543.
As we have seen, statutes of this character are intended to furnish
a fund exclusively for the benefit of creditors, and under the rule laid
down in all cases, they are to be construed as imposing an individual
liability upon stockholders, in addition to their liability to the cor-

THE CREDITORS AND SHAREHOLDERS.

7!3

2OO9

Accepting
poration for the amount of their subscription to. the stock.
this as the correct rule of construction, the plain and obvious import
of the language of our act is to make stockholders in banking associations individually liable for the debts of the association in double the
amount of the par value of the stock owned by them, notwithstanding they may have paid, or are still liable to the corporation, for their
*
* *
original subscription.
(Affirmed, except as to certain items of debt, and rehearing denied.)
Note.

See note, infra,
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(c) Proportional.
J.,

IN

IN THE SUPREME

LARRABEE

v.

BALDWIN ET

COURT OF CALIFORNIA.
on

AL.
35

Cal. Rep.

The question involved was as to whether a creditor, in his recovery against an individual stockholder on his personal liability, is limited to the stockholder's share of that particular debt, or whether he
can recover the whole amount of his debt (if not exceeding the whole
amount for which the shareholder is liable).
The solution of the questions upon which the rehearing was granted
depends, in my judgment, upon the construction of section 16 [act
of 1853], and not of section 32 [act of 1850].
The first clause of section 16 declares the liability of stockholders.
"Each stockholder shall be individually and personally liable for his
proportion of all the debts and liabilities of the company contracted or
incurred during the time that he was a stockholder."
The remainder
of the section relates to the mode of procedure in ascertaining and determining the amount of the debts for which each stockholder is liable.
The stockholder may
Joint and several actions may be instituted.
prove, and there shall be allowed to him, in reduction of the amount
for which he would otherwise be liable, in a suit brought by a creditor, the amount which he may have paid upon " any debt or liability
of such corporation," and, thereupon, judgment shall be given for a
sum not exceeding his " proportion of the debts and liabilities of such
corporation," less the amount previously paid by him.
That is to say, each stockholder is liable for his proportion of all
the debts and liabilities of the corporation, and for nothing beyond ;
and upon his payment of such proportion his liability ceases.
Suppose the debts of the corporation amount to one hundred thousand
dollars, and that there are one hundred stockholders, each holding the
same amount of stock.
When one stockholder has paid a creditor
1
This case discusses the nature of proportional liability pretty fully, in the
opinion of Sawyer, C. J., and the dissenting opinion of Crockett, J.
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one thousand dollars he-is no longer liable to the other creditors.
Under that section he is clearly authorized to exhaust his whole liability
in the satisfaction of the debt of one creditor, and the other creditors
must look to the corporation and the other stockholders for the payThis construction, it is true, may enable the
ment of their demands.
creditor
to
secure
the payment of his demand from the only
diligent
solvent stockholder in the company and leave the other creditors without remedy except against the corporation, which may, perhaps, be inThis result certainly would ensue should the only solvent
solvent.
stockholder exhaust his liability for his proportion of all the debts of
the corporation in the payment without suit of the claims of one or
more of the creditors.
This results not from construction, but from
the positive terms of the act.
Should the opposite construction be given, consequences more injurious to the creditors and more absurd in their results would ensue.
The solvent stockholder in the supposed corporation pays ten dollars
on any debt or liability of the corporation ; and in each of the suits
brought by creditors whose claims do not severally exceed one thousand dollars, he relieves himself from responsibility by proving his one
Had the stockholder paid one hundred dolpayment of ten dollars.
lars he would not he liable to any creditor whose claim did not exceed
*
*
*
ten thousand dollars.

Crockett,
Sec. 714.

J.,

dissents.

Same,

(d)

For labor and services.

-
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1899.

IN THE COURT

OF

APPEALS OF NEW YORK.
Rep. 526-532.

158

N. Y.

O'BRIEN, J. The courts below have determined, by the order appealed from, that four different and distinct claims presented to the
receivers were not entitled to the preference provided by chapter 376
of the laws of 1885.
One of the claims was presented by a clerk and
bookkeeper, who had been employed in the office of the corporation
at a salary of $100 a month, payable at the end of each month.
Another by the superintendent of the corporation, who had been emAnother by a draughtsman,
ployed at a salary of $125 a month.
employed in the office of the corporation at a salary of $125 a month,
and the other claim was made by two foremen employed by the corporation, one in the boiler shop, at a salary of $225 a month, and the
other in some other department at a salary of $125 a month.
The question is whether these claims were entitled to a preference
under the provisions of the statute, which reads as follows:
"Where
a receiver of a corporation created or organized under the laws of this
*
*
*
state, and doing business therein,
shall be appointed, the
wages of the employes, operatives and laborers thereof shall be pre1
Arguments, part of opinion of O'Brien,
of Gray, J., omitted?

J., and all

of concurring opinion
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ferred to every other debt or claim against such corporation, and shall
be paid by the receiver from the moneys of such corporation which
shall first come to his hands."
It is said that the applicants were employes of the corporation, and
But the word employe would indoubtless that assertion is correct.
clude every person in the service of the corporation, without regard to
his grade or rank, or the nature of his duties.
If preference should
be given to the claims of these parties on the ground that they were
employes of the corporation, we would necessarily have to exclude
the other words, "operatives and laborers."
When two or more
words of analogous meaning are employed together they are understood to be used in their cognate sense, to express the same relations
and give color and expression to each other.
Hence, although the
word employe is general and comprehensive, it must be limited by
the more specific words, operatives and laborers, which are found in
the statute.
(Wakefield v. Fargo, 90 N. Y. 218; People, ex rel.
Satterlee, v. Board of Police, 75 N. Y. 44.)
The most important word in the statute is the word "wages."
It
was wages that the legislature intended to prefer, in the distribution of
the assets of the insolvent corporation, not salaries, nor earnings, nor
It was not intended to prefer the claims of all the
compensation.
employes, but it was manifestly intended to limit the preference to the
particular class whose claims' would be properly expressed by the use
of the word wages.
This word is applied, in common parlance, specifically to the payment made for manual labor, or other labor of menial or mechanical kind, as distinguished from salary and from fee, which
denotes compensation paid to professional men.
(Century DictionIn its application to laborers and employes it conveys the idea
ary.)
of subordinate occupation which is not very remunerative, of not much
independent responsibility, but rather subject to immediate supervision.
This was the construction which this court placed upon the statute in the case of People v. Remington (45 Hun 338, affirmed here
on the opinion below, 109 N. Y. 631).
It was said in that case that
the statute was designed to secure the prompt payment of the wages
of persons who, as a class, are dependent upon their earnings for the
support of themselves and their families, and it was not designed to give
due to officers and ema preference to the salaries and compensation
ployes of a corporation occupying superior positions of trust or profit.
*
#
*

It is in derogation of the common law, and should not be extended
to cases not within the reason as well as within the words of the statute.
In the distribution of the assets of an insolvent corporation by
courts of equity the maxim that equality is equity is a fundamental
rule, and it is only by force of legislation that this principle can be
departed from, and then only in favor of the class of creditors that
come within the scope of the statute when fairly and reasonably inIn a very recent case we were required to pass upon the
terpreted.
claim of an attorney at law which it was contended was entitled to
preference under the terms of the statute. In a general sense it might
well be said that he was an employe since he was retained or em-
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ployed in the business of the corporation, but it was held that he was
not a laborer or servant within the scope or policy of the statute.
(Bristor v. Smith, 158 N. Y. 157.) While the claim in that case
was not based upon the statute in question, but upon another of a
kindred nature, the reasoning applies to the claims in question.
We
adhere to the doctrine there announced in the opinion of Judge Gray
as a correct interpretation of the statute.
These views are not in conflict with the case of Palmer v. Van
Santvoord (153 N. Y. 612). The claimant in that case was not a
superintendent, or foreman, or bookkeeper, or clerk.
The courts below had held that he was a laborer or operative within the meaning
*
* *
of the statute, and this court affirmed the decision.
Affirmed.
Note.

Posson,

See. 1872, Moyer v. Penn. Slate Co., 71 Pa. St. 293;
105

Wis.

ARTICLE III.
Sec. 715.

N. W. Rep.

123.

ENFORCEMENT

OF

99, 81

I. In

THE STATUTORY

1899,

Foster v.

LIABILITY.

general.

See Umsted v. Buskirk, 17 Ohio St. 113, supra, p. 1990; Zang v.
Wyant, 25 Colo. 551, supra, p. 2005; Coleman v. White, 14 Wis.
700, supra, p. 2000; Bank v. Ibbotson, 24 Wend. 473, supra, p.
2001; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, supra, p. 1892.
1. While special remedies are provided in some cases, as in the case
Note.
of the Kansas liability (see Marshall v. Sherman, 148 N. Y. 9, infra, p. 2021),
and in some states an action at law by the creditor directly against the shate*
holder may be maintained (1900, Woodworth v. Bowles, 61 Kan. 569, 60 Pas.
Rep. 331), the most usual method, if no other is prescribed, is by a creditor's
bill in equity or a similar statutory proceeding: See, 1879, Terry v. Little, 101
U. S. 216; 1895, National Bank v. Dillingham, 147 N. Y. 603, 49 Am. St. Rep.
692; 1897, Wallace v. Carpenter Elec., etc., Co., 70 Minn. 321, 68 Am. St. Rep.
530; 1898, Parker v. Carolina Bank, 53 S. C. 583, 69 Am. St. Rep. 888;
1899, Foster v. Posson, 105 Wis. 99, 81 N. W. Rep. 123; 1899, Maine T. & B.
Co. v. Southern L. & T. Co., 92 Maine 444 ; 1900, Stiles v. Laurel Fork Oil Co.,
47 W. Va. 835, 35 S. E. Rep. 986.
2. While it has been held that a receiver of the corporate assets can enforce
such liability (1896, Gushing v. Perot, 175 Pa. St. 66, 52 Am. St. Rep. 835),
the better rule certainly is that the receiver or assignee of the corporate assets
has nothing to do with such liability, for it is not a corporate asset, but only a
security for the creditor: See, 1891, Bank of N. Am. v. Rindge, 154 Mass.
203, 26 Am. St. Rep. 240; 1898, Zang v. Wyant, 25 Colo. 551, 71 Am. St. Rep.
145, supra, p. 2005 ; 1898, Brown v. Trail, 89 Fed. Rep. 641 ; 1899, Fidelity Ins.
T. & S. D. Co. v. Mechanics' Bank, 97 Fed. Rep. 297 ; 1900, Wigton v. Bosler, 102 Fed. Rep. (C. C. Pa.) 70; 1900, Colton v. Mayer, 90 Md. 711, 78 Am.

St. Hep.

In

-156.

the case of secondary liability, the creditor must first exhaust his
remedy against the corporation, unless it is insolvent and has ceased to do
business. See note, supra, p. 1997 ; and, 1873, Shellington v. Rowland, 53 N. Y.
371 ; 1890, Barrick v. Gifford,47 Ohio St. 180, 21 Am. St. Rep. 798; 1895, National Bank v. Dillingham, 147 N. Y. 603, 49 Am. St. Rep. 692; 1895, Trades3.
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man Pub. Co. v. Car Wheel Co., 95 Term. 634, 49 Am. St. Rep. 943; 1898,
Wehn v. Fail, 55 Neb. 547, 70 Am. St. Rep. 397 ; 1898, Sleeper v. Norris, 59 Kan.
555; 1900, Seattle National Bank v. Pratt, 103 Fed. Rep. 62. Compare, 1899,
Foster v. Row, 120 Mich. 1, 77 Am. St. Rep. 565.
4. As to parties, see note, supra, p. 2005.
As a general rule the statute begins to run only
5. Statute of limitations :
after judgment and unsatisfied execution against the corporation, or insolvSee, 1875, Kincaid v. Dwinelle, 59 N. Y.
ency and ceasing to do business.
548; 1887, Hollingshead v. Woodward, 107 N. Y. 96 (only after actual dissolution); 1890, Barrick v. Gifford, 47 Ohio St. 180; 1892, Younglovev. Lime
Co., 49 Ohio St. 663; 1892, Bronson v. Schneider, 49 Ohio St. 438; 1896, State
Sav. Bank v. Johnson, 18 Mont. 440, 56 Am. St. Rep. 591; 1898, Kelly v.
Clark, 21 Mont. 291 ; 1898, Van Pelt v. Gardner, 54 Neb. 701 ; 1899, Crofoot v. Thatcher, 19 Utah 212, 75 Am. St. Rep. 725; 1900, Steffins v. Gurney,
61 Kan. 292, 59 Pac. Rep. 725; 1900, Ryland v. Com. & Sav. Bank, 127 Cal.
525, 59 Pac. Rep. 989; 1900, Seattle Nat'l Bank v. Pratt, 103 Fed. Rep. 62.
6. Suit by one creditor in time saves the rights of all : 1890, Barrick v. Gifford, 47 Ohio St. 180; 1898, Hirshfield v. Fitzgerald, 157 N. Y. 166. But one
creditor that sues for himself and others can settle for himself, and dismiss
the suit before others actually join: 1898, Hirshfield v. Fitzgerald, 157 N. Y.
166.
7. Enforcement in other states. See Whitman v. Oxford Nat'l Bank, 176 U.
S. 559, infra, p. 2018 ; Marshall v. Sherman, 148 N. Y. 9, infra, p. 2021 ; Howarth
v. Angle, 162 N. Y. 179, infra, p. 2028, with notes.
8. When the constitutional liability is self-executing, see next case and

note.

Sec. 716. Same.
cuting.

2.

Constitutional

MITCHELL, J.,
1892.

IN

provisions,

WILLIS

v.

when

self-exe-

MABON.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA. 48 Minn. Rep.
140, on 149, 150, 31 Am. St. Rep. 626, on 628, 629.

provided "each stockholder in any corporation
manufacturing,
(except
etc.) shall be liable to the amount of stock
held or owned by him."]
This brings us to the main question, viz., whether this provision
of the constitution is self-executing.
That such has been the general
understanding of the bench, bar, and business men in this state is conceded.
This court has, in a long line of cases, assumed that such
was the fact.
Dodge v. Minnesota Plastic Slate Roofing Co., 16
Minn. 368 (Gil. 327) ; Allen v. Walsh, 25 Minn. 543; State v. Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co., 40 Minn. 213 (41 N. W. Rep. 1020);
Mohr v. Minnesota Elevator Co., 40 Minn. 343 (41 N. W. Rep.
1074); Arthur v. Willius, 44 Minn. 409 (46 N. W. Rep. 851);
Densmore v. Shepard, 46 Minn. 54(48 N. W. Rep. 528, 681). * * *
The question in every case is whether the language of a constitutional provision is addressed to the courts or the legislature,
does it
indicate that it was intended as a present enactment, complete in itself as definitive legislation, or does it contemplate subsequent legisThis is to be determined from a conlation to carry it into effect?

[The constitution
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sideration both of the language used and of the intrinsic nature of the
If the nature and extent of the right conferred and
provision itself.
of the liability imposed is fixed by the provision itself, so that they
can be determined by the examination and construction of its own
terms, and there is no language used indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action, then the provision should be construed as self-executing, and its language as addressed to the court.
case cited by appellants in which a constitutional provision has been held not self-executing, it will be found either that its
language indicated an intention that legislation should be had to
carry it into effect, or that the nature of the provision itself was such
*
* *
as to render such legislation necessary.

In almost every

Note.
Accord: 1893, Fowler v. Lamson, 146 111. 472, 37 Am. St. Rep. 163,
note 168 (Kans. liability is self-executing) ; 1898, Bell v. Farwell, 176 111. 489,
68 Am. St. Rep. 194, 42 L. R. A. 804 (same); 1900, Whitman v. Nat'l Bank,
176 U. S. 559, infra, p. 2018 (same) ; 1900, Hancock Nat'l Bk. v. Farnum, 176
, 69 Pac. 77.
Cal.
U. S. 640 (same); 1902, Rice v. Howard,
Contra: 1900, Woodworth v. Bowles, 61 Kan. 569, 60 Pac. Rep. 331, infra.

Same. 3. Self-executing provisions
remedy in equity or at law; repeal.

Sec. 717.

WOODWORTH ET
1900.

IN THE SUPREME

AL. v.

BOWLES ET

OF KANSAS.
Pac. Rep. 331.

COURT
60

;

61

special remedy;
AL. 1

Kan. Rep. 569,

This was a proceeding in equity begun by Thomas
DOSTER, C. J.
Bowles in behalf of himself and others, as creditors of an insolvent
banking institution, against R. J. Woodworth and others, as stockholders in the bank, to compel the payment by them of the amounts
due on their statutory liability as stockholders, and for a distribution of
such amounts among the several creditors of the bank, and to restrain
certain of its creditors from the prosecution of actions begun by them
against the stockholders to enforce for themselves, and in their several
interests, the statutory liability of the latter. Judgment in accordance
with the prayer of the petition was rendered in the court below. From
that judgment proceedings in error have been prosecuted to this court,
and the principal question is, Can an equitable action be maintained
for the purpose stated in the plaintiff's petition?
In 1895 the bank of Garnett became insolvent.
It was taken in
under the authority of the statute
charge by the bank commissioner
then in force.
As required by that statute, a receiver was appointed,
who entered upon the labor of converting the assets of the bank into
In 1897 the legismoney and distributing it among the creditors.
lature revised the act for the regulation and supervision of banks in
their insolvent as well as in their active and solvent condition.
Laws
1

Statement abridged

;

much of the opinion omitted.
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By section 55 of that act it was made the duty of re1897, ch. 47.
ceivers of insolvent banks to prosecute actions for the recovery of the
That duty had not been theretostatutory liability of stockholders.
fore imposed upon the receivers of such banks, but before the taking
effect of the statute mentioned the liability of stockholders of banks,
as well as of other incorporated institutions, was enforceable only by
individual creditors against individual stockholders, unless, as the defendants in error claim, it was enforceable in* equity by the creditors
This
collectively. In June, 1897, the action stated was commenced.
was after the taking effect of the law of 1897, which made it the duty
*
*
*
of the receiver to institute the proceedings.
After the occurrence of the bank's insolvency, but before the institution of the proceeding in equity, and also before the taking effect
of the act of 1897, a large number of the bank's creditors instituted
actions under the statute against certain of its stockholders to enforce
their individual liability for the payment of its debts.
These creditors were made parties defendant to the action in equity before mentioned, and are the plaintiffs in error in this court.
The provisions of law respecting the liability of stockholders of a
corporation to pay its debts are both constitutional and statutory.
The constitution declares:
"Dues from corporations shall be secured
of
the
individual
stockholders to an additional amount
by
liability
to
the
owned
each
stockholder, and such other means
stock
equal
by
as shall be provided by law."
Article 12, 2. Prior to the act of
1897, before referred to, the statutory remedies for the enforcement
of the liability ordained by this constitutional provision were those
provided by sections 49, 50, chapter 66, General Statutes 1897.
By
section 49, an action in the form of a petition and summons by the
creditor against the stockholder was authorized in the event of a dissolution of the corporation, and by section 50, a proceeding in the form
of a motion by the creditor for leave to issue execution against the
stockholder was authorized in the event of a previous judgment and
unsatisfied execution against the corporation.
Cottrell v. Manlove, 58
Kan. 405, 49 Pac. Rep. 519. These sections did not provide a remedy by the creditors collectively against the stockholders collectively,
but in each of them provision was made for a single proceeding by a
single creditor against a single stockholder. This was expressly so declared in Abbey v. Dry-Goods Co., 44 Kan. 415, 24 Pac. Rep. 426,
In that case it
as to the liability of the stockholders
to the creditors.
was ruled "the liability of stockholdei's to the creditors of a corporation is several, not joint, and each must be sued separately." By
much the stronger reason should it be held, we think, that the right
of action of creditors under these statutes is several, and not joint.
Each one has his own demand, and because of the lack of community
of interest with other creditors, he can not join with them in the institution and maintenance of a proceeding to secure their several claims.
However, back of these statutory provisions, which thus mark out the
remedies to be adopted by the creditors of a corporation for the recovery of their demands against its stockholders, lies the constitutional
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provision before quoted, which, independently of all legislation upon
the subject, must be allowed such self-operative force as the terms
employed indicate the framers of the organic law intended it should
have.
If the legislative enactments are not up to the requirements of

the constitution, and if the constitution be self-operative to the ends
sought to be reached, this court must carry out the mandate of the
organic instrument.
It is evident that if the constitutional provision be self-executing it
operates in favor of creditors as a class and collectively, and against
stockholders as a class and collectively.
If the constitution itself
secures dues from corporations through the individual liability of
stockholders, it secures them in the interest of all the creditors alike.
In such event the provision, being declarative of a rule of general
right and of general liability, would of necessity assert itself through
the legal forms adapted to its ends.
Those ends, being equality of
right and equality of liability, could be reached only through the equity
Although the legislature might rightfully
procedure of the courts.
devise a mode of procedure adapted to the end in view, yet, in the
lack of such legislative enactment, the constitution, through its selfoperative force, would seize upon and appropriate to its purposes such
general forms of action as had been already provided for similar
cases, and in such event the petition of the plaintiffs in the court
But we are constrained to hold that the
below might be maintained.
It does not
constitutional provision in question is not self-operative.
execute its own commands, and can only be regarded as a direction to
the legislature.
As a rule, constitutional provisions, unless expressed
in negative form or possessed of negative meaning, are not self-assertive. They usually assume the form of a command to the legislature, and
The one unlegislative action becomes necessary to give them effect.
der consideration is an instance of the latter kind. The constitution does
not ordain in terms of the present tense the individual liability of stockholders for the debts of corporations, but it ordains it in terms of the
future tense. It declares that "dues from corporations shall be secured," etc., not that "dues from corporations are secured." When
the constitution declares that a right shall be secured or a thing shall be
done, it means that it shall be secured or shall be done by the legislaIn such case the constitution places upon the legislature the obture.
ligation to carry out its ordinances by appropriate enactment. '
(Citing and quoting from Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Funk,
holding that "stockholders shall be responsible," im49 Neb. 353,
ports a present liability and so is self-executing, and is different from
" dues shall be secured by;" also Tuttle v. Bank, 161 111. 4971 34 L.
R. A. 750; Marshall v. Sherman, 148 N. Y. 9, 34 L. R. A. 757,
holding the Kansas constitutional provision was not self-executing.)
The statute, as we have seen, provides for no method of equity procedure to secure equality of right among them, nor equality of liability among the stockholders.
It is a general rule, from which, we think, no dissent exists, that if a
statute prescribes a special mode of enforcing the individual liability
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of corporations, that mode, and that alone, can be
can be enforced in no other way.
The
The decisliability
pursued.
ions on the subject are collected in a note to Thompson v. Bank
These de19 Nev. 103, 3 Am. St. Rep. 797 (s. c. 9 Pac. Rep. 121).
cisions illustrate the general rule that where a statute confers a right,
and at the same time prescribes a remedy for its enforcement, the
Notwithstanding the strength
statutory remedy only can be pursued.
with which the above rule has been fortified by the decisions, counsel
for defendants in error present for our consideration a number of
cases in which the right of the creditors of corporations to resort to
equity for the enforcement of their statutory demands against stockholders, and to secure the distribution among them of the stockholdHowever, an examination
ers' statutory liability, have been upheld.
of these cases shows that in none of them had any statutory remedy
been provided for the enforcement of the liability in question, and
that in all of them the statute declarative of the substantive right
(that is, of the right of the creditors to make demand upon the stockholders) likewise declared an equality of right among the creditors.
In such respect all these statutes were like the Nebraska constitution
above quoted.
They declared a present liability in all the stockholdall
creditors.
to
the
ers
They were lacking, however, in the matter of
an accompanying statutory remedy, and hence, in all the cases called
to our attention, the courts held that the remedy in equity was appropriate and available to enforce the equality of right declared by the
of

the stockholders

statute.

*

*

*

(Citing and quoting from Pollard v. Bailey, 20 Wall. 520; Horner
v. Henning, 93 U. S. 228; Wright v. McCormack, 17 Ohio St. 86;
Umsted v. Buskirk, 17 Ohio St. 114; Bank v. Dillingham, 147 N. Y.
603; Thompson v. Bank, 19 Nev. 103, 3 Am. St. Rep. 808, note.')
We have thus far considered this case without regard to the act of

1897, which vests in receivers of insolvent banks a right of action for the
* * * The reenforcement of the statutory liability of stockholders.
ceiver, who had been made a defendant to the equitable suit instituted
by the creditor, joined in a portion of the plaintiff's prayer for relief.
He asked that he be allowed to collect the several sums due from the
stockholders in respect of their statutory liability, that he might disThe order of
tribute it among the creditors as an asset of the bank.
the court was in accordance with the receiver's answer or cross-petition. Hence, for all purposes, the action, although begun in the name
of a creditor for himself and in behalf of the others, may be regarded
as though it had been instituted by the receiver under the statute, and
in his trust capacity.
It can only be maintained by him by giving to
an effect which will deprive the indithe statute a retroactive effect
vidual creditors of their right to maintain the proceedings theretofore allowed by law, and in the form theretofore prescribed by statute,
The
or at least delay their doing so for a year.
Can this be done?
uniform holding of the courts has been that it can not be done. It can
not be done because the relation between the creditors of a corpora-
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not a contract in the
tion and its stockholders is a relation of contract
ordinary sense of an agreement between two persons who have reduced their engagement to express terms, but a contract which the law
implies from the stockholder's willingness to assume the liability imposed by the statute, as evidenced by his stock subscription, and the
creditors' willingness to accept the advantage and security allowed to
him. * * *

(Citing and quoting from Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wall, ro ; McDonnell v. Insurance Co., 85 Ala. 401; Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S.
118, distinguishing Story v. Furman, 25 N. Y. 214
presenting a mere
change of remedy.)
Reversed.
Note.

See preceding case and note.

Same.
Sec. 718.
4. Self-executing
forceable in other states.

WHITMAN
1900.

v.

provisions.

When

en-

OXFORD NATIONAL BANK.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
-

OF THE UNITED
559-S 68 -

STATES.

176

U. S.

[Action by the National Bank of Oxford, Pennsylvania, brought in
the United States Circuit Court for the southern district of New
York, against Whitman, to enforce his statutory liability as a shareholder in a Kansas corporation, upon a debt of $2,000 due by it to the
bank. The defendant moved to direct a verdict in his favor, on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction to enforce the Kansas statutory liability ; the court overruled the motion, directed a verdict for
The
plaintiff, refused a new trial, and gave judgment for plaintiff.
circuit court of appeals affirmed the decision, and the case was
brought to this court by writ of certiorariJ\
MR. JUSTICE BREWER. By section i, of article 12, of the constitution of Kansas, a certain definite liability is cast upon each stockholder in other than railway, religious and charitable corporations.
This liability is for the dues of the corporation, and to an amount
The word "dues" is one of genequal to the stock owned by him.
Whether
eral significance, and includes all contractual obligations.
broad enough to include liabilities for torts, either before or after
judgment, is not a question before us, and upon it we express no
The words "shall be secured," are not merely directory to
opinion.
the legislature to make provision for such liability, but of themselves
To this extent the constitution is self-executing.
Willis
declare it.
The discretion of the legislature extends
v. Mabon, 48 Minn. 140.
beyond this, as indicated by the clause "and such other means
'Statement

abridged, part of opinion omitted.
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A failure of the legislature to create
as shall be provided by law."
courts or prescribe modes of procedure may, it is true, make ineffective this constitutional provision, but does not destroy the liability ;
nor is it created by the act of the legislature prescribing the mode of
This is the obvious meaning of the constitutional
its enforcement.
"The
simplest and most obvious interpretation of a conprovision.
stitution, if in itself sensible, is the most likely to be that meant by the
Lamar, Justice, in Lake County v. Rolpeople in its adoption."
662,
lins, 130 U. S.
671.
The legisBut this constitutional provision does not stand alone.
lature of Kansas has acted on the subject-matter, and the constitution
and the statutes are to be taken together, as making one body of law ;
and it serves no good purpose to inquire what rights and remedies a
creditor of a corporation might have or what liabilities would rest upon
a stockholder if either constitution or statutes stood alone and unaided
by the other.
In section 32 of chapter 23 of the General Statutes of that state,
passed before the organization of the corporation referred to, the legislature prescribed the mode of enforcing this constitutional liability,
and if such were needed, declared to what extent it could be enforced.
It may be either by motion in a case in which judgment has been rendered against the corporation and execution thereon returned unsatisfied, or by a direct action by the plaintiff in such judgment.
Neither remedy can be made effectual in the courts of Kansas against
a stockholder, unless by due service of process he is brought within
the jurisdiction of such courts.
Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U. S. 41 ;
Howell v. Manglesdorf, 33 Kan. 194, 199.
Whatever else may be said about the remedy, it is direct, certain
and available to every creditor of a corporation, and leaves to the
stockholders the adjustment between themselves of their respective
individual shares of the corporate obligations. In view of the present
tendency to carry on business through corporate instrumentalities and
the freedom from personal liability which attends ordinary corporate
action, it can not be said that this limited additional remedy is open
to judicial condemnation.
The liability which by the constitution and statutes is thus declared
to rest upon the stockholder, though statutoiy in its origin, is contractual in its nature.
It would not be doubted that if the stockholders
in this corporation had formed a partnei'ship, the obligations of each
partner to the others and to creditors would be contractual, and deIf
termined by the general common law in respect to partnerships.
Kansas had provided for partnerships with limited liability, and
these parties, complying with the provisions of the statute, had
formed such a partnership, it would also be true that their obligations
to one another and to creditors would be contractual, although only
in the statute was to be found the authority for the creation of
And it is none the less so when these same stocksuch obligations.
holders organized a corporation under a law of Kansas, which prescribed the nature of the obligation which each thereby assumed to
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the others and to the creditors.
While the statute of Kansas permitted the forming of the corporation under certain conditions, the action
of these parties was purely voluntary. In other words, they entered
into a contract authorized by statute.
Flash v. Conn, 109 U. S. 371, is much in point. In that case a
corporation was organized in the state of New York under an act of
legislature which contained this provision:
"Section 10. All the stockholders of every company incorporated
under this act shall be severally individually liable to the creditors of
the company in which they are stockholders, to an amount equal to
the amount of stock held by them respectively, for all debts and contracts made by such . company, until the whole amount of capital
stock fixed and limited by such company shall have been paid in,
and a certificate thereof shall have been made and recorded as prescribed in the following section."
An action was brought in Florida against one of the stockholders,
and on error to this court it was held that the stockholder was liable,
the court saying (p. 377) :
"We think the liability imposed by section 10 is a liability arising
upon contract. The stockholders of the company are by the section made
severally and individually liable, within certain limits, to the creditors
of the company for its debts and contracts.
Every one who becomes
a member of the company by subscribing to its stock assumes this
liability, which continues until the capital stock is all paid up and a
certificate of that fact is made, published and recorded."
And again after noticing the rulings of the court of appeals of the
state of New York (p. 379) :
"If this were a case arising in the state of New York we should,
therefore, follow the construction put upon the statute by the courts of
that state.
The circumstance that the case comes here from the
state of Florida should not leave the statute open to a different construction.
It would be an anomaly for this court to put one interpretation on a statute in a case arising in New York, and a different
interpretation in a case arising in Florida. Our conclusion, therefore,
is that this action was not brought to enforce a liability in the nature
of a penalty.
"The right of the plaintiffs to sue upon this liability in any court
having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties is, therefore,
clear.
Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U. S.
And finally, in reference to the objection that the action was one at
law against a single stockholder, instead of in equity against all

n."

(p. 380):

"But in this case the statute makes every stockholder individually
liable for the debts of the company for an amount equal to the amount
of his stock.
This liability is fixed, and does not depend on the liaThere is no necessity for bringing in
bility of other stockholders.
other stockholders or creditors.
Any creditor who has recovered
judgment against the company and sued out an execution thereon,
which has been returned unsatisfied, may sue any stockholder, and no
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other creditor can.
Such actions are maintained without objection in
the courts of New York, under section 10 of the statute relied on in
this case.
Shillington v. Rowland, 53 N. Y. 371 ; Wiles v. Suydam, 64 N. Y. 17-? ; Handy v. Draper, 89 N. Y. 334; Rocky Mountain
*
*
*
Nat. Bank v. Bliss, 89 N. Y. 338."
(Citing from Richmond v. Irons, 121 U. S. 27; Concord Bank v.
Hawkins, 174 U. S. 364, 372 ; Abbey v. Dry Goods Co., 44 Kan. 415,
418; Plumb v. Bank of Enterprise, 48 Kan. 484, 486; Howell v.
Manglesdorf, 33 Kan. 194, 199; Pierce v. Security Co., 60 Kan.
164, to the effect that such statutory liability was of a contractual
nature,

And

)

as this liability is one which is contractual in its nature, it is
also clear that an action therefor can be maintained in any court of
Der.nick v. Railroad Company, 103 U. S.
competent jurisdiction.

ii

; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657.
Similar views have been expressed by the highest courts of several
states in like actions based upon the same Kansas constitutional
and
Ferguson v. Sherman, 116 Cal. 169; Bell v.
statutory provisions.
Farwell, 176 111. 489; Hancock National Bank v. Ellis, 172 Mass.
39; Western National Bank v. Lawrence, 117 Mich. 669; Guerney
See, also, Paine v. Stewart, 33 Conn. 516;
v. Moore, 131 Mo. 650.
Perot,
Pa.
St. 66; Rhodes v. United States NaCushing v.
175
tional Bank (U. S. Ct. App., 7th Cir.), 24 U. S. App. 607; Bank
of North America v. Rindge (U. S. Cir. Ct. S. Dist. Cal.), 57 Fed.
Rep. 279; McVickar v. Jones (Cir. Ct. Dist. N. H.), 70 Fed. Rep.
754; Mechanics' Savings Bank v. Fidelity Insurance Company (Cir.
Ct. E. Dist. Penn.), 87 Fed. Rep. 113; Dexter v. Edmands (Cir.
Ct. Mass.), 89 Fed. Rep. 467; Brown v. Trail (Cir. Ct. Dist. Md.),
89 Fed. Rep. 641.
We see no error in the judgment of the circuit court of appeals,

and it is, therefore,

Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Peckham dissented.
Note.

See note, supra, p. 2014, and infra, pp. 2028, 2033.
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EDWARD MARSHALL,
1895.

Enforcement in other states,
When it will not be enforced.
RESPONDENT, v.
PELLANT. 1

GEORGE

R. SHERMAN,

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.
Rep. 9-29, 51 Am. St. Rep. 654.

148

N.

AP-

Y.

[Action brought by the creditor of an insolvent Kansas bank
against the defendant to enforce his statutory liability under the Kansas
The complaint set forth the facts as to the incorporation of
statute.
1

Statement much abridged
2 WIL. CAS.
64

;

arguments

and part of opinion omitted.
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the bank, its insolvency, the appointment of a receiver, its dissolution ;
that debts were left unpaid ; that he had recovered judgment against
it for $1,804; execution was returned unsatisfied; that the receiver
had paid him $880, leaving $924 unpaid, for which he demanded
The provisions of the constitution
judgment against the defendant.
and statutes of Kansas were set forth as follows :
"The provision of the constitution of that state, which is the foundation of the alleged liability, reads as follows: 'Dues from corporations shall be secured by individual liability of the stockholders to an
additional amount equal to the stock owned by such stockholders, and
such other means as shall be provided by law ; but such individual
liability shall not apply to railroad corporations nor corporations for
religious and charitable purposes.' The statutes for the enforcement
of this liability enacted by that state, and set forth in the complaint, are
embraced in two sections of the laws with respect to the liability of
the stockholders in corporations.
They are as follows (section 44) :
'If any corporation created under this, or any general statute of this
state, except railway or charitable or religious corporations, be dissolved, leaving debts unpaid, suit may be brought against any person
or persons who wei'e stockholders at the time of such dissolution,
without joining the corporation in such suit ; and if judgment be rendered and execution satisfied, the defendant or defendants may sue all
who were stockholders at the time of the dissolution for the recovery
of the portion of such debt for which they were liable, and the execution upon the judgment shall direct the collection to be made from
property of each stockholder respectively; and if any number of the
stockholders (defendants in the case) shall not have property enough
to satisfy his or their portion of the execution, then the amount of the
deficiency shall be divided equally among all the remaining stockholders, and collections made accordingly,. deducting from the amount
a sum in proportion to the amount of stock owned by the plaintiff at
the time the company was dissolved.'
"The other enactment is section 32 and is set forth in the complaint
as follows : 'Execution against stockholders' action. That if any execution shall have been issued against the property or effects of a corporation, except a railway or a religious or charitable corporation, and
there can not be found any property whereon to levy such execution,
then execution may be issued against any of the stockholders, to an
extent equal in amount to the amount of the stock by him or her
owned, together with any amount unpaid thereon ; but no execution
shall issue against any stockholder except upon an order brought or
instituted, made upon motion in open court, after reasonable notice
in writing to the person or persons sought to be charged, and upon
such motion such court may order execution to issue accordingly, or
the plaintiff in the execution may proceed by action to charge the
'
stockholders with the amount of his judgment.'
The defendant demurred on the ground that the complaint showed
a defect of parties, in that all stockholders were not made defendants,
and that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute the cause of ac-
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tion.

There was no allegation as to the meaning of the constitution
and statutes of Kansas, or that there had been any judgment in that
state against the defendant.
The demurrer was overruled in the
court below.]
*
*
*
O'BRIEN,
stating the facts, and holding that

J.

(After

the constitutional provision was not self-executing, proceeds:)
The
question is thus presented whether a right of action unknown to the
common law, and existing only by the force of the statutes of another
state, can be enforced in the courts of this state, or outside of the
local jurisdiction where the corporation is domiciled. The defendant's relation to the corporation is governed by the laws of the state
of its creation, and the general rule is that the statutory liability of
stockholders in foreign corporations can not be enforced except at the
domicile of the corporation when the law of the domicile provides
the remedy.
In Erickson v. Nesmith (4 Allen 233) the court said:
"There seems to be no practicable mode of dealing with such corporations and its members, when seeking to charge the latter upon the
statute liability, but to proceed in the manner prescribed by the statute creating such liability, and in the local jurisdiction where the
corporation was established and carries on its business, and by whose
local statutes alone the responsibility exists."
We think that when
the statutes set forth in the complaint are carefully read, it is apparent
from their language that they provide for a special and peculiar
remedy against the stockholders of a corporation created under the
laws of that state. From their whole structure and scope it is apparent that they were intended to operate and be enforced only within
that jurisdiction.
It is quite clear that as to some of their provisions,
at least, it would be impossible to enforce them in this state, and
they should be construed as enactments in part materia, and as a
whole. If it appears that they can not as a whole scheme be given
full effect in this state, we ought not to detach some particular provision from the general context with a view of ascertaining whether
that is or is not enforceable beyond the local jurisdiction.
But without reference to the special and peculiar provisions of these statutes,
we think that the general current of authority is to the effect that such
enactments are to be enforced only within the jurisdiction of the sovSome of the authorities will be referred
ereignty where they exist.
to hereafter.
The judgment of the learned court below seems to have proceeded
principally upon the ground that the liability of the defendant as a
stockholder of the insolvent bank in another state is primary and contractual. It is quite doubtful, at least, whether any such relation exists between the stockholders of the corporation and its creditors after
the capital stock has been paid in, and the organization of the corporation completed so as to give it legal capacity to make contracts and
incur obligations for itself.
The statute of this state, as construed by
judicial decisions, seems to recognize that relation only in cases of
liability before the capital stock is paid in. Up to that time the liability of stockholders has been likened to that of partners engaged
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in a joint enterprise, which, however, disappears upon the perfection
of the corporate organization. * * *
(Citing and quoting from First National Bank of Auburn v. Dillingham, 147 N. Y. 603.)
The only liability that in law is imposed upon the defendant to pay
this debt, or any part of
created by the statutes of the state
where the corporation
domiciled. The principle adopted, generthat such
ally, by the more recent cases in this state,
liability
not strictly based upon contract, but
created by statute.
It
not
primary but secondary, and conditional upon the failure of the corpoA liability
ration itself, which owes the debt, to pay it.
imposed
statute
the
defendant
to
the
limited
upon
corporate debts to
by
pay
It
extent, under certain circumstances and upon certain conditions.
not
but
and
failure
conditioned
the
general liability,
special,
upon
of the corporation itself to pay.
This peculiar liability has been held
by our courts to place the stockholders of the corporation in the relation of sureties or guarantors of the corporate debts, and the obligation
limited in the first place, by the defendant's holdings in the
corporation, and in the second place by the deficiency existing after
the application of all the property of the corporation to the payment
of its debts.
It does not appear from the statements of the complaint that the
corporate property which passed into the hands of the receiver has
for the benefit of creditors.
It
yet been marshalled or appropriated
of
but
to
how
redoes appear that
as
still
has,
much,
part
any,
mains in the hands of the receiver, applicable to the discharge of the
True, there
silent.
obligations held by creditors, the complaint
the allegation that the corporation
insolvent and has not sufficient property to discharge its debts.
But until all the property
of the corporation in the hands of the receiver has been appropriated
can not be known what the deficiency
which the
to that purpose
If the defendant should pay
stockholders are required to make up.
the plaintiff's debt in this action, for aught that appears some one
dividend from the receiver on account of
may still be entitled to
and until
has been definitely ascertained by some proceeding, legal
or equitable, either in the courts of the state where the corporation
was domiciled, or here, what the deficiency is,
impossible to say,
with any degree of accuracy, how much the defendant ought to pay.
The relations of the defendant as a stockholder of the corporation are
fixed and governed by the laws of the state in which the corporation
was created.
If those laws created
domiciled and under which
certain
and under certhe
defendant
conditions
upon
liability against
tain circumstances, they also provided a special and peculiar remedy;
and the general trend of authority
to the effect that the remedy thus
be
followed,
must
and
the
provided
proceedings for its enforcement
must be within the local jurisdiction and by the judicial department
of the sovereignty which enacted the law and created the corporation
and this would be so whether the liability
penal in its nature or
arises from the implied obligation of defendant by the purchase of
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under any circumstances, the action could be mainBut
stock.
must be in such form and by such modes
tained in this jurisdiction,
created under our own statutes are enlike
liabilities
of procedure as
citizens.
own
forced against our
no reason why the plaintiff should be permitted to enforce
There
citizen of this state in
form of
his debt in this jurisdiction against
creditor
which
of
domestic
corporation
action different from that
quite well estabmay prosecute against a domestic stockholder. It
case like this an action at law by
single creditor
lished that in
for
of
the
specific sum of
single stockholder
recovery
against
in
our
courts
under
our
statutes declarmoney can not be maintained
In such cases the liability must be
ing the liability of stockholders.
suit brought by or in behalf of all the creditors
enforced in equity in
against all the stockholders wherein the amount of the liability, and all
The stockholders of
the equities can be ascertained and adjusted.
for
this Kansas bank are not equitably liable
any greater sum than may
be necessary to discharge the debts after the corporate property has
All of them that are solvent should contribute in
been applied.
We are not
proportion to the amount of their holdings of stock.
informed by the complaint how many stockholders there are, or even
Nor are we informed whether any
the amount of the capital stock.
It
of the stockholders are insolvent.
quite evident, therefore, that
the equitable proportion of the corporate debts which this defendant
The
should pay can not be ascertained or determined in this action.
fund to which all the creditors are
liability of the stockholders
entitled to resort after the corporate property has been applied upon
If this action can be maintained
the debts.
quite apparent that
one creditor may collect his debt in full, and another creditor may
able to collect from the corponot be paid anything except what he

it

a

is

if

is

is

is

ration.
based provide, among other
The statutes upon which this action
stockholder and
obtained against
things, that when judgment
satisfied by collection or payment, he may, in turn, maintain an
action against all the other stockholders, who are such at the time of
dissolution, for the recovery of the portion of the debt for which they
were liable, and
any stockholder thus sued shall not have pi'operty
enough to satisfy his portion of the claim, the deficiency shall be divided equally among the remaining stockholders and collected accordquite apparent that the purpose of the law can not be
ingly. It
carried out, except by a proceeding in equity for an accounting, to
If the plaintiff can mainwhich all the stockholders are made parties.
tain this action and collect his debts from the defendant, how can the
defendant proceed against his fellow-stockholders to reimburse himIt would
self for that part of the debt which they should have paid?
be manifestly unjust and unfair to compel him to pay this claim and
turn him over to another action, perhaps in another state, or in many
states, in order to obtain the contribution which the law evidently

All these questions should be settled in one proceedcontemplates.
ing, or in one action, and that at the domicile of the corporation.
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The statute contemplates that each stockholder shall pay his just proportion of any sum that may be required to discharge the outstanding
obligations of the corporation. The form of the action should be
A suit at law by one
one, therefore, adapted to the protection of all.
creditor to recover for himself alone is entirely inconsistent with any
The liability is not to any individual creditor,
idea of contribution.
but for contribution to the fund, out of which all creditors are to be
paid alike. Hence, the appropriate remedy is by suit in equity to
enforce the contribution, and not by one creditor alone to appropriate
to his own use that which belongs to others equally with himself.
(First National Bank v. Dillingham, 147 N. Y. 603 ; Terry v. Little,
101 U. S. 216; Hornor v. Henning, 93 U. S. 228.)
It is impossible
to conceal from ourselves that such is the scope and real purpose of
the action, and hence we are asked to enforce a remedy under a foreign law where it is perfectly apparent that complete justice can not
be done, and where it is plain that an equitable result can be accomplished only by the courts of the jurisdiction where the corporation
was created.

The

case has thus far been considered with reference to the disof
some practical method of applying in this jurisdiction the
covery
local
peculiar
remedy for the enforcement of the statutory liability
created by the law of the domicile. There is still another aspect of the
question which deserves attention, and it must be viewed in the light
of notorious facts which, though not appearing in the record, are matters of current histoiy and common knowledge to which we can not

Within recent years numerous business enterprises
shut our eyes.
have been promoted in some of the western states, the money for the
prosecution of which has been to a large extent borrowed here, either
in the form of direct loans upon some kind of security, or by inducing
many of our citizens to purchase stock in corporations organized for
the purpose under local laws.
Much of these investments, amounting
to a vast sum in the aggregate, has been lost.
This result, in some
is
be
to
attributed
to
financial
degree,
depression and the consequent
of
in
business,
but
a
much
derangement
greater degree to the gross
and
of
the
The
managers and promoters.
mismanagement
dishonesty
funds thus procured have been used largely in furtherance of local and
private interests and in disregard of every prudent safeguard for the
protection of the investors, and sometimes in defiance of every prinIn some cases, when the managers well
ciple of common honesty.
knew they were hopelessly involved, they continued to transact business, borrowing recklessly and pledging the assets in their possession
or under their control.
When the crash came these assets were sold
and,
the
of
course,
sacrificed in many cases, leaving large
by
pledgees,
deficiencies, which honest and prudent management could have converted into a surplus:
A careful investigation of some of the
disastrous failures of loan, investment, trust, land and mortgage companies, as well as banks and other corporations, will reveal this condition of things.
It will not be difficult for speculators to purchase
large claims against these defunct corporations at a very low price, if
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they can be readily enforced here against stockholders who have made
and lost investments in the stock.
These considerations are not, of course, pertinent in a case where a
party is seeking to enforce a clear legal right, whatever may have
been the circumstances of its origin, but they serve to stimulate a careful inquiry as to the principles and reasons upon which the courts of
this state are required to aid in the enforcement of claims of this
character.
In the case at bar the plaintiff's right of action has no other legal
dr moral basis than the flat of a legislature of another state.
It is a
principle of universal application, recognized in all civilized states,
that the statutes of one state have, ex proprio vigore, no force or
effect in another.
The enforcement in our courts of some positive
or
of
another state depends upon our own express or
law
regulation
tacit consent.
The consent is given only by virtue of the adoption of
the doctrine of comity as a part of our municipal law.
That doctrine
has many limitations and qualifications, and generally each sovereignty has the right to determine for itself its true scope and extent.
The courts of this state are open to all suitors to enforce rights of
action, transitory in their nature, recognized by the common law or
founded in natural justice, and when no law of the forum or any
There is, however, a large
principle of public policy interferes.
class of foreign laws and statutes which, under the doctrine of comity,
It belongs exclusively to each
have no force in this jurisdiction.
sovereignty to determine for itself whether it can enforce a foreign
law without, at the same time, neglecting the duty that it owes to its
*
*
*
own citizens or subjects.
(Citing cases to the effect that the courts of one state would not
enforce the revenue, exemption, penal and bankrupt laws, and statutes of frauds of other states ; also citing the following cases where
states had refused to enforce the statutory liability of shareholders in
the foreign corporations:
Derrickson v. Smith, 27 N. J. L. 166;
New Haven Horse & N. Co. v. Linden Spring Co., 142 Mass. 349;
Post v. T. C., etc., Ry. Co., 144 Mass. 341 ; Bank of North Am. v.
Rindge, 154 Mass. 203; Fowler v. Lamson, 146 111. 472; Young v.
Farwell, 139 111. 326; May v. Black, 77 Wis. 101 ; Nimick v. Mingo
Iron Work Co., 25 W. Va. 184, on the ground that the remedy was
peculiar and exclusive; Terry v. Little, 101 U. S. 216; National
Tube Works Co. v Ballou, 146 U. S. 517; Pollard v. Bailey, 20
Wall. 520; Fourth National Bank v. Francklyn, 120 U. S. 747;
Peck v. Miller, 39 Mich. 594; Barrick v. Gifford, 47 Ohio St. iSr ;
Allen v. Walsh, 25 Minn. 543; Smith v. Huckabee, 53 Ala. 191, on
the ground that the remedy should be in equity after all remedies
against the corporation are exhausted.)
It would, perhaps, be impossible to state the principle upon which
the decision should rest, without apparently coming in conflict with
The
some of the numerous cases on the subject at some point.
great weight of authority, as will be seen, is against the right to
Sometimes the decision is put upon one
maintain such an action.
ground, and sometimes upon another, but it is to be noticed that the
party seeking to enforce such a statute in a foreign jurisdiction has
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been quite uniformly defeated.
The statute in question, while creating a certain liability on the part of a stockholder to a creditor of a
corporation, at the same time gives to the former certain rights as
It should be adminagainst his fellow-stockholders for contribution.
istered in such a way as to secure the rights of all in the same action.
This is the interpretation which we have given to our own statutes
enacted for a similar purpose.
It is clear that this can not be done
in this action, since the theory of the plaintiff is that the defendant is
liable in successive actions at law by creditors suing separately, until
he has paid a sum equal to his stock, and then he must resort to some
other jurisdiction for contribution.
This would be most unjust and
oppressive, and it is safe to say that no well considered case can be
found that sanctions such a principle.
While this is not an action for a penalty, yet we think that it belongs
to a class of cases in which there is no obligation under any wellrecognized principle of the law of comity to enforce a claim founded
Moreover, the right asserted and the remedy
upon such a statute.
provided are of such a nature that they can not be given any practical
effect here without injustice to our own citizens. We are virtually asked
to ignore our own rules of construction and methods of procedure in
order to compel the defendant to pay to foreign creditors a sum equal
to his holdings of stock, without any power to inquire into the necessity for it by an accounting or to secure to him any recourse against
others equally liable.
When the courts of this state are asked to administer the statutes of Kansas-, and we can see that the case is surrounded by such complications and the circumstances are such that it
can not be done without injustice to our own citizens, or that it will
be impossible to do full and complete justice to all the parties in interest, it is reasonable and just to decline to administer them at all.
Reversed. All concur.
When will not be enforced:
See, 1887, Post v. Toledo, etc., R., 144
341, 59 Am. Rep. 86; 1887, Fourth Nat'l Bk. v. Francklyn, 120 TJ. S.
747; 1893, Fowler v. Lamson, 146 111. 472, 37 Am. St. Rep. 163, note 168; 1899,
State Nat'l Bk. v. Sayward, 91 Fed. Rep. (C. C. A. Mass.) 443; 1899, Crippen
v. Laighton, 69 N. H. 540, 46 L. R. A. 467, 44 Atl. Rep. 538; 1900, Finney v.
Guy. 106 Wis. 256, 82 N. W. Rep. 595; 1900, Eau Claire Nat'l Bk. v. Benson,
106 Wis! 624, 82 N. W. Rep. 604.
Note.

Mass.

See following case and note.

Same,

Sec. 720.
states.

(b) When

LEONARD HOWARTH,

RESPONDENT, v.

1900.

and how it

AS RECEIVER

will be enforced in other

OP THE TRADES'

CHARLES E. ANGLE,

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
179-193. 47

OF

NEW YORK.

L- R - A -

7

2

BANK

APPELLANT.
162

OP TACOMA,
1

N. Y. Rep.

5-

[Appeal from judgment in favor of plaintiff, who brought suit,

receiver of

as

in the state of Washington, to recover the statu1
Statement abridged, arguments and part of opinion omitted.
a

bank

72

THE CREDITORS

AND

SHAREHOLDERS.

2O2Q

The
tory liability from the defendant as a shareholder in the bank.
Washington statutes provide that stockholders "should be held individually responsible, equally and ratably, and not one for the other,
for all the contracts, debts, and engagements of the bank, accruing
while they remain such stockholders, to the extent of the amount
of their stock therein, at the par value thereof, in addition to the
amount invested in such shares."
They also provide for the appointment of a receiver when the corporation becomes insolvent, with
"power under control of the court, to bring and defend actions, take
and keep possession of property, receive rents, collect notes, and generally to do such acts respecting the property in his hands as the
court should authorize."
The supreme court of Washington in construing the statute have held that such receiver was a guasi-assignee
clothed with such power as authorized him to collect and enforce the
statutory liability, and that the title to the same was in said receiver as
a trust fund for the purpose of satisfying the claims of creditors; that
they were assets in his hands; and should be adjusted in such receivership proceedings, that he should enforce the same ; and that he, and
not the creditors, should sue upon the same.
The lower court in New
York found that plaintiff had been duly appointed receiver of the bank
by the Washington courts; that report had been made showing that
after the corporate assets were exhausted there still remained due
and owing $131,670.40; that to pay this the court had ordered the
receiver to levy an assessment of 26 34-100 percent, of the face value
of the stock; that the defendant was the owner of sixty-five shares, of
the face value of $6,500, and his pro rata share should be $1,712.10,
for which the trial court directed judgment, and which the appellate
division affirmed.
Defendant appeals.]
VANN, J. * * * While the plaintiff is called a receiver, the
name does not measure his power, for he represents all the creditors
and stockholders of the insolvent corporation, and is authorized to
maintain such actions as are necessary to recover the assets, among
which is included the cause of action set forth in the complaint. He
* *
* invested
is not a mere custodian, but " a ^z^wz'-assignee,
with the title to all rights of action possessed by his principals," and
entitled to bring " any and all actions involving the property, funds
and effects in his hands as receiver, or concerning the persons repreThe
sented by him, including the creditors of such corporation."
statutory liability of stockholders is an asset of the insolvent bank,
" the title to which was in said receiver as a tmst and fund for the
purpose of satisfying the claims of" creditors.
While a foreign receiver can not sue in this state, as a matter of
right, "still our courts uphold the title of a foreign assignee or receiver
upon the principle of comity. If the title is by virtue of a voluntary
conveyance or transfer, it is sustained as against all, including even
domestic creditors, but if it depends on a foreign statute or judgment,
*
* * Every
it is sustained against all except domestic creditors.
remedy to gather in the assets is afforded, unless it would interfere
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with the policy of the state or impair the rights of its own citizens."
This is made
(Mabon v. Ongley Electric Co., 156 N. Y. 196, 201.)
division,
learned
of
the
the
which
opinion
appellate
very plain by
v.
leaves nothing to be said upon the subject.
Angle, 39
(Howarth

App. Div. 151.)

It

was not necessary that all the stockholders should be before the
Washington court when the order was made appointing the plaintiff
receiver and giving him authority to sue any more than when a decree
in bankruptcy is made, which binds all who are not parties the same
as those who are.
(Sanger v. Upton, 91 U. S. 56.) That judgment
a proceeding in rem, binding upon all the world
be
as
regarded
may
so far as title to the assets of the corporation is concerned, and, according to the decisions of the highest court of the state where it was
made, the so-called statutory liability of stockholders is a part of the
assets.
The defendant took stock in the Tacoma bank subject to the burden of the law, which he impliedlv agreed to bear, as he could not
otherwise have become a stockholder.
(Lowry v. Inman, 46 N. Y.
in
an
vested
That
burden
is
the receiver, and can be enasset,
119.)
forced in this state the same as a promissory note, not because the laws
of Washington are in force here, but because the defendant voluntarily
assented to the conditions upon which the bank was organized. As
was said in the case last cited: "A personal liability of stockholders
for the debts of a corporation, in virtue of the charter, is not in the
nature of a penalty or forfeiture, and does not exist solely as a liability
It is not enforced simply as a statutory obligaimposed by statute.
tion, but is regarded as voluntarily assumed by the act of becoming a
*
*
*
It is like other obligations, assumed in the
stockholder.
form prescribed by the laws of the place where made, and being valid
Its validity, interpretation and
there, is enforceable
everywhere.
effect are to be determined by the lex loci, but the remedy is governed
While the liability is, for convenience, frequently
by the lex

fori."

statutory, because the statute, which is the constitution of the
bank, affixed the obligation to the ownership of stock, it is in fact
There is no subcontractual and springs from an implied promise.
stantial difference between the liability for an unpaid balance on a
stock subscription, which is an express contract to take stock and pay
for it (Stoddard v. Lum, 159 N. Y. 265), and the liability for the unpaid deficiency of assets assumed by the act of becoming a member
of the corporation through the purchase of stock, from which a contract is implied to perform the statutory conditions upon which stock
may be owned.
(Richmond v. Irons, 121 U. S. 27, 55-) The fact
that the former is the promise of a principal and the latter of a surety
The express promise runs to the cordoes not affect the question.
while the implied promise runs
poration, and may be enforced by
to the creditors, and may, according to the common law of the state
rewhere
was made, be enforced for the benefit of creditors by
The latter
ceiver of the corporation appointed to wind up its affairs.
a

it

it,

called
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promise is not a part of the capital stock of the bank, but is a substitute, required by statute, for the personal liability of a partner at
common law, and has the same object, which is the protection of
creditors.
The stockholders, however, may controvert in our courts all the essential facts, such as insolvency, the amount of the deficiency, and the
like, whether they ai'e established by the judgment appointing the
receiver or not.
They may require strict common-law proof as to all
the facts upon which the deficiency is based, and may contest any unreasonable expenditure in the conversion of assets and the collection
of accounts, including extravagant allowances to attorneys or counsel.
Upon all these questions the defendant has had his day in the courts of
this state, and the united action of the courts below have conclusively
determined them against him.
If the statute, upon which the personal liability of the stockholders
is founded, had also provided a remedy for that liability, such remedy
would have been exclusive and could not have been enforced in the
It was said in Pollard v. Bailey (87 U. S. 520,
courts of this state.
527), "the liability and the remedy were created by the same statute.
This being so, the remedy provided is exclusive of all others. A general
liability created by a statute without a remedy may be enforced by an
appropriate common-law action." The statute of Washington, however, provided no remedy, but left that subject to the courts, to be
worked out according to the common law. The learned counsel for
the appellant recognizes
the distinction between foreign statutes
which create a liability and provide a remedy and those which create
a liability but do not provide a remedy.
He admits that, according
to the law of this state, in the former class only the remedy provided
by the foreign statute can be pursued, while in the latter it depends
He insists, however, that the procedure
upon interstate comity.
against resident stockholders of a foreign corporation must be in substantial accordance with the practice established in the state where
the action is brought, and this is true to the extent that no departure
from that practice is permitted, which results in injustice to the citiHe relies
zens of that state or is against the public policy thereof.
upon the case of Marshall v. Sherman (148 N. Y. 9), where the
action was not brought by a receiver, but by a creditor of an insolvent
bank in Kansas, to recover the amount of a deposit after a receiver
had been appointed in that state.
The action was founded upon a
local statute, which not only created the liability, but also provided a
peculia'r and complicated remedy unknown to our courts, and which
could not be entirely enforced in this state. (Lowry v. Inman, 46 N.
Y. 119; Christensen v. Eno, 106 N. Y. 97, 103). The liability was
neither contractual, in the general sense, nor penal, but the statute
charged the property of the stockholder with the debts of the insolvent corporation to the extent of the stock held by him.
It was the
case so aptly described by Judge Allen, in Lowry v. Inman (supra^),
where the intent of the legislature "was not to create a general, per-
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sonal or property liability, but to charge the property of the stockholders, and that not generally, or by the usual and ordinary process,
but conditionally, and by a peculiar and unusual procedure, only
available in the courts of that state, not only limiting and prescribing
the security and rights of the creditor, and the obligation and liability
of the stockholder, but prescribing the remedy going with
and as
*
of
the
right."
part
In that case the amount of the deficiency was not ascertained in any
way by court or otherwise the action was not brought by receiver;
the remedy sought was that provided by the foreign statute which
created the liability; that remedy could not be wholly enforced in
this state, and, to the extent that
could be enforced, might result in
to
our
citizens.
In
this
case
the action
reinjustice
brought by
ceiver, who, according to the decision of the Washington courts, rfas
the title to the right of action, and the amount of the deficiency has
been definitely ascertained both by the courts of that state and of this.
It does not appear that there
any other stockholder or any creditor
in this state, or that injustice will be done to any citizen of this state,
by sustaining the judgment appealed from. The reasons given by
the court for denying relief in Marshall v. Sherman are met by the
facts of this case, which distinguish
in many essential respects and
under
the
principles sanctioned, but not applied, in
permit recovery
*
*
that case, because the necessary facts were wanting.
It
sufficient
the method of procedure in our courts
such that
no injustice
done to the defendant, or to any citizen of this state,
and the established policy of the state
not interfered with.
(Willitts v. Waite, 25 N. Y. 577, 585.)
No injustice was done the defendant by the judgments below, because he was only required to pay
his exact proportion of the deficiency, as duly ascertained by the
The fact that the deficiency had also been ascercourts of this state.
tained by the courts in Washington and the same amount found to
There
no inequality, for one creditor
exist did no harm.
not paid
in full, while others get less, but all are benefited equally, and no one
done to all and injustice to none.
gets more than his due.
Justice
While only single stockholder was made
party to the action, he
was the only stockholder, so far as appears, who could be served in
this state.
If some of the stockholders should prove insolvent, the defendant
or his liability increased thereby.
can not be affected by
Under
the Federal banking law, which contains the same provision as to the
liability of stockholders, in the same words as the statute in question,
was held that there was no power to direct
second assessment to
caused
the
of
the
deficit
the
receiver to enforce
supply
inability
by
from
as
were
such
stockholders
or
insolvent
payment
beyond the jurisdiction. It was also held that the effect of the words " equably and
ratably and not one for another," was to make the liability several
and not joint, and to protect each stockholder from liability for the
Marshall v. Sherman.
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It was distinctly announced "that the shareholders were not intended to be put in the relation of guarantors or sureties .one for another, as to the amount which each might be required
to pay," and that "the insolvency of one stockholder, or his being beyond the jurisdiction of the court, does not in anywise affect the liability of another."
(United States v. Knox, 102 U. S. 422. See,
Bank, 27 N. Y. 393 ; Crease v. Babcock,
Hollister
of
the
also, Matter
on
and
Morse
10 Mete. 525,
Banking, 503.) * * * When an action
receiver
to
collect
assets, under the authority of the court
by a foreign
no
him,
works
detriment to any citizen of this state,
which appointed
and is not repugnant to its policy, it would be a provincial and narrow view for our courts to refuse to extend the usual state comity.
There is a close business connection between the citizens of the differInvestments are freely made in other states
ent states of the Union.
of
this state, who need the aid of the courts of the
by the citizens
The comity which we
jurisdiction where the investments are made.
expect to have extended to citizens of our state, we can not, in justice,
State lines should not prevent justrefuse to citizens of other states.
ice from being done.
Our courts should not close their doors to a
receiver from another state, who comes here, armed with a title to a just
claim against a citizen of this state, and offers to establish by commonlaw evidence the liability of that citizen. While we should keep control of the subject, so as to see that no discrimination is practiced
against our citizens, or injustice done them, either as to the substance
of the liability or the method of procedure, when the same result is
attained in practically the same way as, under similar circumstances,
would be attained in the case of a domestic corporation, there is no
reason for withholding that aid which is now afforded by the courts
of almost all enlightened countries.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
concur;
Parker, C. J., Bartlett, Haight, Martin and Landon,
O'Brien, J., not voting.
default of another.

JJ.,

Judgment affirmed.

Note.
When enforceable in other states. See, 1883, Flash v. Conn, 109 U. S.
371; 1893, Aldrich v. Anchor, etc., Coal Co., 24 Ore. 32, 41 Am. St. Rep. 831,
note; 1895, Mandel v. Swan Cattle Co., 154 111. 177, 45 Am. St. Rep. 124, note
132; 1896, Hancock Nat'l Bank v. Ellis, 166 Mass. 414, 55 Ain. St. Rep. 414;
1898, Hancock Nat'l Bank v. Ellis, 172 Mass. 39, 70 Am. St. Rep. 232, 42 L.
R. A. 396; 1899, Fidelity Ins. T. & S. D. Co. v. Mechanics, etc., Bank, 97 Fed.
Rep. 297 (C. C. A. Pa.) ; 1900, Howarth v. Lombard, 175 Maes. 570, 49 L. R.
A. 301, 56 N. E. Rep. 888.
See preceding case and note.

Sec. 721.

Same,

See Huntington v.

(c) Penal liability.
Attrill,

146

U. S. 657, supra, p. 1892.
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II.
Sec. 722.

I. To

See, supra,

RIGHTS

OF

/22

SHAREHOLDERS.

receive dividends from profits earned.

543-549.

2. To keep dividends received in good faith, though
Sec. 723.
paid out of capital when solvent.
See McDonald v. Williams, 174 U. S. 397, supra, p. 1981, and
note, p. 1985, Lawrence v. Greenup, 97 Fed. Rep. 906, supra, p. 1985.

Sec. 724.

To be released from liability.
(a) By fraud in securing subscription.
3 .

See Martin v. South Salem, etc., Co., 94 Va. 28, supra, p. 539;
Upton v. Englehart, 3 Dill. 496, supra, p. 1559.
See note,
Compare, 1859, Ogilvie v. Knox Ins. Co., 22 How. 380.
Note.
supra, p.

Sec. 725.

Same,

(b)

By forfeiture of shares for non-payment.

See Small v. The Herkimer
Note.

Rep.

Mfg. Co.,

2

N. Y. 330, supra, p.

1567.

See, 1896, Burt v. Real Estate Exchange, 175 Pa. St. 619, 52 Am. St.

858.

Sec. 726. Same,
(c) By acceptance, by the corporation, of a
material amendment, when not assented to by the shareholder.
See Ashton v. Burbank, 2 Dill. 435, supra, p. 87; Railway Co.
v. Allerton, 18 Wall. 233, supra, p. 442; Clearwater v. Meredith, i
Wall. 25, supra, p. 984; Buffalo & N. Y. C. Ry. v. Dudley, 14
N. Y. 336, supra, p. 1461 ; Stevens v. Rutland, etc., R. Co., 29 Vt.
545, supra, p. 1448; Durfee v. Old Colony R., 5 Allen 230, supra,
p. 1462; Zabriskie v. Hackensack, etc., R. Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 178,
supra, p. 1466; note, supra, p. 1472.
See, also, 1824, Natusch v. Irving, Gow. Partnership App., vi, p. 398;
Hartford & N. H. R. v. Croswell, 5 Hill 383; 1863, Kenosha R. & R. I.
R. v. Marsh, 17 Wis. 13; 1873, Nugent v. The Supervisors, 19 Wall. 241; 1876,
Memphis B. R. Co. v. Sullivan, 57 Ga. 240.
Compare, 1895, Greenbrier Indus. Exp. v. Squires, 40 W. Va. 307, 52 Am.
St. Rep. 884.
Note.

1843,
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Sec. 727.

(d) By completed transfer

See supra,
Note.
1900,
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of shares.

566-568.

See, also, 1889, Foster v. Row, 120 Mich. 1, 77 Am. St. Rep. 565;
v. Union Nat'l Bk., 62 Ohio St. 446, 78 Am. St. Rep. 734.

Wick Nat'l Bk.

V.

SUBDIVISION

RIGHTS OF CORPORATE

CREDITORS

AMONG THEM-

SELVES.

ARTICLE I.
Sec* 728.

PRIORITY.

I . In general by promptness of action.

N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Boney, 117 Ind. 501,
supra, p. 1842; Allen v. Montgomery R. Co., n Ala. 437, supra,
p. 1960; First Nat'l Bank v. Peavey, 69 Fed. Rep. 455, supra, p.
See

Louisville,

1962.
Note.
See note, 3 Am. St. Rep. 806, 869.
See, 1901, Merchants Natl. Bank v. McDonald,

Sec. 729.

2.

Neb.

, 88

N. W.

492.

In case of unpaid subscriptions, or withdrawal of

assets.
See Allen v. Montgomery R. Co., n Ala. 437, supra, p. 1960;
Hatch v. Dana, 101 U. S. 205, supra, p. 1965 ; Lawrence v. Greenup, 97 Fed. Rep. 906, supra, p. 1985.

Sec. 730.

3.

In case of statutory liability of shareholders or offi-

cers.
See supra,
Note.

707, 709, 713, 717.

See note, 3 Am. St. Rep. 869.

Sec. 731.

4.

(a)

By voluntary preference by corporation,
General creditors.

See Catlin v. Eagle Bank, 6 Conn. 233, supra, p. 1815; Rouse v.
Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 46 Ohio St. 493, supra, p. 1819.
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Same,

(b)
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Director-creditors.

" See Olney v. Conanicut Land Co.,

16 R. I. 597, supra, p. 1832;
Howe, Brown & Co. v. Sanford F. & T. Co., 44 Fed. Rep. 231,
supra, p. 1835 ' Corey v. Wadsworth, 118 Ala. 489, supra, p. 1836.

Resident and non-resi5. By statutory provisions.
dent creditors.
(a) Natural and artificial non-resident persons as creditors.

Sec. 733.

BLAKE
1898.

v.

McCLUNG.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
Rep.

172

U. S.

239269.

[In 1893, McClung & Co., residents of Tennessee, filed a creditor's
bill in the Tennessee courts againt the Embreeville Company, a Brit-

it

&

a

&

a

it,

ish mining and manufacturing company authorized to do, and doing,
business in Tennessee from an office established there, alleging inconsolvency of the company and fraudulent preferences made by
The home office was in London,
trary to the laws of Tennessee.
and after suit was begun in Tennessee, liquidation proceedings under
The Tennessee court appointed
the English law were begun there.
receiver of the property in Tennessee, administered its affairs there,
the rights and priorities of creditors, including
and adjudicated
claims of debenture holders to amount of $125,000, and trade claims
both owned by non-residents of the United
to amount of $90,000
States; also the claims of Blake, and of Rogers
Co., residents of
Ohio, and of the Hull Coal Company,
all of
Virginia corporation
whom had intervened in the original suit, alleging that McClung
Co. claimed priority of right over "citizens of the United States, but
not of the state of Tennessee," according to certain statutes of Tennessee, which were alleged to violate the national constitution.
The court held the law constitutional, and held that the Tennessee
creditors were entitled to priority (with certain exceptions, not important here) over other creditors, "residents and citizens of other
states of the United States or other countries;" that the creditors who
were "citizens of other states" of the United States are entitled to
share ratably in its assets being administered in this cause, next after
This decision, in these particthe payment of the Tennessee creditors.
ulars, was affirmed by the court of chancery appeals, and finally by the
Plaintiff obtained this writ of error.
supreme court of Tennessee.
The statute complained of provides that any foreign corporation may
become. incorporated in Tennessee, and do business there by filing a
copy of its charter in the office of its secretary of state, whereupon
is

;

1

Part of opinion omitted
Statement abridged.
of Mr. Justice Brewer, C. J. Fuller concurring,

also the dissenting opinion

omitted.
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shall be deemed and taken to be a corporation of that state ; and that
such corporation and all its property "shall be liable for all the debts,
liabilities and engagements of the said corporation, to be enforced in
the manner provided by law, for the application of the property of
natural persons to the payment of their debts, engagements and contracts.
Nevertheless, creditors who may be residents of this state
have
a priority in the distribution of assets, or subjection of the
shall
same, or any part thereof, to the payment of debts over all simple
contract creditors, being residents of any other country or countries."]
*
*
*
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN.
The plaintiffs in error contend
that the judgment of the state court, based upon the statute, denies to
them rights secured by the second section of the fourth article of the
constitution of the United States providing that " the citizens of each
state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states," as well as by the first section of the fourteenth amendment, declaring that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty
or property without due process of law," nor " deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." * * *
(After holding that the words, "residents of this state," and "residents of any other countiy or countries," as used in the act, made it
plain that "the state did not intend to place creditors citizens of other
states upon an equality with creditors citizens of Tennessee," and that
"the manifest purpose was to give to all Tennessee creditors priority
over all creditors residing out of that state, whether the latter were
citizens or only residents of some other state or country.")
We must therefore consider whether the statute infringes rights secured to the plaintiffs in error, citizens of Ohio, by the provision of
the second section of article 4 of the constitution of the United States,
declaring that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.
Beyond question a state may, through judicial proceedings, take
possession of the assets of an insolvent foreign corporation within its
limits, and distribute such assets or their proceeds among creditors
according to their respective rights. But may it exclude citizens of
other states from such distribution until the claims of its own citizens
In the administration of the property
shall have been first satisfied?
of an insolvent foreign corporation by the courts of the state in which
it is doing business, will the constitution of the United States permit
discrimination against individual creditors of such corporations because
of their being citizens of other states, and not citizens of the state in
*
*
*
which such administration occurs?
This court has never undertaken to give any exact or comprehensive
definition of the words "privileges and immunities," in article 4 of the
constitution of the United States.
Referring to this clause, Mr. Justice Curtis, speaking for the court, in Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591,
"We do not deem it needful to attempt to define the
593, said:
It
meaning of the word privileges in this clause of the constitution.
is safer, and more in accordance with the duty of a judicial tribunal,
65
2 wit,. CAS.
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to leave its meaning to be determined, in each case, upon a view of
*
* *
the particular rights asserted and denied therein."
One of the leading cases in which the general question has been
examined is Corfield v. Coryell, decided by Mr. Justice WashHe said:
"The inquiry is, what are the privington at the circuit.
We feel
ileges and immunities of citizens in the several states?
no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and
immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental '; which belong,
of right, to the citizens of all free governments, and which have, at
all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union from the time of their becoming free, independent
and sovereign.
What these fundamental principles are, it would perThey may, howhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate.
ever, be comprehended under the following general heads : Protection
by the government ; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right
to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as
the government
may justly prescribe for the general good of the
whole. The right of a citizen of one state to pass through or to reside
in any other state for the purposes of trade, agriculture, professional
pursuits or otherwise ; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the
state ; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal ;
and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by
the other citizens of the state, may be mentioned as some of the particular priyileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly
embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental ; to which may be added the elective franchise, as regulated
and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to
These, and many others which might be mentioned,
be exercised.
are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and the enjoyment
of them by the citizens of each state in every other state was manifestly calculated (to use the expression of the preamble to the corresponding provision in the old articles of confederation) 'the better to
secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the
" 4 Wash. C. C. 371, 380.
people of the different states of the Union.'
(Quoting from McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, 395; Paul v.
Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180.) * * *
Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430, involved tne validity of a
statute of Maryland requiring all traders, not being permanent residents of the state, to take out licenses for the sale of goods, wares and
merchandise in Maryland, other than agricultural products and articles there manufactured.
This court said: "Attempt will not be
made to define the words 'privileges and immunities,' or to specify
the rights which they are intended to secure and protect, beyond what
Bemay be necessary to the decision of the case before the court.
yond doubt, those words are words of very comprehensive meaning,
but it will be sufficient to say that the clause plainly and unmistakably
secures and protects the right of a citizen of one state to pass into any
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if

if

;

is

it

it

it

if

it,

other state of the Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce, trade or business without molestation; to acquire personal
property ; to take and hold real estate ; to maintain actions in the courts
of the state, and to be exempt from any higher taxes or excises than
are imposed by the state upon its own citizens.
Comprehensive as
the power of the states is to lay and collect taxes and excises, it is nevertheless clear, in the judgment of the court, that the power can not
be exercised to any extent in a manner forbidden by the constitution ;
and inasmuch as the constitution provides that the citizens of each
state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states, it follows that the defendant might lawfully sell, or offer or expose for sale, within the district described in the indictment,
any goods which the permanent residents of the state might sell, or
offer or expose for sale, in that district, without being subjected to any
higher tax or excise than that exacted by law of such permanent
residents."
(Quoting from Slaughter-house Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 77;
*
*
*
Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 113, 114.)
These principles have not been modified by any subsequent decision of this court.
The foundation upon which the above cases rest can not, however,
stand, if it be adjudged to be in the power of one state, when establishing regulations for the conduct of private business of a particular kind, to give its own citizens essential privileges connected with
that business which it denies to citizens of other states.
By the statute in question, the British company was to be deemed and taken to
be a corporation of Tennessee, with authority to carry on its business
in that state.
It was the right of citizens of Tennessee to deal with
as
was their right to deal with ^corporations created by Tennessee.
was equally the right of citizens of other states to
And
The state did not assume to declare,
deal with that corporation.
even
could legally have declared that that company,
being
admitted to do business in Tennessee, should transact business only
with citizens of Tennessee or should not transact business with citizens of other states.
No one would question the right of the individual
in
error,
although not residents of Tennessee, to sell their
plaintiffs
that
to
corporation upon such terms in respect of payment as
goods
be
might
agreed upon, and to ship them to the corporation at its place
mateof business in that state. But the enjoyment of these rights
statute,
for
that
in
by its
obstructed
the
statute
question
rially
by
from
of
other
states
citizens
transacting
excludes
necessary operation,
business with that corporation upon terms of equality with citizens of
Tennessee.
By force of the statute alone, citizens of other states,
contracted
at all with the British corporation, must have done
they
the corporation became inso subject to the onerous condition that
solvent its assets in Tennessee should first be applied to meet its obligations to residents of that state, although liability for its debts and
engagements was "to be enforced in the manner provided by law for
the application of the property of natural persons to the payment of
But, clearly, the state
their debts, engagements and contracts."
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could not in that mode secure exclusive privileges to its own citizens
If a state should attempt, by statute reguin matters of business.
lating the distribution of the property of insolvent individuals among
their creditors, to give priority to the claims of such individual creditors as were citizens of that state over the claims of individual
creditors, citizens of other states, such legislation would be repugnant
to the constitution upon the ground that it withheld from citizens of
other states as such, and because they were such, privileges granted
to citizens of the state enacting it.
Can a different principle apply, as between individual citizens of the several states, when the
assets to be distributed are the assets of an insolvent private corporation lawfully engaged in business and having the power to contract
with citizens residing in states other than the one in which it is located

?

It

is an established rule of equity that when a corporation becomes
insolvent it is so far civilly dead that its property may be administered
as a trust fund for the benefit of its stockholders
and creditors (Graham v. Railroad Co., 102 U. S. 148, 161), not simply of stockholders

and creditors residing in a particular state, but all stockholders and
In Wabash, St.
creditors, of whatever state they may be citizens.
Louis, etc., Railway Co. v. Ham, 114 U. S. 587, 594, it was said
that the property of a corporation was a trust fund for the payment of
its debts, in the sense that when the corporation was lawfully dissolved
and all its business wound up, or when it was insolvent, all its creditors were entitled in equity to have their debts paid out of the corporate property before any distribution thereof among the stockholders.
In Hollins v. Brierfield Coal and Iron Co., 150!!. S. 371, 385, it was
observed that a private corporation, when it becomes insolvent, holds
its assets subject to somewhat the same kind of equitable lien and trust
in favor of its creditors that exists in favor of the creditors of a partnership after becoming insolvent, and that in such case a lien and trust
These
will be enforced by a court of equity in favor of creditors.
obtain,
no
in
and
be
doubt,
Tennessee,
will
applied
principles
by its
courts in all appropriate cases between citizens of that state, without
making any distinction bet-ween them. Yet the courts of that state are
forbidden, by the statute in question, to recognize the right in equity
of citizens residing in other states to participate upon terms of equality
with citizens of Tennessee in the distribution of the assets of an insolvent foreign corporation lawfully doing business in that state.
We hold such discrimination against citizens of other states to be
repugnant to the second section of the fourth article of the constitution of the United States, although, generally speaking, the state has
the power to prescribe the conditions upon which foreign corporations
Such a power can
may enter its territory for purposes of business.
not be exerted with the effect of defeating or impairing rights secured
Into citizens of the several states by the supreme law of the land.
deed, all the powers possessed by a state must be exercised consist?
ently with the privileges and immunities granted or protected by the
*
* *
constitution of the United States.
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(Citing and quoting from Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How.
404, 407; Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186, 200; Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100,
We must not be understood as saying that a citizen of one state is
entitled to enjoy in another state every privilege that may be given
in the latter to its own citizens.
There are privileges that may be
accorded by a state to its own people, in which citizens of other states
may not participate except in conformity to such reasonable regulations as may be established by the state. For instance, a state can
not forbid citizens of other states from suing in its courts, that right
being enjoyed by its own people ; but it may require a non-resident,
although a citizen of another state, to give bond for costs, although
such bond be not required of a resident. Such a regulation of the internal affairs of a state can not reasonably be characterized as hostile
to the fundamental rights of the citizens of other states.
So a state
may, by rule uniform in its operation as to citizens of the several
states, require residence within its limits for a given time before a
citizen of another state who becomes a resident thereof shall exercise
the right of suffrage or become eligible to office.
It has never been
supposed that regulations of that character materially interfered with
the enjoyment by citizens of .each state of the privileges and immunities secured by the constitution to citizens of the several states. The constitution forbids only such legislation affecting citizens of the respective states as will substantially or practically put a citizen of one state
in a condition of alienage when he is within or when he removes to
another state, or when asserting in another state the rights that commonly appertain to those who are part of the political community
known as the people of the United States, by and for whom the government of the Union was ordained and established.
Nor must we be understood as saying that a state may not, by its
courts, retain within its limits the assets of a foreign corporation, in
order that justice may be done to its own citizens ; nor, by appropriate action of its judicial tribunals, see to it that its own citizens are
not unjustly discriminated against by reason of the administration in
other states of the assets there of an insolvent corporation doing business within its limits.
For instance, if the Embreeville Company
had property in Virginia at the time of its insolvency, th Tennessee
court administering its assets in that state could take into account
what a Virginia creditor, seeking to participate in the distribution of
the company's assets in Tennessee, had received or would receive
from the company's assets in Virginia, and make such order touching
the assets of the company in Tennessee as would protect Tennessee
creditors against wrongful discrimination arising from the particular
action taken in Virginia for the benefit of creditors residing in that

in.)

commonwealth.
It may be appropriate to observe that the objections to the statute
of Tennessee do not necessarily embrace enactments that are found in
some of the states requiring foreign insurance corporations,
as a
condition of their coming into the state for purposes of business, to
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deposit witn tne state treasurer funds sufficient to secure policyholders in its midst.
Legislation of that character does not present any question of discrimination against citizens forbidden by the
Insurance funds set apart in advance for the benefit of
constitution.
home policy-holde'rs of a foreign insurance company doing business in
the state are a trust fund of a specific kind to be administered for the
exclusive benefit of certain persons.
Policy-holders in other states
know that those particular funds are segregated from the mass of
property owned by the company, and that they can not look to them
to the prejudice of those for whose special benefit they were deposited.
The present case is not one of that kind. The statute of Tennessee did not make it a condition of the right of the British corporation to come into Tennessee for purposes of business that it should,
at the outset, deposit with the state a fixed amount, to stand exclusively
or primarily for the protection of its Tennessee creditors.
It allowed
that corporation, after complying with the terms of the statute, to
conduct its business in Tennessee as it saw fit, and did not attempt to
impose any restriction upon its making contracts with or incurring
liabilities to citizens of other states.
It permitted that corporation to
contract with citizens of other states, and then, in effect, provided
that all such contracts should be subject to the condition (in case the
corporation became insolvent) that creditors residing in other states
should stand aside, in the distribution by the Tennessee courts of the
assets of the corporation, until creditors residing in Tennessee were
fully paid not out of any funds or property specifically set aside as a
trust fund, and at the outset put into the custody of the state, for the
exclusive benefit, or for the benefit primarily, of Tennessee creditors,
but out of whatever assets of any kind the corporation might have in
that state when insolvency occurred.
In other words, so far as Tennessee legislation is concerned, while this corporation could lawfully
have contracted with citizens of other states, those citizens can not
share in its general assets upon terms of equality with citizens of that
state.
If such legislation does not deny to citizens of other states, in
respect of matters growing out of the ordinaiy transactions of business, privileges that are accorded to it by citizens of Tennessee, it is
difficult to nerceive what legislation would effect that result.
We adjudge that when the general property and assets of a private
corporation, lawfully doing business in a state, are in course of administration by the courts of such state, creditors who are citizens of
other states are entitled, under the constitution of the United States, to
stand upon the same plane with creditors of like class who are citizens
of such state, and can not be denied equality of right simply because
they do not reside in that state, but are citizens residing in other states
of the Union.
The individual plaintiffs in error were entitled to contract with this British corporation, lawfully doing business in Tennessee, and deemed and taken to be a corporation of that state, and
no rule in the distribution of its assets among creditors could be applied to them as resident citizens of Ohio, and because they were not

733

CREDITORS

INTER

SE.

2043

residents of Tennessee, that was not applied by the courts of Tennessee to creditors of like character who were citizens of Tennessee.
As to the plaintiff in error, the Hull Coal and Coke Company, of
It has
Virginia, different considerations must govern our decision.
long been settled that, for purposes of suit by or against it in the courts
of the United States, the members of a corporation are to be conclusively presumed to be citizens of the state creating such corporation ; Louisville, Cincinnati and Charleston Railroad Co. v. Letson,
2 How. 497; Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, etc., 20 How.
227, 232; Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Co. v. Wheeler, i Black
286, 296; Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U. S. nS, 120; Barrow
Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100; and, therefore, it has been
said that a corporation is to be deemed, for such purposes, a citizen of
the state under whose laws it was organized.
But it is equally well
settled, and we now hold, that a corporation is not a citizen within
the meaning of the constitutional provision that "the citizens of each
state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in
Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 178, 179; Ducat
the several states."
v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410, 415; Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts,
The Virginia corporation, therefore, can not in10 Wall. 566, 573.
voke that provision for protection against the decree of the state court
denying its right to participate upon terms of equality with Tennessee
creditors in the distribution of the assets of the British corporation in
the hands of the Tennessee court.
Since, however, a corporation is a "person" within the meaning of
the fourteenth amendment (Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific
Railroad Co., 118 U. S. 394, 396; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466,
522), may not the Virginia corporation invoke for its protection the
clause of the amendment declaring that no state shall deprive any
person of property without due process, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws?
We are of opinion that this question must receive a negative answer.
Although this court has adjudged that the prohibitions of the
fourteenth amendment refer to all the instrumentalities of the state,
to its legislative, executive and judicial authorities (Ex parte Virginia,
100 U. S. 339, 346, 347; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 373;
Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, 45, and Chicago, Burlington, etc.,
Railroad v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 233), it does not follow that,
within the meaning of that amendment, the judgment below deprived
the Virginia corporation of property without due process of law, simply because its claim was subordinated to the claims of the Tennessee
creditors.
That corporation was not, in any legal sense, deprived of
its claim, nor was its right to reach the assets of the British corporation
in other states or countries disputed.
It was only denied the right to
participate upon terms of equality with Tennessee creditors in the distribution of particular assets of another corporation doing business in
It had notice of the proceedings in the state court, became
that state.
and the rights asserted by it were adjua party to those proceedings,
If the Virginia corporation can not invoke the protection of
dicated.
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the second section of article 4 of the constitution of the United States
relating to the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states, as its coplaintiffs in error have done, it is because it is not a
citizen within the meaning of that section ; and if the state court erred
in its decree in reference to that corporation, the latter can not be
said to have been thereby deprived of its property without due process
of law within the meaning of the constitution.
It is equally clear that the Virginia corporation can not rely upon
the clause declaring that no state shall "deny to any person within its
That prohibition
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
manifestly relates only to the denial by the state of equal protection
Observe that the prohibition
to persons "within its jurisdiction."
against the deprivation of property without due process of law is not
qualified by the words "within its jurisdiction," while those words
are found in the succeeding clause relating to the equal protection of
The court can not assume that those words were inserted
the laws.
without any object, nor is it at liberty to eliminate them from the con-

stitution and to interpi-et the clause in question as if they were not to
be found in that instrument.
Without attempting to state what is the
full import of the words, "within its jurisdiction," it is safe to say
that a corporation not created by Tennessee, nor doing business there
under conditions that subjected it to process issuing from the courts
of Tennessee at the instance of suitors, is not, under the above clause
of the fourteenth amendment, within the jurisdiction of that state.
Certainly when the statute in question was enacted the Virginia corSo far as the
poration was not within the jurisdiction of Tennessee.
record discloses, its claim against the Embreeville company was on
account of coke sold and shipped from Virginia to the latter corpoIt does not appear to
ration at its place of business in Tennessee.
have been doing business in Tennessee under the statute here involved, or under any statute that would bring it directly under the
jurisdiction of the courts of Tennessee by service of process on its
Nor do we think it came within the jurisdiction of
officers or agents.
Tennessee, within the meaning of the amendment, simply by presenting its claim in the state court and thereby becoming a party to
this cause.
Under any other interpretation the fourteenth amendment would be given a scope not contemplated by its framers or by
the people, nor justified by its language.
We adjudge that the statute, so far as it suboixlinates the claims of private business corporations, not within the jurisdiction of the state of Tennessee (although
such private corporations may be creditors of a corporation doing
business in the state, under the authority of that statute), to the
claims against the latter corporation of creditors residing in Tennessee, is not a denial of the "equal protection of the laws" secured by
the fourteenth amendment to persons within the jurisdiction of the
* *
*
state, however unjust such a regulation may be deemed.
Reversed as to the Ohio creditors; affirmed as to the Virginia

coal corporation.
Mr. Justice Brewer and Mr. Chief Justice Fuller dissenting.

CREDITORS INTER

$734

SE.

2045

See, 1899, Ward v. Connecticut P. M. Co., 71 Conn. 345, 42 L. R. A.
Note.
706, 71 Am. St. Rep. 207; 1899, Hammond Beef Co. v. Best, 91 Maine 431;
1899, McClung v. Embreeville F., L. I. & R. Co., 103 Tenn. 399,52 S. W. Rep.
1001.
See following cases.
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[After decision of this court reported in 172 U. S. 239, supra,
p. 2036, the Ohio creditors, Blake et al., asked for a decree in conformity thereto. The court rendered a decree which it is here claimed
is not in accordance with that decree, and for which error is brought
again.]
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN. * * * (After quoting extensively from
the former decision proceeds : ) The state court adjudged :
"i. That the effect and purpose of the opinion and mandate of the
supreme court of the United States in respect to the rights of C. G.
Blake and Rogers, Brown & Co. is to adjudge and decree that the said
C. G. Blake and Rogers, Brown & Co. are entitled to participate in
the assets of the said Embreeville Freehold, Land, Iron and Railway
Company, Limited, upon the basis of a broad distribution of the assets
of said corporation among all of its creditors, without preference or
priority, as though the act of 1877, chapter 31, had not been passed, and
it is ordered that there be made a computation of the aggregate indebtedness due from the said insolvent corporation to its creditors of
every class, wherever residing, and that there shall be paid to the said
C. G. Blake and the said Rogers, Brown & Co. the percentage and
proportion which is found to be due to them as creditors of said cor2. It is further
poration in the aggregate of assets thus ascertained.
adjudged and decreed, that after thus setting apart to the said C. G.
Blake and Rogers, Brown & Co. the proportion and percentage thus
found to be due to them, that all the rest and residue of the estate of
the said Embreeville Freehold, Land, Iron and Railway Company,
Limited, is applicable first to the payment of the indebtedness due to
the creditors of said corporation residing -within the state of Tennessee, as provided in section 5 of chapter 31 of the acts of Tennessee,
1877, and that the residue of said estate, if any, shall then be applied
pro rata to the payment of the debts of the alien and non-resident
creditors of said corporation, other than the said C. G. Blake and
Rogers, Brown & Co." The cause was remanded to the court of
original jurisdiction for the collection and distribution of the fund
then in that court, and for the making of such further orders as might
be found necessary to the final settlement of the cause.
Mr. Justice
Beard dissented upon grounds stated in his opinion, which is published
in 52 S. W. Rep. 1001.
1

That part of opinion quoted from former decision is omitted.
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Blake and Rogers, Brown & Co. excepted to the action of the state
court "in determining that creditors residing in Tennessee were entitled, under the act of 1877, chapter 31, section 5, to any priority or preference, by way of increased percentages in distribution" over them, on
the ground that such priority and preference was in violation of section
2 of article 4 of the constitution of the United States, and was not conThe present writ
sistent with the opinion and mandate of this court.
of error was brought to review the last judgment.
We are constrained to hold that the judgment of the supreme court
of Tennessee is not in conformity with the opinion and mandate of
this court.
The thought expressed in our former opinion was that
Blake and Rogers, Brown & Co., citizens of Ohio and general creditors of the Embreeville Freehold, Land, Iron and Railway Company, were entitled, in the distribution in Tennessee of the assets of that
insolvent corporation, to stand upon the same plane with citizens of
Tennessee who were also general creditors of the same corporation;
and that the judgment of the state court heretofore under review, 172
U. S. 239, so far as it gave priority to citizens of Tennessee over citizens of other states, was inconsistent with the second section of the
fourth article of the constitution of the United States, providing that
"the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states."
By the judgment now under review certain creditors, solely because
of their being citizens of Tennessee, are accorded advantages in the
distribution of the assets in question which are denied to other creditors solely because of their being citizens of .another state than Tennessee.
That judgment gives to the plaintiffs in error, respectively, their
percentage of the entire assets of the insolvent corporation upon the
basis of equality among all the creditors, wherever residing, and that
being done, the court in effect directs the idea of equality among all
creditors to be abandoned, and "all the rest and residue of the estate"
of the insolvent corporation to be applied first to the payment of the
debts due to citizens of Tennessee.
Thus the decree gave a decided
advantage to Tennessee creditors over Ohio creditors, when, as Mr.
Justice Beard correctly said, the cause was remanded by this court
substantially with direction that the state court should see to it that no
advantage accrued to Tennessee creditors over the Ohio creditors. * * *
Reversed.

Sec. 735.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
S. Rep. 289-304.
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[This case involves the priority of creditors under the Tennessee
statute involved in Blake v. McClung, supra, pp. 2036, 2045 ; a bill was
filed in the Tennessee courts by the American National Bank, a Ten1
Statement much abridged.
single point given.

Only the part of the opinion relating to the
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nessee creditor, against a Virginia land company doing business in
Tennessee, alleging the insolvency of the company, and the making
of an assignment for the benefit of its creditors, without providing for
the preference allowed by the Tennessee statutes, and asked for a receiver, marshaling of assets, and distribution of same according to
While this suit was pending, Sully and Carthe Tennessee statute.
hart, residents of New York, filed a bill against the land company,
and the Travelers' Ins. Co. of Connecticut, and the Connecticut Trust
and Safety Deposit Co., alleging that Sully was the mortgagee in
trust for Carhart, the sole holder of $85,000 of bonds issued by the
land company in 1893, secured by a mortgage, the same being duly
registered in Tennessee July 10. 1893, and covering substantially all
the property involved in the suit by the bank, and upon which the
insurance and deposit company claimed a lien, and asking that the
bill might be taken as a general creditor's bill, or a cross-bill in the
bank suit. The Travelers' Insurance Company also filed a bill setting forth its claim of $30,000, secured by mortgage, of which the
deposit company was trustee, upon part of the property involved
in the bank, and the Sully cases, and asked to have its claim declared
claim, alleging it was prior to the Carhart claim. The
a preferred
bank filed an answer denying the validity of the Carhart claim, and
alleged that if it was found to be valid, the bank was entitled to preference in payment.
The suits were finally consolidated and a decree
was rendered, finding Carhart to be the bona fide holder of the bonds,
and that he was entitled to recover on the same, but subject to the
payment of the Tennessee creditors upon debts existing prior to the
registration of the mortgage ; the same was found as to the insurance
This decree was affirmed by the appeal court, and finally
company.
by the supreme court of Tennessee, from which the case is brought
here on writ of error by Carhart and the insurance company, and
some of the unsecured creditors.]
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM. * * * Part of the fifth section of the
"Nevertheless, creditors who maybe residents
act of 1877 provides:
of this state shall have a priority in the distribution of assets, or subjection of the same, or any part thereof, to the payment of debts over
all simple contract creditors, being residents of any other country or
countries, and also over mortgage or judgment creditors, for all debts,
engagements and contracts which were made or owing by said corporation previous to the filing and registration of such valid mortgages,
or the rendition of such valid judgments."
Under this provision of the section, creditors of the land company
residing in Tennessee, whose debts accrued prior to the filing and
registration of the Sully, trustee, mortgage were by the decree of
By reathe court below preferred in payment over the mortgagee.
son of such preference Carhart did not receive what he would have
He claims that this preferreceived but for the preference so given.
ence in favor of resident creditors, whose debts existed when his mortgage was registered, is an illegal discrimination against him as a nonresident mortgagee, because the statute, as he says, while directing
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discrimination against a non-resident mortgagee, does not peras against a resident mortgagee.
Such a discrimination, if it
existed, is invalid within the decision of Blake v. McClung, supra. 1
such

a

mit it

It is objected, however, on the part of the defendants in error, that
this is a merely abstract or moot question, because there are no resident mortgagees, and their rights have not, therefore, been determined.
The objection is not well taken.
Although there are no resident mortgagees in this case, yet the decree of the court below, following the statute, has postponed the payment of the mortgage, in
favor of resident creditors whose debts accrued prior to the registraIf the statute does not permit such postponetion of that mortgage.
ment against a resident mortgagee, then the postponement in the case
of a non-resident mortgagee would be invalid. The postponement has
in fact been made as against the non-resident mortgagee, and whether
that postponement was legal and valid is no mere abstraction, because
by reason thereof this non-resident mortgagee has actually suffered a
It is therefore entirely immaloss in the payment of his mortgage.
terial whether, in this particular case, there are or are not resident
We are in this case necessarily brought to a decision of
mortgagees.
the question, whether the postponement was valid, and that depends
upon the question, whether the act permits a similar postponement in
If it does, it is conceded that the
the case of a resident mortgagee?
act is valid, so far as 'this particular question is concerned.
For us to hold that such postponement is not permitted in the case
of a resident mortgagee is to condemn the statute on that point as a
violation of the constitution of the United States.
Such a construction should not be adopted if the statute is reasonably susceptible of
That rule applies, even though on
another which renders it valid.
some other point the statute has been already held to be a violation of
the federal constitution.
We think the true construction of the statute requires us to hold
that the resident owner of a mortgage would be postponed in its payment in favor of those debts made or owing by the corporation prior
In other words, that the
to the filing and registration of his mortgage.
Tennessee general creditor has the same right of preference as
against a resident mortgagee that he has against a non-resident, and the
same burden that is placed upon non-resident mortgagees and judgment creditors is by the statute placed upon resident mortgagees and
We do not think that this construction leads to
judgment creditors.
any absurd result.
It is urged that if it were to be so construed, a Tennessee creditor
who had no mortgage or judgment would share with all other unsecured Tennessee creditors In the assets of the insolvent company, but
that if he, being such creditor, took a judgment or mortgage as a
security for the payment of his debt, he would thereby lose his right
to share with the other resident non-secured creditors, and the latter
would have a preferred right of payment over him for all debts of the
company existing at the time of the registration of the mortgage.
The creditor, it is said, would thus lose his right as a general creditor,
1

Page 2036.

735

CREDITORS INTER

SE.

2O49

and he would obtain no lien by his mortgage or judgment as against
those creditors of whom he was one before he took his mortgage.
We agree that a construction which leads to such a result would be
absurd, but such a result does not follow from our construction of the
statute. When the Tennessee creditor takes his mortgage or recovers
his judgment to secure an existing indebtedness, a new debt is not
thereby created, but he has simply received, or obtained, a security
for its payment, and a preference as against all other creditors whose
debts may accrue subsequently to the filing and registration of his
He gains no priority over
mortgage or the recovery of his judgment.
existing creditors of his class by taking a mortgage or judgment. The
debts existing at that time, including his own, are to be paid, and it is
only against debts subsequently incurred that the mortgage, or the
judgment, has a preferential lien. If the debt for which he took the
mortgage existed prior to the execution thereof, the mortgagee did not,
by taking his mortgage, lose his right to share with the other unsecured
creditors, but he did not acquire the right to assert the lien of his mortgage in preference to and against those creditors whose debts existed
His rights as a general creditor of the
at the time of its registration.
land company, existing prior to the registration of the mortgage, were
He can not assert
not in any manner lost or affected by the mortgage.
the lien of his mortgage against prior creditors, but he does not lose
his own right as a prior creditor by taking the mortgage.
Although
the act was evidently passed for the purpose of awarding certain preferences to Tennessee over foreign creditors, yet we see nothing in its
general purpose which requires us to consider the act as making a distinction in favor of a Tennessee mortgagee as against a non-resident
mortgagee.
While the effect of this construction deprives both classes of mortgagees, in case of insolvency of the mortgagor, of any benefit from
their mortgages as against resident non-secured creditors existing when
the mortgages were registered, yet, at the same time, it permits such
mortgagees to share in the distribution of assets with such unsecured
creditors, provided their own debts existed prior to the taking of the
mortgage, and did not spring into existence simultaneously with the
mortgage.
The rights of Carhart as a secured creditor must be adjusted with
reference to these views.
If his secured debt, or any portion thereof,
did in fact exist prior to his mortgage, he is entitled to share with
other unsecured creditors who are residents of the state of Tennessee.
*
#
*

Affirmed as to the non-resident secured creditors.
another point as to unsecured non-resident creditors.

Reversed upon
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THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, v. THE
GRANITE STATE PROVIDENT ASSOCIATION AND D. A.
TAGGART,

1900.

ASSIGNEE.

1

OF NEW YORK.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
*

161

N. Y.

49 -4992

O'BRIEN, J. The only question in this case is one concerning
the distribution of a fund now under the control of the courts of
The defendthis state, which is owned by a foreign corporation.
ant corporation was created by the laws of New Hampshire as a
building and loan association, and was permitted to transact business
in this state. In January, 1896, the authorities of the state where this
corporation is domiciled took proceedings in the courts of that state
to restrain it from any further prosecution of its business.
In this
or
to
an
trustee
was
take
assignee
appointed
proceeding
charge of the
local
law.
as
the
provided by
property,
Subsequently this action
was brought in the courts of this state by the attorney-general, in behalf of the people, under the provisions of the code, for the sequestration and preservation of the assets and property of the corporation in
this state, and for an equitable distribution of the same among the
In order to carry out the objects of the acpersons entitled thereto.
tion a receiver was also appointed in this state. The New Hampshire assignee upon his own application was made a party to the
action, and so is bound by the judgment.
It appears from the record that the corporation transacted business
in several other states. The stockholders at the time of the appointment of the receiver in this state exceeded in number twenty thousand,
of whom nearly one-sixth were residents of this state, and about onefourth of the assets was located here ; or, at least, the situation was
such that they could not be collected or distributed except through the
The fund in controversy may be
action of the courts of this state.
About $69,000 represents assets of the cordivided into two parts.
poration collected by the receiver in this action from the foreclosure
of mortgages and other obligations due from parties in this state, and
The securities thus colthe sale of some realty located in this state.
lected were transmitted to the receiver by the assignee in New Hampshire under tne direction of the courts of that state.
The other part
of the fund consists of a special deposit of $100,000, which the corporation was required to make under the banking law of this state in
order to acquire the right to transact its business here.
With respect to the part of the fund first mentioned, which is described in the record as the general fund, the court below, by the
amendment of the original judgment, directed the receiver in this
state, after paying the expenses of the receivership, to transmit the
1
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same to the assignee in New Hampshire for general administration,
upon receiving from such assignee at the domicile a bond or undertaking in a sum equal to double the amount to be so paid over, with
sufficient sureties to be approved by a justice of the court, conditioned for the payment by the assignee of the domicile to each creditor and shareholder resident in this state of the same dividend on his
claim that may be awarded other creditors and shareholders throughout
the country, without any deduction on account of any sum the creditor
and shareholder of this state might receive from the special fund
hereafter mentioned ; and that in default of such payment to the domestic creditors and shareholders, that the foreign assignee would
return to the receiver in this state, or his successor, the general fund
The only objection made to this part of the judgment
so paid over.
is to the provision which requires the assignee at the domicile to execute the bond before described as a condition of receiving the fund in
the hands of the domestic receiver.
The general assets of a corporation are to be administered and distributed at the home of the corporation ; but in order to accomplish that result, ancillary trustees or
assignees must frequently be appointed in other jurisdictions, subject
to the control and direction of the local courts.
All creditors of a
corporation, wherever residing, are entitled, in case of insolvency, to
have the general assets distributed among them upon principles of perfect equality.
The courts of one state have no right to favor domestic creditors in
the distribution, but it must be made upon the principle that equality
is equity.
(Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239.)
In the case at bar the foreign assignee is a party to the action upon
his own application ; he asks for the transmission to him in another state
of the fund now under the control and in the custody of the courts of this
state through 'the receiver.
We think that the court below, in directing the transmission of the fund to another jurisdiction, had the power
to impose such conditions as are just and reasonable, with a view to
the protection of domestic creditors, and that was the only purpose for
We do not think it can
which the bond or undertaking was required.
be said, as matter of law, that the court was bound to direct the
transmission of the fund to the administration at the domicile without
It doubtless had the power to do so
exacting any conditions whatever.
if it was thought to be wise and expedient. But it determined that before sending the fund out of the jurisdiction of the court, it was just
and reasonable to require the foreign assignee to give security to the
effect that he would distribute the fund upon principles of perfect
In other words, the court had power to guard against any
equality.
discrimination on the part of the foreign assignee against domestic
creditors by reason of any trust fund which was held in this state for
their benefit.
(People v. Remington, 121 N. Y. 328.) We think,
therefore, that no rule of law or any absolute legal right of the foreign
assignee was violated by that provision of the judgment requiring
him to give the security referred to.
The fund in the hands of the domestic receiver, arising from the
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conversion of the special deposit in the banking department, stands
The defendant, in order to acquire the
upon a different ground.
right to transact its business in this state, was obliged to make this deposit since the statute so provides. If this was a deposit as security
merely for domestic creditors, we would be inclined to agree with the
learned counsel for the defendant, who insists that this fund should be
devoted to the benefit of all creditors equally wherever residing.
But
it is something more than a mere deposit as security.
It is in the
nature of a fund held in trust for the benefit of domestic creditors and
The deposit was made in obedience
shareholders of the defendant.
to section fourteen of the banking law, as a condition of the defendant's
right to transact business here. By section thirty-three it is provided,
in substance, that upon the appointment of the receiver of a corporation in this state, the superintendent of the banking department shall
pay over to him the funds remaining in his hands, less any charges
that he may have against the same, and the receiver shall distribute
these funds among the creditors and shareholders of the corporation
residing in this state, in the manner prescribed by law for the payment of creditors in the case of voluntary dissolution of a corporation.
It is apparent from the provisions of these two sections, that the securities so deposited were held by the superintendent
as a trustee for
domestic creditors and shareholders.
The defendant corporation in
making the deposit must be deemed to have consented that in case of
insolvency the fund might be distributed according to the terms of
the statute ; that is to say, to creditors and shareholders residing in
this state. So that by the act of the corporation itself, in availing itself
of the benefit of the statute, it has devoted this fund to the benefit of
the domestic creditors and shareholders ; at least so far as to enable
them to receive payment upon all their obligations in full.
Therefore, the application of the fund to their benefit in the first instance
does not infringe upon the provision of the federal constitution, that
citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.
(Blake v. McClung, supra.}
The court below, therefore, directed that this fund be disposed of
in the following manner, after paying the expenses of administration :
(1) In case the foreign assignee should give the undertaking provided for, with respect to the general fund, and the whole fund received by him was insufficient to pay all the creditors throughout the
country in full, then the domestic receiver should pay from this special fund the balance of all just claims due to the creditors residing
within this state at the time of his appointment, and after such payment distribute the balance of the special fund remaining in his hands
among the different shareholders residing within this state until they
were paid in full.
(2) In case the fund in the hands of the foreign assignee should
prove to be sufficient to pay all the creditors in full, but insufficient to
pay the shareholders throughout the country in full, then the domestic
receiver should distribute the balance remaining in his hands to the
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until they were

(3) That in case anything remained in his hands after paying the
claims of the creditors and shareholders in this state in full and all
expenses, the same should be paid to the assignee at the place of the

domicile.
Assuming that the special deposit referred to was a fund held in
trust here for the benefit of domestic creditors and shareholders,
as we think it was, there is no legal error in this principle of distribuIt is quite true, as the counsel for the defendant suggests, that
tion.
it impounds a large sum, a part of the assets of the corporation, for
But we think the answer to all that is,
the benefit of creditors here.
that there is no injustice in devoting the fund to the very purpose for
which it was created and sent here. The corporation could have declined to enter the state upon such conditions, but having accepted
them by making the deposit, no creditor or shareholder in any other
state can complain because the courts of this state have, with the consent of the corporation, devoted the fund in the first instance to the
The defendant virtupayment of home .creditors and shareholders.
made
the
that
it
consented,
when
it
should be distributed
deposit,
ally
in this manner in case of insolvency.
The judgment appealed from should, therefore, be affirmed, with
costs to the foreign and domestic receivers, respectively, to be paid
out of the general fund.
See, 1887, Strangham v. Hallwood, 30 W. Va. 274, 8 Am. St. Rep.
Note.
29, note, p. 49; 1889, Humphreys v. Hopkins, 81 Cal. 551, 15 Am. St. Rep.
76 ; 1894, Holbrook v. Ford, 153 111. 633, 46 Am. St. Rep. 917 ; 1897, Grogan
v. Egbert, 44 W. Va. 75, 67 Am. St. Rep. 763. See, also, note, supra, p. 2049.

6. Power of the court to provide for the
Sec. 737. Same.
payment of the claims of certain creditors in preference to
prior liens.
MR. JUSTICE

1900.

HARLAN IN SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY
CARNEGIE STEEL COMPANY. 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

176

v.
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257-297.

[Writ of certiorari to review decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals,
allowing certain claims of the steel company as preferential debts
arising from the operation of railroads in the hands of receivers.
June 15, 1892, Clyde and others, citizens of New York, for themselves and other creditors and stockholders of the Richmond and Danville R. R. Co., and other defendant corporations, brought suit in the
United States Circuit Court, eastern district of Virginia, against the
Much of the opinion and the short dissenting
Statement much abridged.
opinion of Mr. Justice White omitted.
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it

if it

;

;

a

it

if

;

a

it,

Richmond and Danville R. R. Co. (called here the Danville Company) and the Richmond & W. P. Terminal Ry. & W. Co. (called
the Terminal Company), Virginia corporations, setting forth that
the Danville Company owned 164 miles of railroad, with a capital
stock of $5,000,000 (a large majority being owned by the Terminal Company), and by lease, ownership of stock or operating contracts had possession, and operated and controlled more than 3,100
miles of railway in six states, and also one steamboat company
the
aggregate outstanding stock of all controlled companies being over
$43,000,000, about $11.000,000 being owned by other than the defendant companies; the bonded debts and rental obligations assumed
by the Danville Company for its allied lines amounted to over
$71,000,000, embraced in fifty-nine different classes, issued by the
several companies, secured by separate mortgages or deeds of trust,
while its own bonded debt was over $16,000,000 in five different issues
of securities, all of the sixty-four issues being capable of separate default
or foreclosure.
That in addition to this the Danville Company had
outstanding car trust obligations to amount of $1,500,000, and a floating debt of over $5,000,000, and also an emergency loan of $600,000,
partly advanced by the plaintiffs to prevent default in April, 1892.
It was also alleged that the Terminal Company, through its control
by stock ownership of the Danville Company, had compelled it
jointly with the East Tennessee, Virginia and Georgia Railway
Company to issue $6,000,000 of bonds, guaranteed by the Terminal
Company, secured by the pledge of stock of the Alabama and
Great Southern Railway (of uncertain value, because subject to
a prior heavy mortgage), this road being a central link in the
eastern Tennessee
system of over 2,300 miles of road; also the
Terminal Company compelled the Danville Company to become assignee and guarantor of a lease of all the system of railroad and
steamship lines owned and controlled by Central Railroad Company,
of Georgia, for a long period of years, to the Georgia Pacific Railpay interest on its bonded
way Company, and bind itself to operate
bond of $1,000,000 for
debt and all rental obligations, and execute
The bill further set
the faithful performance of these covenants.
forth that the owners of all these claims were far separated and numerous
that default in payment of interest and many other claims
occurred the whole system of railroads would
was imminent, and
scramble for priority, and in the conflicting
be dismembered in
was for
jurisdiction of courts where suits would be brought that
the best interest for all that the system be not disrupted
that
was,
a depreciation of many million dollars would result, and that the corporations were in fact insolvent, and asked that plaintiffs be declared

a

a

to have
specific lien under the emergency loan, upon all the income
of the Danville Company and its allied lines, that the court would
marshal all the assets and ascertain all liens and priorities, and adtrust fund all the assets and property of both defendant
minister as
corporations, and appoint one or more receivers for that purpose.
Upon hearing, June 16, the court appointed two receivers (called in-
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solvency receivers) clothing them with full power to operate the property, and pay all expenses thereof, and also to pay all such prior
traffic, mileage and damage claims, as they should think proper to be
paid as operating expenses, and all supply and labor claims incurred
in the operation of the system at any time -within six months prior
thereto.
Upon that and succeeding days auxiliary suits were instituted by same plaintiffs against the Danville Company in United States
Circuit and District Courts, in other states where the-Danville Company
operated roads, and orders were obtained confirming the appointment
of the receivers, and recognizing the Circuit Court of the Eastern District
of Virginia as having primary jurisdiction over all the system and property of the Danville Company ; June 28 same plaintiffs filed another
petition making the Central Trust Company of New York, trustee for
the five issues of the mortgage bonds of the Danville Company, defendants, so they might be heard, asking that the receivers might be
allowed to issue $ i ,000,000 receiver's certificates which should be a first
lien upon the property of the Danville Company, its leasehold interests,
contracts and income, for the purpose of using the proceeds to pay
for materials and supplies used in operating the roads in the receivers'
hands, and which were purchased six months prior to June 15, 1892.
The trust company was represented at the hearing and made no objection, and the court ordered the issue of $1,000,000 receiver's certificates.
July 13, 1892, the trust company, upon its application for the
purpose of protecting the bondholders of the Danville Company, and
representing many other mortgages and railroads, was allowed to intervene, "on condition that it hereby submits to the several orders
heretofore entered herein."
It asked that the same receivers be appointed as permanent receivers, and an order to that effect was made.
December 19, other parties representing underlying bonds of various
In the Clyde suit the
parts of the system were allowed to intervene.
Carnegie Steel Company filed with the master, October 14, 1892,
claims for furnishing 4,203 tons of steel rail, at $125,067, at various
times upon contracts entered into between June 10 and October 10,
1891, for which notes had been taken, and which had been renewed
for three and four months at the time the Clyde suit was begun, and
were due between June 21 and October 10, 1892.
April 13, 1894,
the Centrul Trust Co. filed a separate suit against the Danville Company to foreclose the consolidated gold mortgage of about $4,500,000 ;
arid upon motion of the trust company the two former receivers with
a third were appointed
receivers of .all the property involved in the
Clyde suit with its interveners, all of whom were made defendants,
the order stating that nothing in this order should vacate any former
order in the Clyde suit, and the court reserving the right to determine
all questions of creditors claiming any preference to the mortgage
The Carnegie Company was
upon either the property or income.
in this foreclosure suit, setting forth its
to intervene
permitted
claim as before, and alleging it was entitled to priority over the mortAll the suits were finally consolidated, and the Carnegie
gage debt.
Company, upon its application, was made a defendant in the con-
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A decree of foreclosure was issued in the consolidated
solidated suit.
suit, and the sale took place June 15, 1894, all the property being
sold as a unit, and purchased by a committee on behalf of and for
the sole use of the Southern Railway Co. of Virginia, then organized
The decree of confirmation reserved the
to take over the property.
right to require the Southern Company to pay all "such sums as have
been or maybe ordered by the court for the payment of any and all receivers' debts or claims adjudged or to be adjudged as prior in lien or
equity to the mortgage herein foreclosed, or entitled to preference in
payment of the proceeds of sale, "under penalty of retaking possession of the property and reselling it upon failure to comply with the
order of the court, or to pay any and all such debts, liens, or claims as
it may decree ought to be paid out of the proceeds of sale in preferThe court, upon report of
ence to the mortgage herein foreclosed."
the master, found the Carnegie claim to be correct, and with interest
to amount to $154,895, and that "the earnings which should have
been used for the payment of current expenses, including this claim,
had been used for the benefit of mortgage creditors in a sum more
than sufficient to pay this claim," and it was therefore entitled to priority of payment out of the funds resulting from the sale of the
property, over the mortgage foreclosed, and it was ordered that the
The Southern RailSouthern Railway Co. forthwith pay this sum.
way Co. presented an appeal from his order to the Circuit Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the decision below. 76 Fed. Rep. 492.]
The respective rights of the mortgagees of a railroad company and
of parties having claims against it at the time its property passed into
the hands of receivers have been frequently the subject of consideraBut as counsel differ as to the scope and effect of
tion by this court.
former decisions, it is necessary to examine them and ascertain
whether those decisions embrace the case now before the court.
The leading case is Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235, 252, 253,
which related to a claim against a railroad company for rent of cars.
In that case Chief Justice Waite delivered the unanimous judgment
After observing that the business of all railroad comof the court.
panies was done to a greater or less extent on credit, and that this
credit was longer or shorter as the necessities of the case required, said :
" The income out of which the mortgagee is to be paid is the net income obtained by deducting from the gross earnings what is required
for necessary operating and managing expenses, proper equipment
and useful improvements.
Every railroad mortgagee in accepting
his security impliedly agrees that the current debts made in the ordinary course of business shall be paid from the current receipts before
If, for the convenience of the
he has any claim upon the income.
moment, something is taken from what may not improperly be called
the current debt fund, and put into that which belongs to the mortgage creditors, it certainly is not inequitable for the court, when asked
by the mortgagees to take possession of the future income and hold it
for their benefit, to require as a condition of such an order that what
is due from the earnings to the current debt shall be paid by the
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court from the future current
receipts before
anything derived
from that source goes to the mortgagees.
In this way the court
will only do what, if a receiver should not be appointed, the company ought itself to do. For even though the mortgage may in
terms give a lien upon the profits and income, until possession of
the mortgaged premises is actually taken or something equivalent
done, the whole earnings belong to the company and are subject
The court further said: "The mortgagee has
to its control."
his strict rights, which he may enforce in the ordinary way.
If he
But if he calls upon a court of
asks no favors he need grant none.
chancery to put forth its extraordinary powers and grant him purely
equitable relief, he may with propriety be required to submit to the
operation of a rule which applies in such cases, and do equity in order
The appointment of a receiver is not a matter of
to get equity.
Such an application calls for the exercise of judicial disstrict right.
cretion, and the chancellor should so mold his order that, while favorIf this can not be accoming one, injustice is not done to another.
We think, also,
plished the application should ordinarily be denied.

that if no such order is made when the receiver is appointed, and it
appears in the progress of the cause that bonded interest has been
paid, additional equipment provided, or lasting and valuable improvements made out of earnings which ought in equity to have been employed to keep down debts for labor, supplies and the like, it is within
the power of the court to use the income from the receivership to discharge obligations which, but for the diversion of funds, would have
This, not because the
been paid in the ordinary course of business.
creditors to whom such debts are due, have in law a lien upon the
mortgaged property or the income, but because in a sense the officers
of the company are trustees of the earnings for the benefit of the different classes of creditors and stockholders; and if they give to one
class of creditors that which properly belongs to another, the court
may, upon an adjustment of the accounts, so use the income which
comes into its own hands as, if practicable, to restore the parties to
While, ordinarily, this power is contheir original equitable rights.
fined to the appropriation of the income of the receivership, and the
proceeds of moneyed assets that have been taken from the company, cases may arise where equity will require the use of the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged property in the same way. * * *
No fixed and inflexible rule can be laid down for the government of
the courts in all cases. Each case will necessarily have its own peculiarities, which must to a greater or less extent influence the chancellor when he comes to act. The power rests upon the fact that in
the administration of the affairs of the company the mortgage creditors have got possession of that which in equity belonged to the whole
or a part of the general creditors. Whatever is done, therefore, must
be with a view to a restoration by the mortgage creditors of that which
It follows that if there has been
they have thus inequitably obtained.
in reality no diversion, there can be no restoration ; and that the
amount of the restoration should be made to depend upon the amount

SOUTHERN R. CO. V. CARNEGIE

2058

STEEL CO.

737

If, in the exercise of this power, errors are commitof the diversion.
All depends
ted, they, like others, are open to correction on appeal.
upon a proper application of well settled rules of equity jurisprudence
*
* *
to the facts of the case as established by the evidence."
(Citing, and quoting extensively to the same effect, from Hale v.
U.S. 776, 780, 783;
Frost, 99 U. S. 389; Burnham v. Bowen,
Union Trust Co. v. Morrison, 125 U. S. 591, 609, 612; St. Louis,
Alton, etc., R. R. Co. v. C. C., etc., Ry. Co., 125 U. S. 658, 673.)
In Kneeland v. American Loan and Trust Co., 136 U. S. 89, 97,
this court said: " The appointment of a receiver vests in the court no
absolute control over the property, and no general authority to disBecause in a few specified and limited
place vested contract liens.
cases this court has declared that unsecured claims were entitled to
priority over mortgage debts, an idea seems to have obtained that a
court appointing a receiver acquires power to give such preference to
It has been assumed that a court
any general and unsecured claims.
appointing a receiver could rightfully burden the mortgaged property
Indeed, \ve are adfor the payment of any unsecured indebtedness.
vised that some courts have made the appointment of a receiver conditional upon the payment of all unsecured indebtedness in preference
Can anything be conto the mortgaged liens sought to be enforced.
ceived which more thoroughly destroys the sacredness of contract
obligations? One holding a mortgage debt upon a railroad has the
same right to demand and expect of the court respect for his vested
and contracted priority as a holder of a mortgage on a farm or lot.
So, wyhen a court appoints a receiver of railroad property, it has no
right to make that receivership conditional on the payment of other
than those few unsecured claims which, by the rulings of this court,
No one is bound
have been declared to have an equitable priority.
and whoever has dealto sell to a railroad company or to work for
mortgaged must be assumed to
company when property
ings with
on the faith of its personal responsibility, and not
have dealt with
in expectation of subsequently displacing the priority of the mortgage
liens.
It the exception, and not the rule, that such priority of liens
the exception, and not the rule,
Again: "It
can be displaced."
We emphasize this fact
that such priority of liens can be displaced.
of the sacredness of contract liens, for the reason that there seems to
be growing an idea that the chancellor, in the exercise of his equitable
powers, has unlimited discretion in this matter of the displacement of
These principles were reaffirmed in Thomas v. Westvested liens."
was held that the car
ern Car Co., 149 U. S. 95, no, in which
preference over mortgage creditors had concompany there seeking
tracted upon the responsibility of the railroad company, and not in
court of equity
reliance upon the interposition of
consequently its
*
claim to preference was denied.
Alabama Coal Co. v. Cen(Citing and quoting from Virginia
tral, etc., R. Co., 170 U. S. 355, 365, 368.)
It apparent from an examination of the above cases that the deThis court has
cision in each one depended upon its special facts.
is

;

&

*

*

a

a

a

it

is

is

it

a

is

it,

in
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uniformly refrained from laying down any rule as absolutely controlling in every case involving the right of unsecured creditors of a corporation, whose property is in the hands of a receiver, to have their
demands paid out of net earnings in preference to mortgage creditors.
But it may be safely affirmed, upon the authority of former decisions,
that a railroad mortgagee when accepting his security impliedly agrees
that the current debts of a railroad company contracted in the ordinary
course of its business shall be paid out of current receipts before he
has any claim upon such income; that, within this rule, a debt not
contracted upon the personal credit of the company, but to keep the
railroad itself in condition to be used with reasonable safety for the
transportation of persons and property, and with the expectation of the
parties that it was to be met out of the current receipts of the company, may be treated as a current debt ; that whether the debt was
contracted upon the personal credit of the company, without any reference to its receipts, is to be determined in each case by the amount
of the debt, the time and terms of payment, and all other circumstances attending the transaction ; and that when current earnings are
used for the benefit of mortgage creditors before current expenses are
paid, the mortgage security is chargeable in equity with the restoration of any funds thus improperly diverted from their primary use.
The doctrine announced in Burnham v. Bowen in which case the
decisions in prior cases were affirmed
is thus expressed in the recent
case of Virginia & Alabama Coal Co. v. Central Railroad Company,
" The dominant feature of the doctrine as applied in
above cited:
Burnham v. Bowen, is that, where expenditures have been made
which were essentially necessary to enable the road to be operated as
a continuing business, and it was the expectation of the creditors that
the indebtedness created would be paid out of the current earnings of
the company, a superior equity arises in favor of the material-man as
against the mortgage bond in the income arising both before and after
the appointment of a receiver from the operation of the property.
The equity thus held to arise when a purchase of necessary current
supplies is made by the owning company is not in anywise influenced
by the fact that the company itself is the purchaser of the supplies,
but is solely dependent upon the fact that the supplies are sold and
purchased for use, and that they are used in the operation of the road,
that they are essential for such operation, and that the sale was not
made simply upon personal credit, but upon the tacit or express understanding that the current earnings would be appropriated for the
payment of the debt."
Can the decree below be sustained consistently with these principles ? Are the debts due the Carnegie Company of the class designated in the adjudged cases as current debts contracted, not on the
personal credit of the railroad company, but in the ordinary course of
As already said,
its business, and to be met out of current receipts?
in
had
view
whether the parties, seller and buyer,
only the personal
in
of
be
each
case
determined
credit
the latter is to
by its special facts,
*
*
*
of
and
of
the debt
the terms
including the amount
payment.

2060

SOUTHERN R. CO. V. CARNEGIE

STEEL CO.

(Reciting the facts as to the purchase of the rails, as heretofore,
and in addition stating they were not all purchased at one time, but in
small amounts, to be paid for on short time, and that 1,100 tons were
used on the Northeastern Railroad in Georgia, 1,270 tons on the Virginia Midland, 1,793 tons on the Danville and 31 tons on the Georgia
Pacific.)

What was the condition of the roads owned and controlled by the
Danville Company at the time the rails were purchased and used? It
was in the power of the railroad company and its receivers, who had
possession of the books of the company, to have furnished evidence
on this point that would have removed all possible doubt.
But there
is enough in the record to show that the rails purchased from the Carnegie Company were needed in order that the roads in question might
be kept by the railroad company in that condition of safety which its
In
duty to the public and to the mortgage bondholders required.
August, 1892, immediately after the receiver took possession of the
railroads constituting the Danville system, they reported to the court
that the financial difficulties of the Danville Company during the previous two years had "prevented the operating officers from being able
to expend the proper amount for new rails, and upon the road-bed
and structures, to keep the railroad in the condition in which it
should be maintained, and it will be necessary for the receivers during
the summer and autumn to make a much larger expenditure than they
would for ordinary maintenance."
Here is a direct admission by the
receivers, that during the two years immediately preceding their appointment, the railroad company had not expended for new rails and
upon the road-bed and structures the amount necessary to keep its road
in proper condition. There is no evidence in the record which even
tends to show that the statements of the receivers on this point were
not strictly accurate.
But this purchase of new rails proved to be in-'
adequate, for on the 27th of January, 1894, the foreclosure receivers
represented to the court by petition that "for the proper and economical operation of the lines of railroad of which they are receivers, and
for the safety ofpassengers and property transported over such roads,
as required by the order of this court appointing such receivers, two
thousand tons of new steel rails are an absolute necessity," and that
they had "negotiated with and purchased from the Carnegie Steel
Company, Limited, subject to the approval of the court, that quantity
of rails at the cost of $24 per ton." The court made an order in accordance with that petition.
Again, on the I3th day of April, 1894,
the court
all parties to the foreclosure suit consenting thereto, includmade an order authorizing the reing the bondholders' committee
ceivers to purchase 2,500 tons of new steel rails, in order ''to properly operate the railroads" in their charge, "and for the safety of
persons and property transported."
It is apparent that the purchases of new steel rails while the railroads were in possession of receivers were made in the ordinary
course of business and were properly chargeable upon and payable
out of current receipts in preference to the claims of mortgage cred-

737

CREDITORS INTER

SE.

2O6l

In every substantial sense the expenses thus incurred were operating expenses.
They were incurred in the interest of mortgage
creditors, the value of whose securities depended upon the unity of
the Danville system being preserved and the interests of all concerned
not allowed to goto ruin.
Why should a different rule be applied to
the contracts made with the Carnegie Company shortly before the appointment of receivers in the Clyde suit, the original contract being
for only 2,500 tons, and the last one for only 1,656 tons? Is it to be
said that the contract for 2,000 tons of steel rails and the contract for
suit created
2,500 tons made by the receivers in the foreclosure
debts of a preferential character, while contracts made by the railroad
company of exactly the same kind shortly before the appointment of
receivers for 2,500 and 1,656 tons of steel rails could not, under any
circumstances, become a preferential debt chargeable upon current
receipts?
Surely the quantity of rails purchased from the Carnegie
and
delivered in 1891 was insignificant in view of the interCompany
and
involved
the extensive mileage of the Danville system, and
ests
itors.

was by no means so large as to suggest that they were to be used in
constructing new and additional road, and not to keep existing roads
in proper condition for use. Every railroad company must have on
hand a limited quantity of rails in order to keep every part of its Hne
in proper and safe condition. It is evident that the Carnegie rails
purchased shortly before the receivers in the Clyde suit were apwere obtained for the same reason
pointed the rails here in question
*
* *
that induced the subsequent purchases by the receivers.
We next inquire whether it was not at the time the expectation of
both parties, vendor and vendee, that the rails delivered by the Carnegie Company between July 25, 1891, and October 10, 1891, should
be paid for out of the current earnings of the railroad company?
The
attendant circumstances require an affirmative answer to this question,
although the parties did not in express words declare that the debts
due contracted with the Carnegie Company were to be charged upon
The quantity of rails
the current earnings of the railroad company.
was not so large as to preclude the expectation that they could be paid
As already
for out of the current earnings of the railroad company.
said, it was a very small quantity for purposes of ordinary or necessary repairs, and there is nothing in the record to show that the Carnegie Company relied merely or exclusively on the personal credit of
The renewal notes executed by the railroad
the railroad company.
company were all within the three months immediately -preceding the
* *
appointment of the receivers.
(The learned justice further held that the fact that the rails were
largely used upon the allied lines of the system inured to the benefit of
the bondholders, and after consideration of the financial management in
detail also concluded that during both the insolvency and foreclosure
receiverships "immense sums were expended in paying interest, sinking-fund and car trust debts, and for construction and equipment,
which were all for the benefit of mortgage creditors, and which to the
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extent necessary should have been applied in payment of preferential
claims, including those of the Carnegie Company.")
We must not be understood as saying that a general unsecured creditor of an insolvent railroad corporation in the hands of a receiver is
entitled to priority over mortgage creditors in the distribution of net
earnings simply because that which he furnished to the company prior
to the appointment of the receiver was for the preservation of the
That, no
property and for the benefit of the mortgage securities.
doubt, is an important element in the matter. Before, however, such a
creditor is accorded a preference over mortgage creditors in the distribution of net earnings in the hands of a receiver of a railroad company, it should reasonably appear from all the circumstances, including
the amount involved and the tei'ms of payment, that the* debt was one
fairly to be regarded as part of the operating expenses of the railroad
incurred in ordinary course of business, and to be met out of current
*
* *
receipts.

Affirmed.
See, 1878, Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235; 1885, Union Trust Co. v.
117 U. S. 434; 1892, Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Kansas City,
etc., Co., 53 Fed. Rep. 182; 1895, Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. N. Pac. R., 68 Fed.
Rep. 36; 1898, Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, etc., Ry. Co., 174 U. S.
674; 1898, Knickerbocker v. McKindley Coal Co., 172 111. 535, 64 Am. St.
Rep. 54; 1899, Lackawanna Co. v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 176 U. S. 298; 1899,
Hale v. Harden, 95 Fed. Rep. 747 ; 1900, International Trust Co. v. U. C.
Co., 27 Colo. 246, 60 Pac. Rep. 621 ; 1900, Standley v. Hendrie & B. Mfg. Co.,
Note.

111.

27

Mid. Ry. Co.,

Colo.

331, 61

Pac. Rep.

600.

ARTICLE II. CONTRIBUTION
Sec. 738.

1900.

HELM

IN THE SUPREME

AS TO EXPENSE OF ENFORCING

v.

REMEDIES.

SMITH-FEE CO.

COURT
297, 82 N.

OF MINNESOTA.

W. Rep. 639.

79

Minn. Rep.

One W.,
[Action to enforce liability of stockholders to creditors.
attorney for plaintiff, asked for allowance of an attorney fee of $1,100,
which was denied by the lower court, and an appeal taken.]
START, C. J. This action was brought under General Statutes
1894, chapter 76, for the purpose of enforcing the stockholders' liability, and was prosecuted by the plaintiff on behalf of himself
and all other creditors of the defendant corporation.
Other creditors
intervened, and proved their claims, and the action was prosecuted to
final judgment against the stockholders.
As a result of the prosecution of the action, there will be realized a common fund amounting
to over $13,000, which will be available for distribution to the several
The attorney for the plaintiff petitioned the trial court for
.creditors.
an allowance out of this fund for his services in prosecuting the action.
No objection was or is here made on the ground that the allowance
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is
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it,

should be made to the plaintiff, and not directly to his attorney.
The
court made its order denying the petition, stating, in a memorandum
attached thereto, that there was nothing in the statute warranting the
allowance, and no authority to sustain such a claim.
While the memorandum is no part of the order (see Kertson v.
Great Northern Exp. Co., 72 Minn. 378, 75 N. W. Rep. 600), yet
it would seem, from the whole record, that the trial court must have
denied the petition as a matter of strict legal right, and not as a matHowever this may be, we are of the opinion that,
ter of discretion.
in the exercise of a sound discretion, the trial court ought to have allowed the petitioner a reasonable amount for his services.
The
power to make such an allowance does not depend upon any statute,
but upon the equity rule that where one of many parties having a
common interest in a trust fund, at his own expense, takes proper
he
proceedings to collect it for the benefit of all interested in
equitably entitled to reimbursement for his reasonable expenses
Now, no one
in the proceedings out of the fund before its division.
entitled to enforce the liability of stockholders of a corpocreditor
He must prosecute the action
ration for his own exclusive benefit.
for the benefit of all creditors who elect to become parties to the
action and exhibit their claims, and, where he assumes the burden of
successfully prosecuting the action for the benefit of all, equity requires that he be reimbursed for his outlay from the common fund
Seibert v. Minneapolis
St. L. Ry. Co., 58
secured by his efforts.
Minn. 39, 59 N. W. Rep. 822; Dwinnell v. Badger, 74 Minn. 405,
77

N. W. Rep.

219.

The correctness of this proposition

is

is

is

it

it

it

a

is

a

a

;

a

a

is

it

is

substantially conceded by the
Moore,
he
claims that
would be inbut
Watson
S.
respondent,
him,
in
this
case
because he
to
the
as
against
petition
equitable
grant
both
creditor and stockholder of the corporation that nearly all of
the money to be brought into the common fund by the plaintiff's action
will be contributed by him as a stockholder; that approximately twocreditor, as an offthirds of the fund will be distributed to him as
set pro tanto to his stock liability, and that the plaintiff and his
creditor, taking an
attorney opposed the allowance of his claim as
Helm
v. Smith-Fee Co.,
court
to
this
from
its
allowance
appeal
(see
he
therefore,
ought not to be
Minn.
W.
Rep. 313);
328, 79 N.
76
as
creditor,
the
to
as
petitioner,
such
attorney for the
pay
compelled,
other creditors, for his services in opposing his claim. This
good
reason why the whole amount of the petitioner's fees as attorney in
no reathe action ought not to be paid from the common fund, but
The undisputed
son for refusing him any compensation whatever.
would be inequitable to allow the
evidence in this case shows that
entire amount of the reasonable value of the services rendered by the
plaintiff's attorney in this action out of the common fund, and that his
On the other hand,
claim should be liberally reduced.
equally
entitled to an allowance for such
clear from the evidence that he
services as were rendered for the common benefit of all the creditors.
Reversed.

APPENDIX OF FORMS.
FORM

SUBSCRIPTION

TO

I.
CAPITAL STOCK 1

PRIOR TO ORGANIZATION OP COMPANY.

Whereas, It is proposed to organize under the laws of the state of Delaware,
a corporation to be known as
, or by such other name as the parties in
interest may determine ; and
Whereas, It is proposed that said company shall have a capital stock of
dollars, and shall transact the business of
.
Now, therefore, the signers hereto, in consideration of their mutual promises, do severally agree to and with each other, and with
, the promoter
and founder of said company, that they will take, and they do hereby severally subscribe to the capital stock of said company to the amount of the par
value of stock set opposite their respective names.
This agreement is conditioned upon the procuring by said
of subscriptions of at least
dollars to said capital stock.
.
Dated at
Witness :
NAME.
AMOUNT.

FORM

SUBSCRIPTION

TO STOCK

II.

IN CORPORATION TO BE FORMED.

See supra, p. 510.
Note.

See cases, supra, pp. 471-510.

1 Copy furnished by Delaware Charter, Guarantee and Trust Company, Wilmington, Del. See form II, next, and paragraph 1, form XVI, infra. The
forms herein printed, numbered I, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XV and
XVI, were all furnished by the Delaware Charter, Guarantee and Trust Company, and are printed by their permission. They furnish such forms to those
who wish to incorporate under the Delaware laws, and have an office in that
state with them.
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FORM

STATUTORY

III.

SUBSCRIPTION.

See supra, p. 459.
FORM IV.
CONDITIONAL SUBSCRIPTIONS.
See supra, pp. 460, 522, 526, 529.
FORM

V.

APPLICATION FOR INCORPORATION.
See supra, p. 436.
FORM VI.
CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION
OF

COMPANY.

The name of this corporation is
Second. Its principal office and place of business in the state of Delaware is
The agent in
to be located in the city of Wilmington, county of New Castle.
charge thereof is the Delaware Charter, Guarantee and Trust Company.
Third. The nature of the business and the objects and purposes proposed to
be transacted, promoted and carried on, are to do any or all of the things herein
mentioned, as fully and to the same extent as natural persons might or could
.
do, and in any part of the world, viz:
In furtherance and not in limitation of the general powers conferred by the
laws of the state of Delaware, and the objects and purposes herein set forth,
it is expressly provided that this corporation shall also have the following
powers, viz :
To take, own, hold, deal in, mortgage or otherwise lien, and to lease, sell,
exchange, transfer, or in any manner whatever dispose of real property,
within or without the state of Delaware, wherever situated.
To manufacture, purchase or acquire in any lawful manner, and to hold,
own, mortgage, pledge, sell, transfer, or in any manner dispose of, and to deal
and trade in goods, wares, merchandise and property of any and every class
and description, and in any part of the world.
To acquire the good-will, rights and property of any person, firm, association or corporation ; to pay for the same in cash, the stock of this company,
bonds or otherwise ; to hold or in any manner to dispose of the whole or any
part of the property so purchased ; to conduct in any lawful manner the whole
or any part of any business so acquired, and to exercise all the powers necessary or convenient in and about the conduct and management of such business.
To apply for, or in any manner to acquire, and to hold, own, use and
operate, or to sell or in any manner dispose of, and to grant license or other
rights in respect of, and in any manner deal with, any and all rights, inventions, improvements and processes used in connection with or secured under
letters patent or copyrights of the United States or other countries, and to
First.

1

See Forms

V and VII,

and paragraph

2,

Form

XVI.
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work, operate or develop the same, and to carry on any business, manufacturing or otherwise, which may directly or indirectly effectuate these objects
or any of them.
To purchase, hold, sell, assign, transfer, mortgage, pledge or otherwise dispose of. the shares of the capital stock of, or any bonds, securities or evidences
of indebtedness created by any other corporation or corporatipns of this state
or any other state, country, nation or government, and while owner of said
stock may exercise all the rights, powers and privileges of ownership, including the right to vote thereon, to the same extent as natural persons might or
could do.
To enter into, make and perform contracts of every kind with any person,
firm, association or corporation, municipality, body politic, county, territory,
state, government or colony or dependency thereof, and without limit as to
amount to draw, make, accept, indorse, discount, execute and issue promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, warrants, bonds, debentures, and other
negotiable or transferable instruments and evidences of indebtedness, whether
secured by mortgage or otherwise, as well as to secure the same by mortgage
or otherwise, so far as may be permitted by the laws of the state of Delaware.
To have offices, conduct its business and promote its objects within and
without the state of Delaware, in other states, the District of Columbia, the
territories and colonies of the United States and in foreign countries.
To do any or all of the things herein set forth to the same extent as natural
persons might or could do, and in any part of the world, as principals, agents,
trustees or otherwise, and either alone or in company with
contractors,
others.

In general to carry on any other business in connection therewith, whether
manufacturing or otherwise, not forbidden by the laws of the state of Delaware, and with all the powers conferred upon corporations by the laws of the
state of Delaware.
Fourth. The amount of the total authorized capital stock of this corporation
is
dollars ($
shares, of
dollars ($
) , divided into
)
each.

The amount of capital stock with which it will commence business is
dollars ($
dollars ($
), being
shares, of
) each.
residence
each
of
the
The
names
and
of
of
places
subscribers to the
Fifth.
capital stock are as follows :
NAME.

RESIDENCE.

The existence of this corporation is to be perpetual.
The affairs of this corporation are to be conducted by a board of
not less than three directors, the number to be determined by the by-laws
and elected at such times and places as may be determined in the by-laws,
and the said directors shall appoint or elect such officers as the by-laws may
prescribe.
Eighth. This corporation may become seized and possessed of either real
dollars.
or personal estate, or both, to the value of
Sixth.

Seventh.
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Ninth. The highest amount of indebtedness or liability which this corporadollars.
tion may at any time incur shall be
Tenth. The private property of the stockholders shall not be subject to the
payment of corporate debts to any extent whatever.
Eleventh.
The directors shall have power to make and to alter or amend the
by-laws ; to fix the amount to be reserved as working capital, and to authorize,
and cause to be executed, mortgages and liens, without limit as to amount,
upon the property and franchises of this corporation.
With the consent in writing, and pursuant to a vote of the holders of
per cent, of the capital stock issued and outstanding, the directors shall have
authority to dispose, in any manner, of the whole property of this corporation.
The by-laws shall determine whether and to what extent the accounts and
books of this corporation, or any of them, shall be open to the inspection of
the stockholders; and no stockholder shall have any right of inspecting any
account, or book, or document of this corporation, except as conferred by law
or the by-laws, or by resolution of the stockholders.
The stockholders and directors shall have power to hold their meetings
and keep the books, documents and papers of the corporation outside of the
state of Delaware, at such places as may be from time to time designated by
the by-laws or by resolution of the stockholders, except as otherwise required
by the laws of Delaware.
It is the intention that the objects, purposes and powers specified in the
third paragraph hereof shall, except where otherwise specified in said paragraph, be nowise limited or restricted by reference to or inference from the
terms of any other clause or paragraph in this certificate of incorporation,
but that the objects, purposes and powers specified in the third paragraph,
and in each of the clauses or paragraphs of this charter, shall be regarded as
independent objects, purposes and powers.
We, the undersigned, for the purpose of forming a corporation under the
laws of the state of Delaware, do make, record and file this certificate, and
do certify that the facts herein stated are true ; and we have accordingly
hereunto set our respective hands and seals.
.
Dated at
,
,

In

19.

presence of

.
.

.
.

[SEAL.]
[SEAL.]
[SEAL.]

State of

County of-

.}ss.

remembered, that on this
, A.D.
, personally
day of
, parties to the foregoing certificate of incorporation,
appeared before me
known to me personally to be such, and I, having first made known to them

Beit

and each of them the contents of said certificate, they did each severally acknowledge that they signed, sealed and delivered the same as their several
voluntary act and deed, and each deposed that the facts therein stated were
truly set forth.
Given under my hand and seal of office, the day and year aforesaid.

[SEAL.]

.
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VII.

STEEL CORPORATION.

OP INCORPORATION OP

1

UNITED STATES STEEL COR-

PORATION.

We, the undersigned, in order to form a corporation for the purposes hereinafter stated, under and pursuant to the provisions of the act of the legislature
of the state of New Jersey, entitled "An Act Concerning Corporations (Revision of 1896)," and the acts amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto,
do hereby certify as follows :
I. The name of the corporation is
UNITED STATES

STEEL CORPORATION.

II.

The location of its principal office in the state of New Jersey is at No.
Newark street, in the city of Hoboken, county of Hudson. The name of
the agent therein and in charge thereof, upon whom process against the corporation may be served, is Hudson Trust Company^ Said office is to be the
registered office of said corporation.
III. The objects for which the corporation is formed are:
To manufacture iron, steel, manganese, coke, copper, lumber aud other materials, and all or any articles consisting, or partly consisting, of iron, steel,
copper, wood or other materials, and all or any products thereof.
To acquire, own, lease, occupy, use or develop any lands containing coal or
iron, manganese, stone or other ores, or oil, and any woodlands, or other lands,
for any purpose of the company.
To mine or otherwise to extract or remove coal, ores, stone and other minerals and timber from any lands owned, acquired, leased, or occupied by the
company, or from any other lands.
To buy and sell, or otherwise to deal or to traffic in, iron, steel, manganese,
copper, stone, ores, coal, coke, wood, lumber and other materials, and any of
the products thereof, and any articles consisting, or partly consisting thereof.
To construct bridges, buildings, machinery, ships, boats, engines, cars and
other equipment, railroads, docks, slips, elevators, water-works, gas-works and
electric-works, viaducts, aqueducts, canals and other water-ways, 'and any
other means of transportation, and to sell the same, or otherwise dispose
thereof, or to maintain and operate the same, except that the company shall
not maintain or operate any railroad or canal in the state of New Jersey.
To apply for, obtain, register, purchase, lease, or otherwise to acquire, and
to hold, use, own, operate and introduce, and to sell, assign, or otherwise to
didpose of, any trade-marks, trade names, patents, inventions, improvements
and processes used in connection with, or secured under letters patent of the
United States, or elsewhere, or otherwise; and to use, exercise, develop,
grant licenses in respect of, or otherwise turn to account any such trademarks, patents, licenses, processes and the like, or any such property or
rights.
To engage in any other manufacturing, mining, construction or transportation business of any kind or character whatsoever, and to that end to acquire,
hold, own and dispose of any and all property, assets, stocks, bonds and
51

1

Printed by permission from copy sent by
2 WIL. CAS.

57

J. P.
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rights of any and every kind ; but not to engage in any business hereunder
which shall require the exercise of the right of eminent domain within the
state of New Jersey.
To acquire by purchase, subscription or otherwise, and to hold or to dispose
of, stocks, bonds or any other obligations of any corporation formed for, or
then or theretofore engaged in or pursuing, any one or more of the kinds of
business, purposes, objects or operations above indicated, or owning or holding any property of any kind herein mentioned ; or of any corporation owning or holding the stocks or the obligations of any such corporation.
To hold for investment, or otherwise to use, sell or dispose of, any stocks,
bonds or other obligations of any such other corporation ; to aid in any manner any corporation whose stock, bonds or other obligations are held or are
in any manner guaranteed by the company, and to do any other acts or things
for the preservation, protection, improvement, or enhancement of the value
of any such stock, bonds or other obligations, or to do any acts or things designed for any such purpose ; and, while owner of any such stocks, bonds or
other obligations, to exercise all the rights, powers and privileges of ownership thereof, and to exercise any and all voting power thereon.
The business or purpose of the company is from time to time to do any one
or more of the acts and things herein set forth; and it may conduct its business in other states and in the territories and in foreign countries, and may
have one office or more than one office, and keep the books of the company
outside of the state of New Jersey, except as otherwise may be provided by
law ; and may hold, purchase, mortgage and convey real and personal property either in or out of the state of New Jersey.
Without in any particular limiting any of the objects and powers of the corporation, it is hereby expressly declared and provided that the corporation
shall have power to issue bonds and other obligations, in payment for property purchased or acquired by it, or for any other object in or about its business ; to mortgage or pledge any stock, bonds or other obligations, or any property which may be acquired by it, to secure any bonds or other obligations by
it issued or incurred ; to guarantee any dividends or bonds or contracts or other
obligations ; to make and perform contracts of any kind and description ; and
in carrying on its business, or for the purpose of attaining or furthering any
of its objects, to do any and all other acts and things, and to exercise any
and all other powers which a copartnership or natural person could do and
exercise, and which now or hereafter may be authorized by law.
IV. The total authorized capital stock of the corporation is eleven hundred
million dollars ($1,100,000,000), divided into eleven million shares of the par
value of one hundred dollars each. Of such total authorized capital stock,
five million five hundred thousand shares, amounting to five hundred and
fifty million dollars, shall be preferred stock, and five million five hundred
thousand shares, amounting to five hundred and fifty million dollars, shall
be common stock.
From time to time, the preferred stock and the common stock may be increased according to law, and may be issued in such amounts and proportions
as shall be determined by the board of directors, and as may be permitted

law.
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The holders of the preferred stock shall be entitled to receive when and as
declared, from the surplus or net profits of the corporation, yearly dividends
at the rate of seven per centum per annum, and no more, payable quarterly
on dates to be fixed by the by-laws. The dividends on the preferred stock
shall be cumulative, and shall be payable before any dividends on the common stock shall be paid or set apart ; so that, if in any year dividends
amounting to seven percent, shall not have been paid thereon, the deficiency
shall be payable before any dividends shall be paid upon or set apart for the
common

stock.

Whenever all cumulative dividends on the preferred stock for all previous
years shall have been declared and shall have become payable, and the accrued quarterly installments for the current year shall have been declared,
and the company shall have paid such cumulative dividends for previous
years and such accrued quarterly installments, or shall have set aside from
its surplus or net profits a sum sufficient for the payment thereof, the board
of directors may declare dividends on the common stock, payable then or
thereafter, out of any remaining surplus or net profits.
In the event of any liquidation or dissolution or winding up (whether voluntary or involuntary) of the corporation, the holders of the preferred stock
shall be entitled to be paid in full both the par amount of their shares and
the unpaid dividends accrued thereon before any amount shall be paid to the
holders of the common stock ; and after the payment to the holders of the
preferred stock of its par value, and the unpaid accrued dividends thereon,
the remaining assets and funds shall be divided and paid to the holders of
the common stock according to their respective shares.
V. The names and post-office addresses of the incorporators, and the number of shares of stock for which severally and respectively we do hereby subscribe (the aggregate of our said subscriptions being three thousand dollars,
is the amount of capital stock with which the corporation will commence
business), are as follows:
Name.

Post-Office Address.

Charles C. Cluff, 51 Newark St., Hoboken, N.
William J. Curtis, 51 Newark St., Hoboken, N.
Charles MacVeagh, 51 Newark St., Hoboken, N.

VI.
VII.

J

J
J

Number of Shares.
Preferred
Common
Stock.
Stock.
5

5

5

5

5

5

The duration of the corporation shall be perpetual.
The number of directors of the company shall be fixed from time to
time by the by-laws ; but the number, if fixed at more than three, shall be
The directors shall be classified with respect to the
some multiple of three.
time for which they shall severally hold office by dividing them into three
classes, each consisting of one-third of the whole number of the board of diThe directors of the first class shall be elected for a term of one year ;
rectors.
the directors of the second class for a term of two years ; and the directors of
the third class for a term of three years ; and at each annual election the
successors to the class of directors whose terms shall expire in that year shall
be elected to hold office for the term of three years, so that the term of office
of one class of directors shall expire in each year.
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The number of the directors maybe increased as may be provided in the byIn case of any increase of the number of the directors the additional
directors shall be elected as may be provided in the by-laws, by the directors
or by the stockholders at an annual or special meeting; and one-third of
their number shall be elected for the then unexpired portion of the term of
the directors of the first class, one-third of their number for the unexpired
portion of the term of the directors of the second class, and one-third of their
number for the unexpired portion of the term of the directors of the third
class, so that each class of directors shall be increased equally.
In case of any vacancy in any class of directors through death, resignation,
disqualification or other cause, the remaining directors, by affirmative vote of
a majority of the board of directors, may elect a successor to hold office for
the unexpired portion of the term of the director whose place shall be vacant,
and until the election of a successor.
The board of directors shall have power to hold their meetings outside of
the state of New Jersey at such places as from time to time may be designated by the by-laws or by resolution of the board.
The by-laws may prescribe the number of directors necessary to constitute a quorum of the board
of directors, which number may be less than a majority of the whole number
of the directors.
Unless authorized by votes given in person or by proxy by stockholders holding at least two-thirds of the capital stock of the corporation, which is represented and voted upon in person or by proxy at a meeting specially called for
that purpose, or at an annual meeting, the board of directors shall not mortgage
or pledge any of its real property, or any shares of the capital stock of any other
corporation ;but this prohibition shall not be construed to apply to the execution
of any purchase-money mortgage or any other purchase-money lien. As authorized by the act of the legislature of the state of New Jersey, passed March 22,
1901, amending the seventeenth section of the act concerning corporations (revision of 1896), any action which theretofore required the consent of the holders of two-thirds of the stock at any meeting after notice to them given, or required their consent in writing to be filed, may be taken upon the consent of,
and the consent given and filed by the holders of two-thirds of the stock of
each class represented at such meeting in person or by proxy.
Any officer elected or appointed by the board of directors may be removed
at any time by the affirmative vote of a majority of the whole board of directAny other officer or employe of the company may be removed at any
ors.
time by vote of the board of directors, or by any committee or superior
officer upon whom such power of removal may be conferred by the by-laws or
by vote of the board of directors.
The board of directors, by the affirmative vote of a majority of the whole
board, may appoint from the directors an executive committee, of which a
majority shall constitute a quorum ; and to such extent as shall be provided
in the by-laws, such committee shall have and may exercise all or any of the
powers of the board of directors, including power to cause the seal of the corporation to be affixed to all papers that may require it.
The board of directors, by the affirmative vote of a majority of the whole
board, may appoint any other standing committees, and such standing cemlaws.
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shall have and may exercise such powers as shall be conferred or
authorized by the by-laws.
The board of directors may appoint not only other officers of the company,
but also one or more vice-presidents, one or more assistant treasurers, and
one or more assistant secretaries; and, to the extent provided in the by-laws,
the persons so appointed respectively shall have and may exercise all the
powers of the president, of the treasurer and of the secretary, respectively.
The board of directors shall have power from time [to time] to fix and to
determine and to vary the amount of the working capital of the company ;
and to direct and determine the use and disposition of any surplus or net
profits over and above the capital stock paid in ; and in its discretion the
board of directors may use and apply any such surplus or accumulated profits
in purchasing or acquiring its bonds or other obligations, or shares of its own
capital stock, to such extent and in such manner and upon such terms as
the board of directors shall deem expedient ; but shares of such capital stock
so purchased or acquired may be resold, unless such shares shall have been
retired for the purpose of decreasing the company's capital stock as provided
by law.
The board of directors from time to time shall determine whether and to
what extent, and at what times and places, and under what conditions and
regulations, the accounts and books of the corporation, or any of them, shall
be open to the inspection of the stockholders, and no stockholder shall have
any right to inspect any account or book or document of the corporation, except as conferred by statute or authorized by the board of directors, or by a
resolution of the stockholders.
Subject always to by-laws made by the stockholders, the board of directors
may make by-laws, and, from time to time, may alter, amend or repeal any
by-laws ; but any by-laws made by the board of directors may be altered or
repealed by the stockholders at any annual meeting, or at any special meeting,
provided notice of such proposed alteration or repeal be included in the notice
of the meeting.
In witness whereof, We have hereunto set our hands and seals the 23d day
of February, 1901.
CHARLES C. CLUFF.
[L. S.]
WILLIAM J. CURTIS.
[L. S.]
CHARLES MACVEAGH.
[L. S.]
Signed, sealed and delivered
in the presence of
FRANCIS LYNDE STETSON.
mitteea

VICTOR MORAWETZ.
State of New Jersey,

County of Hudson,

\
J

Sk

Be it remembered, that on this 23d day of February, 1901, before the undersigned, personally appeared Charles C. Cluff, William J. Curtis and Charles
MacVeagh, who, I am satisfied, are the persons named in and who executed
the foregoing certificate ; and I, having first made known to them, and to each
of them, the contents thereof, they did each acknowledge that they signed,
sealed and delivered the same as their voluntary act and deed.
GEORGE HOLMES,

Master in Chancery of New Jersey.
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[10 cent internal revenue stamp canceled.]

Indorsed.

A. D.

1901,

Indorsed.

"Received in the Hudson Co., N. J., clerk's office Feb'y 25th,
and recorded in Clerk's Record No.
.
, on page
"MAURICE J. STACK, Clerk."

"Filed Feb'y

25, 1901.

"GEORGE

WURTS, Secretary

of State."

[Indorsed : United States Steel Corporation. Amended Certificate of Incorporation filed in office of secretary of state April 1, 1901.]

FORM

VIII.

WAIVER OF NOTICE

l

OP FIRST MEETING OP INCORPORATORS OF
COMPANY.
We the undersigned, being all the parties named in the certificate of incor, incorporated under the laws of the state of Delaware,
poration of the
and having its principal office in the state of Delaware with the Delaware
Charter, Guarantee and Trust Company, at Wilmington, Delaware, do hereby
waive notice of the time, place and purpose of the first meeting of said corpo19
noon,
o'clock in the
, at
day of
ration, and do fix the
as the time, and the office of the Delaware Charter, Guarantee and Trust
Company, in the city of Wilmington, state of Delaware, as the place of said
first meeting of the corporation.
And we do hereby waive all the requirements of the statutes of Delaware
as to the notice of this meeting, and the publication and service thereof; and
we do consent to the transaction of such business as may come before said
meeting.

19.

Dated

FORM

IX.

PROXY, FIRST MEETING OF INCORPORATORS*
OP THE

COMPANY.

men by these presents, That I, the undersigned, being one of the
shares of the capital
incorporators, a subscriber for and the owner of
stock of the corporation above named, incorporated under the laws of Dela-

Know all

my true and lawful attorney,
ware, do hereby constitute and appoint
in my name, place and stead, to vote upon the stock owned by me or standing in my name, as my proxy, at the first meeting of the said corporation, to
day of
be held at the company's office, Wilmington, Delaware, on the
may be thereafter held by ad, or on such other day as the meeting
journment or otherwise, according to the number of votes I am now or may
then be entitled to cast, hereby granting the said attorney full power and
1

See paragraph

3,

Form

XVI,

infra.

z

See paragraph

4,

Form

XVI,

infra.
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authority to act for me in my name at the said meeting or meetings, in voting
for directors of the said company or otherwise, and in the transaction of such
other business as may come before the meeting, as fully as I could do if personally present, with full power of substitution and revocation, hereby ratifying all that my said attorney or substitute may do in my place, name and
stead.

In witness whereof, I

day of

(

have

hereunto set my hand and seal, this

.

Witness.
[Internal revenue stamp,

25 cts.]

[SBAL.]

X.

FORM

OF SUBSCRIPTION

ASSIGNMENT
IN
Know all

THE

TO STOCK 1

COMPANY.

men by these presents,

I,

in consideration of

one dollar, lawful money of the United
and delivery of these presents, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and for other good and valuable considerations, have sold, assigned, transferred and set over, and by these

That

,

States, to me paid before the ensealing

my right, title and
presents do sell, assign, transfer and set over unto
company, a corinterest as a subscriber to and an incorporator of the
Delaware,
the
the
state
of
to the extent of
under
of
laws
organized
poration
shares, and I do hereby request and direct the said company to issue
or such
shares to and in the name of said
the certificate for said
he
name.
as
may
other person
day
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal, this

of

.

[SEAL.]

Sealed and delivered in the presence of
[Internal revenue stamp.]

FORM

.

XI.

WAIVER OF NOTICE
OP MEETING

TO CONSIDER

8

THE QUESTION OF INCREASING THE CAPITAL STOCK
COMPANY.
OF

We, the undersigned, being all the incorporators and subscribers to the
company, incorporated under the laws of the state of
capital stock of
Delaware, do hereby waive notice of the time and place of a meeting for the
purpose of considering the advisability of increasing the company's capital
stock and the number of shares therein, and do hereby waive all statutory
requirements as to publication or service of such notice ; and we do hereby
consent that said matters be considered at a meeting of the corporation to be
19, at
o'clock, in the
day of
the
held on

-

1

See paragraph 5, Form

XVI,

infra.

-

'2

See paragraph 6, Form

XVI,

infra.
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noon, and do likewise consent and agree that at the said meeting, or at any
other meeting, the board of directors be authorized, empowered and directed
to take all proper steps in said matters and to increase the company's capital
stock and the number of shares therein, until the same shall reach the
amounts named in the company's certificate of incorporation as its total
authorized capital stock, and that the said board of directors be authorized,
empowered and directed to issue the additional shares of the company's capital stock, at such times and in such amounts as said board shall determine,
up to the amount of the company's total authorized capital stock.

FORM

XII.

WAIVER OF NOTICE
OP ASSESSMENT

OF

BALANCE

REMAINING

1

UNPAID

ON

CAPITAL

STOCK

OP

COMPANY.

We, the undersigned, being all the incorporators and subscribers to the
capital stock of
company, incorporated under the laws of the state of
Delaware, do hereby waive notice of the time and place of a meeting, to consider the subject of assessing and calling for the balance remaining unpaid on
said stock of said company, and do hereby waive all statutory requirements
as to publication or service of such notice, and we do hereby consent that
said matters be considered at a meeting of the incorporation to be held on
noon, and
the
o'clock in the
, 19
day of
, at
do likewise consent and agree that at said meeting, or at any other meeting,
the board of directors be authorized, empowered and directed to assess upon
all stock, subscribed for or issued, the entire balance remaining upaid thereon
up to the par value thereof, and to assess and call for the payment of such
sums without any notice whatever, by publication or otherwise, and do hereby
waive all our rights to publication of notice of any such assessment, and all statutory requirements concerning such assessment, and do hereby consent and
agree to pay the balance remaining unpaid on the shares of said stock of said
company held by us respectively, up to the par value of said shares, without
any such notice or publication whatever, and immediately upon demand of
the board of directors.
,
Dated at

1 See

paragraph

6,

Form

XVI, infra.
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XIII.

BY-LAWS 1
OP THE

1.

COMPANY.

The title of this corporation is
OFFICE.

The principal office of this corporation in Delaware shall be in Wilmington, Delaware, and it shall there be represented by the Delaware Charter, Guarantee and Trust Company.
2.

SEAL.

The corporate seal of this corporation shall have inscribed thereon the
name of this corporation and the year of its creation and
.
3.

STOCKHOLDERS'

MEETINGS.

shall be
(a) The annual meetings of stockholders after the year
on the
of
held at
in each year at
o'clock in the
noon, when they shall by plurality vote elect a board of directors for
the ensuing year.
The polls shall remain open from
o'clock in the
noon until
o'clock in the
noon.
A majority in amount of the stock issued and outstanding shall constitute
a quorum for an election or for the transaction of other business.
(b) Each stockholder shall be entitled to one vote, either in person or by
proxy, for each share of stock registered in his name on the books of the corporation for twenty days preceding the meeting.
(c) Notice of the meetings and the conduct of the same shall be as prescribed by the board of directors.
(d) Special meetings of the stockholders shall be called by the secretary
on the written request of two directors, or on the written request of the owners of a majority of the stock, by notice given to each stockholder at least
three days prior to such meetings.
Such notice shall briefly state the objects
of such meetings, and no other business shall be transacted at such meeting.
4.

DIRECTORS.
5. (a) The property and business of this corporation shall be managed by
directors, and they shall hold office for one year and
board of at least
until their successors are elected and qualified.
(b) The board of directors may at any regular or special meeting increase its
number by electing additional members from among the stockholders to hold
office until the next meeting of stockholders or until their successors shall be
.
elected, but the number of directors shall at no time be more than
death,
resignareason
of
If
the
office
of
vacant
by
director
becomes
any
(c)
tion or otherwise, the remaining directors, though less than a quorum, may
elect a successor or successors, who shall hold office for the unexpired term.
on the
of
(d) Regular meetings of the directors shall be held at
. o'clock in the
noon, unless otherwise ordered by the
each month at
board.
a

1

See Form

XIV,

and paragraph

7,

Form

XVI,

infra.
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(e) Notice of such meetings shall be given to each director by the secretary, at least two days previous thereto.
(f) Special meetings may be called by the president on his own motion on
one day's notice to each director.
(g) Special meetings shall be called in like manner by the president upon
the written request of two members of the board.
members shall constitute a quorum
(h) At any meeting of the board
for the transaction of business, but a less number may adjourn.
(i) The board of directors shall have power to elect or appoint all necessary officers and committees, to employ agents, factors, clerks and workmen,
to require any of them to give such bond for the faithful discharge of their
duties as may be deemed wise, to fix their compensation, to prescribe their
duties, to dismiss any appointed officer or employe, and generally to control
all the officers of the corporation.
(j) The board may delegate to any committee such powers as to the board
may seem wise.

(k) The board of directors, in addition to the powers and authority expressly conferred upon them by these by-laws, may exercise all such powers
and do all such things as may be exercised or done by the corporation, but
subject, nevertheless, to the provisions of the law, of the charter, and of these
by-laws.
(1) The order of business at the meetings of the board shall be as follows:
1. A quorum being present, the president shall call the board to order.
2. The minutes of last meeting shall be read and considered as approved, if there is no amendment offered.
3. Reports of officers.
4. Reports of committees.
5. Unfinished business.
6. Miscellaneous business.
7. New business.
OFFICERS.
6. The officers of the corporation shall be a president, a vice-president, a
secretary, a treasurer, a general counsel, and such other officers as may from
time to time be elected or appointed by the board of directors ; the secretary
and treasurer may be one and the same person.

PRESIDENT.
7.

The president shall have such powers and perform such duties

as

the

board of directors shall prescribe.
VICE-PRESIDENT.
8. In the absence of the president, the vice-president shall be vested with
all his powers and perform all his duties.
SECRETARY,

TREASURER AND COUNSEL.

The secretary, treasurer and general counsel shall have such powers and
perform such duties as the board of directors shall prescribe.
9.

OFFICER PRO TEM.
10. In the absence of any officer, the board of directors may delegate his
powers and duties to any other officer, or to any director, for the time being.
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COMMITTEES.

Standing and special committees shall have such powers and perform
such duties as the board of directors shall prescribe.
11.

STOCK.

The stock of the corporation shall be issued, transferred, canceled and
replaced in accordance with such rules as the board of directors shall prescribe.
12.

13.

All

CHECKS.
the funds of this corporation for an amount
dollars, shall be countersigned by the president.

checks drawn against

exceeding

CONTRACTS.
14. No contract or agreement involving more than
dollars, shall be
entered into by this corporation except by a resolution of the board of directors.
INSPECTION OP BOOKS AND ACCOUNTS.
15. No stockholder owning less than
per cent, of the capital stock of
this corporation, unless said stockholder shall be a director of this corporation, shall be allowed to examine the books and accounts of this corporation,
except by a resolution of the board of directors.

WAIVER OF NOTICE.

Any stockholder,

officer or director may at any time waive any notice
required to be given under these by-laws.
16.

NOTICE.
17. Whenever, under the provisions of these by-laws, notice is required to
be given to any director, officer or stockholder, it shall not be construed to be
limited to personal notice, but such notice may be given in writing by depositing the same in the post-office or letter-box in a postpaid, sealed wrapper,

to such director, officer or stockholder at his or her address as the
same appears in the books of the corporation, and the time when the same
shall be mailed shall be deemed to be the time of the giving of such notice.
addressed

ALTERATION AND AMENDMENT.

The board of directors may, by a majority vote of the whole board,
alter or amend these by-laws at any regular or special meeting, provided notice of such alteration or amendment has been given to each director at least
three days prior to said meeting.
18.

FORM XIV.
GENERAL SCHEME FOR BY-LAWS. 1

BY-LAWS

OP THE

ARTICLE I.

Title or

COMPANY.
GENERAL.

name of corporation.
Offices: (a) Principal, (b) Other.
1
This is meant to be an outline of points to be provided for by the by-laws.
Many matThe terms of the by-laws will vary with the business or occasion.
ters suggested here are provided for in statutes, and these should always be
consulted.
1.

2.
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3.
4.
5.
6.

Seal: (a) Form and description, (b) Custodian.
Interpretation of words, terms, etc., as used in these by-laws.
Penalties for violation of by-laws by officers.
Amendments: (a) By whom made, (b) Notice of. (c) Vote necessary
ARTICLE

1.
2.

3.
4.

5.

6.

7.

OF FORMS.

II.

:

(a)

ARTICLE

2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

8.

STOCK.

Common, (b) Preferred, (c) Treasury.
Amount,
Preferred stock: (a)
(b) Nature of preference: (1) as to dividends cumulative or non-cumulative; (2) as to assets; (3) as to
voting ; (4) as to liabilities.
Treasury stock: (a) Amount, (b) Disposal of. (c) Dividend, (d)
Voting.
Subscription to stock : (a) Acceptance of subscriptions made prior to
incorporation, (b) Subscriptions after incorporation:
(1) opening
books; (2) agents in charge; (3) conditional subscriptions, (c) Payment of subscriptions, (d) Forfeiture for non-payment.
Certificates of stock: (a) Who and when entitled to. (b) Form, (c)
Signature, (d) Number, (e) Registration, (f) Form of indorsement for
transfer, (g) Form of power of attorney to have transfer made on books,
(h) Lost certificates.
Transfers of stock: (a) Surrender and cancellation of certificates, (b)
Registration on books, (c) Issue of new certificate,
(d) Closing of
books before elections and dividend days.
Stock and transfer books: (a) Books to be kept,
(b) Form, (c)
Classes of stock

Place or offices in which to be kept,

1.

.

III.

(d)

Custodian.

STOCKHOLDERS.

Meetings: (a) First or organizing: (1) how and by whom called;
(2) waiver of notice ; (3) who entitled to vote ; (4) number of votes ;
(5) method of voting, (b) Annual, or regular: (1) time;
(2) place,
time;
or
called
:
authority
to
call
;
Special
place.
(2)
(c)
(3)
(1)
Notice of meetings: (a) Regular:
(1) by whom given; (2) how
given; (3) how long, (b) Called: (1) by whom given; (2) how
given ; (3) how long ; (4) business to be done.
Quorum: (a) Number of persons,
(b) Number of shares.
Organization of meeting: (a) Chairman or president, (b) Secretary,
(c) Inspectors of election.
Rules of order parliamentary manual.
Order of business : (a) Roll call, (b) Proof or waiver of notice of
meeting,
(c) Reading and approval or correction of minutes,
(d)
Reports of officers and committees,
(f) Un(e) Election of officers,
finished business,
(g) New business,
(h) Adjournment.
Voting: (a) Who entitled to. (b) Lists to be made by secretary for
inspectors, (c) Method: (1) vivavoce; (2) yeas and nays; (3) ballot, (d) Proxies: (1) form; (2) evidence; (3) filing and preserving, (e) Cumulative.
Record: (a) Books, (b) Kept by secretary,
(c) Custody.

APPENDIX
ARTICLE IV.
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.

9.

10.

2.

2.

STANDING COMMITTEES.

Executive:
(b) Qualification,
(e) Compensation,
(f) Vacancies in.
Finance:
(a) Selection, (b) Qualification,
(e) Compensation,
(f) Vacancies in.
(a) Selection,

ARTICLE VI.
1.

DIRECTORS.

Number.
Qualifications: (a) Age. (b) Shareholders or not/ (c) Residence or
citizenship, (d) Holding other office, (e) Oath: (1) form; (2) before whom; (3) record of .
Classification: (a) First,
or others.
(b) Second,
(c) Third,
Term: (a) Date of beginning, (b) Duration, (c) Holding till successor
qualified.
Election: (a) Time, (b) Place, (c) Method: (1) selection of inspectors ; (2) ballot or otherwise ; (3) majority or plurality vote.
Vacancies: (a) Entire board: (1) not to work dissolution ; (2) special
meeting for election to be called, by whom, notice of. (b) Partial
for
months before end of term : (1) special election ; (2) appointment,
(c) Otherwise, by election by majority of remaining members
of board.
Removal : (a) By whom, (b) For what cause, (c) Hearing, (d) Record.
Meetings: (a) Regular: (1) time; (2) place; (3) notice,
(b) Special:
members; (2) notice, time,
any
(1) called by whom, president;
place, business,
(c) Quorum: (1) number; (2) lesser number may
adjourn, (d) Voting: (1) in person; (2) by proxy, (e) Order of business: (1) roll-call; (2) minutes disposed of ; (3) report of officers and
committees ; (4) unfinished business ; (5) new business ; (6) adjournment,
(f) Record: (1) by whom kept; (2) access to by members.
Powers: (a) General management,
(b) Officers: (1) elector appoint;
fix
direct
and
supervise ; (4) remove,
;
compensation
(c) By(2)
(3)
laws: (1) may not (or may) amend or repeal the by-laws of the company ; (2) make rules to regulate their own transactions,
(d) Fix and
establish offices, (e) Regulate inspection of books, (f) Make calls for
payment on shares : (1) how; (2) how often; (3) notice of . (g) Contracts: (1) with the corporation; (2) between corporations having common directors, or in matters in which they are interested,
(h) Fix
(j) Regulate transfer of
working capital, (i) Declare dividends,
shares,
(k) Delegation of authority.
Compensation : (a) Amount,
(b) By whom and how fixed.
ARTICLE V.

1.
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OF FORMS.

(c) Term,

(d) Powers.

(c) Term,

(d) Powers.

OFFICERS IN GENERAL.

Enumeration:
(a) President,
(b) Vice-presidents, (c) Chairman of
stockholders' meetings,
(e) Treasurer, (f) General
(d) Secretary,
Auditor,
(g) General counsel,
manager,
(i) Other.
(h)
Qualifications: (a) Shareholder, (b) Residence, (c) Member of boards,
(d) Bonds.
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Election: (a) By whom, (b) Time, (c) Place, (d) Method: (1) ballot; (2) vivavoce; (3) in writing.
Term: (a) Beginning, (b) Duration.
Vacancies : (a) By whom filled, and for full term or unexpired term.
Compensation: (a) By whom fixed, (b) How.
Eemoval: (a) By whom, (b) How.
AKTICLE VII.

1.

OF FORMS.

President:

PARTICULAR OFFICERS.

(a) Preside at meetings

:

(1) board;

(2) stockholders;

(3)

committees.

(b) Sign: (1) certificates; (2) bills, notes, checks, contracts, deeds, etc.
(c) Exercise general supervision and direction of corporate affairs and
officers.

2.
3.
4.

5.

6.

7.

(d) Report: (1) to annual meeting ; (2) to board at any time.
(e) Compensation: (1) amount; or (2) fixed by whom.
Vice-presidents : (a) Duties of each, (b; Compensation, etc.
Chairman of stockholders' meeting: (a) Selection,
(b) Functions.
Secretary: (a) Keep minutes: (1) stockholders' meetings; (2) board
meetings; (3) committee meetings,
(b) Give notices: (1) elections;
calls;
of dividends, etc.
time
of
meetings;
payment
(c)
(4)
(3)
(2)
Seal: (1) custody; (2) affix to documents requiring, (d) Stock certificate book:
(1) prepare; (2) record certificates issued ; (3) issue certificates,
countersign and seal the same ; (4) record transfers ; (5) cancel
certificates surrendered, (e) Countersign with president certificates,
contracts, etc., and affix the corporate seal,
(f) Report: (1) to stockholders; (2) to board of directors; (3) to public officers as required by
law. (g) Make lists of stockholders for inspectors, (h) Salary : (1)
amount, or (2) by whom fixed.
Treasurer:
(a) Custody of money and corporate securities,
(b) Keep
accounts,
notes,
checks,
etc.,
bills,
Indorse
of
books
(c) Deposits, (d)
collection,
for
checks
and
bills
vouchers,
on
draw
for
(e) Pay money
board;
furnish
meeting;
annual
such purpose,
(2)
(3)
(f) Report: (1)
information to secretary or auditor for public reports,
(h) Bond: (1)
amount; (2) sureties; (3) filing or custody,
(i) Salary.
General manager: (a) Manage business under supervision of board,
(c) Contract: (1) supplies; (2)
(b) Reports: (1) annual; (2) to board,
service,
labor, etc. (d) Term of
(e) Salary : (1) amount, (2) or fixed
by whom ; (3) payment of.
General counsel : (a) Legal documents : (1) prepare; (2) inspect and
pass upon,
(b) Advise officers upon legal matters concerning corporation, (c) Conduct litigation,
(d) Compensation: (1) salary; (2)
fees.

8.

Auditor:
(a) Have charge of accounts:
(1) fix forms of books and
blanks; (2) direct what shall be kept; (3) supervise keeping them,
.
(c) Verify assets of treas(b) Examine books regularly every
urer, (d) Report to board any delinquency or default, (e) Supervise taking of inventories,
(f) Report: (1) annually; (2) to board; or
(g) Advise
(3) executive committee ; or (4) president, at any time,
with board and executive officers as to manner of keeping accounts,
(h) Furnish information necessary for making public reports.
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FINANCES.

Working capital : (a) Fixed by whom,
(b) Limits as to amount,
(c)
Investment until needed,
(d) Used for what.
Indebtedness: (a) Limit as to amount,
(b) Mortgage of real estate,
or corporate securities, consent of shareholders.
Sinking fund: (a) Amount, (b) How accumulated,
For what
(c)

When and how to be paid.
Dividends:
(a) Declaration of : (1) by whom; (2) how; (3) out of
what; (4) when payable; (5) closing transfer books before.
Surplus: (a) Investment, (b) Disposition: (1) payment in money ; (2)
stock dividend.
Deposit of funds : (a) In name of the company,
(b) In what bank or
purpose,

4.

OF FORMS.

(d)

banks.

FORM XV.
MINUTES OF FIRST MEETING

OF THE

1

COMPANY.

Minutes of the proceedings of the first meeting of the incorporators and
subscribers to the capital stock of
, held at the office of the Delaware
Charter, Guarantee and Trust Company, Wilmington, Del., at
o'clock in
the
noon of
.
, the
day of
, 19
Present :
in person,
in person,
in person,
by proxy to
by proxy to
by proxy to
being all the parties named in the certificate of incorporation, and all the
subscribers to the capital stock of the company.
1. Mr.
was chosen temporary chairman, and Mr.
temporary
secretary of the meeting.
2. The proxies were ordered placed on the files of the company.
3. A waiver of notice of the first meeting, signed by all the parties named in
the certificate of incorporation, was read, and on motion duly made, seconded
and carried, was directed to be entered in full in the minutes of the meeting.
It is as follows : (See Form VIII.)
4. A subscription to the capital stock of the company heretofore signed was
presented and ordered spread upon the minutes.
It is as follows: (See Form I.)
5. A copy of the company's certificate of incorporation dated
, 19,
filed in the office of the secretary of state of Delaware on the
day of
, 19
, and recorded in the office of the recorder of deeds for New Castle
county, Delaware, was presented, read and on motion duly made, seconded
and carried, was directed to be placed on the files of the company and to be
entered in full in the minutes of the meeting.
1

See

paragraph

8,

Form

XVI, infra.
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OF FORMS.

is so entered as follows: (See Form VI.)
of
6.
set
proposed by-laws, for the management of the company's propand government of its affairs, was presented.
regulation
On
erty and the
and carried, the meeting proceeded to the conseconded
motion duly made,
sideration of the by-laws, article by article. On motions duly made, seconded
Thereupon, on
and carried, each of the articles was separately adopted.
motion duly made, seconded and carried, the by-laws were adopted as a
whole, and were ordered to be entered in full in the minutes.
They are so entered as follows : (See Form XIII.)
7. A "Waiver of notice of meeting to consider the question of increasing
the company's capital stock and consent to such increase" (see Form XI),
and a "Waiver of notice of assessment of balance remaining unpaid on the
capital stock" (see Form XII), were presented, read, and on motion duly
made, seconded and adopted, were ordered to be entered in full in the minutes of the meeting.
They are as follows: (See Forms XI and XII.)
8. Thereupon, on motion duly made, seconded and unanimously adopted,
it was ordered and resolved that all persons hereafter subscribing to the
capital stock of this company, or in any manner acquiring any share or shares
of its capital stock, shall be deemed and considered to have done so with full
notice and knowledge of, and fully consenting to, ratifying, approving and
adopting the two waivers of notice and the consents last recorded ; and that
the directors of this company be, and they are hereby empowered, without
any notice whatever, either to the present incorporators, subscribers or stockholders, or to any future subscribers or stockholders, to increase the capital
stock of this company and to issue the same until it shall reach the amount
named in the certificate of incorporation, and to make such increase at such
times and in such amounts as they may deem wise, until the capital stock of
dollars, the sum named in the certificate
this company is increased to
of incorporation of this company as its total authorized capital stock ; and
that the directors be, and they are hereby authorized to assess, similarly,
without notice or publication, upon each share of stock from time to time,
when, and as they may deem proper, such sum or sums of money as the directors shall designate, not exceeding in the whole the balance remaining unpaid
on said stock up to the par value thereof ; and that said directors may, upon
any default or delinquency in the payment of such assessment, or any part
thereof, take any procedure which they might have taken had they given the
notices specified in sections 27 and 29 of the general corporation law of Delaware, or in any other provision of the laws of said state.
9. Upon motion duly made, seconded and carried, it was resolved that the
Delaware Charter, Guarantee and Trust Company be and it is hereby appointed
the representative
of this company in the state of Delaware, to maintain an
office for this company in said state, to have an agent in charge thereof, to exhibit this company's sign on said office, as required by law, and to keep in
said office such lists and copies of records as the statute of the state of Delaware may require to be kept in said state, and the secretary was ordered to
send a copy of the foregoing resolution, duly certified by him, to the said
Delaware Charter, Guarantee and Trust Company.
Said certificate

A
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10. Mr.
presented a proposed contract for the acquirement by this
company of certain property and rights, and the procurement of certain services and labor as more fully described in said contract.
Said contract was
read and ordered filed, and upon motion duly made, seconded and carried, it
was recommended to the board of directors to enter into said contract on behalf of this company, and to issue the full-paid capital stock of this company
to the amount of
dollars ($
therefor, provided
) in compensation
that, in the judgment of the said board, said property and services are reasonably worth said sum to this company,
11. Upon motion, duly made and seconded, and by the affirmative vote of
all present, the following preamble and resolution were adopted :
Whereas, It has been agreed between each of the incorporators and the
parties to the aforesaid contract, that the stock to be issued in payment of the
property and rights to be acquired, and the services and labor to be procured
by the resolution set forth above, shall include the stock subscribed by the
incorporators, as evidenced by the subscription to capital stock ; Resolved,
That the board of directors be and they are hereby authorized to accept said
property as full payment of the subscriptions for stock of the incorporators,
and to issue full-paid stock to the incorporators, or their assigns, to the amount
of their respective subscriptions.
12. On motion duly made, seconded and carried, it was resolved that the
board of directors be and it is hereby empowered to purchase, from time to
time, such property and similarly to procure the performance of such services
and labor as it may deem necessary for the company, and to issue in payment
therefor such amount or amounts of the full-paid capital stock of this company as to the directors may seem fair and reasonable compensation for such
property, services or labor.
13. On motion made, duly seconded and carried, the following assignments
of stock were approved and accepted by the affirmative vote of all present.

to
to
to

of

of
of

shares.
shares.
shares.

14. On motion duly adopted, the stockholders proceeded to an election by
ballot for directors of the company to hold office as such until the next anand until their successors shall be
nual meeting of the stockholders in 19
chosen and qualified.
15. Said election resulted as follows :

Number of
Votes Received.

Names.

Whole Number of
Votes Cast.

The chairman thereupon declared that the following named persons
had each been elected a director of the company to serve for said period, viz :
16.

Thereupon, on motion duly made, seconded and carried, the meeting
adjourned.
, Temporary Secretary of the Meeting.
17.

2

WIL. CAS.
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FORM

OF FORMS.

XVI.

DIRECTIONS FOR USING THE BLANK FORMS. '
1.

"SUBSCRIPTION TO CAPITAL STOCK PRIOR TO ORGANIZATION"

FORM

i,

SUPRA.

This form is used to cover two requirements under the law ; first, that the
company should begin business with at least $1,000 of capital stock, and second, that each director must be the owner of at least three shares of stock.
These subscriptions, however, need not be paid until required by the board
of directors. This subscription may, of course, be for as much capital stock
as is required ; only $1,000, however, is necessary to qualify the company to
begin business.
As each director is obliged to own three shares of stock, it is wise to have
each person who expects to be elected as a director of the company, at its first
meeting, to subscribe on this blank for at least three shares of the capital
stock of the company. Should it not be practicable, however, to have each
of the proposed directors to subscribe for the three shares necessary to qualify
him to be elected as a director, then some other person could subscribe for
three shares, or some other party subscribing may subscribe three shares
extra, and assign the same to the proposed director before the first meeting
of the corporation, according to "Form X," hereafter explained.
2.

"CERTIFICATE

OF INCORPORATION"

FORM

vi,

SUPRA.

In filling

out section "third" of this form, state, if convenient to do so, the
particular places at which the business is proposed to be carried on, then
state fully the special objects and purposes to be transacted, promoted and
carried on by the proposed corporation.
A number of "Special Object" forms will be found in our pamphlet, "Cor-

porations under the Laws of Delaware," that may be useful and suggestive.
Filling out section "fourth" of this form is very simple, bearing in mind
that the authorized capital stock must be at least $2,000, and the amount of
capital stock with which the company will commence business must be at
least $1,000.
Under section

"fifth"

place the name and post-office address of each incorporator, and while a majority only of the incorporators need to sign the certificate of incorporation, it is wise to insert here only the names of those who
propose to sign the certificate of incorporation, and of these there must be at
any amount
least three. Some amount should be stated, but there is no limit

desirable may be inserted.
Under section "eleventh," a blank is left for including "any provision
creating, defining, limiting and regulating the affairs of the corporation, the
directors and the stockholders, or any classes of the stockholders, provided
such provisions are not contrary to the laws of this state."
It is not often, however, that it will be desirable to add any provisions that
are not already included in "Form VI," as issued by us.
The certificate is now dated and signed by at least three incorporators, and
acknowledged before a commissioner of deeds for the state of Delaware, a
notary public of any state or territory, or of the District of Columbia, or be1
Furnished by the Delaware Charter, Guarantee
mington, Delaware.

and Trust Company,

Wil-
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lore any other person authorized to take acknowledgment of deeds by the
laws of the state of Delaware.
The certificate is then properly stamped under the war revenue act, and is
ready to send to us.
3.

"WAIVER

OF NOTICE OP FIRST MEETING OF INCORPORATORS"

VIII,

FORM

SUPRA.

The first meeting of the incorporators may be called by a notice thereof
published for two weeks, etc., or by a personal notice served upon all the
parties named in the certificate of incorporation at least two days prior to the
time of such meeting, or it may be called by consent, that is, by waiving the
notice and fixing the time.
This is done by means of this form, thereby saving the time and expense of personal notice or notice by publication.
The first meeting of incorporators can not be held until the certificate of
incorporation has been filed with the secretary of state, and a certified copy
thereof returned to us and entered for record in the recorder of deeds' office
in and for New Castle county, and as it will take us at least two days to do
this, be sure and make due allowance for this time in setting the date for the
first meeting in filling up this form.
This form must be signed by each person who signs the certificate of incorporation.
4.

"PROXY

FOR FIRST MEETING

OF INCORPORATORS"

FORM

ix,

SUTRA.

We advise that the first meeting of incorporators be held in this state, and
as the incorporators may not be able to attend the first meeting, this form is
prepared to enable them to have a proxy to act in their stead at such meeting. All of the incorporators may send proxies if they so desire, and on request we will send the names of satisfactory persons to act in their stead at
the said meeting.
This form must be stamped in accordance with the war revenue act.
5.

FORM x,

"ASSIGNMENT OF SUBSCRIPTION TO STOCK"

SUPRA.

If it is desired to elect any one a director who has not subscribed to the
capital stock in "Form I, "then some person who has subscribed will use
this form in assigning three shares to the person who is to be elected a director, so as to qualify him so to act. This company, if requested, will suggest the name of a satisfactory person to serve as resident Delaware director
who can be qualified by having assigned to him the necessary shares of stock
as before stated.

This form must be stamped in accordance with the war revenue act.
6.

"WAIVERS

OF NOTICES,

AND

ETC."

VIII,"

FORMS

xi

AND

xn,

SUPRA.

These two forms, like "Form
are prepared for the purpose of saving
the time, expense, etc., of publication required under the Delaware law, and
we would advise their being signed, so as to enable the incorporators at the
first meeting to fully qualify the board of directors to be elected, to carry out
the purposes of the company without the necessity of calling a further meeting of the stockholders.
These forms must both be signed by all the incorporators.
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OF FORMS.
FORM

xm,

SUPRA.

We would suggest that a working set of by-laws be prepared in advance,
that they may be adopted at the first meeting of the corporation without loss
of time, etc. The set of by-laws which we submit is merely a suggestion to
corporations and counsel, and can be revised and corrected to suit the circumstances of each case.
Should this set of by-laws be adopted, we will supply each of the directors
with a copy, that he may have the by-laws of the company in convenient
form.
8.

"MINUTES

OF FIRST MEETING"

FORM

xv,

SUPRA.

This form is prepared for the purpose of facilitating the work of the first
and to help the temporary secretary in keeping the minutes of the

meeting,
same.

This form also can be corrected and revised to suit the circumstances of
each case.
Should the corporators be unable to come to Delaware to hold this meeting T
they can send their proxies to such parties as we will name, and the meeting
will be held and such action taken as may be prescribed by the prepared
"Forms XIII and XIV."
Then, if desired, we will secure a minute-book for the company, and have
the minutes of the first meeting properly entered therein, signed by the temporary secretary and forwarded to the company, which is then ready to elect
officers and proceed to business.
Note, by Delaware Charter, Guarantee

Del.:

and Trust Company, Wilmington,

The use of these forms makes incorporating under the Delaware law a very
simple matter, and enables persons desiring to incorporate under the Delaware law to do so without the loss of time and the expense of coming to Delaware to incorporate or to organize a corporation.
After the first meeting, the directors and stockholders may meet at any
place that is stated in the by-laws.
When the blank forms are prepared to suit the circumstances of each case,
send them to us with check for an amount to be ascertained upon the following basis :
Incorporating fee of fifteen (15) cents for each $1,000 of capital stock,
but in no case less than
$20 00
Secretary of State's fee (about) (The amount of this item depends upon
7 00
the number of pages in the charter)
Eecorder of Deeds' fee (about) (The amount of this item depends upon
4 00
the number of pages in the charter)
50 00
Fee to this company for one year's services
Charge for minute book, if secured by us as per directions under

"Form

Charge

XV"

for entering minutes, if entered by us

"Form

XV"

as

per directions under

1 55

5 00

We will then attend to the filing, recording, and all other matters required
to be done in Delaware for the company.
Should the parties in interest reside at different places and it should be inconvenient to get them together to sign the paper explained above, we will
secure a charter for you without any action on your part other than forwarding to us the following :
1. "Form VI," filled out to suit the business to be carried on.
2. "Form XIII," corrected and filled out to suit your case.
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"Form XV," completed to suit your wishes.
Check for expenses as shown above.
We will then have the papers signed by three parties here, and at the first
meeting the aforesaid parties will assign the subscription to stock to such parties as you may name and elect them as a board of directors, and as a board
of directors they can then meet at such places as may be designated in the
by-laws and proceed with the business of the company.
3.
4.

FORM

XVII.

OPTION CONTRACT. 1
this
This agreement made at
day of
, upon the various
named,
herein
and
other
good and valuable considerations, beconsiderations
company (herein called vendor), the stockholders thereof as
tween the
individuals (herein called the stockholders, meaning thereby each one who
signs this agreement as fully as if he was individually named in each provision of this agreement), of the one part, and
(herein called the purchaser), his nominee or assigns, of the other part, witnesseth:
Whereas, The said vendor is a corporation organized under the laws of
,
divided into
shares of comwith a capital stock outstanding of $
shares of preferred stock, each of the par value of
mon stock, and
; and,
$
Whereas, It is deemed desirable to consolidate the property and business of certain companies engaged in manufacturing, etc.,
, located
(enumerating them), or such of them and such others
and
at
as may agree to come in upon such terms as contained herein, and to
organize one corporation under the laws of the state of
, for the purpose
of acquiring and taking over the property and business of such companies
upon the terms and conditions hereinafter contained as to each of said companies; and,
Whereas, The said purchaser proposes to form such a corporation under the
with a capital stock of about $
laws of such state, to be called the
,
per cent, preferred
to be divided into shares of $100 each, part to be
(both as to capital upon dissolution, and cumulative as to dividends), and part
to be common (the exact amount of such capital stock more or less than
), and the division (to be as nearly equal as possible) into preferred and
$
common, to be determined by what shall be found necessary to acquire the
Note. The promotion and organization of one corporation to take over the
business of several others is a matter of so intricate a nature that it is difficult
to provide forms that can be of much service and the following Nos. XVII,
XIX, are given mainly by way of suggestions, which it is hoped will be
helpful. They are designed only to illustrate one plan, viz: 1. Securing options;
2. Securing the assistance of bankers who form a syndicate for the purpose
of furnishing for a commission the necessary cash ; 3. Organizing the proposed corporation, with the proper amount of capital authorized, but with
only such sum subscribed as is necessary to organize and select officers
proper to contract in its name; 4. Making a contract with the prompter to
exchange its stock for the property upon which he has options ; 5. Simultanecessary to complete the
neous exchanges of stock and the conveyances
transaction. Perhaps the more usual plan now followed is for a syndicate to
be first organized which undertakes the securing of the options, furnishing
the funds, and organizing the corporation ; under such plan the steps are substantially the same, and the forms could be varied to meet such conditions.
1

XVIII,

2090

APPENDIX

OF FORMS.

of such companies, pay all expenses and commissions connected
with the promotion, organization, and financing said
company, and
provide it with not less than $
working capital ; but no preferred stock
of such
company shall be issued except in payment for real or personal property, or for cash received, equivalent in value to the face value of
such preferred stock issued therefor.
Now, therefore,
I. Option: Said vendor, and said stockholders, in consideration of
dollars to it and them paid by said purchaser, and the other good and valuable considerations herein contained, sell to the purchaser who buys of the
same, the sole option and privilege until the
day of
of purchasing,
for the price to be determined and paid as hereinafter provided, all the property, real and personal, tangible and intangible, franchises, good-will, patents, trade-marks, processes (cash on hand, bills, notes and accounts receivable), 1 belonging to said vendor used in carrying on its business, set forth and
described in the schedule hereinafter provided for, and made part hereof, and
the shares of stock of said vendor held by the said stockholders.
II. Date of transfer: If said option is exercised, the sale may be completed
day of
on or before the
(called the transfer day), which the board
of
said
extend
for thirty days thereafter if necessary
vendor
may
directors
of
to complete such transfers. It is, however, understood that the sale shall be
considered as taking effect at the date of completing the schedule hereinafter
provided for, and no dividends shall be declared or paid, and no property
contained in said schedule shall be disposed of thereafter, except in the ordinary course of business, previous to the completion of said transfer.
III. Schedule: Said vendor promises to execute and deliver to said purdays after the date hereof, a complete schedule of the enchaser, within
tire property which it proposes to sell to such purchaser, sufficiently describing each item thereof to identify it. Said schedule shall enumerate and value
by the method hereinafter provided the tangible and intangible property separately ; the tangible property shall include land, plants, materials, supplies
and products, etc., on hand, to be separately itemized; there shall also be
contained a full description of all patents or interests in patents belonging to
said vendor, and the value thereof, together with a statement of the price
asked for a general license to use the same by said purchaser; also, a list of
all insurance policies upon the property meant to be sold hereby, with the
amounts thereof and the date of expiration ; also, all bills, notes and accounts
receivable, with the amounts, rate of interest, and date when due; also a
statement of all liens and incumbrances upon any of said property, together
with the aggregate indebtedness of such vendor. Said schedule shall also
contain a full and detailed statement of all items required for valuing such
intangible property as the franchise, good-will, etc., of said vendor, in the
manner hereinafter indicated. It shall also give a complete list of all shareholders of said vendor, with their residences, and the number of shares held
by each. It shall also contain an express guaranty of the correctness of the
facts stated therein.
IV. Appraisal: In order that there may be an uniform and just method
of establishing the proper value of the various plants which it is proposed to
business

1

Not usually included.

APPENDIX

OF FORMS.

2OQI

consolidate, said schedule shall be placed in the hands of
, and
,
,
, as a committee of experts and accountants,
who shall verify the facts
stated in such schedule, and for such purpose may have access to the books,
papers, documents, etc., of said vendor, and may call for such other information necessary therefor. Each of said committee before entering upon such
work, shall take an oath to perform faithfully all duties and obligations
herein placed upon them, and especially to value the property of all vendors
herein proposed to be consolidated, according to the methods herein prescribed, and to observe the obligation of secrecy as to the details thereof, as
herein provided. Said committee shall make report in writing duly certified,
as to their findings and valuations, and the same, unless otherwise herein
provided, shall be binding on the parties hereto.
V. The method of appraisal shall be as follows : Land shall be valued at its
actual market value without reference to the plants thereon, but consideration shall be given to its location and adaptability to the business.
Plants,
including buildings, machinery, appliances, etc., shall be appraised apart
from the land, at their present value to a going concern, estimated by the
present cost of construction at the place where located ; materials, supplies
and products on hand at the premises, or in transit thereto, at the cost to replace them at present prices at the location of said plant but such changes
shall be made therein at the time of transfer as shall be due to changes in
quantities and market prices at that time.
Unexpired insurance of whatever kind shall be estimated at its pro rata
value, to be changed at time of transfer to its proper pro rata value at that
time.
Bills and notes shall be estimated at the present worth of their real value,
subject to such change as is proper at the time of transfer. Accounts receivable shall be valued at such per cent, of their face as the experience
of
the vendor for the past
years shall show are collectible. (Note : It
is usually provided that bills, notes, cash and accounts, as they shall exist at
the time of the option, shall remain with the vendor, to discharge any current
obligations then existing, and after that for its own use.)
Said committee shall investigate the value of such patents and the price
asked for a general license to use the same as contained in the schedule, in
whatever way they deem most likely to ascertain the real value thereof, and
shall report thereon, but such report shall not be conclusive on the parties
hereto.

The value of the franchise, goodwill, etc., shall be estimated as follows:
fiscal years
(1) The average yearly earnings of said vendor for the past
shall be ascertained by adding together for each year the net profits of said
vendor, and such of the following items as have been in each year charged
against the earnings, in ascertaining the net profits, viz : interest on indebtedness ; cost of insurance ; items allowed, but not in fact paid out or incurred
as a debt for depreciation ; items for new construction ; salaries and compensation paid to general officers, directors, general managers, superintendents,
partners, auditors, cashiers, etc. (but not to foremen, clerks, employes, servants and laborers), and the amount for repairs, renewals and maintenance for
each year ; the sums so ascertained for each year shall then be added together
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and the average taken. (2) From this average there shall be deducted a sum
per cent, of the value
per cent, of the value of the land, and
equal to
per cent, of the value of the machinery, tools, apof the buildings, and
pliances, etc., as fixed by said committee; the remainder shall be considered the average net annual profits of said vendor; provided, however,
that if for any year the figures for any item shall be found to be due to peculiar
or extraordinary causes which are not permanent and no longer exist, the
committee may reject such figures, or may use for such year such results as
may fairly be due to usual and ordinary conditions.
(3) The sum so ascertained multiplied by such multiplier as shall be found necessary to multiply
the sum total of the net profits so ascertained of all the companies proposed herein to consolidate, in order to make the amount of common stock of
the proposed new company approximately equal to its preferred stock, and
also allow out of said total net profits as nearly as may be a dividend of
per cent, on such amount of common stock after paying the dividends on the
preferred stock, shall be considered the value of said franchise, good-will,
etc., of such vendor company.
VI. Purchase-price: The purchase-price to be paid said vendor by said
purchaser, in case the option is exercised, shall be ascertained as follows:
Any vendor whose net profits ascertained as above set forth (except the items
for insurance and salaries shall be charged to expense accounts) shall be
equal to or over 8 per cent, of the appraised value of the land, and plant,
including tools, machinery, appliances, materials, supplies and products on
hand of said vendor, shall receive for such property twelve and one-half times
said profits, in cash or in fully paid preferred shares of said new company, as
said vendor shall elect at the time notice of exercising the option is given.
Any vendor whose net profits likewise ascertained shall be less than 8 per
cent, of the appraised value of its land and plants, etc., shall receive in cash
or preferred shares twelve and one-half times its said profits, and the balance
of the appraised value of such land, and plants, including tools, etc., in common stock.
The purchase of all patented apparatus, machinery, etc., included in the
property purchased shall include the right to use the same without any charge
or royalty therefor, and the said purchaser may or may not, at his option, at
the transfer day, purchase said patents or general license to use the same at
the prices above set forth or. then agreed upon, and pay therefor in
Bills, notes, accounts, etc., and unexpired
stock of said proposed company.
insurance, shall be taken at their value, estimated as above provided, as of
the date of transfer, and be paid for either in cash or preferred stock, as the
vendor shall then determine.
In case there are any liens upon any of said property, the said purchaser
may retain of the purchase-price, if it is to be paid in cash, such sum as will,
interest, amount to enough to discharge the same when due;
if put at
or if to be paid in preferred stock, may retain an amount thereof equal to 125
per cent, of such lien until the same is due and paid. Also said purchaser
may retain such an amount of the purchase-price
as may be necessary to
secure him against any defect of title or any other indebtedness not otherwise provided for, until the same is removed.
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The entire value of the franchise, good-will, etc., ascertained as above provided, shall be paid for in the common stock of said proposed new company.
VII. Destruction or loss of property: If before the transfer of the property
by the vendor, any part thereof shall be destroyed by fire or other casualty
(in case the option is exercised), the same shall be fully restored or replaced
by said vendor on or before the
day of
; and if not so done then the
insurance (if any) collected therefor shall be paid to said purchaser, or the purchase-price to be paid shall be reduced by an amount equal to the appraised
value of the property so destroyed, at the option of said purchaser.
VIII. Assumption of contracts: In case the option is exercised, all contracts bonafide made before by said vendor and existing at the transfer day,
for the purchase, sale, or manufacture of materials or products shall be assigned to and assumed by said purchaser.
IX. Vendor not to engage in like biisiness: As part of the consideration for
said purchase, in case this option is exercised, said vendor and said stockholders shall on or before said transfer day execute and deliver, by depositing with the trust company hereinafter named, to said purchaser a contract or
contracts (subject to assignment by him), by which said vendor and said
stockholders each of them shall obligate themselves for a period of
years
after said transfer day not to engage or become interested in, directly or indirectly, either as individuals, partners, stockholders, officers, factors, agents
or employes, the same or similar business competing with that hereby agreed
to be sold to the purchaser herein (except for him or his assigns) within the
.
states of
X. Delivery of papers: The vendor upon
days' notice given by the
Trust Company of
purchaser shall deliver to the
, complete
abstracts of title to all real property agreed herein to be sold, wherever
situated, prepared and duly searched to date of delivery (and in case of
transfer, continued to the time thereof) , by competent lawyers or title guarantee companies, and full and sufficient deeds, bills of sale, indorsements, assignments and all other necessary writings and conveyances, properly executed, stamped, acknowledged and certified, to make them valid and admissible to record where required, in order to convey all such property, and containing usual covenants and warranties that said property is free and clear
of all incumbrances except as herein provided, or therein disclosed, and acTitle Insurcompanied by title insurance policies and certificates of the
of
title
to
such
property
the
true
condition
the
in
disclosing
ance Company,
every particular.
Said vendor and stockholders shall also upon like notice deliver to said
trust company the certificates of stock held by such stockholders, with proper
Said trust company shall deliver to said
assignments thereof in blank.
vendor and said stockholders separately, receipts for all such title papers and
stock certificates so deposited with it, and shall hold all such documents until the transfer day or until the expiration of said option.
XI. Payment: Upon the transfer day the said purchaser may pay or cause
to be paid the purchase-price in cash or stock issued in such name as said
vendor may designate, less any amount to be retained as security against
debts or defective titles as hereinbefore provided, to said trust company, for
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said vendor and stockholders, and thereupon shall be relieved from further
obligation to said parties, except to pay any balance due when the matter of
Said trust company is
debts and defective titles shall be finally adjusted.
hereby authorized at such transfer day, upon payment being so made, to de-

liver all abstracts, title papers, policies, contracts, assignments, writings, cerof stock, etc., to said purchaser, or as he may direct. In case payment is to be made in stock, and permanent certificates are not at the transfer day ready for delivery, payment may be made in transferable scrip cerupon presentation, duly authenticated, at
tificates exchangeable
, for
permanent certificates when they are ready for delivery.
XII. Arbitration: In case of disagreement as to the meaning or method of
carrying out any of the provisions of this agreement, such difference shall be
submitted to three disinterested persons, one chosen by said vendor, one by
said purchaser, and the third by the two so chosen, and the award of the
majority of such shall be final and conclusive on the parties hereto.
XIII. Return of papers : If the purchaser fails to exercise this option, said
trust company shall return to the vendor and stockholders all such abstracts,
title-papers, policies, contracts, certificates, etc., deposited with it, and said
purchaser shall pay all the charges of said trust company, and it shall have
no lien of any kind upon said papers or any part of them.
Said purchaser shall also, if said transfer is not completed, return to said
vendor all schedules, appraisements, reports of committees, etc., within
days after the expiration of the option, and until said transfers are completed, the details of such schedules, appraisals, valuation reports and information put in the hands of the purchaser or the committee above mentioned (except the total sums to be paid for the real and personal property,
franchise, etc., ascertained as above set forth), shall be considered and treated
as private information given by each vendor only for the special purpose indicated herein, and shall not be made known to any of the other vendors or
tificates

to outside parties.
XIV. Assignment:

It is expressly understood that this instrument may be
assigned by said purchaser, and when duly assigned all its provisions shall
inure to the benefit of such assignee, and subject him to all liabilities arising
thereunder, whereupon the rights and liabilities of the purchaser hereunder
shall terminate.

XV. Stockholders: In consideration that the said purchaser shall deliver
or cause to be delivered to said vendor, or the party designated by it, the
said purchaser to
purchase-price of said property herein agreed to be sold,
be in no way liable for the proper distribution of said purchase-price to said
shareholders by said vendor, the undersigned stockholders owning respectively the number of shares set opposite our several names, do each of us hereby
agree to, approve, ratify and confirm the said proposed sale and transfer of
the property of said vendor, and our shares of stock therein, upon the terms
and conditions hereinbefore set forth.
In witness whereof, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands and
signatures on the day and year first above written.
, Purchaser.
, Vendor.
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SHAREHOLDERS.
Shares of Stock Now Held.
Name.

Residence.

Preferred.

FORM

Common.

XVIII.

UNDERWRITING CONTRACT.
day of
by and between the parties hereThis agreement made this
inafter named witnesseth :
Whereas,
(herein called promoter), proposes to organize a corporaCo.
to be known as the
tion under the laws of the state of
stock,
the
propof
acquiring
for
the
the
purpose
corporation),
called
(herein
erty, and plants, and taking over and consolidating the business of companies
And which cor.
, named and located as follows :
engaged in
shares of
consisting of
poration shall have a capital stock of $
per cent, preferred (as to capital, and cumulative as to dividends), and
shares of common stock ; and,
Whereas, Said promoter has obtained options for the purchase of all of said
property of said companies, at certain prices, to be paid for partly in cash
and partly in preferred and common stock of said corporation ; and,
in cash in order to
Whereas, It will be necessary to provide at least $
working
capital for said
necessary
the
and
provide
said
purchases
complete
and,
corporation ;
Whereas, It is deemed desirable to form a syndicate for the purpose of furnishing the cash required as above set forth, by underwriting and guaranteeing a subscription to the preferred stock of such corporation at its par value,
which syndicate shall be composed of those who subscribe hereto as provided
bank of
herein, and which syndicate shall be represented by the
as managers of such syndicate; and,
Whereas, Such syndicate for so underwriting, guaranteeing and furnishing
the amount of cash hereinbefore specified, is to receive as a commission
common stock,
of preferred, and $
therefor from said promoter, $
commission,
paying the
after
both fully paid up and non-assessable, which
undersigned
the
among
bank above named, is to be divided
fees of the
subscribers in proportion to their subscriptions.
Now, therefore, in consideration of the premises, the undersigned subscribers, each desiring to become a member of such syndicate, and for himself
severally and not jointly, to underwrite and guarantee the purchase and payment of said stock to the extent of his subscription hereto,
It is hereby agreed upon the considerations herein contained, and
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by each paid to the other between said subscribers, said bank on besuch syndicate, and said promoter, as follows :
the undersigned subscribers, each for himself, and not jointly, does
subscribe for so much of the preferred stock of said corporation as is
set opposite our names upon the terms herein stated, and does hereby agree
days' notice ;
to pay to said bank in cash the full face value thereof upon
therereceipts
bank
issue
is
so
said
shall
made,
negotiable
when payment
of
stock
certificates
the
same
in
for
exchange
for, and when ready receive

dollars
half of
That
hereby

in said corporation.
With each share of preferred

stock subscribed and paid for'each subscriber
shall receive one full-paid share of common stock of said corporation.
This agreement shall not become obligatory upon any of the parties hereto
is underwritten acunless and until preferred stock to the amount of $

cording to the terms hereof, but shall immediately become operative when
such amount is so subscribed ; said bank shall mail notice of this fact to said
Said bank shall also have power to enforce this agreement,
subscribers.
either by suit upon such subscriptions or by forfeiture of all payments made
by parties in default, and may deprive the same of any right to participate in
the benefits of this agreement.
It is further agreed that upon delivery by said promoter, or any one for
him, of the certificates of stock in said corporation to said bank, the latter is
hereby authorized immediately to pay over to said promoter, or as he shall
direct, the cash paid in by the subscribers hereto, and said promoter or said
corporation shall in no way be or become responsible for the proper distribution of such shares to the subscribers hereto by said bank.
If, for any reason, said promoter shall abandon the project of organizing
said corporation, and shall so notify said bank, then this agreement in all its
parts shall become inoperative, and all sums paid by said subscribers shall be
, Promoter.
returned to them.
, Bank.
SUBSCRIBERS.

Names.

Address.

FORM

Number of Shares of
Preferred Stock.

XIX.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE

CORPORATION

AND THE PROMOTER.
, between the
This agreement made this
day of
a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
witnesseth:
the corporation), and
, promoter,

Company,
(called herein
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Whereas, Said corporation has been organized [describing it and its purpose,
And,
as in Form XVII above].
Whereas, Said promoter has entered into contracts with such companies for
the purchase of all their stock and property upon certain terms and valuations
therein contained, with the power of assignment thereof. And,
Whereas, Said corporation, after careful investigation by its board of directors, has ascertained that the amounts promised to be paid for said stock
and property by said promoter is just and reasonable, and not in excess of the
real value thereof. And,
Whereas, There will be required $
in cash in order to complete said purchase and provide the working capital necessary to the successful operation
and management of the properties so proposed to be acquired by said corporation. And,
Whereas, Said promoter, in order to provide said amount of cash, has ensyndicate, organized to furnish the same
tered into a contract with the
by underwriting and subscribing for the preferred stock of said corporation,
upon the terms and conditions therein stated, and particularly to deliver to the
of the preferred and $
of the common
bank for said syndicate
stock of this corporation, as a commission for so guaranteeing and furnishing
said cash, and also to deliver with each share of preferred stock subscribed
and paid for by each member of such syndicate, one full-paid share of comAnd,
mon stock.
Whereas, Said corporation, being fully advised as to the terms and conditions of all the contracts entered into by said promoter for the purposes therein
contained, and which said promoter proposes to assign to said corporation,
Now, therefore, it is hereby agreed by the parties hereto that for and in
consideration of the payment by delivery of stock of said corporation hereinafter provided, to be made by said corporation to said promoter, or as he shall
, make or cause to be made
day of
direct, he will on or before the
business
and
stock
of
the aforementioned comall
the
property,
of
a transfer
instruments
of
conveyance
thereof, and also will
full
and
sufficient
panies by
cash,
the
sum
of
together with an assignment
deliver to said corporation
$
in
and
to
such
property under such contracts.
of all his rights and interests
such
transfer and payment by said
And said corporation, in consideration of
promoter, or any one for him as above set forth, agrees to pay and deliver to
of its preferred and $
said promoter, or as he shall direct, the sum of $
of its common stock, fully paid, which said promoter shall receive in full payment for such property and stock and for his and all other services in the
formation, organizing and financing such corporation; and such corporation
hereby ratifies, confirms and adopts all of the terms and provisions of said
aforementioned contracts made by such promoter, assumes the same, and
agrees to hold harmless said promoter thereunder.
, Corporation.
, Promoter.

i
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XX.

UNINCORPORATED

TRUST.

See, supra, p. 100.

FORM

XXI.

PROSPECTUS.
See, supra, p. 540.

FORM

XXII.

CERTIFICATE OF STOCK.
[COMMON

\
/

Number.

Incorporated under the Laws

f

\

Certificate for
Less than 100 Shares.
Shares.

of the State of New Jersey.

H

P '3

CO

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

is the owner of
This is to certify that
fully paid and non-assessable shares of the par value of
one hundred dollars each in the common capital stock
of the United States Steel Corporation, transferable
only in person or by attorney upon the books of said
corporation upon surrender of this certificate.
The
holders of the preferred stock shall be entitled to receive, when and as declared, from the surplus or net
profits of the corporation, yearly dividends at the rate
of seven per centum per annum, and no more, payable
quarterly on dates to be fixed by the by-laws. The dividends on the preferred stock shall be cumulative, and
shall be payable before any dividend on the common
stock shall be paid or set apart, so that if in any year
dividends amounting to seven per cent, shall not have

31=1

UNITED STATES STEEL COBPORATION.

I

\

Certificate for
Less than 100 Shares.

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

f

CAPITAL STOCK.]

\

J
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been paid thereon, the deficiency shall be payable before any dividends shall be paid upon or set apart for
the common stock.
Whenever all cumulative dividends
&B
0>

-'

-

w"
O

^
&
H
53

OL,
M

o

o

on the preferred stock for all previous years shall have
been declared, and shall have become payable, and the
accrued quarterly installments for the current year shall
have been declared, and the company shall have paid
such cumulative dividends for previous years and such
accrued quarterly installments, or shall have set aside

from its surplus or net profits a sum sufficient for the
payment thereof, the board of directors may declare
dividends on the common stock payable then or thereafter, out of any remaining surplus or net profits. In
the event of any liquidation or dissolution or winding
up (whether voluntary or involuntary) of the corporation, the holders of the preferred stock shall be entitled
to be paid in full both the par amount of their shares
and the unpaid dividends accrued thereon, before any
amount shall be paid to the holders of the common
stock, and after the payment to the holders of the preferred stock of its par value, and the unpaid accrued
dividends thereon, the remaining assets and funds shall
be divided and paid to the holders of the common stock
The preferred
according to their respective shares.
stock and the common stock may be increased as provided in the certificate of incorporation. This certificate
is not valid without the signatures of the transfer agent
and registrar of transfers.
Witness the signatures of the president or of a vicepresident, and of the treasurer, or of an assistant treasurer, of said corporation. 1
Assistant Treasurer.

O

i

o

Vice-President.

[SHARES $100 EACH.]

(On the back.)
shares
hereby sell, assign and transfer unto
For value received
of the capital stock represented by the within certificate, and do hereby irreattorney to transfer the said stock on
vocably constitute and appoint
the books of the within named corporation, with full power of substitution in
the premises.
Dated

In

,

19.

.

.
presence of
The signature to this assignment must correspond with the name as
Notice.
written upon the face of the certificate in every particular, without alteration
or enlargement, or any change whatever.

See, also, supra, p. 1695.
It will be noticed that these shares are not issued under the corNote..
porate seal ; it is usual to have the corporate seal affixed to certificates of
stock.
1

2IOO

APPENDIX
FORM

OF FORMS.

XXIII.

PREFERRED AND GUARANTEED STOCK.
See, supra, pp. 786, 1632, and provisions of the charter of United States Steel
Corporation, supra, p. 2071, and infra, Form XXIV.

FORM

XXIV.

VOTING TRUST. 1
AGREEMENT

DATED FEBRUARY

1, 1897.

This agreement, made in the city of New York this first day of February,
1897, by and between
PARTIES.

J.

P. Morgan & Co. (hereinafter called the "managers"), reorganization
managers, under a certain plan and agreement for the reorganization of the
Philadelphia and Reading system, dated the fourteenth day of December,
1895, parties of the first part, and J. Pierpont Morgan, Frederic P. Olcott,
and Henry N. Paul (hereinafter called the "voting trustees"), parties of the
second part.
PREAMBLE

PURPOSE

OF VOTING

TRUST.

Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the said plan and agreeand in order to promote and protect the value of the
reorganization,
ment for
held
and
to be issued by the Reading Company, and as an adsecurities to be
to
its
new general mortgage bonds, the managers have
ditional protection
delivered to the voting trustees certificates for fully paid shares of fifty dollars (|50) each of the capital stock of the Reading Company, as follows, viz:
560,000 shares of the first preferred stock ; 840,000 shares of the second preferred stock; 1,398,000 shares of the common stock, which certificates, together with such other similar certificates as hereafter from time to time may
be delivered hereunder, are to be held and disposed of by the voting trustees
under and pursuant to the terms and conditions hereof.
And, whereas, Such certificates for shares are substantially in the forms
hereto annexed, and for all purposes are made a part hereof.
WHEREAS,

NOW, THEREFORE

\

The voting trustees do hereby promise and agree to and with the
managers, and to and with each and every holder of any certificate issued as
hereinafter provided, that from time to time, upon request, they will cause to
be issued to the managers, or upon their order, in respect of all stock received from them, certificates in substantially the following form :
FIRST.

[New

York Certificate.']

READING COMPANY.

First Preferred

Stock Trust Certificate.

will be entitled
THIS is TO CERTIFY THAT, as hereinafter provided,
fully paid shares of fifty dolto receive a certificate or certificates for
lars each in the FIRST PREFERRED capital stock of the READING COMPANY, and in
1

From the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol.

1897).

64, pp. 955-6

(May

15,
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the meantime to receive payments equal to the dividends, if any, collected
by the undersigned voting trustees upon a like number of such shares standing in their names ; and until after the actual delivery of such certificates,
the voting trustees shall possess, and shall be entitled to exercise, all rights
of every name and nature, including the right to vote, in respect of any and
all such stock, it being expressly stipulated that no voting right passes by or
under this certificate, or by or under any agreement express or implied.
This certificate is issued under and pursuant to the terms and conditions of
a certain agreement dated February 1, 1897, by and between J. P. Morgan &
Co., as reorganization managers, and the undersigned voting trustees.
No
stock certificates shall be due or deliverable hereunder before the first day of
January, 1902, nor until the expiration of such further period, if any, as shall
elapse before the Reading Company, for two consecutive years, shall have
paid 4 per cent, per annum cash dividends on its first preferred stock; but
the voting trustees in their discretion may make earlier delivery.
This certificate is transferable only on the books of the voting trustees in
New York by the registered holder, either in person or by attorney duly
authorized, according to rules established for that purpose by the voting
trustees, and on surrender hereof , and until so transferred, the voting trustees
may treat the registered holder as owner thereof for all purposes whatsoever,
except that delivery of stock certificates hereunder shall not be made without the surrender hereof.
This certificate is not valid unless duly signed by J. P. Morgan & Co., as
agents, and also registered by the Central Trust Company, of New York, as
registrar in New York.
This certificate may be exchanged in such manner as the voting trustees
may prescribe for a similar certificate to be issued by Drexel & Co., in behalf
of the voting trustees, and to be registered by the Pennsylvania Company for
Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The said voting trustees have caused this certificate
to be signed by J. P. Morgan & Co., their duly authorized agents, this
day of

,

189.

J.

PIERPONT

FREDERIC

P.

MORGAN,

-\

OLCOTT,

I

Voting Trustees.

HENRY N. PAUL,
By their agents hereunder
Registered in New York this

day of

,

.

189.

CENTRAL TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Begistrar.

By

Ent.
,

PROVISIONS

-

Transfer Clerk.

SECOND PREFERRED STOCK
RESPECTING TERMINATION OF TRUST
SUBJECT TO CONVERSION.

On the first day of January, 1902, if then the Reading Company
for two consecutive years shall have paid 4 per cent, per annum cash dividend on its first preferred stock, and, if not, then so soon as such dividend shall
be so paid, and upon surrender of any stock trust certificate then outstanding, the voting trustees will, in accordance with the terms hereof, deliver
SECOND.

2 WIL. CAS.

59

2IO2

APPENDIX

OF FORMS.

therefor corresponding proper certificates of stock of the Reading Company.
It is, however, distinctly understood and agreed that at any date the voting
trustees may call upon the holders of stock trust certificates to exchange them
for certificates of capital stock, and at or after the date so to be specified in
any such call they shall deliver stock certificates in exchange therefor; and
also that the second preferred stock is subject to the right of the Reading
Company, at its option and in such manner as it shall determine, at any time
after dividends at the rate of 4 per cent, per annum shall have been paid for
two successive years on the first preferred stock, to convert the second preferred stock not exceeding $42,000,000 at par, one-half into first preferred
stock, and one-half into common stock.
VOTING TRUST TO APPLY TO ANY SUCCESSOR CORPORATION.

THIRD. The term "Reading Company," for the purposes of this agreement
and for all rights thereunder, including the issue and delivery of stock, shall
be taken to mean either the Pennsylvania corporation of that name, or any
successor or consolidation or any corporation which, with the unanimous approval of the voting trustees, shall be adopted to carry into full effect said
reorganization plan and agreement, dated December 14, 1895.
TO INCLUDE ALL STOCK

HEREAFTER

ISSUED.

FOURTH. From time to time hereafter the voting trustees may receive any
additional fully paid stock, duly authorized, of the capital stock of the Reading Company, either preferred or common, and in respect of all such stock so
received, will issue and deliver certificates similar to those above mentioned,
entitling the holders to all rights above specified.
RESIGNATION AND APPOINTMENT OP VOTING TRUSTEES.

FIFTH. Any voting trustee may, at any time, resign by delivering to the
other voting trustees, in writing, his resignation, to take effect ten days thereafter; and in every case of death or resignation, or of the inability of any
voting trustee to act, the vacancy so occurring shall be filled by the appointment of a successor or successors, to be made by the other voting trustees by
" voting trustees," as herein used, shall
a written instrument, and the term
apply to the parties of the second part and their successors hereunder.
LIMITATIONS

All

ON POWERS

OF VOTING TRUSTEES.

SIXTH.
questions arising between the voting trustees shall from time
to time be determined by the decision of the greater number of those then
acting as voting trustees, either at a meeting, or by writing with or without
meeting, and in like manner they may establish their rules of action, but
they will not, nor will any of them, consent that (1) any mortgage, additional
to the mortgage of $135,000,000 heretofore authorized, shall hereafter be put
upon the property formerly constituting the system of the Philadelphia and
Reading Railroad Company and Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron
Company, or that (2) the amount of the first preferred stock of the Reading
Company may be increased, except after they shall, in each instance, have
obtained the consent of the holders of a majority of the whole amount of
each class of preferred stock trust certificates given at a meeting of such certificate holders called for that purpose, and also the consent of the holders of

APPENDIX

OF FORMS.
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a majority of such part of the common stock trust certificates as shall be represented at such meeting; the holders of each class of stock trust certificates
voting separately ; or that (3) the amount of the second preferred stock be
increased except with like consent by the holders of a majority of the whole
amount of second preferred stock trust certificates given at a meeting of the
holders of second preferred stock certificates called for that purpose, and also
with like consent by the holders of a majority of such part of the common
stock trust certificates as shall be represented at such meeting; the holders
of each class of stock trust certificates voting separately ; provided, however,
that no consent of holders of stock trust certificates shall be required or necessary to authorize the voting trustees to consent or the company to proceed
to the conversion of its second preferred stock to an amount not exceeding
$42,000,000 at par, one-half into first preferred stock and one-half into common stock, at any time after dividends at the rate of 4 per cent, per annum

shall have been paid for two successive years on the first preferred stock.
VOTING

TRUSTEES

TO SELECT

SUITABLE DIRECTORS.

SEVENTH. In voting the stock held by them, the voting trustees will exercise
their best judgment from time to time to select suitable directors, to the end that
in accordance with the purposes first above set forth the affairs of the company
shall be properly managed ; and in voting on other matters which may come
before them at any stockholders' meeting, they will exercise like judgment;
but they assume no responsibility in respect to such management, or in respect of any action taken pursuant to their votes so cast, it being understood
that no voting trustee .incurs any responsibility for the act or omission of any
agent hereunder, nor by reason of any error of law or of any matter or thing
done or omitted under this agreement, except for his own individual malfeasance.

EIGHTH. This agreement may be simultaneously executed in several counter
parts, each of which so executed shall be deemed to be an original, and such
counterparts shall together constitute but one and the same instrument. Any
voting trustee hereunder may vote in person or by proxy to any other person,
whether or not a voting trustee.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The several parties hereunto have set their hands and
seals the day and year first above mentioned.
Signed by J. P. Morgan & Co. and the three voting trustees, viz : J. P. Morgan, F. P. Olcott, H. N. Paul.
FORM

CORPORATE

XXV.

NOTES, SIGNATURES

AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.

See, supra, pp. 862, 863, 864, 1138, 1142, 1145 and 1150.
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A
ABANDONMENT,
of corporate organization,

580.

ABATEMENT,
of actions, 912 n.
See ACTIONS;

PARTIES.

ABBOTT, AUSTIN,
definition of corporation,

79 n.

ABDICATION,
of corporate management,

a cause of forfeiture, 108, 975 n.

ABUSE,
See FRANCHISES;

FORFEITURE.

of corporate franchises, 106, 402, 949,
as a cause of forfeiture, 106, 1442.

1300, 1442.

repeal, 402.

meaning of,

ACCEPTANCE

949, 1300, 1442.

OF,

amendments,

417, 424, 750, 751, 1447, 1454, 1455, 1461, 1472 n, 1790, 1814.

See AMENDMENTS.
acquiescence
essential,

and continuing business is an acceptance, 1473 n.

424, 750, 1447,

1461.

under reserved power, 1461.
majority may accept immaterial, 1454, 1472 n, 1790.
may not accept material, 1472 n, 1790.
state may require, under reserved power, 1472 n.
charter, 151, 410, 412, 414, 416, 417, 420, 582, 588, 636, 750,
See CHARTER.

evidence of, 414.
inferred from action under, 410,
inferred from holding meetings,
organizing, 414, 420.

856.
414.

it

is a matter of fact, 636.
must be in the state granting, 417.

necessary,

412, 582, 750.

(2105)

751, 856.

2106
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ACCEPTANCE OF

Continued.
grants and deeds, presumed, 856.
offers of an amendment,

necessary,

1472 n.

from corporation, as an estoppel,
to form a corporation, 409.
to subscribe,

650

n.

necessary, 474, 480.

renewals, extensions, etc., essential, 417, 419.
subscriptions, essential, 474, 480.
surrender of charter, necessary, 867, 879, 886 n.
unexecuted power, may be revoked before, 749 n.

ACCEPTOR,
of franchise, rights of,

ACCOMMODATION

151.

PAPER,

power of corporations to issue,

949, 951.

ACCUMULATED EARNINGS,
may be taxed, 1372.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT,
of articles of association essential, 469, 609-11.
of deeds by corporation, form, 863 n.

ACQUIESCENCE,
in corporate acts,

assent is inferred from, 422.
equivalent to accepting an amendment, 793 5
evidence of consent, 1004 n.
works an estoppel, 650 n, 1080.

1473

n.

ACQUIRING PROPERTY,

powers of corporation, 1007, 1015 n, 1045, 1047, 1062 n, 1064.
its own shares, power of corporation, 1045, 1047.
shares in other corporations, 1062 n, 1064.

ACQUISITION,
of membership, 682.
non-stock corporation, 682, 685.
stock corporation, by common law contract of subscription,
estoppel, 687.

statutory contract, 687.
transfer, 687.
of name, 817, 818 n.
statutory provisions, 818 n.
user, 818 n.

ACTS,
of agents, are those of corporation, 1263, 1264, 1281-2.
of commissioners, 390 n.
of congress, creating corporations, 320, 324 n, 1131.
of corporation, abdicating their powers, 100, 108, 975 n.
effect of dissolution, 912 n.
estoppel by, 649 n.

forbidden, differ from unauthorized,

1177.

687.

INDEX,
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Continued.

illegal, 1187.
internal affairs, 1520.
surrender, 884.
ultra vires, 1176, 1178-9, 1229.
under a charter is an acceptance, 410.
of directors, 852, 857.
de facto, 391 n.
of legislature, altering charter, 708, 1414.
different states can not unite to create one corporation,
dissolving corporation, 879.
general,

989.

333, et seq.

granting corporate powers, construction of, 365-6,
review by courts, 402-3.

934.

special, 337 n, 360.

titles of, 363-5.
of officers, 1091-2.
of shareholders, 107, 702 n, 834, 835, 852, 890, 1456, 1463-5.
concerted, equivalent to corporate acts, 107.
majority, 1463-5.
not in meeting, 834, 890.
out of the state, 841, 844, 846, 847 n.
of visitors, controlled by will of founder, 1333.

ACTION,
organs of corporate,

196, 690.

ACTIONS,
See SUITS;

POWER TO SUE AND BE SUED.

by and against corporations, 1092-1136, 1291, 1698, 1706, 1841.
consideration of sealed instrument not inquired into, 1140.
determining the validity of corporate organization, 1522.
dissolving corporations, 1522.
general issue does not raise question of corporate existence, 1128.
inpersonam, when the res is not within the jurisdiction, 812-4.
restraining issue of stock or bonds, 1522.
shareholders, in behalf of corporation, 1706, et seq.
transitory, where to be brought, 1108.
ultra vires contract, 1179.
unlawful detention, 1231.
upon subscription contracts, 1567-72.
writ of right, when to commence, 199.

ADDITIONAL POWERS,
consistent with general corporation law, claiming in articles of association, 434.

ADJOURNED MEETINGS,
notice of, 838.

2IO8
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ADMINISTRATORS OR EXECUTORS,
corporation may be,
voting by, 1600.

ADMISSIONS

1088 n, 1089.

OF MEMBERS,

are not evidence against corporation, 71 n.

ADMITTING,

members to corporations, 703 n, 744.
foreign corporations, state can impose conditions, 1493-9, 1500.

AFFIXING SEAL,

must be by authority, 1140-3.

AGENT, CORPORATE,
authority of, 1119, 1147 n,
presumption, 1119.

n,

1148

1246.

may be questioned, 1148 n.
seal as evidence of, 1147 n, 1246.

signing,

1143.

acts bind corporation, 218, 546, 1252.

charitable corporation not liable for torts of,
directors as, 694, 1727-8, 1751.

1272-7.

See DIRECTORS.

fraudulent transfer by,

1680.

notice to, 1763.
penalty upon does not invalidate contract,
promoter is not, 1554.

qualifications,

1094.

692.

gwasi'-corporations, 218.
service of summons upon, 1120 n, 1121 n.
visitors' jurisdiction over, 1333.
corporation may be agent or attorney in fact, 1090-1.

AGGREGATE CORPORATION,

193, 196, 197, 199, 727, 1719.

AGREEMENTS,
association, consideration, 448.
forms, 510.
general nature, 445, 448, 474, 491-4, 687.

not to compete, 972.
not to remove suits to federal courts, 1492-3.
subscription, acceptance, 474-8.
before organization, 474-8.
consideration, 448.
forms, 510.
general nature, 445, 448, 474, 491-4, 687.
subscribing, 474-494, 687.
to subscribe, 471-2, 687.
statute of frauds does not apply, 801.

underwriting, 504.
with promoter, 687.
withdrawal, 478, 480.
"trust," form of, 108.

INDEX.
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ALIENATION,

general power of corporation, 1066.
fees, 1018.

franchises, 1081 n, 1179.
franchises, primary, 136,
secondary,

property,

142, 147, 149.

147, 149.

1015 n, 1065, 1068.

in mortmain, voidable,
ALIEN CORPORATION,

1015 n.

See FOREIGN CORPORATION.
suits against,

taxation of,

ALIENS,

1111, 1114.
1374, 1381, 1392, 1393, 1398 n.

directors, 850 n.
discrimination against, 1403.
shareholders, 552, 850 n, 1402-3.

ALLOTMENT,
by commissioners, 386.
definition of, 506-7.
effect of, 507.

ALTER,

1453^1472.

See AMENDMENT;

AMALGAMATION,

1003

AMENDMENT,

CHARTER.

n.
See CONSOLIDATION.

of by-laws, 792-3.
See BY-LAWS.

AMENDMENT OF CHARTERS,

See CHARTER.
acceptance, essential, 422, 750-1, 1447, 1454, 1455, 1580, 1790.
by majority, 1454-5, 1461-72, 1790.
states power to compel, 750-1.

unanimous, 87, 1466.
written, 424.
becomes part of charter, 1472-3 n.
change of name, 829.
corporation can accept, as against creditors, 1580, 1814.
directors may change name, 1474 n.
effect on vested rights, 1426, 1435, 1444.
immaterial, what is, 1454.
majority may accept, when, 1454, 1461, 1463, 1466, 1476 n.
methods, 424, 751.

no reset ved power, 708, 1447, 1454, 1472 n.
parties, by whom made, 1464.
persons dealing with corporation are charged with knowledge,
release non-consenting members, when, 87.
reserved power, effect of, 1422, 1426, 1435, 1472 n.
shareholders' rights, 702 n, 1470, 1790.
state's power, 708, 750-1, 1807.

1217.

2
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AMOTION,
of officers,

213, 1165, 1744.

ANCILLARY RECEIVER, 1544.
ANCIENT IDEAS OF A CORPORATION,
of corporate

ANGELL

&

n=note.~\

liability for torts,

49, 1239

72.

n.

AMES,

definition of corporations,

ANTI-TRUST

ACTS,

977

n,

78

n.

1540.

"ANY NUMBER OF PERSONS MAY FORM A CORPORATION,"
means more than one, 889 n.

APPARENT CORPORATION,

650-672.
See DE FACTO CORPORATIONS, AND CORPORATIONS BY ESTOPPEL.

APPARENT OWNER,
holder of certificate as,

1667-70.

APPEALS TO UNITED STATES COURTS,
statutes forbidding, 1097-8.

"APPLICATION AND ALLOTMENT"
of shares,

504-8, 687.

APPLICATION FOR CHARTER, 267,
APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVERS,
in

436, 562.

state courts, 1526 n.

ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION OR INCORPORATION,
acknowledgment necessary, 470, 607, 609.
additional powers consistent with general law, claiming,
construction of, 432-4, 934-6.

434.

contents of, 21, 436, 594.

filing, effect of, 406-8,
failure, 241.
necessary,

430, 611.

611.

organizing after, 563.
form and contents, 435, 594.
inconsistent with general law, void pro tanto, 86 n, 434 n.
notice to creditors, 406 n, 1947.
place of business must be stated, 596, 603.
purposes of corporation determined by, 605, 607 n.
signing, effect of, 414, 470.
mandatory condition, 607-8.
necessary in some cases to make a subscriber to the stock,
usual provisions of the general law, 435.
when complete, 432.
written, necessary, 597.

ARTIFICIAL PERSON,

See PERSON.

corporation as, 1, 2, 33-79, 109-113.
joint stock company as, 176.

469, 485-9.

INDEX.
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ASSAULT AND BATTERY,
corporate liability for, 1244-5.

ASSEMBLIES,
corporate,

690.

ASSENT,
inferred from acquiescence, 420,
directors, from conduct, 858-9.
stockholders, 422, 985, 1455-7.
to ultra vires contract does not estop, 1181.
corporate,

422.

ASSESSMENTS,
corporation can not make, beyond amount due on shares without special
authority, 1579, 1900.

ASSETS CORPORATE,
non-stock corporation, go to state on dissolution or revert to gr'antor,
904-910.
stock corporation, distribution on dissolution, 891-904, 910 n.
are a trust fund, 1730, 1815-1836, 1847, 1867, 1943-1950.
are not a trust fund, 1836, 1852, 1943-1950.

payment of shares in overvalued property,
withdrawal of, 1847, 1977-81.
creating insolvency, 1979 n.
liability from, 1977-1985.
remedy for in equity, 1985.
distribution of, 1521, 1526.
corporation,
foreign

1943-1950.

ASSIGNEE,
can enforce subscription liability, 1968.
can not enforce statutory liability, 2012.
foreign, can sue in courts of another state, 1968.
guaranteed stock, right to dividends, 1632.

ASSIGNMENT,
certificate,

effect of, 1668, 1697.

corporation can make, for benefit of creditors, 1968,
with preferences, 1815, 1836 ; contra, 1819, 1832.
does not dissolve corporation, 867.

ASSOCIATED
as a

1972 n.

PRESS,

public service corporation,

1368 n.

ASSOCIATES IN DEFECTIVE CORPORATIONS,
See DE FACTO CORPORATIONS, AND CORPORATIONS
estoppel of, 646-650 n.
liability of, 647-650, 673-7.

ASSOCIATION,
necessary to a corporation aggregate, 289, 442-8.

ASSOCIATION

CONTRACT,
See SUBSCRIPTIONS;

consideration, 448.
forms, application, allotment, 504-6.

MEMBERSHIP.

BY ESTOPPEL.

I

INDEX.
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ASSOCIATION

CONTRACT
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Continued.

common-law agreement,

471, 497.

estoppel, 510.

underwriting,

502.

nature, 442.
necessity,

289, 442-8.

aliens, 58, 552 n.
corporations, private, 553.
public, 554.
infants, 547, 548 n.
married women, 549, 552 n.
national government, 558.
state government, 558.

parties,

ASSOCIATIONS,
unincorporated, distinguished from corporations,

ASSUMPSIT,
when it will lie, 1563-5, 1644-5,
ATTACHING CREDITORS,
of shareholders,

1699.

1665, 1670, 1673-4.

ATTACHMENT,
dissolution of corporation terminates, 912 n.
laws, "person" includes corporation, 55 n.
preferences of creditors may be made by, 1827.
shares, at common law, 811, 1665, 1673.
by statute, 811.
equitable interest in, 811.
legal interest in, 811.
location of, 811-14.

ATTORNEY,
for service of summons,
power under seal, 1141.
trustee for client, 1733.

1095.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL,
can not waive cause of forfeiture, 1307.

indictment by, 1321.
informations in equity by, 1326-1332.
informations in quo warranto, 1295-1307.
mandamus, by, 1308-1321.

ATTRIBUTES,
of corporations, 3, 17, 20, 28, 925.
of shares of stock, 794-815.

AUTHORITY,
SEE POWERS.
agent's, may be questioned, 1148 n.
slander and trespass, 1246, 1254, 1281-2.
"borrow" includes power to mortgage, 1077.

187, 283, 363.

INDEX.

2113

[References are to the pages; n=note.]

AUTHORITY

Continued.
commissioners,
390 n, 391 n, 520, 524.
congress, over commerce, 1528.

"consolidate," 985, 1063 n.
corporations, as to by-laws, 1157 n.
conditional subscriptions, 527.
contracts,

1148 n.

liens, 1164.
court to appoint receiver for foreign corporation,
directors, delegate powers, 696.
over surplus, 1626-7.
proxy, 1612.

AUTHORIZED STOCK,
AVERMENTS,

784

n.

See PLEADING;
as to corporate

existence,

SUITS.

1122-1130.

misnomer, as aided by, 825.
shareholders' suits for corporate wrongs,

"BACK PAY,"

1525.

1722, 1724.

B

'

directors can not vote,

1757.

BAD FAITH,
state may forfeit charter for, 590.

BANKING,
as a

franchise,

120 n, 275, 279.

BANKS,
counterfeiting bills, admits corporate existence, 669.
franchises of, 120, 275, 279.
power to invest in stock of other corporations, 1062 n.
power to create, 279.
shares, 1708.
state, as corporations, 192.
debts due are not debts due the public, 222.

taxation by states, 1528.
taxation of by United States,

1372.

BENEFITS,
of joint contract by corporations, 959.
conferred by ultra vires contracts estop,

1209.

BEQUESTS,
capacity of corporations to take, 1029 n.
effect of, when in excess of charter limit, 1029, 1034, 1232.

BEST EVIDENCE,
corporate

records as, 862 n.

2 I
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BILL,

creditor's, against shareholders,
multifariousness, 1724, 1853.
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1847, 1852, 1868, 1960, 1965.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE,
power of corporation to issue,

940, 941, 946 n, 947, 948 n.

BIRTH OF CORPORATION,
date of, 565-585.

BISHOP,
church

as a sole

corporation,

200 n.

BLANK ASSIGNMENTS OF SHARES,
validity of, 1675-81.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS,
See DIRECTORS.

BOARDS OF TRADE,
as

public service corporations,

1368 n.
See STOCK EXCHANGES.

"BODIES POLITIC OR CORPORATE,"
person includes, 33, 51, 55 n, 72 n, 1053.

BONA FIDE,
attempt to organize a corporation, 614,
purchaser of fictitious stock, 1952 n.

617, 629 n, 671

n.

note, 908, 947 n, 949.
shares, 1164, 1655-8, 1673-85,

1695-7.

BONDHOLDERS,
can not be authorized to vote, 1599.

BONDS,
authority of corporation to issue, 766, 938,
of municipality to issue, 555-6.
of railroad company to issue, 1070.
delivery in escrow, 538.
issued with same amount of stock, 1923.
situs, for taxation, 1402 n.

939

n.

BOOKS,
as evidence of membership,
1586, 1588, 1589, 1900 n.
inspection by shareholders, 1319 n, 1645, 1651 n, 1651, 1653.

corporate,

BORROW MONEY,
power of corporation,

766, 938, 939 n.

BRANCH COMPANY,
parent company may acquire stock of,

1064 n.

BREACH,
of contract of subscription, measure of damages, 1572.
of trust, by promoters, remedy of corporation, 1547.
transfer of shares, 1674, 1682-5.
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BRIDGE COMPANIES,

application of doctrine of Dartmouth College case to,
franchises of, nature, 309.
taken in eminent domain, 309, 1337.
power of congress to create, 320.

750

n.

BUSINESS,
forbidden by statute, 1094.
foreign to corporate purpose, 933, 1462.
"insurance" is not "commerce," 1509.
material change in, releases shareholder,

1705.

notice of, to be done at special meeting, 838.
outside of state, corporation may do, 845, 1480.

shareholders can not do, 847 n.
partnership, taxation of, 1401.
ultra vires, 933, 1462.

BUSINESS CORPORATION,
death of members does not dissolve, 867.
dissolution, property becomes stockholders,

908.

may take a fee, 1019.
may not take stock of another, 1062 n.
purpose not to be changed without consent,

1467-70.

BY-LAWS,
authorized by charter, can not be held void,
creating liens, 1161, 1164 n.
definition of, 1153-5.
differs from regulation, 1155.

1174 n.

effect of, 1174, 1175.
fixing duration of corporation, 880.

forbidding transfer of shares,
voting by proxy, 1612.

1159-1162,

1664-71.

office of, 1175.
power to make, 792-3, 1153-1157.

limits on, 1157, et seq.
providing for expulsion of members, 137,
for forfeiture of shares, 1158-1159 n.
voting by proxy, 1593, 1612.

1165-1169.

scope of, 1154.

third parties not affected by, 1175.
validity, can not change terms as to dividends,
create individual liability, 1900.

1174 n.

enlarge corporate powers, 1174 n.
increase or decrease shareholders' liability, 1174 n, 1900.
modify vested rights, 1174 n.

generally, 1171, et seq.
must be for corporate purpose, 1173.
must not be contrary to charter, 1173.
common law, 1173.

2Il6
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n=note.~]

constitution, 1173.
public policy, 1173.
statute, 1173.

in restraint of

trade, 1158, 1172.

unreasonable,

1173.

restricting voting by proxy,

1612.

c
CALIFORNIA CODE,
definition of corporation in,

78 n.

CALLS,
form of, 1570.
how made, 1569.
mandamus

to compel, 1964.
must be made by legal directors, 1576, 1579 n.

uniform, 1575.
operate equally,

1574.

necessity of, 1565.
notice of, 1573.
operation of, 1574.

right to make, before capital is all subscribed,
by court of equity, I960, 1962, 1964, 1968.
when they can be made, 1576.
who may make, 1570.

1566.

"CAN NOT HOLD,"
meaning

in-

mortmain statutes,

1037.

CANON LAW,
idea of a corporation in,

CAPACITY,

74 n.

See POWERS.

aliens to subscribe for stock, 552.
bequests of personal property, 1029 n.
church corporations, 202.
corporation, before subscription of stock, 567.
to sue, admitted by pleading to merits, 653.
ecclesiastical corporations, 202.
infants to subscribe, 548.
married women to subscribe,
state to subscribe,

558.

CAPIAS,
against a corporation, 49, 1236.
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CAPITAL,

See CAPITAL

definition, 778, 782 n, 785 n.
distinguished from capital stock,
franchise, 778.
property, 782 n, 785 n.
surplus,

STOCK.

778, 785

n.

778.

distribution of, 1615, 1622, 1847, 1977-1985.
dividends, paying out of, 1847, 1977-1985.
good-will as, 1387.
as, 1386.

patents

taxation of, 1373.
trust fund, is, 760,

1815-1852

CAPITAL STOCK,
amount,

contra, 1836, 1852.

;

See CAPITAL; SHARES.

authorized,

781 n, 784 n.

decrease of, 764.
increase of, 697-8, 762-3.
paid, 784 n.
subscribed, 784 n.
changes in, 697-8, 761-3 n, 764, 1565.
creation of is a franchise, 761-3.
decrease of, 764.

definition, 767-8, 1624.
distinguished from capital, 775, 781 n,
franchise, 778.
property, 760, 773, 781 n, 784 n.

782 n, 785 n.

shares, 774, 778, 784 n, 785 n, 1371.

surplus, 778, 1624.
fixed by charter, 762.
function of, 766-74.
held by the corporation itself, can not be voted,

1372.

increase of, 697-8, 762-3, 1565.
kinds of, 771, 785 n.

limits use of, 775.
measured by corporate property in some cases of taxation,
misuse of term, 775.
nature of, 766-77.
necessity of in corporation for profit, 237.
preferred, 789.
purpose of, 766-7.

taxation, 782 n, 1373 n.
trust fund, 774-7, 1815-1852,

1900-1950.

uses of, 774.

withdrawal of, 788-9.

CARE,
required of officers,
2

WIL. CAS.

60

1743, 1876-84.

1377.

2Il8
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"CARRYING ON BUSINESS,"
definition of,

1514.

CASE,
action of against a corporation, 47.

CAUSES OF ACTION,
are not assignable,

1220.

CEMETERY ASSOCIATION,
liability for

torts, 1279 n.

CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION,
See CHARTER.
essentials

of, 604.

evidence of corporate existence,

1133-4.

CERTIFICATE OF MEMBERSHIP,
in non-stock corporations,

686.

CERTIFICATE OF SHARES,
assignment passes title, 1697.
compelling issue of, 1521.
evidence of membership, 805-6, 1581, 1582, 1667-70.
gift of, 1691.
indorsement in blank and delivery, 1658-9, 1684.
lost, right of owner, 1521, 1655, 1673-S4.
nature,

1655.

transfer of,
unnecessary

810, 1655, 1G70.

to make one a member,

1900 n.

CESSATION OF BUSINESS,
state may require for non-acceptance

of amendments,

1472-3 n.

CESTUI QUE TRUST,
corporation as, 1024.
members of church as,

211.

CHANCERY,
See COURT; EQUITY.

CHANGE,
of enterprise, shareholder can enjoin, 1705.
of name, 828-9, 1461.
of shareholders' liability, 1476 n.
of use in eminent domain proceedings, question
1344 n.

CHARGES,
regulation of,

749 n.

See RATES.

CHARITABLE CORPORATION,
common law governs, 1019.
in charter of, 735.
dissolution, effect of on property, 908.
contracts

may invest in stock of other corporations, 1061.

of legislative intent,
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CHARITABLE

Continued.
CORPORATION
not liable for torts of agents and officers, 1272, 1275, 1278 n.
officers and agents of, liable for their own torts, 1277.

property of may be acquired by contract, 1275.
gift, 909.
protected under the constitution, 708, 749 n.
reversion of property on dissolution, 906, 908.

CHARITABLE GIFT,
definition,

1273.

CHARITABLE USES,
what are,

1274.

CHARITY,
definition,

1274.

CHARTER,
abuse of, as a cause of forfeiture, 1442.
acceptance of, 410, 414, 417, 590, 750, 856, 1447, 1454.
See ACCEPTANCE.

amendment of,

87, 702, 730, 748 n, 750, 1426, 1447-77,

1580, 1790, 1807, 1814.

See AMENDMENT.

charitable corporation, 753.
compliance with provisions
construction of, 933, 1417.

as to

subscriptions, 517-20.

contents of, 426-434.
contracts in, 397-9, 406, 707, 735, 1345, 1414.
definition of, 397.

expiration of, 868-9.
forfeiture of, 109 n, 1442.
See FORFEITURE.
fixes capital stock, 762.

duration,

833

n.

quorum of shareholders, 853.

grant of, 413, 907, 936 n, 989.
by general or special law, 936 n.
by territorial legislatures, 907.
by two states, 989.
judicial notice of, 406 n.
law, 397-106.
license to form a corporation, 406.
limitation by statute of wills, 1029 n.
may authorize a lien on shares, 1164 n.
measure of corporate power, 917.
misuse as a cause of forfeiture, 1442.
nature of, 397.
new, right of crown to force one on a corporation, 744.
non-use, a cause of forfeiture, 1443.

notice of contents,

406 n, 1947.
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CHARTER

Continued.
offer, 409, 410, 1449, 1454.
powers,

430.

See POWERS.

directors, 695.
expulsion, 1169-70.
guaranty, 952.
hold land, 1029 n.
regulations and by-laws,
transfers, 1669.
presumption as to existence,
proof of, 406 n, 668, 670.
purpose of, 397.

1154.
669.

repeal of, 399, 402, 1422-46.
See REPEAL.

restrictions in, 1026-7.
royal, creation of corporation by,
surrender of, 1789, 1815.

CHATTELS,

See PROPERTY;

270

n.

PERSONAL PROPERTY.

corporations may hold as tenants in common,
shares of stock are not, 805.

10 n.

CHOSES IN ACTION,
assignability of, 803, 1668.
classification of, 802.
shares in corporations, 531, 791-804, 1689.
in partnership, 804.
vest in consolidated corporation, 1006 n.

CHURCH,
capacity

of, 200.

corporations, 201, 207.
civil corporations, 207.
definition of, 208-9.
integral part of ecclesiastical corporation,
judicatories, powers of, 213.
lands, held by bishop, 200.
lay corporation, 206.

202.

powers of, 201, 212, 213.

private corporations, 207.
relation to the corporation,
wardens, 206.

201.

CITIZENS,
of different states, suits in federal courts, 1101.
one state may incorporate in another, 1487.
restriction of membership to, 1591.
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CITIZENSHIP,

for purposes of suits, 1097-1109.
under fourteenth amendment, 38, et
directors, 693.
partnerships and joint stock companies,

seq., 55 n, 233, 2036.
176.

CITIES,
right to aid private enterprises, 555-6.
public improvements, 556.
revoke exclusive franchises granted, 1474 n.
not liable for injuries in city hospital, 1278 n.

CIVIL CORPORATION,

201, 206, 207, 715, 725, 1292.

CLASSES,
choses in action, 802.

contracts in restraint of trade, 975 n.
corporations, 193, et seq., 335, 1016 n.
corporate powers, 925.
guaranteed stock, 771 n.
illegal contracts, 1191.
persons representing corporations, 690.
preferred stock, 771 n.
trusts, 1854.

CODES,
definitions of corporations in,

78 n.

general denial under, 1130.

COKE, LORD,
definition of corporation,

4.

COLLATERAL ATTACK,
on corporate existence.
ultra vires acts, 1198-9.

255.

COLLATERAL SECURITY,
holder of is

a member,

1585, 1665, 1900

n.

COLLECTION OF INDIVIDUALS,
corporation as,

1, 79, et seq., 88, 97, 100.

COLLECTIVE RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS,

1790.

COMBINATIONS,
to prevent competition, 100, 108, 961-973 n, 984.

COMITY,
doctrine of, in connection with corporations,

1224, 1480-5, 1490-6, 1970.

COMMENCEMENT,
of corporate existence, theories of, 565-585.
of interstate commerce, 1505 n.

COMMERCE,
insurance is not, 1507.
interstate, 967, 973 n, 1503,
manufacture is not, 1504.
navigation, 1376.

1504 n, 1534, 1535, 1541.
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COMMISSIONERS,
action compelled by mandamus, 390.
authority and Junctions, 385-7, 390, 391 n, 520, 524.
as promoters,

374.

distribution of shares, 385-7, 390 n.
right to subscribe, 389-90.
review of acts by legislature, 387-8.
statutory functions, 385.

COMMON CARRIERS,
regulation of rates,

1352, 1367 n.

COMMON LAW,

by-laws contrary to, are void, 1158.
contracts restraining trade are illegal, 962, 970, 1058.
subscription, 471, 484, 527, 549, 573, 687.
definition of corporation, 74 n, 727.
dissolution of corporation, causes, 877, 891, 1018-9.
effects, 891, 910-2, 1018-9.
of corporation by, 270, 275.
liability of officers, 1739, 1874, et seq.

existence

shareholders, 573, 1900, et seq.
powers, corporation, 1015 n, 1065-88.
legislature to create, 285.
quorum,

840.

required a seal to contract, 1136,
right to inspect books, 1648.
right to sue, 1092-1120.
right to vote, 1592-3.
shares, attachment

1141, 1144.

of, 811.

conversion of, 805.
liens on, 1163.
transfer, 1669.
statutes in derogation of, strictly construed,

955

n.

COMMON RIGHTS,
not franchises, 131.
statutes in derogation

COMMON SEAL,

of strictly construed,

935 n.

1147 n.

See SEAL.

COMMON STOCK,
definition,

771 n, 785.

COMPANY,
incorporation in several states,

1103.

See CORPORATION.

COMPELLING CORPORATION TO ANSWER,
by distringas, 1714.

COMPENSATION

OF OFFICERS

AND SERVANTS,

703, 1755, et seq.
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combinations restraining, 961-984.

COMPLIANCE,
with conditions, 517-20, 585-7, 677-9.
See CONDITIONS

;

CONCERTED ACTION,

COMMENCEMENT OF CORPORATE EXISTENCE.

of shareholders, when equivalent to corporate

action,

107.

CONCLUSIVENESS,
of judgment against corporation,

PROCEEDINGS,

CONDEMNATION
CONDITIONS,
as to corporate

implied,

existence,

as to

shareholders' liability,

1973, 1976

n.

1341.

express, 511.

411, 511.

precedent,

264, 267, 411, 530, 585, 602, 672.

de facto, 264, 614.
de

jure,

264, 530, 585, 602, 672.

estoppel, 264, 630, 637.
subsequent, 511, 532, 586-7.
as to creditors' suits
as to doing business

in equity against shareholders,
in other states, 1093, 1096, 1500,

stockholders' suits, 1726.
as to subscriptions, after incorporation, 526-7,
authority of commissioners, 524.
before incorporation, 522-4.
delivery, 536, 760.

1868, I960, et seq.
1518.

as to

530.

express, 511.
form, 511.

implied,

511.

precedent,
subsequent,

532.
532, 534-5.

CONDUCT,
what is corporate,

104, 276-7, 402, 690, 858-9, 891.

CONFERRING CORPORATE POWERS,
meaning of,

345, 349, 360.

CONFESS JUDGMENT,

power of corporation, 1134-6.

CONGRESS,
power to amend and repeal charters, 907,
create corporations, 305 n, 320, 324 n,
over interstate commerce, 1531-36.
mails, 1541

1406, 1411.
906, 1293, 1370.

CONSENT,

of congress, necessary to state taxation of national corporations,
of corporation, necessary to amendments, 1406, 1517.
of state, necessary to amend charters, or create corporations,

1479.
142, 258,

828 n, 1003 n, 1071, 1529.

of shareholders to material amendments,
1209.

480, 829

n,

838, 1004 n, 1066

n,
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CONSIDERATION,
for grant of charter, 714-35, 749 n.
sealed contracts, 1140, 1148 n, 1688, 1691.
subscription contracts, 448, 474, 478, 482, 486, 491, 492, 497, 517.
ultra vires contracts, 1148-50.

CONSOLIDATION,
of corporations, 847, 974 n, 984-1006, 1815.

CONSPIRACY,
liability of corporation for,
restraint of trade,

1262-8.

972.

CONSTITUTION,
of corporations,

LIMITS,

CONSTITUTIONAL
on

196, 205-6, 705.

power to create corporations,

3, 19, 31 n, 32 n, 320, 326, 333, 338, 339,

345, 349, 369.

PROTECTION,

CONSTITUTIONAL
of corporations,

255, 371, 708, 746 n,

750, 752,

754, 757,

1337-1478,

1503-

1545.

of creditors,

1805, 1808, 2036-2050.

CONSTRUCTION,
of articles of association, 432-4, 936 n.
of charters, 365-6, 432-4, 933-936 n, 1417.
of constitutions, 355.
of statutes, 389, 935 n.

of statutory liability,

CONSTRUCTIVE
CONSTRUCTIVE
what are,

1992.

NOTICE,
TRUSTS,

850.

1854.

CONTEMPTS,
corporation liable for,

1287.

CONTENTS OF CHARTER,
under general and special grants, 426-434,

CONTINUING
CONTINUING

FRANCHISES,

936 n.

149.

TO DO BUSINESS

AFTER EXPIRATION OF CHARTER,

881, 895, 1305.

CONTRACTOR,
payment of in stock at market value,

1919.

CONTRACTS,
See POWER TO CONTRACT.
acceptance of a franchise as, 150.
against public policy, 966, 974 n, 1059, 1191.
association, 445-7, 456-8.
between corporation and members, 60, 80, 757-9.
officers, 1753-4.
corporations having same directors, 1753.

INDEX.
[^References are to the pages;

2125
n

note.]

CONTRACTS Continued.
charter, 225, 359, 397-406, 707-21, 735-54, 1345-8, 1404-15,
defined, 723-32.
effect of consolidation,
dissolution, 895-7,

1006

1481.

n.

910 n.

of, 691, 862 n, 937, 1137, 1141, 1147 n, 1481.
fraudulent, 541-2, 1562.
execution

guaranty, 953.
infants, 548.
mala in se, 1191.
mala prohibita, 1191, 1511.
members' power to make, 65, 80, 86 n, 100.
partnership, 249.
power to make, 937, 1209, 1481, 1536, 1554.
presumption as to validity, 691.
restraining trade and competition, 966-75, 1058.
sealed, 1136-53.
specific performance of sale of shares, 86 n.
subscription, 452-531, 1562.

ultra vires, 922-4,

1176, 1191, 1209, 1515 n.

CONTRACTUAL STATUTORY
CONTRIBUTION,
right of creditors to,

LIABILITY,

1892, 1987-92.

2062.

officers to, 1794.

shareholders to,

1573-79,

1770-75.

CONTROL OF CORPORATIONS
by courts, actions at law,
indictment, 1321.
mandamus,

1099-1122,

1236-1291.

1294, 1308-20.

quo warranto, 1294, 1298.
scire facias, 1294, 1298.

equity, 1291, 1321, 1326.
by legislative bodies, 1292, 1337.
amendment,

708,

1447-1475.

eminent domain, 1337-43.
police power, 1344-1366 n.
lotteries, 1348.
rates,

1352.

reports,

1363.

repeal, 708, 1404-1446.

taxation, 1370-1404.
by national government, 1527-1546.
by state governments, over foreign corporations
by visitors, 206-8, 729, 1291, 1332, 1336 n, 1337.

CONVERSION,
by corporation, 1236, 1238.
of shares of stock, 804, 807 n.

1476-1526.

INDEX.

2126
CONVEYANCES,

[References are to the pages;

fraudulent, right of creditor to set aside,
of land to corporation, execution of, 862.
validity of, 1007, 1010, 1016 n-1039.
COOX, WILLIAM,
definition of corporations,

79
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1866.

n.

COPYRIGHTS,
taxation of,

1385.

CORPORATE,
See CORPORATION ; CORPORATOR.
acts, acceptance of charter inferred from, 856-862 n.
presumptions from, 854-5.
records are best evidence of, 862 n.
when the acts of shareholders are, 100, 890.

when void, 1094-5.
affairs, power of majority to manage, 1775-90.
agents,

SEE AGENTS.

assemblies,

690.

assets, distribution among members, 1773.
trust fund, 910 n, 1815-1836, 1847.
authority, questioning, 615, 924 n.

authorities, demand upon before suit by shareholder, 1716-24.
birth, theories of, 565, et seq.
bodies, validity of conveyances to, 1010.
bonds, taxation of, 1401 n.
books, contents of, 1589.
evidence of membership,
inspection of, 1648-51.

1586-90, 1900 n.

transfers upon, necessity of, 1663-94.
knowledge of, imputed to directors,
capacity, theories, 574-8, 914-36.
capital,
business,

1734.

See CAPITAL STOCK.
charter,

as a contract,

359, 707, 1415.

See CHARTER.

construction of, 934 n.
combinations, validity of, 960-84, 1072, 1535.
conduct, not necessarily formal corporate action,
consolidations, 974 n, 984-1006.
contracts,

104.

forms, 937.
See CONTRACTS

; POWERS.

validity depends on law of sovereignty where made,
credit measured by capital, 770.
creditors,
See CREDITORS.

liability of transferrer or transferee to,
preferences

of, 1815-1836.

1694.

1482.

INDEX.

2127

[References are to the pages; n=noe.]
Continued.
CORPORATE
relation to various parties, 1805, et seq.

rights in equity, 1862-5.
debts, liability of members for, 573, 895, 1617, 1771, 1899-2035.
effects, when revert to the state, 892.
enterprise,

1580, 1705, 1770.

existence,

begins, 565, et seq.
effeQt of change of name, 828.

contracting with, 644, et seq., 1125.
dissolution, 881, 895, 910, 1305.
misnomer, 1134.
estoppel to deny, 253, 630-81.
mode of, 829.

pleading, 629, 1122-29.
proof of, 249, 297, 563, 1131-34,
questioning, 620-3.

1146 n, 1482.

tests of, 2-33.

franchises,

1, 113-167, 289, 705, 1381-88 n, 1936.

See FRANCHISES.

taxation of, 1381-88 n.
funds, 760-793, 1472, 1628-31, 1815-47.
See CAPITAL AND CAPITAL STOCK.

grant, not necessarily be made to persons in
indebtedness, taxation of, 1402 n.
leases, 429, 915, 974 n, 1073, 1178, 1224.
liabilities, 1236-90, 1841-74.
liens, 1161-4, 1697 n.

esse, 289.

members,
See MEMBERS.

disfranchisement, 1165,
who are, 1581, 1900 n.
meetings,

1175.

590, 833-854, 862 n.

See MEETINGS.
name, 816-29, 862 n.
See NAME.
neglect, what is, 105.
note, sealed, effect of, 864 n, 1150.
officers,
common law

liability

See OFFICERS.
of, 1874, et seq,

dealing with corporation, 1899.
relation to various parties, 1790, et
statutory liability of, 1888, et seq.
organization, 566-9, 580.

seq.

powers, 360-6, 421, 856, 917, 925, 1174 n, 1176, 1466.
See POWERS.

privileges, good faith in obtaining, 590-2.

INDEX.

2128

[References are to the pages; n=note."\

CORPORATE

Continued.
necessity of recording, 862 n.

proceedings,

property,

698, 703 n, 756, 784 n, 823, 1372, 1625, 1713, 1756, 1772.

See ASSETS;

CAPITAL; PROPERTY.

records, 862 n, 1673.
sales destroying autonomy, 100, 957, 974 n, 1066, 1070-8.
seals, 138-41, 863 n, 1136-53.
See SEAL.
stocks, situs for taxation, 1401n.
See SHARES

;

BONDS.

CORPORATION,
See CORPORATE; CORPORATOR; CAPITAL; POWERS, ETC.
acting under charters from two states, 989.
acts of directors, when do not bind, 857, 1760.
admissions of members do not bind, 71 n.
agents,

See AGENTS.

aggregate, essentials of, 1, 15, 19, 28, 193, 264, 713, 723, 727.
amenable to the creating sovereignty, 258.
ancient ideas concerning, 72 n.
as an artificial person, 17.
association, 79, et seq., 443.
a cestui que use, 1024.

citizen, 38, et seq., 56 n, 1099-1121, 2036.
collection of individuals, 79, et seq.
a fictitious person, 33, et seq., 60, 72-77, 109,
a franchise, 113-171, 723.
a
a

a person,

33, et seq., 60-79.

in canon law,

74 n.

common law, 74 n.

modern law, 77 n.
Roman law, 73 n.
assemblies, 690.
assets as a trust fund, 730, 1815-1950.

by-laws, 1153-75.
capacity of, 567,
capital,

914, et seq.

See POWERS.
See CAPITAL

charter,

;

CAPITAL

87, 397-442, 750, 1217.

See CHARTER.

church, 201, 203.
citizenship of, 56 n, 1099-1121,
civil, 201, 203, 214, 725.

2036.

classes of, 1, 193-257, 335, 1016 n.
aggregate, 1, 193, 713, 723, 727.
by estoppel, 239, 253, 630-81, 1899.

STOCK.

et seq.
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church, 201, 203.
civil, 201, 203, 214,

725, 727.

complete,
de facto, 239, 244, 248, 614-30, 1899.
dejure, 239, 585-613.
214.

de novo,

148.

domestic,

1294, et seq.

ecclesiastical,

201, 203, 205.

eleemosynary, 201, 203, 207, 725,
foreign, 1480, et seq.
lay, 201.
national, 324, 1388, 1476, et seq.
non-stock, 233.
private, 221, 233, 727.
public, 221, 223, 228, 727.

727.

214, 221.

pure,,

quasi, 214.
quasi-public,

religious,

221.

201, 203, 725, 727.

sole, 26, 193, 272, 890.
stock, 233.
commencement of life of, 565-585.
common rights of, 131.
compliance with conditions, essential,

consolidation of, 847, 974 n, 984-1006,
constitution of, 705.
contempts, liability for, 1287.
contracts

560, et seq.
1815.

of, 914-1093, 1176-1235.
See CONTRACTS ; POWERS

control of,

1099-1136,

;

ULTRA VIRES.

1236-1546.

See CONTROL.

corporators as agents of, 741.
creation of, by common law,
congress,

270, 274

n.

320, et seq.

consolidation, 984-1006.
deed of settlement, 898.
laws, 1, 15, 19, 279, 287-98,
implication, 298, 300 n.
king, 268.
legislative act, 279, 283, 302, 373.
parliament, 270 n.
prescription, 275.
ratification or recognition, 300 n.
registration, 270.
royal charter, 266, 270 n.
general

333, 337

n.
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special acts, 287, 295, 333, 337 n, 358.
territorial legislatures, 302, 332, 333 n.
compliance with conditions, essential, 585-681.

constitutional limits, 320-373.
no prescribed form of words necessary,
power, state only has, 258-264.
delegation

264, 300 n.

of, 302, 332.

limits on, constitutional, 320-373.
from nature of franchise, 306,

320.

general and special Taws, 333.
creature of creating sovereignty, 258.

creditors,

1760, 1808, et seq., 1874, et seq., 1899, et seq., 2035, et seq.

See CREDITORS.
crimes, liability for, 1283-6.
date of beginning of corporate life, 565, 585.
de facto, 239, 244, 614-30, 1899.

definitions of, 1, 17, 31 n, 77 n, et
as a collection of individuals,
as a franchise, 113-171, 723.

seq., 248, 713, 723, 727.
79, et seq.

as a person, 33, et seq., 60-79.
239, 585-613.
de novo, 148.
de

jure,

directors,

444, 690-703, 848, 1727-60,

1790-1804,

1832-41.

See DIRECTORS.

dissolution,

286, 866-913, 1807.

See DISSOLUTION.

distinguished from associations,
church, 202.
cost-book

companies,

fraternity,
joint stock company,

187.

182.

176.

1, 16, et seq., 171.

members, 60, et seq., 100, 1719.

partnership, 7, 23, 167,
state institutions, 191.
stock exchanges,

170, 575.

178.

distringas against, 227, 1243.
domicile of, 56 n, 1099-1121,
duration, 830-3, 1307.

2036.

duties of, 34, 44, 47, 1236-1321.

private, 47, 1236-1291.
public, 44, 1294-1320.
ecclesiastical,

eleemosynary,

201.
201, 725.

elements subject to taxation, 1370-91.
essentials of, 2, 19, 264, 560, et seq.
estates that may be acquired, 891, 903, 911 n, 1018.
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CORPORATION
deny
to
existence of, 239, 253, 630-81, 1899.
estoppel
vires contract, 1080, 1184, 1188, 1211-1224.
ultra
validity
execution

of contracts,

691, 862 n, 1137,

1141, 1147 n, 1481.

exemplary damages against, 1251.
existence, 258-374, 565-682, 1482.
See, supra, CREATION.
565-585.

commencement,
duration, 830-3, 1307.

pleading, 653, 1122-1130.
proof, 249, 563, 653, 1131-4,
express

1146

n.

powers, 926.
See POWERS.

expulsion of members,
foreign, 1476-1526.
formation of,

1165,

1175.

See CREATION, supra.

founder of, 35, 725, 729, 1335-6.
franchise, 1, 113-167, 705, 1372, 1381-88 n,
fraudulent conveyance by, 1866.
functions of incorporators, 391.
members,
promoters,

694.
374.

"going concern," 1827, 1923.
"habitat" of, 1109.
history of, 72 n, 109 n.
implied powers, 926-934 n, 1045-6.
incidental powers, 921, 925.
indictment of, 1283-90, 1321.
injunction against, 1326-32.
integral parts of, 687-90.
internal relations, 705-816.
issue of shares below par, 1907-1933.
joinder with its servants as defendant,

joint

tenants,

1936.

1249.

1019.

judgment against, effect of, on shareholders' liability,
confession

of, 1135-6.

jurisdiction of equity,
kinds of,

90, 1291, 1321-32.

See CLASSES, supra.

lay, 201.
liabilities, contracts, 914-84,

1176-1243,

1263-7, 1556-8.

contempts, 1287.
crimes, 1283-91.

exemplary damages, 1279.
expenses of promotion, 384, 1556-8.
torts, 47, 546, 763 n, 1209, 1232, 1236-82.
See TORTS.

1708, 1973, 1976 n.
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transfers negligently made,
ultra vires holding of stock,

1655, 1673, 1685-8.
1064.

management of, 79, 833-66.
mandamus to, 1308-21.
meetings, 833-854.
members, 682-703, 1165, 1175, 1559-1727,
name, 9, 22, 816-30.

1770-1790,

national, 320, 324 n.
notice to, 1760-7.
offer and acceptance of charter,
See ACCEPTANCE.
officers, 690, 694-705, 1727-1760, 1790-1804,
See OFFICERS.
organization of, 242, 414, 420, 560-682.
organs of action, 690.
origin of, 72 n, 109 n, 267.
payment of shares, 1559-80,

1874-1899.

1900-59.

succession of, 26, 830.
pleading, 653, 827, 1122-30, 1183, 1249, 1716-23 n.
police control of, 1344-1366 n.
perpetual

powers,
SEE POWERS.
express, 926.

implied, 926, 934, 956 n.
incidental, 20, 925.
particular, 937.
preference of creditors, 1815-41.
preliminary subscriptions, 471-511.
presumptions, 563, 854, 864 n, 1119.
private, 221, 224, 233, 727.
privileges and immunities, 356.
promoters,

374-96, 1547-58.

proof of organization, 249,
property, 33, 43, 58, 68-70,
public, 221, 228, 727.
pure or complete, 214.
quasi, 214.
quasi-public,

563, 653, 1131-4, 1146
1007-87,

1618.

221, 225.

questioning corporate existence,

255, 615, 622.

quo warranto

against, 591, 1294, 1298-1307.
relation to commissioners, 390 n.

creditors,

1808-74.

directors, 381, 699, 1259, 1706, 1727-60.
officers, 1706, 1727-1760.
promoters,

374, 1546-58.

shareholders,

468, 707, 1559-1727.

n.

1899-2035.
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state, 1291-1544.

third persons, 914, 1236, 1760-66.
rights of, 33-36, 1559, 1718, 1727, 1760.
rights, to accept amendments, 1580, 1814.
acquire and hold property, 1007-1065,
act in a personal relation, 1087-90.
adopt contracts of promoters, 1554.
alienate property, 1065-1087, 1809.
carry on corporate enterprise, 1580.
change name, 822.

consolidate, 847, 974 n, 984-1006, 1815.
create capital stock, 761-3.
declare dividends, 1615.
declare stock dividends, 1622.
do business out of state, 842, 845, 1480, 1611.
dispose of its property, 1809, 1813.
dissolve itself, 877-881, 1581.
enforce contracts of subscription, 1559.
exercise power of eminent domain, 624, 1005 n, 1341,
expel members, 1171 n, 1175.
have and use a seal, 1136.
hold its own shar.es, 1041-51, 1601.
shares in other companies, 553, 1051-64.
increase or decrease its stock, 763, 764, 1559.
issue negotiable instruments, 940-6.
issue preferred stock, 791, 1559.
issue shares at market value, 1919, 1923-1943, 1947 n.
issue shares for property, 1936, et seq.
issue stock dividends, 1625.
make by-laws, 1153.
make calls, 1566.
manage its own business, 1580, 1808.

1343

name, 819-22.
plead ultra vires, 1221.

prefer creditors, 1815, et seq.
prescribe qualifications of officers,
profits made by officers, 1735-7.
'regulate transfers, 1580.
reserve a lien upon shares, 1580.

693

n.

remove officers, 1744.
subscribe for stock of other corporations, 553, 778, 1051-64.
sue and be sued, 226, 1092, et seq., 1706, 1717-8.

surrender charter,

1815.

take and grant an estate in fee, 911 n.
vote on its shares held by itself, 1602.
sole, 26, 193.
stock, 234, 760-93, 1472, 1628-31,
2 WIL. CAS.
Gl

1815-47.

n.
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subscriptions to capital stock, 411, 445-560.
suits by and against, 56 n, 70, 92 n, 226, 1092, et seq., 1111, 1717-24.

taxation of, 15, 36, 781, 1370-1404.
tests of corporate existence, 2-33.
torts of, 47, 248, 546, 763 n, 1209, 1232, 1236-82.
ultra vires contracts and acts, 1176-1235.
vested rights of, 230, 708, et seq., 1413-1444.
visitation of, 206-8, 729, 1291, 1332, 1336 n, 1337.

CORPORATORS,
who may

n.

be, 396, 464, 547-559, 889

COST-BOOK,
mining companies,

distinguished from corporations,

182.

COURTS,
judicial notice of general incorporation laws, 406 n.
private acts, 1124-5.
special incorporation acts, 406 n.
presumption of corporate existence from name, 1128.
right to punish for contempt, 1289."
to review acts of legislature, 402-3.

COURTS OF EQUITY,
are open to foreign corporations, 1490.
power to appoint receivers, 1525, 1542, 1748-9.

control corporations,

1321.

contracts, 899, 910 n.
interfere with declaration of dividends, 1645.
enforce corporate

COURTS OF LAW,
control of corporations by,

1291-1321.

CREATION,
of corporation,

258-441.

See CORPORATION, CREATION OF

;

LEGISLATIVE

POWER TO CREATE.

CREDITORS,
and the corporation, 1808-1874.
rights of the corporation, 1808-1841.
to accept amendments,

1814.

consolidate, 1815.
dispose of its property, 1809-14.
manage its own business, 1808.
prefer creditors, can, 1815-19.
attachment,

1827.

extraterritorial, effect,
can not, 1819.
officer creditors, can, 1836.
can not, 1832.
reason, 1835.

surrender the charter,

1815.

1828.
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general, 760, 1841.

in equity, 1847-74.
conditions precedent,

1868-74.
assets are a trust fund, 1847-52.
assets are not a trust fund, 1852-61.

theories,

to enjoin threatened wrong, 1865-6.
to enjoin waste, 1862-5, 1708.
to set aside fraudulent conveyance, 1866.
and officers, 1874-99.
rights of creditors, 1874-98.
common law, care required of officers, 1884-8.
directors' responsibility, 1874-84.
ultra vires acts, 1888.
statutory liability of officers, 1888-98.
general nature of, 1888.

contractual or penal,

1892.

enforcement in other states, 1892.
rights of officers, to contract with corporation, 1899.
manage corporate affairs, 1899.

obtain preference as creditor, 1899.
and promoters, 1553.
and the shareholders, 1899-2035.
rights of the creditors, 1899-2034.
arising from imperfect incorporation, 1899.
common law or equitable liability of shareholders, 1900-87.
arising from ownership of shares, 1900-77.
evidence of membership, 1900.
non-payment of shares, general rule, 1900-77.
theories, fraud at law, 1917.
fraud in equity, 1836, 1852, 1911.
trust fund, 1907.
exceptions to general rule, 1919-77.
issuing stock for debt, 1919.
to save a going concern, 1923.
gift of shares, 1933.
payment of shares in property, 1936-77.
good-will, 1936-42.
valuation of property, actual fraud, rule, 1950.
true value rule, 1943-9.
fictitious issue of stock, 1951-60.
remedy of creditors, 1960-77.
assignee or receiver in foreign state, 1968.
at law and in equity, 1842, 1960-4.
in U. S. courts, 1962.
conditions precedent, 1960.
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extraterritorial effect of judgment,
mandamus, or suit in equity, 1964.

1972.

parties, 1965, 1967 n.
receiver can enforce, 1968, 1972 n.
statute of limitations, 1972.
subsequent creditors only can complain, 1811, 1813,
1915.

arising from withdrawal of assets, 1622, 1977-87.
creating insolvency, 1979.
paying dividends after insolvency,
out of capital, 1981.
remedy in equity, 1985.
what is, 1977.
statutory liability of shareholders, 1987-2034.
general characteristics,

1980.

1987-97.

kinds, contractual,

1990, 1997, et seq.

general nature, 1990.
interpretation, 1992-4.

it

to what

penal,

applies,

1992-4.

1990, 1996.

general nature of, 1996.

particular kinds of contractual,
as to legal character,

1997.

1997-2003.

limited and joint, 1997.
unlimited and several, 1997.
primary, unlimited, partnership, 1998.
primary, limited, joint, enforceable only in equity,

secondary,
secondary,

2000.

primary, limited, several, enforceable
as to amount,

unlimited,
double,

2003.

who liable, 2003, 2005.

proportional, 2009.
for labor and services,
enforcement,

at law, 2001.

2003.

2010.

2010.

in general, 2012.
constitutional provisions, when self-executing,

2013,

2014,

2018.

in other states, 2018, 2021, 2029.
penal, 2033.
remedy in equity or at law, 2014.
repeal, 752, 2014.
special remedies, 2014, 2021.

rights of shareholders, 2034-35.
to keep dividends received in good faith out of capital when solvent,
2034.
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receive dividends from profits, 2034.

CREDITORS

be released from liability, 2034-5.
by acceptance of amendment, 2034.

transfer, 2035.
forfeiture, 2034.
fraud inducing subscription,
completed

CREDITORS'

2034.

RIGHTS AMONG THEMSELVES,

2035.

contribution, 2062.
priority, 2035-62.
by order of court, labor and material claims, 2053.
%
by preference by corporation, 2035-6.
director-creditors, 2036.
general creditors, 2035.
by statutory provisions, resident and non-resident creditors,
2036-53.

artificial and natural persons, 2036-50.
protection of home creditors, 2050.
by promptness of action, 2035.
in case of statutory liability, 2010, 2035.
unpaid subscriptions, 2035.

CREDITORS

AND THE STATE,

1805-8.

rights of creditors, to have security unimpaired,
rights of the state, to amend charters, 1807.
change remedies,

1808.

1805.

dissolve corporation, 1807.
protect home creditors, 1807,

2050.

CREDITORS,
estoppel to deny corporate

CREDITOR'S
CRIMES, 668,
CROSSINGS,

BILL,

existence,

656, 662.

1852, 1868, 1874, 1878, 1960, 1965, 1967

976 n, 1283-6.

grade, requiring change of, 1475 n.

CROWN,

See KING.
authority to create corporations, 717-24, 744.
delegate power to create, 268.
compel surrender, 744.
contract between and corporation, 736.
reverter of personal property to on dissolution,

CUMULATIVE VOTING,
DAMAGES,

911 n.

1476 n, 1603.

D

mental and physical suffering, 1279.
measure of for breach of subscription contract,
ultra vires contract, 1041.

1572.

n.

1517,
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708.

applications of, 748 n.
criticisms of, 747 n.
extent of doctrine of, 1413.
limits of, 1417.

DATE,
of beginning of corporate

existence,

379, 565-85.

DEALERS,
with knowledge of claim of corporate

to deny it,

existence,

estopped

existence,

not estopped,

631,652-61.

without knowledge of claim of corporate

662.

DEALINGS,
between officers and corporation, validity of, 1750-3.

DEATH,
of members, does not dissolve stock corporation, 9, 866-7, 873-5,
of subscriber before incorporation revokes subscription, 481.

877.

DEBENTURE STOCK,
defined,

772 n.

DEBTOR,
when may be compelled to accept a creditor with whom he did not contract, 1000.
property of subject to claims of creditors, 997-1000.

DEBTS,
corporation may issue its stock below par to pay, 1919.
take its own shares in satisfaction of, 1049 n.
stock of other corporations to pay, 1056-61.
effect of consolidation, 1007.
dissolution, at common law, 894, 911 n.
in equity, 911 n.
meaning of in statutory liability of shareholders, 1992.
power to contract, 938, 1408.
provision for paying before declaring dividends, 1616-18.

DECEIT,
corporation liable for, 1262-5.

DECREASE OF STOCK,
power of corporation,

764.

DEED,
corporation, form of,
requires

862 n.

seal, 1138-41,

1691.

DEED OF SETTLEMENT,
formation by,

440, 561.

DE FACTO CORPORATIONS,
conditions precedent to,
definitions of, 239, 248.
doctrine of, 629 n.

614, 616.
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effect of quo icarranto, 249.
essentials of, 249, 615, 671 n.

when applies, 637-40.
liability of members, 249, 577, 658,
estoppel,

1899.

officers, 249.
reasons why collateral attack is not allowed, 625-7.
rights and liabilities in case of ouster, 619-24, 625-7.

right to exercise power of eminent domain,
391 n, 844.

624.

DE FACTO OFFICERS,
DEFERRED STOCK,
definition,

772 n.

DEFINITIONS,
allotment, 506-7.
by-laws, 1153-1.
capital, 778-81.
capital stock, 767-81,

1624.

See STOCK, below,

"carrying on business," 1514.
charitable gift, 1273.
charity, 1274.
charter, 397.
church, 208-9.
"conferring corporate powers," 360.
conspiracy in restraint of trade, 972.
contract under U. S. constitutional provision, 723-32.
corporate power, 357.
corporation, 1, 3, 17, 67, 77 n, et seq., 248, 356, 713, 723,
as a collection of individuals, 1, 79, et seq., 109.
a franchise, 1, 6, 113-171, 723.
a persjon, 1, 33, et seq., 60-79, 713.

Abbott, 79 n.
Angell and Ames, 78 n.
cases, giving, 31 n.
Code, 78 n.

Coke, 4.
Cook, 79 n.
Domat, 4.
Freund, 79 n.
Grant, 78 n,
Kent, 356.

Kyd, 4.
Lindley,

78 n.
Lowell, 78 n.
Marshall, 1, 4,
Morawetz, 1.

77

Reese, 79 n.

Roman law,

4, 5.

n,

713.

725.
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Story, 727.
Walker, 78 n.
Washington, 78 n,
Wooddeson, 4.

723.

classes of, 1, 193-257, 335, 1016 n.
See CORPORATION, CLASSES OF.

"creating corporations," 338-360.
director, 1732.
dividends, 1614.
eminent domain, 1338.
filing, 612.
franchises, primary, 118, 163.
secondary,

143.

good-will, 1386.
incorporators, 392.
"interstate or foreign commerce,"
levy, 810.
libel, 1255.
manufacturing, 606-7.
organization, 567.
"original package," 1506 n.
partnership, 249, 957.
succession,

perpetual

police power,
powers,

1504

n.

831-2.

1366 n.

express, 926.

implied, 926.
incidental, 925.
profits, 769, 1615-18.
promoter, 374, 1546.
public policy, 1608.
reasonable

rates, 1356-62.

"reasonable restraint of trade,"
"retaliatory laws," 1495.
scrip, 772 n.
stock, 771-3.
common,

771, 785.

debenture,

deferred,
fictitious,

971, 975

772

n.

772.
1951, 1952

guaranteed,

771

n,

1953.

n.

interest bearing, 771 n.
overissued, 773 n.
preferred,

771 n, 785.
share, 771, 774 n, 775, 779, 784.
special, 772 n.

spurious,

773

n.

n.
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treasury, 772 n.
watered, 773 n.

DEFINITIONS
surplus,

778, 1624.

trustee, 210.

trusts, express, 1854.
implied, 1854.
constructive, 1854.
resulting, 1854.
uses, 1022.

visitation, general and special,

1333.

DEFRAUDING CREDITORS,
corporate

scheme for, 99.

DEGREE OF CARE REQUIRED OF OFFICERS,
DE

JURE

1737-52.

CORPORATION,

conditions of existence,
directory, 588-9.
mandatory, 590.
definition of, 239, 264.

585.

DELEGATION OF POWER,
by directors, 696, 850-1.
by legislature to create corporations,
retaliatory laws, 1495.

DELIVERY

OF SUBSCRIPTION
DE NOVO CORPORATION,
liability of, 149.

DENYING CORPORATE
estoppel,

268, 283, 302, 304 n.

IN ESCROW,

536-8.

EXISTENCE,

631.

DEPOSIT,
payment of on stock subscriptions,

514, 521 n.

DESTRUCTION OF AN USE, 1022.
DEVISES TO CORPORATION, 1021-39.
DIRECTORS,
are not integral parts, 688-9.
compensation, 1756-7.
de facto, when selected in a meeting out of the state, 844.

definition, 1732.
elected by the shareholders,
ex officio, what are, 1742.
meetings of, necessity,
notice of, 848.

702 n.

848.

place, 843-5, 847.
out of the state, 847.
quorum,

848.

statutory requirements, 847.
voting, can not vote by proxy,

851.
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DIRECTORS

Co ntinued.

method of election may be changed, 1474 n.
notice to, 1760, 1762.
powers, 444, 694-703 n.
acts, when not acts of corporation, 857.
delegation of, 696, 850.

derived from shareholders,
limitations on, 1619.

850.

over surplus, 1626-7.
to adopt agreements made by promoters, 1551-2.
to dispose of corporate property, 1756.
effect changes in corporation, 697-702.
elect inferior officers, agents, etc., 703 n.

fix compensation to other officers and agents,
increase capital stock, 697-8, 762.
make by-laws, 1157 n.
set aside fund to meet depreciation, 1621.
transfer corporate property, 698.
vote back pay to officers, 1757.
qualifications, 850 n.
aliens may be, 850 n.
holding sto'ck not necessary, 692.
non-residents may be, 850 n.

703

officers may be, 850 n.

relation to corporation, 381, 699, 1259, 1727-60.
rights of corporation, 1727-44.
general doctrine, 1727.
general rules as to duties and liabilities,

1735.

theories,

agents, 694, 1727, 1751.
mandataries, 1731-5.

trustees, 1729, 1756.
to careful service, 1737, 1743 n.
profits made by officers, 1735.
remove officers, 1744.

rights of directors,

1746-1760.

to compensation, 1755, 1756 n, 1758.
deal with corporation, 1750, 1753.
manage corporate business,

703 n, 1746-50.

relation to creditors, 1874-99.
rights of creditors, 1874-98.
common law liability, 1874-88.
care required of officers, 1884-8.
directors' responsibility, 1874-84.
ultra vires acts, 1888.
statutory liability of, 1888-98.
general nature of, 1888-92.

penal or contractual, 1892.
enforcement in foreign state,

1892.

n.
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DIRECTORS

Continued.
rights of directors to contract or deal with corporation, 1899.
manage, corporate affairs, 1899.

obtain a preference as a creditor, 1899.
relation to shareholders, 699, 1727, 1790-6.
rights of shareholders, 1790.
collective, 1790.
individual, 1707, 1790.
to elect, 702 n.

fill

vacancy,

1746.

rights of directors, 1791-6.
to contribution or indemnity, 1794.
deal with shareholders, 1791.
relation to third parties, 1796-1804.
false warranty of authority, 1796.
negligence, 1800.
torts, in general, 1799.

DIRECTORY CONDITIONS,
what are, 588-9.

DISCRIMINATION,
against foreign corporations, 1498-1502
creditors, 1807, 2036-53.

DISCHARGE OF SUBSCRIBER,

n.

487, 2034.

DISCRETION,
mandamus

does not lie to control, 1319 n.

DISFRANCHISEMENT,
of members,

1175.

m

DISPOSITION,
of corporate

property on dissolution,

DISSOLUTION OF CORPORATIONS,

902, 910, 912 n.

286, 866-913, 1298-1307,

causes, abuse, 1300.

fraudulent organization, 1301.
illegal acts, 1301.
imperfect organization, 1305.
misuser,

1300.

non-user, 1301.
unlawful purpose, 1305.
usurpation, 1302.
waiver, 1306.
effect of, 891-910 n.
actions, 912 n.
attachment proceedings,
contracts,

912

n.

891, 895, 896, 897, 910

n.

debts, 891, 899, 911 n.

franchises,

910

goods, chattels,

n.
etc., 891, 893, 899, 911 n, 1706, 1773.

1321, 1404-46.
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DISSOLUTION

OF CORPORATIONS -Continued.

judgments,

913 n.

lands, 891, 893, 899, 903, 911 n, 1018,
charitable corporations, 906, 908.
mutual companies, 904.

1706, 1773.

suits, 912 n.
vested rights, 224, 1426-44, 1706, 1773.
methods, 866-890.
act of legislature,

866, 879.

of property, 867.
consolidation, 986, 990.
death of members, 9, 866, 873-4.
expiration of charter, 868-9, 880.
failure to elect trustees, 882.
forfeiture, 866. 887, 1298-1307.
happening of contingency stated in charter, 871-2.
insolvency, 867, 881, 886 n.
loss of integral part, 875.
assignment

merger, 991.

non-user, 881, 883.
ownership of shares by one person, 887-9.
repeal, 887, 1404.
866, 877-86 n.

surrender,

parties, 1302, 1322.

power, courts, 1294-1305, 1321-6.
equity, 1321-6.
law, 1294-1305, 1321.
legislature, 1404, etseq.
majority to dissolve, 886.
only the state creating, can dissolve,
parliament, 1404.

258, 325, 1322.

proceedings, quo warranto, 1294-5, 1298, 1302.
scire facias, 1295, 1298.
statute of limitations, 1305.

waiver,

1306.

DISTINCTION,
between acts not authorized and those forbidden, 1177.
capital, capital stock, franchise and surplus, 778.
capital stock and shares, 1371.
corporation and church, 202.
expenses for construction and ordinary expenses,
gift and devise, 1038.
lien and pledge, 1678.
rents and profits, and uses, 1022.
repeal and forfeiture, 1437.
sale and devise, 1038.
sale capital stock and shares,

774.

1619.
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sole and aggregate corporation, 194.
subscriptions before and after incorporation, 520.

surrender and forfeiture, 878.
trading and non-trading corporations

as to

restricting membership,

1592.

prohibitions in charters and in statutes of wills,
public and private corporations, 727-32.

1028.

DISTRIBUTION,
of assets on dissolution, 891-910 n,
of stock, 386-90, 1704.

1526, 1706, 1773-4, 2050-63.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
corporations in,

DISTRINGAS,

325

n.

227, 1243, 1714.

DIVIDENDS,
by-laws can not change terms
compelling, 1619, 1642-5.
declaration of authority, 1619.

as to, 1174 n.

effect, 1626-31.
out of what, 1408, 1615-21, 1847, 1977, 1980, 1981, 1985.
provisions for paying debts before, 1408, 1615, 1616-8,
rescinding, 1629.
stock,

1625.

definition, 1614.
payment, out of capital before insolvency, 1981-1985.
after insolvency, 1980.
reliance on record," corporation may, 1673.
who entitled to, 1631-43.
assignee of guaranteed stock, 1632.
corporation holding stock in another, 1064.
life tenant or remainder-man, 1638.
option contracts, 1631-8.
preferred shareholder, 1617-8.
purchaser, 1636-7.
transferrer or transferee, 1631-8.
withholding, remedy for, 1643.
severance of, from corporate property, 1628-31.
stock, 1622.

taxation,

1372.

"DOING BUSINESS,"
what is, 1117-8,

1121, 1513-15.

DOMAT,
definition of a corporation,

4.

DOMESTIC,
corporation, 824, 1120 n, 1124, 1360, 1502 n.
creditors, right of state to protect, 1807, 2036,

2050.

1980.
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DOMICILE,
corporation,

1109.

situs of shares may be at, 1402 n.
state may forbid foreign corporation from obtaining, 1503.
law of, controls bequests, 1029 n.

DOMICILIAEY KECEIVER, 1525.
DOUBLE TAXATION, 1372-3 n.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW, 137, 1227,

1355, 1409.

DURATION,
of corporate existence,

830-3, 1307.

DUTIES,
of commissioners,

385-7.

corporations, public, 34, 44,
private, 47, 1236-1291.
directors, 379, 1621, 1734-5.

1294-1320.

See DIRECTORS.
promoters,

374, 1546.

See PROMOTERS.
secretary of state to register name, 829.
subscribers, 447.

E
ECCLESIASTICAL CORPORATION,

201-6, 1291.

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS,
protected

by constitution, 749 n.

EJECTMENT,
corporation can maintain,

ELECTION OF OFFICERS,

1017 n.
199, 210, 217; 238, 1474 n.

ELEVATORS,
are public service institutions, 1368 n.

ELEEMOSYNARY CORPORATIONS,

201, 206-7, 727, 731, 912 n, 1292.

EMBEZZLEMENT,
liability of corporate officers for,

1878, 1884.

EMINENT DOMAIN,
application of Dartmouth College case to,
de facto corporation may exercise, 624.

750 n, 966, 1338.

defined, 1338.

franchises subject to, 317, 1337, 1340.
must be for public purpose, 1309.
national corporation may exercise within the states,
private property may be taken, 556-7.
public use, change of, 1337-43.

EMPLOYES,
who are, within meaning of statutory

liability,

2010.

325 n.
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ENGLAND,
creation of corporations in, 270 n.
dissolution of corporations, 878.
promoters, functions, 380.

ENGLISH RULE,
interpretation of incorporation statutes, 890.
misnomer in contracts, etc., 827.
right of corporation to acquire its own shares, 1041.
shares in other corporations, 1051.
right of one man with proxies to hold meetings, 841.
right of life tenant and remainder-man as to dividends,
right to transfer stock, 1663.

1639.

ENTITY,
legal, fiction of, 109 n.

"EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS,"

36, 552, 1355,

1392,

1396,

1500, 2036, et seq.

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL, 630, 654, 1221.
EQUITABLE INTEREST IN SHARES,
attachment of,

811.

EQUITABLE TITLE,

passes without corporate seal, 1141 n.

EQUITY,
assignment of stock in, 1668.
creditors' bills in, 1852, 1868, 1960, 1965, 1967 n.
effect of dissolution in, 911 n.
fraud, basis of shareholder's liability in, 1907, 1911.
jurisdiction, over church elections, 210.
controversies between shareholders and corporation, 1717-8.
corporations, 90, 1291, 1321, 1323 n, 1326.
declaration of dividends, 1619.
defrauding creditors, 99, 1866.
disfranchisement of corporators, 210.
dissolution, 1291, 1321, 1323 n, 1326, 1750.
distribution of dividends, 1642.
forfeiture, 1291, 1321, 1568.
gifts, 1691-2.
issue of new stock, 1704.
name, 819-22.
sale of stock by illegal directors, 1577.
stockholder's property, 1728-9.
transfers in breach of trust, 1687.
trust funds, 210-2, 1087-8, 1730, 1815-36,

1847, 1867, 1943-50.

ultra vires acts, 1228, 1454.

pleading in, 1128, 1852, 1868, 1960,
power to appoint receivers, 1972 n,
cancel documents,

1230.

1965, 1967 n.
1968.

1402,
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compel transfer, 86, 1698-1703.
dispose of corporate property, 902.
dissolve corporations, 1321, 1322^, 1750.
make calls, to pay creditors, 1960, 1962, 1964, 1968.
order issue of certificate of membership, 686.

protect minority of shareholders, 3775, 1777.
set aside fraudulent conveyances, 1866.

transfer trust funds in eleemosynary corporations, 731.
visit eleemosynary corporations, 206.
rights of creditors in, 911 n, 1847, 1857, 1862-8, 1907, 1911, 1960-8,
members in, 88, 1655, 1685, 1698-1703, 1706, 1709-24.
shares, seizure of, in, 815.
suits in, 1709, 1852, 1868, 1960, 1965, 1967 n.

ESCHEATS TO THE STATE,
ESCROW, 536-8, 760.
ESTATES,

1985.

904, 1018 n.

that corporation may acquire,

911 n, 1018-9.

ESTOPPEL,
by ultra vires contract,

membership

1080, 1181, 1188-9.

by, 687, 1900 n.

to deny corporate existence, 630-73.
doctrine of, applied only when equitable to do so, 632.
when inequitable not to do so, 631.
where there is de facto existence, 637-40.
arises on matter of fact, not law, 634-5.

conditions requisite to,

637.

conduct alone not sufficient, 644.
extent of doctrine, 671 n, 672.

founded on truth,

654.

office of, 648.

principles pertaining to, 654, 672.
public policy forbids creation of corporation by estoppel, 642-3.
elements of, 1222.
parties estopped, associates, among themselves,
as to the corporation, 647.
as to creditors, 647, 650 n.

646-7.

corporation itself, 644-5.
creditors, who deal with knowledge, 254, 631-3, 652-61.
dealers, with knowledge, 631-3, 652-61.
without knowledge, 662-3.
members,

254, 646-7, 1559, 1586.

non-dealers, 664-8.
officers, 650.
promoters,
state, 593.

650.

trustee, 903.
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what constitutes,

accepting
office, 650 n.

benefits, 649 n, 650 n.

acquiescing in corporate acts, 650 n.
attending and participating in meetings,
paying calls, 649 n.
voting, 510 n, 650 n.
waiver by pleading, 392.
want of consideration, 456 n,

650 n, 847

n.

EVIDENCE,
acceptance of charter, 414.
admissions of members are not against corporation, 71 n.
agents' or officers' authority, 1147 n.
corporate

existence,

249, 297, 563, 653, 1131-4, 1146

corporation is a living person, 56 n.
fraud in valuing property, 1944, 1950,
malice, in slander cases, 1260.
membership, books, 1587-90, 1900 n.
certificate,

1951

n.

n.

805-6.

right to vote, 1599.
shareholder disqualified

as a

witness at common law,

71

n.

state's consent to create, 298, 300 n.

EXCISE TAXES, 1390-1.
EXCLUSIVE FRANCHISES AND PRIVILEGES,

309, 824, 1006

n,

1343

n,

1416, 1418, 1474 n.

EXECUTED CONTRACT IS A GRANT,
EXECUTION,
against corporate

property,

723.

49, 1135.

EXECUTION OF CORPORATE CONVEYANCES,
EXECUTORS

862, 1080.

AND ADMINISTRATORS,

corporation may be,
right to vote, 1600.

1088 n, 1089.

EXECUTORY AND EXECUTED CONTRACTS,
See CONTRACTS

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES,

;

DISSOLUTION

1251, 1279-82

n.

EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION,
franchise, 149, 749 n, 756, 935 n,
effect of consolidation, 992, 1006.
as a

994.

merger, 991.

transfer of franchise, 150 n.
presumption against, 1371.
withdrawal of, 1475 n.
See TAXATION.

EXIGENT,
against a corporation, 49, 1236.
2 WIL. CAS.
62

;

897-9 ? 910 n, 918, 1199-1209.

ULTRA VIRES.
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EXISTENCE OF A CORPORATION,
beginning of, 565, et seq.,
conditions of by estoppel,

1004 n.

253, 630-81.

de facto, 233, 244, 248, 614-30.
de

jure,

239, 585-613.

methods of, 258-300.
mode of, 833.

pleading, 629, 653, 1122-29.
proof, 249, 297, 563, 1131-4,
questioning, 620-23.
termination,

1146 n, 1482.

See DISSOLUTION.

tests of, 2-33.

EXPIRATION OF CHARTER,
dissolution by, 868-9,

871.

EXPRESS COMPANIES,
interstate commerce of,
taxation of, 1381.

1505 n.

EXPRESS CONDITIONS,
of corporate existence, 594-613.
subscriptions, 514.

EXPRESS POWERS, 926, 1164 n.
EXPULSION OF MEMBERS, 137,
EXTENSION OF .RAILROAD,
as a

fundamental change,

1165, 1169, 1171 n, 1175.

1461, 1466, 1476 n.

EXTERNAL RELATIONS, 1805-2063.
EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT,
of judgments,

1972.

of preferences of creditors, 1828.
of statutory liability of officers, 1892.
shareholders, 2021-32.

EXTRATERRITORIAL

POWERS,

of assignee to enforce
corporations,

shareholder's liability,

1968, 1972 n, 2029, 2050.

See FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.

receivers,

1524, 1542, 2029, 2050.

F

FAILING,

corporation, majority may dissolve, 886, 1780, 1787.
to comply with conditions, 673-5, 667-80.
statute, upon right to do business, 1095, 1510, 1512 n.
elect trustees, does not dissolve, 882.
exercise corporate powers, 885.
file articles of incorporation, 241.
operate a railroad, 44, 1308, 1313, 1318 n.

perform

a

prescribed duty,

44, 872, 1308, 1318 n.
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corporation liable for, 1250-1.

FEDERAL,
corporation, creation of, 320, 324 n.
may sue in federal courts, 1098-9.
status of

in

the states, 1476.

taxation, by the states, 1476-80.
courts, jurisdiction of corporations,
mandamus,

1097, 1099-1122.

261.

quo warranto,

262.

receivers in, 1542, 1972 n.
government, right to control state corporations, 1527-45.
create corporations, 320, 324 n, 1479.
impose conditions on corporation in its employ, 1501.

FEE,
corporation may take and grant,

903, 910

n,

1018-19.

FELONY,
liability of corporation for,

1285.

FERRY,
franchise, nature of,

311.

FICTION,
when corporate personality is

FICTITIOUS STOCK,
FIDUCIARIES,

so

considered,

105, 109 n.

1951-3.

FIFTH AMENDMENT,

See DIRECTORS;

OFFICERS.

to United States constitution, 39, 1536.

FILING ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION,
necessity of, 241, 406-8, 430, 563, 571-2, 611-13, 1096.

FINE ON CORPORATION,
collection of,

1290.

FIRE COMPANY,
liability for torts of agents, 1275,
FORBIDDEN ACTS, 1476 n.
FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE,

1279

n.

effect on franchise, 1071.

FOREIGN ASSIGNEE,
right to enforce shareholders' liability,

1968, 1972 n.

FOREIGN CORPORATION,
garnishment against, 814.
national corporations are not,

325 n, 1477.

residence

of, 814, 1097-1109, 2036.
rights of, to do business in any state, 845, 1480-90,
engage in interstate commerce, 1503-10.

1491-1517.
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owning property, 1516.
presumption of authority, 1118.
protection of name, 824.
property, 845, 1480, 2036.
sue, generally, 1093, 1483-5, 1489, 1490.
non-residents, 1490.
in federal courts, 1490.
rights of the state to discriminate against, 1498, 1502 n.
to exclude, general rule, 1491, 1503.
insurance, 1537.
manufacturing, 1503.
owning land, 845, 1516.
retaliatory laws, 1494.
to impose conditions, 1094-6, 1491, 1510-17.
"doing business in violation of," 845, 1094, 1513-17.
effect of failure to comply, 1491, 1510-13.
limits on, government agency, 1502.
interstate commerce, 1394, 1503-10.
what is, 1503, 1504 n.
what is not, insurance, 1507.
suit in federal courts, 1491.
visitation over, 1517-27.
compel inspection of books, 1524, 1651.
issue of certificate, 1521.
reinstatement of member,

declaration of dividends,
forfeit charter, 1517.
oust from state, 1517.
receivers,

1520.

1524, 1543.

service of process on, 1120 n.
tests of corporate existence, 28.

FOREIGN INSURANCE COMPANIES,
power to do business,
receivers,

1491, 1507.

effect of, 1972.

judgments,

1524, 1543, 1968-72 n.

FORFEITURE,
causes, abuse, 106, 119, 1300.

fraudulent organization, 1300.
illegal acts, 1301.
imperfect organization, 1305.
misuser, 152, 731, 1300, 1442.
non-user, 152, 731, 1301, 1316, 1443.
unlawful purpose, 1305.

usurpation, 1302.
waiver of, 1306.

1519.
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differs from repeal,

1437.

effect, dissolves corporation, 866, 887.
jurisdiction, courts of equity, 1321-6, 1568.

law, 1294-1305,
power, 109 n, 155,

1321.
258, 325,

1322.

proceedings, 1294-5, 1298, 1302, 1568.
statute of limitations, 1305.
waiver of, 1306.

FORFEITURE OF SHARES,
for non-payment, 1157-9,

1567, 1705.

FORGERY,
of transfer of shares, effect of, 1663.

FORMATION

OF CORPORATIONS,

See CORPORATION, CREATION;

COMPLIANCE

WITH CONDITIONS;

ORGANIZATION.

FORMS,
acceptance of charter, 409.

of subscriptions, 416, 424.
acknowledgment by corporation, 863 n.
application for incorporation, 436, 2066.
articles of incorporation, 435, 2066, 2069.
assessment of stock, 1570.
waiver of notice of, 2076.
assignment of shares, 2099.
subscription to stock, 2075.
association

contracts,

456-539.

by-laws, 2077, 2080.
calls, 1570.
certificate of incorporation, 435, 2066, 2069.
stock, common, 2098.
preferred, 786, 1632, 2071, 2100.
charter (U. S. Steel Corporation), 2069.
conditional subscriptions, 460, 522, 529, 2066.
contracts of corporations, 862, 937.
for combining several corporations, 100, 967,
deed, corporate, 862.
directions for organizing corporations, 2086.
judgment in information in quo icarranto, 1299.
minutes of first meeting of corporation, 2083.
note, corporate, 864 n.
notices, waiver of, 2074, 2075, 2076.
option contract, 2089.
promissory note, 864 n.
promoters' contracts, 2097.
prospectus,

proxy,

540, 2098.

2074, 2100.

schemes of organizing corporations, 560-63.

1937, 2089, 2095, 2096.
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signature of corporation, 862 n.
subscription contracts, conditional, 460,
prior to incorporation, 510, 2065.
statutory, 459, 2066.
syndicate agreements, 2095.

"trusts,"

522, 526, 529, 2066.

100, 967, 1937, 2089, 2095, 2097, 2098.

underwriting contracts, 502, 2095.
voting trusts, 1604, 1606, 2100.
waiver of notice, assessment of unpaid stock,
first meeting, 2074.
meeting for increasing stock, 2075.

2076.

FOUNDER OF CORPORATIONS,
incipiens, 35,
perficiens, 35,

729, 1292.
729, 1292, 1336.

FOUNDERS' SHARES,
definition,

772 n.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT,
as applied to corporations, 36, 38, et seq., 56 n, 1352, 1366 n, 1392, 1396,
1402, 1500, 2036, et seq.

FOURTH SECTION,
statute of frauds, 801.

FRANCHISE,
abuse or misuse, 106, 119, 1300.
accepted makes a grant or executed contract, 150, 708, et seq.
alienation of, 136, 142, 148, 1070, 1081 n, 1082, 1179, 1659.

banking as, 120, 279.
bridge, nature of, 309, 1337, 1343 n.
common rights are not, 131.
consolidate, unexercised right to is not, 1004 n.
construction of statutes interfering with, 935 n.
continuing, 149.
corporate, what are, 113, 118, 130, 279, 705-6.
corporation itself is, 1, 6, 113, 157, et seq., 723.
definitions of, 113, 130, 157, et seq.
dissolution of corporation terminates, 910 n.
eminent domain, may be appropriated under, 317,
exclusive, may be, 309, 314, 1418.
exemption from taxation as, 149, 994.
ferry, nature of, 311.
foreclosure, under mortgage may terminate, 1071.
forfeiture of, 152, 1015.
grant to person in esse, 281.
levy on, 1071.
license is not, 706.

limits on power of legislature to create,

306.

1340.

INDEX.

2155

[References are to the pages;

FRANCHISE

n=note.~\

Continued.
have, 136-150,

694, 706.
members
misuse of, 106, 119, 136, 1300.
mortgage of, 149 n.

name as, 823-4.
nature of, 12, 113, 130, 159,
officers, 703.

et seq.

permission to consolidate is not,
power to create, 279, 306.
primary, 118, 136.
property in, 132, 152, 741, 1527.

1004 n.

sale of, 136, 142, 148, 1070, 1179, 1081 n, 1082, 1659.
secondary, 143.

surrender, 886.
taxation of, 134-5, 778, 1388,
theory of sale of, 1082.
use of streets as, 706.
valuation, 134-5, 778, 1388.

1479, 1527.

FRATERNITY,
distinguished from corporation,

176.

FRAUD,
actual,

in overvaluing property issued for stock, 1950-1.
liability to creditors, 1836, 1852, 1911.

basis of shareholders'

corporation, liable for, 1262, 1268 n.
corporation organized for purpose of, may be dissolved, 97, 1323-6.
equity may dissolve fraudulent corporation, 1323.
effect of, on purchase of stock, 539, 1560, 1663, 1705.
evidence of, in valuing property issued for stock, 1944, 1950-1,
purchase of stock induced by, 539, 1560, 1663, 1705.
subscriptions induced by, 539, 1560, 1663, 1705.
transfers induced by 1663, 1674-88.

FRAUDULENT,
conveyance,

creditors may have set aside,

1866.

corporation, 97, 1323.
dealing does not estop denying corporate existence,
organization, 97,1301.
transfers, 1663, 1674-88.

FREUND,

633.

DR. ERNST,

definition of

a

corporation,

79

n.

FUNCTIONS,
of corporators, members and officers,

FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES,

224, 374-5, 385, 391, 694-705.

1406, 1461, 1476 n.

See AMENDMENTS.

FUNDS,
corporate,

760-94,1331 n, 1408, 1815, 1852, 1900-1950.
See CAPITAL ; CAPITAL STOCK.
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G
GARNISHEE PROCEEDINGS,
against foreign corporation, 811, 814.

GAS COMPANIES,

948, 1071-3, 1368

n,

1474 n.

GENERAL CAPACITY,
doctrine of,

919, 921, 924

n.

GENERAL CORPORATION LAWS,

articles inconsistent with, 434.
causes for enacting, 287-298.
claiming additional powers, 434.
contents of charter under, 429, 434.
creating more than one corporation at a time, 294.
creation under, how differs from special act, 296.
definition of, 333, 337 n.
does not prevent operation of a corporation created under special act,
extent of power, formed under, 1058.
functions and powers of incorporators under, 391.
organization under, 561.
policy of, 287-98.
proof of corporate existence under, 1132.
provisions of, 21, 435.
repeal of, 1445-6.

GENERAL DENIAL,
effect of on proving corporate existence,

1130.

GENERAL ISSUE,
effect on question of corporate existence,

653, 1128-9.

GENERAL MANAGER,
powers, 705 n.

GENERAL VISITATION,
what is,

1333.

GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES,
right to exclusive use of,

GEORGIA

824.

CODE,

definition of corporation in,

GIFT OF SHARES,

78 n.

453-4, 1688-92, 1933.

"GOING CONCERN,"

1827,

1923.

GOOD FAITH,
receiving dividends out of capital, 1981, 1985.
securing corporate privileges, 590-2.
securing subscribers, 488, 758-9, 1559, 1655.
valuing property given for shared, 1943, 1944,
GOODS AND CHATTELS,
effect of dissolution on, 893,

911

n.

1950.

295.
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"GOODS, WARES, AND MERCHANDISE,"
shares as, 799-800.
subscription for stock is not, 531.

GOOD-WILL,
definition, 1386, 1937, 1939.
payment of stock by transfer of,
taxation of, 135, 1385-7.
valuation of, 135, 1385-7, 1938.

1936-42.

GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY,
taxation of,

1397, 1502.

GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL,

1291-1546.

See CONTROL.

GOVERNOR,

as a sole corporation, 272-4.
has no power to waive cause of forfeiture, 1306.

GRANT, JAMES,
definition of corporation,

GRANT OF CHARTER,

78 n.

300

n, 714-35,

See CHARTER

GRATUITOUS

;

749, 856.

CORPORATION, CREATION.

SHARES,

GROSS EARNINGS,
taxation of, 1377,

See GIFT.
1389.

GROSS NEGLIGENCE,
directors' liability for,

1880, 1884.

GUARDIANS,
corporations may be,

GUARANTEED STOCK,

1090 n.
771 n, 1632.

GUARANTOR,
power of corporation to be,

949, 952, 956

n.

H
HABITATION OF A CORPORATION,
HACKS,
are employed

in

a

1099-1121.

public-service occupation,

1368 n.

HEIRS,
complaint by, of ultra vires bequest to corporation,

HISTORY,
corporations,

72, 109, 157.

devises, 1021.

information in nature of quo warranto, 1295 n.
joint stock companies, 175.
partnership, 170.
scire facias, 1295 n.
statutes of mortmain and wills, 1007, 1021-39.

1232.

INDEX.

2158

[References are to the pages; n=note.~\

HOSPITAL,
liability for
HOTELS,

torts, 1278 n.

are public-service institutions, 1368 n.

HOUSE OF REFUGE,
liability for torts,

1278 n.

HUSBAND,
liability upon stock held by wife, 549-552.

ILLEGAL

acquisition of real estate,

1018

n.

acts, effect of, 1183-7, 1209.

banking, 1301.
combinations, 961-3.
contracts,

1183-1196

corporations, 97,
directors, 1577.
insurance, 1301.

n.

567, 1323.

stock, 773 n.

ILLUSTRATIONS,
amendments,

valid,

1473

n.

vote, 1476 n.

"doing business" in

a state, 1514.
commerce, 1504 n.
police power, 1367 n.
public service occupations, 1368 n.

interstate

person, as including corporation, 55, et seq.
ouster, causes of, 1305.
quo warranto, for abuse, misuse, etc., 1300.
schemes of organization, 560-63.

IMMORTALITY,
corporate,

713, 830.

IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS, 359, 708, 749
IMPERFECT ORGANIZATION, 565-681, 1305.
See CORPORATION DE FACTO,

AND BY ESTOPPEL.

IMPLICATION,

creation of corporation by,

n.

298, 300 n.

IMPLIED CONDITIONS OF CORPORATE EXISTENCE,

IMPLIED POWERS,

511, 590.

926, 930, 933 n, 1045-6.

See POWERS.

INCIDENTAL CORPORATE POWERS,
INCORPORATED

"TRUSTS,"

legality of, 978-84.

6, 20, 34, 356, 921, 925.
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CORPORATION,

;

INCORPORATION,
See ASSOCIATION

;

articles of, 435, 2066, 2069.
conditions, compliance with,

CREATION

ORGANIZATION.

264, 267, 411, 511, 530, 565, 681.

laws, 294, 333, 429, 434, 561.
notice, 406 n.
person in, does not include corporation, 56 n.

relations resulting from,

INCORPORATORS,

760.

374, 391-3, 396 n, 443, 464, 905.

INCREASE OF STOCK, 762, 1370,
INDEMNITY OF OFFICERS,
right to,

1460, 1559,

1582.

1794.

INDICTMENT OF CORPORATIONS,
INDIVIDUAL,

1283, 1321.

ownership of stock by one, 887-9.

liability of shareholders, 1900, 1987-2033.
INDORSEMENT OF CERTIFICATE FOR TRANSFER,
INDUSTRIAL SCHOOL,
liability for torts,

810, 1684, 2099.

1278 n.

INFANTS,
as subscribers

or shareholders, 547-8 n.

INFORMATION,
in equity, 1329.
in nature of quo

warranto,

1295

n, 1298-9.

INHABITANT,
corporation as,

1099-1121.

INJUNCTION,
control of corporation by, 1233, 1326-32, 1454.
upon application of corporation to protect corporate name, 819-20.
creditor to prevent waste of corporate property, 1862-66.
private party, 1327, 1331 n.
state, 1233, 1327-31 n, 1454.

ultra vires acts,

INJURIES,

1233.

106, 664, 671 n, 1236-90.

See CONTEMPTS

;

CRIMES

;

TORTS.

INNOCENT PARTY,

INSOLVENCY,

See BONA FIDE PURCHASER.

directors become trustees for creditors, 1819, 1878-9.
does not dissolve, 867, 881, 910 n.
payment of dividends after, 1980.
preference of creditors after, 1819.
simple contract creditor can not immediately proceed in equity,
transfer of shares after, 1661.
withdrawing assets after, 1847, 1879-80.

1873.

2I6O
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BOOKS, 1319 n, 1363, 1645-54.

state, as corporations, 191-2.

INSUEANCE,
is not commerce,

1491, 1507.

INSURANCE COMPANY,
power to hold stock in other

companies,

1061, 1063 n.

INTANGIBLE PROPERTY,
taxation of, 1381-9.

INTEGRAL PARTS,
church as an, 202.
directors are not, 687-9.
dissolution by loss of, 875.

INTEREST-BEARING STOCK, 771 n.
INTEREST OF SHAREHOLDER,
disqualifies as judge, juror, or witness,
does not disqualify from voting, 1596.

INTERNAL RELATIONS, 705, 1519-20,
INTERPRETATION OF CHARTERS,

71 n.

1767-1804.

365-6, 432-4, 933-6 n, 1417.

See CONSTRUCTION.
statutory

liability,

1992.

INTERSTATE BRIDGES,
taxation of,

1398 n.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE,

1503-10, 1539.

anti-trust acts, regulation by, 967-77, 1535.
combinations to control prices as regulations of,
manufacture are not, 1538.
commencement

of, 1505 n.

corporations organized to engage in,
definition of, 1504 n.
express

1538.

1506-7.

business as, 1505 n.

insurance is not, 1507, 1508.
manufacturing is not, 1504 n.
navigation, 1505 n.
original package, what is, 1506 n.
police power as affected by power of congress over, 1366 n.
power of congress over, includes individuals as well as states, 967-77,
1531, 1534, 1536.

purchase of goods, 1505 n.

railroads, as engaged in, 1507 n.
regulation according to state laws,
sale of goods, 1503-1504 n.
state can not exclude, 1503.
taxation of, 1389, 1397.
telephone

and telegraph

companies,

1530.

1505 n.

2l6l
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INTERSTATE COMMERCE

Continued.

termination of, 1506 n.
transit of persons, 1505.
transportation, as, 1505 n.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION,
powers of, 1534-5.

INTERSTATE CONSOLIDATION, 988, 1005 n.
INTERSTATE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, 1397.
INTRUSION INTO OFFICE, 1305.
IOWA,
sole corporation in, 890.

IRREVOCABLE GRANTS BY STATE,
IRREVOCABLE PROXIES, 1596.
ISSUE OF CERTIFICATE,

1349.

compelling, 1521-3.
to replace lost one, 1657.

ISSUE OF STOCK,'
for good-will, 1936, 1942.
property, 1936, et seq., 1947 n.
right to participate in, 1704.
to induce sale of bonds, 1923.

JOINDER,
of corporation and servant in action of tort, 1249.
parties in creditors' bill, 1852, 1965, 1967 n.

JOINT CONTRACTS,
may be made by corporation, 959.

JOINT OWNERS OF SHARES,
JOINT STOCK COMPANIES,

1601.

artificial personalty of, 27, 176 n.
distinguished from corporations,
formation of, 175 n.
history of, 175 n.
membership in, 467.
partnership rules apply, 175 n.
power to expel members, 1169.
gwasi-corporations, 221 n.
suits against, 27, 175 n.
taxation of, 176 n.

7, 16, 171.

JOINT TENANTS,
corporations as,

960, 1019.

JOINT TORT-FEASORS,
shareholders for representing stock

as

full paid,

1917.

2
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JUDGE,

disqualification, by holding shares,

71 n.

JUDGMENT,
after dissolution, effect of, 913 n.
against ancillary receiver, 1544.
at law, necessary, before creditor can proceed

collusiveness,

as against

shareholders,

in equity,

1972-76

1868.

n.

effect in another state, 1892, 1896, 1972.
ouster, 619-20, 1307.
seizure under, 892.

JUDICIAL NOTICE,
of incorporation acts,

406 n, 1124-5.

JURISDICTION OF CORPORATIONS IN GENERAL:
actions by and against corporations, 1092-1136, 1291, 1698,
citizenship of corporations, for purposes of suits, 1097-1109.
control by courts, 1291-1332.
equity, 90, 1321-32.
dissolution, 1321, 1323 n.
dividends, 1619, 1642.
forfeiture of shares, 1567.
fraudulent conveyances, 1866.

1706, 1841.

gifts, 1691-2.
issue of new stock, 1704.
name, 819-22, 824.
receivers,

1524, 1542, 1972 n, 2029, 2053.

recovery of property held ultra vires, 1228.
shareholders' suits, 1709-43.
statutory liability, 2000, 2005, 2014.
transfers of shares, 1674-88, 1690, 1698-1703.
trust funds, 210-2, 760, 1815-52, 1862-1868, 1960, 1964,
law, actions in general, 1092-1136, 1236-1291, 1796-1804.
dividends, 1643.
indictment, 1321.
forfeiture for non-payment, 1567-72.
mandamus,
quo warranto,

1294, 1308-20, 1519-24,
1294, 1298-1308,

1645, 1701.

1517.

scire facias, 1294, 1298.
statutory liability, 1888-92, 1997-2000, 2001, 2014.
suits on subscription contract, 1559-67, 1917, 1960-72.

subscription liability, 1917, 1960-72.
transfer of shares, 1698-1703.
wrongs done to corporation, 1706.
United States courts, 1097, 1113, 1333, 1962.
legislative bodies, 1292, 1337-1446.
visitors, 206-8, 1291, 1332, 1336 n, 1337, 1517-9.

JUROR,

disqualified by holding shares in

a

corporation party,

71

n.

1968, 1985.
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TT

KENT, J.,
definition of corporation,

366.

KING,

corporation, 273.
power to create corporation,
a sole

KYD,

34, 266-70 n, 426, 660.

S.,

definition of corporation,

4, 6.

LABORERS,
who are, in connection with statutory liabilities,

LACHES,

franchises may be lost by, 1071.
right to complain of an ultra vires contract,

2010.

1231.

LAND,
power of corporation to take and hold,
1342, 1344 n.

891, 903^1, 928-31, 1006 n, 1018

n

LAW,
See GENERAL

LAWS;

SPECIAL

ACTS.

charter is, 397-9, 406.
creditors' rights at, against corporation, 1842.
estoppel does not apply to, 634-5, 672.
mistake of, in subscription contracts, 547.

LAY CORPORATIONS,
LEASES,

201, 206, 1292.

by corporations, 974 n, 1071-3, 1224.
long practically a consolidation,

1003 n.

LEGAL ENTITY, 109 n, 176.
LEGAL EXISTENCE OF CORPORATION,
questioning,

255, 620-3, 1109.

LEGAL TITLE TO SHARES,
LEGISLATIVE POWER,

811, 1697.

to amend charters, 223, 444, 1447-72.
See AMENDMENT.
no reserved power, 1447-54, 1472 n.
reserved power, 1458-72.
authorize use of eleven miles of one
1344 n.

railroad by another,

change name, 829.

require sinking fund to be established,
take away exclusive rights, 1416.
authorize municipal subscriptions, 555-6.

consolidation,

985.

to control corporations, 1337.
amend, 1447-72.

eminent domain, 556-7, 1337-43.
police power, 1344-1370.
forbid lotteries, 1348, 1366 n.

1409-10.

2

I 64

INDEX.
[References are to the pages;

LEGISLATIVE POWER

n^=note.~\

Continued.

regulate rates, 1352, 1366 n.
require construction cattle-guards,
reports,

1344.

1363, 1366 n.

repeal, 1404-47.
congress, 1404-12.

legislature,

1412-47.

no reserve power, 1412-22.
reserve power, 1422-46.
effect on vested rights, 1426-44.
general laws, 1445-6.

parliament, 1404.
taxation, 557, 1370-1404.
See TAXATION.
to create corporations, 258-441.
See CORPORATION, CREATION OF.

exclusive, 279.
inherent, 279.
plenary, 283.
methods of exercise,

287-301.

consolidation, 301.
general law, 287-301, 333.
differs from special, 296.
policy of, 287-298.
implication, 298, 300 n.
limits, 302-73.
constitutional, 320-73.
national, 320-333.
on congress, 320-326.
on state legislatures, 326.
on territorial legislatures, 332.
state constitutions, 333-73.
general law only, 333-73.
creating,

338-60.

conferring corporate power, 360.
definition of, 333.
special acts forbidden, 333-63.
title and special privileges, 363.
two-thirds vote, 373.
from nature of franchise, 306-20.
can not be forced on any one, 306.
may be exclusive, 309.
from nature of legislative power, 302-6.
delegation forbidden, 302, 304 n.
exceptions, regents of University of New York,
territorial legislatures, 302.
to question corporate existence, 620-2.

304.
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LEVY,
definition of,
on franchise,

811.
1071.

LIABILITY,
corporation,

jure, or by estoppel,
generally, 914-1092.

de facto, de

contracts,

249, 644, 671-81, 1899.

See POWER TO CONTRACT.

promoters' contracts,
ultra vires, 1176-1235.
contempts,

1551.

1287-90.

creditors, 1841-74.
crimes, 1283-7.
exemplary damages, 1279-82.
officers, 1730, 1755-60.
others, 1760-66.

promoters, 1553-1558.
shareholders, dividends, not paying,
inspecting books, 1645-54.

1614-45.

release, 1705.

transfers, breach of trust, 763 n,
refusal, 1655, 1698-1703.

1655, 1674-88,

vote, 1591-1614.
state, for violation of franchise, 1294-32.
torts, 1007 n, 1236-82.
See TORTS.
of agents, 218-20.
for
acts
<7wasji-corporation,
officers, to corporation, 1727-1746,

creditors,

1878, 1884.

1874-1898.

common law, 1874-1888.

statutory, contractual, 1888-98.
penal, 1892-98.
one another, 1796.
others, torts, 1796-1804.
ultra vires transactions, 1796.

promoters, to corporation, 1546, 1550.
creditors, 1553.
one another, 1767.
shareholders, 1546, 1550.
shareholders, to corporation, assessments,
calls, 1559-78, 1581-2.

1578.

release, 1705.
to creditors, 6, 573, 1563 n, 1847-52, 1899-2034.
common law or equitable,
fictitious stock, 1951-60.

1900-77.

imperfect organization, 1899.
statutory, contractual, 1987-2034.
penal, 1987, 2033.
2 WIL. CAS.

63

1700.
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unpaid shares, 1900-51.
paid in overvalued property, 1936-51.

withdrawal of assets, 1977-87.
enforcement, equity, 1960-67,
law, 1960, 2014-33.
statutory, 2012-34.

1895, 2014-33.

assignee, 1968.
receiver, 2029.
release,

waiver,

1705.
86 n.

to officers, compensation,

indemnity,
to one another,

1755-60.

1794.
1770-90.

to others, 1726, 1790, 1994.
subscribers to stock, 243, 484, 501, 514.
transferee of unpaid shares, 1694-6, 1773.

LIBEL,
corporation liable for, civilly, 1253-5.
criminally, 1286.

LICENSE..

charter as, 406, 561.
distinguished from franchise, 406, 706,
permission to consolidate is, 1004 n.

LICENSE TAXES,
LIEN,

1004 n, 1493.

1392-3.

corporate upon shares, for unpaid subscriptions, 1161-64, 1580, 1678.

LIFE TENANT,
right to stock dividends,

1638-43.

LIMITATIONS,
statutes of, on subscription contracts,

1568-72,

1907, 1972, 2013.

See STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

LIMITS,
on power to create corporations, 302-73.
See LEGISLATIVE POWER, LIMITS.

LINDLEY, SIR N.
definition of corporations,

78 n.

LIQUORS,
right to sell, not

a vested

right,

230.

LITERARY CORPORATION,
power to hold stock in other corporations,

LOCAL ACT,

860.

See SPECIAL

ACT.

1061.
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LOCATION OF SHARES,
for attachment, 811-14.
taxation, 1399-1401.
LOSS OF INTEGRAL PART,
dissolution by, 877.

LOST CERTIFICATE,
right of bona fide purchaser, 1673-84.

LOTTERIES,
power to regulate or forbid,

1348, 1367

n,

1541.

LOUISIANA CODE,
definition of corporation,

78 n.

LOWELL, A. L.

& F. C.
definition of corporations,

78

n.

M
>

MAILS,
control by congress

as a

method of controlling corporations,

1541.

MAJORITY,
of directors, powers of, 852.
shareholders or members, power, to accept amendments,
immaterial, 1454-66.
material, 1466-73.
convert common stock into preferred, 793 n.
dissolve corporation, insolvent, 886.
solvent, 886.
manage corporation generally, 837, 1463, 1775-79.
sell corporate property, 1780-87.
surrender charter, 1789.

MALA IN SE,
lotteries are not,

1351.

MALA PROHIBITA,
lotteries are,

1351.

MALFEASANCE,
corporation liable for,

1284, 1286.

MALICE,
corporation may have,

1260.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION,
liability of corporation for, 1256.
MANAGEMENT OF CORPORATIONS,
by oflicers, 690-705, 848-65, 1746-50, 1899.
shareholders, 690-703, 833-48, 1453-73, 1775.
right of creditors to interfere, 1808, 1862-66.
courts to interfere, 1746-50.

1453-73.
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390 n.

corporations, 44, 1308-1321, 1702, 1964.
general principles, to enforce a specific legal duty, 44, 1308,
common law, or statutory, 1318 n.
express or implied, 1318 n.
public or private, 44, 138, 1317, 1318 n.
and no other adequate remedy, 138, 1317, 1318 n.
but not to control discretion, 1319 n.
or use a mere privilege, 1319 n.
without a specific duty, 1313, 1319 n.
particular applications, 44, 1308-1321.
private duties, to compel admission to membership, 44,
call of meeting, 1319 n.
calls to be made, 1964.
inspection of books, 1319 n, 1651.

1318 n.

1319

n.

restore to membership, 1319 n.
transfer of shares, 1319 n, 1701.
public duties, canal companies, to bridge canals, etc., 1320 n.
carriers, to furnish facilities, 1321 n.
cemetery companies, to permit burial, 1320 n.
ditch companies, to build bridges, 1320 n.
elevators, 1310.
enforce religious trusts, 1319 n.
gas companies, furnish gas, 1320 n.
inspection of books, 1319 n.
irrigating companies, build bridges, 1319 n.
furnish water, 1319 n.
news gathering companies to furnish service, 1320 n.
payment of taxes, 1319 n.
railroad companies, to build bridges, etc., 1310, 1319 n.
build road, 1311, 1320 n.
build station, 1310.
furnish transportation, 1321 n.
operate its road, 1308, 1310, 1313, 1320 n.
telegraph companies, furnish service, 1320 n.
telephone companies, 1320 n.
transportation companies, to furnish facilities, 1321 n.
water companies, to furnish water, 1320 n.
power of courts to issue, federal, 262.

state, 1295.

MANDATARIES,
directors

are, 1731-2.

MANDATORY CONDITIONS,
MANUFACTURING,
what is, 606-7.

590, 594.
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MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS,
powers of, 949, 1063, 1211, 1503, 1538.

MARINE INSURANCE IS NOT COMMERCE,
MARRIED WOMEN,
as

shareholders,

1508.

549, 552 n.

MARSHALL, CHIEF JUSTICE,
definition of

a

corporation,

1, 4, 77 n, 713.

MEASURE OF DAMAGES,
for breach of subscription contract,

1572.

MEETINGS,
directors, 848-53.
shareholders, necessity,

833.

may be corporate action without, 100.
notice, business, 835-9.
place, 837 n.
838 n.

time,

place, out of sjtate, 839-847.
quorum, 839-842.
one member with proxies of others, 839.

MEMBERSHIP AND MEMBERS,
acts of are sometimes

See SHAREHOLDERS.
acts, 100, 890.

corporate

acquisition, non-stock corporations. 234, 682.
stock corporations, estoppel, 687, 1559.
gift, 1688, 1933.
purchase from corporation, 1919, 1923,
signing articles of incorporation, 485.
subscription, common-law contracts, 687.
agreement with promoter, 687.
agreements subscribing, 687.
to subscribe,

687.

application, allotment, etc., 687.
underwriting, 687.
transfer, 687, 1654-1703.
who may become, 468, 547-59.
differ from the corporation, 58, 68-71 n, 468.
estoppel to deny corporate existence, 634, 687, 1559.
expulsion, 137,210, 1165, 1169, 1171 n, 1175.
liabilities,
See LIABILITIES; SHAREHOLDERS.
among themselves, 1770-90.
to corporation, 1559-82, 1705.

creditors,

6, 17, 573, 895, 1563 n, 1847-52,

officers, 1755-60, 1794.
others, 1726, 1790, 1794.
necessity,

682, 993.

1899-2034.
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own the primary franchise, 136.
powers, 690-703, 793 n, 833-48, 886, 1453-73, 1775-89.
See-

preferred are not creditors,
relations,

MAJORITY.

788, 1618.

See, infra, EIGHTS.
among themselves, 1770-90.
to corporation, 1559-1727.

creditors,

1760, 1899-2035.

officers, 1727-1760.
others, 1760-66,

1790.

promoters, 1546-58, 1770.
state, 845-7, 1770.

rights, among themselves,

908, 1770-90.

agreements between do not generally affect corporation, 86 n.
equality, in proportion to stock, 1770-75.

in contributing

to corporate enterprise, 1770.
discharging corporate debts, 1771.
distribution of assets, on dissolution, 908, 1773.
of profits, 1770.
management,

1770.

good faith upon part of fellow-subscribers,
of majority, 1775-1790.

in

accepting amendments,

1770.

1790.

increasing stock, 762-3.
managing corporate affairs, 1775-80.
selling corporate property, 985, 1780-89.
surrendering charter, 886, 1789.
majority owner, 1608.
rights against the corporation, 1581-1727.
collective, to sue for corporate wrongs, when it will not, 88, 1706-27.
to enjoin consummation of ultra vires contract, 1017 n.
individual, 1581-1706.
to certificate of shares, 1581-2, 1673-84.
contract with the corporation, 60.
dividends, 1614-45.
See DIVIDENDS.

enjoin change of corporate enterprise,

1705.

ultra vires contract, 1017 n.
evidence of membership, 1581-91.

inspect books,

1645-54.

See INSPECTION OP BOOKS.

insure corporate property, 59.
participate in issue of new shares, 1703-5.
release, 87, 542-3, 788-9, 1705.
See RELEASE.
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MEMBERSHIP AND MEMBERS

Continued.
share in distribution of assets on dissolution, 1706.
sue corporation, 88, 92 n.

transfer shares,

1654-1703.

See TRANSFER.
vote, 851, 1591-3, 1598, 1677.
as against creditors, 2034.
to dividends from profits, 2034.

rights

capital received in good faith before insolvency, 2034.
release
from liability, 788-9, 1705, 2034.
to
by acceptance of material amendment, not assented to by shareholder, 1705, 2034.
forfeiture for non-payment, 1705, 2034.
fraud inducing subscription, 2034.
payment for shares in full, 1900-2.
transfer, 2034.
to set off claims, against liability, 1906-7, 1991 n.
rights as against ^officers, careful service, 1737-43.
elect officers' 238.
profits made, 1735-6.
removal, 703 n, 1744-6.
rights as against promoters, 1546-51.
rights as against the state, not to have his liability increased or rights
decreased without his consent, 1770.
termination, death, 9, 866, 873-5.
fraud, 529, 1560.
release, 87, 1705.

removal,
transfer,

137, 210, 1165, 1169, 1175.
687, 1654, 1703.

who may be, 547-61.
aliens, 552, 850 n, 1402-3, 1591, 2036.
citizens, limited to, 1402-3, 1591.
corporations, municipal, 554.
private, 553, 1051-64.
infants, 547-8.
married women, 549-52.
national government, 558.
not necessarily stockholders, even in stock companies,
state governments,

MERGER,

558.

989, 1003 n.

See CONSOLIDATION.

MIGRATORY PROPERTY,
taxation of,

1381 n.

MILLS,
as

public service institutions,

1368

n.

MINISTER,
power of church to call or depose,

212.

468.

INDEX.

21/2

[References are to the pages;

n=note.~\

MINING COMPANIES,
how differ from corporations, 182.
power of majority to sell all the property, 1780, 1786.
payment of dividends without replacing capital, 1622.
cost-book,

MINORS,
subscriptions by, 547-8.
See INFANTS.

MINORITY,
rights of,

886, 1453,. 1775, 1777.

See MAJORITY, POWER OF.

MISFEASANCE,
corporate

liability for,

1284, 1286

n.

MISNOMER,
aided by averment,

verdict,

825.

825.

does not affect corporate existence,
effect of, 825-7.
contracts, 825, 826 n.

1134.

devises, 826.
grants, 826.

n.

judgments,

827

pleadings,

827 n.

process, 827 n.
remedy,

amendment, 827 n.
plea in abatement, 827 n.
waived, by pleading to merits, 827 n, 1134.

MISTAKE,
fact, in subscription contracts,
law, in subscription contracts,

545, 547n.
547 n.

MISTJSER,
of franchise,

a cause of

forfeiture,

106, 152, 156, 402, 731, 1442.

MODES,
of action of corporations, 833.
dissolution, 866, et seq., 868 n.
existence,

830.

MONOPOLIES, 100, 935 n,
MORAWETZ, VICTOR,

957-84, 1535.

definition of corporation,

1.

MORTGAGE,
power to, 149 n, 834, 1078-81.
for future advances, 1079-80.
'
franchise, 149 n, 1081.

MORTMAIN,
statutes of, 1015 n, 1034.
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MULTIFARIOUSNESS,

in creditors' bills, 1724, 1852.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
authority to subscribe to stock of private corporation,
charters of, may be amended, 749 n.
judicial notice of, 406 n.
liability for torts, 214, 1275.

554, 557-8.

MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANIES,
reversion of property on dissolution,

1019.

N

NAME,

corporate, acquisition of, 817-19, 824, 937.
change of, 827-9, 1474 n.
effect of misnomer, 825-7.
See MISNOMER.
necessity

of, 9, 22.

presumption from use,
rights in, 819-25.
signing, 862-5, 1142.

1128.

NATIONAL BANKS,
taxation of,

1398 n.

NATIONAL CORPORATIONS,
creation of, 305 n,
exempt from state
franchises can not
may sue in United

320-325, 1478.
control, 325 n, 1478.
be taxed, 1478.

States courts, 325 n, 1098.
powers, 325 n.
state corporation can reorganize as a national corporation, 1529.
status in the states, not foreign, 325 n, 1476-9.

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT,
corporation, 275-6.
control of state corporations, 1527-45.
interstate commerce, anti-trust acts,
regulating carriers, 1534.
regulating by state laws, 1530.
as a

1535.

mails, 1541.
taxation, 1527-29.

NEGLECT,
what constitutes

corporate,

105.

NEGLIGENCE,
corporation liable for, 1268-70, 1272 n,
officers' liability for, 1800, 1874, 1879.

1281.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS,
certificate

of shares is not, 807-10.

power of corporation to issue, 940-52,
sealed, effect, 864 n, 1150.

1150.

INDEX.
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what are, for paying dividends,

1618.

NEW CERTIFICATE,
liability of corporation for issuing,
NEW CORPORATION, 984-1007.

1655, 1686.

See CONSOLIDATION.

NEW SHARES,

right to participate in issue of, 1583-4, 1703-4.

NON-DEALERS,
when estopped from denying corporate existence,

664-8.

NON-FEASANCE,
when corporation liable for,

1283, 1286 n.

NON-RESIDENTS,
aliens, not protected under fourteenth amendment, 1402.
corporations as, may be discriminated against, 1517, 2036-50.
may be directors, 850 n.
shareholders may be taxed on shares held, 1399-1402.

NON-STOCK CORPORATIONS,
acquisition of membership, 234, 682-5.
not organized for profit, 237.
power of members, 238.
property reverts on dissolution, 905, 912 n.

NON-SUIT,
dissolution

as a cause

for,

912

n.

NON-USER,
as a cause of

forfeiture,

152, 731, 881-3, 1443.

NOTES AND BONDS,
form of corporate, 864 n.
power of corporation to deal in,

946

n

issue, 940-52, 1150.

NOTICE,
of allotment of shares, 507.
of calls, 1565, 1573.
of contents of charters, generally,
judicially, 406 n.
of meetings, directors, 848.
shareholders, 835-839.
adjourned, 838.
business to be done, 838.

called,

838.

necessity, 415.
place, 838.

presumptions,

415, 850

special, 838.
service of, 839 n.
time, 838.

n.

406 n, 950, 1208, 1947.
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of visitation, 1334-5.
of withdrawal of agreement to take stock, 478-80.
to corporation, 1760-66.
agent, generally notice to corporation, 1763.
agent, before employment, not, 1761.
director, not sufficient, 1760, 1762.
directors as a board, is sufficient, 1760, 1762.
officer, engaged in corporate business is, 1762.
unless acting for himself, 1763-4.
servant, as to his duties, 1765-6.
shareholder, not sufficient, 1762.
but to all is sufficient, 1763.
to creditors, of value of property taken in payment of shares, 1946-9.

NUISANCE,
corporation liable for,

1239, 1242, 1285.

NUL TIEL CORPORATION,

625, 666, 1126, 1130.

NUMBER,

of incorporators necessary to incorporate, 594-6.
of votes of shareholders, 1591, 1596.

OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS,
impairment of, extent of doctrine,

708, 749 n, 1413-21.

OFFENSES,
corporate

liability for,

1285.

See CRIMES.

OFFER,
of an amendment, 1447, 1454, 1472 n.
of a charter, 409, 412, 749 n.
to subscribe for stock, 474-8, 482-9, 492-4, 527-30.

OFFICERS,
amotion of,

213, 1165, 1744.

See REMOVAL.

appointment,
compensation,

199, 210, 217, 238, 1474 n .
703, 1755, et seq.

creditor's bill against,
de facto,

1852, 1874, 1878.

1578.

directors, functions and powers, generally, 694, 703, 2068, 2072, 2077,
responsibility and duties generally, 1706, 1727-9, 1752, 1874-98.
duties, 1706, 1727-46, 1796-1804,

1874-98.

LIABILITIES;

OFFICERS.
to corporation, as agents, 1706, 1727-9.
as mandataries,
1731-5.
See

as trustees,

1729-31.

2081.

INDEX.
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OFFICERS

Continued.
account for profits, 1735-7.
careful service, 1737^3, 1752.
general rules, 1735.

to creditors, 249, 1874-98.
common law, 1874-88.
care required, 1743, 1884-8.

director's responsibility, 1874-84.
diversion of funds, 1874-9.
ultra vires transactions, 1888.
statutory, general nature of, 1888-92.
contractual or penal, 1892-8.
to one another, 1796.
to outside parties, 1796-1804.
false warranty, ultra vires, 1796-8.

torts,

1254, 1799-1804.

to shareholders,
See MEMBERS ; RIGHTS AGAINST CORPORATION.
collective, 88, 1706-27.

individual,

1581-1706.

elections of, 693 n, 702.
estoppel, 650-1.
general manager, 705 n.

liabilities,

See DUTIES, above,

necessity of, 567, 690-2.
notice to, 1760-66.
See NOTICE.
powers,

690, 691, 694-705, 848-65, 1746.

preference

See RIGHTS, below,
1832-41.

of, as creditors,

president, powers and functions, 703, 705 n, 2078, 2082.
presumptions, as to powers and authority, 854, 864 n, 1138 n,
qualifications, 692-3, 850 n.
relation, among themselves, 1796.
to corporation, 1727-60.
creditors, 249, 1874-99.
others, 1796-1804.

shareholders, 1770, 1790-6.
removal, 1744-50.
rights, among themselves, 1796.
against corporation, 1750-60.
1755-60.
compensation,
to deal with corporation, 1750-55.

creditors,

1899.

to contract with corporation, 1899.
manage corporate affairs, 1899.
obtain preference,

1899.

1144

n.

INDEX.
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OFFICERS

Continued.

shareholders, 1791-6.
to contribution or indemnity for discharging corporate debts,
1794.

to deal with shareholders, 1791-4.
705 n, 2078, 2082.

secretary,
service of process on, 1117-8, 1120 n, 1135.
treasurer, 705 n, 2078, 2082.

vice-president,

705

n,

2082.

ONE-MAN COMPANIES, 200 n, 887-r9.
OPTION CONTRACTS, 1631-8, 2089.
ORAL SUBSCRIPTIONS, 459 n.
ORDINARY BUSINESS OF CORPORATION,
right of directors to control, 694-703 n.

ORGANIC CHANGES,
power of directors to make, 697-702.
shareholders, 702.*

ORGANIZATION

OF CORPORATIONS,

242, 289-90, 560-681.
of corporate existence, 565-85.
under general laws, theories, 565-85.
are filed, 571.
as soon as articles of association
not until articles are filed and officers selected, 581.
not until stock is subscribed, 574.

commencement

only after complete organization, 565-70.
under special acts, depends on its terms, 585.

ORGANIZATION,
compliance with conditions, 242, 289-90. 585-673.
de facto corporation, 239, 614-30, 671.
precedent, 614-29.
bona fide attempt to organize,

614-29, 671.

color of apparent organization, 614-29, 671 .
constitutional law under which to organize, 614-29.
user, 614-29, 671.
reasons for not allowing collateral attack, 625-9.
de jure corporation, 239, 585-614.
precedent, 585.
subsequent, 586.

directory, 588.
mandatory, 590.
implied, good faith, 590-3.
express, 594-614.

acknowledging articles of association, 609-11.
certain number of in corporators, 574.
filing articles of incorporation, 611-13.
names and residences of subscribers to stock, 600-3.
place of business, 603-5.
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ORGANIZATION

Continued.
purpose, 605-7.

written articles of association,

597-9.

estoppel, 239, 630-72.
theories concerning, 630-644.
applies only where de facto existence, 637-42.
arises on matter of fact and not of law, 634-7.
doctrine is one of equity, 630-4.

applied only where equitable, 6324.
inequitable not to do so, 631-2.
public policy forbids recognition of corporate
estoppel, 642-4.
parties estopped, where doctrine is recognized,
apparent corporation itself, 644-6.

existence by
644-73.

associates or members, 646.
among themselves, 646-7.

corporation and its creditors, 647-50.
upon subscription liability, 647-50.
statutory liability, 650.
dealers with knowledge of claim of corporate existence,
as to the

652-61.
seeking to evade liability to corporation, 652-6.
hold members individually liable, 656-61.
dealers without knowledge of claim of corporate
ence are not estopped, 662-4.
non-dealers, 664-71.
crimes against corporation, 668-71.
torts against the corporation, 664-7.
officers, 650-2.
promoters, 650-2.
effect of non-compliance with conditions, 673-81.
does not result in partnership, 677-81.
results in a partnership, 673-6.

definition of, 567.
proof of, 563-5, 1131-4.
schemes of, 560-63.
under general incorporation laws, 561-3.
before application, 562.
by subscribers to stock, 563.
deed of settlement,
license plan, 561.
king's charter, 560.

561.

special acts, 560-1.

ORGANS OF ACTION OF A CORPORATION,

ORIGINAL PACKAGE,
definition of.

1506

n.

690-1.

exist-

INDEX.
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OUSTER OF CORPORATION,
OVERISSUED SHARES,
validity of,

note.]

1305, 1517.

763 n.

OVERSUBSCRIPTION,
treatment of, 385-7.

OVERVALUATION
SHARES,

OF

PROPERTY

TAKEN

IN

PAYMENT

OF

1943-51.

OWNERSHIP,

a

it,

of shares, evidence of, 1587-90, 1666-7.
estoppel by placing indorsed certificate in hands of another party
809, 1673, 1679.
who fraudulently transfers
one member, all, 887-90.
of real property by foreign corporation, 1516.

PARLIAMENT,
power to create corporations,
repeal

corporate

charters,

270.
1404.

to

a

PAROL CONDITIONS
written subscription, validity of, 494-6.

PAROL EVIDENCE,
acts of directors may be proved by, 857.

declaration of dividend,

as to

1629.

PAROL SUBSCRIPTIONS,
validity of,

459

n.

as

a

PARSON,
sole corporation, 200 n.

PARTICULAR POWERS OF CORPORATIONS,

937-1175.

See POWERS.

PARTIES,

to association contracts, 547-59.
to set aside or complain of ultra vires contracts, 1233.
to suits, by and against the corporation generally, 92, 1092-1122,

by creditors,

1852, 1862, 1863, 1865, 1866, 1868,

1968, 1997-2003,

2012-33.

by shareholders, 71, 88,
injunction proceedings,

92, 1706, 1709, 1723, 1724.
1326, 1330, 1331 n.

mandamus proceedings, 1308, 1317, 1319 n.
quo warranto proceedings, 258, 1295, 1302-4.

PARTNERSHIP,

7,

corporation generally has no power to form a, 109 n, 957-9, 1052.
defective corporate organization, results in, 673-5.
definition of, 249, 957.
distinguished from corporations,
history of, 170 n.

23, 167, 170, 575.

1236-90.

1960, 1962, 1965, 1967,

INDEX.
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PATENTED ARTICLES, MAY BE TAXED, 1387
PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS AND GOOD-WILL,
part of corporate capital, 1386.
pass to new corporation on consolidation,
payment of stock in, 1936.
taxation of, 135, 1385.

n.

1006.

PAYMENT,
of calls operates as an estoppel, 649 n.
of deposits to bind subscriptions, theories,

of dividends, remedy for withholding,
of subscriptions, 457-8, 1581, 1907-23.
in property, 1936-50.
good-will, 1936.
overvalued,

517, 521 n.

1643.

1943-50.

actual fraud rule, 1944, 1950.
true-value rule, 1943-1947 n.
effect of notice to creditor, 1946, 1947, 1949.
statute forbidding, 1949.

PENAL LIABILITY,
statutory,

PENALTY,

1893, 1987, 1989 n.

against doing business in a state, effect of, 1094, 1512 n.

what is,

1894.

PERJURY,

corporation can not commit,

PERPETUAL SUCCESSION,
meaning of,

1285.

26, 197, 830-3, 937.

PERSON,
a corporation is generally so considered,
as to contracts, 60.

1, 3, 17, 33, 51, 55, 77, 1053.

ownership of its property, 58.
suits between it and its members, 71, 90 n.
ancient ideas, 72 n.

in

canon law, 74 n.
common law, 74 n.

Roman law,

in interpretation
attachment

73

n.

of statutes, generally, 51, 55 n.
laws, 55 n.

but not in incorporation statutes,
under fifth amendment, 39.

PERSONALITY,
corporate,

theories of, 109 n, 224.

Mr. Pomeroy's, 111, n.
Mr. Morawetz's, 110 n.
Mr. Taylor's, 110 n.
Mr. Trapnell's, 112 n.
joint stock company, 176.

56 n.

2l8l
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PERSONAL PROPERTY,
acquisition of by corporation, 1040-64.
escheat to state upon dissolution, 904,
franchises may be so considered, 132.
shares of stock as, 794-8, 1046.
situs for taxation, 1375.

908, 911 n.

PERSONAL RELATION,
power of corporation to act in,

1087.

PERVERSION OF CORPORATE FRANCHISES,
PLEADING,
alleging corporate existence,
abatement,

108, 1300.

1122-30.

827, 1130, 1220.

creditors' bills, 1724, 1847, 1852,
misnomer, 827.
multifariousness, 1724, 1852.
ultra vires, when allowed, 1220.

PLEDGE OF SHARES,
POLICE POWER,

1868, I960, 1965, 1967 n.

1598, 1661, 1674, 1680.

control of corporations under, 750 n, 1344-68, 1418, 1531.
definition and general extent, 1366 n.
effect of power of congress to regulate commerce, 1369 n.
concurrent with congress, 1369 n.
to bridge navigable waters, 1369 n.
enact quarantine laws, 1369 n.
establish ferries, 1369 n.
forbid heating cars by stoves, 1370 n.
running through trains on Sunday, 1370 n.
improve navigable channels, 1369 n.
regulate pilots, 1369 n.
piers and docks, 1369 n.
number of trains to stop to accommodate
reasonable
require
traffic, 1370 n.
matters not local, but national in character,
exclusive in congress,
wharves,

or admit of uniform system, 1370 n.
exclusive in the states, 1369 n.
build bridges over non-navigable waters, 1369 n.
construction of highways, etc., in the state, 1369 n.
prescribe form of all commercial contracts, 1369 n.
regulate its internal trade, 1369 n.
illustrations of exercise of the power, 1367.
safety of person and property, 1367.
examination of employes of railroads, 1367.
fences, guards, etc., of railroads, 1344, 1367 n.
fire, prevent spread, 1367 n.
grade crossings, 1367 n.
heating cars, 1367 n.
2 WIL. CAS.

64
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public health and comfort,
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generally,

1367 n.

1367.

cigarettes, 1367 n.
diseased cattle, 1367 n.
inspection and quarantine laws, 1367 n.
intoxicating liquors, 1367 n.
nuisance,

1367 n.

oleomargarine, 1367 n.
public information reports, 1363, 1367 n.
lotteries, etc., 1348, 1367 n.
public morals,
regulation of public service occupations, 1367-8.
associated press, 1368 n.
boards of trade, 1368 n.
gas companies,
hacks, 1368 n.

1368

n.

hotels, 1368 n.
mills, grist and flour,
railroads, rates, etc.,

1368 n.
1352, 1368 n.

stock yards, 1368 n.
telegraphs and telephones, 1368 n.
theaters, trains, restaurants, 1368 n.
warehouses and elevators, 1368 n.

water companies,
wharves, 1368 n.

1368 n.

POOLING CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS,
POWER OF ATTORNEY,

960, 963, 966, 974 n, 1610-13.

to convey land must be under seal, 1141.

POWER OF COMMISSIONERS, 385-91.
POWERS, CORPORATE, 914-1235.
See CORPORATION ; RIGHTS.
as tests of corporate existence, 19, 20, 28.
classes, 925-37.
express, 430, 926, 933.
construction of, rules, 934 n.

presumptions as to knowledge of,
implied, 926-933.
incidental, 6, 20, 34, 925.
See PARTICULAR

by-laws,

POWERS,

925.

contract, grant, etc., 925.
name, 925, 937.
perpetual succession, 26, 925, 937.
purchase and hold property, 925.
remove members and officers, 925.
seal, 925.
sue and be sued, 925.

406 n, 950, 1208, 1947.

below,

INDEX.
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POWERS, CORPORATE

Continued.

doctrine of general capacity,

914, 919-24.

special capacities, 914, 915-18.
in whom vested, 691.
particular powers, 937-1235.
acquire personal property, 1040-65.
generally, 1040-1.
its own shares, 1041-51, 1372.

American rules, may, 1045-8.
exceptions, 1047-8.
may not, 1048-51.
English rule, 1041-5.

in other corporations, 1051-62 n,
American rule, 1054-60, 1062 n.

shares

exceptions,

1064, 1778-87, 1900 n.

1060-62 n.

English rule, 1051-4.
acquire and hold real property, 928-32,

1007-39.

devise, 1021-39.
history and general doctrines, 1021-'.
restrictions in charters, and in statutes of wills, 1026-9.
who may object when limit is exceeded, 1016 n, 1029-39.
the state only, 1016 n, 1029-33.
those next in interest, 1016 n. 1034-9.
purchase, 1007-21.
consequences of ultra vires purchase,

1014.

estates that may be acquired, 1018-21.
common, and joint tenancy, 1019-21.
fee, 1018.

extent of power, 1008-14.
presumptions, 1007-8.
statutes of mortmain, 1015 n.
who can complain of ultra vires holding,
act in a personal relation, 1087-92.
administrator or executor, 1088-90.
agent or attorney in fact, 1090-92.

1016 n.

trustee, 1087-8.

alienate property, 1065-87.
general doctrine, 1065-6.
limits, 1066-87.
execution, 1136.
franchises, 1081-7, 1179.
theory of sale of franchise when authorized, 1082-7.
mortgage,

149 n, 1065, 1070, 1078-81.

property charged with
contract, 937-1007 n, 1176-1235.
as to form, general, 937.

a

public use,

seal, 937, 1136-53.
See below.

1070-77.

2 I
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POWERS, CORPORATE

Continued.
938-1007 n.

as to subject-matter,

paper, 949-52.

accommodation

borrow money, 938-9.
consolidate, 984-1007.
See CONSOLIDATION.
consent of shareholders necessary, 1004 n.
state necessary, 1003 n.
definition, 989-95, 1003 n.
effect, on creditors' rights, 995-1003.

former companies,
existence,

989-95, 1004 n.

1004 n.

liabilities, 1004 n.
property, 1004 n.
rights, 1004 n.
effect on new company, 1005 n.
contracts,
debts,

1005 n.

1007 n.

liabilities, 1005 n.
property, 1005 n.
rights and special privileges,

1005 n.

torts, 1007 n.

interstate consolidation, 988.
merger, how differs from consolidation, 989-95.
negotiable instruments, 940-8.
partnership, 109 n, 957-60.
surety or guarantor, 952-6.
trade combinations, 960-89.
pools, 960-6.

restraint of trade, 967-77.
"trusts," incorporated, 978-84.
unincorporated, 100, 977.
create, and increase or decrease, a capital stock, 761-94.
disfranchise members, 1175.
See REMOVE, below.
have a name, 817-29, 937.
See NAME.
perpetual succession, 26, 197, 830-3, 937.
See PERPETUAL SUCCESSION.
seal, 942, 1136-63.
See SEAL.
make assignment for benefit of creditors, 1972 n.
make by-laws, 792-3, 1153-75.
See BY-LAWS.
definition and purpose, 1153-5.

differs from regulation, 1153-5.
effect, 1174-5.
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POWERS, CORPORATE

Continued.
power to make, 1156-7.

incidental, 1156.
resides in member, 1156-7.
limits on, 1157-71.
expulsion of members, 1165-71.
.forfeitures, 1157-9.
liens, 1161-4.
transfers, 1159-61.
validity, 1171-74.
prefer creditors, 1815-41.
receive subscriptions, 471-559.
See SUBSCRIPTIONS.
remove members,

137, 210, 1165, 1169, 1175.

officers, 213, 1165, 1744, 1746.
select its officers, agents and servants, 693 n.
sue and be sued, 1092-1136, 1483-85.
See ACTIONS.
confess judgment, 1134-6.

execution, 1136.
jurisdiction, 1092-1115.
sue, 1092-9.

federal corporation in U. S. courts,
generally anywhere, 1092-3.

1098-9.

statutes may exclude, 1095-6.
except as to interstate commerce,
in the federal courts, 1097-8.

suits against corporations,

in

1095-6.

1099-1115.

state courts, 1115-22,

1483-5.

generally wherever found doing business,
what is doing business, 1121-22.

in

1115-20.

service of process, 1115, 1120-1.
domestic corporations, 1120 n.
foreign corporations, 1120 n.
the United States courts, 1099-1115 .

alien corporation, 1111-15.
citizenship, for purpose of s-uits, 1099-1106.
residence, for purpose of suits, 1106-1111.
pleading,

1122-30.

See PLEADING.

corporation plaintiff, need not allege

corporate

existence,

1122-3.
must allege corporate existence,

1124-5.

party plaintiff, need not allege defendant is

a

corporation,

1125-6.

should allege defendant is a corporation, 1126-8.
general denial, effect of pleading, 1130-1.
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Continued.
general issue, at law, does not raise question
existence, 1128-9.

POWERS, CORPORATE

of corporate

does raise question of corporate existence, 1129-30.
in equity, does raise question of corporate existence,
1128-9!

proof of corporate existence, 1131-4.
general law, 1132-4.
special charter, 1131.
ultra vires transactions, 1176-1235.
See ULTRA VIRES.
vote shares in itself held by itself, 1372.
held in other corporations, 1064,
unexecuted are not vested rights, 1420.

1778.

POWER OF COURTS,
control of corporations by,
See COURTS

;

CONTROL.

equity, 1291, 1321-32, 1748-50.
appoint receivers, 1748-50.
dissolution, generally no power, 1321-23, 1750.
exception, 1323-6.
injunction, 1326-32.
law, generally, by allowing actions by and against corporations,
methods,

1294-1321.

power to issue the necessary writs, 1295-8.
contempt

proceedings,

1289.

indictment, 1321.
information in nature of
mandamus,

quo warranto,

1295, 1299.

1295, 1308-21.

no specific duty, 1313.
specific duty, 1308-13.
who may complain, 1317-19.
warranto,
1295, 1298-1305.
quo
abuse, misuse, or perversion, 1300-1.
ultra vires holding of land, 1014.

usurpation, 1302-5.
proceedings, 591, 1302-5.
statute of limitations, 1305-6.
waiver, 1306-7.

POWERS OF INCORPORATORS,

391-6.
See INCORPORATORS.

POWERS OF OFFICERS,
See OFFICERS.

directors,

444, 695-702, 843-51.

See DIRECTORS.
general manager, 705 n.
inferior officers, agents and servants, 705 n.

1291.
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POWERS OF OFFICERS
president,

Continued.

703, 705 n, 834.

secretary, 705 n.
treasurer, 705 n.

vice-president,

705 n.

POWERS OF SECRETARY OF STATE,
as to

registering corporate name,

824.

POWERS OF SHAREHOLDERS,
See MEMBERS

;

SHAREHOLDERS.

majority, 695-702, 837, 1066 n, 1454, 1462, 1597,
check ultra vires acts, 702 n, 1220, 1233.
control issue of stock, 702 n.
dissolve corporation, 703 n.
elect directors, 702 n.
hold meetings, 833-47.
increase or decrease stock, 702 n.
make by-laws, 702 n, 1156.

1707, 1775, 1780-7.

pass on amendments 422, 702 n.
prevent sale of all the corporate property, 703 n.
provide for admission of members, 703 n.
remove members or officers, 703 n.

POWERS OF THE STATE,
See CONTROL; LEGISLATIVE POWER ; POLICE POWER;
amend charters, 223, 708, 748, 1293, 1447-75, 1805-8.
create corporations, 258-441.

eminent domain, 1337-43.
forfeiture, 109 n, 155, 258, 322, 1300-5, 1517.
foreign corporations, 1491-1527.
indictment, 1283-7, 1321.
injunction by, 1326-31.
interstate commerce, 1369, 1503-10, 1539.
limits on, 302, 320, 1292-3.
mandamus,

1294, 1308-20.

national corporations, 1476-80.
police power, 1344-66 n.
quo warranto,

receivers,

1293, 1294, 1298-1305,

1544, 1968, 1972 n.

repeal, 399, 708, 1404-6.

retaliatory laws, 1494.
taxation, 756, 1370-1404.
vested rights, 1420-44.

PREFERENCE,
of creditors, 1815-36.
general creditors, 1815.
corporation may, 1815-22.
attachment,

1827.

1517.

TAXATION.

2 I

INDEX.

88
\_Eeferences

PREFERENCE

are to the pages;

n=note.']

Continued.

extraterritorial effect of,
going concern,

1828.

1827.

not after insolvency,

1819.

may not, 1819.
officers as creditors, 1832-6.
may not, 1832.
reasons, 1835.
may, 1836.
trust fund doctrine applied to, 1815, 1819, 1828, 1832, 1835, 1836.

PREFERRED SHARES,
classes of, 771 n.
definition of, 771 n, 789. 1618.
issue of, 785, 788, 790-3, 1475 n, 1559, 1775.

PRELIMINARY SUBSCRIPTIONS,

463, 469, 483, 485, 649 n.

PREROGATIVE WRITS,
power to issue,

1297.

PRESIDENT,
powers of, 200, 703, 704 n, 834, 947, 1135.

PRESCRIPTION,
corporations may exist by, 275-6.

PRESUMPTIONS,
as to acts of

corporations, 854-5.

officers, 855.
agent's authority, 855, 1118.
assent of foreign corporation to service of summons by doing business in a state, 1118.
shareholders, to necessary changes in charter, 1455-7.

authority of president, 704.
of officers, 1758,
compliance with conditions, 520.

compensation

contracts, 924 n.

grant of charter from long user, 669,
notice of meetings, 850 n.
purchases of real property, 1007-8.
quorum,

856.

841, 850 n.

regularity of organization, 563-4.
sufficiency of seal, 1145-6.
tax exemptions,

1371.

PRIMARY FRANCHISE,

See FRANCHISE.
can not be sold, 136, 142, 148, 1070, 1081 n, 1179, 1659.
definition of, 113, 130, 157, et seq.
taxation of, 134-5, 778, 1388, 1479, 1527.
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PRIORITY AMONG CREDITORS,
preference, general,
officers, 2036.

2035.

of action, 2035.
protection of home creditors, 2036-53.
artificial, 2036-50.
natural, 2036-50.
requiring deposits, 2050-3.
labor and material claims, 2053-62.

promptness

PRIVATE CORPORATION,
nature of, 221-4,

234, 239, 553, 582, 625-7, 729, 748

n,

877, 912

PRIVATE STATUTES,
judicial notice of,

1124.

PRIVATE VISITORS, 1332.
PROCEEDINGS IN QUO WARRANTO,

1302.

PROCESS,
against corporations, 49, 227-8, 827, 1120 n.

distringas, 228.
misnomer, 827.
prerogative writs, 1295-8.
service of, 1120 n.

PROFITS,
definition of, 769, 1615-18.
payment of as dividends, 1408,

1615-21,

1847, 1977, 1980-5.

See DIVIDENDS.

taxation of,

PROHIBITION,

1372.

creating corporations by special act,
taking lands by devise, 1023-8.

PROMISSORY

358.

NOTE,

power of corporation to issue, 940-52,

1150.

PROMOTERS,
classes of, self-constituted, 375.

statutory, commissioners,
incorporate rs, 391.

374.

compensation, 384, 1558.
contracts of, liability of corporation, 384, 1551-7.
. promoter, 1548, 1553.

definitions,

374, 380, 1546.

duties of, 374, 381-3, 1646, 1554.
estoppel of, 650.

fiduciary relation to company, 1547-50.
functions of, 374, 1552.
liability to the corporation, 1548.
shareholders, 1548-50.
third parties, 1553.

n.
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PROMOTERS

in England, 380.
United States, 2089-98.
relation to the corporation, 374-9,

n=note.]

procedure

1546, 1767.

each other, 374.

shareholders,

1767.

state, 1767.

third parties, 1767.
right to do business with the corporation, 381-3.

PROOF OF CORPORATE EXISTENCE,
under general laws,

297,406 n, 563, 1131-2.

406 n, 563, 1132.

special acts, 406 n, 563, 1131.

PROPERTY OF CORPORATION,

acquisition of, 928-32, 1007-65.
alienation of, 1065-87.
distinguished from capital stock, 773.
shares of stock, 785 n.
effect of consolidation on, 984-1007.
dissolution on, 891-910 n.
owned by the corporation and not by its members, 58, 68, 69, 70.
protection of, by constitutional provisions, 33, 43, 137, 1460, 1480, 1500-1.
taking by eminent domain, 1337-44.
taxation of, 1374-90.
trust fund, character of, 774-7, 1408, 1618, 1815, 1847-62, 1900-50.

PROSPECTUS,
form of,

PROXY,

540.

directors can not vote by, 851.
shareholders may, 1591-6, 1606-12.
form, 2074, 2100.
voting trust, 1604, 1606, 2100.
revocation of, 1604, 1606.

PUBLIC CHARITY, 1276-9, 1331 n.
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, 223-5, 727-32.
state banks as, 192.
state universities as, 192.

PUBLIC DUTY,
mandamus

will lie

PUBLIC OFFICERS,
as

to enforce,

corporations sole,

PUBLIC POLICY,
definition,

1317-18.

275.

1608.

estoppel, to deny corporate existence, 642-3.
general laws for creating corporations, 289, 292.

proxy voting,

1608-12.

trade combinations, 980, 1072.
ultra vires transactions, 918, 1191, 1215.
voting trusts. 1605-13.
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PUBLIC SERVICE OCCUPATIONS,
enumerated,

1367-9.

PUBLIC USE,
eminent domain exercised for,

1309.

PUBLIC VISITORS, 1387.
PURCHASE OF PROPERTY,
See POWERS, PARTICULAR,

ACQUIRE PERSONAL AND REAL PROPERTY.

PURCHASER,
of shares, 928-32,

1007-65,

1636-7,

1683, 1685, 1726, 1773.

PURCHASER, BONA FIDE,
See BONA FIDE PURCHASER.

PURE OR COMPLETE CORPORATIONS,

214, 217.

PURPOSE OF
capital stock, 776.
charter, 397.
incorporation, necessary to state,
quo icarranto,

visitation,

605, 607 n.

261.

1333.

Q
QUALIFICATION OF OFFICERS,
QUASI-CORPORATIONS,

AND DIRECTORS,

198, 214-20.

private, 221 n.
public, 214-20.

QUASI-PUBLIC CORPORATIONS,
QUORUM,

221-5, 749 n.

839-41, 848-53.

charter, by-law, or statutory provision, 841, 853.
common law rules, 840.
body of definite number, majority, 840.
indefinite number, 840.
directors' meetings, 848-53.
presumptions as to, 841, 850 n.
shareholders' meeting, majority of shares, 841.
one man with proxies, 839.
statutory provisions relating to, 838.
QUO WARRANTO,
control of corporations by, 1293, 1294, 1298-1305,
de facto corporation is subject to, 249, 1302-5.
history, 1295 n.
parties, 259-62, 591, 1302-5.
power to issue the writ, 259-62, 1295-8.
remedy for, abuse, misuse, perversion, 1300-1.
ultra vires holding of land, 1014.
usurpation, 119, 1302-5.
statute of limitations, 1305-6'.

1517.

692, 850.
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R
RAILROADS,
congress may create, 324, 325 n.
effect of repeal of charter upon their property, 1422, 1426, 1435.
exclusion of those engaged in interstate commerce, 1507 n.

extension of, as a material amendment,
judicial notice of charters, 406 n.
powers, condemn lands, 1344 n.
bills of exchange, 948.
bonds, 1070.
pooling contracts,

960, et seq.

purchase stock of other companies,
subject to eminent domain, 1340-44.

police power,

358, 1461, 1462, 1465, 1472.

1063

1311, 1314, 1344, 1347-63,

n.

1366-70,

1475.

suits against may be brought in any county through which they pass,
1111 n.

taxation, 1374-81.

RATES,
regulation of public service occupations,

1352-63,

1368, 1475, 1534.

RATIFICATION,
by corporation, 1209, 1215, 1246, 1272, 1551, 1597.
by state, may create a corporation, 300 n, 1307.

REAL PROPERTY,
acquisition of, 1007, et seq.
estates that may be acquired, 1018-1020.
foreign corporation may acquire, 1516.
franchises, as, 132.
reverter on dissolution, 891,
shares of stock as, 798 n.

893, 903, 904, 911 n.

REASONABLE,
rates, 1356-62.

restraint of trade,

971, 975.

statutes, 1356.

RECEIVERS,
ancillary, 1545.
power to appoint, federal courts, 1542-5,

1972.

state courts, 1525-6, 1748-9.
right to enforce executory contracts, 899.
statutory liability of shareholders, 2000, 2014, 2029.
subscription liability of shareholders, 1968, 1972 n, 1985.
pay labor and material claims in preference to prior liens, 2053.
sue in foreign jurisdictions, 1968, 1972, 2029, 2050.
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RECORDS,
corporate,

inspection of,

1319 n, 1363, 1645-54.

of, 862 n.

necessity

relying upon in paying dividends,

REDUCTION OF CAPITAL STOCK,
REESE, R. A.,
definition of

a

corporation,

1673.

764, 1048

79 n.

REGISTRATION OF TRANSFERS,
on corporate

books, necessity of, 1663-92.

theories in regard to,

1673.

REGULATION,
differs from by-law, 1155.
of transfer of shares, 1159-64.

RELATION OF CORPORATION,
to creditors, 1808-74.
officers, 1259, 1727-SO, 1790-95.
promoters, 374-96, 1546-58.

shareholders,

1559-1727.

state, 1291-1559.

third parties, 914-1291,

1760-66.

RELATION,
of creditors, among themselves,
to corporation, 1808-74.
officers,

2035-63.

1875-99.

promoters,

1553-58.

shareholders,

1899-2035.

state, 1805-8.
of officers, among themselves,

1796.

to corporation, 1259, 1727-60, 1790-95.

creditors, 1875-99.
shareholders, 699, 1707,
third parties, 1796-1804.

1790.

of promoters, among themselves, 1767-70.
to corporation, 374-96, 1546-58, 1767.
creditors, 1553-58.
shareholders, 374-84, 1546-50.
state, 385-96, 1767.

third parties, 1553-58.
of shareholders, among themselves,
to corporation, 1559-1727.
creditors, 1899-2035.
officers,

699, 1707, 1790.

promoters, 374-84, 1546-50.
state, 1770.

third parties,

1790.

1770-90.

n.
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RELATION

Continued.
of state to corporation, 729, 1291-1559.
creditors, 1805-8.
385-96, 1767.

promoters,

shareholders,

1770.

RELEASE OF SHAREHOLDERS, 87, 2034.
RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS, 201, 208, 467,

1061, 1278 n.

REMAINDER-MAN,
right to stock dividends,

1638.

REMEDIES,
See ACTIONS;

CONTROL; COURTS.

corporation, breach of duty by promoters, 1547.
subscription contract, 474.
use of corporate

creditor,

name, 819-20.

1894, 1960-8, 1985, 2012-34.

misnomer, plea in abatement, 827.
right of state to change, 749 n, 1805, 1808.
shareholder, expulsion, 138.
refusal to pay dividends, 1643.
transfer shares, 1651, 1655, 1698.
ultra vires acts, 1220.
state, for abuse, misuse, or non-use of .franchises,

44, 108, 119, 157, 238,

259, 883, 1014, 1300-6, 1308-21.

REMOVAL,
of members,

of officers,

137, 210, 1165, 1169, 1175.

213, 703 n, 1165, 1744, 1746.

RENEWALS,
extensions, and amendments,

need acceptance,

417, 419.

RENTS AND PROFITS,
distinguished from uses,

1022.

REORGANIZATION,
of state bank

as a

national bank,

1529.

REPEAL OF CHARTERS,
effect of, 401, 756, 887, 1426, 1435.

power to, congress,
parliament,

1404-12.
1404.

state legislatures,

1412-46.
no reserved power, 708, 1412-22.
under reserved power, 751, 1422, 1426, 1435, 1444-6.
limits on, 708, 1292-4, 1412-22.

review by courts,

REPORTS,

401, 402.

liability of officer for false, 1892.
state may require, 1363, 1365-6.

REPLEVIN,
shares of stock not subject to,

811

n.
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RESCISSION OF SUBSCRIPTION CONTRACT, 542-4.
RESERVED POWER TO REPEAL OR AMEND, 751,
[References are to the

1004

756,

n,

1407,

1458-61, 1472-3.

1412, 1422-35,

RESIDENCE,
of corporation, 1099-1120.
creditors, state may protect domestic,
officers,

1807, 2036-53.

693.

shareholders, 1402-3,

1591.

RESTRAINT OF TRADE,
contracts in, 100, 109 n, 960-84, 1535.

RESTRICTIONS,
constitutional, 3, 31 n, 32 n, 708, 1292-4,
in statutes of wills, 1026-7.
on transfer of shares, 1158, 1654.

RESPONDEAT

1412-22.

SUPERIOR,

not applied to charitable corporations,

1252, 1275.

RESULTING TRUSTS,
what are,

1854.

RETALIATORY LAWS, 1494-97.
REVERSION OF PROPERTY ON DISSOLUTION

OF CORPORATIONS,

903-6.

REVOCATION,
of license to do business

proxy,

in a state,

1493.

1606.

RIGHTS,
effect of consolidation on, 1005 n.

dissolution,

901, 910, et seq.

.

vested, what are, 230, 1420.

RIGHTS OF
corporation, 914-1236, 1291-1874.
See CORPORATION; POWERS; RELATION.

creditors, 1553-8,

1805-2063.

See CREDITORS ; RELATION.
officers, 1727-95, 1875-99.
See DIRECTORS; OFFICERS; RELATION.
374-96, 1546-58,

promoters,

1767-70.

See PROMOTERS

shareholders,

1546-50,

1559-1727,

See MEMBERS

;

;

RELATION.

1770-90,

SHAREHOLDERS

2035.
;

RELATION.

state, 385-96, 1291-59, 1805.
See CORPORATION ; CONTROL ; CREATION ; LEGISLATIVE
LATION; STATE.

ROLLING STOCK,
execution

against,

taxation of,

1380 n.

1845, 1846.

POWER

;

POWERS

;

RE-
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ROMAN LAW,
definition of corporation,

4, 5, 73 n.

ROYAL CHARTER,
creation of corporation by,

270 n. 708.

s

.

SALARIES,
See COMPENSATION.

SALE,
capital stock and shares, distinction, 774.
distinguished from consolidation, 998.
devise, 1038.

franchise, 148, 1082.
good-will, carries with it the right to use the name, 823-4.
original package of interstate commerce, 1506 n.
property,
See ALIENATION

; POWERS,

creditor's right to complain, 1066 n,
power of majority, 974 n, 1780-6.
shares for non-payment, 1571.
statute of frauds applies to, 799, 801.

CORPORATE.

1809-14.

SAVINGS BANKS,
may invest in stock of other corporations, 1061.

SCHEMES OF CORPORATE ORGANIZATION,
SCIRE FACIAS, 157, 883, 1294-5, 1298.
SCRIP,
definition of,

SEAL,

560-5, 2089-98.

772 n.

*

1246.

938, 1136-53,

effect, 1145-53.
as evidence

of agent's authority, 1144, 1147-8.

consideration,
as to merger,

1148-50.

1141.

as to statute of limitations, 1141.
on negotiable instruments, 1150-3.
must be affixed by one having authority, 1140-3.

necessity, 938, 1136-44, 1246.
common law, 1136-7.

not now generally required except when required of natural person, 1137-8.
deeds frequently are required to be sealed, 1138-41.
signing is now generally required, 1142-4.
but was not at common law, 1144 n.
presumptions from presence, 1145-7.
sufficiency, 1145-6 n.
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143, 147.

See FRANCHISE.

SECRETARY,
powers of, 705 n, 2078, 2082.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
duty to register change of name,

824, 827.

SEIZURE OF SHARES,
in equity,

815.

SEQUESTRATION,

49, 213, 227, 811, 1071, 1135, 1243, 1714.

See EXECUTION

;

LEVY.

SERVANTS,
liability for acts of,

1282 n.

notice to, 1765.
preference

of claims of,

SERVICE OF PROCESS,

2010.
1118, 1120 n, 1121.

See PROCESS

;

SUITS.

SET-OFF,
against statutory

liability of shareholders,

subscription liability of shareholders,

1991 n.
1906 n, 1907.

SHAREHOLDERS,
See MEMBERSHIP

;

POWERS

;

RELATION.

acquisition of membership, 687, 1559, 1654-1703,
who may become, 468, 547-59.
disqualification as judge, juror or witness, 71 n.
liabilities, among themselves, 1770-90.
to corporation, 1559-82, 1705.
creditors, 6, 17, 573, 895, 1563 n, 1847-52,

1919, 1923, 1933.

1899-2034.

officers, 1755-60, 1794.
others, 1726, 1790, 1994.
powers, 695-702, 837, 1066 n, 1454, 1462, 1597, 1707, 1775, 1780-7.
See POWERS OP SHAREHOLDERS.
relations among themselves, 1770.

right to equality in proportion to shares, 1770.
in contribution to corporate enterprise, 1770.
discharging debts, 1771-2.
distribution of assets on dissolution, 1773-5.
profits, 1770.
management, 1770.
to good faith, 1770-90.
in accepting amendments,

1790.

managing corporate business, 1775-80.
selling all the corporate property, 1780-9.
subscription contracts, 1770.
surrendering corporate charter, 1789.
2 WIL. CAS.

65

INDEX.

2IQ8

SHAREHOLDERS

Continued.

relation to corporation, 1559.
rights of corporation, 1559-81.
to accept amendments, 1580.
carry on corporate enterprise by its agents, 1580.
estoppel, 1559.
corporate existence

dissolve itself, 1581.
enforce subscription contracts, 1559-80.
assessments beyond amount subscribed, 1579-80.
assumpsit, for amount subscribed, 1559-67.
forfeiture for non-payment, 1567-73.
make calls, 1569-78.
must be by legal directors, 1576-8.
equal, 1574.

uniform, 1575.
transfers,
1580.
regulate
See TRANSFERS.
reserve a lien upon shares, 1580.

rights of shareholders,
to certificate,

1581-1727.

1581-90.

dividends, 1614-45.
definition, 1614-16.
out of what to be paid, 1616-21.
remedy for not paying, 1643-5.
severance from other funds, 1628-31.
stock, 1622-8.

who entitled to, 1631-43.
life tenant and remainder-man, 1638-43.
transferrer or transferee, 1631-8.
to enjoin change in corporate enterprise, 1705.
completion of ultra vires executory contracts,
inspect books, 1645-1704.
general rule, 1645-51.
foreign corporations, 1651-2.
exception, 1653-4.

1233.

meet, 833-47.
notice of meetings, 835, 837.
participate in issue of new stock, 1703-4.
release from liability, 1705.
by forfeiture of shares for non-payment, 1705.

fraud or mistake in subscription, 1705.
insufficient subscription, 1705.
material change in corporate business,

not assented to,

1705.

transfer,

1705.

share in assets on dissolution, 1706.
sue to protect corporation, in case
1706-27.

it will not or can not,

INDEX.
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at law, general rule, 1706-9.
in equity, general rule, 1709-15.
causes, 1716-24.

good-faith shareholder only,
ultra vires acts, 1064, 1715-16,

1724-7.
1724.

to transfer shares, 1654-1703.
See TRANSFER.
to vote, 851, 1591-1614.
See VOTING.
who are shareholders, 393-4, 468, 547-60, 1581-90, 1900 n.
certificate, subscription, 1581-2.
increase of stock, 1582-4.
collateral holding of shares, 1585-6.
corporate books as evidence, 1586-90,
are not prima facie, 1586-9.
are sprima facie, 1589-90.

relation to creditors, 752-4, 1563,
rights of creditors, 1899-1987.

,

1900 n.

1790, 1899-2035.

See CREDITORS.

arising from imperfect organization, 567, 658, 1899.
common law or equitable liability, 1900-87.
fictitious issue of shares, 1951-60.
payment in overvalued property, 1936-51.
good-will, 1936-43.
valuation, actual fraud rule, 1950-1.
true value rule, 1943-50.

remedy, 196-077.
at law, 1960-1, 1964, 1968.
in equity, 1960-1, 1964.
1962-4.

TJ. S. courts,

conditions precedent, 1960.
extraterritorial effect of judgment,
parties, 1965-8.
receiver in foreign state, 1968-72.
unpaid shares,

1972-77.

1900-1951.

general rule, 1902-6.
basis of, fraud at law, 1917-8.

in equity, 1836,
trust fund, 1832-47,
exceptions,

1852, 1911-17.
1907-11.

1919-36.

gift of shares, 1933-6.
issued for debt, 1919-22.
save a "going concern," 1923-33.
no set-off allowed, 1906 n.
withdrawal of assets, 1977-87.

definition, 1977-9.
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creating insolvency, 1979.
paying dividends when solvent, 1981-5.
after insolvency, 1980-81.
remedy in equity, 1985-7.
statutory liability, 1987-2012.
See STATUTORY LIABILITY.
enforcement of, 2012-34.
general character, 1987-97.

particular kinds of contractual,
relation to officers, 700, 1706-60,

1790-6.

rights of shareholders. 1706-46, 1790.
collective, 1706-46, 1790.
individual, 1790.
rights of officers, 700, 1746-60, 1791-6.
collective, 1746-50, 1791.
individual, 1751-60, 1791-6.
relation to promoters, 374, et seq., 1546-58.
See PROMOTERS.

relation to state, 707, 1475 n, 1770.
to third parties, 1223, 1725, 1790.

SHARES,
classes, 771-3.
common, 771, 785, 790.
debenture, 772.

deferred, 772.
fictitious, 1951, 1952 n,
founders' shares, 772.
guaranteed,

1953.

771.

interest-bearing, 771.
overissued, 773 n.
preferred, 771, 785, 790,
scrip, 772.

793.

special, 772.
spurious,

773.

unpaid, 1907-33.
watered,

773, 1951, 1953.

definition, 771, 774, 775, 779, 784.
distribution by commissioners, 386-7.
forfeiture for non-payment, 1157, 1567.
issued below par, 1773, 1907-33.
for property, 1936, et seq.
overvalued, 1943-53.
to sweeten bonds, 1923.

liens on, 1164 n, 1580.
nature of, 794-815, 1399-1402, 1632, 1708.
personal property, 794-815, 1046.

1997-2012.
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choses in action, 531, 791, 801-4, 1689.
goods, wares and merchandise, 799-801.

non-negotiable, 807-10.
subject to attachment, execution
conversion, 804-7.
seizure

in

transferable,

equity,

or replevin, 810-15,

1673.

815.

6, 1654-1703.

See TRANSFERS.
situs for purpose of attachment,

taxation,
subscription,

811-15, 1672.

1372, 1399-1402.

See SUBSCRIPTION.

transfers, 1654-1703.
See TRANSFERS.

SHERIFF,
not disqualified td serve process on corporation, though he is
holder, 71 n.

a share-

SITUS,
of migratory property for taxation, 1374-81.
of shares, for purposes of attachment, 811-15,
of taxation, 1399-1402.

1673.

SINKING FUND,
state may require corporations to establish,

SLANDER,
liability of corporation for,
SOLE CORPORATION,

1409.

1253, 1255 n.

26, 193-6, 200 n, 272, 889-90.

SPECIAL ACTS,
organizing corporations under, 295-6, 333-49, 358-63,
1131.

SPECIAL CAPACITIES,
theory of,

915, 918 n.

SPECIAL FRANCHISES,
taxation of,

1388.

SPECIAL STOCK,
characteristics of,

772

n.

SPECIAL VISITATION,
defined,

1333.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE,
when decreed,

86 n, 1224, 1699.

SPURIOUS STOCK,
defined,

773 n.

406, 426, 560, 585,
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STATE,

as a corporation, 275-6, 559.
as a

corporator,

275.

powers,

See CONTROL ; COURTS ; LEGISLATIVE POWERS.
to amend charters, 708, 750-1, 1422-72, 1807.
See AMENDMENT.

to complain of ultra vires transactions, 1014, 1030-2, 1197-9, 1233.
to control corporations, 1099-1545.
See CONTROL.

by courts,

1099, 1122, 1236-91, 1294-1326.

See COURTS,

by legislation,

See LEGISLATIVE

by visitation,

Quo WARRANTO, ETC.

1292, 1337, 1446.

POWER

;

POLICE POWER;

TAXATION.

1291, 1332, 1336 n, 1337.

See VISITATION.

to create corporations, 279-373, 984-1006.
See CORPORATIONS, CREATION;

LEGISLATIVE

POWERS.

to discriminate against foreign corporations, 1501.
to dissolve corporations, 286, 708, 866-913, 1298-1307, 1404,
See DISSOLUTION; Quo WARRANTO; LEGISLATIVE POWER.
limits on, constitutional, 302-73, 708, 1404-47.
See CONSTITUTIONS ; LIMITS.
relations to corporations, 1291-1480.
domestic,

foreign,

1294-1476.
1481-1527.

may revoke license to do business,
national, 1476-80.
creditors, 1805-8.

1493.

See CREDITORS.

promoters,

1677.

See PROMOTERS.

shareholders,

1770.

See MEMBERS;

SHAREHOLDERS.

suits by or against as a corporator, 559.

STATE BANKS,
as corporations, 192, 406 n.

STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
construction of, 355.
limits on power to create corporations, 333-73.
amend, modify or repeal, 223, 708, 1292-3, 1404-47.

STATE INSTITUTIONS AS CORPORATIONS,

191-2.

STATE UNIVERSITIES AS CORPORATIONS,
STATUS OF NATIONAL CORPORATIONS,
in the states, 1476.

191-2.

et seq.
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STATUTES,
acquisition of name, 818 n.
construction of, 389, 935 n.
discriminating against non-resident corporations,

1517.

escheats, 1018 n.

forbidding appeals to U. S. courts, 1097-8.
doing business in a state, 1094, 1510-15.
fictitious issue of stock, 1951-1953.
general creating corporations, 287, 294, 296, 333, 434,
making officers liable for false reports, 1892.
shareholders liable for unpaid shares, 1949.
method of changing corporate names, 829.
dissolution, 886.
"persons," usually include corporations, 51, 55-6.
relating to service of process, 1118-20.

561, 1058, 1445.

STATUTES OF FRAUDS,
application to agreements to subscribe,
subscribing, 459.
promoters' contracts, 1552.'

801.

sale of shares, 799.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS,
as

applied to

quo warranto,

sealed and unsealed

1305.

instruments,

subscription liability, 1567-72,
statutory liability, 2013.

1141.

1907, 1972.

trusts, 1731-3.

STATUTES OF MORTMAIN,
STATUTES OF WILLS,
STATUTORY

1015, 1016, 1037.

1023-1029,

1036.

LIABILITY OF OFFICERS,

1888-99.

general nature, 1888-1892.

when contractual, and when penal, 1892-9.
enforced in other states, 1892-9.

STATUTORY

LIABILITY OF SHAREHOLDERS,

contractual,

1987, 1990-2034.

general nature of, 1987, 1990-2.
interpretation, 1992-6.
debts and dues, 1992-6.

particular kinds,

1997-2012.

as to amount, 2003-12.
double, 2003-9.
labor and services, 2010-12.
proportional, 2009-10.

unlimited, 2003.
unpaid stock, 1949.
as to legal character,

t

1997-2003.

1987-2034,

INDEX.
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primary, limited, joint, enforceable in equity, 2000-1.
several, enforceable at law, 2001-3.
unlimited, partnership, 1998-2000.
secondary, limited, and joint, 1997, 2005.
unlimited, several, 1997-8.

enforcement,
assignee, 2005.
at law, 2014.
in equity, 2014.
estoppel of shareholder, 650 n.
generally, 2012-13.
self-executing constitutional provisions, 2014-21.
set-off, 1991.
special remedies,

2012, 2014, 2021.

statute of limitations, 1996, 2013.
waiver of, 86 n.
when enforceable in other states, 1892, 2018-21, 2029-34.
when not enforceable in other states, 2021-9.

who liable,

2003.

who may sue, 1967 n.

penal,

1996.

1987-90,

repeal of, 2014.

STOCK,
See CAPITAL STOCK

;

SHARES.

STOCK-BOOKS,
as evidence

of membership,

1598, 1666, 1900 n.

STOCK CORPORATION, 234, 237, 577.
STOCK DIVIDENDS, 1520, 1622-5.
STOCK EXCHANGES, 178, 1368 n.
STOCKHOLDER,
See SHAREHOLDERS.

STOCK YARDS,
as

public service occupations,

1368 n.

STREETS,
privilege to use,

as a

franchise,

706.

STREET CAR COMPANIES,
power to condemn track of other companies,

1343-4.

STRIKES,
effect upon duties of railroad companies,

SUBSCRIBING
necessity

1313.

ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION,

of, 602.

SUBSCRIPTIONS

TO

CAPITAL STOCK,

442-558, 1583.

See ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS

consideration, 445-56, 517.
forms, 456-547.
agreements subscribing, 474-510.

;

MEMBERS.

INDEX.
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'

to subscribe, 471-4.
with a promoter, 492-602.
application, allotment and notice, 505-10.
agreements

conditional, 511-39.
estoppel,

510, 647-9.

preliminary agreements, 471-510.
statutory contract, 459-71.
underwriting, 502.
effect of fraud or mistake, 539-47, 1562.
secret conditions, 494-6, 759.
necessary to valid organization, 561.
parties, 547-58.
aliens, 552.
corporations, 553-8.
private, 553-4.
public, 554-8.
infants, 547-8.
married women, 549-52.
national government, 558.
state governments, 558.
statute of frauds, does not apply to, 459, 531.

writing not necessary,

459.

SUBSEQUENT CONDITIONS,
subscriptions on,

532.

SUBSEQUENT CREDITORS,

only, can complain of unpaid shares,

1915.

SUCCESSION,
perpetual, idea of,

26, 197, 201, 803, 937.

SUITS,
See ACTIONS

;

CITIZENSHIP

;

COURTS ;

JURISDICTION

;

POWERS,

CORPORATE

PROCESS.

SUMMONS,
See PROCESS.

SURETY,
power of corporation to be,

952-6."

SURPLUS,
definition of, 778, 1624.
disposition of, 1624-7, 1706.

SURRENDER

OF CHARTER,

703, 744, 866-7, 877-9, 886, 1789, 1815.

;

INDEX.
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T
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS,

36, 1370-1404.

bonds, bills, notes, etc., 1402 n, 1528.
capital and capital stock, 772-778, 781 n, 1373.
copyrights, 1385, 1387 n.
corporate elements, 781 n, 1370-73.
double, 1372.
equal protection of laws in, 1392, 1396, 1403.
excise, 1390.

exemption, 749, 992, 1006, 1475.
franchises, 120, 134, 1388 n, 1527.
primary, 120, 1388 n.
property essential to exercise of,
special,

1388 n.

1388 n.

valuation of, 1388 n.
good-will, 135, 1385, 1387.
government agency, 1397, 1479.
gross earnings, 1377, 1384, 1389.
interstate bridge, 1398 n.
interstate commerce, 1393, 1398,
joint-stock companies, 176.

1504.

license, 1392.
messages, telegraph, 1398.

national banks, 1398 n.
national taxation of state corporations,
patents,

1385-87

1404, 1527.

n.

property, intangible, 1381.
migratory, 1381 n.
tangible, 1374-80.
railroads, 1830n.
rolling stock, 1380 n.
sales of articles, 1397.
shares, 1399, 1401 n, 1403.
situs of, 1399, 1401 n.
special franchises, 1388.
1398 n.
valuations of property or franchise,

telegraphs,

vessels, 1381 n, 1389-1398.

TELEGRAPH COMPANIES,
public service companies,
taxation of, 1382, 1505 n.
as

1368 n.

TELEPHONE COMPANIES,
as public service companies,
taxation of, 1382, 1505.

TENANTS IN COMMON,
corporation

as, 1020.

1368 n.

134, 1373, 1388.
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302, 322.

TESTS OF CORPORATE EXISTENCE,

2, 15, 18, 19, 28, 31, 32 n.

legislative intent, 15, 18, 28.
merger of individuals into an artificial person,
powers conferred, 19, 28, 31, 32 n.
especially in foreign jurisdictions, 28.

2.

THEATERS,
as

public service institutions,

1368 n.

THEFT,
effect on ownership of shares, 807-10, 1655-8.

THEORIES,
subscribing to stock in prospective corporation,
alienation of franchises, 148, 1082.
bequests in excess of charter limit, 1232.
conditional subscriptions, after incorporation, 526-7.
before incorporation, 522.
corporate birth, 565, et seq.
corporate capacity, general, 914, 924 n.

as to agreements

474.

special, 915.
corporate consolidations, 1004 n.
corporate existence by estoppel, 630.

corporate residence for purposes of suits, 1110.
failure to comply with statute before doing business in
677, 1513 n.

payments of deposits on subscriptions, 521 n.
registration of transfers, 1663.
relation of directors to corporation, 1727.
subscriptions in escrow, 536.
ultra vires transactions, 1176-91.

THIRD PARTIES,
relation to corporation,
officers,

914-1290.

1796.

promoters, 1767.
shareholders, 249,

1175 n, 1790, 1917.

TITLE OF ACTS,
constitutional requirements

TOLL-ROADS

as to, 363-5, 369.

AND BRIDGES,

power to make free, 1343 n.

TONNAGE,
tax on as a regulation of commerce,

TORTS,
corporate liability for, 47, 1236-82.
assault and battery, 1244-46.
charitable corporations, 1277-9.

1389.

a state, 673,

INDEX.
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TOUTS -Continued.
consolidated company, liability for torts of old companies,
conspiracy, 1262-8.
conversion, 1236-7.
debts, do not include unliquidated damages, 1992.
1262-8.

deceit,

,

1007

exemplary damages, 1279-82.
false imprisonment, 1250-3.
fraud, 1262-8.
fraudulent issue of stock, 763 n.
joinder of corporation and servant, 1249-50.
libel, 1253-6.
malicious prosecution, 1256-62.
modern doctrine of liability, 1239 n.
negligence, 1268-77.
nuisance, 1239-43.
officers liable for, 1799, 1800.
old doctrine, 1246-49 n.

religious corporation, 1278 n.
shareholders, liability for representing stock
slander, 1253, 1255 u.

as

full paid,

1917.

trespass, 1243-4.
ultra vires torts, 1195, 1209, 1232 n, 1268-77,
liability of parties who injure the corporation, estoppel of, 664-7.

TOWNS,

as <7M<m'-corporations,

198.

TRADE COMBINATIONS,
power of corporations to enter,

100, 960-84.

TRADE-MARK,
analogy of corporate

name to, 819-25.

TRAMP CORPORATIONS,
TRANSFER OF SHARES,

1486.
1654-1703,

basis of the right, 1644, 1654.
effect of, on continued liability of seller, 1655, 1692-8.
effect of, as to dividends, 1633-6.

fraud, forgery, etc., 1655, 1661, 1663, 1674-88.
general doctrine as to, 1655-61.
limit, evading liability, 1661-3.
gift, 1688-92.
how accomplished, 810, 1655, 1658-9.
nature of certificate,

1655.

registration, theories as to necessity, 1663-92, 1673 n.
attaching creditors of seller, not necessary, 1663-8.
is necessary,

1668-73.

fraudulent transfer by agent,
pledgee, 1674-80.
trustee, 1682-8.

1680-82.

n.
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liability of corporation for registering,
gifts, 1688-92.
lost certificate, 1663.
theft, 1655, 1661, 1663.
regulation by by-laws, 1157-60, 1580, 1669-71.
remedy for refusal, 1655, 1698-1703.
mandamus,

who is owner,

1655, 1685-88.

1701-3.
1655.

of ownership, 1666-7.

books as evidence

TREASON,
liability for,

corporate

1285.

TREASURER,
functions of,

705

n.

TREASURY STOCK,
definition,

772 n.

TRESPASS,
liability of corporation for,

1243-6.

TRUSTEE,
corporation may be, 1087-8.
definition of, 210.
responsibilities of, 211.

TRUSTEES,

1727-50,

1791, 1878-9.

See DIRECTORS

TRUST-FUND DOCTRINE,

;

OFFICERS

.

760, 774-7, 1618, 1819-35,

1862-6, 1902-1

1847-52,

1,

1943-9, 1960-7.

applications of, fictitious issue of stock, 1953-60.
fraudulent conveyances, 1866.
payment of shares in overvalued property,
preference of creditors, general, 1819-32.

1943-9.

officers, 1832-5.

unpaid prescriptions, 1902-11, 1960 7.
waste of corporate assets, 1862-6.
withdrawal of assets, 1847-52.
conditions precedent to application, 1868-74, 1960-7.
criticisms and limitations on, 1815-19, 1836-40, 1852-62,

1911-17,

TRUSTS,
classes of, 1854.

constructive, what are, 1854.
resulting, what are, 1854.

"TRUSTS,"
trade combinations, 100, 935 n, 957-84, 1535, 1937, 2089-98.

1919-36.

22
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u
1176-1235,

1712-24.

924 n, 1203-35.

in excess of amount allowed by charter, 1232.
valid as to everybody but the state, 1232.
void as to excess, at suit of those next in interest, 1232.
change of name, unauthorized, effect of, 828.
bequests

contracts,

1203-24.

executory, wholly, 1205-10.
corporation complainant, 1205-7.
other party complainant, 1207-10.
executed, wholly, 918, 1203-5.
partly executed, 1211-24.
performed by corporation, 1211-13.
enforceable by it, 1211-2.
contra, 1212-3.

performed by other party, 1214-24.
enforceable by him, 1217-24.
contra, 1214-17.
specific performance, 1224.
holding of lands, 1014-18, 1069.
leases, 1073, 1224-31.

in action for unlawful detention, 1231.
recovery of damages for breach, 1041, 1224.
unpaid rentals, 1073, 1224.
for use of property, 1225.
of possession in equity, 1228-31.
re-entry, 1225-8.
pooling contracts, 966.
torts, 1195, 1209, 1232, 1272 n.
recovery

officers'

liability

for, 1796, 1888.

pleading ultra vires is necessary, 1183 n, 1190.
theories as to the effect of ultra vires transactions, 1176-1203.
definition, 949, 956, 1176-7.
valid as to all except the state, 1197-1200.
if consented to by all shareholders, 1197.
void, because illegal, 918, 1191-7, 1215.
contra, not necessarily so, estoppel theory, 1080, 1183-91.
void, because of incapacity, 1177-83.
ratification, 1181.
who can complain, 1016 n, 1200-3, 1211, 1233-35.
benefited party, estoppel, 1080, 1183-91, 1211.
creditors, 1233, 1888.
parties to the contract,

shareholders,

1233.

703, 1017 n, 1069, 1233, 1715, 1724, 1780-87.

state, 1069, 1200, 1233.

third parties, 1233-5,

1888.
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ULTRA VIRES, DOCTRINE OF
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who liable, corporation, upon an ultra vires holding of stock,
estoppel,

1064.

1080, 1183-91, 1219.

officers, 1888, 1796.

UNDERWRITING,
as a

form of subscribing,

504, 687, 2095.

"UNEXECUTED POWERS,"
are not vested rights, 749 n, 1006 n, 1420.

UNINCORPORATED

ASSOCIATIONS,

distinguished from corporations,

"UNINCORPORATED TRUSTS,"
UNISSUED

187, 675.
100, 977.

STOCK,

not part of the capital stock,

784 n.

UNITED STATES,
corporation, 275-7.
bound by their contracts, 1406.
power to create corporations, 305 n,
as a

as

320.

UNITED STATES BANKS,
taxation of,

1372.

UNITED STATES COURTS,
decisions on corporate combinations, 967, 973 n,
jurisdiction of, not dependent on state statutes,
receivers in, 1542.
remedy of creditors in, 1962.
right of corporations in, 1717-8.
of foreign corporations to sue in, 1490.
of shareholders in, 1717-8.

1535.
1097, 1113, 1490,

UNIVERSITIES,
state, as corporations, 192.

UNLAWFUL COMBINATIONS,

100, 967, 973 n, 1535.

UNPAID SHARES,

as fictitious stock, 1951, 1952 n, 1953.
as a trust fund for creditors, 1900, 1906 n, 1907, 1951, 1970.
liability of transferee of, 1695-7.

USER,
acquisition of name by, 818 n.
what is sufficient user to constitute

de facto existence,

USES,
definition of.

1022.

USURPATION,
as a ground of forfeiture, 119, 157, 259, 1300-3.
of corporate name, injunction is a remedy, 819-20.

672.
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V

VACANCIES,
power to fill,

467, 1746.

VALUATION,
of capital stock, 772, 778, 781 n, 1373.
franchise, 120, 134, 1388 n, 1527.
good-will, 1938.
property issued for shares, 1943-1951 n.
telegraph and telephone property, 1378-1381,

1388.

VENUE,
suits in United States courts, 1106-9.
See ACTIONS ; COURTS ; POWERS TO SUE AND BE SUED.

VERDICT,

misnomer aided by,

825.

VESSELS,
taxation of,

1381 n.

VESTED RIGHTS,
what are,

230, 231, 791, 1006

VICE-PRESIDENT,
functions of,

705

n,

1174 n, 1420, 1422, 1426, 1435, 1444.

n.

VISITATION OF CORPORATIONS,
VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION,
effect of, 899, 910 n.

VOTING,

206-8, 729 ; 1291-2, 1333-7, 1517-9.

See DISSOLUTION.

1591-1613.

holder, 1677.
corporation owning its own shares can not, 1601-2.
stock in other corporations, 1064.
cumulative, 1603-4.
certificate

estoppel by, 650 n.
executors, 1600-1.
number, 1591-96 n.
outside of the state, 851.
personal interest of shareholder, 1596-8.
pledgor and pledgee, 1598-9.
proxy, 1591-96 n, 1608-10.
directors can not vote by, 851.
form, 2074.

irrevocable,
residence,

1596 n.

1591.

rescinding vote declaring dividends,
right, 1591-6, 1677.
trusts, 1604-13.

form, 2100.
lawful, 1606-13.
New York's law,
unlawful, 1604-6.

1613.

1629.

INDEX.
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WAIVER,

of cause of forfeiture by the state, 1306-7.
conditions of subscriptions, oil.
estoppel, 392.

misnomer, 827, 1134.
notice of meetings, 1115, 2074.
provisions as to quorum, notice, etc.,
WALKER, T.,
definition of corporations, 78 n.

838.

WAREHOUSES,
public service institutions,

as

1368 n.

WARRANTY,

false, liability of officer for, 1796.
WASHINGTON, MR. JUSTICE,

definition of corporation.

78 n.

WASTE,
right of creditors to enjoin,

WATER COMPANIES,
as

public service occupations,
773 n,

"WATERED STOCK,"
WHARVES,
as

public service institutions,

1708, 1862, 1863.
1368 n.
1907, 1911, 1919, 1923, 1933, 1951, 1953.
1369 n.

"WILLFUL OR NEGLIGENT NON-USER,"
what is,

1301.

WINDING UP,

See DISSOLUTION.

WITHDRAWAL,
of assets,

1847, 1977-85.
offer of a charter, 412.

subscriptions before acceptance, 478-80.

WITNESS,
member disqualified to be, in suit of corporation,

71

n.

WOODDESON, PROF.,
definition of corporation,

WRIT,

See MANDAMUS

4.

; PROCESS

;

Quo WARRANTO

distringas, 228.
of right, 199.
prerogative, power of courts to issue,

;

SCIRE FACIAS.

1295-8.

WRITTEN ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT,
necessity of, 597-9.

WRONGS,

See TORTS.
done to corporation, shareholders' right to sue, 1706, 1723.

Y
YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION,
liability for torts,
2 WIL. CAS.

1279 n.
66
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